Shaping a Science of Social Work

Abstract

Social workers provide more social services to populations across the life span than any other human service profession, including psychiatry, nursing, and psychology. The scientific methodologies and the scientific knowledge relevant to social services have expanded dramatically in the last 30 years. Using the two indicators of the total number of journals and the impact factors of those journals, it would appear that social work’s contribution to that expanding scientific knowledge base has been relatively limited. The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between social work and science and to propose the outlines of a science of social work that intends to serve as a catalyst for shaping social work into a scientific discipline.

Keywords

social justice field of practice

Social workers provide more social services to populations across the life span than any other human service profession, including psychiatry, nursing, and psychology.

Social work is the largest and most important social service profession in the United States. Social workers help people function better in their environments, improve their relationships with others, and solve personal and family problems through . . . counseling, education, psychotherapy, and/or other services . . . in a wide range of settings, including public agencies, private organizations, and private practice arrangements. (Center for Health Workforce Studies & NASW Center for Workforce Studies, 2006, http://workforce.socialworkers.org/studies/natstudy.asp)

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2008 there were 642,000 social workers employed in the United States, while there were 170,200 psychologists and 33,070 psychiatrists (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2010, Occupational outlook handbook, 2010-11 edition). As can be seen, social workers are central to the welfare of vulnerable populations in the United States, and they are the largest feature of social service and mental health agencies nationwide.

The articulation of social work as a profession has been steadfast since 1955 when the National Association of Social Workers began by joining together seven professional social work organizations. The rise of social work has co-occurred with striking advances in the scientific methodologies and the scientific knowledge relevant to social services in the last 30 years. There has been a steady increase in the number of PhDs awarded in the social and life sciences during this time period, and they represent the highest number of PhD degrees awarded (Nerad, 2004). Knowledge relevant to social work on the multifactorial causes of human behavior and the methods for treating dysfunction in multiple populations has increased dramatically (e.g., Lambert, 2004; The Cochrane Library, 2011). There has also been substantial evolution in the methods for studying complex behaviors and contexts, as well as in the methods for analyzing data from complex designs (e.g., Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2001; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). Similarly, the application of scientific methods to the understanding of treatment effectiveness has provided practitioners with a range of evidence-based treatments for many of the conditions that social workers confront in their practice (Norcross, Beutler, & Levant, 2005; Rosen & Proctor, 2003; Weisz & Kazdin, 2010). The wisdom of practice experience is being merged with more and more sophisticated ways to test and advance knowledge that is relevant to social work.

Despite these scientific advances relevant to social work, and despite social work’s putative centrality to the application of this knowledge in social services, there is evidence that social work has not been central to these scientific advances. The number of peer-reviewed journals that a discipline houses is an indicator of how much knowledge building and formal communication about knowledge is central to that field. In essence, it addresses to what degree science and scholarship are core aspects of a field. A journal’s impact factor quantifies how much the average article from a journal is cited in other articles in a specified time period. Using the two indicators of the total number of journals and the impact factors of those journals, it is possible to make one kind of assessment about the degree to which science and knowledge discourse are central to a discipline.

Using these two indicators it would appear that social work’s contribution to the expanding social science knowledge base has been relatively limited. For example, a comparison on these indicators between social work, nursing, psychology, and psychiatry is a case in point. Using the ISI Web of Knowledge (2011), there are 39 journals in social work, 1 with an impact factor over 2.0 and the highest impact factor is 2.6. In nursing, there are 87 journals, 2 have impact factors over 2.0 and the highest is 2.1. In clinical psychology, there are 104 journals, 33 of them have impact factors over 2.0 and the highest is 9.7. In psychiatry, there are 110 journals, 41 have impact factors over 2.0 and the highest is 12.8. Offering another comparison, there are 118 journals in applied physics, 35 have impact factors over 2.0 and the highest impact factor is 29.9. In biology, there are 86 journals, 29 have impact factors over 2.0 and the highest is 12.5.

