Abstract
This study explores police extortion and the negotiation strategies of dealers in street drug markets. Analysis of 31 in-depth interviews with male retail drug dealers in Uyo, Nigeria, framed by the theoretical concept of habitus, revealed how bribery and collusion with corrupt police officers offered protection from raids and arrests. Connivance with police was a double-edged sword; it also fostered exploitation of dealers by police officers. Police extortion, motivated by greed and opportunism, undermined profit from drug trade. Dealers negotiated police extortion by walking-away from exploitative collusions and forming new ones, and temporarily desisting from selling drugs to reduce the risk of arrest by vindictive police officers. I argue that street market policing, driven by greed and self-interest, encouraged bribery, extortion, and criminal alliances that effectively redirected policing from the goals of crime control and public order to personal enrichment of police officers. On the other hand, the negotiation of extortion through street habitus suggests that drug dealers are not passive victims of police predation. Improved oversight over patrolling officers and providing viable alternative livelihoods for dealers are suggested as measures for addressing police corruption and retail drug trade.
Introduction
Police corruption, defined broadly as any form of “deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical and criminal behaviour by a police officer” (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 423), is a phenomenon of global magnitude. Types of corrupt conduct engaged in by police officers include corruption of authority, collection of bribes and kickbacks, and protection of illegal activities (Punch, 2000; Roebuck & Barker, 1974). Further, corrupt police conduct can be “proactive,” where police officers seek out opportunities to engage in unlawful activities or “reactive,” exemplified by the collection of bribes (Skogan & Meares, 2004).
In most parts of the world, levels of corruption in police institutions surpass those in most other sectors of public life. For example, Transparency International (TI) reported in 2010 that in 86 countries police were considered to be the fourth most corrupt public institution, only exceeded by political parties, public officials generally, and parliament and legislature (Transparency International, 2010). A World Bank study conducted in 23 countries reported that most people perceived the police not “as a source of help and security, but rather of harm, risk and impoverishment” (World Bank, cited in Agbiboa, 2015, p. 96). The burden of police corruption is uneven, borne largely by people in the lowest quantile of income who often report that they had to offer bribes to the police (Bayley & Perito, 2011; Smith, 2007).
Police corruption is known to be more visible and pernicious in developing countries, a reflection of the extent of corruption in these societies and the failure of state institutions (Hope, 2016). In the report mentioned earlier, corruption was said to be particularly common in sub-Saharan Africa, the newly independent states of the former Soviet bloc, the Middle East, and North Africa (Transparency International, 2010). Hope (2016, p. 4) has contended that in many developing societies police corruption has degenerated into lawless predatory policing where policing activities are primarily devoted to personal enrichment and self-preservation of the officers themselves rather than to the protection of the public.
Across the world, socially marginalized populations (e.g., sex workers, people who use drugs) experience elevated levels of police violence and unlawful conducts, including frisking, physical abuse, sexual harassment, and unlawful detention (Fick, 2006; Miller et al., 2008; Muldoon et al., 2017; Sarang et al., 2010; Sherman et al., 2015). There is also small but important body of international research, which shows how street policing, surveillance, highly visible patrols, and crackdowns on street markets, involve corrupt and illegal conduct such as planting evidence, misappropriation of confiscated drugs, extortion of money from dealers/users, and facilitating the drug trade (Dixon & Maher, 2002; Dorn & South, 1990; Lee & South, 2012; Stinson et al., 2013).
In Africa, studies have shown how brutality, corruption, and other misbehaviors continue to undermine police legitimacy despite efforts to reform the police and build public trust (Faull, 2011; Hope, 2016; Kagoro, 2019; Lamb, 2021). Others focus on the contextual dynamics shaping everyday police corruption. For example, Gaibazzi (2017) has shown how the discretionary power of the Angolan police allows for arbitrary use of authority, extra-legal practices, violence, and extortion of undocumented migrants. While undermining formal rights, police corruption creates a space through which migrants negotiate their inclusion in the state. Similarly, Onyango (2022) has described how police corruption in Kenya thrives within a well-established and expansive network of institutionalized corruption regulated by the “rules-of-the-game,” where police officers maximize illicit income through extortion of motorists, who comply to evade traffic regulations or court favor with corrupt police officers. He further showed the discreetness of bribery at checkpoints, consisting of coded languages, techniques, networks, and trust that are socially transmitted and perpetuated through the complicity of high-level officers.
Absent in the current literature on everyday police corruption in Africa are the accounts of street-level drug dealers. There is a small literature that explores police extortion of drug dealers (Nelson & Ramirez, 2022; Nnam et al., 2020). But less is known about how dealers experience police corruption, and how they negotiate shifting dynamics of extortion and predation. Such research has theoretical and policy significance, including enabling a better understanding of the persistence of street drug markets amidst police crackdowns and informing context-specific responses to police corruption and the illegal drug trade. This study contributes to filling this gap in the literature. Drawing on 31 in-depth interviews with commercially oriented Nigerian retail drug dealers, I explore police extortion and everyday negotiation strategies of street dealers. The study is guided by two questions: (a) how do street dealers experience police corruption? (b) How do they negotiate extortion and exploitation? In the section that follows I describe the theoretical framework. Thereafter, I provide an overview of police corruption in Nigeria. Next, I describe study methods, present the findings and discuss them, and offer some concluding thoughts as well as suggestions for policy.
