Rumor as Revenge in the Workplace

Abstract

Two studies that examined the role of revenge in rumor transmission and involved working adults as participants are reported. Study 1 used hypothetical scenarios to manipulate organizational treatment of an employee and the believability of a rumor. Participants had higher intention to transmit a harmful rumor when the organization broke job-related promises (i.e., breached the psychological contract) and revenge motivation mediated this relationship. Believability of the rumor had no effect. Study 2 used a field survey methodology and, controlling for social desirability, replicated the results for self- and peer-reported rumor transmission behavior. Study 2 also showed that participants’ belief in negative reciprocity norm strengthened the relationship between breach and revenge motivation.

Keywords

communication social exchange workplace deviance

Research consistently finds that people generate rumors to make sense of ambiguous, uncertain, or confusing situations (Allport & Postman, 1947; Bordia & DiFonzo, 2004; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a; Rosnow, 1991). In the absence of information from (or lack of trust in) formal channels, people turn to each other; rumors are a product of this informal collective problem-solving process (Shibutani, 1966). In the workplace context, rumors are characterized as collective sense-making in times of uncertainty (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a; DiFonzo, Bordia, & Rosnow, 1994). For example, during organizational change, employees are confronted with uncertainty about the nature and consequences of the change (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2013). Rumors help employees make sense of the changes by predicting the nature of changes (“Departments X and Y will be merged”) and the possible consequences of the changes (“Staff benefits will be cut”; Bordia, Jones, Gallois, Callan, & DiFonzo, 2006).

This relatively benign characterization of rumors stands in contrast to findings in various research streams that portray a darker and more destructive side of rumor spread. For example, workplace bullying and mobbing sometimes take the form of a concerted campaign of rumors targeting the victim (Hoel, Cooper, & Faragher, 2001). Orchestrated rumor is also a way co-workers engage in social undermining of each other (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002). Spreading rumors about the organization or the supervisor can be a form of organizational retaliatory behavior (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Finally, in a survey of incidence of workplace deviance, around 70% of respondents confessed to spreading rumors about the company and/or co-workers (Bennett & Robinson, 2000). This listing implies that there are motivations other than uncertainty reduction that may fuel rumors.

Indeed, recent theorizing on motivations in rumor transmission has acknowledged the role of self-enhancement goals and political motives in rumor transmission (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b). Despite the burgeoning literature that addresses employee deviance in the workplace (E. H. O’Boyle, Forsyth, & O’Boyle, 2011), there is little research on rumors as motivated retaliation in organizational contexts. In the research reported here, we address this gap in the rumor literature. We propose that people may transmit rumors with the intention to harm the target and this intention is likely to arise from the need to seek revenge for perceived harm to the self. We begin by defining rumors and outlining the motivations that may underlie rumor spreading.

Rumors: Definition and Motivations

Rumors have been defined as “information statements that circulate among people, are instrumentally relevant, and are unverified” (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a, p. 16). Three characteristics define rumors. First, rumors are a collective phenomenon and a rumor’s existence is contingent on its circulation. For this reason, it is important to understand factors affecting rumor transmission. Second, rumors inform, explain, predict, and thus provide useful information. For example, a rumor that a product contains harmful ingredients warns consumers to avoid that product. Third, rumors comprise unverified information; this feature distinguishes rumors from news, which is by definition verified. Rumors are not untrue statements; they may turn out to be true or false, but their veracity is unknown for the moment. As a result, rumors are often prefaced with expressions of caution, such as “this may or may not be true, but I have heard . . .” (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2004; Bordia & Rosnow, 1998).

Three core motivational goals (acting effectively, belonging, and self-enhancing) have been identified in a variety of social psychological phenomena, such as conformity and attitude change (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), and these also play a role in rumor spreading (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005, 2013). The first goal of acting effectively refers to the need to be able to cope adaptively with the environment. The goal of acting effectively stimulates the fact-finding motivation, which plays a role in rumor spread. Rumors arise from the need to understand and interpret ambiguous circumstances and are a product of the population’s collective sense-making effort (Rosnow, 1991; Shibutani, 1966). The second core motivational goal of belonging leads to relationship building and maintenance activities (Leary, 1995). These relationship-oriented motivations are particularly relevant to the conversational context in which rumors are transmitted; the teller takes into account the tone of the conversation and the audience in deciding whether to share a rumor (Heath, 1996). Third, a variety of self-oriented motives play a part in rumor spread. People are motivated to enhance their self-interest (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009). At a tangible level, rumors may be spread to undermine a rival candidate in a political contest or to steer consumers away from a rival product (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007b). At an intangible level, rumors may be used to bolster the sense of self or reassert a sense of justice by punishing those who have undermined self-interest (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005).