These data might question the centrality of science to social work, and they lead to several questions: What is the relationship between science and social work? Do we need to increase the centrality of science to social work? Is it time for a science of social work? The purpose of this article is (i) to examine the relationship between social work and science and (ii) to propose the outlines of a science of social work that can serve as a catalyst for shaping social work into a scientific discipline.

What is the Relationship Between Social Work and Science?

We can define a science as a combination of theory and systematic empirical method, rooted in ontological and epistemological context, and applied to a defined set of phenomena. When a discipline describes, derives, or advocates a set of theories and empirical methods, it has begun to define itself as a science. There are also many ontological and epistemological contexts that shape the assumptions and approaches which undergird theory and empirical method in science (Rosenberg, 2011). These assumptions offer a philosophical framework that provides a rational structure to a scientific approach. Finally, when a discipline combines these elements with a targeted set of phenomena for study, it has derived a scientific field of study, a science. It is a process of self-definition that is placed in a history of ideas and consensual identity. It is clear that social work has not engaged in this process of self-definition as a science. A first question, then, is what is the relationship between social work and science?

Based on the data provided above on journals and impact factors, it would appear that science pervades psychiatry and psychology to a much greater degree than it pervades social work. A brief look at how social work and psychology define themselves in their respective codes of ethics is also illuminating. In the Preamble to the NASW Code of Ethics (2008), science is not mentioned and the word research appears once toward the end of the second paragraph. In our core values, we do not mention knowledge, empirically based, science, or research. In contrast, here is the first sentence of the preamble of the Code of Ethics for the American Psychological Association (2010), “Psychologists are committed to increasing scientific and professional knowledge of behavior and people’s understanding of themselves and others and to the use of such knowledge to improve the condition of individuals, organizations, and society.” Similarly, here is the brand of the American Psychiatric Association: “Member driven, science based, patient focused.” So, if science is not central to our self-definition as a profession, what is our relationship to science?

The Piggyback Approach to Science in Social Work

In 1961, Werner Boehm (1961) made the following declaration:

In recent years there has been widespread interest in strengthening the scientific base of social work practice and in establishing more clearly the identity of the social work profession . . . . Increasingly we are convinced that effectiveness of social work practice depends on the creation of an appropriate base in science and values. Increasingly we are aware that without such a base our efforts to define and if possible to widen the scope of our profession and to add to our social usefulness will falter and fail.

Perhaps in response to statements like this, social work textbooks have tried to incorporate science and be informed by the latest scientific findings relevant to the issues and problems social workers encounter and address. We have spent considerable time using and translating research and science from other disciplines in our textbooks. For example, our practice texts try to balance practice wisdom and convention with findings from relevant social sciences such as psychology and psychiatry, as well as research done by social workers (e.g., Hepworth, Rooney, Rooney, Storm-Gottfried, & Larsen, 2010). Similarly, our behavior texts attempt to include a scientific perspective for understanding human behavior in complex environmental contexts (e.g., Ashford & LeCroy, 2010; Zastrow & Kirst-Ashman, 2007). Our research texts articulate social science methods defined generically and illustrate methods derived from other fields that can be used to evaluate social work practice (e.g., Rubin & Babbie, 2010; Thyer, 2010).

The same is true for our research journals. For example, here are the mission statements from three of our research journals:

Social Work & Social Sciences Review sets out to keep readers abreast of the key developments in the social sciences which affect how social work is understood and practiced. It is aimed at fully committed professionals whether in practice, education, or research. Papers and proposals are welcome from any field in the social sciences with a relevance to the development of social work knowledge. Social Work Research publishes exemplary research to advance the development of knowledge and inform social work practice. Widely regarded as the outstanding journal in the field, it includes analytic reviews of research, theoretical articles pertaining to social work research, evaluation studies, and diverse research studies that contribute to knowledge about social work issues and problems. Research on Social Work Practice (RSWP), published bi-monthly, is a disciplinary journal devoted to the publication of empirical research concerning the assessment methods and outcomes of social work practice.

