Abstract
Women have had a long and varied participation in terrorist groups. This project explores the role of gender in one of the most prominent armed organizations in the Middle East, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, commonly known as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK). Rejecting the patriarchal values of traditional Kurdish society, the PKK has been particularly receptive to female membership. Insights on the nature of this participation are drawn from an extensive interview with a long-term, high-ranking PKK official. Inspired by secular egalitarian ideology from its inception, the PKK has created an organizational culture that encourages substantial gender equality in recruitment, training, military missions, leadership, and protections against sexual victimization. It is possible that gender equality in the PKK will have a feedback effect on the broader Kurdish society where patriarchal values remain dominant.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, commonly known as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), is one of the oldest armed groups in the Middle East. Since 1978, it has battled for autonomy for the Kurdish people within Turkey (Haner, 2018). Recognizing the strategic importance of both Turkey and the Kurds, the United States and many western countries have had complicated and fluctuating relationships with the PKK, alternately ignoring, supporting, abandoning, or condemning it depending on how geopolitical winds surge and swirl across the region. Because it is a large and politically consequential organization, the historical development and organizational structure of the PKK has received significant attention from scholars (Khezri, 2018; Massulo & O’Connor, 2017; McDowall, 2003; O’Ballance, 1996; Romano, 2006; White, 2000). These investigations have shed considerable light on the goals and motivations of the PKK, its methods of recruiting fighters, its operational successes and failures, and its evolving strategies and tactics in the ongoing conflict with Turkish authorities. However, one important aspect of the PKK as an insurgent organization has, to date, received insufficient attention from researchers, and that is the role of women as supporters, fighters, and leaders (however, see Bengio, 2016; Düzgün, 2016).
The failure to explore the role of women in the PKK is unfortunate because, as we demonstrate below, they are integral to the success and long-term maintenance of the organization. More importantly, even though the PKK is situated in a traditional and deeply paternalistic society, women in the PKK are not as constrained by the patriarchal hegemony that typifies the experiences of women involved in other nationalistic or religious struggles in the Middle East (see Berko & Edez, 2007). Indeed, because of the ideology on which it was founded, the PKK may be unique among the armed organizations located in the region in the roles that women play.
Studying women in the PKK provides insights into the role of gender in an organization where equality has been a core principle. In addition, even though the exact number of women in the PKK is uncertain, it is estimated that they constitute around 40–50% of the PKK cadre (approximately 25,000; Foreign Affairs, 2015; Khezri, 2018). Considering the patriarchal and male-dominated religious hegemony in this specific geographic context, such a high rate of female participation in this type of organization is unusual. No understanding of the PKK can be complete without taking into account what women have meant to the development and trajectory of the PKK and how their role has been shaped by the ideology on which it is based.
There are media reports on military actions, frequently suicide bombings, carried out by women for the PKK, but these reports rarely go into any detail about the day-to-day lives of the women, and they are almost never based on in-depth interviews with PKK leaders (Damon, n.d.); Krajeski, 2013; but see West, 2015). In this article, we present the results of several months of interviews conducted with a former leader of the PKK, the first such study of its kind. The individual, whom we describe more below, joined the PKK as a young man and over the course of two decades rose through the ranks to become one of its top leaders. He spent years living and training with women, fighting alongside them, commanding them, and being commanded by them. The interviews were used to construct a life history that covered all facets of the subject’s life, but here we focus on our subject’s relations with women.
The life history is a particularly useful method to use to study social relations because, as the subjects reveal their personal history, they also expose and illuminate their social world. It can reveal the structure of the subject’s reference group and the roles that people in that group played, including, in our case, women in the PKK. Criminologists have long known that interviews with insiders are an especially valuable methodological tool because of the light they can shed on the inner workings of clandestine and marginalized groups engaged in deviant or illegal activities (e.g., see Contreras, 2013; Decker & Van Winkle, 1996; MacLeod, 1987; Miller, 2001, 2008). However, relatively little of the research on women in armed groups, especially the PKK, has been based on the testimony of insiders, especially those who have been in leadership positions.
Accordingly, the goal of this article is to extend our understanding of women in the PKK. Drawing from the interviews, we explore six themes related to female involvement in the PKK: (1) the ideology of equality, (2) women’s motivation and recruitment, (3) training and fighting, (4) leadership opportunities, (5) willingness to die, and (6) romantic relationships. Before presenting our results, we briefly review previous research on women and terrorism and then discuss the history of the PKK. Next, we present our methodology, followed by our analysis of the interviews. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these results for a general understanding of gender and terrorism.
Gender and the PKK
Women and Terrorism
The role of women in terrorist organizations is a topic on which misinformation and misperception abound (Bloom, 2011). Their participation in political violence has been paradoxically interpreted in terms of female autonomy and empowerment or as an indicator of gender subjugation and exploitation (Berko & Erez, 2007). The difficulty of understanding what females in terrorist organizations actually do stems in part from the tremendous diversity of armed groups and the accompanying diversity of roles played by women in them. Constructing a coherent and comprehensive typology of terrorist organizations is difficult because of the variation in motives, demands, organizational structures, operative methods, and arenas of operation as well as other criteria found among terrorist groups (Ganor, 2008). In some groups, the duties of women are limited to providing logistical and moral support and the delivery of health care (Berko & Erez, 2007; Hearne, 2009; Ness, 2005). In these organizations, women are often assigned secondary roles, with duties dictated by tradition-bound patriarchal social systems (Margolin, 2016). For example, in Palestinian terrorist organizations, women have less opportunity to rise into important leadership positions (Sutten, 2009). However, in other groups, they have a wide range of duties stretching from the dissemination of propaganda to the execution of the actual terrorist attacks. For example, women have played leadership roles in many leftist groups, including the Red Brigades of Italy, Shining Path of Peru, and Red Army Faction of Germany (Bloom, 2011; Nacos, 2005; Weinberg & Eubank, 2011). Their work has not been limited to housekeeping, caring for the sick and wounded, cooking, or running the errands (Benson, Evans, & Simon 1982; Hearne, 2009; Martin, 2014; Raghavan & Balasubramaniyan, 2014). Rather, females in these groups have become key figures in almost every aspect of the group’s terrorist activity, and they have advanced to hold important leadership positions (Sutten, 2009).
