Community Safety Officers in Western Canada

Introduction

Community safety officers (CSOs) have emerged as local security providers in a dozen Canadian cities since 2001. CSOs are not private security, since they are public employees of municipalities and other levels of government. Despite being publicly funded, they are not public police either, because they lack key police powers and don different uniforms. CSOs conduct active patrols in downtowns and other neighborhoods as a form of reassurance policing (Barker & Crawford, 2013) and community policing (Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Fielding & Innes, 2006; Lambert, Wu, Elechi, & Jiang, 2012; Schneider, 2000). They tend to operate according to the “broken windows” thesis that seeks to remove visible signs of disorder. As a result, CSOs in Canada have also become responsible for a range of practices including regulation of “nuisance” and anti-graffiti campaigns. CSOs operate in Western Canadian cities that lack a public police service or receive minimal Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) service. ¹ Although the numbers and roles of CSOs are expanding, no scholarship has examined why these CSOs have emerged in Canadian regions, how local policing and security provision is impacted, or the international policy connections CSOs may have in Canada.

CSOs in the United Kingdom were first introduced via New Labour legislation (Crawford & Lister, 2004; Hughes & Gilling, 2004). In 1998, local governments were mandated by the Home Office “to develop local partnerships with strategies for reducing crime and disorder” (Gilling & Hughes, 2002, p. 5). Although not monolithic, this CSO model has been since transferred elsewhere, such as to Australia in the late 1990s (Cherney & Sutton, 2004). For Canadian CSOs, the principle knowledge transfer stimulus has been CSOs in England. Some Canadian CSOs have emerged independently of public police, but the RCMP also has created a CSO program to enhance visible presence in towns where regular RCMP officers cannot conduct high cost patrols. Whether CSOs in Canada differ from CSOs elsewhere has not been examined. The role that CSOs play in local security networks, how CSOs have diffused among Canadian municipalities, and variation in CSO practices remains unknown too. This dearth of empirical research restricts academic understandings of security, safety, and reassurance and community policing in Canadian jurisdictions and elsewhere (see Barker & Crawford, 2013; Bazeman & Griffiths, 2004; Fielding & Innes, 2006; Lambert et al., 2012; Monaghan, 2008; Schneider, 2000).

Gilling (2001, p. 395) argues more research is needed on CSOs in “advanced liberal states” to determine whether the various CSO models in the United Kingdom have been transferred to new sites. For Gilling, community safety is “an international policy development” (p. 382) and research is needed outside the United Kingdom. Our study examines the following: CSO program establishment and expansion in Canada from 2001 to 2014; CSO practices that include patrols, surveillance, policing of municipal lands, and cooperation with other agencies in local networks; and the role of international CSOs in transferring policy to Canada. We argue that the establishment of CSOs in Western Canada was not a straightforward exercise in international criminal justice policy emulation. Instead, policy has mutated. We show this policy mutation happened not with the initial CSO policy uptake in Canada, but instead as CSOs entered the RCMP’s purview and other Canadian jurisdictions. We demonstrate too that introduction and expansion of CSOs in Canada is an indicator of the status of reassurance and community policing in Canada that currently compete with alternative models such as municipal corporate security transferred from the private sector and the U.S.-based American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS) and which is devoid of community discourse (Lippert, Walby, & Steckle, 2013; Walby & Lippert, 2012). A key purpose for exploring CSOs in Canada is to gain fresh insights into the status and possible futures of community and reassurance policing as opposed to rival approaches such as “intelligence-led policing” or lesser known alternatives, which we discuss subsequently.

This article is in four parts. First, we review existing literature on CSOs in the United Kingdom and in Australia, as well as literature on criminal justice policy transfer. After a note on method, we examine CSO establishment in Canadian cities and analyze CSO practices. We conclude by conceptualizing policy mutation as a distinctive, local, or regional expression of general criminal justice policy transfer. Our findings enhance understanding of CSOs and contribute to criminal justice research on reassurance and community policing by developing insights into these mutations.

Community Safety Officers, Criminal Justice Policy Transfer, and Reassurance Policing

In the United Kingdom, the New Labour criminal justice policy agenda in the 1990s made a lasting impression on policing (Hodgkinson & Tilley, 2011; McAra, 2008). New forms of visible patrol and reassurance policing—including CSOs—became prevalent as a way of addressing crime concerns consistent with New Labour’s criminal justice policy agenda. Reassurance policing grew most during the early 2000s to manage “public insecurities” (Barker & Crawford, 2013, p. 13). Many of these forms are framed as a supplements or complements to public police (Crawford & Lister, 2004, p. 413), not replacements. There are multiple reasons for this development. First, Crawford and Lister (2004) argue that citizens have increased demands for safety. Second, public police welcome load sharing that allows them to retain prominence without a duty to perform all the work. Third, policing in the United Kingdom has been subject to new public management that inserts performance indicators into police work, resulting in civilianization of policing when these measures are not attained. CSOs were one portion of a new “patchwork” of reassurance policing.

