Suspicion of White-Collar Crime: A Case Study of Retaliation Against Whistle-Blowers

Abstract

Norwegian law regulates and prohibits retaliation against whistle-blowers, but there is no conviction so far where a court passes a prison sentence because of such crime. Rather, victims of retaliation have to sue their employer for compensation if they suffer retaliation in the form of job loss or other consequences. This article starts by briefly reviewing literature on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Next, we distinguish between retaliation as concrete, individualized measures and retaliation as a coherent process over time. The process may start with ignorance, move into rejection, and finally sanctions. This article continues by presenting the case of two whistle-blowers in a Norwegian municipality who have experienced retaliation. Then, we apply incident-based and process-based retaliation measures by comparing classifications in groups and stages. This case study is a result of critical, provocative, and confrontational action research.

Keywords

whistle-blowing white-collar crime fraud examination retaliation job loss

Organizations are often dependent on whistle-blowers to detect and investigate white-collar crime. However, retaliation makes informants reluctant to blow the whistle. Whistle-blowing has been studied for many years in Norway (e.g., Bjørkelo, Einarsen, Nielsen, & Matthiesen, 2011; Bjørkelo & Matthiesen, 2011; Bjørkelo, Ryberg, Matthiesen, & Einarsen, 2008; Einarsen, 2000; Gottschalk, 2017; Skivenes & Trygstad, 2016). Research results indicate that there is a fear and a chance of retaliation after whistle-blowing has occurred. In this article, we explore and categorize retaliation items and discuss those items related to two whistle-blowers in a Norwegian municipality.

A whistle-blower is as a person who believes to have discovered or uncovered and therefore notifies of critical circumstances, illegal activities, or misconduct in an organization in which he or she works or has worked. The whistle-blower attempts to create attention among recipients who have the power to investigate and correct the situation. A victim of misconduct who reports an offense is not a whistle-blower, and a person outside the organization is not a whistle-blower.

Whistle-blowing involves revealing or exposing perceived negative secrets that occur in an organization. Whistle-blowing is an account by employees who believe that their business or colleague(s) are involved in activities of misconduct or crime, cause unnecessary harm, violate human rights, or contribute to otherwise immoral offenses. Whistle-blowing includes informing superiors, professional organizations, the public, or some government agency of these activities (Mpho, 2017).

Once an organization member has blown the whistle on organizational wrongdoing, the recipient of the message may make two decisions: (1) whether to disregard the claim or engage in appropriate measures and (2) whether to reward or retaliate against the whistle-blower. A whistle-blower’s experiences following whistle-blowing might have strong effects on other’s willingness to do the same. The threat or fear of retaliation can greatly reduce the likelihood that an observer of wrongdoing will intend to blow the whistle (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).

The case of two whistle-blowers in a Norwegian municipality is interesting in light of research by Bjørkelo, Einarsen, Nielsen, and Matthiesen (2011), who studied characteristics and experiences of self-reported whistle-blowers in Norway. They found that whistle-blowers reported low levels of retaliation at the same time as they reported less job satisfaction and more bullying at work than their nonreporting colleagues did.

This article starts by briefly reviewing literature on retaliation against whistle-blowers. Next, we distinguish between retaliation as concrete, individualized punishment incidents and retaliation as a coherent process over time. The process may start with ignorance, move into rejection, and finally sanctions. This article continues by presenting the case of two whistle-blowers in a Norwegian municipality who have experienced retaliation. Then, we discuss retaliation measures and processes by comparing classifications in groups and stages.

This research is important. While scholars and practitioners all emphasize the importance of whistle-blowing as an important source of information about wrongdoings, few decide to blow the whistle because of retaliation threats.

Retaliation Literature

Retaliation is defined as measures that are negative for the whistle-blower and which is a response to the notification. Retaliation can take place in the form of concrete, individualized measures. Retaliation can also occur through a coherent process over time. Retaliation may take many forms, ranging from light criticism to outright exclusion of the individual from the organization (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005, p. 281):

Other retaliatory acts may include organizational steps taken to undermine the complaint process, isolation of the whistleblower, character defamation, imposition of hardship or disgrace upon the whistleblower, exclusion from meetings, elimination of perquisites, and other forms of discrimination or harassment. Retaliatory acts may be motivated by the organization’s desire to (1) silence the whistleblower completely, (2) prevent a full public knowledge of the complaint, (3) discredit the whistleblower, and/or (4) discourage other potential whistleblowers from taking action.

