LAND RUSH

Basic Data

LAND RUSH is a game that simulates real-life dynamics taking place in the land arena such as changing agrarian policies, institutional plurality and the effect of unequal power relations in negotiating land rights. It is a board game that allows participants to critically assess the ways in which different social classes face both opportunities and constraints in securing their livelihoods through the negotiation over land rights in an extremely competitive environment. Each participant represents a farmer of a particular social class (rich, middle class, poor) who enters a competitive land arena. He/she engages in a scramble to acquire as much space as possible and to manage the gained land in a sustainable way. On acquired land, participants cultivate one of three crops (cassava, tomatoes, or palm) that generate an income after each full season. However, the exploitation of land also has a cost (also payable after each full season). Moreover, participants are confronted with reshuffling land rights, and with ‘events’ that profoundly alter their stakes in the land arena. The participants will enter in interaction with each other to negotiate their rights to land. Each game will therefore have a different and unique dynamic. Furthermore, the importance of negotiation in the game context echoes the importance of mediation in the land arena. Land access schemes and land rights are not determined in a mechanical way. They do not take place in a political vacuum, but are rather negotiated in a context of institutional plurality and unequal power relations of the different actors. This explicit focus on power relations and the possibility to politically negotiate certain rules differentiates LAND RUSH from other simulation games that treat the land question in developing countries. ¹

The LAND RUSH game has both factual and socio-emotional learning objectives (Hromek & Roffey, 2009). Among the factual goals is the striving to improve participants’ knowledge about dynamics taking place in the land arena in developing countries and to enhance their understanding of the working of inequality and unequal power relations during negotiation processes to access natural resources. The socio-emotional learning objectives include the experience of “how institutional rules of the game and power relations influence agency of different socioeconomic groups and how this can induce poverty and inequality” (Ansoms & Geenen, 2012, pp. 853-854).

The target audience consists primarily of persons interested in development studies, agrarian change, land dynamics, environment, poverty and inequality.

In this article we first briefly sketch the different components of the land arena in developing countries that inspired us to develop the game rules. Subsequently we will go through the course of the game by explaining the participant’s guide and the facilitator’s guide. Third, we will pay due attention to the debriefing process, a crucial phase of this game. The combination of the facilitator’s guide, the participant’s guide and some suggestions for debriefing is a ready to use package for interested participants. Before concluding, we will link the game dynamics to actual land dynamics in developing countries.

Introduction: Dynamics in the Land Arena

Over the last couple of years - in a context of intensifying globalisation and liberalisation - developing countries (particularly those in Sub-Sahara Africa) have increasingly been confronted with the commercialisation of their space. Various so-called large-scale actors - international consortia, ‘investor’ states, and private entrepreneurs - seek to acquire large plots of land for production of food crops or bio fuels, for the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources, for urban expansion, etc. However, also at the local level, competition for land has risen due to heightening demographic pressure in increasingly land-scarce environments. A growing group of scholars critically evaluates the position of these large-scale actors and questions their capacity to manage the land and its production in a sustainable way. This debate is then often linked to very contemporary debates on climate change; food security and sustainable food production; and environmental sustainability (see for example De Schutter, 2011; Patel, 2010; Van Der Ploeg, 2010; Weis, 2007).

In this introduction we highlight three characteristics of contemporary land dynamics in this altering world. First, we contrast the logics of smallholder farmers with those of current agrarian policies of most international and national policy makers. Second, we frame how the rules of the game in the land arena are not uniformly defined, but are characterized by a reality of legal pluralism. Third, we discuss how access to or exclusion from land is the result of a negotiation process in which actors with unequal power relations interact and compete with each other. Better-off actors have a comparative advantage in negotiations over land rights. However, poorer actors still exert agency, although in constrained ways.

Facilitator’s Guide

The simulation pictures a situation in which farmers of various socio-economic classes (rich, better-off, poor) have to acquire and cultivate land. The learning objective of the game is to improve participants’ understanding of the diverse opportunities and constraints that various social classes in society face in their negotiation over land rights.