Community safety has made its mark not only in local security networks but in academia too. New fora such as Community Safety Journal and debates have emerged that sometimes feature practitioners reflecting on CSO work. As Bailey (2003) remarked, CSOs are involved in a “dazzling variety” (p. 29) of practices, which describes CSOs in Canada now too.

CSOs subsequently arose in Australia. Cherney and Sutton (2004) argue that CSOs in Australia facilitate networks of local security providers. CSOs also shift management of crime from a criminal justice model to a problem-solving approach consistent with community policing principles (Goldstein, 1990). However, Cherney and Sutton note that CSOs face funding challenges and endure at the whim of the ruling political party’s position on policing. Cherney (2004) has argued that CSOs have assumed a chief role across Victoria, Australia, within local safety initiatives. However, “the short-term and contractual nature of their employment” (p. 122) remains challenging.

CSOs are claimed to bring a new style and knowledge to local policing and security provision. Gilling and Hughes (2002) suggest CSOs have professional aspirations and view themselves as significant players in local policing and security networks. The work of CSOs includes liaising with elected officials, the public, public police, media, and more. Hughes and Gilling (2001) similarly argue that CSOs perceive themselves as knowledge workers and networking experts. As Shepherdson, Clancey, Lee, and Crofts (2014) argue, CSOs in Australia participate in local government committees, exchanging information and participating in decision making about safety issues, and enduring what the authors call an “administrative burden” (p. 114). CSOs are jacks-of-all-trades and CSO work is incredibly varied even across one country. Because of all the local diversity, there is no longer a single model of CSO work. Gilling et al. (2013) have conducted comparative research on “the uneven institutionalization of community safety” (p. 326), in particular, in England and Wales, as well as in Scotland and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. In England and Wales, they argue, “institutionalization tended both to be highly dependent upon central government project funding and locally variable” (p. 329). In Scotland, CSOs were not mandatory until 2003, which resulted in local variation. Across Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, CSO models vary considerably too. Gilling et al. stress this is due to the local network aspect of community safety, which we address subsequently in relation to Canada.

Questions also have been raised about the centrality of community discourse in CSO work. Gilling (2001) has argued community safety may be more neoliberal and exclusionary than welfarist and inclusionary. Gilling argues the community safety discourse was too soft for Conservatives in England, yet a few years later it befit the ideological position of New Labour. While the notion of community safety resonates well with community policing principles of prevention and partnership, and the ideas of restorative justice and dialogue, New Labour’s version of community safety was to become inconsistent with the latter two concepts. From the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act onward, it included antisocial behavior orders, which were first called community safety orders. For these reasons, Gilling argues community safety is not as progressive as it might appear. As Gilling noted, “in the UK, community safety shows little sign of bringing about the socialization or welfarisation of criminal justice” (p. 398). Hope (2005) likewise argues the idea of community safety implies citizens and security professionals participating in a dialogue about policing issues, while most citizens have neither the time nor the social capital to do so. The result is that “the communities most in need of community safety will end up doubly disadvantaged” (pp. 382–383), unable to confront security issues or shape security provision. These criticisms also have been lodged against the broader notion of community policing of which reassurance policing and CSOs are constituents. Yet, if we focus exclusively on the deeper reality or effectiveness of CSO work in this way, we may obscure the significance of the centrality of community discourse in CSO emergence and practices in the first place. That community is a signifier in these programs at all raises questions about the future of community policing in light of the emergence of new policy rivals, as we discuss later.

For the RCMP in particular, Deukmedjian and de Lint (2007, p. 247) note that in 1990 community policing “appealed to the most senior levels of the RCMP” and therefore “the Commissioner proposed the adoption of a new service-delivery mechanism for the RCMP at large.” But in the 2000s, this “problem-solving partnership between the RCMP and the ‘community’…had faltered. It was displaced by a style of policing” (p. 250) referred to as intelligence-led policing. In other words, the idea of community policing was (and still is, we show) misaligned with the RCMP’s strategic and tactical orientation. As municipal policing costs continue to increase, the role of public police like the RCMP in community policing in Canada and elsewhere remains murky, and our examination of CSOs clarifies why.

