Abstract
A response to the critique of where social work research currently stands, as put forth by Garrow and Hasenfeld, and their position that social work research should be undertaken from a feminist perspective. It is important to remember the origins and foundation of feminist thought and to approach research and practice with a full understanding of what both empiricist epistemology and feminist standpoint epistemology actually means. Maintaining a balanced perspective and recognizing the value in varied approaches to scientific inquiry will keep the field of social work moving toward its ultimate goal of reducing the plight of marginalized and oppressed peoples. Social work research and practice has always claimed itself to be committed to furthering social justice and equality and to building a society with a minimum of human suffering. In order to remain focused on these goals, perhaps a shift in perspective is necessary.
We, as social work practitioners, researchers, and academics, have a duty to fulfill the core principles of the profession. Garrow and Hasenfeld, quite rightly I believe, question whether the best means of doing this is to subscribe to and be guided by the currently mainstream research and intervention methodological positions. That is, empiricism, by virtue of not questioning it, provide a tacit approval and acceptance of the dominant narrative. How can this be the best means to achieve the end goal which is to better the lives, health, well-being, and environment of those who suffer. The argument and the question are rather circular. But at the center is the simple dilemma of whether it is possible to dismantle an oppressive and unequal system, an oppressive and unequal system at that, with continued reliance on tools bestowed upon us by the architects of that system. Simply put, can a slave use a master’s scythe against him with any degree of sustainable success? Eric Hoffer speaks of a “true believer,” a unifying person or force to motivate the proletariat, an outside actor; this actor brings new methods, new definitions, new weapons, and new strategies (1951). This actor, ideally, reminds the powerless that they do not have to remain so; they do not have to adhere to their assigned role or play by the rules already written. And while the varied permutations of feminist theory may not always subscribe to this concept, it is certainly part of a paradox that has doggedly plagued agents of change. Do we in fact have to be a part of the thing to change it from within, a subtle changing of the language and culture within a nexus of acceptable behavior? Or do we stand apart and draw up our battle lines? Will the tools ever be truly belonging to those who would deserve them or are they forever tainted by their lineage. The deck is stacked, of course, but will the house always win unless until they are forced to play with a different set of cards?
Empiricism, or the traditional philosophical position taken by researchers in both the “hard” and “soft” sciences, has a vital place in academia and indeed the larger society. To ignore the fact that dominant paradigms and norms exist is absurd, but refusing to accept any of these, by virtue of their dominance, is also counterproductive. The problem, it seems, is that there has been no middle ground achieved. There is no place where feminist perspectives and empiricist ones can meet in a useful manner. For each standpoint has value and contributes hugely to the field.
The paper in question does an excellent job of delineating the drawbacks of traditional research methodology, and why these elements can be harmful. What it does not do, however, is adequately explain how to implement the proposed alternative. When stating that one method should be cast aside in favor of another, it seems one should offer a more thorough picture of how to go about this. Too often, do we castigate an intervention or theory without giving any reasonable alternative, and that creates a problem for researchers, the scope and quality of work, and the individual research participants themselves.
We, as social work providers and researchers, no matter what our ideological or theoretical standpoint, see that our primary mission is to enhance human well-being and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty. Social work is the Sisyphean task of ending human suffering and inequality. Social work focuses not just on individual well-being but also on that of society. Our goal, collectively and quite simply, is to help. To see injustice, inequality, and oppression as circumstances that can be changed, not as static conditions. The National Association of Social Workers (NASW) code of ethics outlines the core principles and ideology of the field. By subscribing to this code, we have entered into a contract; the conditions surrounding us demand our continued and focused service toward social justice, the importance of human relationships, the dignity and worth of all persons, and to serve these goals with competence and integrity (NASW, 2008).
Epistemology
Epistemology is simply a theory of knowledge—how do we know what we know and where does this knowledge originate? Epistemology is at the beginning of any and every scientific inquiry, it informs which questions are asked. Beneath this is the broader system of beliefs; once an epistemological position is taken and the subject or question decided upon, it is the epistemology that determines what methods will be used, how the research itself will be conducted, and how it will be reported. Hasenfeld and Garrow argue that, if this is flawed or created by and for the dominant and oppressive actors in our culture, everything stemming from it will be tainted, fruit of a poison tree. This is by no means a new argument and is quite compelling, though divisive.
This article argues, however, that even the “objective” truths, the properties and qualities of different groups, and what is needed—these things are in fact dictated. The assumptions about the needs of those served by social work are specious at best and harmful at worst.
The argument is a circular one: Science and research must be as objective and neutral as possible, which is impossible, given the fact the entire system is one of social inequality. The definitions and qualities themselves, the facts known about any given group, are based not in the realities of said group but in the projections upon them. They, in turn, come to emulate those projections, and the cycle becomes self-sustaining. Empiricist research is based in part on a major assumption that damages everything flowing from it; researchers in this method accept that there is a common goal, an understanding, of what social needs must be met. Beneath this common understanding, supporting, and shoring up the goals set forth is the research itself, which appreciates and acknowledges the differences between us; there is a determination not to accept knowledge adopted wholesale across disciplines.
The societal and cultural problems that are the foci of social work—both in practice and research—should be addressed using the highest level of integrity and evidence. At its core, evidence-based practice represents a commitment to the principles and values of the field. Garrow and Hasenfeld argue that utilizing an empiricist epistemology as the basis for research is exactly opposite to these ideals. If we aim to eradicate inequality and injustice, why then have we adopted a methodology that is firmly rooted in the dominant culture? It is dismissive to state that, in short, science and the scientific method is inherently oppressive; that its very design is one that feeds into and supports a deeply flawed system of beliefs and norms. But dismissive or no, it is also, at least in part, true. Given social work’s constant struggle to be taken seriously as a science, it is no wonder why there is conflict and lack of clarity around these issues. It becomes a seemingly endless and unbreakable Möbius strip.
The Feminist Difference
Feminist standpoint epistemology is rooted in Marxist theory; in the belief that an individual’s lived experience, her place in the world and culture, inform and builds not only her reality but also how she understands of her social position and of the larger sociocultural world. One must begin, as social work does, at the assumption that there are social inequalities and hierarchies in effect. Social work is undertaken in an effort to address these inequalities and the pain stemming from them. Marxist theory suggests that those in power need only to understand their place, while those in the margins need to see the larger picture and their place in it; a person must understand these two realities in order to survive. Feminism argues that marginalized people can more easily see the disparities and mechanisms which support and foster oppression: the very thing social work seeks to remedy. Is it possible to utilize tools bestowed by the controlling culture for the purpose of dismantling the system of power? There are arguments for both causes, science should strive to be neutral, argues one side, and neutrality is impossible, argues the other. And to be sure, science is not immune to societal factors and may often be at risk of reflecting only the beliefs of the majority. There is a representation, however, a narrative that presents hard science as though it is a thing unto itself, and is thought to be above or outside the messiness and disorder of the world. Hard sciences are often represented as being untouched and untainted by outside influence or pressure. This concept—this idealized and quite frankly ludicrous construct—is an unattainable goal. It is a fantasy, and if we are to be honest and thorough in our research, we must discard the notion of a completely objective truth, while at the same time making a convincing argument—perhaps even an argument that can be proven or as close to proven as we are likely to get.
The authors propose starting from the perspective of the marginalized. They admit that this could lead to bias but offer no true means to combat these biases. Only the empirical can cure these biases. Herein is the crux of the problem. The problem may not be with either stance specifically but with our unwillingness and perhaps inability to see the value inherent to both. Too often we tend toward extremism; in a field where nuance is meant to be important and valuable, why do we argue without respect for it?
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.