Of the various motivations in rumor spread, self-oriented motivations have received the least amount of research attention. In the research reported here, we examine the role of revenge seeking—which can be a self-oriented goal (McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001)—in rumor spread. We propose that when employees experience unfair treatment at work in the form of broken promises (also referred to as psychological contract breach; Rousseau, 1995), they will be more likely to spread rumors about the organization, and this willingness to spread rumors is explained by the revenge motivation. Theoretical explanations for revenge can be derived from equity and retributive justice theories grounded in fairness norms (Stillwell, Baumeister, & Del Priore, 2008; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007). When people perceive that they have been wronged, they seek to restore the balance in the relationship by harming the wrongdoer (Jensen & Raver, 2012). The vigilante model of justice (Tripp et al., 2007) notes that people are more likely to seek revenge when formal avenues to restore justice do not exist; victims then have to take matters into their own hands and use revenge to punish the wrongdoer. In the following section, we explain how a perception of psychological contract breach can result in revenge seeking and transmission of negative rumors.

Psychological Contract Breach, Revenge Seeking, and Rumor Transmission

The psychological contract refers to an employee’s subjective perception of the mutual (i.e., the employee’s and the employer’s) obligations to each other in the employment relationship (Rousseau, 1995). These perceived obligations develop during the recruitment process and are based on the explicit and implicit messages from organizational representatives (i.e., recruitment manager or line supervisor). Employer obligations may include career advancement, job security, bonuses, and a safe work environment. Employee obligations may include adequate job performance and loyalty to the employer (Low & Bordia, 2011). The psychological contract relationship is governed by the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). If the employee perceives that the organization has failed to fulfill its obligations—referred to as psychological contract breach—the employee may react by reducing his or her own contributions to the organization (Bal, Chiaburu, & Diaz, 2011; O’Leary-Kelly, Henderson, Anand, & Ashforth, 2014; Restubog, Bordia, Tang, & Krebs, 2010). If the breach is significant enough, the employee may seek revenge on the organization by engaging in behaviors harmful to the organization (Bordia, Restubog, & Tang, 2008; Restubog, Bordia, & Tang, 2007).

Tripp et al. (2007) identified several triggers of revenge seeking, including goal obstruction (when someone obstructs the achievement of desired goals), rule violation (when disadvantage results from the breaking of established norms and rules), and status and power derogation (when one’s status is undermined). All three triggers are relevant in the context of psychological contract breach. Breach represents goal obstruction, because not delivering on organizational obligations (such as inadequate training and support) can make it more difficult for the employee to achieve desired career goals (Restubog, Bordia, & Bordia, 2011). Similarly, breach is a form of rule violation, because social norms imply that promises should be fulfilled. Finally, breach also signifies status and power derogation, because breach undermines an employee’s sense of self-worth (Restubog, Hornsey, Bordia, & Esposo, 2008). Given that breach represents all three triggers of revenge seeking, we propose that breach will result in willingness to seek revenge against the organization.

The revenge process comprises several steps. Once injustice is perceived and blame apportioned, the motivation for revenge develops (“I ought to punish them for what they did to me”; Bordia et al., 2008; Bradfield & Aquino, 1999). This motivation is then acted on in the form of revenge acts (behaviors such as acts of sabotage, violence, or bad mouthing). We propose that psychological contract breach will elicit the revenge motivation, and this motivation may be acted on by spreading negative rumors about the organization. While employees can engage in a variety of revenge acts, many of these, including sabotage or destroying organizational property, are high risk because they are more visible than spreading rumors. In contrast, rumors are a form of covert aggression that may be easier to enact (Baron & Neuman, 1996). Of course, for the revenge to be enacted, an opportunity (in the form of a suitable rumor) has to be available. Therefore, once the breach is experienced and the revenge motivation is active, if an opportunity becomes available to hurt the organization with a damaging rumor, the employee is more likely to engage in rumor transmission compared with a situation where no breach is experienced. These ideas are formalized in the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Breach of psychological contract will be positively related to the transmission of a harmful rumor, such that transmission will be higher under conditions of breach compared with no breach.

Hypothesis 2: Revenge motivation will mediate the relationship between breach of psychological contract and harmful rumor transmission.