The case of CSOs in Australia, and now Canada, also raises questions about criminal justice policy transfer (Bergin, 2011; Jones & Newburn, 2006). Rather than view the rise of CSOs as a result of corporatism, managerialism, or the offshoot of a particular political regime, we draw from literature on criminal justice policy transfer to conceptualize establishment of CSOs in Canada. Literature on policy transfer examines how policies move across jurisdictions and how policies change. Policy transfer refers to the voluntary flow of ideas that results in policy learning. Rather than a cookie cutter application of a policy model found elsewhere, it involves adaptation of policy to local conditions. We draw from this literature to show how the establishment of CSOs in Canada reflects this process of learning about crime and security policies from afar. The vision of CSOs in England inspired CSOs in Canadian cities but not in a uniform manner.

Most research on policy transfer examines the national or international level, not the regional or local. The CSO model changed, not only with the initial Canadian uptake of the CSO policy idea, but also when it was transferred regionally and to other jurisdictions within Canada. Benz and Fürst (2002) introduce the idea of policy-learning regions. Their argument is that regional networks in Europe are important pathways in which policy learning can happen. Policies can move through networks quickly even if the network is regionally distributed across a diverse country like Canada. And when policies are transferred or become mobile, they often change or mutate in an uneven manner (Hier & Walby, 2014; Peck, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2010). Indeed, after transfer from the United Kingdom, CSOs emerged in Western Canada in regionally specific ways. To understand this form of uneven transfer, McCann (2008) similarly uses the term “urban policy mobilities” with specific focus on how policies transfer across cities. McCann suggests policy transfer literature focuses too narrowly on the national or federal scale. Urban policy mobilities also connect to the regional and the national scales, as in the case of CSOs in the United Kingdom and now Western Canada with the RCMP.

Note on Objectives and Method

CSOs in the United Kingdom have been noted as an inspiration for CSOs in Canada. Simultaneously, the RCMP has introduced its own CSO model that we will show is at odds with most visions of community policing. It is thus vital to examine the rationales and funding debates for CSO justification, establishment, and expansion as elements of community policing and for CSO policy diffusion among municipalities.

We have conducted research on community safety in Canada from 2009 to 2013. Data for this research were generated using three strategies. First, we located all open source material including reports, policies, and policy evaluations, as well as newspaper articles pertaining to CSOs. Second, where CSOs do not provide access to key documents concerning policies and policy evaluations on government websites, we submitted freedom of information (FOI) requests to obtain them as well as CSO documents such as occurrence reports that are not usually publically accessible. We collected approximately 400 pages of documents. FOI requests provide access to government documents not meant for public circulation and not already a matter of public record. Using FOI requests in this way provides a methodological contribution insofar as it fosters more investigative methodologies in criminal justice studies more broadly. Third, we conducted interviews with CSO personnel in three Canadians cities. Program managers were contacted directly to participate. In this article, we focus on the first two layers of data. We coded these data for excerpts pertaining to CSO work, policy, and policy transfer or change.

Below we organize our findings as case studies, which allows for maximum depth of exploration (Yin, 2003). We have selected CSOs in different cities as illustrative cases because they are indicative of trends in community policing and safety in Canada. Case study design also allows the researcher to use multiple data collection and analysis procedures. We focus on Langford as among the first municipalities to establish CSOs. We then examine Surrey, Maple Ridge, and other cities where the RCMP created its own CSO model. The rationale for the comparative research design is to lend insight into policy transfer among municipalities as well as variations among CSOs internationally. Examining fewer cities would make it too difficult to discern variations in transfer and models.

Langford, British Columbia: Reducing the Need for the RCMP

The City of Langford’s CSO initiative was “designed to employ suitably trained and equipped Municipal Bylaw Enforcement Officers as CSOs who perform an essential role and extend the range of overall activities the police are able to provide the community” (City of Langford, 2007a, p. 5). The main policy goal was to reduce need for the “overstrained” RCMP to conduct municipal bylaw enforcement. Launched in July 2006 partially in response to citizen dissatisfaction with community safety levels, the CSO program was designed to respond efficiently to nuisances such as graffiti and improve public relations on streets and bicycle paths. ²

The Initiative reorganized the Bylaw Enforcement Department, which was renamed Community Safety and Bylaw Enforcement, adding two officers for afternoon, evening, and weekend patrol work. In Langford, CSOs were responsible for enforcement of bylaws, the local laws enacted by the municipality. As one municipal staff member noted, at the beginning they were without a name and plan. Officers were searching for a fitting label and vision. Eventually, Langford settled on CSOs after looking into CSO arrangements in England.