Theoretical Framework
In this study, I use “habitus” as a theoretical construct to explore the everyday negotiation of police extortion in street drug markets. The concept is used in this study because it accounts for the dynamic interplay between social structure and actors’ agency represented here by policing and dealers’ negotiation practices respectively. Defined as “systems of disposition that are shaped by the experiences of actors in particular positions in social structure” (Calhoun et al., 2022, p. 261), habitus helps to overcome the objectivist-subjectivist dichotomy in social analysis by “specifying the mechanisms that link structural conditionings to social practices and regularities” (Lau, 2004, p. 370). Lau (2004) has conceptualized it, in critical realist terms, as a collective, non-reflective practical sense emergent from experience. He further identified three interrelated components of habitus: “belief-premises” (fundamental beliefs, taken-for-granted assumptions), “perception-appreciation” (which means understanding), and “practical sense” (which is to say, the reasonable thing to do). Habitus, along with the related concept of “field,” has been used in previous studies to analyze police culture and conducts. Narayanan (2002) and Narayanan and Cheong (2016) has explored police habitus as cultural dispositions which are shaped by the structural conditions (field) of policing. She has shown how changes in the structural conditions bring about changes in occupational habitus. Similarly, Johnson (2010) has used the concept to explore policing of consensual sex in public spaces in New South Wales, Australia. He has shown how the legal construction of public sexual offenses facilitates forms of police discretion that, because of the wider social and moral landscape in which policing takes place, encourages disproportionate social control of sexual conduct. He argues that police discretion, which is a product of officers’ moral habitus, determines the scope and application of the law. In this study, I extend the application of habitus to street market policing. Specifically, I draw on Lau's (2004) three components of habitus to frame analysis of interview accounts, showing how central beliefs about police extortionary behaviors shaped how drug dealers understood and strategized in response to everyday police extortion. I also show how corrupt police practices operate as structural mechanisms adversely impacting retail drug trade, and how beliefs about policing inform practicalities that allow drug dealers to exercise a degree of agency in the face of structural constraints. I emphasize the generative capacity of habitus whereby very different practices could emerge in different social circumstances.
Police Corruption and Misconduct in Nigeria
The Nigerian Police Force (NPF), considered the largest in Africa, is notorious for preying on the people it is meant to protect (Human Rights Watch, 2010). A nation-wide survey conducted in 2006 ranked the NPF as the most corrupt public institution in Nigeria (Alemika & Chukwuma, 2007). In 2008, the Presidential Committee on Police Reforms reported that the police are publicly perceived as the most corrupt government institution, with its personnel constantly accused of bribery and extortion in the course of performing their functions (HRW, 2010). Policing in Nigeria is characterized by “arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low accountability to the public, and corruption” (Alemika, 1988, p. 161). Ordinary Nigerians struggling to earn a living are routinely accosted by armed police officers who demand bribes and threaten those who object with arrest or physical harm (Bayley & Perito, 2011). High-ranking police officers have also been reported to embezzle public funds meant for police operations (Bayley & Perito, 2011), which encourage extortion of ordinary Nigerians by rank-and-file officers in the pretext of generating funds for logistics (e.g., fuel for police vehicles).
Over the 90 years of NPF existence, attempts to democratically reform unethical officer conduct have not yielded results (Hills, 2008; Smith, 2007). Instead, the NPF has become a symbol of unfettered corruption, mismanagement and human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention, threats and acts of physical and sexual violence, and torture and extra-judicial killings (Agbiboa, 2015; HRW, 2010). The poor and marginalized bear the burden of police corruption and brutality in Nigeria, which shows how socioeconomic inequality shapes the “policing landscape” (Marks & Wood, 2007). The outcome of widespread corruption and brutality in the police is negative public perception of the police (Owen, 2014), and erosion of the legitimacy of the government (Hills, 2008).
Research on everyday interaction between the police and citizens in Nigeria has shown various forms of corrupt and deviant conduct, including deviation from the rule of law, police brutality, and bribery and extortion of the Nigerian populace (Arisukwu & Okunola, 2013; Igwe, 2014; Ikuteyijo & Rotimi, 2014). Police extortion mirrors endemic corruption in the Nigerian public service, where officials routinely use their positions to demand bribes and kickbacks from ordinary citizens before rendering services, and those who fail to cooperate are often subjected to delays or denial of services (Akinlabi, 2017). Police corruption is similarly unfettered and conspicuous, taking the form of bribery, extortion, and egregious human rights violations often perpetrated by rank-and-file officers (HRW, 2010). Corrupt practices are institutionalized in the NPF through a lucrative system of “returns” wherein rank-and-file officers remit a portion of the money they extort from the populace to officers higher up on the hierarchy (Nkuyen, 2010).
