Abstract
The reduction of prehospital delay for patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS) is widely discussed within cardiac research. Medically informed literature generally considers patient hesitancy in seeking treatment a significant barrier to accessing timely treatment. With this starting point, we conducted an interview study with people previously hospitalized for ACS and with the bystanders involved in their decision to contact the health care system. The analysis was conducted in two stages: first, a systematic extraction of key information; second, an in-depth analysis informed by medical anthropology. This led us to understand the prehospital period as an interpretation process where bodily sensations appeared as symptoms. Informants vacillated between sensations, knowledge, interpretations, and emotions as they struggled to preserve everyday ordinariness. They were led to contact the health care system by bodily discomfort rather than a rational decision to reduce risk. The paradigmatic implications from medical anthropology proved an important alternative to the medical paradigm.
Keywords
Introduction
In the article, we explore health care–seeking practices among people affected by acute coronary syndrome (ACS). Along with the presentation of the study, we present our epistemological journey away from a purely medical understanding, arguing that perspectives on bodily sensation borrowed from medical anthropology have much to offer in the understanding of what is conceptualized within cardiological research as prehospital delay. The overall aim is to contribute to the growing body of literature aiming to expand and nuance the conceptualization of everyday decision-making processes relating to health and the symptoms of ACS.
Background
Our empirical starting point is the field of cardiology. During the past 20 to 30 years, the concept of “prehospital delay” has attracted significant interest both within cardiac clinics and within ongoing research. Prehospital delay is considered a major factor impeding the delivery of effective treatment, and the challenge of reducing prehospital delay for patients with ACS has been widely discussed (Coventry, Schalkwyk, Thompson, Hawkins, & Hegney, 2017; Dracup, 2009; Dracup & Moser, 1997; Moser et al., 2006).
Prehospital delay is defined as “the time from onset of symptoms to arrival to the hospital” (Xie, Huang, & Hu, 2015, p. 75) and can be divided into two time periods: patient delay (PD) time and transportation delay (TD) time. According to La Xie et al. (2015), patient delay is defined as “time from the onset of symptoms to making the initial decision to seek for professional healthcare facility” and is “mainly caused by the patient’s own decisions.” (p. 75) In line with this understanding, medical literature argues that a major impediment to achieving timely treatment is related to the patient’s indecision and reluctance to seek treatment (Moser et al., 2006; Xie et al., 2015). As stated by Ottesen, Dixen, Torp-Pedersen, and Køber (2004), Delay in the recognition of symptoms as requiring medical attention may be a result of inadequate knowledge of heart attack symptoms, maladaptive coping strategies, interaction with the surroundings or misattribution of the symptoms to a non-cardiac and potentially less serious cause (p. 97).
Accordingly, it is problematized that “[d]espite decades of research and public education campaigns aimed at decreasing patient delay times, most patients still do not seek treatment in a timely manner” (Moser et al., 2006, p. 168).
Much research has, therefore, focused on investigating whether the reasons why patients do not seek health care in a timely manner are due to difficulties in recognizing symptoms (Moser et al., 2006; O’Donnell, McKee, Mooney, O’Brien, & Moser, 2014; O’Donnell & Moser, 2012; Roffi et al., 2015), or to issues related to race and gender (Al-Hassan, 2015; Banks & Dracup, 2007; Davis, 2017; Galick, D’Arrigo-Patrick, & Knudson-Martin, 2015; McSweeney, Lefler, Fischer, Naylor, & Evans, 2007; Ratner et al., 2006); age (Ryan & Zerwic, 2003); beliefs; knowledge and interpretation of symptoms (Cytryn, Yoskowitz, Cimino, & Patel, 2009; O’Brien, O’Donnell, McKee, Mooney, & Moser, 2013; Perkins-Porras, Whitehead, Strike, & Steptoe, 2009; Thuresson et al., 2007); cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses (Finnegan et al., 2000; Gallagher, Marshall, & Fisher, 2010; Rosenfeld, Lindauer, & Darney, 2005; Sjöström-Strand & Fridlund, 2008); or patients’ and relatives’ thoughts and actions (Henriksson, Lindahl, & Larsson, 2007) or emotions (Nymark, Mattiasson, Henriksson, & Kiessling, 2014).