Retaliation against a whistle-blower represents an outcome of a conflict between an organization and its employee, in which members of the organization attempt to control the employee. The control might occur by threatening to take, or actually taking, an action that is detrimental to the well-being of the employee, in response to the employee reporting as an observer, through internal or external channels, a perceived wrongful incident. Retaliation does not only happen when undesirable measures against the whistle-blower occur but also when no desirable measures occur. Retaliation against a whistle-blower is similar to acts of revenge (Rehg, Micelli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008).

Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) examined correlates of whistle-blowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. They found that whistle-blowers risk retaliation both by their organization (e.g., via job loss, demotion, decreased quality of working conditions) and by the public (e.g., character assassinations, accusations of being merely “sour grapes,” spies, or “squealers”) in their efforts to expose perceived immoral or illegal acts. Furthermore, they found that retaliation against whistle-blowers is more likely when top management perceives the notification to represent a questioning of or challenge to the organization’s authority structure.

In their study of correlates, Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that whistle-blowers who utilize an external reporting channel are more likely experience retaliation. Furthermore, older whistle-blowers are more likely to perceive retaliation, as are those with greater perceived value congruence with the organization.

Rehg, Micelli, Near, and Van Scotter (2008) studied antecedents and outcomes of retaliation against whistle-blowers in terms of gender differences and power relations. They investigated whether females experienced more retaliation than males by testing propositions derived from theories about gender differences and power variables. Results showed significant gender differences in antecedents and outcomes of retaliation. For men, lack of support from others and low whistle-blower power were significantly related to retaliation. For women, lack of support from others, serious wrongdoing, and the wrongdoing’s direct effect on the whistle-blower were significantly associated with retaliation. Retaliation in turn relates negatively to relationships with the supervisor for both men and women. Females perceived that they experienced more retaliation than males. Greater individual power did not help female whistle-blowers avoid retaliation.

Rehg et al. (2008, p. 236) expected that both men and women would equally turn to external channels subsequent to retaliation:

In fact, retaliation significantly predicted external reporting for women, but the coefficient for men was insignificant.

Rothschild and Miethe (1999) studied whistle-blower disclosures and management retaliation. Based on collected data on whistle-blowers and silent observers, they found that whistle-blowers suffer severe retaliation from management, especially when information proves significant, and no special method of disclosure or personal characteristics can insulate the whistle-blower from such retaliation. Furthermore, retaliation was most certain and severe when the reported misconduct was systematic and significant and when the practices exposed were part of the regular organizational process.

In the following, we distinguish between retaliation actions versus retaliation processes. While offenders more conveniently might be able to explain independent actions, processes seem less convenient to defend. On the other hand, victims will prefer the process argument, which for them seems harder to document.

Retaliation Actions

First, we look at retaliation as concrete, individualized actions. While Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) describe four motives, we apply two motives in Table 1, that is, retaliation motivated by revenge to inflict injury to the whistle-blower and retaliation motivated by the goal of removing the person from the organization. We have thus combined Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran’s (2005, p. 281) forms of discrediting the whistle-blower and silencing the whistle-blower as revenge, while forms of preventing public knowledge and discouraging others is concerned with removal from the organization.

Table 1.

Retaliation Motives and Actions Against Whistle-Blowers.