Scholars have attributed police corruption in Nigeria to factors such as the post-military mentality of the police institution, the centralized nature of the police force, weak oversight structures, and the politicization of policing in Nigeria (Arisukwu & Okunola, 2013; Igwe, 2014; Ikuteyijo & Rotimi, 2014; Johnson, 2013). Other explanations link the phenomenon to lack of adequate training of police personnel, under-funding, and poor remunerations, which is widely seen as incentivizing bribery and extortion (Agbiboa, 2015; Obaro, 2014). The wages of police personnel, especially lower cadre officers, are appalling and places them in the category of the extremely poor (Agbiboa, 2015). The 2012 Presidential Committee on Police Reform reported that less than 10% of all police personnel are housed in barracks and even less own personal houses. Even where barrack accommodations are available, the facilities are often dilapidated single-room buildings that lack toilet facilities (Yusuf Commission Report, 2012). Such living conditions create a context where extortion becomes a means by which “lower cadre officers try to supplement their meagre incomes” (Ibeanu, 2007, pp. 54, 61).
Hills (2008) has argued that the militaristic policing model, rooted in colonial social control and prolonged military dictatorship, significantly altered police operations such that the Nigerian police struggles to change a “force” to a “service.” Cooper-Knock & Owen (2015) have noted that the Nigerian police has been negatively affected by its relationships with oppressive military regimes. Steinberg (2011) has argued that the politicization and militarization of the police in Nigeria have persisted even under democratic governments due to the institutional legacies of previous governments and the appeal that such trends continue to have for some segments of the political elite, the police, and the general population. The accountability of the institutions and officials of the police in Nigeria is extremely limited, and citizens have grown accustomed to, and even learn to circumvent, the injustices and ineffectiveness of the police (Agbiboa, 2015; Cooper-Knock & Owen, 2015). But a scholarly examination of the strategies employed by citizens to circumnavigate police corruption is sparse.
Studies have documented various forms of unlawful conduct in everyday interactions between police and citizens in Nigeria. For example, officers of the Nigerian police are known to routinely use force and torture to elicit confessions from suspects (Aborisade, 2019; Owen, 2014). Such unlawful practices have persisted despite the fact that Nigeria has ratified various international human rights treaties that proscribe torture and violations of human dignity (Amnesty International, 2009), including the Anti-Torture Act signed into law in 2017. Police officers routinely collect bribes from suspects and overlook their offenses, decline to investigate, arrest and prosecute offenders due to friendship or family ties to colleagues, and mount roadblocks to collect bribes from motorists (Adisa et al., 2020; Agbiboa, 2015; Omotola, 2007; Tankebe, 2010). Such practices are contrary to Article 324 of the Police Act, which requires that a police officer “offer prompt obedience to a lawful order” and “be determined and incorruptible in the exercise of his duties” (Police Act, Cap 154). Collection of financial inducement from complainants violates the Police Act and regulations and the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000.
Aborisade and Oni (2020) have documented how female detainees in police stations are subjected to different forms of abuse, including rape, intimidation, torture, deprivation, sexual harassment, and deception, which violates human rights, constitutional provisions, criminal codes, and police regulatory standards. Female sex workers, especially poor women who use illegal drugs and work on the streets, bear a disproportionate burden of physical violence and sexual harassment by police officers and are known to offer sex or money to police officers in exchange for freedom from arrest (Aborisade, 2019; Fawole & Dagunduro, 2014; Nelson, 2020; Salihu & Fawole, 2021). People who use or sell illegal drugs also experience police brutality and extortion (Nelson, 2018; Nelson & Brown, 2020). Police routinely raid street drug markets and extort money from arrestees (Nelson, 2018; Nelson & Ramirez, 2022). Police officers are also known to collect financial compensation from retail drug dealers to exempt their hotspots from raids (Nnam et al., 2020). However, less is known about how street drug dealers negotiate police extortion.
Illegal Drug Use and Markets in Nigeria
The consumption of illegal drugs is an issue of significant concern in Nigeria. The national survey of drug use conducted in 2018 estimated past-year drug use at 14.4% (corresponding to 14.3 million people aged 15–64 years) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2019). Geographically, the highest past-year prevalence of drug use was found in the southern geopolitical zones, which includes the south-south zone where the present study was conducted. Cannabis was the most commonly used drug (10.8% or 10.6 million people), distantly followed by pharmaceutical opioids such as tramadol and cough syrup (4.7% or 4.6 million people) (UNODC, 2019).
Since the 1980s, Nigerians have been involved in the trafficking of heroin and cocaine from Asia and South America through West Africa to western drug markets (Akyeampong, 2005; Ellis, 2009). Trafficking of drugs through the region has contributed to the development of domestic consumer markets. Some commentators have stressed how endemic corruption, widespread poverty, and limited opportunities for social advancement in Nigeria have created a context where illegal activities are seen as legitimate undertakings to secure one's livelihood (Felbab-Brown, 2010). The drug trade has been seen in some contexts as a legitimate form of commerce since it involves transactions between willing buyers and sellers (Ellis, 2009). Retail trade in illegal drugs (e.g., cannabis, heroin, cocaine) serves as a viable means of income generation for many young people in a depressed economy (Nelson & Ramirez, 2022).
