Political Perceptions in the Obama Era

Abstract

Using three national surveys from the Great Recession period in America, I demonstrate two aspects of group-based political attitudes beyond citizens’ partisanship preferences: (1) the economic scapegoating of African Americans by whites during the recession and (2) Latinos’ and African Americans’ use of their marginalized economic status as a lens for understanding how mortgage companies and bankers treated their communities during the downturn. I also discuss the broad impact of disparate economic opinions on citizens’ political outlook for the future. The key patterns of political attitudes are shown to be remarkably consistent from 2009 to 2012.

Keywords

economic perceptions racial and ethnic group politics the Great Recession

Introduction

In Public Opinion and American Democracy, Key (1961, 14) emphasizes that public opinion includes “opinions held by private persons which governments find prudent to heed.” Nowhere is this principle of democratic governance more relevant than citizens’ views about the economy. Indeed, the state of the economy is a topic that Americans list among the nation’s “most important issues” and a subject people closely follow in the news (Pew Research Center 2012a, 2012c). Moreover, election forecasting models generally include measures of economic performance among factors that predict voting outcomes.¹ And sentiments about the country’s fiscal health figure prominently in assessments of elected officials, perceptions of political and financial institutions, and beliefs about how the government functions as a steward of the economy (Bloom and Price 1975; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Harris-Lacewell and Albertson 2005; Hibbs 1979; Kramer 1971; Markus 1988; Monroe 1978; Rudolph 2003; Tufte 1978).

As one might expect, peoples’ economic perceptions are partly influenced by their partisan preferences. Democrats, for example, provide more favorable assessments of the economy when their party holds political power (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Margalit 2013; Markus 1988). But we know much less about the foundations of economic opinions that derive from individual’s ethno-racial group ties or their perceptions of how various communities are harmed or benefit during periods of economic decline. The present work builds upon research on economic evaluations by providing a theoretical account of the ethno-racial bases of citizens’ attitudes beyond partisanship preferences. Although public opinion studies have explored divisions in social policy preferences and beliefs about government spending among whites and blacks (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Smith and Seltzer 2000) analyses of economic appraisals often neglect the racial and ethnic group dimensions of these evaluations.² But given the increasingly diverse makeup of the U.S. electorate, a more nuanced account of economic judgments is warranted in political science scholarship. Indeed, whites, Latinos, and African Americans often draw upon different considerations when making political evaluations (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Dawson 1994; Kinder and Sanders 1996; McKenzie 2008, 2011; Smith and Seltzer 2000; Tate 1994; Walton 1985). To better understand how these processes operate, I ask if voters’ perceptions of their personal financial situation, their attributions of blame for the state of the economy, and overall political outlook for the future are a function of objective criteria about the economy or more subjective, racial group-based rationales. In addition, this discussion is placed within the broader context of citizens attitudes about the political status of marginalized groups in society and opinions about economic inequality in America.

An ideal setting to investigate these issues is in the wake of the recent Great Recession. Analysts agree that this deep recession (December 2007–June 2009) and slow recovery period (2009–2011) represent the most crippling economic contraction to hit the United States since the Great Depression of the 1930s (Barro 2011; Bernanke 2013; Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011; Krugman 2012; Stiglitz 2009). Thus, these events could have enormous influence on the economic views of various segments of the population and how they perceive America’s prospects for success moving forward. Although a few studies discuss the economic and social implications of the Great Recession (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011; Seefeldt and Graham 2013), its political consequences have received less attention from researchers. Yet, the political lessons from this drastic slowdown and sluggish recovery may be considerable for students of American and minority group politics.

I am especially interested in examining how concerns about one’s economic standing and attributions of blame for economic conditions diverge among the nation’s three largest racial and ethnic groups.³ To unpack these group distinctions, I use the notion of “economic scapegoating” to explain whites’ attitudinal proclivities relative to minorities. The findings demonstrate that for many whites, frustration about their financial situation is directed at the Obama administration and reflects the view that the president privileges the economic interests of African Americans over other groups—even though the data do not support this contention. Whites’ aggravated feelings are also fueled by misperceptions that they have been disproportionately hard-hit by the Great Recession relative to other racial and ethnic groups. Psychological uneasiness is not driven by the same factors for Latinos, despite the fact that this community has been more negatively affected by the economic downturn than whites in terms of higher unemployment levels and diminished household wealth (Bocian, Li, and Ernst 2010; Pew Research Center 2011).

While all who struggle financially assign blame to Washington for their predicament, whites’ sentiments are unique because their fault attributions are partially rooted in individuals’ sense that blacks are being unfairly aided throughout the recovery by the Obama administration. This is interesting given that most African Americans do not believe they have received favorable treatment from presidential initiatives. In fact, scholars argue that Obama’s record on race-specific policies in this period is weak, and many blacks have been disappointed that the president has not done more for his most loyal constituency (Gillespie 2010; Harris 2012). The results also demonstrate that African Americans and Latinos who believe minorities suffered most economically during the slump place blame on Wall Street financial institutions, while comparably hard-hit whites do not criticize mortgage and investment brokers in the same manner. These findings illuminate key differences in the opinion formation process for non-racial economic issues across portions of the electorate.

