Abstract
Despite large population gains, political observers commonly refer to Latinos as a “sleeping giant” because of low voter turnout. Conversely, steady declines in union membership have led some to label organized labor a “dinosaur.” Several unions have made special outreach efforts to Latinos to rebuild their ranks and improve Latino political participation. Incorporating insights from the Civic Voluntarism Model, we find union affiliation increases Latino voter registration and turnout, and disproportionately so in comparison with non-Latinos and in recent elections. We conclude that continued declines in union membership have significant implications for Latino political power and inequalities in political voice.
A newly invented metaphor assists thought by evoking a visual image, while on the other hand, a metaphor that is technically “dead” (e.g., iron resolution) has in effect reverted to being an ordinary word and can generally be used without loss of vividness. But in between these two classes, there is a huge dump of worn-out metaphors that have lost all evocative power and are merely used because they save people the trouble of inventing phrases for themselves.
Popular descriptions of Latino political behavior and labor unions in the United States suffer from no shortage of the worn-out metaphors that once vexed George Orwell. Political observers have characterized Latinos as a “sleeping giant” in American politics, capable of wielding significant political power if only they could shake off their civic torpor. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Latinos are the fastest growing ethnic group in the United States. From 2000 to 2010, the number of Latinos in the United States increased from 35.3 million to 50.5 million (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Statistics also reveal, however, that while Latinos make up 16 percent of the U.S. population, they comprised just 10 percent of the electorate in 2012 (Lopez and Taylor 2012).
Part of the explanation for the much smaller percentage of Latinos in the electorate relative to the population is that many Latinos living in the United States, including a large number of legal residents, are not U.S. citizens (Gonzalez-Barrera et al. 2013). Yet, even when examining only those who are voting eligible (U.S. citizens who are eighteen years of age or older), Latino voter turnout was 48 percent compared with 64 percent for voting eligible whites and 67 percent for voting eligible African Americans in 2012 (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). Two years earlier during the midterm election of 2010, Latino turnout among eligible voters was just 31 percent compared with 48 percent of eligible white voters and 44 percent of eligible African American voters (Lopez 2011). This considerable turnout gap is consistent over several election cycles (see, for example, Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). Indeed, a task force of the American Political Science Association (APSA) noted in a 2004 report that “substantial inequalities of political voice remain” and singled out Latinos as a group that is significantly underrepresented in the political process (APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy 2004b, 50).
In sharp contrast to Latinos, labor unions have a very politically active but shrinking membership (see, for example, Dark 1999; Francia 2006). In the mid-1950s, unions represented roughly one of every three U.S. workers (Troy 1965). By 2013, however, just 11.3 percent of wage and salary workers claimed membership in a labor union (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). With their once commanding presence now gone, contemporary observers of the labor movement often discuss the “steady decline” of unions (see, for example, Western and Rosenfeld 2012, 88) with a few even comparing unions with dinosaurs (Tasini 1995, C3).
Despite significant drops in union membership as a percentage of the overall U.S. workforce, voter turnout is consistently higher among union members than it is among non-union members (Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Francia 2012; Leighley and Nagler 1992, 2008; Radcliff 2001; Radcliff and Davis 2000; Zullo 2008; but see Sousa 1993). Furthermore, the labor movement remains relatively strong in some regions of the United States (Francia 2012). This includes two of the nation’s most populated states: New York and California. In New York, nearly one-quarter of workers (24.4%) belong to a labor union (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014)—a rate comparable with Canada’s and higher than in Germany (Organisation for Economic and Co-Operation and Development 2013), two nations with relatively strong labor movements (Panknin 2012; Riddell 1993). In California, the state with the largest Latino population, union membership increased by 110,000 members in 2012 despite a national decline of 398,000 union members (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). As of 2013, California had a total of more than 2.4 million union members and a union density rate significantly above the national average at 16.4 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014).
Labor unions in New York and California also draw heavily from the public sector. A majority (54%) of union members in California and nearly half (49%) of union members in New York belong to a public-sector union (Hirsch and Macpherson 2014). This is worth noting because there is evidence that suggests public-sector union members are more likely to be politically active than union members are in the private sector (Corey and Garand 2002; Rosenfeld 2010). Moreover, public-sector unions have been especially active in organizing immigrants and minorities (Fantasia and Voss 2004).
Beyond New York and California, the labor movement nationally remains the largest mass membership organization of Latinos, African Americans, Asians, and women, topping the membership of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Organization for Women, La Raza, and the League of United Latin American Citizens combined (Bronfenbrenner and Warren 2007, 143). Latinos, in particular, have been a popular target for recent union organizing campaigns (Milkman 2006; Sherman and Voss 2000), and many unions now advocate positions popular with the Latino community, such as a pathway to citizenship for immigrant workers (Fine and Tichenor 2012). Latinos, in turn, who gain citizenship status, have been receptive to these union outreach efforts (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2009; Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000).