Belief and Rumor Transmission

Given a motivation to achieve revenge, we wondered whether belief in the rumor moderates peoples’ willingness to spread it. Put another way, will a retaliatory rumor be more likely to be transmitted if it is plausible? We expect belief to have a main effect. Belief in the rumor has been shown to be positively related to rumor transmission (Rosnow, 1991). The relationship between belief and transmission can be explained by the fact that people generally prefer consistency between cognitions and behavior. Thus, rumors that are believed are more likely to be transmitted. Both fact-finding and relationship-oriented motives play a role. A believable rumor is more likely to help explain uncertain situations and, therefore, aid fact-finding. In terms of relationships, spreading a rumor that is false is likely to cause undue alarm (in the case of negative rumors) or raise false hope (in the case of positive rumors) among the rumor recipients, create a reputation of the transmitter as an unreliable source of information, and threaten membership in established communication networks (such as in the workplace). Therefore, we make the following prediction:

Hypothesis 3: Belief will be positively related to transmission of a harmful rumor such that transmission will be higher under conditions of high belief compared with low belief.

Given that believable rumors are more likely to be spread, belief could enhance the use of rumor for revenge. That is, given the revenge motivation to transmit a harmful rumor, a more believable rumor would be more likely to be transmitted than a less believable rumor. Our reasoning is based on the idea that a believable harmful rumor used for revenge serves multiple motivations—fact-finding and relationship enhancement via belief, and self-enhancement via revenge—and, therefore, should be more likely to be transmitted than a less believable harmful rumor. As a result, we make the following prediction regarding belief as an enabler of the breach–revenge–rumor transmission relationship:

Hypothesis 4: The indirect effect of revenge in the breach-harmful rumor transmission relationship should be stronger under condition of high belief compared with low belief.

Study 1

This study tests Hypotheses 1 to 4. We manipulated breach and belief in the rumor using hypothetical vignettes. Vignettes are often used in organizational research because they provide an ethical and pragmatic way to manipulate variables and allow experimental realism (Aronson, Brewer, & Carlsmith, 1985; Greenberg & Eskew, 1993). Vignettes have been used to understand employees’ responses to perceived organizational injustices (Scott & Colquitt, 2007) and reactions to psychological contract breach (Edwards, Rust, McKinley, & Moon, 2003). Following best practice recommendations (i.e., Greenberg & Eskew, 1993), the scenarios were created using situations familiar to participants.

Method

Participants and procedure

Participants were 100 retail workers from the metropolitan region of a large city in eastern Australia. There was an equal distribution of males and females. Participants had an average age of 24.11 years (SD = 7.20) and an average of 4.46 years (SD = 5.12) of retail or sales-related work experience. Surveys were administered to participants during and after work hours and during lunch breaks.

Design and materials

The hypothetical vignettes were used to manipulate psychological contract breach and rumor belief, resulting in a 2 (psychological contract breach: no breach, with breach) × 2 (belief: low, high) between-subjects design. Guided by past psychological contract research (Restubog & Bordia, 2006; Rousseau, 1995), all scenarios depicted a retail work context in which participants assumed the role of a sales representative who is promised commission-based pay and job security on the condition of meeting performance targets. The scenarios also described a negative rumor about the organization and the opportunity to transmit the rumor. Breach versus no breach was manipulated by varying the outcome of the promise, such that the position is terminated (breach; Beaumont & Harris, 2002; Edwards et al., 2003) or the promise is delivered in the form of commission-based pay and opportunity for promotion (no breach). Consistent with prior research (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a; Fragale & Heath, 2004), belief was manipulated by varying the credibility of the source of the rumor (a co-worker named Sam). Participants were asked to imagine themselves in the scenario and to indicate their likelihood of transmitting the negative rumor in a social context (to a friend named Emma, who works as a journalist). The complete wordings of the scenarios are shown in the appendix. After reading the scenario, participants completed a survey assessing manipulation checks, revenge motivation, and intentions to spread the negative rumor about the organization.

Measures

Manipulation check for psychological contract breach

We adapted two items from Robinson and Morrison (2000), each rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all, to 7 = very much), to assess the effectiveness of the breach manipulation. These items were as follows: “To what extent has the organization broken its promise to you?” and “To what extent has the promise made to you during recruitment been fulfilled?” (reverse-scored). This scale yielded a reliability coefficient of .78.

Manipulation check for rumor belief

Rumor belief was assessed on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all, to 7 = very much), using the following items: “How much do you believe what Sam just told you?” and “What is the likelihood that Sam’s information is true?” These items were combined to operate as a measure of rumor belief. This scale obtained a reliability coefficient of .81. We also assessed the credibility of the source with two items: “How credible is Sam as a source of work-related information?” on a scale from 1 (barely credible) to 7 (extremely credible), and “How accurate is Sam as a source of work-related information?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The two items yielded a reliability coefficient of .77. These measures are consistent with Fragale and Heath’s (2004) conceptualization of credible sources as being characterized by truthful and accurate information reporting.