The point of departure for our study was in line with the assumptions embedded in this medical paradigm, focusing on the processes of decision-making and cognition. Thus, our aim was to examine the prehospital process in ACS patients, focusing on the interaction between people suffering from ACS and the person(s) facilitating their contact with health professionals. This endeavor was formulated on the basis of a previous study on ACS and prehospital delay (Larsen & Lorentzen, 2016), together with literature that identifies a “witness” (Moser et al., 2006) or “bystander” (Finnegan et al., 2000; Henriksson et al., 2007) who facilitates contact with the health care system by advising or persuading the affected person to seek health care (Coventry et al., 2017; Finnegan et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2010; Henriksson et al., 2007; Khraim & Carey, 2009). We assumed that by examining the significance of this interaction and of the knowledge of and/or the impact made by this person (in this article termed the bystander), we would contribute to the fundamental knowledge available to improve efforts to reduce prehospital delay. However, during the process of interviewing and analyzing, we realized that much more was at stake than knowledge, cognitive processes, and linear decision-making.
As we noticed that the medically informed literature provided little, if any, space for acknowledging the complex process undergone by the patients and their relatives in relation to recognizing, negotiating, and accepting their illness, we searched for a new theoretical framework with which to understand this process. Although the medically informed literature generally indicates that delay in seeking medical help is caused by some sort of “deficiency” or “weakness” on the part of the patients, we wanted to take a step back and explore this process, to clarify the nature of this apparent hesitation. In the reorientation of our study, we were inspired by the ongoing discussion in medical anthropology of symptom experiences (Andersen, Nichter, & Risør, 2017). In exploring this field of knowledge, we found new concepts to inform our analysis. We came to understand the prehospital period as what might be seen as a back-and-forth process in which bodily sensations appeared as symptoms and our informants vacillated between sensations, knowledge, interpretations, and emotions as they experienced the bodily sensations of potential ACS. On this basis, we decided to leave behind the idea of the prehospital phase as a cognitive decision process and explore the phase as it appeared in all its complexity.
Method
The study was designed as an exploratory interview study with people who had been hospitalized for ACS and with those among their close family or friends who were involved with them in the period preceding their contact with the health care system. In this article, these people are termed bystanders.
Recruitment and Data Collection
Informants were recruited from the catchment area of the Central Jutland Regional Hospital, which serves patients from a large part of the central Denmark region, comprising both urban and rural areas. We recruited 17 men and women above the age of 18 (no upper age limit) who had been diagnosed with and hospitalized for ACS and whose decision to contact health care in the prehospital phase involved a bystander. The informants were included successively, as we made no strategic recruitment based on gender, age, or social status, based on the assumption that the phenomenon examined was universal in the population and not dependent upon such factors. A further requirement was that informants should be able to understand and speak Danish adequately and be physically and mentally able to participate in an interview.
The recruitment was carried out by two project nurses employed in the cardiac unit. The project nurses identified, contacted, and informed potential informants verbally and in writing about the project. Patients who agreed to participate were then screened according to our inclusion criteria. Subsequently, the screening forms together with the informed consent forms signed by the participating informants were distributed equally between the three authors. Patients were contacted by telephone 4 weeks after their discharge from hospital to agree an interview time with the patient and with her or his bystander(s). The patients themselves contacted the bystander(s) who had been involved in their decision to seek medical help.
Interviews were conducted 1 to 2 months after discharge during the period June 2016 to June 2017. Both the patient and her or his bystander(s) participated in the interview. Fourteen of the interviews were conducted with one patient and one bystander, whereas three were conducted with one patient and two or three bystanders. With the exception of one (a neighbor), all the bystanders were close family members (partners, sons/daughters, children-in-law). The interviews took place at a location of the patient’s choosing. All except two interviews were conducted in the patient’s home: one of these was conducted in a bystander’s home, the other at the research center. 1 The 17 patients were between 45 and 85 years old (M age = 67 years). Fourteen were males and three females. All interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim.