Our textbooks and each of these journals exemplify what can be called the “piggyback approach” to science and social work. The piggyback approach is that social work will embrace knowledge from any discipline that is relevant to the problems and issues we define as central to our profession. The strength of this approach is its receptivity and agnosticism with regard to disciplinary boundaries. The weakness is that it has allowed social work to avoid defining itself as a social science. Oddly enough then, the social sciences from which social work derives some of its knowledge have not included social work since we have not defined ourselves as a science. In essence, we have not defined a science of social work that would articulate the critical domains of knowledge in social work, that would define a core set of constructs that frame our approach to the scientific study of phenomena that are central to our profession, nor have we articulated the characteristics of a scientific approach that would most exemplify the kind of knowledge our profession would hold in highest regard. Such a framework will be outlined below.

Science and Evidence-Based Practice in Social Work

Evidence-based practice (EBP) is another area where social work has an explicit relationship with science. There appear to be two facets to this approach in social work. The first facet defines EBP as an approach to science-informed practice. There are generally several steps from problem definition, intervention selection, and measurement to the assessment of outcomes (e.g., Bloom, Fischer, & Orme, 2006; Gambrill, 2006). This has resulted in the sometimes expressed notion of the scientific practitioner (Rosen, 1996).

The other facet of EBP in social work focuses on the use of what are called evidence-based or evidence-supported practice interventions. For example, assertive community treatment (Allness & Knoedler, 2003), problem-solving therapy (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010), and interpersonal therapy (Weissman, Markowitz, & Klerman, 2007) have been designated “best practices” because they are evidence based and they have shown effectiveness and portability across settings. This aspect of EBP within social work also focuses on implementing these practices within agency settings (RSWP special issue, 2009).

So, while EBP can be seen as a central feature for an accountable, informed, and ethical approach to social work practice, it, too, is agnostic about a science of social work. But clearly, a science of social work must encompass the issues relevant to an evidence-based approach to social work practice. There are two other indications that social work is poised to define itself as a science. The first concerns the philosophy of science, and the second is our research productivity.

Social Work Research and the Philosophy of Science

Social work has had a limited but sometimes lively debate about the philosophy of science and social work research. Perspectives ranging from the instrumentalist (Hudson, 1982) to the constructivist/relativist sociology of knowledge (Heineman, 1981; Pieper, 1987; Rodwell, 1998) to scientific realism have been advocated (Brekke, 1986, 1987). Regardless of how one values philosophical issues in science, a coherent and well-articulated approach to these issues can lay forth the assumptions and working premises for a foundation of knowledge and science. For example, if one fundamentally believes that there is no way to establish whether science is growing closer to a true approximation of the world and its laws, then it matters little whether there are rational criteria for establishing progress in scientific knowledge. On the other hand, if the veridicality of knowledge from science is critical, then establishing the most robust and rational ways for understanding the world and testing scientific knowledge becomes meaningful (Lakatos, 1978).

Social Work Research: Growing and Sophisticated but not Enough

There are signs that social work’s commitment to rigorous research is growing. National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding levels for faulty in schools of social work have increased substantially over the last 25 years (Social Work NIH Grant Directory, https://htmldbprod.bc.edu/pls/htmldb/f?p=545:SW_GRANTS:5984497914634842). The Society for Social Work and Research began in 1994 and has a yearly conference featuring social work research. We have begun articulating how to develop research infrastructures in social work (e.g., Flynn, Brekke, & Soydan, 2008; Proctor, McMillen, Haywood, & Dore, 2008). The profession just launched the American Academy of Social Work and Social Welfare that elects fellows to its national body. These are signs of a growing maturity for social work research in the profession. Overall, however, we have had an ambivalent relationship with science in that we have piggybacked on science from other disciplines, and have not taken seriously the definition of a science of social work. This is no longer acceptable for a profession that deals with some of the most challenging problems in society and that has a commitment to human welfare from birth to death. We are the legal guarantors of child welfare, and we provide more mental health and social services than any other profession. We have a growing research capacity, and we have articulated some elements that could be organized into a scientific discipline, a science of social work. As Boehm (1961) agued over 40 years ago, this effort is linked to the growth and viability of our profession.