The article begins by reviewing the literature on the economic and political repercussions of the Great Recession and its aftershocks in American communities. Next, drawing on social-psychological theories of group attitudes, I provide a theoretical framework for understanding citizens’ varying assessments of their personal financial situation and attributions of blame for the economic challenges faced by Americans. I then develop testable hypotheses from these propositions. Later in the empirical section, the 2011 Race and Recession Survey is used to examine the distinct contributors to whites’, Latinos’, and African Americans’ beliefs about the economy and whom they hold responsible for its lackluster performance. A careful replication of the study’s primary results using the 2009 Pew Research Center Racial Attitudes Study and the 2012 American National Election Study also reveals similar patterns of ethno-racial group-based political opinions. Thus, the findings consistently show that meaningful ethno-racial group differences (beyond partisanship) underlie the economic perceptions that Americans express from 2009 to 2012. Moreover, I discuss the broad impact of disparate economic opinions on citizens’ overall political outlook for the future.

Background and Literature Review

Several studies regarding the political ramifications of high unemployment, the 2008 Financial Crisis, and the Great Recession provide a foundation for the present work. In their book on political responses to unemployment in the mid-1970s, Schlozman and Verba (1979) note that citizens blame a variety of sources including individuals, the private sector, and government for the prevailing economic conditions. The authors also contend that the effects of joblessness on citizens’ political attitudes are quite contained. Because people think of financial hardships as being temporary in nature, their firmly held political beliefs are hardly changed by short-lived events. I draw upon some of the insights from Schlozman and Verba, while expanding upon others in light of the contemporary economic climate. The varying reactions to adverse economic circumstances that citizens report, for example, suggest that economic attributions must be carefully analyzed to fully understand their meaning for political life. Along these lines, I focus on the racial and ethnic dimensions of Americans’ views about economic issues. And to update a few conclusions from previous work, this article considers that the lengthier and widespread devastation of the Great Recession could mean these more severe economic conditions exert a significant impact on public opinion today.

A few recent analyses of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the short-term impact of the Great Recession highlight some effects of the downturn on citizens’ political views and voting behavior. Malhotra and Margalit (2010) examine the public’s attitudes toward the stimulus proposals put forward by the Obama administration to address the financial services industry collapse. They show how citizens’ perceptions of presentational features combine with their predispositions to shape views on public policies. Relatedly, Holbrook, Clouse, and Weinschenk (2012) demonstrate that the Lehman Brothers failure altered the information context for voters in 2008 and focused the electorate’s attention on economic conditions and presidential performance. Research on the political effects of economic conditions also shows that changes in attitudes about government assistance policies and negative perceptions of financial institutions may be temporary during the worst periods of crisis (Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013; Kenworthy and Owens 2011; Margalit 2013). The findings from these studies prompt one to look beyond the 2008 crisis and consider the longer term effects of the stagnant economy on public opinion between 2009 and 2012.

In addition, it is clear from past research that analysts seldom focus on racial and ethnic group differences in opinions about the recent recession and slow recovery.⁴ Theoretically grounded analyses that compare the opinion formation process for whites, Latinos, and blacks could provide evidence of the contrasting political effects of downturns in the business cycle on various portions of the population. And, political scientists often do not provide systematic explanations for whites’, Latinos’, and African Americans’ sense of frustration about their personal financial situation amid hard times. At the same time, it is possible that different racial and ethnic groups might distinctly assign blame for the crisis to government officials or Wall Street financiers. The present work aims to provide a clearer picture of these issues.

The Great Recession and Its Aftermath in American Communities

The Great Recession resulted in astonishing levels of unemployment, poverty, and rates of home foreclosures across the country. Approximately 27 percent of African Americans lived in poverty during this period—a figure that is higher than other racial and ethnic groups (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). Available data also show that black unemployment at the onset of the recession was above 8 percent and sky-rocketed to approximately 16 percent at its peak (Hout, Levanon, and Cumberworth 2011; National Urban League 2012). And the percentage of unemployed African Americans is consistently higher than the levels for Latinos and whites throughout the downturn. In terms of mortgage distress and foreclosure activity, about 28 percent of black homeowners had negative home equity in 2009, compared with 23 percent of Hispanics and 15 percent of whites (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011, 134). Estimates of foreclosure rates for loans granted between 2005 and 2008 show that African American and Latino borrowers were 76 and 71 percent more likely, respectively, to have lost their homes than whites (Bocian, Li, and Ernst 2010). Both black and mainstream media outlets covered these alarming disparities.

Government data show that poverty rates for Latinos (approximately 25%) are slightly less than figures for African Americans. We also know that Latino unemployment in this period begins at approximately 6 percent and rises above 12 percent by the end of 2009 (Pew Research Center 2012d). In addition, Hispanic median household wealth levels greatly eroded from the meltdown by 66 percent, compared with black declines of 53 percent and only 16 percent for whites (Pew Research Center 2011). Latinos are hurting as well when one considers the share of homeowners who are delinquent (15.4%) or will soon be behind on their mortgage payments (44.4%). These figures are four times higher than data for whites (Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011, 134). Latinos suffered tremendously on this dimension because many live in states that experienced the worse of the housing bust including, California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada (Manzano 2007).

In contrast to minorities, the poverty rate for whites in 2011 (9.8%) was lower than figures for other groups. Meanwhile, white unemployment rates hover above 3 percent in 2007 and increase to roughly 8 percent in 2009 (Pew Research Center 2012d). By several metrics, then, the financial outlook for whites in this period was more favorable when weighed against the circumstances of Latinos and blacks. These numbers suggest that economic conditions may have distinct consequences on citizens’ views about their financial well-being and assessments of government and financial institutions. I turn to these subjects in the next section.