In addition, the roles played by women in any one organization can evolve over time. Women may start out primarily as providers of social support and care for men, but over time as conditions in the struggle change, they may assume more active roles in the fight. For example, during the Algerian uprising against the French, the role of women in the National Liberation Front (FLN) changed. At the start of the rebellion, women were not involved except in the mountains where they fed and cared for the guerrillas, but as the French adapted to the male-dominated tactics of the FLN, women assumed new roles. The FLN started to allow some of their female members to become Europeanized (i.e., unveiling), so that they could move about freely. These women were then used to carry explosives or weapons to the scene of an attack where men could retrieve them (Benson et al., 1982). Likewise, in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, women started out playing mainly supporting roles but from the mid-1980s were recruited as fighters and then recognized as being among the most experienced (Allison, 2003). Even movements that are based in traditional and conservative societies, such as the Islamic Revival Movement (Hamas) of Palestine, have at times come to appreciate and depend on the skills of certain prominent female operatives (Bloom, 2011). The key insight is that female terrorism has diverse manifestations that are shaped by sociohistorical and organizational contexts.
Although it is now clear that terrorism is no longer exclusively dominated by men and that women are playing increasingly active roles, much still remains unknown about women and terrorism. In particular, our understanding of how women are recruited, their motives for joining, and their actual activities in specific individual terrorist organizations is underdeveloped (Berko & Erez, 2007; Bloom, 2011). In light of the diversity in organizational structures, aims, operative methods, and social and cultural contexts of terrorist organizations, detailed case studies of the role of women in individual organizations, such as the PKK, are needed to build an empirical base. As noted above, the PKK has been the subject of numerous reports and investigations, but to date none have been based on insider reports particularly from persons in leadership positions nor have any focused in depth on the experiences of women in the PKK. We begin to correct both of these shortcomings here.
Contingency, Gender Ideology, and the PKK
Established in 1978, the PKK emerged in response to repressive measures imposed by the Turkish state aimed at accelerating the cultural assimilation of the Kurds in Turkey (Haner, 2018). Initially calling for an independent Kurdish state, the PKK launched its first armed attack in 1984 by targeting a military barrack (White, 2000). Since then, the primary targets of the PKK have been the police, gendarmerie, military, and village guards (teachers have been occasionally targeted, as well). With a few exceptions, the group has continued to follow a policy of limited war—targeting only members of Turkish security forces as a means of retaliation (Haner, 2018).
Today, the status of the PKK as a terrorist organization is a controversial issue. Some countries and organizations—including the United States, England, the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and several others—have designated the PKK as a terrorist group. However, other states and organizations—including the United Nations, China, Russia, and Switzerland—have refused to designate the PKK as a terrorist group for a variety of reasons (Casier, 2010). Additionally, in 2008, the European Court of First Instance (2008) asked the Council of European Union to remove the PKK from the designated foreign terrorist organizations list because there was not sufficient evidence for it to be included. Further, despite being designated as a terrorist group by NATO and the United States, Kurdish female guerillas have been trained by the United States, along with their male comrades, and they are now fighting in Syria to expel ISIS terrorists (Erhan & Stein, 2016). Thus, we recognize that saying that we are focusing on female “terrorists” may be regarded as prejudicial in some quarters where the labels “freedom fighter” or “insurgents” would be considered more appropriate. However, regardless whether the PKK is a terrorist organization, it is still important to investigate the role of women in the PKK in order to better understand how women fit into nontraditional military-like organizations that cause serious problems for traditional states and societies.
As a group founded within a patriarchal and religious culture, the PKK might well have been informed by those values, which would have resulted in a subordinate role for women. In the 1970s—and even today, especially in rural areas—Kurdish women were subjected to genital mutilation, child marriages, and honor killings (Khezri, 2018; “Kurdish Women in Culture,” 2018). However, a different contingency shaped the organization’s culture and gender relationships. Emerging in the mid-1970s in the shadow of groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the PKK embraced Marxist–Leninist ideology and trained its recruits in the teachings of Mao Tse-Tung and other revolutionary groups in Russia, China, and Vietnam (McDowall, 2003). Its most influential leader is Abdullah Öcalan, popularly known as “Apo.” Apo was sensitized to Kurdish nationalism and leftist ideology while studying political science in the 1970s at Ankara University. His initial efforts to recruit others to join the Kurdish nationalist freedom movement began in 1975. He originally named the emerging organization as the National Liberation Army and, thereafter, the Kurdistan Workers Party (Haner, 2018).
Portraying itself as the protector of poor peasant Kurds, the PKK rejected the traditional systems of authority and gender restrictions to forge a new Kurdish identity (White, 2000). The group’s message of gender equality, justice, and egalitarianism resonated among thousands of men and women who were frustrated with the status quo of the tribal authorities and patriarchal hegemony in Kurdish society.
Notably, the issue of gender was central to Öcalan. Although imprisoned for the past two decades, he has continued to write about the centrality of gender equality to Kurdish nationalism (see Öcalan, 2013). His perspective and directives are consequential. It is important to note that Apo is to the PKK and the Kurdish people what Nelson Mandela was to the African National Congress (ANC) and South African people of color. He is a moral leader who is revered and whose words inspire Kurds. A YouTube video that presents the testimony of Kurds combating ISIS is instructive in this regard (see https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=zVx7nktKCNM). As one female fighter commented, “As the members of Women’s Defense Units, we will not accept a life without leader Apo…The resistance here is first and foremost for him. That’s why we have been struggling, as women, to free him and all women of the Middle East…What makes us fight and resist against the vicious enemies is his philosophy.” This view was echoed by a male fighter, “What Apo means to me is freedom, women’s liberation, and people’s right to self-determination.” The theme of equality and gender liberation is palpable throughout the video.