Revenge motivation

Revenge motivation was measured by two items taken from Bradfield and Aquino (1999), but slightly modified for relevance to this study. Participants responded to each of the following items on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much): “To what extent would you share the information with Emma to “get even” with the organization?” and “To what extent would you share the information regarding complaints of allergic reactions with Emma to hurt the organization’s reputation?” This scale yielded a reliability coefficient of .88.

Rumor transmission

Rumor transmission was assessed by two items, each on a 7-point Likert-type scale. These items were as follows: “How likely are you to share the information with Emma?” on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely), and “How willing would you be to share the information with Emma?” on a scale from 1 (not at all willing) to 7 (very willing). The items were combined to form a single measure of rumor transmission. This scale obtained a reliability coefficient of .94.

Results

Manipulation checks

Univariate analyses revealed that participants in the breach condition (M_breach = 5.54, SD = 1.42) perceived significantly more psychological contract breach than those in the no breach condition (M_{no breach} = 2.31, SD = 1.33), t(98) = 11.74, p < .001. Similarly, participants in the high belief condition (M_{high belief} = 3.96, SD = 1.06) reported higher belief as compared with those in the low belief condition (M_{low belief} = 2.54, SD = 1.02), t(98) = −6.80, p < .001. In addition, participants assigned to the high source credibility condition (M_{high source credibility} = 3.81, SD = 1.16) perceived the rumor source as more credible relative to the participants in the low source credibility condition (M_{low source credibility} = 2.16, SD = 0.77), t(98) = −8.39, p < .001. Overall, the manipulations were successful.

Test of hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect of psychological contract breach on rumor transmission, with rumor transmission expected to be greater under conditions of psychological contract breach compared with conditions of no breach. We conducted a 2 (psychological contract breach: no breach, with breach) × 2 (rumor belief: high vs. low) between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA; the cell means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1). As expected, there was a main effect of psychological contract breach on rumor transmission, F(1, 96) = 24.35, p < .001, η² = .20. Participants who perceived contract breach were more inclined to transmit the rumor (M_breach = 3.94, SD = 1.72) compared with those assigned to the no breach condition (M_{no breach} = 2.35, SD = 1.52). Hypothesis 1 was supported. However, using the same analysis, we did not find any support for the main effect of rumor belief, F(1, 96) = 0.08, ns, η² = .00. There was no difference between high and low belief conditions (M_{high belief =} 3.10, SD = 1.71; M_{low belief =} 3.19, SD = 1.90). Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Finally, there was no interaction between the two independent variables of breach and belief, F(1, 96) = 2.91, ns, η² = .03.

Table 1.

Rumor Transmission Ratings Under Different Levels of Psychological Contract Breach and Rumor Belief for Study 1.

	Psychological contract condition
Rumor belief condition	No breach condition	Breach condition
High	2.58 (SD = 1.49)	3.62 (SD = 1.78)
Low	2.12 (SD = 1.54)	4.26 (SD = 1.62)

Hypothesis 2 predicted that revenge motivation would mediate the relationship between psychological contract breach and rumor transmission. We assessed the simple mediation model using Model 4 of the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2012). Using 5,000 bootstrap re-samples, the indirect effects were significant (indirect effect = .95, boot SE = .24). The resulting 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect ranged from 0.51 to 1.46. Given that the range is positive and the lower bound does not include 0, Hypothesis 2 was supported.

Hypothesis 4 predicted that belief will moderate the mediating effect of revenge in the breach–rumor transmission relationship. To test this hypothesis, we conducted moderated-mediation analysis using the PROCESS macro. We first examined the moderating effect of belief in the breach–revenge path (i.e., first stage moderation). The interactive effect between breach and belief in predicting revenge cognitions was non-significant (coefficient = −1.100, t = −1.78, p = .08). The conditional indirect effects of breach in predicting rumor transmission via revenge cognitions was significant at low belief (indirect effect = 1.34, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals ranging from 0.76 to 2.09) but not for high belief (indirect effect = 0.56, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals ranging from −0.07 to 1.19). We next examined the moderating effect of belief in the revenge–rumor transmission path (i.e., the second stage moderation). The interactive effect between revenge and belief in predicting rumor transmission was non-significant (coefficient = .01, t = 0.08, p = .94). The conditional indirect effect of breach in predicting rumor transmission via revenge cognitions was significant at both low belief (indirect effect = 0.95, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals ranging from 0.49 to 1.52) and high belief (indirect effect = 0.97, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals ranging from 0.52 to 1.49). Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Discussion

In this study, we demonstrated the role of situational triggers in eliciting revenge in the form of rumor spread. In support of Hypothesis 1, participants who perceived psychological contract breach were more willing to transmit a negative rumor about the organization. This willingness to transmit the rumor was partly explained by a need to get even with the organization (providing support to Hypothesis 2). Contrary to Hypotheses 3 and 4, belief did not seem to matter in transmission intention. Thus, it appears that belief may not matter when the rumor fulfills the goal of revenge.

