Response: Epistemological Issues of Social Work Science as a Translational Action Science

Can We Do Without Social Work Science?

To conclude that “the health of the social work profession depends quite directly on the availability of useful knowledge” (Cha et al., 2006, p. 121) is problematic, for the profession, because a profession which deserves its name has to rely on a science which deserves its name, and not only on useful knowledge. And it is risky for the clients, because the failure of help cannot be seen as caused by an inadequate intervention model (the eventuality that social work can do harm in the name of helping is only thinkable as individual failure).

The core question is no longer “What does practice need?” or “Which theory does practice need?” or “Which knowledge is useful for practice?”, so one loses sight of the problem that the issue is not only about practice (which pretends to know what is good for clients) but also about “avoid harm in the name of helping” (Gambrill, 2006). So the core question must be “How can we know what helps?”. To avoid misunderstandings, it is to clarify that helping is not meant in a trivial sense (e.g., a social worker helps a schizophrenic client to be freed from his four cell phone contracts), it is about a sustainable regaining of (partial) autonomy in the conduct of life.

In this way, epistemology comes into play. What is meant by this can be demonstrated by taking the example of Smalley (1967): she formulates a psychological and a social base for social work. For the former, she relies in particular on psychoanalysis (Rank, Erikson) and humanistic psychology (Maslow). Why are other theories, (e.g., behaviorism, cognitivism) irrelevant?—a justification is missing. Her background is formed by a number of assumptions on the essence of social work and its rather intuitive translation into theories. This intuitively plausible theory building is unsatisfactory because it leads to no more than unregulated eclecticism. “A lifelong activity of social worker is to carefully select a configuration of perspectives, theories, and models that matches his or her practice style and best meets the needs of his or her clients” (Sheafor & Horejsi, 2003, p. 118). The principles for practice are a well-informed agglomeration of theoretical ingredients and idiosyncratic experiences. And, what is more weighty, with a theory system built in this way one loses sight of the problem of whether the methods the profession uses are suitable to help the clients and that social work has to avoid causing harm in the name of helping. The question “What is useful for practice?” must be replaced by “How can we know what helps?” If one believes that these sins of the past have meanwhile been overcome, one will find oneself wrong. The professional language in usual terms of “knowledge, skills, and values” is quite en vogue and fosters eclecticism (see below).

Questionable Assumptions

An erroneous starting point with erroneous questions leads to a futile enterprise. Applying the “theory for practice” pattern, one begins with questionable assumptions and blindly walks into the following epistemological traps:

Practice-Governed Science? Social Work Is Not Like Craftsman’s Work!

In contrast to a handicraft, in which the usefulness of the skills used and the success of the measures taken become evident already during the execution of the work (e.g., an electrician repairs a washing machine, does a test at the end and knows that he has done a good job), a social worker can only observe what happens between her and the client. She only sees the effects of her actions here and now, for example, whether the client sees reason and is motivated, whether a trusting relationship evolves, whether he or she is feeling better. But the connection between measures taken and the effects outside in real life in the sense of a lasting betterment of the problem remains obscure. Indications regarding the question of What helps? can only be gained to a certain degree. Of course, every practitioner searches for affirmation of his or her actions and has some successful presentation cases (e.g., the child from a childrens’ home that became an attorney). A collapse occurs, when clients deny themselves, do not stick to agreements, or do not come any more, but the social worker does not get any clearer indications as to what has worked and what has not. And what about so-called practice wisdom, gained through years of experience, supervisions, professional talks with colleagues, and other experts? It would be wrong to do without and to preach pure faith in science. The German pedagogue Erich Weniger (1929) distinguishes tree levels of theories: theories of the first grade, that is, everyday knowledge coming from life experience, second-grade theories, that is, vocational knowledge, composed of recipes from professional experience, and theories of the third grade, that is, theories gained by scientific methods. All three theory grades are necessary, but for reliable action programming in the clients’ service, the compass function of science is indispensable.

Praxeological Misconceptions

It is a great misconception with grave consequences to believe that it is possible simply to implement a science for any kind of job or vocation (e.g., a B.A. for hair dressing and salon management). Right from the outset, this leads to a problematical, that is, purely praxeological approach. Praxeology is the “doctrine of a sensible way of shaping human action,” this sounds good, as practice should indeed be supported by useful theory. However, practice and science have nothing to do with each other. Praxeology is dedicated to practice, science can only be dedicated to itself and to create insights, it loses its essence, if it is subjected to another agenda. Science must not become subservient to anything, otherwise it comes under the principle of “hire and fire”; practice determines what it needs and what it does not, thus eradicating any potential irritation for abandoning professional habits.