A local newspaper reporter remarked that CSOs “wouldn’t be armed…and wouldn’t be considered police” (Times Colonist, 2006). The CSOs had flexible schedules permitting efficient application of resources to emerging and seasonal demands. According to a project summary, “the immediate results were evident as congregating youth were disrupted in illicit activities and citizens quickly adopted the use of an after-hours line for immediate response by a CSO to a wide variety of community safety challenges” (City of Langford, 2009, p. 2). Citizen satisfaction was noted to be higher with this service delivery method, as it allowed for quick response to issues such as graffiti and public drug use.

The CSO program was funded by Council via a Provincial Traffic Fine Revenues Sharing Grant Program. Cost savings were realized from CSO bicycle patrols early in the Initiative. The patrols reduced wear on the department’s fleet, thus delaying vehicle replacement needs. Bicycle patrols made the CSOs more interactive, visible, mobile, and closer to street incidents. CSO occurrence reports obtained from FOI requests describe the number of public contacts, written warnings and verbal warnings, and the extent and nature of CSO work. Some CSOs covered 60–70 km by bicycle and recorded dozens of encounters with the public daily. These occurrence reports show a high volume of educative and nonenforcement interactions including those pertaining to drug and alcohol use, bicycle road safety, and personal well-being. Moreover, in 2009, joint bicycle patrols consisting of one RCMP member and one CSO were implemented to maintain patrols and overcome summer staffing shortfalls.

A measurement tool was developed in Langford to show how program objectives were being met. This approach produced statistics about all CSO activities for viewing by the municipal Protective Services Committee that comprises city councilors and oversees security and safety issues. Occurrence reports outlined key CSO achievements such as a 30:1 warning to ticket ratio. CSOs had a post order for destroying drugs like marijuana rather than ticketing or calling the RCMP. Many reports detail this practice, and there was apparently high compliance. This is evidence of the problem-solving approach characteristic of CSOs in the United Kingdom (see Gilling & Hughes, 2002) and of community policing more generally (see Brogden & Nijhar, 2005; Fielding & Innes, 2006).

CSO duties included active patrol to deter illicit activity, responding to graffiti, noise and other “antisocial” behaviors, and enforcing bylaws like the local Truck Route Bylaw to reduce street infrastructure resurfacing costs. CSOs issued municipal tickets (involving fines) for violations and appeared in Court in the prosecution of disputed tickets. They patrolled in pairs on municipal property and in public spaces in marked vehicles, on bicycles, and on foot to provide a visible presence designed to heighten citizen’s safety levels. The CSOs also attended evening Watch briefings at the local detachment to share information with the RCMP and monitored police radio transmissions to assist as appropriate. Moreover, the CSOs were often the “first-line” response to open fire complaints, noisy house parties, and motor vehicle accidents.

Yet the intent of the CSO initiative was to supplement and when necessary supplant RCMP services by providing more visible patrols. It was argued the program created efficiencies in community policing because RCMP detachments were overtasked and understaffed. Cooperation with the West Shore RCMP was part of the success of the CSO project in 2007. The RCMP viewed the “CSOs as a significant resource for everything from on-site officer backup, traffic control at accident scenes to an alternative agency to which they can wholly discharge appropriate file work” (City of Langford, 2009, p. 5). Even with the England-CSO emulation in Langford in 2006, the RCMP already had a police-first vision of the work of these personnel, suggesting their proper role was as a support for RCMP. The CSOs sometimes worked alongside members of the RCMP or the Provincial Commercial Vehicle Safety Enforcement Inspectors as “support officers” in joint traffic operations focusing on motoring safety. As a result, these joint assignments “effectively served to raise the public profile of the CSOs as being part of the local public safety and enforcement landscape” (City of Langford, 2007b, p. 28).

As of 2007, five CSOs operated in Langford. Their backgrounds included not only the RCMP Auxiliary Constable Program but Corrections Services, Provincial Parks Operations, and the British and Australian police services. The municipality, not regional police, hired these personnel. They were trained in mediation, restorative justice, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and officer safety including self-defense training (on CSOs and CPTED, see Haywood, Kautt, & Whitaker, 2009). This training provided them with skills “to settle disputes among neighbours, deal with ‘youth on the street’ issues, mitigate road hazards, respond to emergencies and consult with business and home owners to lessen victimization of themselves and their properties, through improved target hardening strategies” (City of Langford, 2007a, p. 5). They relied on the federal Criminal Code’s citizen arrest powers in rare cases when an arrest was required. However, Langford CSOs deferred to the police on criminal matters requiring use of force. In terms of accountability, the CSOs were subject to a complaints process similar to British Columbia’s Police Act requirements.

