Simulating a Climate Engineering Crisis

Introduction

Spraying particles into the atmosphere to block sunlight or fertilizing the oceans so that they sequester more carbon dioxide are proposed methods of climate engineering (CE), also referred to as geoengineering. So far, these emerging technologies, which aim towards large scale manipulation of the planetary environment to slow down global warming (The Royal Society, 2009, p. 1), have rarely been part of a student simulation or serious game. Thus, we present the first simulation of a climate engineering scenario conducted with the participation of university students. This article includes the scenario, simulation process, and debriefing of the three simulation we ran.

Climate engineering has emerged as a disputed socio-technical response to climate change but is rarely employed in games or mentioned in game studies. Several games, simulations, and studies deal with conventional climate policy scenarios, notably the “Symposium: Climate change and simulation/gaming,” ¹ which was published in Simulation & Gaming. One of the few game theory articles reporting the use of intentional climate manipulation is “Strategic incentives for climate geoengineering coalitions to exclude broad participation,” by Ricke, Moreno-Cruz, and Caldeira (2013). Rick et al., chose the rational choice theory as the approach for a computer simulation of possible strategic actions by nation states. However, their approach lacks elements that are important for international negotiations, such as personal relationships between the negotiators, or traditional alliances. In contrast to this study, a pupil’s game, which was conducted in the school program of a German research project, offered different climate political pathways for the players. ² The only video game on this subject that we know of is a browser game for cloud whitening, which is offered by the British Museum of Science. ³ There are two advantages to using a student’s simulation based on the rules of Model United Nations (MUN): On the one hand, it includes human error in simulating climate policy (which is a disadvantage of rational choice approaches), while on the other hand, it provides a comprehensive serious gaming experience (which is often missing in casual video games).

While Political Science courses in Germany traditionally consist of lectures and text readings, it is also valuable to include role-playing exercises to promote different views on a topic. Kauneckis and Auer closely reviewed the trade-offs for student simulation as high time consumption vs. engaged learning and entertaining experiences (Kauneckis & Auer, 2013). For this article, the debate on theoretical vs. experimental knowledge (Garris, Ahlers, & Driskell, 2002) is less important than the type of teaching scenario and the reflections on international CE governance. Our scenario was designed, conducted and evaluated in the context of Political Science seminars, for both educational reasons, and our interest in the outcomes of the climate engineering scenario. ⁴

With their article on student role-play of international climate negotiation, Kauneckis and Auer (2013) provided a detailed and comprehensive learning example. However, while the authors set out to compare student decision-making with the empirical world, our project dealt with politics of the future, as CE is not yet deployed. Many governments may articulate their attitude towards climate change but they hitherto lack a political position on CE itself. Thus, the students had to anticipate or assume a possible position for their delegations’ country, without knowing what CE politics would look like.

Ever since the 1950s, scientists have been sporadically working on the technological foundations of planetary sunblock and although high presidential and military circles have been involved since the beginning, an open debate has been promoted (Harnisch, Uther, & Böttcher, 2015). Nevertheless, intentional large scale manipulation of the climate system has been discussed as a risky but possibly necessary option for the past decades, while the failure of nations to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions has fueled interest in climate engineering technologies. (For a historical overview see Fleming, 2010; for future scenarios see Böttcher, Gabriel, & Harnisch, 2015) Consequently, our near-future scenario assumes that state administrations will find themselves confronted with a climate catastrophe that forces them to take action in these ways:

“China prepares an atmospheric experiment and aims to shield the earth from sunlight. Using military aircraft, China plans to spread particles in the upper atmosphere, which should reflect some incoming sunlight and cool down the earth. According to French intelligence service information, Chinese scientists and military forces are preparing such a project. France summoned a meeting of the UN Security Council, as it fears an incalculable risk for the global climate.” (The New York Guardian, 14.10.2022 – Fictional future newspaper article for mission briefing, see Annex)