Perceptions of the Economic Downturn among Various Racial and Ethnic Groups

Whites comprise the majority of the electorate and studies of economic attributions mainly focus on this group. Scholarship on this topic tells us that responsibility judgments are conditioned by economic ideology, perceptions of institutional context, and partisanship (see Rudolph 2003). Beyond these factors, whites may also misperceive economic conditions for minorities because these attitudes are rooted in group affiliations and are subject to perceptual mistakes (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Hibbs 1979; Jerit and Barabas 2012). These tendencies are evident in prior work (Tate 1994), which demonstrates that whites felt the economic conditions of blacks had improved following the 1982 recession—even though this group’s poverty rate had increased in these years. Given that whites report erroneous perceptions of the life circumstances of blacks during previous recessions, it is necessary to explore this phenomenon in the contemporary setting to determine if these beliefs represent a systematic pattern of political judgment.

There are few studies of the opinions that Latinos hold toward economic issues or how these beliefs compare with other racial and ethnic groups. The works that discuss this topic only provide descriptive information about Latinos views. And while it is common for analysts of Latino public opinion to examine differences that exist among Latino sub-groups, few researchers have found that nationality differences matter for economic perceptions. The only study slightly related to this topic is Leal’s (2007) examination of Mexican Americans’, Puerto Ricans’, and Cubans’ attitudes toward government and economics—and he found no variation in the opinions reported by various sub-groups. The most common finding regarding economic opinions is that Latinos view “jobs and the economy” as crucial issues for their households (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Fraga et al. 2010). It is also notable that many recent large-scale Latino political surveys were conducted before the start of the economic slowdown, while others include very few items about these matters. Consequently, much can be gained by studying Latinos’ economic views.

A number of factors are relevant for thinking about how African Americans might perceive the Great Recession. Walton (1985, 34–36) argues that blacks’ political attitudes are shaped by their sense that many in their community face financial hardships. When apportioning blame for their economic plight, he contends that African Americans are aware of the specific institutions and individuals that work for or against their interests. In the case of the recent recession, several analysts have highlighted the culpability of mortgage and financial services companies in the collapse of the economy. Many of the nation’s leading financial firms targeted lower middle-class households with creative financing options for homes that were above their means (Bocian, Li, and Ernst 2010; Grusky, Western, and Wimer 2011; National Urban League 2012; Yeaman 2009). These practices included offering no-down-payment loans or adjustable rate mortgages with low initial payments that increased substantially after a few years. Over time, these economically fragile (and largely minority) households had problems making their mortgage payments, which had doubled in some cases. The fallout from these defaults was linked to Wall Street markets and adversely affected blacks’ economic fortunes.

Together, the racial and ethnic group politics literature on economic opinions informs my theoretical arguments about attitude formation processes among individuals. Several questions arise when thinking about the political effects of the Great Recession and slow recovery period. Did individuals express varying levels of frustration regarding their personal financial well-being? And were these sentiments undergirded by racial concerns for particular groups? Moreover, who did whites, Latinos, and blacks blame for the bad situation—government officials or Wall Street financial institutions? Finally, what impact did these attitudes have on Americans’ general beliefs about the nation’s future prosperity? To address these questions, I build upon past research that underscores the importance of distinctly analyzing the political attitudes and behavior of whites, Latinos, and African Americans (Abrajano and Alvarez 2010; Cain and Kiewiet 1987; Garcia 2012; Leal 2007; McClerking 2009; McDaniel and Ellison 2008; Spence and McClerking 2010).

Theoretical Model and Hypotheses

I draw upon the socialpsychology literature regarding the cultural context of beliefs and opinions to discuss mechanisms that structure whites’, Latinos’, and African Americans’ economic perceptions (Fiske et al. 1998; Heine 2010; Kitayama and Cohen 2007). A fundamental premise of this perspective is that people think about events in dissimilar ways across ethno-racial groups because their personal experiences differ.⁵ Individuals, for example, who fare relatively well in society may evaluate economic and political affairs differently than marginalized persons who often have an alternate assessment of the same circumstances. This study focuses on two aspects of group-based political attitudes: (1) the economic scapegoating of African Americans by whites during the Great Recession period and (2) minorities’ use of their marginalized economic status as a lens for understanding how mortgage and financial services companies dealt with Latinos and African Americans during the weak economy.

I define economic scapegoating as a biased belief in which an out-group (blacks) is unfairly blamed for an in-group’s (whites) economic misfortunes (see Allport 1954; Glick 2005).⁶ Allport (1954, 244) discusses the scapegoating tendency among in-group members, noting that they feel “It is not we ourselves who are responsible for our misfortunes, but other people.” Moreover, this formulation of the scapegoating process emphasizes that the out-group (in this case blacks) attracts more negative attention from the in-group (whites) than is rationally justified by the situation. These feelings arise among many whites as a result of the financial problems in the American economy. Faced with daily reports of double-digit unemployment rates, rising poverty levels, and historic increases in mortgage foreclosures, the mass public attempts to make sense of the conditions they observe. One’s latent views about out-groups (minorities) are implicated in this thought process, along with personal experiences. There is a political dimension to this story as well. Economic scapegoating among whites is also facilitated by the strategic actions of Republican elites and media messages in public discourse that frame Barack Obama’s policy agenda in racially divisive ways (see Tesler 2012; Zaller 1992). For numerous whites, their belief that blacks are benefiting from the president’s policies while others are struggling is a source of frustration. These concerns also manifest in heightened levels of blame toward the government in Washington—of which Obama is the head.

