Chief Executive Officer Dismissal: A Multidisciplinary Integration and Critical Analysis

Abstract

Dismissal (or involuntary exit) of the chief executive officer (CEO) is a significant milestone with substantial implications for organizations and their members. The growing occurrence of CEO dismissals, and increased academic interest in this area, motivates our comprehensive multidisciplinary synthesis of the extant literature. Our analysis is organized around understanding the antecedents and outcomes of CEO dismissal, and the relevant moderators that play a contingent role in the nomological network. Based on our synthesis of the extant cross-disciplinary literature, we offer a multilevel organizing framework articulating the current state of research on CEO dismissal. In doing so, we catalog and analyze the concepts, theories, and constructs prevalent in the CEO dismissal literature. We also offer an in-depth discussion for the field going forward and identify a constructive agenda for future research on CEO dismissal.

Keywords

chief executive officer dismissal conceptual review interdisciplinary theory

Chief executive officer (CEO) dismissal is widely considered important to organizational theory (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988) as it offers a unique “window into the heart of executive accountability” (Crossland & Chen, 2013, p. 79). The decision to dismiss the CEO rests with the board of directors of the firm (Boeker, 1992) and serves as the ultimate tool for disciplining the CEO (Beck & Wiersema, 2011; Crossland & Chen, 2013). Not surprisingly, when CEOs are dismissed, it often causes significant upheaval (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Tao & Zhao, 2019; Wiersema, 2002) and attracts considerable media attention (Cordeiro & Shaw, 2010). CEOs influence their firms in a variety of ways, including setting strategy and guiding performance (Adams, Keloharju, & Knüpfer, 2018; Liu, Fisher, & Chen, 2018; Wowak, Gomez-Mejia, & Steinbach, 2017). Indeed, substantial agreement exists among researchers and practitioners that CEOs are central figures in their organizations (Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). Thus, CEO dismissal is “one of the most theoretically interesting topics” for organizational researchers (Li & Lu, 2012, p. 1007).

Substantial previous research has focused on the general process of CEO turnover (Berns & Klarner, 2017; Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Ma, Seidl, & Guérard, 2015). While voluntary departure has historically been the most common form of CEO exit in modern corporations (Parrino, 1997), the incidence of dismissal has been on the rise (Fuhrmans & Feintzeig, 2019).¹ The increasing trend of CEO dismissal may arise from “greater scrutiny of CEO behavior, a greater desire for swift justice and action, and a smaller margin of error” (Karlsson, Aguirre, & Rivera, 2017, p. 3). Unfortunately, it is often difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary departures as the precise reason for the separation of the CEO from the firm is rarely accurately disclosed (e.g., Parrino, 1997; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000; Shen & Canella, 2002a), indicating that the occurrence of CEO dismissal may be underestimated (Hilger, Mankel, & Richter, 2013). Yet, the increasing incidence and focus on CEO dismissal suggests that many opportunities remain to enhance our understanding of this area (Louca, Petrou, & Procopiou, 2020).

For consistency and clarity, we view CEO dismissal as a specific subset of CEO turnover that refers to situations “in which the CEO’s departure is ad hoc (e.g., not part of a mandatory retirement policy) and against their will” (Fredrickson et al., 1988, p. 255). Consequently, a key feature of dismissal (involuntary turnover) that distinguishes it from voluntary turnover is dissatisfaction with the CEO that motivates a change in leadership (Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, & Greger, 2012; Schepker, Kim, Patel, Thatcher, & Campion, 2017). Dismissing the CEO, which is the responsibility of the board of directors, provides the board an opportunity to select a new, preferred leader (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006). The decision to dismiss CEOs may seem straightforward—when firms experience poor performance (or other indications of questionable leadership competence), boards move to dismiss CEOs. Yet, CEOs, wishing to retain their position, often push back. This situation creates opposing interests: the board wanting to dismiss the CEO, but the CEO not willing to be dismissed. A number of factors influence the incidence of CEO dismissal (as we discuss later in this review), either making it easier to dismiss the CEO or making it more difficult for the CEO to be dismissed. As a result, dismissal causes significant disruption for the firm as a whole and profoundly impacts various stakeholders (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Tao & Zhao, 2019).

We organize our analysis around examining the antecedents and outcomes of CEO dismissal, as well as relevant moderators in the nomological network. We examine these factors at four key levels: CEO, board, firm, and external. In doing so, we add value to the field by developing an organizing framework that categorizes previous research and offers clarification on the critical constructs and underlying theories relevant to CEO dismissal. Through this organizing framework, we identify fruitful research avenues to pursue going forward.

Our study proceeds as follows. First, after discussing the parameters of our literature search, we delve into the process and timing of CEO dismissal. In doing so, we offer a clearer understanding of the tension between the two main parties in this process: the CEO and the board. Second, we explore the state of the field by discussing theories and constructs used to examine CEO dismissal. For ease of interpretation and integration, we organize this review around antecedents, moderators of antecedents, outcomes, and moderators of outcomes at four key levels: CEO, board, firm, and external. From this analysis, we are able to ascertain what we know about CEO dismissal and where future research opportunities still exist. We then offer specific and actionable future directions, motivated by our literature review and important for the field to gain a more complete understanding of CEO dismissal.

CEO Dismissal in the Literature: Where Are We?

We started by conducting a targeted search of 12 key terms (and their variations) related to CEO dismissal, presented in Table 1. As we were striving for a multidisciplinary review, we considered articles published in top journals across several disciplines. Using O’Brien, Drnevich, Crook, and Armstrong’s (2010) list of 120 premier business journals, we identified 717 unique articles. Three coders examined the articles to determine whether identified articles were truly about CEO dismissal, with the goal of eliminating articles that mentioned CEO dismissal only in passing in the text (the vast majority in the initial sample) or examined CEO turnover more broadly. This resulted in an initial sample of 116 articles on CEO dismissal. Coders had an initial inter-rater reliability just above .90, and disagreements were decided through discussion.

Table 1.

Search Terms Paired with Chief Executive Officer.

Keyword
Departure
Discharge
Dismissal
Exit
Fire
Forced retirement
Forced turnover
Release
Removal
Resignation
Termination
Withdrawal

Note. We also searched derivations of each keyword.

In the interest of thoroughness, we further expanded our search beyond journals listed by O’Brien et al. (2010),² which yielded 63 additional articles. Thus, our final sample includes 179 articles published between 1985 and 2020. Figure 1 charts the increasing trend in research regarding CEO dismissal across this 35-year period. Scholars in fields other than management, particularly finance and accounting, are leading the way in research on CEO dismissal. Table 2 offers a sampling of exemplary scholarship on CEO dismissal, including the main theoretical theme(s), primary method(s), samples, and relevant findings. A full table including all 179 articles can be found in our online appendix (Supplementary Table).

Figure 1.

Count of chief executive officer dismissal articles by year.

Table 2.

Sampling of Exemplar Research on Chief Executive Officer Dismissal.