Shaping a Science of Social Work

Based on the experience of other fields in the physical and social sciences, it appears that putting forth a science requires at least three critical ingredients: (i) domains of inquiry, (ii) core constructs, and (iii) defining characteristics. The domains of inquiry concern what social work is most dedicated to understanding and knowing—they specify the areas where mental and material resources will be invested. Within those domains, the core constructs are the fundamental notions about reality that will guide and shape scientific inquiry in social work. Finally, the distinguishing characteristics of our research articulate what it is that we cherish in term of methods and theories; in essence, they specify the qualities that will characterize our best science in social work. Before developing these ingredients in finer detail, there are two fundamental questions that arise and that need to be addressed. First, why would we want a science of social work? Second, are there good reasons not to define ourselves as a science? Once these questions are addressed, I will present the outlines of a science of social work, as well as discuss the possible ramifications for our profession.

Why Define a Science of Social Work?

First, there are many other disciplines and professions defining themselves as sciences. Occupational therapy has now defined the field of occupational science. “Occupational science is the science of everyday living. An academic discipline, it focuses on the benefits of productive social and physical activity (called occupation in the discipline) in people’s everyday lives. It is devoted to learning how engagement in occupation can address the global health concerns of the 21st century and promote health, well-being and quality of life throughout the lifespan (University of Southern California website, 2011, http://www.usc.edu).” Further, the Journal of Occupational Science is now in its 15th year of publication and there are 20 academic programs nationally and internationally that identify as occupational science programs. Similarly, the Journal of Nursing Science has been published for 15 years and issues relevant to defining nursing as a science are featured topics (e.g., Barrett, 2002).

Engineering science has been defined as a “ . . . multidisciplinary program designed to integrate the sciences with areas of traditional engineering such as research, design, and analysis. Engineering Science focuses on the creation and use of more advanced and experimental techniques where standard approaches are inadequate (University of Pennsylvania website, 2011, http://www.upenn.edu).” In the field of environmental science there are calls for a new environmentalism driven by the fields of sustainability science, environmental engineering, global change biology, restoration ecology, conservation biology, conservation medicine, biodiversity and ecosystem functioning, and eco-informatics (Naeem, 2009). In other words, new sciences are being developed rapidly in many areas. But aside from this trend in many relevant fields, there are other reasons that a science of social work could be useful.

Second, we believe that we have a unique identity. Social work has defined itself as unique from other human service professions such as psychology, psychiatry, occupational therapy, and nursing. This unique identity is usually expressed in terms of our values, our populations, and our perspective on the biopsychosocial phenomena of the world. It is this uniqueness that will help to shape our science. Third, we are training more PhDs. There are now over 65 programs in the United States that offer a doctorate in social work, and most of them offer PhD. We are clearly developing the workforce for scientific productivity. Fourth, there are now 39 journals that are listed as social work journals. While none of our journals has the word “science” in the title, most of them regularly contain empirical research, and four are dedicated by title to publishing research reports. Finally, as stated above, we are doing more and more sophisticated and respected research that is being funded in increasing numbers and amounts by NIH. In that sense, we are reaching more often a gold standard for social science research. But the notion that we would be better off not defining a science of social work also deserves consideration.

Why not Define a Science of Social Work?

The first reason for not defining a science of social work can be expressed as, “Spare us this haggling, let us just do the studies we want to do and we will all know when it is good social work research.” This is similar to Feyeraband’s approach to the philosophy of science (Feyerabend, 1993) which is a freewheeling approach that does not require rules and definitions for defining the truthfulness (veridicality) of scientific knowledge. It argues that if trained scientists are allowed to do what they do best, then useful knowledge will arise from the community of scientists. Similar to a famous definition of pornography, even if we can not define it, we will know social work science when we see it. In essence, if we have social workers who do good science—that is enough.