The second facet of group-based beliefs pertains to how Latinos and African Americans draw upon their disadvantaged status as a tool for making sense of the political world. This notion builds upon Miller and colleagues’ (1981) work on the influence of minority group consciousness in American politics. Of particular relevance for the current study, the authors argue that marginalized groups express dissatisfaction with their status and material resources in relation to the dominant society (Miller et al. 1981, 496–97). These feelings of discontent are associated with system blame—the belief that responsibility for minorities’ lower status is attributable to inequities in the social, economic, and political system. Moreover, this attitudinal process involves underprivileged people expressing a sense of grievance as victims of injustice. In the context of the financial suffering of Latino and black communities during the recession, we would expect minorities who feel they have been most hard-hit by the sour economy to blame Wall Street institutions whom they view as partly responsible for their situation. Keep in mind that the economic marginalization narrative that minorities use is shaped by their difficult experiences in the housing sector, media discourse from Latino and black elites, and messages transmitted by indigenous political institutions regarding the heavy burden that people of color bore during the downturn (Bocian, Li, and Ernst 2010; National Urban League 2012; Pew Research Center 2011).⁷

I argue that although objective data on the economic conditions of various groups are widely discussed in the media and available online, public perceptions of this information are imperfect and subject to human biases. Moreover, people evaluate the political material they encounter from a specific cultural background and set of assumptions based on their experiences. Thus, some objective economic data might be overlooked or selectively digested by individuals. This process is consistent with economic scapegoating by many whites. Minorities, in comparison, draw upon their disadvantaged societal position when assessing who is at fault for the Great Recession. Based on my theoretical arguments, I examine the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: I posit that there are group-based divisions in how various racial and ethnic groups view their personal financial position and their attributions of blame for economic conditions.

Hypothesis 2: Whites who believe the Obama administration is unfairly aiding African Americans during the recession and slow recovery will report frustration with their economic circumstances and place blame on the government in Washington.

Hypothesis 3: Whites who feel their group was hardest hit by the recession will report heightened levels of frustration with their personal financial situation.

Hypothesis 4: Latinos and African Americans who believe their communities were hardest hit by the recession will assign blame to Wall Street financial institutions.

Data and Measures

The present study uses the Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey for the primary statistical analyses. Later in the article, I replicate several of the key findings using the 2009 Pew Research Center Racial Attitudes Study and the 2012 American National Election Study. The Race and Recession survey was conducted by Social Science Research Solutions/ICR International Communications Research. It contains sampling using landline and cellular phones and was conducted by telephone from January 27 to February 9, 2011, among a nationally representative random sample of 1,959 American adults. Interviews were carried out in English and Spanish. The full sample includes additional interviews with randomly selected African Americans and Hispanics, for a total of 501 black and 501 Hispanic respondents. This oversampling ensures there are enough respondents for separate group analyses. The data also contain 826 white respondents. Results for all groups have been weighted to reflect their actual distribution in the nation. The margin of sampling error for results based on the total sample is plus or minus 3 percentage points; for results based on Hispanics and African Americans, it is plus or minus 6 percentage points; for whites, it is plus or minus 4 percentage points.

Key Dependent Variables

I am interested in gauging peoples’ frustration about their economic well-being in the wake of the Great Recession. The corresponding survey item asks, “Please tell me if each of the following does or does not describe your own feelings about your personal financial situation (Frustrated).” “Frustrated” responses are coded 1, others are coded 0. In addition, respondents are asked to identify the parties who are responsible for the economic difficulties confronting the nation. The first question asks, “How much blame, if any, do you think each of the following should get for the economic challenges facing this country today? Do you blame (The government in Washington) a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?” Responses are coded in an ordinal scheme where a lot = 3, some = 2, only a little = 1, and not at all = 0. Individuals are similarly asked a second question, “Do you blame (Wall Street Financial Institutions) a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?” This measure is coded in an identical fashion as the previous governmental blame item.

Key Independent Variables

The key explanatory variables in the regression models are proxies for the economic scapegoating of African Americans and individuals’ perceptions that their own racial group was hardest hit by the Great Recession. Economic scapegoating is a difficult concept to measure. Examining whites’ biased perceptions about African Americans’ economic plight is one way to gain leverage on this issue. The scapegoating item asks, “When it comes to looking out for the economic interests of African Americans, do you think that the Obama administration is doing too much, too little, or about the right amount?” For the purposes of this study “too much” responses (compared with the other choices) reflect peoples’ view that blacks are being advantaged relative to other groups. “Too much” replies are coded 1 and the other answers are labeled 0. The second question regarding which group experienced the worst of the downturn states, “Do you think whites/Latinos/African Americans have been hit harder by the recession than other groups in this country?” Three separate variables were created to reflect individuals’ sentiments that (1) whites were hit harder, (2) Latinos were hit harder, or (3) African Americans were hit harder by the economic downturn. Identifiers are coded 1, others are coded 0.⁸ The remaining variables are described in the appendix, which appears in the online version of this article (see http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/).

Analysis

Is there a divergence in the political attitudes of whites, Latinos, and blacks regarding the personal impact of the recession and slow recovery? The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that 48 percent of whites say they are frustrated with their personal financial situation, compared with 46 percent of Latinos. African Americans, however, report lower levels of aggravation regarding their pocketbooks than these groups. Only 39 percent of blacks feel frustration about their economic circumstances. These lower levels of dissatisfaction may result from blacks’ more routine experiences with monetary hardships. Consider as well that more than half of whites (59%) blame the government in Washington for unfavorable economic times. In comparison, fewer Latinos (43%) share this viewpoint and just 37 percent of African Americans hold the national government primarily responsible for the economic challenges facing the country. In terms of other targets of blame, most whites (53%) believe that Wall Street institutions are at fault for the recessionary environment, whereas 49 percent of blacks and 43 percent of Latinos believe the financial services industry is liable for the troubles faced by Americans. Together, these data highlight some basic differences in the economic opinions of whites, Latinos, and blacks. The next step is to account for these varying attitudes across different portions of the electorate.