Authors	Journal^a	Main theoretical theme(s)	Primary method(s)	Sample^b	Relevant reported finding(s)
Alexandridis et al. (2019)	FM	Organization	OLS and probit	4949 pre-turnover and 1627 post-turnover M&A deals between 1989–2016	CEOs partake in poor M&A deals prior to dismissal. Following dismissed CEOs, newly appointed CEOs partake in wealth-generating deals
Bednar (2012)	AMJ	Agency	GEE	917 firm-year observations between 2001–2005 from a random sample of S&P 500 firms	Negative media coverage (CEO and management issues) is positively related to CEO dismissal. Positive media coverage (management issues) is negatively related to dismissal
Cline et al. (2018)	JFE	Reputation and signaling	Logit	325 managerial indiscretions among 15950 firm-year observations between 1978–2012	CEO dismissal increases significantly following the revelation of personal indiscretion disclosures, particularly when the disclosure results in large stock price losses and firm reputational damage
Dah and Frye (2017)	JCF	Agency	OLS and probit	20123 firms between 1997–2012	Poor performance is positively related to CEO dismissal, and this relationship is weakened when directors are better compensated
Dasgupta et al. (2018)	RFS	Economic	Linear probability	20548 firm-year observations from manufacturing firms between 1974–2005	Increased firm competition is positively related to CEO dismissal and strengthens the dismissal-performance relationship, particularly in weakly governed firms which have lower productivity. CEO dismissal is positively related to subsequent firm performance
Denis and Denis (1995)	JOF	Agency	Event study	908 management changes in 966 firms	CEO dismissal often preceded by poor performance and followed by improved performance, a downsizing of operations, and lower employment, capital expenditures, and total assets
Devos et al. (2009)	FM	Agency	Probit	3566 firm-year observations from 1463 unique firms between 2001–2003	Firm performance is negatively related to CEO dismissal. The presence of interlocked directors reduces the sensitivity of the dismissal-performance relationship
Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013)	JFE	Agency	Multinomial logit and descriptives	2779 publicly traded companies between 1992–2006	CEO dismissal is concentrated in certain years and industries. Industry shocks and poor performance relative to the industry are positively related to CEO dismissal. CEO dismissals are positively related to outsider hiring
Fee and Hadlock (2004)	JAE	Agency	Logit	10663 executive years between 1993–1998	Poor performance is positively related to CEO dismissal. CEO dismissal is positively related to dismissal of others around the CEO
Fee et al. (2018)	JCF	Signaling	Logit	61208 CEO firm-year observations between 1991–2007	Dismissed CEOs often obtain employment post-dismissal, but these positions are significantly inferior
Florou (2005)	JBFA	Agency	Probit	2180 observations from 460 firms on the London Stock Exchange from 1990–1998	When the CEO is dismissed, the chairman of the board is more likely to be removed to make way for corporate and board restructuring. The chairman’s removal is even more likely when they chose the dismissed CEO
Land (2010)	PAR	Agency	Logit	230 US firms that had restatements between 1996–1999	Severity of earnings restatement is positively associated with CEO dismissal
Lee, Matsunaga, and Park (2012)	AR	Signaling	Probit	30481 firm-quarter observations between 1996–2006	The magnitude of management forecast errors is positively related to CEO dismissal. The forecast error-CEO dismissal relationship is stronger when entrenchment is low
Lee, Lee, and Nagarajan (2014)	JFE	Resource-based view and agency	Probit	2695 firms between 1996–2009	Poor performance is positively related to CEO dismissal. The poor performance-CEO dismissal relationship is weakened when the CEO is more politically aligned with independent directors
Masulis and Mobbs (2014)	JFE	Agency and reputation	Logit	86330 director-year observations from 17525 directors between 1997–2006 from S&P 1500	Percent of independent directors with reputation incentives is positively related to CEO dismissal. Performance is negatively related to CEO dismissal. Percent of independent directors with reputation incentives increases the sensitivity of the performance-CEO dismissal relationship
Park et al. (2014)	JBR	Scapegoating	Logit	492 firm-year observations from 164 firms between 2003–2005	Performance is negatively related to CEO dismissal. Celebrity CEO status weakens the performance-CEO dismissal relationship
Schepker and Barker (2018)	SMJ	Reputation, stigma, and signaling	Heckman and event history	280 dismissed CEOs from public US firms between 2003–2012	Reputational capital aids CEOs in attaining another CEO position post-dismissal, but not after character-questioning events. Social capital aids CEOs in attaining another CEO position post-dismissal, particularly after character-questioning events. Violations of fiduciary duty, but not personal conduct violations, lessen the likelihood of attaining another CEO position post-dismissal
Tao and Zhao (2019)	CGIR	Upper echelons, structure inertia, and complementarity	OLS and Heckman	2542 CEO turnover events from 1700 firms between 1992–2012	CEO dismissal is positively related to the dismissal of other firm executives, lower post-dismissal firm performance, and greater post-dismissal firm volatility
Ward et al. (1995)	HRM	Career outcomes	Hildebrand’s Del	60 CEO dismissals between 1988–1992 from Business Week’s corporate elite listings	Dismissed CEO age is negatively related to subsequent active executive role and positively related to subsequent advisory role. CEOs dismissed for negative reasons or who have higher pay at time of dismissal are less likely to re-enter the workforce. Media coverage and network have no effect on the dismissed CEO’s subsequent career
You and Du (2012)	CGIR	Agency and resource dependence	Logit	4253 firm-year observations from 1511 firms between 2005–2008	Performance is negatively related to CEO dismissal. Political connections reduce the sensitivity of the performance-CEO dismissal relationship

^aJournal: AMJ = Academy of Management Journal; AR = Accounting Review; CGIR = Corporate Governance: An International Review; FM = Financial Management; HRM = Human Resource Management; JAE = Journal of Accounting and Economics; JBFA = Journal of Business Finance & Accounting; JBR = Journal of Business Research; JCF = Journal of Corporate Finance; JOF = Journal of Finance; JFE = Journal of Financial Economics; PAR = Pacific Accounting Review; RFS = Review of Financial Studies; SMJ = Strategic Management Journal; CEO = chief executive officer.

^bIndividual models/subsamples may differ.

Note. OLE = ordinary least squares; GEE = generalized estimating equation.

Processes and Timing of CEO Dismissal

Central to CEO dismissal is the interaction between the board and CEO. Specifically, two opposing factors underlie the process and timing of CEO dismissal: (1) the board’s desire to change the leadership of the firm as boards are tasked with hiring and firing the CEO (Boeker, 1992) and (2) the CEO’s desire to retain leadership over the firm. Once hired, CEOs are tasked with setting strategy and guiding performance (Adams et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Wowak et al., 2017) as well as maintaining organizational culture, values, and controls (Hambrick, 2007; Schnatterly, Gangloff, & Tuschke, 2018). As time passes, various stakeholders (e.g., the board, investors, and analysts) update their expectations and assessment of the CEO (Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). When firms falter in one or more of these areas, such as poor firm performance (Dou, Sahgal, & Zhang, 2015; Engel, Hayes, & Wang, 2003), failed acquisitions (Alexandridis, Doukas, & Mavis, 2019; Lehn & Zhao, 2006), or fraud (Khanna, Kim, & Lu, 2015; Persons, 2006), the failure is often attributed to the CEO, who is viewed as not meeting expectations as leader of the firm (Calder, 1977; Vinkenburg, Jansen, Dries, & Pepermans, 2014; Weber & Wiersema, 2017).

The board’s assessment of the CEO is particularly important in the decision to dismiss a CEO since the board of directors is tasked with overseeing the CEO on behalf of stakeholders and taking corrective action (i.e., dismissing the CEO) if necessary (Boeker, 1992; Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013). Once the CEO is hired, the board has the opportunity to directly observe CEO quality and fit with the firm (Jacobsen, 2014). He and Fang (2016, p. 25) explain that as “managerial talent is revealed over time, the board will update its prior knowledge on CEO quality and make dismissal or retention decisions accordingly.” Thus, the board’s desire to change the company’s leadership is contingent on its recognition of the needs of the firm under existing circumstances (including the nature of the reasons to consider dismissal) (Sebora & Kesner, 1996), informed by information available to boards (Cornelli, Kominek, & Ljungqvist, 2013).

The timing of CEO dismissal speaks to the question of when the process is enacted. On the one hand, frictions between the CEO and board may build up over time, with dismissal only occurring following lengthy discussion and debate by the board (Cornelli et al., 2013; Koskinen, 2018). Declining performance (Dou et al., 2015; Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011), in particular, is often cited as the reason for a CEO gradually losing the confidence of the board. For example, Carly Fiorina was dismissed as CEO of Hewlett-Packard after a significant period of performance declines and protracted disagreements within the board about the direction of the company (Tam, 2005). On the other hand, when unforeseen major negative events or crises unexpectedly arise, the board may abruptly seek CEO change (Berns & Klarner, 2017; Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). Possible crisis situations examined in prior research include accounting restatements (Beneish, Marshall, & Yang, 2017), earnings manipulations (Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012), and personal indiscretions (Cline, Walking, & Yore, 2018). For example, Steve Easterbrook was abruptly dismissed as CEO of McDonald’s following revelations about an inappropriate romantic relationship with a subordinate in violation of the company’s personal conduct policy (Haddon & Vranica, 2019). Thus, the timing of CEO dismissal—after lengthy consideration or suddenly—reflects the board’s perceived urgency regarding the need for leadership change (Weber & Wiersema, 2017).

Complicating the dismissal decision and its timing is the board’s ability to enact their decision versus the CEO’s preference to remain in charge. Even if the board would like to dismiss the CEO, the CEO may have considerable power (by being the chair of the board or having a nontrivial ownership stake in the firm, for example). Under these circumstances, the board’s collective preference for dismissing the CEO might not prevail. Similarly, if the board has greater power than the CEO, the CEO’s position becomes somewhat more precarious. In such conditions, CEOs may want to remain at the helm, but boards will be able to dismiss them if and when they feel it is necessary.

Another complication with regard to the timing of CEO dismissal concerns the ramifications for the firm from dismissing the chief executive. CEO dismissal may leave the firm leaderless or with a temporary CEO for an extended period of time, leading to firm disruption (Wiersema, 2002) and instability (Intintoli, 2013). Furthermore, significant financial and time costs are associated with the search for a new CEO (Mooney, Semadeni, & Kesner, 2017; Taylor, 2010).

Bringing together these concerns about the timing of CEO dismissal highlights the question of whether the dismissal was “too late” (reactive dismissal) long after poor performance was obvious or “too soon” (proactive dismissal) before a CEO’s strategic changes have had time to yield benefits. Some scholars (e.g., Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Martin & Combs, 2011) have recently discussed the possibility that CEO dismissals can be “too proactive” or “too reactive.” The ramifications of dismissal timing are significant as more proactive dismissals may not allow a CEO to rectify problems in the firm, while more reactive dismissals can exacerbate the negative consequences for the firm (Ertugul & Krishnan, 2011; Hazarika et al., 2012). Yet, determining whether the board acted too hastily or slowly in dismissing a CEO is difficult given the speculative nature of CEO dismissal. Thus, until we can accurately ascertain whether a board dismissed a CEO prematurely or only after it was well overdue, our understanding of the “ultimate effectiveness” of such an action will remain unclear (Cools & van Praag, 2007, p. 739).