The growing and cooperative relationship between Latinos and organized labor raises provocative possibilities. Previous research by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) on civic voluntarism shows that political organizations and associations can help their members improve their civic skills and political knowledge, which can lead to increased political participation. In theory, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s Civic Voluntarism Model could apply to labor unions and Latinos. From a normative standpoint, the possibility that unions could increase Latino political participation deserves inquiry on purely democratic grounds. Consistent with the conclusions of the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (2004a, 2004b) and others (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 138–39), increased voter turnout from Latinos would improve the representativeness of the electorate relative to the nation’s overall population.
Despite the potentially significant consequences of labor unions playing a role in enhancing the political voice of Latinos, there is a paucity of research on the subject. What little recent work that does exist is limited primarily to labor’s influence on Latino voters in city and local politics (Lamare 2010a, 2010b). In some other earlier publications, scholars of Latino political behavior included union membership as a control variable in their analyses (DeSipio, Masouka, and Stout 2006; Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000); however, the impact of union membership has not been the focus of this research.
One likely reason that researchers have not previously explored organized labor’s impact on Latino turnout at the national level has been the relatively small number of Latinos, especially Latino union members, in most national surveys. This has meant that finding a data source with a large enough pool of Latino union members for purposes of comparison with their non-union peers has been a major challenge. There are, nonetheless, a few data sources with especially large samples of Latino respondents, making quantitative analysis of Latino union members and non-union members possible.
Using data primarily from two different “large N” sources, the Latino National Survey and the Current Population Survey (CPS), this study offers one of the first systematic and national examinations available on the effects of labor unions on Latino political participation. Our results demonstrate that union affiliation significantly increases both Latino voter registration and voter turnout. Of perhaps greater consequence, our statistical analysis also reveals that union affiliation has a larger substantive impact on Latino political participation than it does on non-Latinos, including differential effects between Latinos and non-Latinos that we find are especially robust in recent elections.
These results move beyond the metaphors that George Orwell so detested and suggest that, on the one hand, where labor unions are strong, Latino political power is likely to expand. On the other hand, continued declines in union membership could mean more than the decline of organized labor. It could also result in Latino political power continuing to go unrealized, furthering the inequalities in political voice that the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (2004a, 2004b) identified as a source of concern.
Theoretical Rationale to Examine Union Affiliation on Latino Political Participation
The Civic Voluntarism Model offers a useful theoretical framework to examine the potential effects of union membership on Latino political participation. As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) explain, the Civic Voluntarism Model takes into account the importance of resources (money, free time, and civic skills) and shows that resource-rich individuals are more likely to participate in politics. It builds on socioeconomic status (SES) and rational choice models of political participation by linking the two theories together. Resources such as money, free time, and civic skills are differentially available to individuals based on socioeconomic status. In turn, individuals with fewer of these resources (i.e., those with “resource constraints”) face higher costs to participate in the political process, and are thereby less likely to do so, as rational choice theory would predict.
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) also note that organizations and voluntary associations play an important role in developing an individual’s civic skills and knowledge, which reduces the unequal disparities across the population in resources such as money, education, and free time. Through organizations and voluntary associations, people gain exposure to political stimuli ranging from informal political discussions among group members to more organized group efforts that encourage individuals to take specific political actions. In this process, the group experience not only builds civic skills but also may “nudge” members to see the rational benefits of political participation (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). As individuals develop enhanced civic skills and become more aware of the benefits of their political involvement from their experiences in organizations and voluntary associations, the Civic Voluntarism Model predicts that these individuals become more politically active.
The Civic Voluntarism Model is especially applicable to labor unions. Similar to other civic associations, research confirms that labor unions improve their members’ sense of political efficacy and civic skills (Leighley and Nagler 2008; Radcliff 2001; Terriquez 2011; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Indeed, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 386) refer to labor unions as “politicizing” institutions, reporting that 56 percent of union members were provided opportunities to “develop civic skills” and 66 percent of union members received a political recruitment request from their union.