Table 1.

Divergences in the Economic Perceptions of Various Groups.

Ethnic/racial group	Frustration financial situation (%)	Blame Washington “a lot” (%)	Blame Wall Street “a lot” (%)	Group sample size
Whites	48	59	53	826
Latinos	46	43	43	501
African Americans	39	37	49	501

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Cell entries represent percentages of individuals offering the response.

Subject to data limitations, I estimate several regression models of whites’, Latinos’, and African Americans’ sense of frustration with their economic predicament and attributions of blame for the state of the economy (Tables 2, 4 and 5).⁹ For the sake of clarity, the discussion that follows focuses on key factors that influence each group’s political attitudes. Because these measures are simple categorical items, I supplement the regression results with straightforward predicted probability tables (Tables 3 and 6) that provide an exact sense of the direction and magnitude of each variable’s effect in the model for typical respondents.¹⁰ Overall, these outcomes highlight whites’ distinct economic opinions and misperceptions about the impact of the Great Recession in minority communities as elements that shape group attitudes. Latino and African American viewpoints, however, reflect their sense of economic marginalization when dealing with the government and financial services industry.

Table 2.

Probit Models-Influences on Frustration with Personal Financial Situation.

Variables	Whites	Latinos	African Americans
Obama helps blacks economically	0.29** (0.15)	0.09 (0.23)	1.05^a (0.60)
Money issues	1.02*** (0.10)	0.70*** (0.12)	0.89*** (0.13)
Our group hard-hit by recession	0.68** (0.31)	−0.05 (0.12)	0.18 (0.13)
Foreign born	−0.10 (0.25)	−0.06 (0.13)	−0.48 (0.28)
Democrat	0.00 (0.12)	−0.01 (0.12)	−0.10 (0.15)
Republican	0.08 (0.12)	0.14 (0.21)	−0.03 (0.45)
Income	−0.09*** (0.03)	−0.10** (0.04)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Education	−0.07 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.10 (0.06)
Age	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01** (0.00)
Female	0.24** (0.10)	0.07 (0.12)	0.29** (0.13)
Constant	0.05 (0.27)	0.04 (0.27)	0.39 (0.33)
n	807	497	477
Wald χ²(10)	151.95	48.42	87.15
Prob > χ²	.00	.00	.00

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Entries are probit coefficients and robust standard errors.

Only five African Americans are in this category, so the result should be interpreted with caution.

p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 3.

Predicted Probabilities Table-Influences on Frustration with Personal Financial Situation, White Respondents Only.

Independent variables	Low value	High value	Difference
Obama helps blacks economically	.66	.76	+.10
Money issues	.27	.66	+.39
Group hard-hit by recession	.66	.86	+.20

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Based on Table 2.

Table 4.

Ordered Probit Models-Influences on Blaming Washington for Economic Situation.

Variables	Whites	Latinos	African Americans
Obama helps blacks economically	0.51*** (0.15)	0.34 (0.19)	0.01 (0.82)
Money issues	0.26*** (0.09)	0.41*** (0.10)	0.27** (0.11)
Our group hard-hit by recession	0.20 (0.32)	0.18 (0.11)	0.07 (0.10)
Foreign born	−0.46** (0.22)	−0.17 (0.11)	−0.36** (0.19)
Democrat	−0.45*** (0.10)	−0.11 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)
Republican	0.08 (0.11)	0.14 (0.17)	−0.18 (0.32)
Income	0.00*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)
Education	−0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.01*** (0.00)
Female	−0.13** (0.09)	−0.17 (0.11)	−0.09 (0.11)
Log pseudolikelihood	−756.90	−588.45	−582.10
n	802	485	463
Wald χ²(10)	75.80	54.17	35.58
Prob > χ²	.00	.00	.00

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Entries are ordered probit coefficients and robust standard errors. Cut points omitted to save space.

p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 5.

Ordered Probit Models-Influences on Blaming Wall Street for Economic Situation.

Variables	Whites	Latinos	African Americans
Obama helps blacks economically	−0.15 (0.13)	0.04 (0.19)	−0.24 (0.44)
Money issues	0.08 (0.08)	0.36*** (0.11)	0.20 (0.11)
Our group hard-hit by recession	−0.41 (0.27)	0.24** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)
Foreign born	−0.25 (0.21)	−0.13 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.19)
Democrat	0.20 (0.10)	0.06 (0.12)	0.10 (0.13)
Republican	−0.13 (0.10)	−0.25 (0.18)	−0.42 (0.43)
Income	0.03 (0.02)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Education	0.07 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.25*** (0.05)
Age	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	−0.11 (0.08)	−0.03 (0.11)	−0.00 (0.12)
Log pseudolikelihood	−843.22	−549.65	−537.38
n	775	461	461
Wald χ²(10)	36.67	56.63	55.60
Prob > χ²	.00	.00	.00

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Entries are ordered probit coefficients and robust standard errors. Cut points omitted to save space.

p < .05. ***p < .01.

Table 6.

Predicted Probabilities Table-Influence of Perceived Group Marginality on Blaming Wall Street “A Lot” for Economic Situation.