Prevailing Theories and Constructs Explaining CEO Dismissal

Several theories offer explanatory power for understanding CEO dismissal. The most prominent theory in the literature on CEO dismissal, accounting for approximately 50% of CEO dismissal studies, is agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Focused on the monitoring relationship between agents and principals, agency theory speaks to the power struggle that emerges between the board, who monitors the firm on behalf of shareholders, and the CEO when dismissal is considered. Several other theoretical lenses (e.g., signaling (Akerlof, 1970), network theory (Burt, 1984), and attribution theory (Calder, 1977)) are also used to understand CEO dismissal. We intersperse the theories used and constructs examined throughout our review of the literature.

Four key levels of analysis emerged from our review of extant CEO dismissal literature: CEO, board, firm, and external. Within each level, constructs can be antecedents, outcomes, or moderators of either antecedents or outcomes. Below, we explore these constructs at each level by discussing theories utilized and constructs examined. Figure 2 presents an organizing framework highlighting a sampling of the areas that have been explored at each level and areas where opportunities for future research remain. In Figure 2, areas that have already been examined in the literature appear in bolded font, while those yet to be explored appear in regular font. Our framework provides a structured visual synthesis of what we know as well as opportunities that exist for future researchers. Key gaps that we identified are elaborated in the section on future directions. Noticeably, for each level, previous work has largely focused on antecedents surrounding CEO dismissal, with much less attention paid to the outcomes. Among other contributions, we hope our analysis draws attention to this imbalance in the CEO dismissal literature.

Figure 2.

Organizing framework of chief executive officer dismissal. Note. Constructs (measurements) that have been examined in the literature are bolded; constructs (measurements) that have yet to be examined are not bolded.

Antecedents of CEO Dismissal

CEO

Several CEO attributes have been found to be antecedents to CEO dismissal. CEO characteristics, or perceptions and interpretations of them, offer signals regarding the quality and fit of the CEO (Chemmanur & Fedaseyeu, 2018). For example, perceptions of CEO capabilities, including a lack of perceived ability (Bruton, Fried, & Hisrich, 2000) and perceived incompetence (Cornelli et al., 2013), are positively related to CEO dismissal. Furthermore, personality characteristics, such as overconfidence (Kim, 2013), are positively related to CEO dismissal. The perceived character of the CEO also impacts CEO dismissal. Consequently, when CEOs commit personal indiscretions, they are often dismissed (Cline et al., 2018; Haddon & Vranica, 2019). Thus, the perceptions of signals (e.g., ability, incompetence, and personal indiscretions) can undermine CEO credibility, motivate calls for leadership change, and drive boards’ decisions to dismiss CEOs.

Board

We find a number of studies use agency theory to examine boards, their monitoring (or lack thereof) of the CEO, and the decision to dismiss the CEO (e.g., Boeker, 1992; Conyon & He, 2011; Dou et al., 2015). In line with agency logic, boards that are more effective monitor and dismiss the CEO more readily. For example, boards with greater independence (Boeker, 1992; Conyon & He, 2011) offer greater monitoring capacity and thus are more apt to dismiss the CEO. Relatedly, characteristics of board structure such as director ownership (Alam, Chen, Ciccotello, & Ryan, 2014; Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011) and meeting frequency (Alam et al., 2014; Khanna et al., 2015) also encourage greater monitoring and are positively related to CEO dismissal. Furthermore, directors bring certain resources to the board that impact the dismissal decision. For example, boards with more expert directors (Francis, Hasan, & Wu, 2015; Wang, Xie, & Zhu, 2015) and experienced directors (Cai & Nguyen, 2018; Dou et al., 2015) dismiss CEOs more often.

Firm

Firm performance is the most studied antecedent of CEO dismissal, examined in over 50% of the studies in our sample (e.g., Ahn & Shrestha, 2013; Banerjee & Homroy, 2018; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Attribution theory (Calder, 1977) offers that firm outcomes (e.g., performance) will be ascribed to the CEO by the board and other stakeholders (e.g., shareholders and analysts). While the relationship between poor firm performance and CEO dismissal is expected, performance is only part of the CEO dismissal picture. Failures in other areas, both strategic and operational, also lead to CEO dismissal. As an example of a strategy failure, poor or failed merger and acquisition deals have been found to precede CEO dismissal (Alexandridis et al., 2019; Lehn & Zhao, 2006; Roosenboom, Schlingemann, & Vasconcelos, 2013). Similarly, corporate scandals, such as earnings management and subsequent restatements (Beneish et al., 2017; Gomulya, Wong, Ormiston, & Boeker, 2017; Hazarika et al., 2012), fraud (Khanna et al., 2015), and tax avoidance (Chyz & Gaertner, 2018), represent operational failure on the CEO’s part, leading to dismissal of the CEO.

External

External to the firm, environmental conditions and stakeholder attitudes impact CEO dismissal. Indeed, adversity spurs challenges to CEO power (Ocasio, 1994), facilitating calls for dismissal. Consequently, dismissal is more commonplace following industry shocks (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013; Gomulya & Boeker, 2016) and with increased regulatory scrutiny (Guo & Masulis, 2015). The potential threat of takeover has also been found to motivate CEO dismissal (Burkart & Raff, 2015). Additionally, some stakeholders have the power to exert influence over the board and facilitate CEO dismissal. Using an agency lens, researchers have examined stakeholders (e.g., analysts, media, and shareholders) who monitor the CEO and use their legitimacy to exert influence on CEO dismissal. For example, scrutiny from the media (Bednar, 2012) and institutional owners (Helwege, Intintoli, & Zhang, 2012; Wu, 2004) are positively related to CEO dismissal.

Moderators of the Antecedents of CEO Dismissal

CEO

CEOs do not want to be dismissed. Thus, much of the work in this area focuses on how CEOs facing dismissal protect themselves. The managerial entrenchment literature (Walsh & Seward, 1990) speaks to the difficulty of CEO dismissal as CEOs often wield significant power (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Finkelstein, 1992) and are able to insulate themselves from accountability and repercussions (Florou & Pope, 2008; Fredrickson et al., 1988). CEO power can come from various sources: structural/positional (e.g., duality), ownership, expertise (e.g., knowledge and tenure), and prestige (e.g., social status and celebrity) (Finkelstein, 1992). Bringing unique qualities to the firm is one way that CEOs increase their power and insulate themselves from dismissal. Being the founder (Beneish et al., 2017; Guo & Masulis, 2015) and having greater firm-specific knowledge (Oehmichen, Schult, & Wolff, 2017; Wang, Zhao, & Chen, 2017) insulate CEOs from dismissal as these CEOs bring valuable resources to the firm. Similarly, CEOs with greater ownership (Boeker, 1992; Gao, Harford, & Li, 2012) and those who are also the chair of the board (Gomulya & Boeker, 2016; Guo & Masulis, 2015) are more insulated as they are able to overcome or avoid board attempts at dismissal via their votes (ownership) or their ability to control board meetings and activities via their role as chair. Networking theory has also been used to understand how the CEO’s network of connections (e.g., prestigious and political) can insulate them from calls for dismissal. For instance, being a high-status CEO (Flickinger, Wrage, Tuschke, & Bresser, 2016; Park, Kim, & Sung, 2014) and being connected to high-status individuals (e.g., politicians) (Cao, Pan, Qian, & Tian, 2017; Khanna et al., 2015) enable CEOs to resist calls for dismissal. Furthermore, recent research suggests that male CEOs may have a lower likelihood of dismissal than their female counterparts (Gupta, Mortal, Silveri, Sun, & Turban, 2020).

Board

Some boards are able to dismiss the CEO with little resistance, while others struggle to do so. Indeed, researchers have found that reputed boards (those with more prestigious directors) are more empowered and thus more capable of dismissing CEOs (Masulis & Mobbs, 2014). Similarly, network theory (Burt, 1984) has also been used to examine how the social capital (external ties and prestigious connections) of board directors can positively influence the board’s ability to dismiss CEOs (Flickinger et al., 2016; Harris & Helfat, 2007). However, some board characteristics weaken the board, making it harder to dismiss the CEO. Boards with more co-opted (or beholden) directors (Dou et al., 2015; Khanna et al., 2015) and directors belonging to the same social network as the CEO (Nguyen, 2012) are closer to the CEO and, consequently, less likely to call for dismissal. Similarly, interlocked directors (Devos, Prevost, & Puthenpurackal, 2009) and better paid directors (Chen, Goergen, Leung, & Song, 2019) are less likely to dismiss the CEO as interlocks facilitate reciprocal relationships. Further, board structural characteristics such as classified boards (Ahn & Shrestha, 2013) decrease board monitoring intensity and make dismissal less likely. Interestingly, dysfunction within the board may also deter monitoring and insulate the CEO from dismissal. Indeed, Van Peteghem, Bruynseels, and Gaeremynck (2018) found that fault lines within the board decrease dismissal likelihood. In short, when boards are more powerful than the CEO, they are better positioned to dismiss the CEO when they choose; when boards are relatively weaker, dismissing the CEO becomes much more difficult (Buchholtz, Young, & Powell, 1998; Pearce & Zahra, 1991).