Another reason is that social work is too big a field, we cover too much. But here is a prototypical definition of physics: physics involves the study of the behavior and properties of matter in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from the submicroscopic particles from which all ordinary matter is made (particle physics) to the behavior of the material universe as a whole (cosmology). Compared to physics we cover a smaller domain of natural phenomena, and, at the least, the scope of physics from particle to the cosmos should give us some optimism about handling the scope of our science.

It could also be argued that we will never agree on anything in a science of social work because the issues are too complex. Returning to physics, we can see that the issue of the fundamental character of light as a particle or a wave captured physics for many decades (Kumar, 2008). Heisenberg also introduced a fundamental uncertainty about being able to measure the location of an electron if you know the speed or of knowing the speed if you measure the location. Similarly, combining theory about quanta (particles) with theory about galaxies continues to challenge physicists (Kumar, 2008). In fact, one of the robust indicators for a science seems to be that there are large complex issues that many well-trained people need to argue about but that are amenable to rigorous empirical study. In that sense, social work as a science will fit in quite well. But even if it can be argued that a science of social work is possible and could even be beneficial, we face a substantial challenge: what would it look like?

Defining a Science of Social Work: Domains, Core Constructs, and Characteristics

Domains

The domains of inquiry concern what it is that we are most dedicated to understanding and knowing, and they specify the areas where our mental and material resources will be invested. They can be derived from our values and our code of ethics. Based on that, I would argue that we have two broad and linked areas that reflect our profession: (i) we seek to understand and (ii) we seek to foster change (see Figure 1). Each of these two areas has specific domains of scientific inquiry. The domains that reflect what we seek to understand are marginalization, disenfranchisement, the individual and social factors in disease, and the individual and social factors supporting health. The domains demarcating the kinds of change we seek to promote are empowerment, inclusion, reducing disease, and increasing health. These notions will be briefly explicated.

Figure 1.

The domains of a science of social work.

Social work has a core commitment to those who are disadvantaged, oppressed or in poverty. People can be disadvantaged for many reasons, but two critical ways are marginalization and disenfranchisement. While these notions are used in different ways (Ferguson, Gever, Minh-ha, & West, 1992), I will propose the following distinction that appears relevant to social work. Marginalization is a psychological and social process where individuals, groups, or populations of individuals are oppressed by being socially segmented and stigmatized and thereby denied access to or excluded from common societal avenues of work, leisure, and living. Marginalization is a process with social and psychological consequences such as internalized stigma and restricted social capital. Disenfranchisement is a formal process of exclusion and oppression expressed in laws and policies that restrict or limit access to normal societal opportunities and resources. These policies and laws can be expressed in groups, organizations, or broadly in a society. A science of social work will seek to understand the dynamic factors which contribute to marginalization and disenfranchisement and to understand how and why these forces emerge to oppress certain groups in our society.

Social work also seeks to understand disease and dysfunction broadly defined in physical, psychological, and social terms. We want to understand the occurrence and patterns of physical disease and behavioral dysfunction, but very importantly we seek to understand how individual and social factors interact to result in disease and dysfunction for individuals, groups, neighborhoods, and societies. It is not enough to understand that individual and social factors contribute to disease, but we seek to understand how these factors interact and combine to result in dysfunction and disease. But social work goes beyond understanding dysfunction, we also have a strong history of understanding and advocating health and wellness. Therefore, we are also interested in understanding how individual and social factors interact to produce well-being in individuals, families, and groups, which includes core social work issues such as resilience and strengths. Understanding how these phenomena occur and with what consequences for individuals and society is central to social work and will be central to our science.

Social work is also deeply invested in human change. Understanding a phenomenon is seen as incomplete in social work unless the mechanisms we understand are eventually linked to processes for positive change. We seek to promote and produce change in all aspects of social reality from individuals, to families, organizations, and societies (e.g., Adams, 2008). The scientific domains demarcating the kinds of change we seek to promote are empowerment, inclusion, reducing disease, and increasing health, and these are directly linked to the domains of scientific understanding that were articulated above.