Since the publication of Verba, Scholzman, and Brady’s research, additional work has further documented that labor unions have remained very active in their political outreach and voter mobilization activities, investing hundreds of millions of dollars into grassroots and political education campaigns in recent elections (Francia 2006, 2012). In 2012, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) reported that union members and other volunteers knocked on fourteen million doors, made eighty million phone calls, registered 450,000 new voters, and were able to contact 70 percent of all union members (AFL-CIO 2012). A recent internal union survey also reported that 64 percent of current union members received a union newspaper, magazine, or newsletter that included information about the 2012 election (Hart Research Associates 2012). In addition, nearly two of five union members reported that they talked to a fellow co-worker on behalf of a candidate (Hart Research Associates 2012). Such face-to-face contact is often especially effective in mobilizing and educating potential voters (Bedolla and Michelson 2012; Green and Gerber 2008).
Consistent with the expectations of the Civic Voluntarism Model, we suspect that labor unions play a significant role in increasing Latino political participation. Using the same data that developed the original Civic Voluntarism Model (see Verba et al. 1990), we can confirm that Latinos in union households are significantly more likely to be very interested in local and national politics, and to have a much stronger sense of political efficacy (see Table 1). Indeed, the differences that separate union and non-union households among Latinos are substantially larger than the differences that separate union and non-union households among non-Latinos. This preliminary evidence gives us good reason to suspect that union affiliation may have especially strong effects in increasing political participation among Latinos.
Union Affiliation: Political Interest and Efficacy.
Source. Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie (1990), American Citizen Participation Study.
All differences among Latinos are statistically significant at p ≤ .05 (τ-c).
In addition to heightening political interest and political efficacy, labor unions may contribute to increased political participation among Latinos for other reasons as well. First, aside from church involvement, Latinos generally have fewer associational memberships than whites (DeSipio 2002; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 316–17), placing unions (and churches) in an especially influential position to have a strong impact on their Latino members who may not have opportunities to gain civic skills from other organizations.
Second, union political mobilization and education efforts may be significant for Latinos because there is often poor voter outreach to the Latino community. Bedolla and Michelson (2012) report that Latinos are often times not asked by anyone to vote and that even when an organization does make an outreach effort to the Latino community, there is poor translation of election information into Spanish. Get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns that rely on personal contact by Latino volunteers, however, can combat this problem and play an important role in boosting Latino turnout (Bedolla and Michelson 2012; see also Lamare 2010a, 2010b; Matland and Murray 2012; Michelson 2005). These findings are consistent with the theoretical framework and underpinnings of the Civic Voluntarism Model, which suggests that encouragement and information from political groups and organizations can affect the political activity of individuals. Again, this places unions in a potentially important position to have an influence on Latinos given that labor leaders have made it a priority to reach out to the Latino community, including through personalized GOTV efforts (Lamare 2010a, 2010b).
Third, unions tend to focus their political appeals on economic issues (Francia and Bigelow 2010; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Given that Latinos, on average, are more economically disadvantaged than whites and that some accounts suggest Latino immigrants have a “historic sense of economic and social justice” that they developed in their home countries (Greenhouse 2013), the politically charged economic message coming from unions is likely to have particular salience among Latinos. In turn, this should encourage greater interest in civic responsibility and political action.
Fourth, native-born Latinos tend to register and vote at higher levels than naturalized Latinos. One explanation for this is that naturalized Latinos may be more likely to be unfamiliar with the U.S. political system. The GOTV and political education efforts of the labor movement should help acquaint and provide needed information to naturalized Latino union members about the system of government in the United States. While there is recent evidence to suggest that this gap in political participation between native-born and naturalized Latinos no longer exists due, in part, to the mobilizing effects of immigration bills (Barreto 2005; DeSipio 2011), this recent shift does not negate the impact unions might still have upon their naturalized Latino members.
To be clear, each of the four reasons mentioned above are speculative but nonetheless remain consistent with the larger theoretical expectations developed from the Civic Voluntarism Model. As Leighley and Nagler (2007, 431) explain in a study that tests the effects of unions on voter participation, “The civic voluntarism argument . . . suggests that, ceteris paribus, union members are expected to participate more than non-union members.” Our focus on the relationship between union affiliation and Latino political participation, therefore, rests on a well-established theoretical foundation.
Data, Method, and Model Specification
To test whether labor unions have an effect on Latino political participation, this study turns to two sources: the Latino National Survey (LNS) (Fraga et al. 2006) and the CPS (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). Although some scholars have relied on aggregate-level data to examine voter participation and behavior (see, for example, Radcliff 2001; Radcliff and Davis 2000), we examine individual-level data to avoid the problem of ecological inference (see, for example, Achen and Shively 1995). We chose to use the LNS data because of its strong reputation for providing reliable estimates of Latino political behavior (Barreto and Pedraza 2009). The LNS is a nationally representative survey of the U.S. Latino population that contains thousands of completed interviews on questions ranging from political attitudes to policy preferences to demographic information. 1 More importantly for our purposes in this study, it contains 858 Latinos who are U.S. citizens and belong to a union household. 2 Perhaps the only significant limitation of the LNS data is that it covers just the 2004 election cycle.