Nigeria, a signatory to the three UN conventions that form the basis of international drug control, has historically relied on repressive measures to control the production, distribution, and consumption of illegal drugs. The existing legislation provides 10 years prison sentence for simple possession of an illegal drug, and life imprisonment for cultivation and trafficking. Described as a military-style policy of social reform, the Nigerian drug law supports punitive law enforcement including raids on street-level markets and arrests of dealers and users (Nelson, 2018). Recent studies have documented drug-related corrupt practices in street-level policing in Nigeria. Nelson and Brown (2020) have described how street market policing in Nigeria is shaped by financial motivations, and how police officers collect bribes from arrested dealers or users with the incentive not to detain or prosecute them. Nnam et al. (2020) have shown how police officers collude with drug dealers and collect financial compensation in exchange for protection from raids. This led to an increase in the prices of drugs as dealers seek to make up for income lost to bribery and extortion. Nelson and Ramirez (2022) have shown how the demand for more bribe money by police officers prompted dealers to desist from selling drugs temporarily to mitigate the risk of arrest. This study will build upon previous research to show how drug dealers negotiate police extortion and mitigate the loss of income in street drug markets.
Methods
Study Design and Setting
The study was designed as a qualitative exploration of retail drug distribution in the context of criminalization. It was conducted in Uyo, the political and administrative capital of Akwa Ibom state, Nigeria. The city has an estimated population of 1,294,726 people (World Bank, 2020). The natives are members of the Ibibio ethnic group, but there are also migrants from other ethnic nationalities. Urban expansion and population growth have outstripped infrastructural development and basic amenities, including healthcare, electricity, housing, water, and transportation. The economy is driven by commerce, services, and administrative jobs in the civil service. A large proportion of the population (51%) lives in absolute poverty (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010), defined as living on less than a dollar per day. Most earn a precarious living from street-based economic activities, including the illegal drug trade. An estimated 12.5% of the population (15–64 years) used an illegal substance in 2018 (UNODC, 2019). Cannabis is the most widely used illegal substance, but other substances such as cocaine, heroin, and prescription opioids are also commonly used (UNODC, 2019).
Participants and Sampling
Snowball sampling, a procedure where participants are asked to identify others who meet the inclusion criteria and those individuals are also asked to recommend others (Noy, 2008), was used to recruit a purposive sample of commercially oriented drug dealers (n = 31). Snowball sampling, known to be suitable for recruiting hard-to-reach populations, is widely used in research with criminalized subjects (Jacobs & Wright, 2008; Waters, 2015). Eligibility criteria included being an active commercially oriented drug dealer (selling drugs for commercial profit at the time of interviews) (Dickinson, 2017). The first six drug dealers were recruited based on acquaintances developed in previous research (Nelson, 2018). These dealers were recruited from different networks and locations to generate a more diverse sample. They kick-started a referral process for the recruitment of subsequent participants. Participants were men between 26 and 45 years (mean = 35.5 years). Female drug dealers could not be reached due to severe stigma and fear (Nelson, 2021). Fourteen of the 31 participants were unemployed, 6 were students, and 11 were engaged in other economic activities (e.g., carpentry). The dealers sold and also used different types of illegal drugs, including cannabis, crack cocaine, and heroin.
Interviews
Recruitment and data collection took place from November 2019 to April 2020, following ethical approval from the research ethics committee of the Ministry of Health, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria. Interviews relied on a semi-structured guide that included open-ended questions, which allowed me to inductively explore emerging themes throughout the research process (Layder 1993). As new themes (such as the ways dealers negotiate police extortion, which is the focus of the present analysis) emerged, new questions were added to further probe them. The interview guide had questions on a range of topics, including drug market entry, violence, and policing. Responses to questions on street market policing where further probed, which yielded interesting accounts of bribery, extortion, connivances, and negotiations. Participants were provided adequate information about the study and assured of confidentiality and anonymity of responses. They all gave verbal consent before the interviews were conducted. To ensure that the participants felt comfortable and secure, interviews took place at locations of their choice (e.g., eateries, drop-in centers for people who use drugs). Interview sessions lasted between 60 and 90 min, and were recorded with a digital audio device based on the consent of each participant. They were reimbursed N500 (US$1.20) for time and transportation.
Data Analysis
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and transcripts were cross-checked against recorded versions to ensure accuracy. A grounded theory analysis was undertaken, which sought to understand how the dealers interpreted, understood, and negotiated police extortion. Data analysis ran parallel with data collection, thus producing an analysis that was closely grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). After a preliminary overview of the data, open coding was conducted (Strauss & Corbin 1998). This was a manual, inductive coding process during which labels were assigned to discrete data. At this stage, the analysis focused on the key assumptions which participants held about street market policing, and how they understood and creatively engaged with changing extortionary practices. Conceptual categories were teased out of the participants’ accounts (e.g., “policing is about money,” “policemen are dishonest,” “policing and exploitation”). Constant comparison of data with concepts facilitated the development of core categories which had higher levels of abstraction (e.g., “police greed,” “unequal alliances,” “temporary desistance”). The conceptual categories resonated with the theoretical construct of habitus, which was then used to frame the analysis. Memos were used to capture analytical ideas as data coding and analysis proceeded. Codes and categories were refined through reading and re-reading the transcripts (Dey, 1993). The aim was to explore how drug dealers interpret, understand, and negotiate police extortion. Pseudonyms are used to protect the participants’ identities.