What if the Chinese government were preparing a military aircraft to spray sun-blocking particles into the sky? On the one hand, this action could lead to a cooler climate by shading the earth from incoming solar radiation. On the other hand, it could evoke international tensions in reaction to this massive environmental manipulation, while China could declare that it is acting in self-defense against climate change (for example against floods or droughts thought to be induced by climate change). Since atmospheric manipulation to cool the earth on a unilateral or small coalition basis would presumably strongly affect the international system, this example lends itself as an ideal crisis scenario. However, such scenarios are not merely science fiction but part of an ongoing scientific discussion. Even when some newspaper articles, scientific papers and fictional texts rate China’s CE usage as possible (Dyer, 2010, pp. 259-262; Edney & Symons, 2013; Hamilton, 2013; Humphreys, 2011, p. 106; Lane, 2010, p. 109; Victor, 2008), sinologists argue against this thesis (Singer, Milligan, & Rethinaraj, 2014; Walker & Boyd, 2013). While the setting for this simulation would be suitable, future simulations should test possible outcomes if the USA were chosen as a CE proponent because of their technological advancement. At this point, one could argue that a scenario in which the USA or an US-led coalition of the willing were chosen as a CE supporter would be more realistic. However, it is not in their interest that another superpower oversees CE research and development. China was selected for the simulation described in this article because an interesting dynamic between the players was expected.

The purpose of this article is to present a best practice example of using a student simulation with MUN, as well as to provide insight into the question as to how to address future international conflicts that could result from CE. What is interesting in simulations is not always how realistic the outcomes are but also which dynamics a certain topic creates. For instance, the dynamics of CE include the amount of risk posed by using or not using various technologies, and the debate about when and how to use them. In this article, we explain the scenario, present our simulation method with the Model United Nations, and describe how the simulation process developed each time. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of the dynamics created by CE.

What Is Climate Engineering (CE)?

This section provides a condensed introduction to climate engineering science and policy. Climate engineering is usually defined as the “deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change” (The Royal Society, 2009, p. 1). For clarification, David Keith – one of the leading CE scholars – differentiates three core attributes (Keith, 2000, p. 247f):

The environmental intervention must be large-scale; hence, local weather modification does not count as CE.

This definition includes a large variety of climate technologies that can be distinguished by their area of deployment (land, sea, atmosphere), time scale (working within a year, or decades), risk profile (high risk and low risk technologies), effectiveness and efficiency (reverse the effect of anthropogenic CO₂ for a few per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) or be much more expensive), among other things. Each technological deployment scenario has an individual profile, socio-political requirements and risks, which makes a general review difficult. The Kiel Earth Institute – commissioned by the German Ministry for Education and Research – attempted to provide a comprehensive review of these technologies in their 2011 report (Rickels et al., 2011), concluding that not a single CE technology is at once feasible, effective, and low risk (Rickels et al., 2011). The employment of many technologies is highly uncertain and risky.

To reduce the complexity of the issue for our own simulation, we focused on one technology: stratospheric solar radiation management (SSRM, or ‘reflective aerosols’, see Figure 1). The main idea is that sulfur particles (or other aerosols) are delivered to the stratosphere via modified aircrafts to block a small percentage of the incoming sunlight. Observations of volcanic eruptions have revealed the ability of sulfur particles to dim sunlight. Following more than a decade of climate modeling studies, results indicate both the cooling potential and the serious risks associated with SSRM. Such risks include increased acid rain, altered precipitation patterns (chance of monsoon failure), and ozone depletion. Such possible harms could impact people from certain regions more severely than others, potentially increasing the threat of international conflicts (Robock, 2008, pp. 14-18). Based on literature about the risks, uncertainties, and possible global and local harms (e.g. Ricke, Morgan, & Allen, 2010; Crutzen 2006), it was easy to design a conflict scenario.

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Figure 1.

Climate engineering options.

A Simulation With Model United Nations (MUN)

Model United Nations (MUN) is more than a role-playing game because it simulates a whole deliberative body such as the United Nations General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, or, in our case, the Security Council (see also Hazleton & Mahurin, 1986; Muldoon, 1995). The largest of all MUN Conferences is held in New York (NMUN). Its prominence increased in 2011 with plenary sessions being held in the United Nations Headquarters, accompanied by an introductory speech by Ban Ki-moon. ⁵

MUN provides a framework and rule set for a group of university students to simulate an international proceeding, and the rules of procedure are very like those used by the United Nations. In the real world, voting mechanisms are often crucial (Strand & Rapkin, 2012), but our simulation used a reduced rule set to enhance freedom to act. The students only had to learn basic rules about moderated/unmoderated caucuses and voting (see Appendix B).