Öcalan’s (2013) vision for gender equality is summarized passionately in his Liberating Life: Women’s Revolution. In the foreword to the book, it is noted that he has had a lifelong concern about women’s liberation, encouraging “women in the movement to take up the struggle against male dominance, providing inspiration through his critique of patriarchy” (International Initiative, 2013, p. 8). Öcalan (2013) observes that the PKK not only had to fight the colonialism of Turkey and other nations but also the “internal feudalism” that enslaved women within Kurdish society. Women were attracted to the movement precisely because it promised “to end the internal feudalism and to demand freedom” (p. 40). “Capitalism and the nation-state,” argues Apo, are insidious because they “represent the dominant male in its most institutionalized form…It is a continuous warfare against society and women” (p. 43). The Marxist influence is clear: “Class and sexual oppression develop together; masculinity has generating ruling gender, ruling class, and ruling state. When man is analyzed in this context, it is clear that masculinity must be killed” (p. 51).
According to Öcalan, true freedom and liberation in life are “impossible without a radical women’s revolution which would change man’s mentality and life” (p. 51). It is essential to create a "libertarian, natural mind-set against the domineering, power hungry mentality of the male” (p. 54). Society’s social problems, he claims, will only be solved by “a movement for women’s freedom, equality, and democracy” (p. 56). Part of this movement should be “the science of women, called Jineoloji in Kurdish” (p. 56, emphasis in original). And the consequences of a true revolution are profound, for “the level of women’s freedom and equality determines the freedom and equality of all sections of society” (p. 57).
In short, since the founding of the PKK, Apo has promoted a secular Marxist–Leninist approach that has embraced feminism. His advocacy for gender equality was present in the formative years of the organization and, following his imprisonment, in his published writings. In 1987, the PKK organized its first congress of women’s rights. Sakine Cansiz—a cofounder of the PKK, who was assassinated in 2013—“proposed that its ‘liberation for all’ rhetoric must include women’s liberation too” (Khezri, 2018). As Khezri (2018) notes, the “Marxist–Leninist PKK…may be the enemy of the Turkish state, but it also happens to be one of the most feminist movements in the Middle East.” In this context, our goal is to assess how these views are manifested in the everyday operation of the PKK. The account provided by our informant (known as Deniz)—as well as other recent independent accounts—suggests that in many ways, his vision for gender equality is a defining goal of the PKK (see, e.g., Khezri, 2018; “Kurdish Women in Culture,” 2018; Nordland, 2018).
Method
Conducting a Life History
Within criminology, the life-history method has a rich historical tradition. As a means of probing the unique turning points and processes that lead an individual into crime and of gaining a rich, textured understanding of that life, the life-history method is unparalleled. It was used to considerable benefit by the members of the early Chicago School of Criminology (Shaw, 1930, 1938; Shaw & Moore, 1931; Sutherland, 1937). Since then, the life-history method has been used with great success in studies of addicts (Rettig, Torres, & Garrett, 1977), professional thieves (Chambliss, 1990), fences (Steffensmeier, 1986), and ordinary street criminals (Allen, Kelly, & Heyman, 1977). One of the most useful aspects of the life-history method is that it not only reveals the subject's own personal history, but it also exposes and illuminates the individual's social world. It can reveal the structure of the subject’s reference group and the roles that people in that group played. It is this dimension of the life-history method that we focus on in this article.
The data for the present article come from a series of recorded interviews that were used to construct the life history of a member of the PKK. The methodology of the study was approved by the institutional review board of the authors’ university to ensure that the subject’s participation was voluntary and that all other protocols for the protection of human subjects were followed. Over a 4-month period from January 13 to May 8, 2015, a high-level PKK leader was interviewed in a Turkish prison by the first author. Because of his long tenure, leadership role, and diverse experiences, our subject—“Deniz”—was able to shed considerable light on gender relations in the PKK.
The interviews with Deniz focused on four domains: (1) his life growing up, (2) how he became an insurgent, (3) what it was like to be an insurgent, and (4) his life in prison and after. As the interview process proceeded, the interviewer posed questions in each of these areas but also let the conversation take paths that Deniz wished to explore. In describing his life history, Deniz discussed at length the people with whom he interacted while he was an insurgent, and he discussed how the organization was structured and operated. These discussions naturally opened up opportunities for the interviewer to ask questions about women and gender relations in the PKK, and at times Deniz brought up these topics himself. He was able to provide extensive information on the group’s recruitment of women, gender relations, women’s ideological and military training, and the general treatment of women. These parts of the overall interview form the basis for the present article. Even though the original goal of the data collection was to analyze why a person joins a terrorist/insurgent organizations, exploring the issue of women in the PKK was an opportunity that was identified during the process of analyzing the larger body of the data that were collected. 1
Validity
Since the data for this investigation come from a single source, questions of validity naturally arise and must be addressed. Part of our confidence in the results is drawn from the fact that Deniz was very informed about the PKK, was a perceptive and balanced informant, and provided finely calibrated details on virtually all aspects of its operations. With regard to gender, his observations were drawn from numerous interviews on a variety of topics over the course of several months. The consistency of his observations was remarkable. Further, we were able to access official documents—court records, intelligence reports, and police records—at the counterterrorism department of Turkish National Police that could be used to corroborate Deniz’s statements and testimony. Deniz’s descriptions of important events and terrorist missions correctly matched the data kept by the Turkish authorities.
A more specific concern is Deniz’s ability to capture the full reality of gender within the PKK because of his male status. We suspect that more important than his gender was Deniz’s wealth of experience being socialized into the PKK’s liberation ideology and then fighting and associating with female comrades. Similar to Shaw’s (1930) good fortune of having Stanley as his subject, we similarly benefited from a subject who was bright, verbal, and perceptive. He also avoided a Pollyannaish view of the PKK, frequently noting its challenges and the personal injustices he experienced. In fact, by his account, Deniz quit the PKK because a woman he loved had been falsely accused of having sexual relations with him and had committed suicide. He turned himself over to Turkish authorities in hopes of exacting vengeance against those he deemed responsible; instead, he received a life sentence. Regardless, as in any project, his version of gender reality within the PKK should be subjected to further study including interviews with female members of the PKK. At the very least, however, his insights are unprecedented and comprise the first baseline of data on this issue.