Results
Extortion and Everyday Street Market Policing
Accounts indicated that extortion of drug dealers was seen as a telling feature of everyday street market policing. Although those who had dealt drugs for a longer period had experienced more extortion, all dealers had sufficient experience of being extorted by police officers to describe it. Police officers were said to routinely collect money from dealers and protect them. This was so pervasive that many participants believed that policing did not pose a significant threat to street drug dealing once police officers have been bribed (“settled”). This view featured in accounts as an important part of the belief-premises or taken-for-granted assumptions of drug dealers’ habitus. Iko (aged 36) told me: The Nigerian police and even the drugs enforcement and agents who work on the streets all around the clock don’t disturb, when you have settled them. The good thing is for you to settle them, and there will be no problem.
The above (police permissiveness due to collection of money) does not mean that police officers did not raid hotspots when they learned about street market activities. Instead, after hotspots were raided and arrests made, arrestees would offer money to the police officers in exchange for freedom. It is only those who did not offer money to the officers that were taken to the station. They (Police) are not behaving badly with us. It is we individuals that behave badly. When there is problem, somebody will call them and say this is what this person did. When they come they will arrest you then, but you will settle. It is only when you don’t settle them that you will go to police station. (Henry, aged 31)
The phrase “settle them” in the above quote further shows that this is a taken-for-granted assumption. Accounts also indicated that failure to offer money to police officers when they show up at hotspots could lead to indiscriminate arrest that disproportionately affects users. This was seen as a form of punishment for the dealer's failure to “cooperate” with the police. Offering money to police officers to avoid raids on hotspot was seen as part of the practicalities of street drug dealing. Pat (aged 33) explained how indiscriminate arrest due to failure to offer money to police officers affected clients, forcing a choice on the dealer in question: When people report to them. When they come they will not investigate, especially if you don’t cooperate. Like dealers usually don’t have much problem. It is users that do. When police or drugs enforcement, come they will collect settlement. If you are stubborn, they will arrest you and you will go and pay the price or you lose interest (i.e., quit the trade).
When a dealer fails to offer money to police officers to keep them from raiding his hotspot and arresting people, individual clients who are arrested may be extorted by the police. This further buttress my interpretation of the practice of offering money to police as practicality. It reduces arrest risk for clients and prevents disruption. A participant described how police would go as far as taking the arrested client to the Automated Teller Machine so he can withdraw money for them. This shows the risk that users (or clients) face when dealers fail to “settle” the police: If they arrest you as the user and it is in your pocket, if you have money you can plead… They will ask you how much you have and you will go to ATM, withdraw and give them. They will tell you not to be sitting at the joint and smoking, but to take it home. They will advise you not to allow them arrest you again over this offence. (Edwin, aged 34)
As shown in the above quote, police often give helpful advice to users from who they collect money so they will not be rearrested. They do the same for the dealers, advising them not to collect stolen items as payment for drugs because of the risk of being arrested as a criminal accomplice. Below Mike (aged 27) links police helpfulness to their being “settled,” which indicates that this is a fundamental belief: The police do not cause problem. When you settle them, they go ahead with you. They will only tell you be careful with the people you sell to. Any day they arrest someone and he says you bought stolen good, you are involved.
Extortion of drug dealers and users by police officers was said to be a long-standing practice. Participants who had dealt drugs for relatively longer periods explained that there is nothing novel about settling police officers. The senescent character of corruption in street market policing largely explained why it was deeply entrenched in the dealers’ habitus. Papilo (aged 34), an experienced street drug dealer, stated: I started selling when I was 17 years old. I have been in this business for a long time. I know what I am talking about here. When you settle Nigerian police, you will not be arrested. When they come, they will collect their normal dividend.
The term “normal” in the quote presented above suggests that the practice of extorting drug dealers become a normalized feature of street market policing, a point that I explore further in the next section.
Remittances and Negotiation of Police Protection
Participants’ accounts indicated that the exchange of money for freedom or protection often developed into a relationship where a dealer remits an agreed sum of money to a police officer periodically, and the officer in turn ensures that the dealer is not affected by policing activities. The relationship was said to develop in most cases after a raid on the hotspot. After offering money to the police officers to be released, phone numbers are exchanged between the dealer and a compliant member of the police patrol team. The dealer would subsequently enlist the officer's help when he has police trouble, and in return would pay an agreed amount of money to him regularly. Pat (aged 33) explained: When they come, they will arrest people. Like November last year, they came and arrested 4 people… They will take you and drive around and bring you back and release you. They will ask you if there is something at home. You will bring them home and find like N10,000 (US$23.93) for them and they will give you their number. I have up to five police officers’ number.