Study 2

Study 2 had several goals. First, in addition to situational triggers (such as breach), revenge seeking is also influenced by individual characteristics, such as beliefs and ideologies (Tripp et al., 2007). In this study, we wanted to examine the role of negative reciprocity beliefs (NRB; Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004), which refers to “a unitary set of beliefs favoring retribution as the correct and proper way to respond to unfavorable treatment” (Eisenberger et al., 2004, p. 788). NRB have their basis in a more generalized reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 1960). However, most theoretical applications of the reciprocity norm have been in the context of positive reciprocity (such as when employees reciprocate with citizenship behaviors to perceived support from the organization; Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2002). Eisenberger et al. (2004) empirically demonstrated the existence of NRB as being independent of the positive reciprocity norm. They found that people high on NRB retaliated more strongly to offensive treatment than those low on NRB. Generalized beliefs that negative treatment should be returned in kind should make it more likely that revenge motivation is elicited on the experience of unjust treatment. Therefore, we predict that NRB will moderate the relationship between psychological contract breach and revenge motivation.

Hypothesis 5: Negative reciprocity beliefs will moderate the relationship between breach and revenge motivation such that the relationship will be stronger among employees with high negative reciprocity beliefs, relative to those with low negative reciprocity beliefs.

Second, a limitation of Study 1 was that it used a hypothetical vignette, and rumor transmission was measured as intention. In Study 2, we wanted to address these limitations and triangulate the findings using a different methodology in the form of a survey study in the field setting. In addition to measures of psychological contract breach, revenge motivation, and self-reported rumor transmission, we obtained peer ratings of rumor transmission. Peers are well placed to report on rumor behavior because rumor transmission is a social act and rumors are generally shared with peers.

Finally, self-report measures of revenge and rumor spread can be influenced by self-report bias (Bordia et al., 2008; Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007). Therefore, we wanted to control for social desirability.

This study tested Hypotheses 1 (main effect of psychological contract breach), 2 (mediating effect of revenge), and 5 (moderating effect of NRB). Given that we were interested in rumor transmission in general (as opposed to a specific rumor), we did not measure belief. Moreover, Study 1 already demonstrated that belief may not be an important element of rumor transmission with a revenge motive.

Method

Participants and procedure

The data used in this study were part of a larger study on employment relationships. Data were collected from surveys administered to employees from a large public sector organization in the Philippines. We administered two sets of surveys in which we temporally separated the predictor, mediator, and outcome variables. The first survey, which measured psychological contract breach, revenge motivation, and demographic variables, was administered before a training session. The content of the training seminar was not related to the current research. Participants in the training sessions were invited to participate and none of the participants declined. After 2 weeks, we administered a second questionnaire to assess rumor transmission. Participants responded to the survey during working hours. A co-worker of the focal participant completed the peer survey. Peers were nominated by the human resources office as someone who regularly interacts and works collaboratively with the focal participant. Peers were requested to complete a behavioral rating scale assessing their co-worker’s rumor transmission behavior. The surveys collected in the two phases of the data collection and peer rating scales were matched using a participant-generated code. Out of the 250 employees who were surveyed, a total of 160 employees provided matched self and peer ratings (yielding a response rate of 64%), and comprised the sample for this study. The majority of our participants were female (79.4%) and within the 41 to 50 age bracket (51.9%). Their average tenure in the organization was 22.68 years. Participants varied in their level of education, comprising 2.0% with a high school diploma, 11.4% with some college education, 36.3% with a college degree, and 50.3% with a graduate or professional degree.

Measures

Questionnaires were prepared in English because this language is spoken by most of the Filipino population and is predominantly used in organizational contexts (Bernardo, 2004). Participants responded to all items using 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).

Psychological contract breach

We measured psychological contract breach using a five-item scale developed by Robinson and Morrison (2000). Sample items include “Almost all the promises made by my employer during recruitment have been kept so far” (reverse-coded), “My employer has broken many of its promises to me even though I have upheld my side of the deal,” and “So far, my employer has done an excellent job of fulfilling its promises to me” (reverse-coded). For this study, the reliability coefficient for the scale was .81.

Negative reciprocity

Consistent with prior research (Garcia, Restubog, & Denson, 2010), we assessed negative reciprocity using six items with the highest factor loadings from the scale developed by Eisenberger et al. (2004). Example items include “If someone dislikes you, you should dislike them” and “If someone says something nasty to you, you should say something nasty back.” In this study, the reliability coefficient was .83.