Ethnic/racial group	Group hard-hit low value	Group hard-hit high value	Difference
Latinos	.20	.27	+.07
African Americans	.30	.45	+.15

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Based on Table 5.

Table 2 illustrates stark differences in the contributors to whites’ sense of frustration with their financial situation, compared with minorities. Only whites who feel the Obama administration is looking out for the economic interests of blacks are more likely to express frustration with their own financial position. In concrete terms, the typical white respondents who think African Americans are being helped economically have a higher probability value (by .10) of reporting feelings of frustration about their economic status during the stagnating economy (Table 3). What is more, whites who think their group has been hit harder by the recession than others (a false impression) tend to say they are aggravated about their own economic prospects. More specifically, this amounts to an increased probability value of .20, relative to their counterparts. Again, whites solely display this tendency, not minorities. Thus, the influences on whites’ reported levels of frustration differ from Latinos and blacks in two important respects. Although these findings support my claims about the distinct determinants of whites’ political opinions, one factor is associated with frustration among all groups. Individuals who often find themselves thinking about money issues are prone to experiencing frustration. But this tendency is most pronounced for whites (whose inclination of being frustrated increases by a value of .39).

Whites’ attitudes about the recession are also noteworthy when looking at blame attributions that are directed at government (Table 4). Whites who believe Obama aids African Americans economically are more likely to say they fault the national government “a lot” by a probability value of .16. This attribution only occurs for whites. So, whites’ beliefs about the president helping blacks now shape their political opinions in two separate domains—feelings of frustration about ones’ financial status (Table 2) and their beliefs about whether Washington officials are responsible for the downturn (Table 4). Another important finding is the positive effect (for all groups) that general financial worries have on increasing citizens’ levels of blame toward Washington.

Next, I consider the factors that shape individual’s views of the role that bankers and financial institutions played in the downturn of the U.S. economy (Table 5). In contrast to the results from Tables 2 and 4, the attitudinal analyses in Table 5 document the importance of minorities’ perceptions of who was most affected by the recession. Both Latinos and African Americans who believe their communities were hard-hit by the long recession attribute “a lot” more fault for the poor economy to Wall Street (probability values of .07 and .15; see Table 6). Recall that media coverage and scholarly evidence support the notion that many investment companies acted in an unscrupulous manner when dealing with black and Latino mortgage customers in the lead-up to the Great Recession (Bocian, Li, and Ernst 2010; Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 2010; National Urban League 2012). The results in Table 5 indicate that investment professionals and mortgage lenders are maligned by Latinos and African Americans for their actions. Comparably distressed whites, however, do not point the finger at the financial services industry.

Together, the evidence shows that many whites view the difficult economic times they experience and who is to blame for the situation (both non-racial issues) from a racialized vantage point. Note, in contrast, that Latinos’ views about whether Obama assists African Americans never affect their frustration levels or fault attributions for the state of the economy. At the same time, the economic stress that blacks and Latinos experienced amid the Great Recession is linked to their negative perceptions of the financial services industry. These results illustrate that group-specific mechanisms are at work as individuals develop their opinions about economic and political life.

Economic Perceptions and Citizens’ Political Outlook on the Future

It is also useful to discuss how individual’s frustration with their personal financial situation and attributions of blame for economic hard times relate to their overall political outlook. Drawing upon Schlozman and Verba (1979), I gauge public perceptions of families’ opportunities for future success and their prospects for American society looking ahead during periods of economic strain.¹¹ Table 7 displays the key results from two regression models that address this topic. The data reveal a striking pattern of findings regarding the distinctiveness of whites’ political attitudes that is consistent with the regression models in Tables 2 and 4. Whites who are frustrated with their financial situation feel less confident they will be able to support their children’s college education. And whites who fault Washington for the weak economic climate have less faith in their ability to assist in their kids’ educational future. Note, however, that Latinos and African Americans who hold these same beliefs do not express this concern in a significant manner.

Table 7.

Probit Models-Political Outlook for the Future among Whites, Latinos, and African Americans.

	Ability to send children to college			General pessimism about the future
Variables	Whites	Latinos	African Americans	Whites	Latinos	African Americans
Frustration with financial situation	−0.48*** (0.11)	−0.14 (0.14)	−0.18 (0.14)	1.05*** (0.12)	0.44*** (0.14)	0.46*** (0.17)
Blame Washington for economy	−0.15** (0.07)	−0.10 (0.08)	−0.06 (0.07)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	−0.08 (0.08)
Blame Wall Street for economy	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.08)	−0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	−0.00 (0.07)
n	771	459	452	771	459	452

Source. 2011 Kaiser Foundation/Washington Post/Harvard School of Public Health-Race and Recession Survey.

Entries are probit coefficients and robust standard errors. Models also include respondents’ foreign-born status, partisanship, income, education, age, and gender as independent variables.

p < .05. ***p < .01.

We should also consider how whites’, Latinos’, and blacks’ economic viewpoints might condition their overall level of pessimism during the slow recovery. By this metric, frustrated whites and those who say government is to blame for the Great Recession are doubtful about the possibilities that lie ahead for the nation. Although prevalent to some degree, the cynicism that stems from similar feelings of personal frustration is not as pronounced for Latinos and blacks. In concrete terms, the effects for minorities are roughly half the size of whites. These additional analyses point to the direct political relevance of disparate group attitudes in terms of how people view the direction the country is headed and the place American families have in that future.