As indicated in the last line of the quote, more experienced dealers often develop extensive contacts with police officers. But connivances between police officers and drug dealers were not stable; they were fluid and negotiable. This point is captured in the following account wherein the participant emphasized that dealers should make money in the understanding that they will have to negotiate with police: If the Nigerian police force arrests you, you will be bailed. You will negotiate. As you sell, you have to keep some money so that when it is time to negotiate, you will pay. Then they will tell you how to do it. If you do it gently (i.e., carefully), you will not have any problem. It is always about negotiation, and how you do things with police. (Edwin, aged 34)
As perception-appreciation, readiness to negotiate arrest through the offer of money reflects awareness of the risk of police arrest among drug dealers. Negotiating with police also involved building rapport with police officers and consistently remitting money to them. This was said to create a safe environment for dealers to operate. But failure to do so creates risk for disruption. Utuk (aged 40) explained how the context of law enforcement corruption in Nigeria allows for on-going negotiations in street market policing: The police then, you know they are all in Nigeria, if you negotiate well, you negotiate with the police. You give them a certain amount of money. You might be giving them like N10,000 (US$23.93) in the course of the month. They will just allow you to be free for a while. May be after the duration of the time they give to you, if you don’t give the money, they will come and disturb you. But if you have a good interaction with them, close relationship like that, nothing breaking the deal that you had with them, they will not disturb you….
The changing nature of police/dealer connivance is further seen in how the remittance is arranged. Although remittance was often made on a monthly basis, participants reported that some police officers may choose to collect it weekly, especially if they think the dealer is making a lot of money. Such decisions were said to be motivated by greed and a desire to exploit drug dealers: After negotiating with them, you will be giving them cut. They know where to stay and collect it from you when the time comes. The course of time might be even one week, not a full month because police knows that this drugs issue that we’re talking about is something that if you buy drugs for N10,000 (US$23.93) you are going to make the same N10,000 (US$23.93) from it. (Danny, aged 38)
In other cases, police officers collected money whenever they rendered help to dealers. For example, a police officer who informs a dealer of an impending police raid on the hotspot may be compensated by the dealer immediately after the fray. Andy (aged 41) narrated: The person that I bribe is in Itam police station. He came on the first of December, after they left Aka Road. He told me that they are coming. That I should not sell anything. So, I had returned from the market. I didn’t sell. So, after they came and left, he now came back alone and I gave him N4,000 (US$9.57).
Also, the amount remitted varied depending on the volume of goods the dealer purchases per time (the volume of goods is used by police officers to gauge the size of profit): Like two to three days ago when people gathered when they came they collected their money. If they say N5,000 or N10,000 (US$ 11.97 or 23.93), It depends on your goods. If you are someone who can buy much goods, you know the part to play to gain. When you gain you must settle them. (Imo, aged 35)
Accounts indicated that alliances were formed with each patrol team posted to the area. The Nigerian police routinely change patrol teams covering an area to prevent collusion between police officers and offenders. I found that, in relation to street drug markets, such measures did not reduce collusion. Each patrol team would form alliances with drug dealers, and would raid street markets and disrupt drug trade if the dealers failed to cooperate. Ido (aged 38) described how he cooperates with police officers to avoid problems with police: Me I cope-up with them. I pay them, so I don’t have any shaking. They like the way I do things. Majority of them they transfer them and when a new person comes to spearhead the deal; when he comes without you going to introduce yourself to them, when they enter they will arrest people.
The phrase “a new person comes to spearhead the deal” suggests continuity in connivances between police officers and drug dealers despite changes in patrol guard, an indication of how entrenched corruption is in police culture in Nigeria. Further, most participants perceived the police/dealer relationship as being more beneficial to police officers because of differences in power between the two parties. This is seen in the tendency of the police to extort and exploit dealers at every turn. Basil (aged 27) told me that he offers money to police officers every time they visit his hotspot, even when he has not sold anything: There are times like we stay for a week or month, and goods do not arrive. It may take two weeks before goods arrive. You will call and tell them that there is no market. They will come and visit, and you will give them N2,000 (US$4.79) for fuel. The person you are dealing with will call you and ask, has it (goods) arrived? Hope there is no problem?’. Later, he will come around and collect something, even though he knows that I didn’t sell anything.
As indicated in the above quote, payments to police officers was seen as an acceptable cost of the illegal drug business. But the unequal and exploitative character of the relationship between police and drug dealers was seen as making these relationships unstable and transient. I elaborate on these dynamics in the next section.