The interview guide was constructed in accordance with guidelines for qualitative interviewing (Brinkmann & Tanggaard, 2015; Halkier, 2008) and was also informed by our initial research interest in the experiences and the decision-making processes of the patients in relation to their contact with the health care system. In particular, the interview topics focused on the following: How was the contact initiated? Which persons participated? What was the nature of the interaction between the person with ACS symptoms and the bystander(s) in the prehospital phase?
During the interview process, we became aware of the limitations of our approach with regard to conceptualizing the prehospital phase in terms of delay, cognitive symptom recognition, and decision-making. The informants told us stories that were much more multifaceted and complex than the medically informed approach and its concepts could cope with or express. In accordance with the exploratory nature of qualitative research and the concept of the researcher as a “traveler” (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, pp. 66–68), we followed the informants on their retrospective journeys to broaden our understanding of health care–seeking practices among the informants.
Ethical Aspects
Prior to project launch, the relevant permissions granting access to work within the field were obtained from the clinical partners involved in the collaboration. All informants (patients and bystanders) were verbally briefed and received written information about the project’s aims, processes, and procedures. Participation was voluntary, and those invited to participate were informed that they were at liberty to withdraw from the study at any time, if they wished. Written consent was obtained from all informants. Complete anonymity was ensured throughout the study for all participants, as stipulated in the Danish Act on Processing of Personal Data (Department of Justice, Denmark, 2018). The project was registered with the Danish Data Protection Agency (reference number: 1–16–02–292–16).
Data Analysis and Analytical Perspectives
In the first phase, we systematically extracted information concerning age, gender, symptoms, symptom interpretation, and health care–seeking practices prior to hospitalization to gain an overview. From this first extraction, we identified four salient features across the 17 interviews. These are presented below in the first part of the “Findings” section.
A second analytical process, moving back and forth between empirical data, theoretical concepts, and interpretations, then followed. Through this process of in-depth analysis, the salient features from the first analysis phase were further nuanced and conceptualized. In this phase, the analysis moved from the informants’ own words and self-understandings to what Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) refer to as critical common-sense understanding and theoretical understanding.
In this phase, moving toward a theoretical understanding (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009), we drew on theoretical literature from the field of medical anthropology on symptom experiences (Andersen et al., 2017; Hay, 2008; Offersen, Bech Risør, Vedsted, & Sand Andersen, 2016). In particular, we drew on Cameron Hay’s (2008) distinction between sensations and symptoms, and on her exploration of the process by which a sensation becomes transformed into a symptom. According to Hay, “[a] sensation is embodied; it is felt experience. By contrast, a symptom is a constructed and socially informed cognitive interpretation that indexes but is not itself an embodied sensation” (p. 221). Sensations never begin as symptoms. They only become symptoms post hoc, that is, after being interpreted as abnormal. This interpretation is, according to Hay, socioculturally informed. According to Hay, bodily sensations are interpreted as symptoms and are accordingly considered as concerns only if (a) a person assesses them as augmenting his or her sense of vulnerability, (b) they exceed normal expectations for duration, or (c) they are disabling beyond what could be considered normal (Hay, 2008). Hay’s argument is that the transformation from sensation to symptom is socially dependent, because the interpretation must be socially legitimated for the transformation to be completed. Consequently, the interpretation is always tentative, and in fact remains open to reinterpretation depending on cultural knowledge and social interaction. Consequently, it is based on people’s judgments that a sensation exceeds acceptable temporal spans or disabilities, or that it fits within their expectations based on experiences of vulnerability, that people seek care (Hay, 2008).
We drew additionally on Offersen et al. (2016), whose work was influenced by the medical anthropology of sensations as suggested by Hay. Within the field of cancer diagnostics in Denmark, Offersen et al. explored “the uncertainty and ambiguity that exists in the space between bodily sensations and symptoms of illness” (p. 23) in the context of middle-class everyday life. According to Offersen et al., middle-class everyday life is characterized by aiming for “the ordinary” everyday life, and additionally by an ongoing process of interpretation of ambiguous sensations. In this view, bodily sensations contain different forms of potentiality: Depending on the specific time and place where a bodily sensation is experienced by an individual subject - and thus constituting the liminal space between sensation and symptom or “non-symptom” – the various potentialities will take on different weight and constitute the perception of potentiality of the sensation. (Offersen et al., 2016, p. 31)
This research influenced our decision to consider the period prior to initiating contact with the health care system as a period of essential uncertainties and the effort to control them.