Firm

While poor firm performance is positively related to CEO dismissal, other firm characteristics may affect the performance-dismissal relationship. Positive firm signals (e.g., engagement in corporate social responsibility) are attributed to the quality of leadership provided by CEOs and can insulate them from dismissal (Chen, Zhou, & Zhu, 2019; Chiu & Sharfman, 2018; Hubbard, Christensen, & Graffin, 2017). In contrast, negative firm signals (e.g., high leverage) weaken the CEO’s ability to resist calls for dismissal (Marshall, McCann, & McColgan, 2014). Furthermore, top management team (TMT) characteristics also impact the dismissal process. For example, having an internal talented heir apparent increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal (Mobbs, 2013; Mooney et al., 2017). Thus, if the perceived path of leadership transition is already planned, the disruption from dismissing a CEO may be minimized, so boards are more likely to push for change.

External

The likelihood of CEO dismissal is also dependent on industry dynamics (Eisfeldt & Kuhnen, 2013). CEO dismissal is more common in industries that are competitive (Dasgupta, Li, & Wang, 2018; DeFond & Park, 1999), poorly performing (Peters & Wagner, 2014), and volatile (Peters & Wagner, 2014). However, external factors can also empower CEOs, enabling them to resist calls for dismissal. For example, when powerful stakeholders offer support to CEOs, they can better weather calls for dismissal and limit the board’s ability to enact desired change. For firms that are at least partly state-owned, state-backing empowers the CEO, allowing for entrenchment, making CEO dismissal less likely (Shen & Lin, 2009). Similarly, positive evaluations by external stakeholders, such as favorable recommendations from analysts (Wang et al., 2017; Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), who act as monitors, decrease the likelihood of CEO dismissal.

Outcomes of CEO Dismissal

CEO

Dismissed CEOs seem to be at a disadvantage in the subsequent labor market. Not surprisingly, after dismissal—a salient signal of leadership failure—CEO careers suffer (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2018). Dismissed CEOs experience diminished opportunities for subsequent employment positions and roles (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Fee et al., 2018; Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Ward, Sonnenfeld, & Kimberly, 1995), and this effect is similar for other top executives below the CEO (Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Tao & Zhao, 2019). Thus, the dismissal of the CEO sends a clear negative signal that appears to stigmatize them and reduces future career opportunities.

Board

Board-level consequences of CEO dismissal have rarely been addressed in the literature. A notable exception is Florou (2005), who found that after dismissing a CEO, the board chair is often replaced and the board restructured. This finding suggests that, as the board is tasked with overseeing the CEO, the board is penalized for its association with a failed CEO. Board-level outcomes of CEO dismissal are an area where rich research opportunities remain.

Firm

CEO dismissal signals dysfunction within the firm (Dedman & Lin, 2002), which encourages calls to hire an outside successor to reinvigorate the firm and break from established norms (Farrell & Whidbee, 2003). Accordingly, outside successors are often hired after a CEO is dismissed (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Farrell & Whidbee, 2003; Marshall et al., 2014). Following CEO dismissal, subsequent financial performance for the firm frequently improves (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Gao et al., 2012). However, CEO dismissal also creates volatility and significant disruptions to the firm (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Tao & Zhao, 2019). Firms that dismiss the CEO are prone to subsequent downsizing (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 2013), capital restructuring (Hornstein, 2013), firm delisting (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011), and even bankruptcy (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). Furthermore, CEO dismissal signals a failure in leadership and monitoring at other levels within the firm, often resulting in the dismissal of other TMT members (Fee & Hadlock, 2004). Together, these disruptions lead to low employee morale throughout the firm (Friedman & Saul, 1991). Thus, the consequences for CEO dismissal are often poor for the firm.

External

A substantive area where CEO dismissal outcomes have been examined is investor reactions. A positive reaction following CEO dismissal has been observed as CEO change is often welcomed by investors (Cools & van Praag, 2007; Friedman & Singh, 1989; Kim, 2013; Marshall et al., 2014). However, succession problems (e.g., lack of replacement) following dismissal are not well received by investors (Dedman & Lin, 2002). Nor is dismissal well received by investors when it is viewed as premature (proactive or “too soon”), before the CEO has had a chance to enact change (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011). Furthermore, Connelly, Li, Shi, and Lee, (2020) found the dismissal of a CEO impacted the risk taking of other CEOs within their industry, demonstrating that the dismissal of one CEO can have ramifications for other firms as well as for the industry as a whole.

Moderators of the Outcomes of CEO Dismissal

CEO

CEO factors can also indirectly impact outcomes of their dismissal. Perceptions about CEO character and ability that may have led to dismissal impact their future career trajectories by signaling capabilities (or lack thereof) to effectively lead a firm in the future. For example, dismissal because of serious indiscretions (e.g., personal scandals) decreases the likelihood of the CEO finding employment after dismissal (Schepker & Barker, 2018; Ward et al., 1995). Yet, it seems some CEOs are able to weather dismissal better than others. From a network theory perspective (Burt, 1984), having social and reputational capital aids dismissed CEOs in finding subsequent employment (Nguyen, 2012; Schepker & Barker, 2018). Other CEO characteristics, such as demographic attributes, also impact their careers post-dismissal. For example, older CEOs who are dismissed are less likely to find executive employment (Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Ward et al., 1995) but more likely to attain advisory roles (Ward et al., 1995).

Board

Many outcomes of CEO dismissal are also contingent on board-level factors. As noted earlier, board chairs are likely to be replaced, particularly when they oversaw the selection of the dismissed CEO (Florou, 2005). The replacement of the board chair seems to be an indictment of their monitoring and leadership abilities and, consequently, a “settling up” for their failure. Board characteristics also play a role in selecting the next successor to lead the firm. Following the dismissal of a CEO, boards with more outside directors are more likely to hire an external successor (Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 1996), while boards with more inside directors are more likely to hire an internal successor (Shen & Cannella, 2002b). These findings speak to entrenchment due to lack of independence within the board. Furthermore, board characteristics exert influence on subsequent firm performance. For instance, board independence strengthens the ability of newly appointed CEOs to enact strategic change as they are better able to work with the board, but only when the incoming CEO is an outsider (Schepker et al., 2017).

Firm

Firm factors also exert influence on the outcomes of CEO dismissal. For the CEO, poor firm performance prior to dismissal (Ward et al., 1995) and dismissal following negative events (e.g., fraud and violations) signal poor leadership and decrease subsequent employment opportunities (Desai, Hogan, & Wilkins, 2006). Firm factors pre-dismissal also moderate firm outcomes post-dismissal. Firm performance prior to dismissal impacts the trajectory of the firm post-dismissal as poorly performing firms are more likely to hire an outside successor (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001; Schwartz & Menon, 1985) and experience subsequent improvements in performance (Shen & Lin, 2009). However, firms performing well prior to dismissal experience a decline in performance post-dismissal (Shen & Lin, 2009). Furthermore, TMT turnover following dismissal further weakens subsequent performance, but only when an outside successor is appointed as the new CEO (Shen & Cannella, 2002a).

External

External factors can also moderate the relationship between dismissal and outcomes. Shareholder lawsuits curtail the dismissed CEO’s ability to attain subsequent board and executive positions (Humphery-Jenner, 2012). Firm outcomes are also impacted by external factors. For example, state ownership signals confidence and buoys firm performance, following CEO dismissal (Shen & Lin, 2009). Furthermore, declining institutional ownership prior to CEO dismissal is positively related to hiring an outside successor (Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003), presumably because it signals discontent with firm leadership and a desire for change.

The Future of CEO Dismissal: Where Do We Go?

The preceding sections have presented an integrated, cross-disciplinary, multilevel synthesis of the extant CEO dismissal literature. Notably, our review highlights several areas where future research opportunities remain, which we hope will motivate further inquiry on CEO dismissal. Table 3 presents some questions we see as particularly promising.

Table 3.

Specific Key Questions.

Area	Questions
1. CEO	Are CEOs who exhibit dark triad personality traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy) more likely to be dismissed? Do these traits impact their career trajectories after dismissal?
	Are CEOs with certain Big Five personality characteristics more or less likely to be dismissed? Do certain Big Five personality traits aid CEOs in dealing with dismissal?
	What are the emotional consequences (grief and resiliency) to the CEO following dismissal?
2. Board	How do boardroom emotions impact the decision to dismiss the CEO?
	If power is concentrated within the board, does this insulate the CEO from dismissal?
	Do individual directors’ careers suffer following a CEO dismissal?
3. Firm	Do faultlines among the TMT increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal?
	Does having an effective TMT with functional diversity empower the CEO, lessening the likelihood of dismissal?
	Does the firm experience employee turnover (beyond TMT turnover) after CEO dismissal?
4. External	Do key alliance partners have the power to motivate CEO dismissal?
	Does operating in non–Anglo-saxon governance systems insulate CEOs from dismissal? If so, what are the underlying mechanisms?
	Can the dismissal of one CEO within an industry start a wave of dismissals across the industry?