In an effort to expand our analysis beyond the 2004 election and to examine whether the effects of union affiliation are especially strong among Latinos in comparison with non-Latinos, we use the CPS data. Like the LNS, the CPS provides a large number of survey responses from Latinos (although only a subsample of these respondents were asked about their union membership). 3 Because there are a set of common questions across years in the CPS surveys, we were able to pool the data to create a large data set of several thousand Latino respondents, covering the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 elections. 4 This pooled data set includes 648 Latino citizens who are union members. 5 For additional testing, we also examine the CPS data separately by year to assess whether there are any noticeable trends or differences over these four election cycles.
One drawback of the CPS data, however, is the limited scope of questions asked. Because the U.S. government conducts the CPS survey, it does not ask respondents to report on some important items such as one’s party identification. As a result, our CPS models control for fewer variables than our LNS model. Nonetheless, the CPS data offer one very significant advantage to other sources. Scholars have found that the CPS data suffer less from over-reporting bias on political participation questions than other surveys, such as the American National Election Study (Freeman 2003; McDonald 2003).
Using these two data sources, we first examine the decision to register to vote and then the decision to vote. We begin with the decision to register to vote because there is evidence that voter registration is a greater impediment to political participation for Latinos than it is for whites (Alvarez and Nagler 2011; de la Garza 2004; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). For the LNS analysis, union affiliation reflects whether the respondent is a union member or belongs to a union household. This broader union household category has value because unions target their campaign materials, activities, events, and political gatherings not only to union members but also to members of their families (Francia 2006, 65). Research has confirmed further that the mobilization and political education efforts of unions have effects that extend to members of the entire household (Francia 2006, 2012). The CPS survey, however, restricts its union affiliation question to measuring only the respondent’s individual union membership. Despite the differences, using two measures of union affiliation has the advantage of allowing for a more robust check of our hypotheses.
For both the voter registration and voter turnout models, we control for various factors. Union members, for example, tend to be slightly older than the rest of the population (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), yet older individuals also tend to be more likely to vote than younger individuals (see, for example, Strate et al. 1989). This raises the possibility that union members or those in union households may be more likely to vote but not because of the efforts and electoral activities of organized labor but because of some other demographic variable, such as age, that also happens to correlate with union membership. To address this potential problem, we include control measures in our model that account for the respondent’s socioeconomic background and demographic characteristics. All of these factors can affect an individual’s likelihood to vote as numerous different studies document (see, for example, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). These factors may be especially significant for Latinos, as researchers have found that relatively low socioeconomic status among Latinos accounts for depressed levels of turnout (de la Garza 2004; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; but see also Arvizu and Garcia 1996).
We also include a control measure for the presence of a competitive statewide election. Competitive statewide elections generate more public interest in politics and consequently higher turnout (see, for example, Franklin 2004). States with a greater percentage of Latinos may influence Latino political participation as well. Research shows, for example, that Latinos are more likely to vote when living in environments where they have numerical strength and believe the candidate of their choice has a chance of winning (Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004).
In the LNS model, we further account for the respondent’s strength of partisanship and church attendance. Strong partisans are more likely to vote than those without strong partisan attachments (see, for example, Abramowitz 2010, 87), and church attendance can be important in the acquisition of civic skills, which improves the likelihood of voting and participating in political activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). For the pooled CPS model, we include controls for the year of the survey to account for the different circumstances that can surround particular elections. We document all variable definitions and coding specifications in Online Appendix A (http://prq.sage-pub.com/supplemental/). Finally, because our dependent variables result in a binary response—the respondent either decides to register or not, or to vote or not—we employ logistic regression analysis to generate our estimates (see, for example, Menard 2001). 6
The Effects of Unions on Latino Political Participation
Our first model, which uses the LNS survey data, shows in column 1 of Table 2 that Latino union members or those in union households are more likely to register to vote than are Latinos who have no union affiliation (p ≤ .001), holding constant all of the control variables. In the second column, the results reveal similarly that union affiliation significantly increases the likelihood of voting for Latinos (p ≤ .01)—a finding consistent with the expectations of the Civic Voluntarism Model. In addition to the tests of statistical significance, we also explore the magnitude of the effects of union affiliation on Latino voter registration and turnout to assess substantive significance (see, for example, Ziliak and McCloskey 2008).
Latino Model: Logit Estimates of Union Affiliation on Voter Registration and Turnout, 2004.
Source. Fraga et al. (2006), Latino National Survey.
Please see Appendix A (http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/) for definitions and the coding information of all variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed).