Throughout the entire process, the three authors discussed themes, interpretations, and findings to ensure the validity of their analyses.
Findings
In the first analytical phase, four preliminary salient features were identified in the prehospital process of ACS across all interviews:
Ignoring and/or dismissing bodily sensations. Typically, the patients’ initial response to their bodily sensations caused by ACS was to ignore them. The majority (11 out of 17) of informants explicitly expressed an expectation that the sensations would pass. Asked about their thoughts in this period, they typically answered, “I thought: It will probably pass.”
Ascribing bodily sensations to already known disorders. When pain and discomfort persisted, the informants typically interpreted their bodily sensations in the light of already known or already diagnosed health problems, such as back pain, gastric catarrh, or carpal tunnel syndrome. With the exception of five individuals, the informants did not ascribe prodromal symptoms to heart disease.
Not ascribing bodily sensations to the heart despite family predisposition to ACS. According to the patients themselves, 10 informants had a family predisposition to ACS. Nevertheless, only one patient ascribed the bodily sensations to the heart. The only one who interpreted the pain and discomfort as symptoms related to ACS had suffered from ACS twice previously.
Ascribing bodily sensations to the heart subsequent to previous experience of ACS. The four patients who quite quickly interpreted their sensations as symptoms of ACS had previously suffered from ACS at least once.
In the subsequent theoretically informed analysis, these features appeared across all the new theoretically informed features. In this respect, the four salient features noted above are intertwined in the following presentation of the results of the second analytical phase.
The Transformation of Sensations to Symptoms in the Context of Everyday Ordinariness
A feature of our research design was that all informants (patients and their friends and relatives) were asked to recall their experiences, thoughts, and reactions from a period before the transformation of sensations into symptoms. In this sense, the informants’ answers are retrospective narrations of the “before” period: They have been reconstructed in light of the informants’ current knowledge that the sensations were actually symptoms of ACS. To cite Hay, “The ambiguous sensations have been indexed” (Hay, 2008, p. 221). Despite this, our data are rich in descriptions of the process as a constant negotiation with oneself, a process in which emotions, experiences, and rationality are constantly in play.
For example, one of the informants (Informant 5) told us that the month before he was hospitalized, he had been experiencing some discomfort in various parts of his chest. It got worse, and in the course of a few days, the pain started to spread to his left shoulder; he had difficulty breathing and he felt increasingly tired. His wife thought the symptoms were caused by his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and was irritated that he took so little exercise; the informant thought it would pass. Finally, after a month, he felt so poorly that his wife called the out-of-hours general practitioner (GP) as he did not have the strength to do so himself. The informant continued to say that he was sure it would pass; all the same, his wife rang for the doctor. When he was asked whether this was the first time that he had experienced these symptoms, he said yes: Interviewer: You are saying that you had never experienced anything similar before? Informant: No, I hadn’t. I have obviously been aware of it, precisely because it is . . . it is a family weakness. My mom died at 41 and her dad at 48 and her mom at 52. It’s something to do with the circulation and things like that. Interviewer: What did you think yourself when you became so poorly? Informant: Not anything really. I thought it might be something that had got caught, muscle pain or something like that. Wife: I thought it was very unlike him to be feeling how he was feeling. I had a father-in-law and when he had a heart attack he was screaming and shouting—he was certainly in a lot of pain. It was nothing like that, but I still thought that it was probably best if I call [for help].
The period of what in the field of cardiology is termed prodromal symptom was reported by the informants as lasting between 1 week and 2 years. Only one of the patients reported “classic” symptoms of acute indisposition and strong heart pain. For some patients, the bodily sensations were of concern and, to some extent, impeded their day-to-day activities; yet, at the same time, they were interpreted as changes in already known disorders. This could be interpreted as an aim for the ordinary in everyday life as described by Offersen et al. (2016). Drawing on Offersen, we consider our study to be focusing on a dramatic event against a background of everyday, unremarkable ordinariness. Looking back, all of us, including the patients, now know that the blurred and ambiguous sensations were actually symptoms of a potentially fatal disease. Despite their current knowledge, however, the informants described very clearly how, during the prehospital phase, they kept interpreting their bodily discomfort as symptoms of already known disorders. It is clear to us that in doing so, they were trying to downplay any drama and to preserve everyday ordinariness. For example, one patient’s wife stated that her husband had said, “Oh there is something that has got struck,” because he had previously suffered from several disk prolapses in his back.