CSOs worked on numerous community projects (City of Langford, 2009). The Langford Council and the CSOs worked together with the local School District 62 to create policies and bylaws to help curb nighttime vandalism at Langford schools by empowering the CSOs as agents for the School District on school properties. Assignment of CSOs to five “hot” schools allegedly led to a 68% decrease in repair costs for the School District in 2007. In 2007, the CSOs also had been able to document up to 50 incidents of graffiti “tagging” on public and private properties. This investigation allegedly resulted in location of the suspect. The file was then turned over to the RCMP and Crown Council. The funding for two CSOs was equivalent to adding the cost of one RCMP constable to the municipality’s annual budget. Although Langford’s was the first CSO program in Canada, the initiative drew attention from municipal governments around the province, with more than 10 jurisdictions requesting detailed information, including Campbell River, Nanaimo, and Kelowna. The CSOs were claimed to be a viable alternative in communities without a stable, local police service.

For many in Langford, the value of the CSO initiative “is worthy of consideration by other…B.C. Municipalities as its design allows for an ever widening community safety gap to be filled” (City of Langford, 2007a, p. 7). Furthermore, the CSO program “has proven itself to be an effective drive toward neighbourhood safety, with the specific aim of tackling crime, the fear of crime and…low level social nuisances” (City of Langford, 2007a, p. 3). As Langford’s Mayor remarked, CSOs allow for reduction “of social nuisances and antisocial crimes before they become a large problem in our community” (City of Langford, 2007a, p. 2). It was also stated “the CSO Initiative offers more value to a community than employing a private security service might as there are distinct Peace Officer and enforcement powers available to help maintain levels of public safety” (City of Langford, 2007a, p. 7). Despite these apparent successes, the CSO program was defunded in 2010, much to the chagrin of Langford’s CSO program leader.

The RCMP Model: Reassurance Policing in “E” Division

Borrowing from the Langford experience, the RCMP created a pilot CSO project to provide reassurance policing in its E Division (Surrey, Langley, Ridge Meadows, and Prince George, British Columbia). E Division is to the RCMP’s British Columbia division. Langford’s CSO program leader shared policy documents with E Division’s officer responsible for the CSO pilot. The Langford Manager of Community Safety and Bylaw Enforcement met with an RCMP Inspector to help plan the RCMP CSO pilot. However, with the RCMP model, the goal of CSOs was to complement and become “eyes and ears” of RCMP officers. The purpose of the RCMP CSO pilot was “to provide the community with additional police resources by engaging in crime prevention activities and reassurance policing” (City of Surrey, 2008a, p. 3).

The Surrey RCMP Crime Reduction Strategy (CRS) Plan for 2008 included funding for CSOs in town centers. The CSR Plan recommended “that the City in conjunction with the RCMP and academic researchers create a model for the role of ‘community safety officers’ in respect to policing prevention functions in the City” (City of Surrey, 2008b, p. 1). The RCMP advised they would implement the new positions on a pilot basis “to gain knowledge about how the positions could best be utilized in the context of delivering effective police services” (City of Surrey, 2008b, p. 2). The CSO pilot program was proposed to last 18 months in Surrey, Langley, and Maple Ridge. The 2008 budget allowed for hiring 10 CSOs in Surrey and lesser numbers in other locations. “It’s two-tiered policing. They will be working with the community to reduce crime. The only difference is they won’t be carrying guns,” said Mayor Surrey Diane Watts. “They’ll deal with things like youth congregating and doing drugs, graffiti issues” (Now, 2007, p. 13). During a Surrey Public Safety Committee Meeting on June 16, 2008, RCMP Inspector Brett Haugli was introduced as the Surrey CSO Program manager. He stated “the CSOs need time to complete their training and be successful in their first assignment and the RCMP need to assess and clarify the roles and responsibilities before introducing the program to other areas of the City” (City of Surrey, 2008c, p. 2).

In Surrey, the 10 CSOs, who were previously RCMP auxiliary members (uniformed but unarmed members who lack full police powers), commenced training on June 16, 2008. Unlike in Langford and dissimilar to CSOs in relation to public police internationally (Shepherdson, Clancey, Lee, & Crofts, 2014), the RCMP themselves hired these personnel. These individuals were sent for training at the RCMP Pacific Regional Training Centre in Chilliwack and then to the Surrey RCMP Detachment for a 1-month orientation and on-the-job training with Neighborhood Liaison regular members. After completion in August 2008, CSOs began shifts as part of Surrey’s police service. Eight of the CSOs were assigned to Cloverdale and two to South Surrey to reach the numbers necessary to be publicly visible.