Retaliation Direction	Retaliation Motivated by Revenge to Inflict Injury to the Whistle-Blower	Retaliation Motivated by the Goal of Removing the Person From the Organization
Retaliation directed at whistle-blower’s personal behavior	The whistle-blower is subject to review and investigation The whistle-blower experiences exhaustion and harassment A supervisor is monitoring the whistle-blower’s calendar Harassment that seems scary, hostile, and degrading The boss expresses dissatisfaction with the notification Retaliators cause harm to the personal reputation of the individual Other executives express dissatisfaction with the warning and alert Retaliators suspect or accuse the whistle-blower of an unrelated event Retaliators expose the whistle-blower to pressure to withdraw the notification Retaliators deny the whistle-blower promotion Moving to another workplace far from colleagues Colleagues express displeasure against the whistle-blower as a person Undermining the complaint process	Termination and dismissal from the job Threats of future consequences of the notification Reduced salary and removal of benefits and bonus Retaliators freeze the whistle-blower out of the community, sitting alone at lunch The whistle-blower experiences negative comments in the organizational environment The whistle-blower receives an offer of a golden handshake based on confidentiality The whistle-blower is suspended The whistle-blower must take a new test of suitability for the position The whistle-blower is subject to investigation or review The whistle-blower is degraded to less responsibility and reduced role Retaliators define the whistle-blower as a load to and liability for the organization Isolation of the whistle-blower Character defamation Imposition of hardship or disgrace upon the whistle-blower
Retaliation directed at whistle-blower’s job performance	Denied participation in meetings within own field of work Reduced job responsibility in current position and function The whistle-blower experiences isolation by removal of work assignments The whistle-blower gets less interesting tasks Necessary information for doing a good job is not available anymore because colleagues hold it back The whistle-blower must move to another work area The whistle-blower must move to less interesting tasks The whistle-blower is subject to new restrictions on the job	Retaliators deny the whistle-blower to talk to professional contacts The whistle-blower sanctioned against talking to colleagues about work The whistle-blower sanctioned from talking to his group members The whistle-blower receives poorer job evaluation from the superior Reduction in access to resources to do a good job Exclusion from meetings The whistle-blower deprived of security clearance The whistle-blower removed from e-mail lists

Furthermore, in Table 1, we make a distinction whether retaliation directs itself at the whistle-blower as a person or the whistle-blower as part of the work force in the organization. Table 1 lists a number of examples to illustrate the magnitude and diversity in retaliation measures that whistle-blowers might experience. We developed the lists in Table 1 based on input from a number of scholars in the field, in particular attorney Eriksen (2018), as well as reviews of whistle-blowing cases presented in Norwegian media.

Retaliation Processes

Here, we look at retaliation as a coherent process over time. The process might escalate toward final expulsion, sick leave, or disability. When defining retaliation as a process, it is possible to capture not only the specific identifiable actions but also the more subtle pattern in the expulsion process. Perhaps that is where the evidence of retaliation lies. If a victim only focuses on independent incidents, the victim may find that the employer often manages to present plausible alternative causal factors for each single incident that are accepted by a judge. A process approach—where you see how measures follow each other and ultimately end up in extinction (e.g., sickness, disability, dismissal)—reinforces the credibility of single actions being included in a pattern that has been the main direction and goal just to undermine and get rid of the whistle-blower and pulverize the whistle-blowing message.

The process might start by ignoring the whistle-blower. There is no risk assessment, no care, no response to letters, inquiries or concerns, no acknowledgment of the role of the whistle-blower, and no intervention to prevent further misconduct and crime. When ignorance turns out not to be sufficient, the intensity from the employer’s side increases in the form of rejection. Representatives for the employer reject the whistle-blowers description of reality and distance themselves from the whistle-blowing phenomenon. If neither ignorance nor rejection helps to silence the whistle-blower or discredit the whistle-blower, then retaliation intensifies by direct sanctions. Relevant sanctions include breach of confidentiality, isolation from information flows, removal from position, denial of participation in meetings, and various forms of harassment.

Considering retaliation as a process from ignorance to sanctions is perhaps the most fruitful way to go to determine whether retaliation has actually taken place or not. Researchers and judges need to look at the process to prevent employers from trivializing, pulverizing, and excusing acts of retaliation.

The case study in this article is concerned with the retaliation process, not the procurement process or the whistle-blowing process. However, the process of whistle-blowing followed the illegitimate procurement process, while the process of retaliation followed the deviant whistle-blowing process.