Another woman said, I lost the power of my hands, tenderness, and had trouble holding things, simply holding a cup could be difficult, I simply did not have the strength [. . .] Actually, I was thinking: it does fit a bit with what I had a year ago, it was at the same time, it’s probably some arthritis. It fits with it had started to get cold—and things like that.
When the pain became more intense, she thought it was probably carpal tunnel syndrome.
According to Hay, the process of interpretation is shaped by the application of cultural knowledge and by social interaction. Sensations only become symptoms when others legitimate them as significantly affecting one’s being-in-the-world (Hay, 2008). At first glance, however, we did not find that social legitimacy featured in our study. On the contrary, as reported above, the patients typically neglected to ascribe their sensations to the heart, despite the fact that their friends and relatives had expressed their concerns and their own heart-related interpretations. In our empirical setting, therefore, social legitimacy seemed to be less important than Hay suggests. Most patients did not seek social legitimacy for their symptoms. Some of them simply tried to hide and play down their discomfort and concerns. For example, Interviewer: You didn’t seek medical advice? Patient’s wife: No, because it would just go away again, you know? And we don’t like to make a fuss. It’s like what we say about dogs: if a man can eat and shit, then he’s all right.
This can, however, be interpreted as a more subtle expression of the significance of social legitimacy. Aiming to preserve ordinary everyday life, the patients attempted to avoid the “pressure” of a potential shared interpretation that the bodily sensations were related to more serious illness. Therefore, it is fair to say that social legitimacy did feature, but only by working the other way around: A sensation interpreted as a symptom remains open to reinterpretation if not socially legitimated (Hay, 2008). In this way, hiding or downplaying the bodily discomfort hinders the anxiety-provoking interpretation that the bodily sensations are symptoms of something serious or life threatening.
Sense of Vulnerability
The first phase of our analysis had revealed that the five patients who did ascribe their uncomfortable bodily sensations to heart disease had previously been diagnosed with ACS, whereas patients with a known family predisposition to ACS did not interpret their discomfort as symptoms associated with the heart. Drawing on Hay, we interpret this as an expression of the patients’ sense of vulnerability. According to Hay, one of the prerequisites for someone to interpret bodily sensations as symptoms is that they assess them as augmenting his or her sense of vulnerability. Vulnerability plays an important role in the interpretation of sensation. It can be deeply personal and indeed unique and it stems from, among other things, a dynamic interplay of an individual’s personal past experiences: “The closer the sensations match a known vulnerability, the more likely they are to be interpreted as symptoms” (Hay, 2008, p. 210). In our data, the crucial personal past experience seems to be the individual’s concrete and lived experience, whereas abstract knowledge of a statistical risk of future health problems did not engender the same sense of vulnerability.
Accordingly, patients who had been previously diagnosed with other health problems interpreted their bodily sensations as symptoms of those conditions. For example, one informant who was convinced that he would not develop ACS because he was on blood thinners attributed his symptoms to the condition he knew he had: gastritis. This illustrates, as Hay (2008) suggests, that every person has an internalized and dynamic set of perceived illnesses to which they feel vulnerable, and that this unique sense of vulnerability catalyzes people to seek answers to or explanations for what they have come to see as either symptoms or harbingers of illness. What in the medical-informed literature is perceived as being caused by interpretative incompetence emerges in this perspective as an example of the complexity of the symptom interpretation process, particularly for people experiencing comorbidity.