The CSO role was supposed to entail observing, recording, and reporting, and only limited arrests as a last resort. They also had the ability to access, open, and initiate files in the RCMP database. About Surrey and Maple Ridge, another RCMP site for the CSO pilot, RCMP were excited: “We look forward to the CSOs getting out into our community,” said Inspector Jim Wakely. “They will be highly visible, and approachable, which will enhance communications, build relationships, and target local issues throughout the community” (Pitt Meadows Times, 2008, p. 12). The CSOs were not subject to transfer like regular RCMP members and were recruited locally, so it was expected that CSOs could establish lasting community relationships. “We’re being trained by people who have experience in our area, and so we’ll be paired up with field coaches,” said Constable Nenadic. “That will be a big part of orientation, getting to know the Ridge” (Pitt Meadows Times, 2008, p. 12). Other planned duties for CSOs were liaising with schools and community organizations. Foot patrols were planned for downtowns, parks, and school grounds, especially during summer months. The CSO uniform was similar to RCMP auxiliary officer dress in consisting of the same white shirt, hats, with different patches and a red jacket emboldened with “RCMP/Gendarmerie Royale du Canada Community Safety Officer.” The hope was that residents would identify a CSO by their different uniform.

The first CSO priority was to patrol on foot in high-traffic areas and hot spots. Their involvement was to range from road checks to special events and other high-visibility areas. CSOs are also involved in crime prevention measures, problem solving, and target hardening. They regularly dialogued with community members and business owners to aid in creating a sense of security. For instance, in Langley, CSOs welcomed all new business owners to the area and provided them with an overview of crime prevention and RCMP contact information (Langley Times, 2010, p. 6). CSOs also made presentations about how to deter and prevent crime and nuisance. These RCMP CSOs maintained they are not better at local problem-solving than regular officers but can enhance RCMP officers’ problem-solving ability.

To justify the project, the RCMP said that the CSO program was based on the Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) in the United Kingdom. “The model’s the same, just consistency, communication, rapport,” said CSO Steve Terrillon (Pitt Meadows Times, 2008, p. 12). Across the United Kingdom, the roles of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and CSOs overlap but remain distinctive since PCSOs provide more support for crime scene investigations and front-line policing than CSOs. This contrasts with the RCMP’s adoption of CSOs from Langford that introduced a policy mutation that fully conflated these roles and the types of work they entail.

Community members and business owners responded positively. An interim Surrey CSO report stated: “I have been approached by countless members of the community who have been coming up to me and saying how happy they are to see us walking around…and when we walk in the downtown core of Cloverdale, shop owners come out and always talk with us and say on a daily basis how happy they are to see us around” (City of Surrey, 2008b, p. 2). The program was designed to provide the RCMP with a visible presence, build community rapport, and enhance regular officers’ ability to fulfill their duties. To accomplish this, three CSOs were deployed to the Maple Ridge pilot site full time to provide a consistent visible presence. “We are here for Maple Ridge,” said Terrillon. “Regular members are going to go from department to department, or get promoted, whereas Community Safety Officers are here specifically for that purpose…we’re just enhancing” (Pitt Meadows Times, 2008, p. 12). “If you’re the business owner or you’re the citizen who sees the same thing over and over again that familiarity will lead to better communications between the community and the RCMP,” said Terrillon. “So we’ll be able to come back to the RCMP and say, ‘this is what I’m hearing on the streets, is there anything that as RCMP…we can do?’” (Pitt Meadows Times, 2008, p. 12). In these ways, the RCMP had a police-first vision of the work of these personnel.

However, the community safety notion is malleable (Edwards & Hughes, 2008; Edwards, Hughes & Lord, 2013). The RCMP adapted the CSO idea to complement their regular duty officers. This contrasted with the Langley model where CSOs substituted for RCMP officers who were deemed to provide neither adequate visible patrol nor effective public liaisons. One issue that emerged is that the RCMP pilot CSOs exceeded specified duties. Appendix A of E Division’s operational manual on the CSO pilot provided a list of prohibited duties, which included arresting violators (with exception of exigent circumstances), being a first responder to police emergencies, providing general duty member back-up, conducting traffic stops, and taking suspects’ statements. Despite positive community feedback, it was noted in the RCMP’s evaluation:

There is a lack of compliance and accountability with CSO policy by some Detachment Commanders, supervisors and CSOs. Interpretation of CSO policy varied amongst the pilot sites and in a few instances, the CSO position was utilized to address detachment needs as opposed to the community’s needs. (RCMP, 2012)

This is where the disjuncture between community policing and the RCMP approach becomes evident. A CSO questionnaire revealed 35% of RCMP CSOs arrested someone; 59% used items from their duty belt (primarily handcuffs); 59% performed enforcement duties (eg, violation tickets, notice and orders, warnings, and seatbelt checks); and 6% were physically assaulted with little or no injury. All these actions are prohibited under RCMP CSO policy. These CSOs were also frequently deployed for criminal investigation support. The RCMP’s evaluation indicated:

Use of force… experts believe that either the CSOs need to be equipped with a pistol or they need to move to softer civilian business attire without intervention options and soft body armour…the PRTC staff advanced the position that CSOs be trained…[to use] OC spray, defensive baton and handcuffs. (RCMP, 2012)

The RCMP’s adaptation of the CSO model was less reflective of any approach in England or in Langford for that matter and instead closer to RCMP regular duty officers.

