Abstract
This is a great book, on par with or exceeding the value of Black’s other classics, The Behavior of Law and The Social Structure of Right and Wrong. Whereas those books explained the handling of conflict, Moral Time explains its frequency and seriousness. To do so, Black creates an intriguing concept: social time. It is change, or movement, in the social status of and social distance between people. “The fundamental cause of conflict is the movement of social time” (p. 4). Disputes arise when people become too close or distant in relational, vertical, or cultural distance.
Relational distance is the degree of intimacy between people; less intimacy equates to further relational distance. Fluctuation in intimacy is referred to as relational time. Overintimacy is a decrease in relational distance, whereas underintimacy is an increase. Spending more or less time together are instances of the former and latter, respectively. There are two kinds of overintimacy and two kinds of underintimacy. Overinvolvement is to gain too much involvement and overexposure is to give too much. Underinvolvement is to lose too much involvement and underexposure is to give too little. Black proposes that conflict is a direct function of relational time: that is, disputes result from fluctuations in intimacy. This idea explains why rape, incest, adultery, divorce, and nakedness may be seen as wrong.
Vertical distance is the difference in social status between people; greater inequality is equivalent to greater vertical distance. Alteration in status is vertical time. Overstratification is too great an increase in vertical distance; understratification is too great a decrease. The rich becoming richer is an illustration of the first; the poor becoming richer characterizes the second. There are two kinds of overstratification and understratification. Oversuperiority is to rise above another and overinferiority is to drop below. Undersuperiority is the decline of a superior and underinferiority is the ascending of an inferior. Black argues that conflict is a direct function of vertical time: that is, disputes result from alterations in status. This notion tells us why—on one hand—flaunting wealth, hard work, and success may start trouble and—on the other hand—so too may becoming poor or ill.
Cultural distance is the amount of diversity between people with regard to expressions of what is good, true, and beautiful; more diversity corresponds to more distance. Oscillation in such diversity is cultural time. Overdiversity is an increase in cultural distance, while a decrease is underdiversity. The former refers to too much growth in expression, the latter to too much decay or denial. Proposing a new theory is an instance of the former kind; rejecting an established one is of the latter kind. Types of overdiversity are overtraditionalism—when two cultures collide—and overinnovation—when a new expression is born. The two sorts of underdiversity are undertraditionalism, or rejection of the old, and underinnovation, meaning rejection of the new. Black suggests that conflict is a direct function of cultural time: that is, disputes result from oscillation in diversity. Here, we gain understanding of the social impetus behind the persecution of heretics, massacres of natives by Europeans during colonial times, and more recent racial/ethnic conflict in the United States and Europe.
To summarize, then, changes in the intimacy between persons, their social status, and culture cause conflict. In the concluding chapter, Black goes on to suggest that the frequency of conflict from over-/underintimacy, over-/understratification, and over-/underdiversity is explained by the amount of existing social closeness/distance. People with more closeness to begin with have more conflicts over too little closeness; those with more distance have more conflicts over too little distance. In turn, this theory leads to explanations of morality among tribes and in modern societies as well as predictions about that of postmodern time.
There is far more to this book than can be described in this review (see especially Chapter 1), and no amount of praise can adequately describe the respect it deserves. Yet like all good books, all good reviews must try to find a few points for contention or improvement. The two I point out relate to the ways in which the ideas in Moral Time link to those contained in Black’s earlier writings.
First, perhaps Black exaggerates when asserting that “social space is a zero-sum game: When I increase my closeness to you I reduce my closeness to others, and vice versa” (p. 4). I might buy this notion when it comes to vertical distance, but not so much when it comes to relational or cultural distance. For example, and at least initially, do people not become closer to their partners (e.g., wife or husband) by meeting their family or best friends? In the Behavior of Law, Black asserts that persons who share more common ties are closer in relational distance. This seems more satisfactory to me, but at odds with the zero-sum definition. Nor does it seem necessary to me that “I cannot say that … any idea is both true and false” (p. 101) as this is the very essence of irony, a long-standing facet of culture.
Second, and as mentioned above, Black’s prior work theorizes conflict management whereas Moral Time theorizes why conflict begins. In some parts of the book, it is unclear whether and, if so how, this newer theory supersedes or builds on the earlier ones. Relatedly, it is difficult to disentangle the point at which conflict traverses from conception (conflict creation) to birth (conflict management). Addressing these issues is of the utmost importance if the full body of Black’s ideas is to be adequately tested in the future.
These questions notwithstanding, Moral Time represents a milestone contribution to our understanding of the wellsprings of human conflict.