Disabling Beyond What Can Be Considered Normal
The usual practice across all our subjects of ignoring or excusing their bodily discomfort and expecting or hoping that it would pass appears to have been a process of negotiation and interpretation, which continued to hold up to the point when bodily discomfort reached a level that was impossible to ignore. Thus, the decision to contact the health care system was made as a result of bodily discomfort rather than any rational decision to try to reduce risk. For example, one patient hoped that the pain would pass if he went out to work in his old car. But it did not. He began to sweat profusely and became dizzy. “I didn’t realize anything was wrong until ten minutes before the ambulance came.” This is in line with Hay’s (2008) observation that sensations are evaluated in terms of how disruptive they are of a person’s daily activities. Mild sensations, or those that do not significantly impair people’s ability to go about their daily tasks, are less likely to be considered symptoms, whereas seriously disruptive sensations tend to be rapidly reinterpreted as symptoms worthy of outside attention. However, we found that some of our informants had endured even very disabling symptoms without contacting the health system. For example, the man previously mentioned who thought he might have gastritis lived with strong pain for a week. He managed to do his job as a teacher by holding onto the blackboard to remain standing. One morning, he called the GP and got an appointment for the afternoon. He waited for 6 hours, sitting in an armchair, struggling with the pain. Then, he drove himself to the doctor, and was immediately hospitalized.
Due to the specific disease progress of ACS, the time span from what in the field of cardiology is termed prodromal symptom to a life-threatening and seriously disabling symptom can be quite short. Thus, most of the informants’ narrations included a process of blurred and ambiguous “noise” from the body, until this phase was replaced by an abrupt change to intense or unbearable bodily discomfort. Some of the patients were in intense pain, others collapsed and lost consciousness. Not until this phase did the informants stop ignoring their bodily sensations and agree with the people around them to contact the health care system.
Discussion
The concept of delay has been subject to critique and debate within the field of cancer diagnostics (Andersen et al., 2017; Offersen et al., 2016), but to our knowledge, only rudiments of a similar debate have taken place within the field of cardiology. In 2006, Moser et al. suggested four major challenges to be addressed by researchers and clinicians to move knowledge forward in the area of ACS and stroke. One of these challenges was the need to move away from examining sociodemographic and health-history factors related to delay, and toward understanding the social, cognitive, and emotional factors that contribute to delay in greater depth, both singly and in interaction (Moser et al., 2006). Moser et al. pointed to the need for research designs based on interviews and questionnaires that go beyond demographically based analyses.
However, in our search of the literature, we found very few qualitative studies. In a grounded theory study based on observations and interviews, Turris and Johnson (2008) explored how women seeking treatment for the symptoms of potential cardiac illness interpreted their symptoms, made decisions about seeking treatment, and understood their experiences of care in the emergency room. In line with our study, Turris and Johnson’s study illustrated that the women resisted any disruption to day-to-day life and that this influenced their decisions about whether to seek medical help. Family and job responsibilities and social roles were generally judged to be of a higher priority than the cardiac symptoms experienced. However, the qualitative studies we found on health care–seeking practices among people with ACS tend to present perspectives and results in line with medically informed literature, that is, by implicitly privileging symptoms as realities and by assessing patients’ and relatives’ ability to recognize symptoms as if these were objective realities. Some studies express the ambition to explore the process of interpretation and decision in greater depth, but these seem to be hampered by unchallenged basic assumptions similar to those from the cardiology field embedded in the research designs. For example, Davis (2017) recently conducted an interesting interview study aiming to identify factors influencing women’s ability to recognize and accurately interpret symptoms of suspected ACS. According to this study, the women underwent a process of recognizing and interpreting their symptoms. Women with less severe, intermittent, or evolving symptoms were at increased risk of delayed presentation, diagnosis, and treatment for ACS. In line with the assumption that decisions are cognitive processes mainly supported by knowledge, the study concluded that these women should be targeted for educational and behavioral interventions. More recently, Coventry et al. (2017) also conducted an interesting interview study aiming to explore “patient decision delay, the symptom experience and factors that motivated the patient experiencing myocardial infarction to go to the emergency department.” (p. 1993) Coventry et al. revealed the significance of the context of the event, the symptomatology, and the layperson who was the first point of contact and influenced the patient’s decision whether or not to go to the emergency room. In the main, the results of both studies are similar to the salient features found in our initial analysis, focusing on the informants’ self-understanding. Both studies do indeed provide in-depth knowledge about relevant aspects of ACS. But all research approaches—including our own study—are limited by their basic assumptions. Neither of these studies challenges the implicit basic assumptions that bodily sensations are already indexed as symptoms in the patients’ minds, and that human life and behavior are mainly formed and changed by knowledge in the form of targeted educational and behavioral interventions. Consequently, the studies seem “tapped in,” reproducing basic views about the problem of delay, and the discussion remains focused on symptom recognition as limited by interpretive incompetence or insufficient knowledge among patients, relatives, and/or health professionals.