The CSOs were not fully differentiated from regular duty RCMP by their uniform either. The RCMP evaluation of the CSO pilot noted, “The CSO uniform…does not distinguish them from GD [General Duty] members. A member of the community may easily conclude that a CSO is a GD member upon first glance and may believe that they hold a full range of enforcement capabilities and authorities…” (RCMP, 2012). As the RCMP evaluation indicated: “While there are potential risks associated to a CSO looking indistinguishable from a GD member in the public, an important factor to consider is that without a recognizable uniformed presence in the community where CSOs are stationed, the final goal of the program may experience some difficulty in attaining success.” Therefore, CSO visibility was at times associated with regular duty RCMP officers, contrary to the goal of providing visible patrols by officers distinct from the RCMP.

The RCMP adaptation of the CSO model deviated from the one transferred to Langford. The model mutated in RCMP hands. As their evaluation noted, “This deviation from the CSO program’s mandate has also contributed to some overlap in activities between CSOs and some GD members” (RCMP, 2012). This is because the RCMP recruited persons with aspirations to work as regular duty RCMP officers and who took the opportunity to demonstrate their police prowess (a similar “wannabe” culture is found in private security firms in Canada—Rigakos, 2002; in the United Kingdom, see Cooper, Anscombe, Avenell, McLean, & Morris, 2006). As the RCMP evaluation suggested,

the majority of CSOs…had plans to attempt to convert from a CSO to a GD member. This identifies the potential for the pilot to become a portal for individuals looking to become GD members. This career aspiration may be attributed to CSOs being Auxiliary Constables prior to assuming their new roles. (RCMP, 2012)

This finding reinforces Deukmedjian and de Lint’s (2007) point about misalignment between RCMP operations and community policing. It also substantiates the claim of Gilling and Hughes (2002) that CSOs comprise a new security profession with a different skill set than public police; personnel with aspirations to be public police who were part of the CSO pilot performed roles that resembled public police, not CSOs. The auxiliary constables were a “known and trusted” element in the RCMP stable, were recruited by RCMP, and possessed substantial police training and security clearance, all reasons why some experienced difficulty transitioning to the CSO role. ³

Community Safety in the Province of Alberta

Gilling et al. (2013, p. 338) note that “urban security” is an ill-liked term in the United Kingdom and in the Republic of Ireland. In the Canadian province of Alberta, neighboring British Columbia, the notion of CSOs and community safety generally was rejected for a different moniker. Alberta municipalities have personnel whose work resembles that of CSOs. While donning uniforms that distinguish them from public police, their work in Alberta is similar to CSOs found elsewhere. However, they more often operate in rural areas and are more likely to coordinate with conservation and wildlife protection officers compared to municipal police. In Alberta, these personnel are referred to as public security officers, public security peace officers, or community peace officers, all of whom have peace officer status and abide by the Public Security Peace Officer Program Policy and Procedures Manual published by Alberta’s Solicitor General. The notion of “community” rarely appears in this manual.

The variation stems from an eleventh hour name change from community safety to public security. According to November 9, 2007 meeting minutes of the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) Standing Committee on Community Infrastructure, AUMA promoted the idea of a CSO program after examining community policing initiatives in various cities in the United States including Seattle which had established their own version of CSOs in 2000. However, when AUMA partnered with the Solicitor General to implement the program, the name was changed. The provincial initiative now called The Public Security Peace Officer Program and administered by the Solicitor General allows levels of government to obtain peace officer status for CSO-like personnel. These personnel do much the same work as their counterparts in British Columbia cities, however, in Alberta, the idea of community safety failed to resonate. Indeed, in an early iteration of the program and draft of the policy, the notion of CSO was used. This rejection of the moniker “community safety” while retaining the work type is a second major policy mutation following CSO policy transfer to Canada. This variation provides insights into the state of community policing in Canada, an issue we discuss subsequently.