Replication Analyses of Major Substantive Findings

So far, I have presented evidence that shows how whites’, Latinos’, and African Americans’ opinions about the Great Recession environment and their attributions of blame for the economic downturn differ across groups using the 2011 Race and Recession survey. To expand upon these findings, I replicate several key results from the present study using two additional independent data sources; the 2009 Pew Research Center Racial Attitudes Study and the 2012 American National Election Study.¹² Collectively, these data permit one to make inferences about racial and ethnic group opinions in three separate years from 2009 to 2012. Due to data limitations, I focus on reproducing the statistical model results for citizens’ sense of frustration with their economic circumstances. Analyses of these new data (Table 8) further reveal that whites who exhibit economic scapegoating tendencies or believe the Obama administration favors African Americans over others report greater levels of dissatisfaction with their personal financial situation. Note that the consistency of this pattern for whites relative to other racial and ethnic groups mirrors the previous findings reported in Table 2. Thus, I arrive at similar substantive conclusions about whites’ political opinions using comparable methods and analyses of three highly regarded, national public opinion surveys.

Table 8.

Replication Analyses Using the 2009 Pew Research Center Racial Attitudes Study and 2012 American National Election Study.

	Dissatisfaction with personal situation			Worried about current financial situation
Variable	Whites	Latinos	African Americans	Whites	Latinos	African Americans
Obama doing too much/favors blacks	0.31** (0.16)	0.19 (0.40)	0.00 (NA)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.27** (0.12)	0.24 (0.27)
n	1,346	301	739	3,004	791	806
Wald χ²(8)	34.79	19.28	13.50	259.07	52.20	56.50
Prob > χ²	.00	.01	.05	.00	.00	.00
Cut 1				−1.75 (0.09)	−1.48 (0.16)	−1.45 (0.17)
Cut 2				−0.82 (0.09)	−0.65 (0.16)	−0.67 (0.17)
Cut 3				0.04 (0.09)	0.12 (0.15)	0.17 (0.17)
Cut 4				0.59 (0.09)	0.69 (0.15)	0.68 (0.17)

Source. 2009 Pew Research Center Racial Attitudes Study and the 2012 American National Election Study.

Entries are probit and ordered probit coefficients, respectively, with robust standard errors. Models also include respondents’ foreign-born status, partisanship, income, education, age, and gender as independent variables.

p < .05. ***p < .01.

Discussion and Conclusion

The Great Recession and slow recovery period are instructive for understanding ethno-racial elements of citizens’ political attitudes beyond partisan distinctions. The analyses here indicate that numerous whites overlook the economic evidence that blacks were substantially harmed on multiple fronts during the recession and instead believe this group was unfairly aided by a sitting black president. These perceptual biases shape whites’ political opinions and are associated with feelings of financial frustration and higher levels of blame toward the government in Washington. This thought process is consistently prevalent for whites, compared with other racial and ethnic groups. And the replication analyses confirm that the key patterns of whites’ attitudes hold across three time periods using several reputable data sources, including the 2012 American National Elections Study. Interestingly, while many whites believe that African Americans are the beneficiaries of favorable economic policies from the Obama administration, blacks themselves do not feel they have been uniquely assisted financially (Harris 2012; Harris and Lieberman 2013).

The present illustration of economic scapegoating by whites suggests that a subtle element of racial bias may be at work in explaining this group’s attitudes about the economy amid the Great Recession and its aftermath. It turns out that racial and ethnic group-based perceptual biases among some whites and feelings of political marginalization for minorities shape the political beliefs that individuals express in opinion surveys. In this sense, the present findings add nuance to the literature on the racialization of mass opinions toward public policies (see Tesler 2012). Aside from the racially charged viewpoints associated with Obama’s health care reform efforts, it seems that the president’s economic policy initiatives also generate a significant degree of polarized racial sentiments. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that voters’ opinions about other social and political topics might similarly be influenced by biases from one’s feelings toward out-group members. More research on this subject is necessary to better understand how these linkages operate across various political domains.

It is also worth noting that while Latinos are usually optimistic about their economic prospects and generally trusting of government (Fraga et al. 2010), at present, those who are experiencing financial difficulties blame officials in Washington for poor economic conditions. And while African Americans tend to be less trusting of government than Latinos or whites (Nunnally 2012), the recent adversities faced by this group have hardened their outlook—directing their ire at government officials. These negative patterns of blame by minorities are, however, countered by the enthusiasm shown toward President Obama and hopefulness about the economy that Latinos and African Americans commonly express (Fletcher and Cohen 2011). Indeed, national exit poll data from the 2012 presidential election show that 71 percent of Latinos and 93 percent of blacks voted to re-elect Obama (amid a sluggish recovery) due to their confidence in his leadership (Pew Research Center 2012b). This paradox of minorities’ political opinions deserves closer examination from scholars to assess the long-term impacts of the Great Recession on Latinos’ and African Americans’ attitudes toward government.

Relatedly, one can imagine that the mortgage and financial services industries role in the economic slowdown might negatively alter minorities’ perception of these entities and society as a whole. Although political leaders have worked to restore citizens’ confidence in these sectors through legislative reforms designed to better regulate both industries, the actual economic effects of these initiatives is uncertain—especially for communities of color.¹³ While vulnerable Latino and black households have faced discriminatory banking practices such as higher rates of loan rejections, increased interest rates for mortgages, and the “redlining” of impoverished neighborhoods in the past (Oliver and Shapiro 2006), the large-scale devastating impact of the current subprime loan crisis is unprecedented in recent U.S. history. How will these populations that disproportionately suffered during the downturn understand their place in a “post-racial” democracy that is supposedly moving toward full equality for all Americans? Will the hopefulness about economic progress that accompanied gains in the Latino and black middle classes during the 1990s and the positive feelings from two consecutive elections of a black president be marred by financial insecurities that remain in the wake of the Great Recession? The answers to these questions will be revealed in the coming years as we learn more about the fallout from this monumental event.