Research Method

There is a bias in the method applied in this research in the sense that access was only possible to victims of retaliation and not offenders in retaliation. It was possible to interview both whistle-blowers who claim to suffer from retaliation, but it was not possible to interview the chief executive or others who carry responsibility for retaliation. This is important to keep in mind when reading the retaliation case below. The chief executive is the head of the administration in a Norwegian municipality. Interviews occurred face-to-face over a period of 1 year as the process of retaliation replaced the process of whistle-blowing. This is a case study, which is qualitative in nature.

Interviews as well as e-mail exchanges took place for more than 1 year. In addition to both whistle-blowers, one journalist in the local newspaper was regularly contacting the research to reflect on the case. Others were also informants, such as the head of the control committee in the municipality. The raw information from these individuals became subject to reflection, interpretation, and context, where both source credibility and information controllability were important to assess. The interviewer–whistle-blower relationship in particular developed into mutual understanding and respect, where the whistle-blower understood that the interviewer needed analytical distance.

Those who carry out retaliation measures against whistle-blowers will tend to have a completely different perception of reality than victims of retaliation. Offenders may argue that an organization changes, and so must executives and other employees, irrespective of whether or not they have blown the whistle at some point on something or someone. Offenders may think that the whistle-blowing experience can have changed attitudes and interests in the organization and in the job. Offenders may believe that restructuring and change management is a relevant recipe when whistle-blowers return after sick leave. Offenders may get annoyed if returned whistle-blowers continue to involve themselves in issues related to their observations, especially if whistle-blowers claim they have a right to be involved in necessary changes that they deem necessary based on their previous observations.

In addition to several interviews with the two whistle-blowers, newspaper articles in local and national media were an important source of secondary data for this research (e.g., Berg, 2018; Karlsen, 2018).

The method applied in this case study represents a variation of action research. The method might be labeled critical, provocative, and confrontational action research. Critical action research can imply “getting your hands dirty” (Ram, Edwards, Jones, Kiselinchev, & Muchenje, 2015, p. 462), since it was “time to get real” (Meehan, Touboulic, & Walker, 2016, p. 255) by challenging assumptions and thinking:

Critical management scholars claim that academic research should aim to systematically challenge assumptions and thinking.

According to Schwencke (2017, p. 361), critical action research is concerned with undemocratic structures in society that lead to distance and a perception of structures as frozen, that it is impossible to influence or do something about.

Provocation can be common in other contexts, such as police investigations, where the purpose is to cause reactions among suspects. The purpose of my provocations was to create reactions from persons who disliked my attention and therefore preferred not to answer my questions. There were persons who might have participated in or contributed to misconduct and crime, or participated in or contributed to concealment of misconduct and crime. Furthermore, there were persons who had handled whistle-blowers and exposed them to perceived retribution. The purpose of my provocations was to cause information transfer.

Levin (2017) recommends critical confrontation combined with analytical distance in action research. Confrontation is an argumentative meeting or situation between opposing parties. I confronted key actors in the municipality with allegations concerning their involvement in illegal procurement, concealment of misconduct, and retribution against whistle-blowers. I kept analytical distance by compiling notes into a manuscript where I reorganized observations, linked observations, and added explanations from the literature as new insights emerged. It was a social inquiry (Durcikova, Lee, & Brown 2018). Action and reflection followed each other (Levin, 2012).

Retaliation Case

Helge Moen was a chief financial officer (CFO) in Grimstad municipality. He blew the whistle on corruption in public procurement in the municipality in the spring of 2016. He reported his concern first to the chief executive and later to the chairperson of the control committee in the municipality. There was no reaction, and he got frustrated. He then was on sick leave for half a year before returning to work. After working for about 40 days, he reluctantly felt he had to move because of a tense situation in the working environment. The retribution to Moen was on an investigation that the chief executive engaged a consultancy firm to conduct against Moen. Investigators from the consulting firm interviewed Moen on Thursday, March 1, 2018. Among other things, the consultants confronted him with his complaints about the management. He had only access to read the accusations on a PC during the meeting with the consultants, and he had to make notes as well as possible while being interviewed. Then, the consultants invited to contradiction in terms of comments to all accusations after the meeting based on his own notes that were certainly lacking completeness and detail.

