Veit criticizes autopoiesis as a competitor with the pathological complexity thesis as an explanation for the origins of consciousness. I argue that this characterization of autopoiesis conflates what I call “autopoiesis 1.0” and “autopoiesis 2.0.” Autopoiesis 1.0, as originally construed by Maturana and Varela, disregarded environmental explanations and focused on autopoiesis as a specific class of mechanisms. Autopoiesis 2.0 is heavily influenced by Hans Jonas and other thinkers in the tradition of Naturphilosophie. Despite the similarity in name, this is quite different from Veit’s contribution to philosophy of nature in the sense of Dennett, Godfrey-Smith, and Sterelny. Veit’s project has much to offer autopoietic enactivists but it is different kind of project. This difference is crucial for assessing how these projects can contribute to each other.
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