In our seminar, we used a conference room, and adhered to formal speech (for example: “The delegation of India addresses the delegation of the USA”) and formal attire (at least business casual). For classes like ours undertaking smaller simulations, it helps to attend larger simulations to develop an understanding of the concept. Luckily, in two out of three cases we and our students had the opportunity to visit the BIMUN in Bonn, ⁶ a professional MUN simulation, a few weeks before our own simulation started. This experience had a notable effect on the students, giving them a better understanding of the concept of MUN simulations. The second simulation run took place during a summer term with no opportunity to visit the BIMUN. As a substitute, we had another source of input: two of the course members who went to the NMUN in New York the year before held an informative presentation about their experience.

In general, simulations and games can be “particularly useful to analyze and teach alternative and complementary views on climate change” (Eisenack & Reckien, 2013, p. 246). From the large variety of climate change games (Reckien & Eisenack, 2013), we chose MUN to generate and emphasize student interaction, and because it gives students the possibility to experience what formal international cooperation could look like (Crossley-Frolick, 2010, p. 188). In general, simulations are understood as artificial replications of the real world. In coherence with social simulation literature, in this article the term simulation is used

“[…] in the manner common to political science and policy studies as an imitation of the real-world policy process, intended to represent the behaviors of nation-states in the international system, and designed to illustrate important outcomes and interactions. In this case, real-world data are provided and students are expected to realistically represent their designated countries in negotiations.” (Kauneckis & Auer, 2013, p. 2)

The hypothetical, yet realistic scenario is the framework for these negotiations. By presenting participants with a problem that must be solved, the scenario provides a starting point, goals, motivations and limitations for the simulation. Teachers and scholars have indicated that in many cases students learn more from this experiential method than from more traditional teaching methods. Hofstede et al. list four major strengths of simulation games:

“They [the students] concentrate on the integration of cognition, emotion, and action; the strong reproduction of social life; the multiplicity of rules; and learning about organizational life and change.” (Hofstede, de Caluwe, & Peters, 2011, p. 829)

Simulation games have some strengths and advantages that lie beyond the scope of merely “learning about a subject,” and increase the students’ motivation to independently deal with a subject. Furthermore, many students are more engaged in a competitive situation than under regular classroom conditions. We received a lot of positive feedback on the three simulations that were conducted, with some students referring to them as “a highlight of all my classes.” On the downside, while students learn a lot about one specific country during the simulation, they learn a lot less about the individual problems of other nations (Kauneckis & Auer, 2013, p. 15). Nevertheless, carefully arranged simulation and debriefing enable designers and participants to avoid such pitfalls.

The Climate Engineering Crisis Scenario

Setting Up the Roles

A few weeks in advance, we assigned roles from the UN Security Council to the students (see Table 1).

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Table 1.

Delegations of the Simulation.

Permanent members	Non-permanent members	Observers
China	Germany	Scientist
France	Ghana	ETC group (NGO)
Great Britain	Grenada

The choice of non-permanent members and observers clearly influenced the outcomes of the simulation. Our aim was to expand the spectrum of political positions and help facilitate a controversial debate. Grenada is one of the Small Island Developing States that will instantly suffer the consequences of sea level rise. As an emerging economy, India has both growing CO₂ emissions and is vulnerable to climate impacts, such as droughts and monsoon irregularities. In general, the impact of climate engineering is likely to be felt most strongly by countries in the global south (Horton, 2015). The high risks make it harder for most countries to decide on how to handle CE proposals. Hence, the constellation of the UN Security Council is important because it cannot be detached from the agenda of single state leaders, contemporary discourses, and environmental events.

The simulation scenario, which was introduced in the newspaper article, implied little information about how the students should fulfill the roles of the delegates. We instructed them to imagine possible but not necessarily real state leadership. For example, the USA could be led by a Republican or a Democrat president. We discussed the alternatives for choosing China as the CE proponent, but we eventually had to decide on the scenario. ⁷

Results

The Simulation in Practice

Between eighteen and twenty-two Bachelor students in their third year of study (5^th or 6^th semester) attended the first two courses, but the third course was notably smaller with only seven students participating in the simulation. We had low diversity regarding non-German-born students and an almost balanced gender ratio. In the larger group, each delegation was played by two students, in the smaller group by only one. The simulation was conducted in a university room, every delegate had to dress formally, and the delegations were introduced with a few basic remarks. The facilitators did not intervene during student discussions.