Revenge motivation

Four items derived from Bradfield and Aquino (1999) were used to measure thoughts of revenge. Sample items include “I’m going to get even,” “I’ll make them pay,” and “I wished that something bad would happen to them.” This scale yielded a reliability coefficient of .88.

Self-reported and peer-reported rumor transmission

We developed a one-item measure of rumor transmission. In the self-report survey, we presented the following statement: “People often talk about their organization with their co-workers. Think of your recent conversation with a co-worker whom you know well and rate the extent to which you told negative rumors about your organization” using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all to 7 = always). To establish the reliability of the one-item measure, we conducted a test–retest reliability analysis between the self-reported data collected and the same one item collected 12 months before. The test–retest reliability estimate was r = .40, p < .001. Peers were also requested to complete a one-item behavioral rating scale of rumor transmission behavior. Peer reports have been found to be valid measures of work behaviors (Van Dyne & Ang, 1998).

Control variable

Social desirability was measured using a 10-item measure of the Crowne–Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (CMSDS; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). This scale consists of true and false items describing both socially desirable and undesirable behaviors. Prior research suggests that the short version is strongly correlated with the 33-item long version of the CMSDS (Fischer & Fick, 1993). In our study, this scale had a reliability coefficient of .69. Although we had a somewhat low reliability, previous research using male university students, female university students, and a combination of student and non-student samples has found similar values for this scale: .70, .66, and .59, respectively (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972).

Results

Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among study variables are shown in Table 2. Table 3 presents results of the hierarchical regression analyses. We estimated three regression models to examine the mediating role of revenge motivation. Social desirability was controlled in all analyses. Hypothesis 1 was supported by a positive relationship between psychological contract breach and self-reported (β = .15, p < .05) and peer-reported (β = .22, p < .01) rumor transmission behavior, over and above the effects of social desirability. To test the mediating role of revenge cognitions, we used Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS macro with 5,000 bootstrap re-samples. The indirect effects from psychological contract breach and self-reported (indirect effect = 0.03, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals ranging from 0.001 to 0.09) and peer-reported rumor transmission behavior (indirect effect = 0.11, with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals ranging from 0.05 to 0.22) via revenge motivation were significant. Overall, the results support Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of the Study Variables in Study 2.

	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. Social desirability	0.66	0.23	(.69)
2. Breach	3.36	0.93	−.03	(.81)
3. Negative reciprocity beliefs	2.45	1.07	−.11	.17*	(.83)
4. Revenge	1.95	1.08	.02	.25***	.41***	(.88)
5. Rumor transmission (self-rating)	1.43	0.64	−.28***	.16*	.12*	.20*
6. Rumor transmission (peer rating)	1.98	1.06	−.14	.23**	.41***	.42***	.17*

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Values in parentheses are internal consistency alphas.

Table 3.

Hierarchical Regression Analyses for the Mediating Role of Revenge Motivation in Study 2.

	Rumor transmission			Peer-rated rumor transmission
Variables and steps	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Social desirability	−.28***	−.28***	−.28***	−.14	−.13	−.13
Psychological contract breach		.15*	.11		.22**	.12
Revenge motivation			.18*			.39***
Adjusted R²	.07***	.09*	.12*	.01	.06**	.20***
ΔR²		.02*	.03*		.05*	.14***

p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that psychological contract breach and negative reciprocity would interact in predicting revenge motivation. We conducted hierarchical moderated regression analyses to assess the interactive effects involving breach and negative reciprocity (see Table 4). The interactive term contributed additional variance in predicting revenge motivation over and above the main effects, ΔR² = .05, F(1, 153) = 11.90, β = .25, p < .001. Simple slope analysis showed that the slope pertaining to high negative reciprocity beliefs was significant, t(153) = 2.13, p < .05, whereas the slope representing low negative reciprocity beliefs was not, t(153) = −0.11, ns (see Figure 1). There was a stronger positive association between breach and revenge motivation for those employees with high as opposed to low levels of negative reciprocity. Hypothesis 5 was supported.

Table 4.

Summary of Hierarchical Regression for the Moderating Role of Negative Reciprocity in Study 2.

	Revenge motivation as the outcome variable
Variables and steps	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Social desirability	.022	.07	.09
Psychological contract breach		.19**	.25***
Negative reciprocity		.39***	.40***
Breach × Negative reciprocity			.25***
Adjusted R²	.00	.20***	.25***
ΔR²		.20***	.05***

p < .01. ***p < .001.

Figure 1.

Interaction between breach and negative reciprocity in predicting revenge motivation in Study 2.