Nevertheless, steps were taken to check on Deniz’s account. Using the resources of the Turkish National Police, the first author reached out and interviewed one active and one former female member of the PKK who were mentioned in Deniz’s life history. The active one was a senior member of the Kurdistan Women’s Liberation Movement (Komalên Jinên Kurdistan) and a member of the Kurdistan Communities Union (the highest executive authority in the PKK); the former one was a “repentant” female PKK member who left the organization and is now free in society. After gaining their trust, they were asked to read the current article and inform us whether they detected any inconsistency or exaggeration in any part of the study. Both of these PKK members—with different experiences—corroborated Deniz’s story (the first by supplying a five-page, single-spaced email). Two additional reviewers were then contacted who agreed to read and assess the manuscript: a male spokesperson of the PKK and a woman, now located in Northern Iraq, who lived with the PKK for 8 months. They confirmed its content as well.
Online Appendix A summarizes the content of detailed letters provided by two of the reviewers . First, the senior member of the Kurdistan Women’s Liberation Movement wrote on behalf of women at the Kurdistan Communities of Women, which is made up of leading women of the PKK. Thus, this is a collective letter. The second letter was from the woman who resided with the PKK. This information has not been integrated into the text because the goal of the life history is to convey Deniz’s views. Still, his insights and the main themes of this article regarding the push for gender equality in the PKK are corroborated.
Online Appendix B lists videos from five different sources in which male and female (mostly) members of the PKK are interviewed. Again, the information conveyed in these interviews is consistent with the portrait of the PKK presented here.
All block quotations in the text are from Deniz. Unless otherwise noted, he is also the source for all accounts presented below about the gender and the PKK. As a result, we do not repeatedly cite Deniz in the text. Related materials are included to provide context and to substantiate points shared in Deniz’s account.
The Ideology of Equality
Unlike the Kurdish organizations that preceded the PKK, which were led by either religious or tribal leaders, the PKK was established as a Marxist–Leninist organization and embraced the basic principles of left political ideology—opposition to inequality and the reorganization of society through violent revolution to end the traditional structures of Kurdish society. The adoption of Marxist ideology by the PKK resulted in a socialist view of equality in every aspect of life, including religion, economics, division of labor, and most importantly the gender relations. According to Deniz: …everyone, ranked or not, had to enter the rotation for the kitchen labor. No one could say, “I’m a commander, so I shouldn’t be cooking meals!” Rank earned you no privileges. So it was no surprise to see a commander washing up the dishes.
Even though a majority of the recruits had joined the PKK out of a desire for revenge and bloodlust, the leadership cadre constantly sought to channel their energy into the teachings of Marxism and Leninism. Karl Marx argued that “anybody who knows anything of history knows that great social changes are impossible without the feminine ferment. Social progress can be measured exactly by the social position of the fair sex” (Marx & Engels, 1988, p. 184), whereas Mao Tse-Tung commented that “genuine equality between the sexes can only be realized in the process of the socialist transformation of society as a whole” (Cheek, 2002, p. 176). Similar to these figures, Öcalan (2013) stated, “The extent to which society can be thoroughly transformed is determined by the extent of the transformation attained by women (p. 57).”
Apo integrated these ideas from Marx and Mao and challenged the existing social hierarchies that restricted women’s freedom by applying gender-inclusive policies to end discrimination against the women—such as assigning women into positions of authority and leadership, establishing women’s own military units, assigning men into auxiliary roles while women were recruited into positions that were traditionally assumed by males, prohibiting domestic and sexual violence, and banning forced marriage. In the PKK cadre, especially, the men went through an intensive ideological training to be socialized with these new basic values and goals of the organization. They were introduced to the new role, status, and rights given to their female Kurdish comrades and alerted to the importance of women to the Kurdish cause. As noted by Deniz: Our reading list included the autobiographies of important figures such as Mao Tse-Tung, who led the Chinese Revolution; legendary Vietnamese commanders; and the undefeatable leader of Cuba, Che Guevara. All of the easiest tasks would be given to women. For example, there were items like pans, glasses, spoons, teapots, forks, knifes, pots, etc. in each squad. In the beginning of the organization, only the female guerillas were responsible for the transport of those things, but that changed as the years went on. I see myself as a candidate for a voluntary death. I willingly concede that to give our lives is, from the standpoint of your unending and tireless work for our liberation, not enough. I hope to be able to contribute much more than my life…I want to be part of the total expression of the liberation struggle of our people. By exploding a bomb against my body I want to protest against the policies of imperialism which enslave women and express my rage and become a symbol of resistance of Kurdish women. (Martyr Zilan’s letter, 2015)
The high importance given by the PKK leadership to fostering gender equality and the greater socialization and interaction between men and women eventually changed the beliefs (stereotypes) of PKK men about women’s ability to participate in nontraditional roles and increased their willingness to accept female militants as their equals in carrying out tasks and duties and filling positions of responsibility and authority. Respect for women increased as they became more active in important missions such as raids, attacks, and ambushes. Female guerillas began to be positioned a step ahead of the men. For example, International Women’s Day on March 8 became an important celebration for the PKK. The leadership cadre required the observance of this day in each region to recognize the achievements of women guerillas. Positive discrimination was applied to further increase their status—special rules were brought into action regarding the appointment of women into important leadership positions, new codes of behaviors were developed on the treatment of women, and auxiliary roles/duties once filled only by women were eventually assigned to men so that women could focus on professional development activities.
For example, men had been warned to be careful of their speech tones when women were present in the same environment. They were not allowed to make inappropriate jokes or stay in a relaxed position when women were around. Let’s say there were a bunch of men watching TV in the ward, and later a woman joined them. Believe me, none of the men could watch TV in a relaxed position by stretching their legs or getting comfortable when a woman was present, even if they were a superior of that woman. They had private schools that were completely separate from the men’s…While the women were being trained at those schools, the men undertook all the chores such as cooking, washing, and cleaning.
Further, the PKK also provided extra protection to women who were abused by the patriarchal authorities. The male-dominated society in the east had encouraged Kurdish men to abuse their women without the worry of criminal sanctions because law enforcement personnel often disregarded such claims. Perpetrators of domestic violence had enjoyed impunity, and victims who reported such incidents usually faced the risk of further abuse and ostracism. As a result, the victimization of the Kurdish women by men often went underreported, and women were regarded as second-class citizens—often beaten, tortured, or even killed.