Exploitation and Re-Negotiation of Police Connivance
As indicated in the previous section, police exploitation was perceived as commonplace, contributing to breakdowns of alliances between police officers and dealers. This topic was probed in each interview, and emerging accounts highlighted key dynamics that led to such breakdowns. For example, alliances would break down when a hotspot is raided despite the remittance of money by the drug dealer. In this context, the conniving officer bears blame for not alerting the dealer of the impending raid, which signifies a failure to perform the role for which he receives money. Danny (aged 38) stated: Then he will come around alone and I will look for like N5,000 (US$11.97) and give him. When others come with him, the others will now plan and come back. They will not come in peace or want to collect small money. They will make trouble and people will run and injure themselves. When it is like that market will not work well and people will not come. So, you will now be angry because the person you have a deal with did not tell you.
The participant went on to explain how injuries sustained by clients during such raids could have been avoided if the conniving officer was scrupulous (“If he was like straightforward with you, all that will not be happening”). This highlights another belief-premise of dealers’ habitus, which is that police officers are greedy and dishonest. In other examples, conniving officers demanded an increase in payments made to them, which prompted the dealers involved to end the alliance. The officers demanded more money because they felt that the dealers are making more money. The following quote captures the belief-premise of police greed and dishonesty: Police do not have friends. They are like that. They like money a lot. He can come like this, collect your phone number, show you his house and the station where he works. But he will not be sincere to the end. He will say that you are selling it too much. But you are not selling too much because you are not the only person selling.
The belief-premise of greed and dishonesty is seen in the above quote, which shows how greed and dishonesty undermine alliances between police officers and drug dealers. In this context, discontinuing the relationship was seen as one of the practicalities of surviving in the street market. Edwin (aged 34) stated: If other officers come like that, I will call the particular person who comes to collect money. He is a big person in National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. He will say that he is not aware, otherwise he would have told me. So, I later left that person. I decided to look for someone else because it seems he was playing me. Sometimes like five minutes after he collects money and goes, others who wear mufti will come. So, I had to leave him and look for someone else because he was not honest.
Temporary desistance from drug selling after dissolution of relationship with conniving police officers was also seen as practical sense in view of the threat of raid by vindictive police officers: So, police will say that we are selling too much. That N5,000 (US$11.97) is not enough. We should give them up to N15,000 (US$33.67). When it is like that you will say no it is not like that, and they will say don’t sell again. So, if you talk and they don’t listen you will stop and tell people not to come again for the next one-week cos things are not going well. The officer that I used to bribe has changed his mind. He is saying I should give him N15,000 (US$33.67). (Ikpe, aged 36)
The quote presented above indicates that dealers usually desist from selling after negotiations with the conniving officers failed. Accounts also revealed situations where conniving officers deliberately violated their agreements with dealers and raided hotspots. More experienced drug dealers often hide their drugs so that no exhibit is found in the event of such an impromptu raid. This practical sense of the habitus developed from experiences of negotiating shifting policing strategies. Imo (aged 35), an experienced dealer, stated: He (police officer) will call, cos he comes in the third week. So, he will call and ask if there is something, and he will come and collect like N5,000 or N6,000 (US$11.97 or 14.36) and go away. But there are times he will want to use you. He will come without calling anybody. When they come, they will arrest anyone they can find. They will enter and scatter the house looking for weed. They will not find it cos I don’t keep it at home. There are people who keep it at home and they will find it and arrest them. But I don’t keep it at home.
The decision to store their products away from home indicates dealers’ understanding that police officers are not trustworthy. It also shows how experience in the trade mediates the risk of police predation, with less experienced dealers being more at risk of victimization by officers. Impromptu raids that violated agreements between police officers and drug dealers was said to be a strategy to reinforce the latter's dependence on the former. Udok (aged 41) explained how this applies in the case of raids on hotspots as part of crime control: Sometimes they will come without telling you and arrest people, and you will surrender and turn back to the police. I will say, “sir here is it for the month”. Then he (police) will be coming around to check on you… If you do like that, you will know the kind of people who you are dealing with. That you should not deal with criminals. So, they sometime break the deal.
Taken together, the accounts presented in this section highlight how the belief-premise of greed and dishonesty led to the dissolution of extant alliances and the formation of new ones, while police officers attempt to use threats to control and extort drug dealers.
Discussion
This study explored how Nigerian retail drug dealers negotiate everyday police corruption and extortion in street drug markets. The study documents unlawful, self-serving, and corrupt practices perpetrated by rank-and-file police officers that corroborate reports of widespread corruption, extortion, and nepotism in the institution of the police in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2015; Akinlabi, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2010; Owen, 2014). The dealers in this study operated day-to-day in a context characterized by police predation and extortion, which ranged from occasional bribes to ward-off raids to changing forms of alliances where the dealers regularly remitted an agreed amount of money to conniving police officers in exchange for protection and exemption from raids. While building on previous research on corrupt and unlawful policing practices, the findings contribute new insights on the agency of drug dealers by which they negotiate the adverse impacts of police corruption on their livelihoods.