CEO

Microlevel theoretical lenses have been employed to understand how CEO attributes such as optimism (Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, & Stanley, 2011) and role congruity (Gupta et al., 2020) are positively associated with CEO dismissal. Yet, similar research grounded in microlevel theory on personality characteristics facilitating CEO dismissal is limited, leaving ample opportunities for future scholars. Specifically, individuals with personality traits such as narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy (i.e., the dark triad) are associated with disagreeableness (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). While these traits are also associated with poor job performance and counterproductive work behavior, being in an authority position (e.g., CEO) may moderate these relationships (Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012). Given the interesting dynamic between the dark triad and leadership, research is warranted to ascertain whether the dark triad is indeed facilitative of CEO dismissal and whether these characteristics impact the subsequent careers of dismissed CEOs.

Furthermore, our review did not uncover any studies that delved into the Big Five personality characteristics (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Goldberg, 1990) of CEOs and dismissal. This is surprising as the Big Five personality traits have been widely studied and seem particularly important in shaping how people lead (Judge & Bono, 2000; Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002). On the one hand, high levels of certain Big Five personality characteristics, such as openness to experience and conscientiousness, would seem to be beneficial for CEOs facing calls for dismissal. On the other hand, high levels of other Big Five personality characteristics, such as neuroticism, would seem to be detrimental to the CEO and hasten CEO dismissal. Thus, future research should unpack if and how the Big Five personality dimensions facilitate or insulate CEOs from dismissal and how these traits impact how dismissed CEOs deal with dismissal.

Given the ongoing “affective revolution” in organizational literature (Ashkanasy & Dorris, 2017; Grandey, 2008), it is surprising that the emotional consequences of CEO dismissal have gone largely unnoticed in the literature. While the dismissal of the CEO is certainly disruptive for the firm (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Tao & Zhao, 2019), the effects on the CEO have received little attention. To date, we have only found a handful of studies that examine CEO outcomes, all of which focus on subsequent career opportunities (e.g., Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011; Fee et al., 2018; Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Ward et al., 1995). Yet, this career focus ignores the potential mental toll that dismissal has on the CEO. Thus, scholars need to examine the effects of dismissal on emotions (e.g., shame or grief), perspectives (e.g., fairness), and behavior (e.g., resiliency). Many dismissed CEOs probably want to helm another firm, so factors affecting their future leadership ability and potential seem worthy of future study.

Board

Details of how boards dismiss CEOs are often difficult to ascertain (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). Thus, opportunities remain in disentangling board discussions preceding dismissal, specifically, the emotional tone of these discussions. The emotional tone, or the degree to which conversations elicit positive or negative affect (Ashkanasy, Humphrey, & Huy, 2017; Kelly & Barsade, 2001), offers information on the emotional state and changes in the direction of discussion as emotions change (see emotional contagion; Barsade, 2002). The emotional state in which the board finds itself when discussing the fate of the CEO, and if and how it changes, is of importance to understanding their ultimate decision. Yet, we found no studies exploring the emotional dynamics within the boardroom preceding CEO dismissal. This omission is surprising given the extent of the literature on emotions within groups and considering the pressure that exists as the board tries to make a decision as significant as dismissing a CEO.

Several studies identify board power as a key facilitator of CEO dismissal (e.g., Alam et al., 2014; Boeker, 1992; Conyon & He, 2011; Ertugrul & Krishnan, 2011), but we did not find any research that examined the concentration of that power within the board. One way the power can be concentrated within the board is by a few select directors dominating committee appointments, since much of the work of the board takes place in committees (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Jiraporn, Singh, & Lee, 2009; Kesner, 1988). If power is concentrated among a few corporate elite (or in-group) directors, the CEO may be insulated from dismissal. Social identity theory suggests that dominant in-group members will exert control over out-group members (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, future researchers need to assess whether concentrated power among in-group board members impacts CEO dismissal.

Finally, opportunities remain to examine the subsequent career impact of the board’s decision to dismiss the CEO on the individual directors. Notably, Florou (2005) found that the chair of the board as well as other board members are likely to leave the board following CEO dismissal, which is consistent with Fee and Hadlock (2004)’s finding that other TMT members leave following CEO dismissal, subsequently detrimentally impacting their careers. However, opportunities remain to study the subsequent career impact on directors associated with dismissed CEOs. One would expect that board members, who are tasked with monitoring the CEO, particularly the members of the nominating committee, may be substantively impacted following CEO dismissal. Given that the dismissal of a CEO may be seen as an acknowledgment of failure to adequately oversee the CEO, calling into question their ability to effectively monitor, the board members involved may suffer similar career setbacks (e.g., fewer and less prestigious directorships), which seem a fertile area for future inquiry.

Firm

Our review revealed little about the relationship between dismissal and the dynamics of the TMT—a key firm-level factor.³ This absence is surprising as, next to the CEO, the TMT is critical to organizational functioning. Indeed, group dynamics between the TMT and the CEO are integral to firm performance (Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003). For example, faultlines—attribute-based group divisions (Lau & Murnighan, 1998)—within the TMT could create dysfunction within the leadership of the firm. While faultlines within the board have been found to reduce effectiveness and decrease the likelihood of CEO dismissal (Van Peteghem et al., 2018), the relationship between CEO dismissal and faultlines within the TMT has yet to be examined. Indeed, faultlines among the TMT would seem to have the opposite effect: facilitating dismissal by increasing dysfunction within the upper echelons of the firm. Given the growing attention to TMT faultlines in the broader literature (Bunderson & Van der Vegt, 2018), attending to this area within the CEO dismissal literature seems warranted.

Another key characteristic of firms is the functional diversity of the TMT. While prior literature has found that CEOs with diverse functional expertise relevant to the firm are less likely to be dismissed as they have made themselves integral to the firm (Oehmichen et al., 2017), opportunities remain in exploring the relationship between TMT functional diversity and CEO dismissal. The relationship between the CEO and TMT is integral to firm functioning (Peterson et al., 2003). Collaborative, well-functioning TMTs with diverse functional backgrounds improve firm performance (Boone & Hendriks, 2009; Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008), but this improvement is contingent on the relationship with the CEO (Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011). Therefore, if CEOs are surrounded by suitable or appropriate TMTs, they are better positioned for success. We encourage future scholars to explore whether CEOs who have collaborative, functionally diverse, and adept TMTs better weather calls for dismissal.

CEO dismissal causes significant upheaval within firms (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Tao & Zhao, 2019). Indeed, restructuring (Hornstein, 2013) and downsizing (Fee et al., 2013) have been observed following CEO dismissal. Consequently, CEO dismissal has been observed to diminish employee morale arising from the sudden instability employees face (Friedman & Saul, 1991), and low morale motivates employee turnover (Staw, 1980). While previous research has noted that TMT turnover follows CEO dismissal (Fee & Hadlock, 2004), whether the broader workforce of the firm turns over disproportionately following CEO dismissal remains to be seen. This question is vital as employees form the backbone of any organization (Liu, Combs, Ketchen, & Ireland, 2007), and employee turnover would further exacerbate disruption within the organization (Shaw, 2011).

External

While several key external stakeholders, such as institutional owners (Helwege et al., 2012; Wu, 2004), analysts (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011), and the media (Bednar, 2012), have been examined in the CEO dismissal literature, exploring other key stakeholders presents an opportunity for future scholars. For example, alliance partners form key relationships for firms, allowing for resource complementarity and performance benefits (Lunnan & Haugland, 2008; Robson, Katsikeas, Schlegelmilch, & Pramböck, 2019). Our review revealed an opportunity for researchers to explore how relationships with alliance partners impact CEO dismissal. Since alliance partners are key stakeholders, we encourage future researchers to examine whether the presence of alliance partners, particularly powerful ones, can facilitate CEO dismissal when they voice concerns about the CEO (similar to shareholders, analysts, and the media).

Academic understanding of CEO dismissal is derived largely from Anglo-Saxon systems of corporate governance (Hilger et al., 2013). However, in non–Anglo-Saxon contexts, banks and governments (rather than shareholders) are often prominent stakeholders, which concentrate ownership and lend greater emphasis to long-term performance (Weimer & Pape, 1999). In examining a non–Anglo-Saxon setting (namely, China), Shen and Lin (2009) found the performance-dismissal relationship to be less sensitive than in Anglo-Saxon contexts, suggesting a fundamentally different view from most research in the area. Thus, the institutional environment in which the firm operates may insulate the CEO from dismissal pressure, but future research needs to further flesh out how specific differences (e.g., state vs. bank vs. family vs. employee-dominated stakeholder systems) impact CEO dismissal.