However, the PKK was able to put an end to most of these practices by introducing severe punishments. Today, Kurdish men know that they would encounter sanctions if they harm their wives. If a woman informs the PKK that she was abused by her husband, the PKK would forcefully separate the husband from the wife, ask him to leave the house, seize a considerable amount of his salary, and allow him to return to the house only after the wife agrees to let him do so.
Thus, the importance attached to the ideology of equality increased women’s status not only in the guerilla cadres but also throughout the Kurdish community in general. These values and procedures facilitated the social integration of Kurdish women and over time became the backbone of party policy.
Even though the appeal of the PKK originated from the rights granted to women, it is important to note that the notion of equality presented itself at every aspect of life including punishment and division of labor. Women are treated the same as men in these matters. Male and female recruits who violate the codes of the organization are subjected to the same consequences. In the same way, the division of labor recognized no gender. Women in the PKK are required to do the same tasks as men.
These findings are consistent with the recent scholarship emerging in political science and political sociology (especially studies on women’s participation in Latin American rebellions in 1970s and 1980s). Several other researchers also discovered that organizations that espouse Marxist–Leninist and egalitarian ideologies are more likely to recruit female combatants than other groups such as Islamist and nationalist ideologies (Israelsen, 2018; Thomas & Bound, 2015; Wood & Thomas, 2017). In fact, Thomas and Bond’s (2015) study indicated that positive gender ideology is the largest determinant of women’s participation in violent political organizations. More specifically, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and Zapatista Army of National Liberation of Mexico benefited from increased levels of female recruitment by changing the long-established gender norms and creating new opportunities for women to engage in social and political life (Kampwirth, 2002; Luciak, 2001; Mason, 1992; Reif, 1986; Thomas & Wood, 2018; Viterna, 2013).
Recruitment
The main factor motivating many of the Kurdish women who join the ranks of the PKK has been the quest for emancipation. Because they are born into a traditionally male-dominated society, which has also been subjected to the oppressive military and cultural measures of the Turkish government, Kurdish women have historically experienced dual oppression.
The customs and traditions of the patriarchal Kurdish society prevented women from being active in the public sphere of life. Women’s participation in the public realm was restricted, and with few exceptions, they were not allowed to pursue educational and occupational opportunities. Instead, Kurdish girls often were forced to marry in their early teens, penned into their houses, asked to bear children, and made to serve the needs of their husbands. Even the formal authorities could not prevent the practice of early and forced marriage of girls in Kurdish society.
In addition, according to Deniz (and corroborated by two other female PKK members), the decades of degradation, mistreatment, violence, arbitrary arrest, torture, and other humiliating measures applied by the Turkish security forces have created widespread trauma in the Kurdish community, especially among males. Every village is surrounded at a certain hour, its inhabitants rounded up…Many have died in these operations, some have committed suicide…women are forced to tie a rope around the penis of their husbands and then to lead him around the village. (McDowall, 2003, p. 33) They [the Turkish soldiers] would force all the men they had gathered into the square, to lie down on the ground. Then they would beat them with rifle butts or their boots, smashing their heads until they lost consciousness. The women and the children weren’t subjected to such treatment, but they were forced to watch this cruelty…
At such a distressing time, the PKK offered an outlet to women to achieve social liberation by breaking the patriarchal structures of their male-dominated society. The group emphasized empowerment and the organization of women to create a new lifestyle in which gender equality is stressed and protected. In the PKK, the men are not allowed to establish hegemony over women, as has been the case in traditional Kurdish society. Rather, women in the PKK are given opportunities to actively participate in all aspects of life, including armed struggle and leadership positions.
However, like their Kurdish brothers, Kurdish women may have multiple motives for joining the PKK, such as grief over the death of a loved one or pursuit of vengeance against the security forces or some other contributing factor. Still, according to Deniz, it is the liberation lifestyle and progressive ideology of the PKK that have been most responsible for the flow of women into the PKK. Today, approximately half of the PKK cadre is composed of women fighters, and their representation outnumbers males in several administrative roles. In fact, the accounts of Deniz revealed that Kurdish men were shamed by their delay in joining to the PKK as they witnessed the existence of female guerillas in the training camps. …we saw female guerillas in the militia force. They were all armed. We asked ourselves why we had waited for so long to join, as there were even armed females already serving the organization.
Additionally, the coercive recruitment of females (e.g., to marry them as wives, use as sex slaves, or exploit as suicide bombers), which has been widely employed in some terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, has not been the case for the PKK. For example, it has been reported that majority of the approximately 300 school-aged girls who were abducted by Boko Haram in 2004 in Nigeria were later married off by the members of the group or forced to carry out suicide missions (Haner & Lee, 2017).
Even though Turkish state propaganda against the PKK often claims that Kurdish peasant girls are abducted and forced into having sex with guerillas, Deniz indicated that these were slanderous lies used to defame the organization. In fact, the PKK bans sexual relationships between men and women (for reasons that will be discussed in the last section of this article).
Training and Fighting
In the PKK, women and men are required to complete the same curricula for both political and practical military training. Training is usually held in mixed-gender classrooms, and guerillas are not segregated except for a few topics (e.g., women’s history, gynecology, gender constructs) that are unique to women (which we return to below). In general, the PKK provides women a level of training and combat experience that is equivalent with men.
Regardless of gender, each PKK member has to attend political (ideological) training so as to fully understand the aim, purpose, and vision of the PKK and the broader subject of world politics. Similarly, military training is required for everyone and is composed of two parts: (1) weapons training and (2) guerilla war tactics. During the weapons training, along with their male counterparts, women are required to learn how to use weapons (e.g., properly hold, aim, fire, reload) and how to maintain them (e.g., cleaning and servicing).
Guerillas who successfully complete the arms training are then transferred to a higher level class that offers practical training on guerilla war tactics, including assault, ambush, raid, infiltration, siege, forestallment, and deployment of explosive mines. Under the guidance of experienced members, women in the PKK learn how to stage an assassination, destroy an enemy encampment, and penetrate enemy facilities.
Basic guerilla war tactics training usually lasts 3–4 months, after which guerillas are assigned to their duty stations. Based on their performance during the training period, they are placed into one of the two main groups—saboteur or operation. Women play direct and active roles in both groups. However, they are often assigned to carry out assassination missions within the saboteur groups as they have proved themselves effective in these kinds of missions.