Tetley, Grant, and Davies (2009), who explored older people and the use of care service, identified factors in line with our own findings. Based on narratives, they explored the factors that had influenced older people’s decision- and choice-making processes as they used or contemplated using care services. Tetley et al. found that, among other factors, the experiences of struggling to manage everyday care needs, the role of personal factors such as social networks, and the influence of biographical journeys stood out as important factors.
Hay’s model, which seeks to understand the process of interpreting bodily sensations as symptoms, emphasizes the social and cultural contextualization of the body. Although originally based on ethnographic fieldwork in Indonesia, the model is applicable to other cultural contexts, because it is a generic model. We find the model and its paradigmatic implications very stimulating, and we consider it an important alternative to the medical paradigm, suggesting additional factors of relevance when understanding human behavior. Furthermore, we consider the aim of understanding interpretation processes as socially and culturally embedded to be appropriate and fruitful in avoiding judging any informant behavior, even if it appeared unwise from a medical perspective.
Although we eventually decided to drop our initial focus on the significance of the bystander, the joint interviews with patients and bystanders turned out to be a very appropriate arrangement for illuminating the complex and challenging interpretation process. Often the patient’s story was challenged or reinterpreted by the bystander, and vice versa. This gave rise to dialogues between the informants, which unfolded the uncertainty and ambiguity of the prehospital process.
Limitations
Our study is based on retrospective interviews with people who were already patients or bystanders. We were, therefore, asking people to recall their decisions to seek or not to seek health care and treatment. As stressed by Hay (2008), this design does not necessarily provide insight into how people initially experience sensations and struggle to interpret them in terms of their practical realities, because they may be seeking to legitimate their decisions (Hay, 2008). To some extent, we recognize a tendency among the patients to legitimate their decisions. However, our data were rich in descriptions of the back-and-forth processes and the accompanying thoughts, worries, and hopes as well as the patients’ and their bystanders’ retrospective reflections. Thus, in our assessment, the informants’ certainty in the interview situation that the bodily sensations had actually been symptoms of ACS did not inhibit both the patients and the bystanders from recalling their thoughts and emotions from the prehospital phase.
As stated throughout the article, our analysis is the result of one analytical perspective among many. In line with this, we do not consider our study to be authoritative or to be conclusively true. With our study, we seek to provide an alternative explanation to that presented in the existing literature, and to nuance the conceptualization of everyday decision processes relating to health and the symptoms of ACS.
Conclusion
In this study, the paradigmatic implications from the field of medical anthropology proved an important alternative to the medical paradigm. Although the medically informed literature generally indicates that delay in seeking medical help is caused by some sort of “deficiency” or “weakness” on the part of the patients, our study explored the prehospital period as a back-and-forth process in which embodied sensations came to be interpreted as symptoms. The typical initial response to bodily sensations caused by ACS is to ignore them, expecting them to pass. When pain and discomfort persist, people typically interpret their bodily sensations in the light of already known or already diagnosed health problems. Even in cases of a familial predisposition to ACS, only a few people ascribe their bodily sensations to this cause. These features in health care–seeking practice among people affected by ACS can advantageously be understood as a socioculturally informed process of interpretation. Our study contributes to the growing body of literature aiming to expand the conceptualization of everyday decision processes relating to health and the symptoms of ACS.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We thank RN Mary Vestergaard and RN Lene Halager Poulsen for their great work and commitment in recruiting informants. We thank patients and relatives for their hospitality and confidence during the period of data collection.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: We would like to express our gratitude for the kind support to our research project provided by Hans Juulsgaard Jensen’s Family Foundation.