Finally, opportunities remain in examining the external implications of CEO dismissal. Morgeson, Mitchell, and Liu (2015) proposed event system theory to understand the spillover (and potentially interactive) effects of critical episodes at different levels (environment, organization, team, and individual) of the firm. Dismissing the CEO would certainly constitute an impactful event capable of having such spillover effects. In this vein, Connelly et al. (2020) recently found that CEO dismissal at one firm induces heightened fears of job insecurity among CEOs at competing firms. Yet, whether the dismissal of a CEO at one firm actually leads to a wave of dismissals at other firms remains to be investigated. If this scenario is indeed the case, the competitive landscape of industries could drastically change with the dismissal of just one CEO, creating a possible domino effect. Thus, future research needs to continue to examine how the dismissal of one CEO impacts the broader environment and the stakeholders therein.

Conclusion

CEOs are at the helm of the organizational hierarchy of their firms. Consequently, CEO dismissals are pivotal events with significant effects for organizations and individuals. The rate of CEO dismissal has grown substantially in recent years as has the literature exploring CEO dismissal. Yet, within this burgeoning literature, many theoretical and empirical opportunities remain. In this critical synthesis, we seek to add value to the field by summarizing, organizing, and analyzing what is currently known about CEO dismissal across four key levels (CEO, board, firm, and external), forming the basis for our identification of fertile research opportunities for future inquiry.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-gom-10.1177_1059601120987452 – Supplemental Material for Chief Executive Officer Dismissal: A Multidisciplinary Integration and Critical Analysis

Supplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-gom-10.1177_1059601120987452 for Chief Executive Officer Dismissal: A Multidisciplinary Integration and Critical Analysis by John P. Berns, Vishal K. Gupta, Karen A. Schnatterly and Clarissa R. Steele in Group & Organization Management

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

John P. Berns

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Associate editor: Lucy Gilson.

Author Biographies

John P. Berns is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Management in the School of Business Administration at the University of Mississippi. His primary research interests include entrepreneurship and strategy. He earned his PhD from the University of Missouri.

Vishal K. Gupta is an Associate Professor in Culverhouse College of Business at The University of Alabama. He has broad research interests, including in the areas of upper echelons and corporate governance. A graduate of Punjab Technical University (India), he received his PhD from University of Missouri.

Karen A. Schnatterly is an Associate Professor at Virginia Tech's Pamplin College of Business. Her research focusses on governance, boards of directors, fraud and entrepreneurship. She received her PhD from the University of Michigan.

Clarissa R. Steele is an Assistant Professor of management at Kansas State University. Her research focuses on gender and leadership, stereotypes and implicit bias in organizational decision making, and diversity among top management and boards of directors. She received her PhD in management from the University of Missouri.

References

Adams

Keloharju

Knüpfer

(2018). Are CEOs born leaders? Lessons from traits of a million individuals. Journal of Financial Economics, 130, 392-408.

Adams

R. B.

Almeida

Ferreira

(2005). Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance. Review of Financial Studies, 18, 1403-1432.

Ahn

Shrestha

(2013). The differential effects of classified boards on firm value. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37, 3993-4013.

Akerlof

G. A.

(1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.

Alam

Z. S.

Chen

M. A.

Ciccotello

C. S.

Ryan

H. E.

(2014). Does the location of directors matter? Information acquisition and board decisions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49, 131-164.

Alexandridis

Doukas

J. A.

Mavis

C. P.

(2019). Does firing a CEO pay off? Financial Management, 48, 3-43.

Ashkanasy

N. M.

Dorris

A. D.

(2017). Emotions in the workplace. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 4, 67-90.

Ashkanasy

N. M.

Humphrey

R. H.

Huy

Q. N.

(2017). Integrating emotions and affect in theories of management. Academy of Management Review, 42, 175-189.

Banerjee

Homroy

(2018). Managerial incentives and strategic choices of firms with different ownership structures. Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 314-330.

10.

Barrick

M. R.

Mount

M. K.

(1991). The big five personality dimensions and job performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44, 1-26.

11.

Barsade

S. G.

(2002). The ripple effect: Emotional contagion and its influence on group behavior. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 644-675.

12.

Beck

J. B.

Wiersema

M. F.

(2011). CEO dismissal: The role of the broader governance context. In Carpenter

M. A.

(Ed.), The handbook of research on top management teams (pp. 396-414). New York: Edward Elgar Publishing.

13.

Bednar

M. K.

(2012). Watchdog or lapdog? A behavioral view of the media as a corporate governance mechanism. Academy of Management Journal, 55, 131-150.

14.

Beneish

M. D.

Marshall

C. D.

Yang

(2017). Explaining CEO retention in misreporting firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 123, 512-535.

15.

Berns

K. V. D.

Klarner

(2017). A review of the CEO succession literature and a future research program. Academy of Management Perspectives, 31, 83-108.

16.

Bilimoria

Piderit

S. K.

(1994). Qualifications of corporate board committee members. Group & Organization Management, 19, 334-362.

17.

Boeker

(1992). Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37, 400-421.

18.

Boone

Hendriks

(2009). Top management team diversity and firm performance: Moderators of functional-background and locus-of-control diversity. Management Science, 55, 165-180.

19.

Borokhovich

K. A.

Parrino

Trapani

(1996). Outside directors and CEO selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 337-355.

20.

Bruton

G. D.

Fried

V. H.

Hisrich

R. D.

(2000). CEO dismissal in venture capital-backed firms: Further evidence from an agency perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 24, 69-77.

21.

Buchholtz

A. K.

Young

M. N.

Powell

G. N.

(1998). Are board members pawns or watchdogs? The link between CEO pay and firm performance. Group & Organization Management, 23, 6-26.

22.

Bunderson

J. S.

Van der Vegt

G. S.

(2018). Diversity and inequality in management teams: A review and integration of research on vertical and horizontal member differences. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 5, 47-73.

23.

Burkart

Raff

(2015). Performance pay, CEO dismissal, and the dual role of takeovers. Review of Finance, 19, 1383-1414.

24.

Burt

R. S.

(1984). Network items and the general social survey. Social Networks, 6, 293-339.

25.

Buyl

Boone

Hendriks

Matthyssens

(2011). Top management team functional diversity and firm performance: The moderating role of CEO characteristics. Journal of Management Studies, 48, 151-177.

26.

Cai

Nguyen

(2018). Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs. Journal of Banking & Finance, 96, 221-235.

27.

Calder

B. J.

(1977). An attribution theory of leadership. In Staw

B. M.

Salancik

R. G.

(Eds.), New directions in organizational behavior (pp. 179-204). Chicago: St. Claire Press.

28.

Campbell

T. C.

Gallmeyer

Johnson

S. A.

Rutherford

Stanley

B. W.

(2011). CEO optimism and forced turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 101, 695-712.

29.

Cannella

A. A.

Lubatkin

(1993). Succession as a sociopolitical process: Internal impediments to outsider selection. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 763-793.

30.

Cannella

A. A.

Park

J. H.

Lee

H. U.

(2008). Top management team functional background diversity and firm performance: Examining the roles of team member colocation and environmental uncertainty. Academy of Management Journal, 51, 768-784.

31.

Cao

Maruping

L. M.

Takeuchi

(2006). Disentangling the effects of CEO turnover and succession on organizational capabilities: A social network perspective. Organization Science, 17, 563-576.

32.

Cao

Pan

Qian

Tian

G. G.

(2017). Political capital and CEO entrenchment: Evidence from CEO turnover in Chinese non-SOEs. Journal of Corporate Finance, 42, 1-14.

33.

Chemmanur

T. J.

Fedaseyeu

(2018). A theory of corporate boards and forced CEO turnover. Management Science, 64, 4798-4817.

34.

Chen

Goergen

Leung

W. S.

Song

(2019). CEO and director compensation, CEO turnover and institutional investors: Is there cronyism in the UK? Journal of Banking & Finance, 103, 18-35.

35.

Chen

W. T.

Zhou

G. S.

Zhu

X. K.

(2019). CEO tenure and corporate social responsibility performance. Journal of Business Research, 95, 292-302.

36.

Chiu

S. C.

Sharfman

(2018). Corporate social irresponsibility and executive succession: An empirical examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 149, 707-723.

37.

Chyz

J. A.

Gaertner

F. B.

(2018). Can paying “too much” or “too little” tax contribute to forced CEO turnover? The Accounting Review, 93, 103-130.

38.

Cline

B. N.

Walking

R. A.

Yore

A. S.

(2018). The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 127, 389-415.

39.

Conger

Finegold

Lawler

(1998). CEO appraisals: Holding corporate leadership accountable. Organizational Dynamics, 27, 7-20.

40.

Connelly

B. L.

Q. J.

Shi

Lee

(2020). CEO dismissal: Consequences for the strategic risk taking of competitor CEOs. Strategic Management Journal, 41, 2092-2125.

41.

Conyon

M. J.

(2011). Executive compensation and corporate governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1158-1175.

42.

Cools

van Praag

C. M.

(2007). The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, 721-742.

43.

Cordeiro

J. J.

Shaw

T. S.

(2010). CEO survival and industry discretion: An application of agency and job matching theories. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2010, 1-6.

44.