A further point is that through the orientation on practice, the orientation gets lost on decisions for the clients’ benefit. The practice pretends, as if it is naturally the clients’ advocate, but these are not only at the mercy of the individual professional ethics and competence but also the profession’s state of knowhow and especially the state of science. The problems which lie existentially at the heart of practitioners are not necessarily those which emerge from an understanding of the change conditions for the clients’ benefit. It borders on hypocrisy, if one insinuates that a profession can always be dedicated completely to the service of the addressees.

What in the first instance seems to be useful, turns out to be dangerous. It is impossible to become aware of the observation circle, self-observation of practice cannot be made without bias, one is always coerced to assume a (not reflected) preconception. One helps oneself with theories and knowledge, one simply takes what somehow seems useful.

Useful Knowledge/Theory—A Comfortable Self-Service Store, With Unregulated Eclecticism and  Arbitrariness as the Hinge

The tricky central question (because everything is more difficult than supposed) must be: how can social work know what type of help helps? or: what kind of help social work needs that it can achieve a sustainable change of their problem areas in cooperation with the clients? Social work must not only concentrate on what it itself needs, but on what the clients need. At this point, “theory” comes into play. But it can possess its compass function only when it is not used as a self-service store, by picking under the motto Which theory does practice need? what one’s appetite suggests. This leads to an arbitrary selection of theory elements, one cannot be sure that something is not lost that one would actually need for help to succeed.

Knowledge and Skills–Directions for Whateverism

“Knowledge” and “skills “ are the sacred cows in the common debate on social work “science” base. But “. . . all our knowledge is theory impregnated, and (almost) all also conjectural in character” (Popper, 1972, p. 104)—so “useful knowledge” suggests an objectivity that is nonexistent and hides that we are dealing with theories in the background. In fact, it is an eclecticism in disguise and so a barrier to acknowledge the necessity of social work science and a barrier to meet the requirements of helping and the responsibilities for clients. And furthermore, one loses the sight for the varying quality of theories (cf. Thyer, 2010, p. 475).

The description of professional action in terms of “skills” and “competences” may be enough for curricular schedules, to frame learning targets, but in this way one does not gain a real compass for practical decisions. Skills are personal properties but no theory models apt for reliably programming the practitioner’s actions.

Basic Science and Action Science

A distinction is commonly made between basic science and applied science. This distinction is a somewhat inept, because it leads to one-way thinking. The term action science stresses that questions of application are not a by-product of pure science, but rather a genuine scientific subject-matter. The difference between basic science and action science is that the former searches for Erkenntnis (knowledge is not enough!) per se and creates explanatory models, while the latter is dedicated to the aim of investigating options for changes of problematic circumstances and conditions and constructing change models; it applies itself to the task of building fundamentals for changes through a justifiable and responsible practice.

It should be added: basic sciences must be specialized. For medical doctors, there are only medical problems, for psychologists only psychological, for sociologists only societal problems. Thus, a self-righteous innocence and naïveté emerges for everything that is outside their disciplinary scope. Action sciences, in contrast, cannot restrict themselves to one discipline in one sector (that would be an unjustifiable arbitrariness and in opposition to scientificness). They must overcome their specialist naïveté in order to obtain effective change models, they must consult all scientific resources available. The classical basic sciences fail to do this. Therefore, a new type of science is indicated, the cross-disciplinary, hybrid science, which can work against the specialist fragmentation of the interrelationship of causes and build integrative models (explanatory and change models), so that in the programming of practice important aspects are not continuously neglected. And translational approaches are necessary that are able to bring science into practice, but also make the issues of practice accessible to science: “from theory to practice” and “from practice to theory” (Soydan, 1999, 2011). This translational action science is necessary for the systematic and many-sided investigation of conditions for change and for the elaboration of action models.

Both have the following in common: as sciences, they carry out the systematic exploration of their subject matter, which not is a section of reality, but a question from a certain perspective. Thereby, no simple truth comes to light, manifold theories are developed, which are in competition and mutually exclusive. Action sciences depend on basic sciences (as referential sciences), without the supply of and the demand for new insights one would stew in one’s own juice.

A warning hint is indicated: “action” in humanities must not be understood as a simple activity. It is to be understood under the fundamental condition of communication of self-willed subjects with its ambiguities, with the difference between what is meant and what is understood. So, no direct way of influencing is possible.

The Subject Matter of Social Work Science

One should not demand a science for just any vocation. The preconditions are, like with social work, tasks that are not manageable in the way of handicraft work. An indispensable prerequisite for a profession is the necessity of science for the performance of its tasks. For a new science, one needs a subject matter, this is not a domain in reality but a question from a certain perspective, which has not yet been covered by the sciences already existing. For social work science, it is an integrative science for social problems.

Following from the arguments so far, the epistemological questions emerging for a justifiable practice do not permit taking practice as a starting point. Only in this way can social work science be an anchor point from outside, practice must control how far science is apt for programming the action of practice for problem changing.