The simulation can be played with groups of various sizes. The game is ideally played with 4 participants (one rich, one middle class, and two poor), although it can be played with 3 participants (one rich, one middle class, one poor) as well. An additional fifth participant may take up the role of banker. The facilitator should know the exact group size in advance, in order to efficiently subdivide the whole group into small groups of 3, 4 or 5 persons.

The following table lists the materials that are needed to play the game. The annex gives an example of each of the elements. These were developed by Okke Bogaerts (independent designer) and Julie Servais (www.afd.be). They may be downloaded free of charge on www.land-rush.org.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 1.

Numeration of Materials Needed.

Materials	Number	Indicative size
Playing board	4 pages with 6 times 6 rectangles and zone in top right corner for event card	A4 or A3 pages
Participant cards	100 small cards with particular symbol per participant	Cards of same size as rectangles on playing board
Crop cards	100 small cards with cassava, tomato, and palm crop image	Cards smaller than participant cards (alternatively, buttons of 3 kinds can be used)
Upgrade cards	30 cards of hoe, truck and factory	Cards that can stand on the playing board
Event cards	1 card with symbol of market, mine, private investor, cooperative, disease, flooding	Cards with the same size as zone provided on playing board for event card
Money	60 notes of 1$, 5$, 10$ and 50$	-
Table with costs and returns	One table per participant according to format in annex below	-
2 normal dice

The facilitator first explains the way in which the game is played (see participants’ guide). A short overview of the rules of the game, printable on one page, is provided on www.land-rush.org. The game is played in seasons. In first instance, each of the participants:

After each participant has had his/her turn, all participants:

After a full season, a next season starts. After the fifth season, the event cards in the middle of the playing board are turned around. The event taking place in each zone of the playing board will have a profound impact upon the stakes of owning land there in the next seasons (see table in annex). The ultimate goal for all participants is to acquire as much money and land as possible. This will be significantly more difficult for poorer and middle class participants. The winner is the participant with most money and land after 10 seasons.

Debriefing

The debriefing is arguably the most important stage of simulation games (Steinwachs, 1992). During this phase, students are encouraged “to reflect on their experiences during the simulation and consider their observations of others, but to frame their answer as an analysis of social processes and structures rather than a description of personal experiences” (Inglis et al., 2004, p. 481). The purpose of this exercise is to extract participants from the abstract game environment and to encourage them to translate their simulation experiences towards the complex reality and real life dynamics in the land arena. For the LAND RUSH game we propose an individually written debriefing, followed by a collective oral debriefing.

Written debriefings allow participants “to see new meanings in the activities and connect them to one’s life and the broader world” (Petranek, 2000, p. 109). The private communication setting in which a written debriefing takes place will encourage students to reflect on behaviours, emotions, but also on linkages with the literature and dynamics in the real world in a personal way. Furthermore, in an academic context, a written debriefing gives a more formal feeling to the debriefing and certain parts of the debriefing (especially the analytical part on linkages with the course material and real world situations) might be used as a certificative evaluation tool. We propose a written question-based debriefing in three stages (events-analysis-reflection) in which participants are invited to write an individual reflection, elaborating on the relationship between game dynamics and land dynamics taking place in the real world. Possible questions might include:

After the facilitator has read (and evaluated) these individual reflections, he/she organizes a collective oral debriefing. In this collective debriefing phase, participants exchange ideas on how the simulation experience enhanced their understandings of land dynamics in developing countries. In an academic context, facilitators can use this oral debriefing to explicitly link the game dynamics to the course material. Here are some potential topics for discussion in the final debriefing:

Links Between Game and Real Land Dynamics

In our introduction we highlighted three characteristics of land dynamics. First, we stated that smallholder farmers are risk averse, and therefore have to take agronomic decisions that are based upon risk diversification, potentially at the expense of maximal profit. Agrarian policies, however, are often oriented towards maximal productivity and towards commercialisation, and therefore favor farmers operating at a larger scale. Second, the land arena is characterized by a plurality of norms. Formal rules and informal norms may potentially reinforce, but also conflict with, each other. Moreover, the normative framework is dynamic and may shift throughout time. This brings us to the third point, namely that access to or exclusion from land is the result of a negotiation process in which various actors interact and compete with each other. Although all actors have agency, those who are better-off and well connected have a comparative advantage in turning the rules of the game to their favor. These three dimensions are also reflected in the LAND RUSH dynamics. We will try to illustrate this with students’ reflection from the debriefing memo’s of students in development studies (master level, 2012 and 2013, Louvain-la-Neuve, over 50 participants)

With respect to the first point, risks faced by farmers are reflected in variety of ways in the game dynamics. A first risk is embedded in the costs that are due at the end of the season. After each participant has had his/her turn, the dice decide on the profits made for each crop type (returns minus costs). Costs and returns vary for each crop type. Farmers may opt for a more risk-averse crop, like cassava (lower return, but lower cost); for crops with moderate risk like tomato (medium return, and medium cost); or for crops with high risk like palm (high return, but also high cost). At the same time, costs due vary per season (dependent upon the roll of the dice), reflecting the real-life situation in which farmers do not know in advance whether and how much their investment will pay off. Better-off farmers are generally better equipped to go for more risky options that result on average in higher returns. Poorer farmers, however, are constrained in their choices and have to adopt a risk-averse behavior.

Another risk is embedded in the location (zone on the playing board) farmers choose for planting their crop. When farmers concentrate their property on one of four zones, they have a higher chance to earn upgrades (hoe, truck, factory). These upgrades result in increased earnings; and represent a situation in which agrarian policies favor larger-scale operations. After five seasons, however, each of the four zones is confronted with a particular event. This event may increase (market, mine, cooperative) or decrease (private investor, disease, flooding) the value of the land for the participants. Farmers therefore may choose to diversify their risk by opting for land property in more than one zone, to avoid that a negative event ruins them. The necessity for poor participants to diversify their risk is apparent from the beginning of the game; “in a situation where the small-scale farmers can just survive, their priority is not to maximize their benefits, but rather to secure their livelihoods by minimizing the risks. This is also the only solution in order to avoid bankruptcy during the game” (memo by student participant, 2013). Better-off farmers on the other hand, have more means to acquire property in different zones and still earn upgrades through land consolidation.

A second observation mentioned in the introduction, is that the land arena is characterized by a plurality of norms. LAND RUSH contains formal rules (the official rules of the game); but throughout the game, also informal norms appear (based upon the negotiation process and the game dynamics). Informal norms may even start to contradict formal rules, unintentionally - when participants forget particular formal norms - or deliberately - when a consensus between participants emerges, or when a particular participant manages to manipulate the rules to his/her favor. Both dynamics were observed by the game facilitators during the game experience in 2012 and 2013 with students in development studies. Some students reflected upon this in their memos; however, for most students this aspect became clear during the debriefing phase.

Another way in which legal pluralism is embedded in the game dynamics, is through the reshuffling of land rights after each season. A roll of the dice determines which category of participants can grab or reshuffle land rights. This phase in the game illustrates the fact that land rights are never fixed and uniformly defined. They are dynamic and may shift continuously. This flexibility leaves room for negotiation (for example, participants may engage in mutual agreements to not sabotage each other; poorer participants may beg not to touch upon their land rights). However, those who are better-off and/or better connected have a comparative advantage in such negotiations. This aspect was very vividly discussed in many of the student’s memos.

This directly leads us to the third point, namely that land rights result from a negotiation process that is characterized by unequal power relations. These unequal power relations are embedded in the game right from the start, given the huge differences in starting capital, and the fact that the rich participant can always roll two dice instead of one which allows him/her to buy more property. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the game dynamics result in a negotiation process over informal norms. This negotiation process depends upon the context, the personal character of each of the participants, the power dynamics between the participants, and the institutional framework already in place.