Cornelli

Kominek

Ljungqvist

(2013). Monitoring managers: Does it matter? Journal of Finance, 68, 431-481.

45.

Crossland

Chen

(2013). Executive accountability around the world: Sources of cross-nation variation in firm performance-CEO dismissal sensitivity. Strategic Organization, 11, 78-109.

46.

Dah

M. A.

Frye

M. B.

(2017). Is board compensation excessive? Journal of Corporate Finance, 45, 566-585.

47.

Dasgupta

Wang

A. Y.

(2018). Product market competition shocks, firm performance, and forced CEO turnover. Review of Financial Studies, 31, 4187-4231.

48.

Dedman

Lin

S. W. J.

(2002). Shareholder wealth effects of CEO departures: Evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 81-104.

49.

DeFond

M. L.

Park

C. W.

(1999). The effect of competition on CEO turnover. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27, 35-56.

50.

Denis

D. J.

Denis

D. K.

(1995). Performance changes following top management dismissals. Journal of Finance, 50, 1029-1057.

51.

Desai

Hogan

C. E.

Wilkins

M. S.

(2006). The reputational penalty for aggressive accounting: Earnings restatements and management turnover. The Accounting Review, 81, 83-112.

52.

Devos

Prevost

Puthenpurackal

(2009). Are interlocked directors effective monitors? Financial Management, 38, 861-887.

53.

Dou

Sahgal

Zhang

E. J.

(2015). Should independent directors have term limits? The role of experience in corporate governance. Financial Management, 44, 583-621.

54.

Eisfeldt

A. L.

Kuhnen

C. M.

(2013). CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework. Journal of Financial Economics, 109, 351-372.

55.

Engel

Hayes

R. M.

Wang

(2003). CEO turnover and properties of accounting information. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 197-226.

56.

Ertugrul

Krishnan

(2011). Can CEO dismissals be proactive? Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 134-151.

57.

Farrell

K. A.

Whidbee

D. A.

(2003). Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36, 165-196.

58.

Fee

C. E.

Hadlock

C. J.

(2004). Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, 3-38.

59.

Fee

C. E.

Hadlock

C. J.

Pierce

J. R.

(2013). Managers with and without style: Evidence using exogenous variation. Review of Financial Studies, 26, 567-601.

60.

Fee

C. E.

Hadlock

C. J.

Pierce

J. R.

(2018). New evidence on managerial labor markets: An analysis of CEO retreads. Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 428-441.

61.

Finkelstein

(1992). Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management Journal, 35, 505-538.

62.

Flickinger

Wrage

Tuschke

Bresser

(2016). How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective. Strategic Management Journal, 37, 1107-1117.

63.

Florou

(2005). Top director shake-up: The link between Chairman and CEO dismissal in the UK. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32, 97-128.

64.

Florou

Pope

(2008). Are boards and institutional investors active monitors? Evidence from CEO dismissal. Managerial Auditing Journal, 23, 862-872.

65.

Forsyth

D. R.

Banks

G. C.

McDaniel

M. A.

(2012). A meta-analysis of the Dark Triad and work behavior: A social exchange perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97, 557-579.

66.

Francis

Hasan

(2015). Professors in the boardroom and their impact on corporate governance and firm performance. Financial Management, 44, 547-581.

67.

Fredrickson

J. W.

Hambrick

D. C.

Baumrin

(1988). A model of CEO dismissal. Academy of Management Review, 13, 255-270.

68.

Friedman

S. D.

Saul

(1991). A leader’s wake: Organization member reactions to CEO succession. Journal of Management, 17, 619-642.

69.

Friedman

S. D.

Singh

(1989). CEO succession and stockholder reaction: The influence of organizational context and event content. Academy of Management Journal, 32, 718-744.

70.

Fuhrmans

Feintzeig

(2019). Companies scrutinize relationships at work. New York, NY: Wall Street Journal, A2.

71.

Gao

Harford

(2012). CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18, 291-310.

72.

Giambatista

R. C.

Rowe

W. G.

Riaz

(2005). Nothing succeeds like succession: A critical review of leader succession literature since 1994. Leadership Quarterly, 16, 963-991.

73.

Goldberg

L. R.

(1990). An alternative “description of personality”: The big five factor structure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1216-1229.

74.

Gomulya

Boeker

(2016). Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct. Strategic Management Journal, 37, 1898-1918.

75.

Gomulya

Wong

E. M.

Ormiston

M. E.

Boeker

(2017). The role of facial appearance on CEO selection after firm misconduct. Journal of Applied Psychology, 102, 617-635.

76.

Graffin

S. D.

Boivie

Carpenter

M. A.

(2013). Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early‐stage CEO evaluation. Strategic Management Journal, 34, 383-403.

77.

Grandey

A. A.

(2008). Emotions at work: A review and research agenda. In Cooper

C. L.

Barling

(Eds.), The SAGE handbook of organizational behavior volume 1, micro approaches (pp. 235-261). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

78.

Guo

Masulis

R. W.

(2015). Board structure and monitoring: New evidence from CEO turnovers. Review of Financial Studies, 28, 2770-2811.

79.

Gupta

V. K.

Mortal

S. C.

Silveri

Sun

Turban

D. B.

(2020). You’re fired! Gender disparities in CEO dismissal. Journal of Management, 46, 560-582.

80.

Haddon

Vranica

(2019). McDonald’s started investigation of CEO’s relationship with employee three weeks ago: Relationship led to Steve Easterbrook’s firing by burger giant. Wall Street Journal.

81.

Hambrick

D. C.

(2007). Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review, 32, 334-343.

82.

Hambrick

D. C.

Quigley

T. J.

(2014). Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 35, 473-491.

83.

Harris

D. A.

Helfat

C. E.

(2007). The board of directors as a social network a new perspective. Journal of Management Inquiry, 16, 228-237.

84.

Hazarika

Karpoff

J. M.

Nahata

(2012). Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 104, 44-69.

85.

Fang

(2016). CEO overpayment and dismissal: The role of attribution and attention. Corporate Governance, 24, 24-41.

86.

Helwege

Intintoli

V. J.

Zhang

(2012). Voting with their feet or activism? Institutional investors’ impact on CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18, 22-37.

87.

Hilger

Mankel

Richter

(2013). The use and effectiveness of top executive dismissal. Leadership Quarterly, 24, 9-28.

88.

Hornstein

A. S.

(2013). Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover. Journal of Corporate Finance, 20, 41-58.

89.

Hubbard

T. D.

Christensen

D. M.

Graffin

S. D.

(2017). Higher highs and lower lows: The role of corporate social responsibility in CEO dismissal. Strategic Management Journal, 38, 2255-2265.

90.

Humphery-Jenner

M. L.

(2012). Internal and external discipline following securities class actions. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 21, 151-179.

91.

Huson

Parrino

Starks

(2001). Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A long-term perspective. Journal of Finance, 56, 2265-2297.

92.

Hutzschenreuter

Kleindienst

Greger

(2012). How new leaders affect strategic change following a succession event: A critical review of the literature. Leadership Quarterly, 23, 729-755.

93.

Intintoli

V. J.

(2013). The effects of succession choice surrounding CEO turnover announcements: Evidence from marathon successions. Financial Management, 42, 211-238.

94.

Jacobsen

(2014). The death of the deal: Are withdrawn acquisition deals informative of CEO quality? Journal of Financial Economics, 114, 54-83.

95.

Jensen

Meckling

(1976). Theory of the firm: Management behavior, agency costs and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.

96.

Jiraporn

Singh

Lee

C. I.

(2009). Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 819-828.

97.

Judge

T. A.

Bono

J. E.

(2000). Five-factor model of personality and transformational leadership. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 751–765.

98.

Judge

T. A.

Heller

Mount

M. K.

(2002). Five-factor model of personality and job satisfaction: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 530-541.

99.

Karlsson

P. O.

Aguirre

Rivera

(2017). Are CEOs less ethical than in the past? Why more chief executives are losing their jobs after scandals and corporate misconduct. Strategy+Business, 87, 1-10.

100.

Kelly

J. R.

Barsade

S. G.

(2001). Mood and emotions in small groups and work teams. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86, 99-130.

101.

Kesner

I. F.

(1988). Directors’ characteristics and committee membership: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender. Academy of Management Journal, 31, 66-84.

102.

Khanna

Kim

(2015). CEO connectedness and corporate fraud. Journal of Finance, 70, 1203-1252.

103.

Kim

Y. H.

(2013). Self-attribution bias of the CEO: Evidence from CEO interviews on CNBC. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37, 2472-2489.

104.

Koskinen

(2018). The process of CEO dismissal: An exploratory study. Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organization Studies, 23, 4-12.

105.

Land

J. K

. (2010). CEO turnover around earnings restatements and fraud. Pacific Accounting Review, 22, 180-198.

106.

Lau

D. C.

Murnighan

J. K.

(1998). Demographic diversity and faultlines: The compositional dynamics of organizational groups. Academy of Management Review, 23, 325-340.

107.

Leblanc

Schwartz

M. S.

(2007). The black box of board process: Gaining access to a difficult subject. Corporate Governance, 15, 843-851.