The right to contradiction is a legal term that defines a fundamental principle in the civil process that the court should not settle a case without the parties having been able to respond completely to the counterparty’s representation of the case. By a factual survey or a fraud investigation, the contradiction contends that an affected person must have a complete opportunity to comment. The person affected by a decision in the investigation must have the opportunity to promote his or her view on the matter. The question is whether you are able to promote your view in the matter if you only see something on a PC while in a meeting.

Moen had not complained about the management. He had in meetings and by e-mail requested that the professional and personal conditions and circumstances reflected his position as the CFO, and he asked for organizational adjustments so that he could return to work.

The chief executive had tried to relocate Moen since July 2017. The chief executive had attempted to degrade him from the CFO position to staff member in the analysis and development department. On January 23, 2018, Moen perceived that the chief executive forced him to move physically out of the finance department into the analysis department, and so he did.

One of the allegations was that staff in the finance department had presumably pointed out that Helge Moen, as CFO, showed no willingness to participate in the municipality’s ERP project in the second half of 2016. This was in fact a decision made by a municipal manager, not by Moen himself. Another allegation was that the municipal manager considered Moen’s competence not to be the best in the ERP area of accounting systems.

A third allegation concerns poor information flow in the finance department. Moen agrees. However, he has participated in very few meetings in the chief executive’s management team and in the strategic management team. Management meetings disappeared from schedules several times.

Moen was unable to attend the finance department’s seminar on working environment on November 15, 2017. He had specifically asked to participate. In retrospect, Moen became aware that management presumably knew of significant alleged workplace challenges in the finance department.

While Moen was on sick leave, the chief executive attended a meeting with staff in the finance department on August 18, 2017. At the meeting, the chief executive asked questions about Moen and wrote in the minutes from the meeting, “On a scale from 0 to10 we consider Helge Moen’s contribution to be 3.” In her minutes from the meeting, she also wrote, “Helge Moen’s role is more like a finance director in a big municipality,” “and even as a professional economist, he made little effort to get into the new system,” and “there is a big gap on how he fulfills the role in practice and the image created through the media.” These characteristics conveyed the chief executive as head of the meeting and referee, contributing in this way that the whistle-blower was exposed to negative comments in the organization.

Another such meeting took place on January 16, 2018, where the minutes of the meeting state that “staff in the finance department find that Moen as the CFO has been released into the organization in ‘free move’ style.” Furthermore that “the CFO is out to make trouble,” that “they are uncertain about the CFO’s motives,” that “getting the CFO to take on a concrete task is like grabbing a pack of jelly,” and that he “is a plug in the system and places sticks in the wheels.”

The consultants expected to deliver their report from the so-called facts survey to the chief executive before Easter in 2018. Moen expected the chief executive to use the report to remove him from his position as the CFO in the municipality, denying the whistle-blower to participate in meetings, and exposing him to expulsion and harassment (Berg, 2018).

The chief executive monitored Moen’s calendar. As the financial manager in the municipality, he needed to talk to the auditor, but the chief executive did not allow him to do so. Moen also had to avoid talking to his own employees in the finance department.

Helge Moen was one of the whistle-blowers. The other whistle-blower was Ragnar Holvik. Independent of each other, Holvik blew the whistle on corruption in public procurement at about the same time in the spring of 2016. Moen and Holvik did not know about each other’s notifications. The contents of Holvik’s warning concerned the assistant municipal manager for health and care services who favored her sister-in-law as a provider of health services without proper procurement handling and incapacity. The recipient of Holvik’s warning was the chief executive and a municipal manager, as well as all members of the municipal council. The first reaction to his warning was ignorance and rejection. Next, nobody acted upon the whistle-blowing letter. Then, Holvik experienced public harassment by politicians who claimed he was wrong. Then, after a fraud examination conducted by global auditing firm BDO (2016), the conclusion was that illegal procurements of health-care services had indeed occurred. However, the ruling parties in the municipality decided not to report the alleged crime cases to the police.