When we work with an institutionalized population like the seriously mentally ill and help them learn how to live in the community and improve their self-esteem, teach them how to live independently, manage their symptoms, and deal with landlords, we are empowering them. When we use problem-solving therapy with depressed adolescents, we are empowering them because problem solving is a skill they can internalize and generalize in their lives. Concerning inclusion, when we tackle public attitudes, institutional aspects of stigma, or challenge dysfunctional organizational policies, we are advancing inclusion for disenfranchised groups. Finally, social work is not only interested in reducing disease through a range of scientifically validated individual and social interventions but also in using proven strategies for increasing health among individuals and groups. We seek interventions that will improve health and quality of life for our targeted groups. Clearly, a science of social work will include developing and applying effective strategies for change.

Taken together, these domains of understanding and change define the focus and boundaries of a science of social work. They articulate what is essential in our knowledge and knowledge building. These domains reflect the values of social work, and they help to articulate the central questions that we will seek to address with our science. However, we also need core constructs with which to organize and articulate our approach to both understanding and change.

Core constructs

In social work, we have consistently articulated three core constructs: biopsychosocial, person in environment, and service systems for change. These ubiquitous constructs in social work and their elaboration will help to further shape a science of social work.

Biopsychosocial and scientific realism

The notion of a biopsychosocial approach to understanding and change in social work implies a multifactorial perspective that is interactive and comprehensive. Scientific realism is an approach to the philosophy of science exemplified in the work of Karl Popper (1972), Imre Lakatos (1978), and Mario Bunge (2009a, b; Mahner, 2001). Bunge has commended scientific realism as an approach that is particularly suited to the social sciences (Mahner, 2001). There are three notions in scientific realism that amplify the biopsychosocial approach and yield a core construct that is scientifically rigorous, generative, and compelling. These three notions are (i) levels of reality, (ii) emergent properties at each level, and (iii) upward and downward causation.

Bunge has proposed four levels to reality: the physical, the chemical, the biological, and the social (see Figure 2). The organization of these levels as a pyramid suggests the following. First, the levels are less populated as they ascend. For example, there are more physical events in the world than social events. Second, the higher levels are more dependent on the lower levels, such that you can have physical events without social events, but there cannot be social events without physical or chemical or biological events on which the social events depend. Third, each of the levels can be divided into sublevels. For example, the social level could begin with human consciousness and move upward through groups to nations. The biological level could begin with molecules, and move through cells to organisms, and classes of species. Finally, as will be seen next, this is not a reductionistic model.

Figure 2.

Levels of reality.

A second notion in a scientific realist paradigm is that there are emergent properties at each level of reality. The notion of emergence (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008; Corradini & O’Connor, 2010) combines qualitative change and holism into a notion that new properties and laws develop (emerge) at each level that cannot be fully reduced to phenomena from an earlier level. These emergent properties are real in themselves and have causal identity and propensities. For example, when individuals form into small groups, the phenomena and laws of group cohesion emerge. Group cohesion as a causal force can alter individual behavior and can shape future events. Similarly, individuals and groups can form into organizations, and these organizations have properties and laws that govern their functioning and performance and causally influence the individuals in them. An economic system is an example at even a larger level of emergence. Combining the levels of reality with the notion of emergence provides a structure to reality that can be described and studied scientifically using theory and method. It takes Figure 1 from being a useful description of reality to being a scientifically generative paradigm that focuses on unique phenomena at each level that can interact with phenomena at other levels. How these phenomena interact leads to another notion in scientific realism: upward and downward causality.

Since there are distinct levels to reality and emergent properties at each level, the notion of upward and downward causation adds a final element to the biopsychosocial construct (Scott, 2004). Upward causation is commonplace in reductionistic paradigms because it suggests that, for example, human behavior is caused by factors at lower levels such as genetics or neuroanatomy. On the other hand, downward causation suggests, for example, that group cohesion could alter brain functioning or psychophysiology or further that social conditions could alter genetic structures. For example, animal studies have found that certain parenting behavior can alter genetic structures across several generations (Murgatroyd & Spengler, 2011).

When levels, emergent properties, and upward/downward causation are put together as notions, the biopsychosocial paradigm becomes scientifically very interesting and generative. It serves to define the scientific character and theoretical approaches to understanding phenomena in social reality that are central to social work.