The most essential qualities for a successful assassination mission (as well as being mentally robust) are the ability to control one’s breathing and to apply the right amount of pressure when pulling the trigger. More specifically, taking a deep breath, exhaling some portion of it, pausing, and then pulling the trigger are important steps to deliver precision fire at the target. According to Deniz, a majority of the male recruits in the PKK are not good at assassination missions because of their smoking habits—as heavy smokers often fall short of breath and so are unable to hold their gun barrel and sights in perfect alignment. Unlike men, female guerillas are usually assigned to assassination teams because they generally do not smoke and thus their ability to shoot targets is not compromised by the side effects of smoking.
Besides mixed-gender training, female guerillas are required to participate in classes that are limited to them. In these lessons, women are given lectures on gender constructs, sexuality, identity, diversity of women’s lives, and the existing social and institutional power structures that represent inequality between the genders. They are lectured on the lived experiences of revolutionary women and the key figures in the struggle for women’s rights to become familiar with the leadership roles that women played in history. Through this training, women are able to deconstruct the stereotypes associated with being female (e.g., that women are weak and should submit to patriarchy) and are also encouraged to assume key positions in the organization.
In sum, women in the PKK are trained to assume leadership positions and given important roles in the planning and execution of guerilla missions. Unlike many other groups in Middle East, they are not recruited because of the tactical advantages that they bring as perpetrators of violence (e.g., they are less likely to arouse suspicion, they are able to conceal bombs under their clothing or by appearing pregnant; Cunningham, 2003, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002a; Jacques & Taylor, 2008; Myers, 2004; Ness, 2005; Schweitzer, 2006; Victor, 2003).
Leadership
The access of women to leadership positions is one of the most striking features of the PKK that separates it from the other insurgent groups. Women in the PKK have had a prominent role in the administration of the organization due to the insistence of its founders, especially its influential leader, Abdullah Öcalan.
Despite this insistence from the top, males in the PKK initially resisted taking orders from female leaders. They often challenged the authority of female commanders by refusing to perform the duties asked by them. They argued with female commanders or covertly circumvented the orders given by women by going around them to male officials. Some even used verbal harassment to goad females to resign from leadership positions.
Even though this internal conflict between the male and female guerillas was apparent for a time, the PKK’s upper-leadership cadre continued to insist on the inclusion of women and the use of training activities on gender equality to overcome male resistance to female equality and leadership. Thus, attempts by males to undermine the authority of females in hopes of regaining leadership positions often proved unsuccessful.
The male guerillas eventually relented and agreed to work under the command of their female leaders as their resistance earned harsh criticism and heavy penalties from the PKK administration. Everyone, from new recruits to senior party members, was forced to accept this new role given to women. Guerillas who insisted that leadership is an inherently masculine concept were excluded and eventually ostracized by the administration.
This strong-minded attitude of the PKK administration toward the assignment of women to leadership positions not only boosted the confidence of female guerillas to lead their respective units, but also it contributed to women’s retention and growth in numbers. Today, women in the PKK have full access to all leadership positions in military units—from squad to platoon, company, battalion, and region commanderships.
Under this sense of empowerment (which made Kurdish women feel trusted and included), the women in key leadership positions have worked effectively and have made inroads into the top executive positions. Today, the PKK has a certain number of guaranteed seat allocations for the women in all executive positions: in the Union of Kurdish Communities (KCK), the Headquarters Command Management, the Guerilla Parliament, and the Defense Committee.
For example, similar to the Baader-Meinhoff group in Germany (1970–1998), the regulations of the PKK require the application of the cochair model for the KCK, the highest administrative structure after President Apo. According to this model, the KCK needs to appoint two leaders, a man and a woman, who are jointly in charge of the PKK and share equal leadership responsibilities on the governance and oversight of the organization. The PKK also requires women to serve as cochairs in committees, including appointment, nomination, investigation, discipline, promotion, and several others that are essential to proper functioning of the organization. Women serve in the judicial committees and render verdicts in important cases. They play key roles during the assignment of guerillas to their duty stations. They serve as senior advisors and supervisors to males in various leadership positions.
Another significant step taken by the PKK to raise gender awareness in the power structures is the right given to female guerillas to establish their own autonomous units within the organization. Women in the PKK have their own headquarters, administrative units, political branches, and even separate congressional meetings—all independent from the men’s. Within this system, women are in charge of decisions and have their own decision-making processes regarding their own lives without the worry of male intervention.
Once oppressed and subordinated by the patriarchal society, Kurdish women within the PKK now have a strong foothold in the political, military, and administrative arena thanks to this autonomous power structure. The strategies implemented by senior executives not only narrowed down the gender leadership gap within the PKK but also empowered them to be an independent source of authority and to influence the direction of the organization’s military and political agendas. Today, the incarcerated leader Apo is still exerting leadership within the PKK. In so doing, he has to consult and exchange communication with three separate entities—the women’s force, the European representatives, and the KCK—before making any decision on important party politics.
It is also worth noting that the PKK requires the legal Kurdish political entities in Turkey to allow women to serve in leadership positions. For example, starting in 2013, the Kurdish municipalities and political parties in Turkey are required by the PKK to employ a woman and a man in their leadership cadre—similar to the cochair system applied within the KCK. A first time in the Middle East, any mayoral positions in Turkey that are won by Kurdish political parties are now run by the cochair system—one man and one woman. The cochairs share the salary, the office, and the official car that is assigned to the service of the mayor. They have equal political representation and personal benefits. They run the office together for the duration of term, and important decisions are undertaken only after the both parties have reached a consensus. If one of the chairs—regardless of age or gender—tries to subordinate the other, the PKK will not hesitate to dismiss him or her from the position.
Willingness to Die
Women in armed groups organizations have carried out suicide missions for various reasons including coercion, revenge, redemption, and tactical advantages (Vogel, Porter, & Kebbell, 2014). For example (although these examples cannot be generalized to every single incident), the Black Widows of Chechnya are known to engage in suicide missions to exact revenge for their males—husbands, sons, or other family members (Sutten, 2009). Some women of the Birds of Paradise (Tamil women) were reported to carry out murderous strikes to cleanse the shame of dishonor brought onto them by the Sri Lankan soldiers who raped them at military checkpoints (Von Knop, 2007). In Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it has been reported that women have been coerced into suicide missions because of the tactical advantages they bring (e.g., increased media attention, ability to hide explosives, and ability to evade security forces; Bloom, 2011; Raghavan & Balasubramaniyan, 2014; Sutten, 2009).