108.

Lee

K. J.

Nagarajan

N. J.

(2014). Birds of a feather: Value implications of political alignment between top management and directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 112, 232-250.

109.

Lee

Matsunaga

S. R.

Park

C. W.

(2012). Management forecast accuracy and CEO turnover. Accounting Review, 87, 2095-2122.

110.

Lehn

K. M.

Zhao

(2006). CEO turnover after acquisitions: Are bad bidders fired? Journal of Finance, 61, 1759-1811.

111.

(2012). CEO dismissal, institutional development, and environmental dynamism. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29, 1007-1026.

112.

Liu

. Fisher

Chen

(2018). CEO attributes and firm performance: A sequential mediation process model. Academy of Management Annals, 12, 789-816.

113.

Liu

Combs

J. G.

Ketchen

D. J.

Jr Ireland

R. D.

(2007). The value of human resource management for organizational performance. Business Horizons, 50, 503-511.

114.

Louca

Petrou

A. P.

Procopiou

(2020). When does the board blame the CEO for poor performance? Extreme resource reallocation and the board’s industry and CEO experience. British Journal of Management, 31, 505-524.

115.

Lunnan

Haugland

S. A.

(2008). Predicting and measuring alliance performance: A multidimensional analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 545-556.

116.

Seidl

Guérard

(2015). The new CEO and the post‐succession process: An integration of past research and future directions. International Journal of Management Reviews, 17, 460-482.

117.

Marshall

McCann

McColgan

(2014). Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions. Journal of Banking & Finance, 46, 118-131.

118.

Martin

J. A.

Combs

J. G.

(2011). Better sooner than later: What triggers early CEO dismissal? Academy of Management Perspectives, 25, 82-83.

119.

Masulis

R. W.

Mobbs

(2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 111, 406-429.

120.

Mobbs

. (2013). CEOs under fire: The effects of competition from inside directors on forced CEO turnover and CEO compensation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 48, 669-698.

121.

Mooney

C. H.

Semadeni

Kesner

I. F.

(2017). The selection of an interim CEO: Boundary conditions and the pursuit of temporary leadership. Journal of Management, 43, 455-475.

122.

Morgeson

F. P.

Mitchell

T. R.

Liu

(2015). Event system theory: An event-oriented approach to the organizational sciences. Academy of Management Review, 40, 515-537.

123.

Nguyen

B. D.

(2012). Does the Rolodex matter? Corporate elite’s small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors. Management Science, 58, 236-252.

124.

O’Brien

J. P.

Drnevich

P. L.

Crook

T. R.

Armstrong

C. E.

(2010). Does business school research add economic value for students? Academy of Management Learning & Education, 9, 638-651.

125.

Ocasio

(1994). Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations, 1960-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 285-312.

126.

Oehmichen

Schult

Wolff

(2017). Keeping their cards close to their chests: How non‐delegating CEOs avoid forced career ends. Human Resource Management, 56, 225-242.

127.

Park

J. H.

Kim

Sung

Y. D.

(2014). Whom to dismiss? CEO celebrity and management dismissal. Journal of Business Research, 67, 2346-2355.

128.

Parrino

(1997). Turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 46, 165-197.

129.

Parrino

Sias

R. W.

Starks

L. T.

(2003). Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 3-46.

130.

Paulhus

D. L.

Williams

K. M.

(2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 556-563.

131.

Pearce

J. A.

Zahra

S. A.

(1991). The relative power of CEOs and boards of directors: Associations with corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 135-153.

132.

Persons

O. S.

(2006). The effects of fraud and lawsuit revelation on US executive turnover and compensation. Journal of Business Ethics, 64, 405-419.

133.

Peters

F. S.

Wagner

A. F.

(2014). The executive turnover risk premium. Journal of Finance, 69, 1529-1563.

134.

Peterson

R. S.

Smith

D. B.

Martorana

P. V.

Owens

P. D.

(2003). The impact of chief executive officer personality on top management team dynamics: One mechanism by which leadership affects organizational performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 795-808.

135.

Pitcher

Chreim

Kisfalvi

(2000). CEO succession research: Methodological bridges over trouble waters. Strategic Management Journal, 21, 625-648.

136.

Robson

M. J.

Katsikeas

C. S.

Schlegelmilch

B. B.

Pramböck

(2019). Alliance capabilities, interpartner attributes, and performance outcomes in international strategic alliances. Journal of World Business, 54, 137-153.

137.

Roosenboom

Schlingemann

F. P.

Vasconcelos

(2013). Does stock liquidity affect incentives to monitor? Evidence from corporate takeovers. Review of Financial Studies, 27, 2392-2433.

138.

Schepker

D. J.

Barker

V. L.

III (2018). How stigmatized are dismissed chief executives? The role of character questioning causal accounts and executive capital in dismissed CEO reemployment. Strategic Management Journal, 39, 2566-2586.

139.

Schepker

D. J.

Kim

Patel

P. C.

Thatcher

S. M. B.

Campion

M. C.

(2017). CEO succession, strategic change, and post-succession performance: A meta-analysis. Leadership Quarterly, 28, 701-720.

140.

Schnatterly

Gangloff

Tuschke

(2018). CEO wrongdoing: A review of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization. Journal of Management, 44, 2405-2432.

141.

Schwartz

K. B.

Menon

(1985). Executive succession in failing firms. Academy of Management Journal, 28, 680-686.

142.

Sebora

T. C.

Kesner

I. F.

(1996). The CEO selection decision process: Bounded rationality and decision component ordering. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 5, 183-194.

143.

Shaw

J. D.

(2011). Turnover rates and organizational performance: Review, critique, and research agenda. Organizational Psychology Review, 1, 187-213.

144.

Shen

Cannella

A. A.

(2002a). Power dynamics within top management and their impacts on CEO dismissal followed by inside succession. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 1195-1206.

145.

Shen

Cannella

A. A.

(2002b). Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: The impacts of successor type, post-succession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 717-733.

146.

Shen

Lin

(2009). Firm profitability, state ownership, and top management turnover at the listed firms in China: A behavioral perspective. Corporate Governance, 17, 443-456.

147.

Staw

B. M.

(1980). The consequences of turnover. Journal of Occupational Behaviour, 1, 253-273.

148.

Tajfel

Billig

M. G.

Bundy

R. P.

Flament

(1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1, 149-178.

149.

Tajfel

H. T.

Turner

J. C

. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In Worchel

Austen

W. G.

(Eds), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

150.

Tam

P. W.

(2005). Fallen star: H-P’s board ousts Fiorina as CEO; Amid languishing stock, computer chief resists pressure to delegate; A big merger’s missed goals. Wall Street Journal.

151.

Tao

Zhao

(2019). “Passing the Baton”: The effects of CEO succession planning on firm performance and volatility. Corporate Governance, 27, 61-78.

152.

Taylor

L. A.

(2010). Why are CEOs rarely fired? Evidence from structural estimation. Journal of Finance, 65, 2051-2087.

153.

Van Peteghem

Bruynseels

Gaeremynck

(2018). Beyond diversity: A tale of faultlines and frictions in the board of directors. The Accounting Review, 93, 339-367.

154.

Vinkenburg

C. J.

Jansen

P. G. W.

Dries

Pepermans

(2014). Arena: A critical conceptual framework of top management selection. Group & Organization Management, 39, 33-68.

155.

Walsh

J. P.

Seward

J. K.

(1990). On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms. Academy of Management Review, 15, 421-458.

156.

Wang

Xie

Zhu

(2015). Industry expertise of independent directors and board monitoring. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 50, 929-962.

157.

Wang

Zhao

Chen

(2017). Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. Strategic Management Journal, 38, 1875-1894.

158.

Ward

Sonnenfeld

J. A.

Kimberly

J. R.

(1995). In search of a kingdom: Determinants of subsequent career outcomes for chief executives who are fired. Human Resource Management, 34, 117-139.

159.

Weber

Wiersema

(2017). Dismissing a tarnished CEO? Psychological mechanisms and unconscious biases in the board’s evaluation. California Management Review, 59, 22-41.

160.

Weimer

Pape

(1999). A taxonomy of systems of corporate governance. Corporate Governance, 7, 152-166.

161.

Wiersema

M. F.

(2002). Holes at the top: Why CEO firings backfire. Harvard Business Review, 80, 70-77.

162.

Wiersema

M. F.

Zhang

(2011). CEO dismissal: The role of investment analysts. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 1161-1182.

163.

Wowak

A. J.

Gomez-Mejia

L. R.

Steinbach

A. L.

(2017). Inducements and motives at the top: A holistic perspective on the drivers of executive behavior. Academy of Management Annals, 11, 669-702.

164.

Y. L.

(2004). The impact of public opinion on board structure changes, director career progression, and CEO turnover: Evidence from CalPERS’ corporate governance program. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10, 199-227.

165.

You

(2012). Are political connections a blessing or a curse? Evidence from CEO turnover in China. Corporate Governance, 20, 179-194.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.58 MB