The subject matter of social work science, that is, the specific question perspective which is investigated can be defined as follows:

Social Work Science as a Translational Action Science

In order to be able to create change strategies suitable for this multiplexity, a hybrid, cross-disciplinary, translational science is needed. Translational science is a new agenda in medicine in the United States, it should be also important for social work (Brekke, Ell, & Palinkas, 2007; Fong, 2011). The intention is to bridge the gap between research and practice, scientific discoveries must be translated into practical application. This translation should not be a one-way street (it is not only about a language that practitioners understand): the scientists must leave the ivory tower and inquire into what is the matter in practice, and for practice it “is to speed the use of findings of our best science into usual care settings” (Brekke et al., 2007, p. 123).

The new change models should program the help for clients (and other addressees) in a way that all problem sides are taken into account and a “thorough going” comprehensive help is guaranteed. They must be innovative, genuine models in “vernacular terms” (J. F. Herbart), the idea that one can piece them together from theories out of the diverse referential sciences is erroneous. New “cross-disciplinary” models are necessary, which grasp the interdependencies between micro-, meso-, and macro-factors at the explanatory level (this cannot be done by the classic basic disciplines!) and conceive action programs on the change models level, which makes possible a multifarious kind of help.

Must It Be A Science?

At the Los Angeles conference in May 2011, Brekke (2011), after balancing the pros and cons, suggested as “intellectual ingredients”: domains of a science of social work (e.g., marginalization, disenfranchisement, individual vs. social factors in disease) and core constructs (biopsychosocial, person-in-environment, levels of systems). But one has to consider whether this is enough for implementing a science. For being on the safer side, one must make a clear distinction between theory building and epistemologically grounding a social work science. Theories “are impregnated with conjectural expectations (. . . ) there can be no pure observational language, since all languages are impregnated with theories and myths” (Popper, 1973, p. 145). Gambrill (2006, p. 154) also speaks about “avoiding the prisons of theories,” but simultaneously she is herself an example of how one can unwittingly become a prisoner. By taking, within a “contextual approach,” as the personal factor only the reinforcement paradigm familiar in the United States, she makes an eclectic, unjustified decision. One has to be careful to stay a visitor and not to become a prisoner. Epistemology too gives no Archimedian point (see next chapter), but it is important not to intermingle the two levels.

Epistemological “Schools”: None Is Right But None Dispensable

There are numerous epistemological positions (positivism, radical, moderate, social constructivism, hermeneutic position, and phenomenology). It depends on the science-theoretical positions which questions it is actually possible to pose. There is thus no Archimedian point by which a decision between these would be possible. They must, therefore, be allowed to exist alongside each other. If one proceeds from one position as being exclusively valid, one always arrives at restrictions of one’s horizon from which no further reflection is possible. Of course, it makes sense to work out the consequences for theorizing on social work but one must not make the mistake of taking one position to be the right one (for e.g., cf. Lorenz, 2011: hermeneutic-critical position, cf. Payne, 1997: social constructivism), they must live in coexistence, the research results from one direction can be fruitful for the others.

Informed Integrative Eclecticism as a Strategy for Theory-Building

Theories are like searchlights, says Karl Popper, they bring light into the darkness, therefore, we can do with many of them. Having only one theory is risky. The practitioners are faced with a mishmash of theories from several disciplines, which are radically contradictory, each one proclaims a different “truth” and leads to a totally different practice. Whoever wants to work in a science-based way must not apply a single theory or a single-discipline device.

A means has yet to be found to deal with the problem of the heap of theories. The referential disciplines are each a maze of theories before which a practitioner can only capitulate; picking out just one is no solution either, as this would violate the principle of justifiability.

Eclecticism is a pejorative label for an accidental selection or mixing of theory elements. An arbitrary eclecticism simply takes any theory and declares it to be the only one universally valid. This contradicts the principle of justified decisions searching for answers to the question How can we know what helps? An unregulated eclecticism, a spontaneous mixing of theories is also not advisable, because it leads to mere fumbling around (if one does not work, just take the other). One could bring together the incompatible, like fire and water, which extinguish each other (e.g., one tries to be friendly–empathic, if this does not work, one uses the emergency brakes and goes over to confrontation and criticism). From these two should be distinguished an informed integrative eclecticism: In seeking for a justifiable way, it seems advisable to, as it were, bundle the searchlights, so that what cannot be seen with one theory can be brought to light by the other. One can achieve this, if one does not stress the contrasts, but instead looks for a common denominator of different theories. There are two options: one can apply the integrative procedure at the explanatory level and attempt to bring into accordance different theories for deducing guide lines for practice. One can also deduce action programmes from diverse models and integrate them at the methodological level. This integrative eclecticism must be a temporary solution until research can offer sounder models.