We used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012) to calculate the conditional indirect effects at various levels of the moderator. The results revealed a significant conditional indirect effect for high (indirect effect = 0.06, SE = .04) but not for low (indirect effect = 0.00, SE = .01) negative reciprocity. The 95% confidence intervals for high negative reciprocity [0.003, 0.17] did not include zero whereas the 95% confidence intervals for low negative reciprocity [−0.03, 0.02] did. Mirroring the findings of self-reported rumor transmission, the conditional indirect effect of breach on peer-reported rumor transmission via revenge motivation was significant for high negative reciprocity (indirect effect = 0.23, SE = .08) but not for low negative reciprocity (indirect effect = −0.01, SE = .04). The 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect of breach on peer-rated rumor transmission through revenge motivation for high negative reciprocity beliefs ranged from 0.10 to 0.41. In contrast, the 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect of breach on peer-reported rumor transmission via revenge motivation for those employees with low negative reciprocity beliefs ranged from −0.08 to 0.06 and included zero.

Discussion

Once again we found support for the idea that rumor transmission can occur with the intention of seeking revenge on the organization for unfavorable treatment (in the form of psychological contract breach). The revenge motivation played a stronger role for employees who were high in the normative belief that unfavorable treatment should be reciprocated in kind. The results were replicated across self- and peer-rated rumor transmission. This study triangulates the findings of Study 1 by using a different methodological approach. In the following section, we discuss the implications of our findings, strengths and limitations, and propose future research directions.

General Discussion

Research on rumors has tended to emphasize uncertainty and collective sense-making functions of rumor (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a; Rosnow, 1991). However, rumors play a variety of functions in social behavior (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005). They assist in making sense of uncertain and threatening circumstances, they justify and garner support for collective action, and, as we have demonstrated here, they can be used to enact revenge on a perceived wrongdoer. Unlike physical acts of aggression, which are more visible, rumors can be used to harm the target with lower likelihood of being identified and possibly punished by counter-retaliation (Baron & Neuman, 1996). The two studies together provide support for the idea that rumors can be the weapon of choice for the weak (i.e., an employee against the organization).

Revenge can have several goals (McCullough et al., 2001). First, it may be an attempt to “even the score” (Stillwell et al., 2008). Second, revenge may be an attempt to teach the offender a lesson that breaking established norms will not go unpunished. Third, revenge may be enacted to restore a sense of self-worth. In the context of our studies, rumor transmission was largely a covert act; therefore, the first and third motivations are more relevant. That is, harming the organization may restore a sense of balance in the relationship and may also give the victim a sense of self-worth.

When and why could rumor be used for revenge seeking? We relied on theoretical frameworks of revenge derived from equity and justice theories to propose that rumor will be used when there is a perception that self-interest has been harmed by a wrongdoer (Stillwell et al., 2008; Tripp et al., 2007). In spreading negative rumors, the intention is to retaliate by harming the wrongdoer in return. Both studies supported this conceptualization; revenge motivation mediated the effects of psychological contract breach on rumor transmission. We also found that situational (breach) and individual (NRB) factors interacted in predicting revenge motivation, such that those who believed that negative treatment should be reciprocated in kind reacted with stronger revenge motivation in response to breach. The moderating effect of NRB provides additional support to the revenge hypothesis, because we would expect revenge to play a greater role for people high on NRB. In sum, a variety of situational and dispositional characteristics converge to the use of rumor as revenge. An experience of injustice, combined with a normative belief that harm should be reciprocated with harm, is likely to generate revenge motivation; given the opportunity (access to a harmful rumor and low likelihood of being identified as the source), the victim is likely to transmit the rumor.

We also examined the main and moderating effect of belief in the context of revenge and rumor transmission in Study 1. However, there were no effects of belief on intention to transmit the rumor. This finding suggests that other motivations, such as fact-finding or relationship building and maintenance, may not be very salient—in both cases a more credible rumor should have been transmitted more (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a). It may be that when revenge is the goal, reason may take a back seat (DiFonzo, 2010) and rumor transmission may be an impulsive act. This interpretation is consistent with research that has examined the role of emotions in revenge; revenge is often associated with “hot” emotional reactions, such as anger and rage, and “cool” reasoning may be overwhelmed (Denson, Pedersen, Friese, Hahm, & Roberts, 2011). However, these findings on the role of belief should be interpreted with caution as they need to be replicated. A stronger manipulation of belief may result in this variable showing an effect.