Discussion and Conclusion

This article has made a three-fold contribution to criminal justice research on reassurance and community policing by examining CSOs in Western Canada. First, we make an empirical contribution by focusing on CSOs in an understudied region. Second, we make a methodological contribution by using FOI requests and personal interviews in tandem to study CSO work and policy. Using FOI requests as a tool allows researchers to obtain revealing internal documents that government officials produce about their practices. Third, we make a conceptual contribution by identifying policy mutation as a distinctive, local, or regional expression of general criminal justice policy transfer rather than a result of corporatism, managerialism, or the logical offshoot of a particular political or economic regime (see Edwards & Hughes, 2011).

Cherney (2004) has called for research on why variation emerges in CSO work. Our research provides insights about the nature, trajectory, and external influences of CSOs on urban policing in Canada. Beyond examining CSO work in Canada, we have provided insights into international criminal justice policy transfer (Jones & Newburn, 2006) and community policing (also see Bazeman & Griffiths, 2004; Fielding & Innes, 2006; Lambert et al., 2012; Monaghan, 2008; Schneider, 2000). Some Canadian sites examined highlight the experience with CSOs in the United Kingdom as the impetus for creating these offices in Canada. However, every national, regional, and local policing organization’s strategic orientation differs, which can lead to mutation when policies are borrowed from international or regional sites and applied locally. The first mutation did not occur with the initial Canadian uptake of the CSO policy idea in Langford. Rather, policy mutation occurred as the policy idea was transferred within British Columbia and adopted by the RCMP. The character of this transfer is more one of “emulation” in Langford and more one of “inspiration” in the latter instance (Jones & Newburn, 2006, p. 27). McCann (2008) uses the term “urban policy mobilities” to refer to policies that mutate when shared regionally, which aptly characterizes what happened to CSOs in Canada. Policy transfer can lead to new wrinkles when existing policy is adapted to different institutional mandates (Hier & Walby, 2014; Peck, 2011; Peck & Theodore, 2010). In some Canadian cities, CSOs are viewed as necessary supplements or replacements for regionally based RCMP who cannot visibly patrol enough in urban centers. In others, CSOs complement public police, although the form of RCMP CSO visibility created some confusion in these sites. In jurisdictions like Alberta, CSOs have abandoned the notion of community safety for other monikers.

This second mutation in Alberta is suggestive too of whether public police will have a minor or central role and whether these arrangements retain any link to community policing without the community signifier. The notion of community may not resonate in some jurisdictions, as shown in the above-mentioned example of Alberta. Some of what CSOs do in these municipalities, such as visible patrols, in other larger Canadian municipalities are now provided or steered by municipal corporate security units that are influenced by private sector corporate models and policy transfer from ASIS International (Lippert, Walby, & Steckle, 2013; Walby & Lippert, 2012). These corporate units operate in sharp contrast to CSOs in that they make few overtures to “community” and instead refer to the municipal “corporation” as their master. In terms of visible patrols, a similar situation is the business improvement association “ambassador” model first pioneered in U.S. cities, and which is now found in several Canadian downtowns (Sleiman & Lippert, 2010). The mutations in CSO policy described earlier suggest that further transfer of CSO models within Canada is not inevitable and, based in particular on the Alberta CSO-like programs that are devoid of a community signifier, that community policing may soon be passing Western Canada by. Yet, the existence of CSOs in some British Columbia municipalities suggests community policing, regardless of effectiveness or deeper realities, has not been displaced by intelligence-led policing or rival corporate and private sector models that eschew community discourse either.

We supplement previous international findings on CSOs by showing how RCMP policy makers in Canada altered an already imported policy framework to fit the strategic vision of the Mounties. The RCMP’s own evaluation showed that RCMP CSOs broke the rules, substantiating the point of Deukmedjian and de Lint (2007) that community policing is misaligned with the RCMP’s overall approach. CSOs are associated with a bottom-up outlook on policing and safety (Shepherdson et al., 2014), but the RCMP adoption and adaptation of the model invert this. Indeed, both strategic orientation within a particular police organization and broader changes in policing and politics can determine how and the extent to which community policing policy is implemented and its effects (Murphy, 1998). Demonstrating the importance of research on cross-national policy transfer and its regional articulations (Schachter, 1991), our findings have policy implications in other countries considering CSOs as a form of visible reassurance policing and as a replacement for public police, insofar as the application of the CSO model and its viability depends on the alignment of the public police agency and its responsiveness to community safety initiatives. Ultimately, the imagined direction of CSOs and its British iteration has drifted off course in Canada, lured by the Red Serge of the Mountie, elsewhere repelled by the softness of the community safety moniker, or sacked in the belt-tightening exercises of Canadian municipal governments.