There is also an important element of American political attitudes that is notable for this investigation. The troubled history of white-minority group social relations and processes of economic marginalization that bear upon black and Latino communities in the United States exert a profound influence on the opinion dynamics we observe in this study. Because of these peculiarities, it is difficult to speculate about how this story might unfold in another context. Examining group-based economic perceptions in other industrialized nations with diverse populations is further complicated by the lack of available data on related subjects. Moreover, understanding the political effects of America’s first black president and the harmful practices of mortgage and financial services firms on minority communities are mainly topics of interest to American politics scholars.

To be sure, economic prosperity matters for presidential popularity, citizens’ confidence in government and financial institutions, and one’s political outlook on the future. Under the best circumstances of democratic governance, individuals would be mostly pleased with the state of the economy, their own financial standing, and have faith in the competence of government officials and the reliability of financial institutions. Yet five years after the official end of the Great Recession, public trust in big banks and Wall Street is at a low level and a majority of Americans voice concerns about growing economic inequality between affluent individuals and the working class. And when asked in surveys, people frequently say they worry about losing their jobs and being able to take care of their families. The social and political tumult surrounding the recent recession and slow recovery touches upon these issues and mass opinions about these topics have broad implications for understanding American politics. The present study is novel in its identification of psychological mechanisms that condition the economic perception process for whites, blacks, and Latinos. These results move us a step closer to comprehending the rationale behind individual opinions and hint at the difficulties of using one general framework to explain the political views of the entire populace.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank numerous colleagues and the editors and anonymous reviewers of Political Research Quarterly for their helpful advice on previous versions of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

1.

See the “Symposium on Forecasting the 2008 National Election” that appears in PS: Political Science and Politics, October 2008, Volume XLl, No. 4.

2.

For an exception, see Harris-Lacewell and Albertson (2005). Duch, Palmer, and Anderson (2000) consider blacks as a source of heterogeneity in evaluations of the economy but found no significant racial group effects. Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger (2013) discuss descriptive racial and ethnic group differences in the uneven experiences of economic insecurity among Americans during the recent recession. In contrast, the present study highlights the varying mechanisms that shape economic attitudes, attributions of blame for the economy, and individuals’ overall political outlook for the future.

3.

Asian Americans are not included in this study because of their small number (19) in the primary data set. The terms “black” and “African American” are used interchangeably throughout the article. “Latino” and “Hispanic” refer to people of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or some other Latin American background. The 2011 Race and Recession Survey did not separate Latinos by national origin. I use the broad “Latino” category for the statistical analyses to compare the results across all three surveys.

4.

discuss the opinions of unemployed black Americans, during the mid-1970s. However, the dismal conditions of the Great Recession and slow recovery could have distinct effects on racial and ethnic groups today due to the economic suffering that minorities experienced relative to whites. Moreover, Schlozman and Verba do not examine the attitudes of Latinos.

5.

More recent work on this topic illuminates differences between U.S. racial and ethnic groups (Fiske et al. 1998; Heine 2010; ).

6.

The survey item that I use gauges bias because the relevant white respondents indicated that blacks had received “too much” consideration from the Obama administration in terms of economic policy initiatives. Choice of this category implicitly reflects somewhat negative sentiments toward African Americans given that interviewees could have answered that blacks received “about the right amount” or “too little” in terms of policies that favor their economic interests. Moreover, in light of the political context (the first black president advancing a broad Progressive agenda) and America’s uneasy history of race relations, it is hard to imagine that “too much” responses would be devoid of racial overtones.

7.

See for a discussion of elite and media framing in shaping black political attitudes.

8.

The “whites have been hit harder” category is derived from responses to qn41 that reflect individuals’ views that non-Hispanic whites are more negatively affected by the downturn than minorities.

9.

I also analyzed the results from model specifications that include class status measures and a political ideology item. The key findings are identical. In addition, the data do not include a conventional “strength of partisanship” measure. Finally, I conducted several diagnostic tests which show that multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are not major problems for the regression analyses.

10.

Values are computed using Long and Freese’s SPost post-estimation software. Typical characteristics are the mean values for continuous variables and the modal category for ordinal variables. Each value had to be present in the data and represent the distribution of the variable well for simulation purposes.

11.

The first question asks, “Compared with how you felt before the recession, would you say you are about as confident in your ability to (send your children to college)? Confident respondents are coded 1, whereas others are coded 0. The second item states, “Looking ahead, would you say that you feel (mostly pessimistic) about your future?” Pessimistic individuals are coded 1 and others are coded with 0.

12.

The 2009 Pew Research Center Racial Attitudes in America II Survey obtained telephone interviews with a nationally representative sample of 2,884 adults living in the continental United States. The survey was conducted by Princeton Survey Research International. Interviews were done in English and Spanish from October 28 to November 30, 2009. The 2012 American National Election Study includes face-to-face and Internet-based interviews with a nationally representative sample of 5,914 American adults. Data collection was conducted in the two modes independently, using separate samples. The study was carried out from September 2012 to January 2013 in English and Spanish.

13.

The Dodd–Frank Act (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) was passed in the summer of 2010 and is a comprehensive set of reforms aimed at monitoring the entire financial system to avoid problems that existed before the 2008 crisis.

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