Similar to these groups, women in the PKK have also carried out suicide missions for reasons such as revenge and tactical advantages. But according to Deniz, women in the PKK have been willing to die including as suicide bombers, mostly for their commitment to an ideological cause—for the freedom and gender equality that they swore to protect and defend. In fact, the first suicide mission in the history of the PKK was carried out by a female guerilla—Zeynep Kinaci (Narozhna & Knight, 2016). Zeynep Kınacı’s suicide mission changed men’s opinion of female guerillas, because it was the first time in its history that someone had sacrificed herself for the organization. Until then, no male guerilla ever dared strap explosives on themselves in order to perform such a mission.
More recently, the willingness of Kurdish women to die for their cause manifested itself in the fight against Islamic State terrorism in Syria and Iraq. Heavily armed female guerillas fought at the front lines to recapture the regions that were deserted by the Assad regime and Iraqi army. The Kurdish women helped the coalition forces by infiltrating behind the IS lines and carrying out attacks. Many of them died during these missions. Some were seriously wounded but returned to fight. One example is Mahabad Kobani, an 18 years old girl who was declared dead after an IS ambush and who said, “I am not worried about dying, I will jump in the way of bullets if my friends are in danger” (Townsend, 2017). Some of them committed suicide to avoid being taken captive by the jihadists, who have a reputation for women enslavement, forced marriage, and rape. We always have a bullet ready to use on ourselves in case we are about to be taken prisoner. (Dehghanpisheh & Georgy, 2016)
Romantic Relationships
Sexual relationships between guerillas, regardless of their ranks or gender, are considered inappropriate and strictly prohibited within the PKK. In fact, apart from killing a comrade, the death penalty within the PKK was reserved for those who violated the policies on sexual relations. Yet the PKK leadership is aware that male and female guerillas often spend time together because they live in the same barracks, trained in the mixed-gender classes, execute missions together, and participate in the same social activities. Thus, the administration recognizes that guerillas can certainly have an emotional connection with one another.
Even though relationships that are asexual in nature are not prohibited, guerillas are asked to end such relationships if they compromise the integrity of the exercise of authority, if they cause unfairness toward the others (e.g., favoritism), if they are exploitative in nature (e.g., between a high-ranking official and a subordinate), or if they adversely affect the general atmosphere of discipline, morale, and the chain of command within guerilla units. For example, the appearance of favoritism can undermine discipline and morale in a camp environment if a male commander was to spend more time with his girlfriend and let her call him by his first name in front of others.
Still, Deniz indicated that these regulations are occasionally violated by some guerillas and sometimes resulted in the impregnation of female guerillas. As he observed: There was also the fact that the organization had thousands of members in the south, within Iran, Syria, and Iraq, and also the north, in Turkey. These thousands of guerillas could not be watched at all times, so there will, of course, be some outliers. Even though the organization did no longer execute those who had sexual intercourse, they were not allowed to raise their children. They were all considered to be children of the organization, and the parents were allowed to see them from time to time. In February 1998, I came across a big problem while staying in the winter camp. A female guerilla reported to one of our company commanders that: “Deniz and I love each other.”…the committee sentenced me to jail time. One of the platoon commanders came to me and said, “They have reached a verdict about your guilt. You will be incarcerated, hand me your weapons.” An investigation committee was established within two days. I was incarcerated on the grounds that I was having a love affair with this girl named Silan. I was put into jail on April 7, 2010.
Discussion
The special value of the life-history method is that it provides rich insights into the lived experiences and perspectives of those engaged in an area of life that is unfamiliar to most observers. The current project has used this method to explore how Kurdish women become members of an armed insurgent group, how they experience their lives as guerilla fighters, and why they are willing to attack and kill military targets. Studying this population is challenging because concerns about members’ safety and the unwillingness to trust most outsiders preclude direct access to PKK fighters. Thus, despite the inherent limits of relying on a single subject’s story (albeit with review by those familiar with the PKK), the life-history method has provided an invaluable means to uncover detailed information on women involved in ongoing armed resistance as the PKK seeks cultural and political freedom.
Confidence in the data can be drawn from the fact that the life-history method has been used insightfully by others to study women involved in political insurgency. For example, Auyero’s (2003) seminal life history of two Argentine women—Nana, a divorced mother of six, and Laura, an unemployed mother of three who experienced humiliation at the hands of their husbands—describes how women overwhelmed by the machismo culture of Argentina played key roles in major social events that involved leading riots, looting, and torching government buildings. Even though the protests were primarily in response to rampant political corruption, Nana’s and Laura’s stories reveal that they reinvented themselves by standing up and fighting against male domination and exploitation. The participation of these two young women in the riots was in part a search for their own sense of agency and identity. They wanted to be “acknowledged and respected” as do the women of the PKK (Auyero, 2003, p. 192).
Another example can be found in Dlamini’s (2014) life history of a man named Glory, an ANC activist, who collaborated with the South African authorities during apartheid. In contrast to Glory, female members of the ANC often acted more courageously than males in order to prove that they were neither weak nor fragile. They remained loyal to the movement to the end. Dlamini (2014) celebrates female recruits such as the martyr Ndwandwe who chose to die (“take the honorable option”) rather than become a collaborator and thus was transformed into a hero (p. 227).