Person in environment

It is almost axiomatic in social work that it is not possible to understand or explain human behavior or the environment in which it occurs unless they are analyzed together. Environment determines the person, and person determines the environment—they interact and that interaction is the causal field that social work seeks to describe and understand. A specific example is the gene–environment interaction model (Hunter, 2005; Meaney, 2010).

People as biopsychosocial beings exist in multiple environments from in utero to neighborhoods and natural ecologies. There are many gene–environment interaction models (Hunter, 2005; Lewontin, 2000). Certain gene–environment interactions can require an environmental event to trigger the genetic event. In essence, the environmental event is necessary for the genetic event to occur. For example, the stress induced expression of a gene. In another model, the environment can dramatically shape the genetic expression. Biologists have known for over 100 years that plants with identical DNA will look dramatically different if they are grown at different elevations (Lewontin, 2000). There are other possibilities now, for example, some argue that the definitive causal model is genetic factors, random molecular factors, and environmental factors; however, many new interaction models are emerging (Zhang & Meaney, 2010). In this regard, epigenetics is a rapidly developing area that involves the study of environmental factors that are critical in gene–environment models of causation. In fact, detailing the epigenome is an increasing focus in the science of genetics (Murgatroyd & Spengler, 2011; Zhang & Meaney, 2010). These interaction models are one example of scientific approaches to the person-in-environment construct that is central to social work. As a science, social work should be proposing, testing, and refining these person-in-environment models as is being done in other disciplines (e.g., Dick, Latendresse, & Riley, 2011; Neufeld, Rasmussen, Lopez, Ryder, & Magyar-Moe, 2006).

Service systems for change

A final core construct in a science of social work encompasses a focus on human change. Just as there are increasingly sophisticated and meaningful models for understanding human behavior in a science of social work, there is also a growing science in the area of human change. In social work, there is a focus on change at all levels of social reality from individual consciousness, through organizations, to communities and societies (e.g., Adams, 2008; Hepworth et al., 2010; Johnson & Yanca, 2006; Twelvetrees, 2008). The target systems can range from individuals, groups, communities, and nations. The strategies for change include therapy, self-help groups, advocacy, community organizing, policy analysis, and policy practice. There is a growing body of research and experimental evidence in many of these areas, and this knowledge is central to a science of social work.

In terms of human services, social work also has a multilevel focus (Hasenfeld, 2009). We move beyond specific interventions to how they become organized into human service organizations and service systems for treating entire populations or geographic areas. As such, we view human service organizations as the context and vehicle for changing individuals, families, groups, or societies. In social work, specific interventions are not seen in isolation from the service delivery systems in which they occur. The domain of social work spans the intervention to the system and all levels in between, including formal and informal helping networks.

Our three core constructs—biopsychosocial, person in environment, and service systems for change—provide a rich foundation of philosophy, theory, and practice with which to define and launch a science. The next issue concerns the core characteristics of our science and of the knowledge we generate.

Defining Characteristics

In articulating the defining characteristics of the best science in the field of systems biology, Breitling (2010) stated that they were diversity, simplicity, and complexity. In social work, I would argue that the defining characteristics of our best science are complexity, synthesis, and pluralism. While some behavioral sciences strive to isolate single variables or constructs for study and sometimes see their multifactorial context as muddy, in social work we embrace complexity in our studies. In fact, I would posit that as a profession we are suspicious of simple explanatory models and findings. Simplicity and parsimony are useful, but in social work we strive to view and understand the world in its complexity. We also value the synthesis of various theories and we are comfortable blending models and perspectives. Analyzing theories into their component elements takes precision, but synthesizing theories and perspectives takes boldness. A science that synthesizes is most highly valued in our profession. Finally, rather than seeking theoretical or methodological hegemony, we value pluralism in our approaches to science and knowledge. Social work is comfortable in an intellectual environment where a variety of approaches and methods are explored for their viability in understanding human behavior and creating change. These characteristics matter because they articulate the science we strive to create, they shape our scientific activity and training, and they create a norm for the kind of science that is most relevant to social work.

