Abstract

Consider the following. In mathematics, when we differentiate, we often use time as the underlying foundation for the calculation. Rates of change across time were indeed the fount of Newton’s origination for his theory of “fluxions” in the first place (Westfall, & Devons, 1981). Regardless of Newton’s dispute with Leibniz over the invention of such a method, it is not unreasonable to recognize that Newton used his own conception of time to found his approach to calculus. In Newton’s interpretation, each and every second proves to be exactly like any one that preceded it, or indeed any one that will follow it. This Newtonian foundation for time remains, in nonspecialized areas, what we still generally consider clock time to be today. True, over the years it has been measured by ever more accurate changes in spatial position; now to a staggeringly impressive degree. Yet, we know that this singular and restrictive expression of Cronus 1 is certainly not all that there is to time. In fact, I argued in my original article (Hancock, 2018) that the human experience of duration should assume supremacy, even beyond these masterful and impressive contemporary clock constructions.
In many ways, I do not think it is an overstatement to say that we have come to “worship” the notion of physical time. Perhaps not consciously, but the constraints that dictate our moment to moment existence are heavily bound up in the chains of Cronus. In the West, “Father Time” is often portrayed with a scythe to indicate his capacity for endless destruction of the moments of our lives that thus “tick” away. Sheridan warns us about mixing this chronometric master of existence with the perception of life as lived. He even notes that it can lead to poetry! But this is the divide I want to anneal. Most especially by asking why, in our technology-enabled age, we cannot design the flow of temporal experience. By this, I do not simply mean redesigning any chronometric accounting framework (as did those involved in the design of the French Revolutionary Calendar) or relabeling common time units (e.g., seconds, minutes, hours, etc.). It was the ecological psychologist James Gibson (1975) who claimed that “events” are perceivable but time is not. But “events” are human-scaled happenings. Casting a chronometric net over these events, however esoteric and benign such a framework might appear, emphasizes and reifies the life as measured over the life as lived. It is this disenfranchising ascendancy of formulaic time that I am seeking to mitigate. Yet, as we are becoming ever-more aware, our technologically mediated world seems to be taking us down a path toward an ever-greater dominance of the tyranny of physical time. Witness, just-in-time manufacturing, overnight packaging, appointments made now down to the minute, and so on. It seems that the clock, the beating heart of the modern computer, is the rhythm to which many of us are becoming, albeit unconsciously, de facto slaves.
Sheridan goes on, naturally, to emphasize an area in which he himself has exhibited great mastery; that is the modeling of human–machine systems. He provides a number of examples, and I have no argument that these models have rendered great value; after all, as I have noted, time is our greatest tool. It would be hypocritical of me here not to support the value of the series of models he has articulated; some of which I have myself even made minor contributions to (Hancock & Newell, 1985). However, what echoes most with me is his phrase that I think bears both reiterating and emphasizing: “Models for designing in experiential time surely seem to be lacking. We need effort to more precisely define and distinguish different types of experiential time.” With characteristic acumen, Sheridan has identified the very core of the issue. We do not really have models of experiential time that are sufficiently articulated for design applications. It is true that we have interesting models of time perception itself (see Hancock & Block, 2012). However, these have not really penetrated into the design world, nor were they promulgated to do so. Sheridan echoes my own original protestation (Hancock, 2018) that we, in human factors/ergonomics, and in applicable realms beyond, need to consider and create tools (including models) to distinguish differing dimensions of experiential time. If such efforts meet with success, then perhaps the bonds of Cronus can be loosened, at least sufficiently, so that eventually the mechanistic view of time as an insensitive, equipotential, and essentially inhuman externality can be relegated back to its appropriate stature. Loosening these chains may not simply facilitate design; I believe it may even be an avenue to an emergent generation of fully individuated, human-centered existence (see Hancock et al., 2009). Thus, I can only end this response by repeating Sheridan’s own closing sentence: “Models for designing with respect to experiential time are lacking, and pose a current challenge.” To which I can only respond: Amen!
Footnotes
Notes
![]()