One of the strengths of our research is that the role of revenge was replicated over two studies that used different methodologies. However, Study 1 was limited by the fact that the outcome variable was intention and not actual transmission. We attempted to address this limitation by obtaining peer ratings of rumor transmission from the workplace context in Study 2. Nevertheless, Study 2 only provides correlational evidence, and future research should replicate these findings using an experimental method involving rumor transmission as a behavioral outcome. Also, Study 2 used a single-item measure of rumor transmission, and future research should use multiple items that capture the complex nature of rumors (i.e., unverified but instrumentally relevant information). Another strength of our research was that we used working adults in both studies, which should enhance the generalizability of the results to the working population. Finally, given that revenge seeking and rumor spread are socially undesirable activities, we controlled for social desirability in Study 2 and still found support for the hypotheses. However, our measure of social desirability had low reliability, and future research should consider alternate measures of this construct.

The findings have practical implications for organizations. Broadly, they point to the need for managerial-level training to understand rumor dynamics, prevention, and control (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2000, 2002, 2007a; DiFonzo et al., 1994; Kimmel, 2004). Rumors may be a symptom of uncertainty born of poor organizational communication (DiFonzo & Bordia, 1998) or may be the result of the perception of broken promises (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007a), as in the current research; able managers effectively assess, interpret, and respond to organizational hearsay in an informed manner. More specific to perceptions of breach, managers can prevent breach of psychological contracts by purposefully setting, monitoring, and fulfilling informal expectations created through promise-making. Particularly challenging may be the assessment of promise perceptions when they are mistaken or unintended; a manager may not be apprised of these perceptions until such promises are “broken.” These activities should be considered as part of the ongoing establishment of strong workplace norms of procedural justice; such a posture will enhance efforts at breach prevention and response (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006). Conversely, treating employees unfairly will make organizations susceptible to retaliatory acts in the form of harmful rumors; to avoid creating a situational trigger for revenge, organizations should aim to fulfill their obligations. However, if promises are broken, whether intentionally or because of changing economic circumstances, managers can manage breach by monitoring and responding to it. Because the breach involved perceptions of injustice, breach may be managed through employer apology and reparation (Palanski, 2012), through alternate forms of redress, or by punishing promise breakers. As noted by the vigilante model of justice (Tripp et al., 2007), revenge is more likely if there are no formal avenues available to redress the harm or punish the offender.

While the findings have shed light on the use of rumors for inflicting harm, several avenues remain unexplored. First, rumor is a social process in which group and intergroup processes play a vital role. Even revenge may have an intergroup element (O’Boyle et al., 2011). Future research should incorporate the collective process, such as how group members collaborate in exerting revenge on another group. Second, multiple motives have been theorized underlying rumor transmission (Bordia & DiFonzo, 2005, 2013). Studies that explicitly measure and assess these motivations are needed to further clarify the role of rumor in the organizational context.

Furthermore, there is dearth of research on how to manage the aftermath of psychological contract breach. Future research might examine the role of apology and compensation in mitigating the negative consequences of breach. Future research should also examine how people feel after transmitting a harmful rumor. Does the transmission result in feelings of gratification and satisfaction at punishing the wrongdoer or does it leave the person feeling remorse? Perhaps the victim feels ready to forgive the wrongdoer after taking the revenge. Research suggests that revenge and forgiveness are dynamic and interlinked processes (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). Engaging in small acts of revenge may assist the victim in forgiving the wrongdoer in the long run. Finally, our results also show that several participants chose not to transmit the rumor. Several factors may underlie this unwillingness to retaliate: a fear of punishment, choosing to forgive, or a normative belief against spreading rumors. Given the harmful effects of rumors, future research should also explore why people elect not to transmit a rumor.

Footnotes

Appendix

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Prashant Bordia is a professor of management at the Australian National University. He received his PhD in social and organizational psychology from Temple University. His research interests include the study of the employee–organization relationship using the theoretical framework of the psychological contract and the role of rumors in an organizational context.

Kohyar Kiazad is a lecturer in management at Monash University. He received his PhD in organizational behavior from the University of Melbourne in 2010. He conducts research into psychological contracts, abusive supervision, and job embeddedness.

Simon Lloyd D. Restubog is a professor of management at the Australian National University. He received his PhD in organizational psychology from the University of Queensland. His research involves the study of psychological contracts, employee workplace deviance, and career persistence.

Nicholas DiFonzo is a professor of psychology at Rochester Institute of Technology, and earned a PhD in social and organizational psychology at Temple University. His research interests focus primarily on rumors, including the motivations involved in rumor transmission.

Nicholas Stenson is Manager, Organization Design and Review at Queensland Rail. He received his masters in organizational psychology from the University of Queensland.

Robert L. Tang is the vice chancellor for academics at De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde. He received his MBA from the University of the Philippines.

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