Corroborating previous research on street market policing in Nigeria (Nelson, 2018; Nelson & Brown, 2020; Nelson & Ramirez, 2022; Nnam et al., 2020), this study shows that extortion of drug dealers is a common feature of everyday street policing. Nelson and Brown (2020) had found that extortion of drug offenders was a key motivation for raids on drug hotspots by the police. This study develops this finding further by showing how police complicity in drug trade due to collection of bribes (“settlement”) is a key belief-premise of drug dealers’ habitus, which they relied on to mitigate police threat to their trade. According to this belief-premise, policing is seen as malleable and negotiable through the offer of money, and therefore does threaten the existence of street markets. The major problem that policing poses to the street drug trade is that it increases financial cost and undermines profit (Nnam et al., 2020). The finding provides further evidence that supports the view that law enforcement corruption impedes the effectiveness of law enforcement in curbing retail trade in illegal drugs in Nigeria (Nelson & Ramirez, 2022).
The financial cost of police extortion was attributed to police greed. Accounts revealed how police officers used their positions to exploit drug dealers. In Nigeria, public perception of the police is overwhelmingly negative due to corruption, extortion, and bribery perpetrated by rank-and-file police officers (Agbiboa, 2015; Owen, 2014). The findings presented in this study corroborate this view. It also adds to the literature on street market policing by describing how the perception of police officers as greedy and dishonest are aspects of the belief-premise of drug dealers’ habitus. Greed and dishonesty reproduced distrust of police officers by drug dealers, which made police-dealers’ connivances fluid and unstable, and subject to ongoing negotiations. Persistent efforts by conniving police officers to control dealers and to perpetuate unequal relationships of extortion through vindictive raids suggest a proactive form of police corruption (Skogan & Meares, 2004). This buttresses the view that police officers can enforce laws according to their own self-interests (Hope, 2016).
Closely related to the view that police officers are greedy and dishonest is the perception of police-dealers’ alliances as exploitative and disadvantageous to the drug dealers. Previous research on police connivance with and extortion of drug dealers has documented that the collection of huge monetary compensations contributed to an increase in drug prices (Nnam et al., 2020), and that corrupt policing practices are perceived as unfair by drug dealers (Nelson, 2018; Nelson & Brown, 2020). Building on these findings, this study highlights pervasive feelings of exploitation among drug dealers, which was due to power differences between police officers and dealers. Echoing findings from research on policing of other socially marginalized groups (Aborisade, 2019; Aborisade & Oni, 2020; Adisa et al., 2020), the present findings show how drug criminalization and police corruption creates a context where extortion could undermine profit from drug trade. This could perpetuate the very socioeconomic conditions that drove the dealers into the illegal trade in the first place. This has implications for policy in that not only is policing ineffective in curbing street drug trade, but it could also encourage the trade as dealers seek to sell more drugs in order to recoup the income lost due to police extortion. Alternatively, they could increase the prices of drugs thereby passing this cost onto the users.
A key insight emerging from the accounts canvassed in this study is how the belief-premise of police greed and perception of police-dealer's connivances as exploitative fostered adaptive strategies or practicalities that ensured survival in street markets. The offer of financial compensation (whether it be occasional bribes or regular remittances) to the police is itself a practical response, a strategy to curb the negative impacts of police raids on the drug trade. However, perceiving police officers to be greedy and collusions as exploitative, the dealers constantly evaluated alliances with the police, dissolving those they considered increasingly disadvantageous and enacting new and (at least initially) less exploitative ones. Furthermore, and in response to reprisal raids on hotspots, they desisted from selling drugs temporarily and concealed their goods to avoid arrest by vindictive policemen (Nelson & Ramirez, 2022). Strategies of adaptation to police exploitation indicates that drug dealers are not passive victims of corrupt policing, but human agents whose inventiveness and negotiation skills enables them to mitigate the adverse effects of police extortion and predation on their livelihoods.
Conclusion
Corrupt and unlawful conduct among police officers in Nigeria is legendary, and is known to pose a significant challenge to the rule of law and the legitimacy of the state. Although police corruption and misconduct affect all Nigerian citizens, the poor and socially marginalized bear a disproportionate burden. This includes those who engage in illegal activities such as illegal drug trade as a means of income generation for livelihoods. The accounts of the study participants indicate that corruption and extortion are telling features of everyday street market policing. Street market policing, driven by police greed and self-interest, created a context for bribery, extortion, and criminal alliances that effectively redirected policing from the goals of crime control and public order to personal enrichment and self-preservation of police officers. On the other hand, dealers’ awareness of and constant negotiation of police extortion and exploitation illustrates the creative tension between structural forces and actor's agency. Police corruption, particularly the complicity of police officers in illegal drug trade through bribery and extortion, could impede the effectiveness of efforts to control trade and consumption of illegal drugs in Nigeria. This highlights a need for oversight on the activities of patrolling police officers to check corrupt and unlawful practices and to enforce appropriate codes of conduct. On the other hand, since drug dealers engage in retail drug trade as a means of income generation for livelihoods, improving living conditions of these marginalized groups through the provision of viable alternative means of income may be a more effective way to reduce participation in illegal drug trade. A major limitation of the study is the absence of the views of female drug dealers. Future researches should explore the experiences and perspectives of female drug dealers on police corruption. Also, the study is based on qualitative data from a purposive sample of dealers from a specific geographic location, so the findings may only be cautiously applied to other settings.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