Social Work Theory

Social work has a history of attempting to articulate a theory or theories relevant to the phenomena we target (e.g., Roberts & Nee, 1974). A previous discussion about science and social work suggested that trying to establish a unique theoretical base for social work was likely to be an unproductive distraction in creating a science of social work (Göppner & Hämäläinen, 2007). I would argue that given the domains and the core constructs of our science there will be many theoretical perspectives and theories that will be relevant to social work science, as well as new theories that can be constructed. Theory is critical and we will use, refine, and create theory, similar to many biopsychosocial approaches to science. Unique to our science are the domains, core constructs, and the distinguishing characteristics that we articulate. The search for a social work theory does not seem as relevant as it was perhaps at other times in our history; however, as our science grows there could be theories that are identified most closely with our field.

Framework for a Science and the Consequences for Social Work

The social work domains, core constructs, and aesthetics described above provide a framework from which to build knowledge for both understanding and practice: a science of social work. This is a posited framework, and, at best, it serves as a starting point for debate and evolution. Clearly, the attempt to create a science of social work will have consequences for our field.

First, with a science of social work, we will be able to train our researchers in a science. Our training of social work scientists will begin with domains of knowledge, philosophical foundations related to our core constructs, and methodological approaches linked to the framework of our science. Second, we will be forced to define our uniqueness in terms of knowledge, and that will build our identity and status in the context of other social sciences. This unique identity will be debated and articulated in our journals. Third, we will be able to make more coherent decisions about methods, scholarship, and where we want our scientists to excel. Our science will provide a foundation for determining what knowledge is most relevant and which interdisciplinary theories and methods are most appropriate for us. Fourth, we will be able to articulate our science in a multidisciplinary context and be identified in that context. We can continue to work in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary teams, and we can engage in translational science (Brekke, Ell, & Palinkas, 2007). But we will contribute from a distinct and well-defined position of domain, knowledge, and method. We will have defined a scientific identity congruent with our professional identity. In fact, our scientific identity will reinforce and propel our professional identity.

Goals for a Science of Social Work

Social work is a goal-directed profession, and our science should be as well. The following are the goals for a science of social work modeled on the goals for engineering science (website, School of Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, 2010, http://www.engr.psu.edu).

To be multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary. This is something that social work has always strived for, but it has not been done from a position of a well-defined scientific identity.

To advance the frontiers of science and social work. These frontiers are contained in the development of the identity of social work, the refinement of the science, and the impact it will have on the social domains we seek to understand and change.

To develop the theoretical underpinnings of scientific phenomena and their social work applications. It is clear that social work will be able to contribute to knowledge building in many sciences, and we will continue to translate that work into specific social work applications.

To lead in anticipating and pioneering the human service technologies of the future and to transfer leading-edge human service technologies for use in furthering the public health and eliminating disparities for marginalized and disenfranchised people. The values of social work will always direct its scientific activity toward human change and social justice.

To create new paradigms for the delivery and dissemination of social work science education. Our science will propel us to create new frameworks for training our practitioners and for educating new generations of social work scientists. Perhaps this will become the signature activity for defining our profession across generations.

The Future for a Science of Social Work

It remains to be seen whether this attempt at articulating a science of social work will generate the kind of progress seen in other disciplines and professions that have taken on this challenge. As Boehm (1961) articulated over 50 years ago, if we are able to build a science joined with a framework of social work values it will have a profound impact on the identity of social work and on the aspects of the world that we are deeply committed to understanding and improving. This volume of RSWP is dedicated to beginning this debate and to challenging social work to continue this process of self-definition as a science.

Footnotes

Author’s Note

This study was presented at the conference on “Shaping a Science of Social Work” held at the University of Southern California School of Social Work on May 23–24, 2011. An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Aaron Rosen Lection at the Annual Conference of the Society for Social Work and Research on January 14, 2011, Tampa, Florida. This article was invited and accepted by the Editor.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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