During the debriefing phase, different students reflected upon these informal negotiation processes that took place during the game. Some negotiations resulted in an improvement of the status of the poor; “the two poor participants put all their assets together and created an alliance. One poor participant even tried to form an alliance with all the poor participants in the room [involved in other LAND RUSH games] which would have allowed them to gain a certain power and to change things” (memo by student participant, 2013). However, other negotiations resulted in exclusive arrangements that had an adverse impact on poor participants’ well-being. One participant testified that “only the rich participants were able to change the rules to their advantage whereas the poor did not have the strategies to change since they felt weak and incapable of taking decisions or to organize themselves differently” (memo by student participant, 2012). Finally, some negotiated arrangements resulted in the creation of economic interdependencies, making poorer participants dependent on the benevolence of better-off participants to survive in the game. In one game, the rich participant hired another participant to manage his assets “just because I did not feel like calculating my own revenues and expenditures and because my money is very important to me” (memo by student participant, 2013).

This diversity of situations somehow illustrates the importance of being connected to a network and the different ways in which power can be exercised. Each participant exerts agency (is capable of taking position, of acting and reacting to others). However, better-off participants are relatively better equipped to bend the rules to their favor. This is illustrated in the following quote: “after three seasons, the poor participants tried to protest by creating a new rule called ‘food riot’. However, this rule was quickly abandoned since the rich participant did not agree. The discussion did not even take very long. The poor participant quickly accepted the categorical refusal of the rich participant” (memo student participant, 2013).

To place these land dynamics in a broader and dynamic context, we introduced events that symbolize wider societal changes currently taking place with a major impact upon agrarian dynamics and land relations. The introduction of the market symbolizes the way in which rural policies push farmers from subsistence production towards commercially oriented production. On the one hand, an increased embedding of the agrarian sector in the global market introduces certain opportunities (potentially higher returns in this zone). On the other hand, market-oriented farming is accompanied by an increased risk (represented by the higher costs in this zone) that disfavors poorer groups (as they may not have the financial reserves to cope with these costs). Moreover, poorer farmers may lack capital to invest in plots in this zone, and they risk to be pushed off the land in this profitable area by better-off participants.

The introduction of a mine represents a situation in which new types of land use (f.e. mining, but also urban expansion, industrial expansion, tourism, etc.) enter into competition with food production. The presence of a mine in a particular zone changes the stakes of participants in ways that are very similar to the introduction of a market. The presence of non-renewable resources suddenly increases the commercial value of the land. In this zone, participants transform from farmers into small-scale miners. However, again, this new opportunity (higher profits) comes with the increased risk of higher costs. Poorer participants are relatively disadvantaged to invest in plots in this zone, and may be pushed off the land whereas other participants have the opportunity to invest (during land reshuffling, or when poorer participants are obliged to sell part of their property to avoid bankruptcy).

The introduction of a cooperative represents a situation in which collective action may improve the relative bargaining position of poorer farmers, which may positively impact upon their livelihoods. Indeed, the presence of a cooperative allows poorer participants to group their land, and profit from potential upgrades. On the one hand, they have to agree upon how they divide the returns. This is not always straightforward, given that one poor participant may bring more property in the cooperative than the other poor participant. On the other hand, a positive experience of collective action in one zone may inspire poorer participants to collaborate and support each other in other ways. This may improve their relative bargaining position in comparison to other participants, and may impact upon the broader game dynamics.

The introduction of a private investor symbolizes the current trend of large-scale land acquisitions (framed by some as ‘land grabbing’) taking place in many developing countries. Investors may be foreign or local. In fact, many of the large-scale land acquisitions that currently take place are carried out by local investors (Deininger, 2011). These investors may be interested in the productive potential of the land for food production or for biofuels. Or they may be interested in the commercial value of the land, becoming an increasingly scarce and valuable resource, and therefore a viable alternative to other types of investments on volatile capital markets. A recent World Bank Report (2010a) highlights the potential benefits of the injection of private capital in the agricultural sector (f.e. through improved access to technology, facilitated access to capital markets, improved infrastructures, promotion of institutions that allow increased productivity and effectiveness in the utilization of land). It frames that potential risks may be countered through the promotion of responsible corporative behaviour (on the side of the investors) and the enhancement of good land management (on the side of the recipient country). In reality, however, the extreme power disequilibrium between large-scale investors and local smallholders often results in a perverse impact upon local livelihoods (Borras & Franco, 2010). In the game, this clearly shows. Whereas farmers with palm tree plots (often the better-off farmers as these are more expensive) can insert their land into the plantation while keeping their property rights; farmers with cassava and tomato plots loose their property rights. They become wage labourers employed by the private investor and earn meagre salaries.