After the BDO (2016) report, both political bodies and the management in Grimstad municipality had to acknowledge Moen as well as Holvik as whistle-blowers.

However, then retaliation started, also Holvik became sick and was on sick leave for almost a year. Before returning to his position as a chief advisor to the chief executive, Holvik lost key assignments. The mayor criticized Holvik publicly. The mayor thus broke the rule of confidentiality concerning employees in the municipality. Holvik had to hire an attorney to defend his case, and the attorney launched a claim on behalf of Holvik for retaliation and harassment.

When Holvik returned back to work in January 2018, Holvik was immediately isolated by being assigned an office far away from the town hall where all his colleagues had their offices. The chief executive deprived Holvik of most of his duties. While Holvik still formally was as a chief advisor to the chief executive, the chief executive prevented him from attending meetings within his own field of work. Holvik together with his attorney documented a series of retaliation incidents in the form of extinction and harassment.

The chief executive did not intervene to defend Holvik against a politician who claimed in a newspaper article that Holvik was a personnel case in the municipality. The chief executive was silent in the next city council meeting. When a different politician toward the end of the meeting asked whether Holvik was a personnel case for the human resources department or not, the chief executive had to confirm that there was no such case against Holvik. Holvik experienced that his superior, the chief executive, let politicians tell all kinds of stories about Holvik in public space.

In the winter of 2017/2018, retaliation processes against Holvik and Moen were very different. The charges against Holvik took place mainly in the public space such as the media-based politician meetings in the town hall. Retaliation against Moen occurred mainly in the town hall with easily identifiable actors. While a large gallery of visible and invisible actors in administration, politics, and community were active in discussing Holvik’s whistle-blowing and behavior afterward, Moen’s case entered into an acute phase with the chief executive as the identifiable actor. Holvik’s case was a political issue between the ruling parties and the opposition parties—for example, as it related to repayment of attorney expenditures—largely more than Moen’s case. In addition, Holvik was on a daily basis confronted with all kinds of messages and opinions in social media.

The implementation of the city council decision regarding compensation of Holvik’s attorney expenditures assumed that he refrained from suing the municipality for retaliation was in itself perceived as retaliation from his employer. Furthermore, the lack of invitation to a seminar for all leaders in the municipality he perceived as an act of retaliation (Karlsen, 2018).

At the time of writing this case study in March 2018, both Moen and Holvik were subject to retaliation on a more or less continuous basis.

Case Discussion

Norway is one of the few countries that have introduced a law on protection of whistle-blowers. Therefore, it might appear paradoxical that no regular procedure to deal with the information reported seems adopted in the two cases we describe. This means that Norway has not fully implemented the law on protection of whistle-blowers and certainly not in the municipality of Grimstad. In fact, because of the lack of implementation, the Norwegian government asked a group of experts to review whistle-blowing and retaliation in the nation, and their report confirms the lack of implementation. The experts suggest the establishment of a national ombudsman office to advice and help whistle-blowers (NOU, 2018).

Retaliation items in the case study are located in Table 2. For whistle-blower Moen, we find items spread across the matrix. For example, the chief executive’s activities while Moen was on sick leave seemed directed at Moen’s job performance. There were discussions about a number of accusations formulated by the chief executive to enable degrading of Moen on his return. The participation at meetings with Moen’s staff while Moen was on sick leave enabled the chief executive to prepare a possible departure of Moen from the organization.

Table 2.

Retaliation Motives and Actions Against Moen and Holvik.