In this context, there are a number of reasons to trust the general outline of the portrait of women’s lives in the PKK that has been painted here. First, Deniz was a member of the PKK for over two decades and rose through the ranks, starting as a common foot soldier and eventually holding a top leadership position. Throughout his time in the PKK hierarchy, he interacted with women constantly, sometimes as a peer, sometimes commanding them, and sometimes being commanded by them. Second, in many instances, we were able to cross-check Deniz’s accounts of particular military missions against the official records of the events as established by Turkish authorities. In every case, Deniz’s accounts were surprisingly accurate and detailed. This suggests he is a reliable respondent. Third, we also were able to have Deniz’s story cross-checked by other PKK members including women, who confirmed his story. Finally, media reports based on interviews with female fighters also support his comments on the independence of women in the PKK (Damon, n.d.: West, 2015). Thus, in light of his extensive experience in the PKK, the documented veracity of his reports on PKK activities, and the corroboration of his peers and media reports, we believe it is reasonable to conclude that Deniz’s account sheds considerable light on women in the PKK. His life history deserves the same respect and careful study that has been accorded to other life histories (Chambliss, 1990; Klockars, 1974; Steffensmeier, 1986; Sutherland, 1937). It provides rich “insider” knowledge about a social world that is very difficult if not impossible to see from the outside. In this regard, the main revelation from Deniz’s story is the centrality of gender equality in the PKK (see also Online Appendices A and B). Three insights follow from this conclusion.
First, reports on some Middle East terrorist organizations suggest that women often play only secondary or supportive roles and have little to do with leadership or actual operations (Berko & Erez, 2007; Cunningham, 2003; Jacques & Taylor, 2008; Margolin, 2016; Sutten, 2009). Their participation also is often coerced by paternalistic males. As Deniz’s account documents, however, women join the PKK willingly, assume leadership roles, and carry out all kinds of military missions. Thus, even though the PKK is situated in an Islamic society, it has managed to transcend the historical and cultural constraints of its environment and to grant to its female members a level of equality they would likely never attain as civilians in Kurdistan (West, 2015). This organizational characteristic may help explain some of the PKK’s longevity and success, as it expands the talent pool that the organization has at its disposal. More importantly, the experience of women as armed insurgents in the PKK confirms what has been found in other military and para-military institutions (Cunningham, 2003; Ness, 2005). If surrounded by a supportive social and cultural context, women can perform well in supposedly male occupations and their availability enhances organizational strength (Bloom, 2011).
The unique ideological, cultural, and social context of the PKK exists primarily because its founder, Apo, conceived of it as a secular political movement grounded in Marxist–Leninist political philosophy as opposed to a religiously based organization. This orientation, which included a strong commitment to equality in general and to the liberation of women in particular, was a contingent sociopolitical turning point initiated by Apo and his followers beginning in the 1970s. If Deniz’s analysis is correct, this ideological framework has enhanced the ability of the PKK to attract young women because it promises them greater freedom and a more fulfilling life in addition to the opportunity to protect their homeland (see also Wood & Thomas, 2017). Over time, Apo’s vision evolved into an entrenched set of normative guidelines and taken-for-granted understandings in the PKK such that women’s equality is now a cornerstone of the group’s structure (see Düzgün, 2016; Öcalan, 2013). Indeed, according to Deniz, women’s equality is an integral part of the overall ideology of equality that pervades the social structure of the PKK.
Second, as noted, the promise of equality is an important reason why women join the PKK. Deniz’s accounts indicate that women are typically motivated by the desire to achieve gender equity and improve their status in the society (where the traditional values dictate gender inequality and view women as homemakers and child bearers). This insight is echoed by Düzgün (2016, p. 284), who observes that Kurdish women join the fighting ranks “because they offer a possibility of achieving freedom and equality…Many Kurdish women demand gender justice.” Still, it is important to highlight that the motivations of women in participating in insurgencies are complex and that the issue of the female empowerment is often multifaceted and nuanced. As Viterna (2006, p. 2) notes, even within the same structural contexts, there may be “multiple, conjunctrural causes of mobilization” that arise from individual-level biography, networks, and situational context. Females’ pathways into insurgency can be diverse.
Thus, the literature on women in terrorism suggests that their participation in violence can be shaped by a variety of contributing factors at the individual and collective levels rather than being driven only by an explicit feminist agenda (Ali, 2006; Alison, 2003; Blee, 1991; Dalton & Asal, 2011; Herrera & Porch, 2008; Jacques & Taylor, 2008; MacDonald, 1991; Margolin, 2016; Ness, 2005; O’Rourke, 2008; Reif, 1986; Schweitzer, 2006; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006; Victor, 2003; Wang, 2011; Weinberg, 1986). Other factors such as a desire for national independence, depression, displacement, humiliation, peer pressure, coercion, personal tragedies, fear of retaliation, commitment to an ideological cause, the need for protection, desire to improve social status, familial connections, desire to avenge personal suffering or loss of a significant other, and opposition to perceived oppression may have all served as important considerations affecting Kurdish women’s participation into PKK. For example, Bejan Matur, a Kurdish author and columnist who interviewed PKK members in Kandil Mountain for her book Looking Beyond the Mountain, found that even though the Kurdish women often cited gender equality for their main motivation to join the PKK, several other factors were also at play. These included experiences such as witnessing loved ones being imprisoned or killed by the security forces, being prohibited from speaking their own language, and escape from forced marriages (Matur, 2011).
Third, the PKK’s ideology of equality may be spreading outside of the organization and affecting relationships between men and women in Kurdistan generally (Düzgün, 2016). For example, by outlawing domestic violence against women, the PKK has shifted the balance of power between men and women in Kurdish society. Of course, we cannot empirically assess the extent to which things have really changed since the PKK came to power and it is certainly likely that women still have far fewer opportunities for fulfillment outside the traditional roles of wife, mother, and homemaker, but it seems clear that men no longer have quite the same freedom to abuse women as they had before the PKK. Thus, even though the PKK was established to protect the culture, social structure, and heritage of the Kurdish people from destruction by Turkey, Syria, and other surrounding states, its potential success in this endeavor may paradoxically eventually lead to the transformation of the very society and culture it sought to protect. As Bengio (2016, p. 46) observes: Regarding the struggle on the nationalist front, Kurdish women’s participation in military activities helps promote their feminist agenda and vice versa…unlike in Arab societies, where after they had fulfilled a significant role in the national movement women were “sent” back to their traditional roles, Kurdish societies’ transformation in the gender equilibrium is deep and authentic enough to not allow for the return to earlier repressive norms.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental Material, Appendix_1_and_2 - Women and the PKK: Ideology, Gender, and Terrorism
Supplemental Material, Appendix_1_and_2 for Women and the PKK: Ideology, Gender, and Terrorism by Murat Haner, Francis T. Cullen and Michael L. Benson in International Criminal Justice Review
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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References
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