The introduction of a disease in a particular zone represents a situation in which farmers are confronted with a sudden event that may ruin their harvest. In this case, farmers who invested in tomato or palm trees are disadvantaged, given that returns are limited (they become comparable to the returns of cassava) and upgrades are no longer possible. The threat of this event has a profound impact upon participants’ strategies in the first five seasons of the game. Indeed, participants will generally tend to buy plots in different zones, to avoid that they loose most of their investment when the event cards are turned. After this event has occurred, the land in the ‘disease’ zone represents a situation in which land has become degraded. On this land of poor quality, only the cultivation of cassava results in some output. Interestingly, the increased commercial value of land in other zones (market, mine) may push poorer farmers to invest in this degraded land.

The introduction of a flooding symbolizes the way in which climatic problems in the real world may have a profound and potentially devastating impact upon overall harvest. Again, the threat of this event makes that participants diversify their risk by acquiring property in different zones in the first phases of the game. Seasonal variations have always been part of the agricultural production cycle. However, climate change has strongly increased the unpredictability of such variations (World Bank, 2010b). Particularly poorer farmers are heavily affected by harvest failure, given that they often lack the necessary reserve and cannot depend upon a safety net to overcome times of extreme distress. In the game, this is reflected by the fact that poorer participants, if they invested a lot in plots in this zone, will face potential bankruptcy. Better-off participants generally have sufficient reserves to overcome this setback.

Conclusion

The experience of playing this board game simultaneously in several small groups has resulted in widely diverse outcomes. In some games, the poor were bluntly exploited and went bankrupt. In other games, they negotiated efficiently, and pushed the rich or middle class into the role of benefactor, allowing the poor to survive and even thrive. In still other games, poor participants understood the potential of collective action and played together as one participant. This allowed them to acquire much more land, upgrades, and to efficiently face risks. Game dynamics were also influenced by the events taking place. Somehow, these diverse game outcomes illustrate that each context is different.

However, it is impossible to take the full complexity and variation of real-life situations into account in a simulation game design. The game for example adopts a very instrumental definition of land (focusing on its productive value) and barely considers the psycho-social importance of land for smallholder farmers. Moreover, the game adopts a model of individual accumulation (of both land and capital) as the basis for increased well-being. The limitations of this model may constrain participants to think of ‘out-of-the-box’ solutions for developmental and environmental problems. It is important to highlight this in the debriefing. Another implicit assumption of the game is that the wider societal changes (‘events’) are externally defined and imposed upon the local setting. In reality, a lot of these changes are the result of the interaction between global, regional, and local dynamics. Furthermore, the impact of these societal changes upon local agrarian dynamics and land relations is presented in the game as a black- or white picture. The presence of the foreign investor is ‘bad’ (except for those owning palm trees); the introduction of a cooperative is ‘good’ for the poor as long as they manage to distribute their income from this zone. Reality, however, is never black or white, but has different shades of grey.

Nonetheless, the game does allow us to conclude that negotiations in the land arena do not take place in a political vacuum, but rather in a context of legal pluralism. At the same time, the institutional confusion (with interacting, competing and potentially contradictory formal and informal norms) often plays to the advantage of the elite. They are better informed, better connected, and financially better equipped in the occurring land negotiations. However, this does not mean that poorer participants are passive victims. They do exert agency, but are constrained in their options. A truly pro-poor policy framework should therefore concentrate on removing those constraints, instead of focusing upon maximal production and productivity.