Retaliation Direction	Retaliation Motivated by Revenge to Inflict Injury to the Whistle-Blower	Retaliation Motivated by the Goal of Removing the Person From the Organization
Retaliation directed at whistle-blower’s personal behavior	Moen Moved physically to another office location Holvik Ignored by receivers of his observations Accused of being wrong in his observations Criticized publicly by the mayor who broke the rule of confidentiality Isolated by moving to an office in a building far away from the town hall	Moen Confronted with external consultants who conduct an inquiry into his behavior Holvik Denied participation at seminar for all leaders in the municipality
Retaliation directed at whistle-blower’s job performance	Moen Degraded from chief financial officer to member of analysis staff Accused of lacking interest in ERP project Accused of poor information flow Accused of poor work contribution. Holvik Removed from key assignments	Moen Criticized in meetings while on sick leave Accused of lack of focus and discipline at work Holvik Deprived of most of his duties Denied attendance at relevant meetings

It is for whistle-blower Holvik, we find retaliation items in all four boxes in Table 2. The main retaliation efforts for Holvik seem to be concerned with retaliation against his behavior to inflict injury. As mentioned above, a large gallery of visible and invisible actors was discussing his behavior. Holvik was very visible in local as well as national media in the fall of 2017. In a national poll, he received most votes as the most courageous municipal employee of the year. In a local poll, he received most votes as this year’s name in the region. Therefore, most retaliation measures against Holvik directed themselves at compensating for the heroic status he had achieved in the beginning of 2018.

Now, we turn to the concept of retaliation as a process. The three stages are ignorance and disregard, rejection and criticism, and sanction and punishment. Holvik experienced a variety of Stage 1 items where key politicians and executives ignored and disregarded his observations. Both Holvik and Moen experienced Stage 2 items, where Holvik was criticized for his visibility externally, while Moen was criticized for inappropriate CFO behavior. Moen experienced most severely Stage 3 items, where external consultants were hired to do a fact-finding with the purpose of finding him unsuited for the job.

Conclusion

This article discussed the retaliation against whistle-blowers based on two Norwegian case studies of potential corruption in the municipality in Grimstad. The purpose of this article was to explore and categorize retaliation items. We have delineated our own analytical approach to examine the cases studied.

Whistle-blowing is an international phenomenon. There is a cultural expectation to blow the whistle on those that cause harm. Yet in a concept of offender versus victim, retaliation is a complicated issue. Offenders might perceive concrete, individual actions as strategic or operational initiatives that have to occur, independent of whether or not individuals are whistle-blowers. Victims can perceive the same actions as retaliation, since whistle-blowers may expect to return to work untouched by changes in the organization. Therefore, distinctions have to clarify differences between obvious and not so obvious retaliation measures.

The police are often dependent on whistle-blowers to detect and investigate white-collar crime. However, retaliation makes informants reluctant to blow the whistle. In this article, we have attempted to introduce a 2 × 2 matrix to enable identifying obvious retaliation actions. If there is an obvious motive and an obvious target, then it is indeed retaliation. The motive can either be revenge to inflict injury to the whistle-blower or to remove the person from the organization. The target can be either a whistle-blower’s personal behavior or the whistle-blower’s job performance.

Furthermore, retaliation measures are studied in a dynamic perspective, starting with ignorance and disregard, moving into rejection and criticism, and finally sanction and punishment. Future research might explore both perspectives of independent measures and coherent process as presented in this article.

There is a leadership challenge in handling whistle-blowers who typically occupy themselves with their own whistle-blowing to an extent that they disregard their daily work obligations. They may claim to become involved in following up their own notifications, for which there is no ground. Therefore, managers may find whistle-blowers troublesome and attempt to avoid them. However, the leadership challenge implies to handle the situation by entering into a dialogue with whistle-blowers concerning their future in the organization. It will not be sufficient simply to ask and require whistle-blowers to return to their jobs. The whistle-blowing experience can have changed their motivation in a way that managers should help promote or otherwise change the job situation for whistle-blowers.

This research has the potential of making a strong contribution to the white-collar crime literature by emphasizing the role of whistle-blowers in detection and the avoidance of retaliation to stimulate future whistle-blowing. This article also contributes by emphasizing both the incident-based and the process-based perspective on retaliation.

While it seems discouraging to promote whistle-blowing to fight corruption based on this case study, some policy implications are important. First, reprisals have to have serious consequences for offenders in terms of jail sentences. Next, whistle-blower protection needs safeguarding by public agencies and not only by the organization. Third, executive education should focus on difficult employees as a resource. Finally, whistle-blowers need assistance in formulating their messages and later in controlling their behaviors.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Petter Gottschalk

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