The chair, the British delegation, initiated a first round of statements (“tour de table”) so that every delegation could bring their position forward. As the positions were restated, the general discussion started. In all three classes the first half to one hour was important for adjusting to the Model United Nations and for creating a fluent debate. As the end of the three-hour-session drew near, a few coalitions had built up and worked on one or more resolutions for the CE crisis. The delegations competed for a final resolution, especially when time ran short.

The simulation dynamics during the three sessions exhibited differences that could not be explained with a single cause, such as personal distinctions or group effects. The first and third class tended to be more cooperative and more opposed to CE than the second. The first group was perhaps more critical because they adhered to plenary discussion most of the time, where delegates debated controversially. In contrast, the second group often entered unmoderated caucus, where coalitions were formed and national interests concerning CE could be played out effectively. The third course remained in moderated caucus most of the time. Their discussion was less focused on scientific facts but more on interests than the second simulation (see 4.2.2 Power Struggle). The third group made more use of the possibility to communicate in secret via paper notes (which is an official MUN rule of procedure). Altogether, the groups were more alike than different in discussion processes and results.

In the end, all three groups aimed to create a transnational organization (in parallel to the IPCC) to regulate both climate engineering research and deployment. The vast majority of delegations in every simulation advocated a position which prioritized further research, although their motives differed. Pro-CE countries encouraged research investments for testing CE as soon as possible; more skeptical countries supported research to understand the risks of the technology before deployment. Some delegations used CE to gamble. They would only vote in favor of research and deployment if they were given international support for climate change adaptation (see Table 2). As a side effect of this “research before practice” agenda, a slowdown strategy was very popular in all three groups. Hence, the result of the simulations was to create standstill agreements for a couple of years in support of further research. When the delegates of the simulation installed an international deployment moratorium and enforced research policy, they also responded to the request of real world policymakers for “governance arrangements before the deployment of geoengineering techniques” (House of Commons—Science and Technology Committee, 2010, p. 3).

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Table 2.

Political Positions Based on Interests.

	global south	global north	single positions
pro CE deployment	deployment in case of climate catastrophedeployment when adaptation impossibleno aggressive mitigation strategy possible in the south	China, to some extent the USA: plead for own right in case of emergency
pro CE research only	supporting research, but less capacity to contributewanting to have a say in research politics	Germany and others: research important but moratorium for deploymentresearch should be governed by international cooperation and a specially designed institution
contra CE	some countries feared the risks of deployment	At the beginning of discussions France, Germany, and others argued against CE	Russia does not feel strongly affected by climate change

Conclusion

In this article, we wanted both to provide a critical evaluation of a Model United Nations example, and reflect on the dynamic of an international climate engineering crisis. Starting with the MUN evaluation, we can summarize our experience:

Simulating a climate governance crisis in class is a valuable experience for students and teachers.

We would tentatively suggest some lessons learned from the simulation for the real-world international governance of CE:

Student simulations are a good teaching method (Asal, 2005; Baranowski, 2006; Boyer, 2012; Muno, Meßner, & Hahner, 2013). However, conclusions for the real world must be made with caution. Even when a MUN simulation works as an “imitation of the real-world policy process” (Kauneckis & Auer, 2013, p. 2), that does not justify the transfer of all observations from the simulation back to international politics (Mayer, 2009, p. 832).

Nevertheless, participatory simulations and other experimental methods to study emerging technologies give advice on social dynamics and how people might select or neglect topics (Felt, Schumann, Schwarz, & Strassnig, 2012, p. 17). A potent technology such as CE is likely to cause conflicts with power play and rivalries. While science is limited by ignorance, tools for an open debate about political implications must be developed.

No planetary climate engineering activities are being conducted for the time being. The only known field experiments linked to CE are small scale iron fertilization experiments. Recent ambitions by a small group of scientists to test solar CE outdoors in the near future (Keith, 2014) are not embedded in an adequate governance structure. To support multi-level-governance, interdisciplinary scholars have held a few public engagement exercises (Natural Environmental Research Council, 2011; Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 2011). However, neither appropriate international law nor a political structure is currently being developed. At the very least, to regulate high risk climate engineering, further discourse stimulation is needed to help build governance and ensure abidance by the principle of “governance before deployment.”