Using the observed-value approach of Hanmer and Kalkan (2013), we generate the predicted change in probability attributed to union affiliation for registering to vote and casting a ballot. Figure 1 shows the differences that separate union affiliated Latinos from non-union affiliated Latinos. The predicted probabilities reveal that union affiliation accounts for a 7.2 percentage point increase in Latino registration and a 4.9 percentage point increase in Latino turnout.

Predicted change in probability: union affiliation on Latino voter registration and turnout.
At the aggregate level, these estimates translate into rather large totals. The U.S. Census estimates that the Latino population is likely to more than double from 53.3 million in 2012 to 128.8 million in 2060 (Bernstein 2012). If the labor movement is able to unionize just 10 percent of this incoming influx of 75.5 million more Latinos, and we assume an average of 2 voters per household, it would equal almost 1.1 million more Latinos to the voter registration rolls who would otherwise go unregistered, and nearly three-quarters of a million more Latino voters who would otherwise not vote.
Aside from these significant numbers, the stimulative effects of unions on Latinos are all the more impressive when compared with non-Latinos. Using the CPS data, the results in Table 3 indicate that union affiliation significantly increases voter registration and turnout for both Latinos and non-Latinos when compared with the reference category of non-union members. However, as the predicted changes in probabilities reveal in Figures 2 and 3, the substantive impact of union affiliation is greater for Latinos than it is for non-Latinos. Indeed, in our CPS model, the increase in probability of registering to vote and casting a ballot for Latinos who are union members (in comparison with those who are not in a union) is 5 and 6.9 percentage points, respectively, while the increase for non-Latino union members is 3.7 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively.
Full Model: Logit Estimates of Union Affiliation on Voter Registration and Turnout, 2004–2010.
Source. Current Population Survey (November 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 combined).
Please see Appendix A (http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/) for definitions and the coding information of all variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.
p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed).

Predicted change in probability: union affiliation on voter registration.

Predicted change in probability: union affiliation on voter turnout.
While those percentages indicate a modestly stronger union effect for Latinos than for non-Latinos, Table 4 reveals that the differential effects of union membership separating Latinos and non-Latinos has expanded in recent elections. Our models in 2004 and 2006 showed no statistically significant increase in voter registration or turnout for Latino union members in comparison with others who did not belong to a union. 7 However, during the 2008 election cycle, the increase in the probability of registering to vote was 7 percentage points higher for Latino union members (relative to non-union members) compared with just 2.1 percentage points higher for non-Latino union members (see Figure 4). In 2010, the predicted increase in voter registration attributed to union affiliation for Latinos was again slightly greater than it was for non-Latinos.
Logit Estimates of Union Affiliation on Voter Registration and Turnout, 2008–2010.
Source. Current Population Survey (November 2008 for columns 1–2 and November 2010 for columns 3–4).
Please see Appendix A (http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/) for definitions and the coding information of all variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates for 2004 and 2006 are available online in the supplemental materials.
p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed).

Predicted change in probability: union affiliation on voter registration.
Perhaps most impressive of all are the estimates for voter turnout. As Figure 5 shows, the increase in the probability of casting a ballot was an impressive 8.2 percentage points higher for Latino union members in 2008 compared with non-union members, and an even greater 11 percentage points higher in 2010. By comparison, the effects of union affiliation for non-Latinos were a 2.4 percentage point increase in the probability of voting in 2008 and a 5.2 percentage point increase in 2010.

Predicted change in probability: union affiliation on voter turnout.
These results are consistent with some observational accounts from labor leaders. After the 2008 election, Anna Burger, who chaired labor’s Change to Win Federation, singled out the United Farm Workers and UNITE HERE as two unions that made especially strong efforts in the battleground states of Colorado and Nevada to increase Latino voter registration and turnout (Burger 2008). In a personal interview that we conducted, Maria Elena Durazo, Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, added that organized labor’s GOTV operation has expanded its reach and grown in sophistication in recent elections. She remarked that the “scale of [labor’s GOTV] program put together during gubernatorial and presidential elections most recently, are much larger than they once were” (Durazo 2014). Durazo explained further that the effectiveness of organized labor’s voter registration and voter turnout efforts comes from the credibility it has earned over the years as a part of and defender of the Latino community on issues such as immigration reform and a living wage. In her words, “We’re more effective because we don’t just talk to voters and community members during election season. And we aren’t just talking politics. The labor movement is part of the community” (Durazo 2014).
Taken together, these results have significant implications for normative concerns about political equality and representation. As the APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy (2004a, 2004b) noted, the continuing decline in union membership is a development that threatens to reduce citizen involvement in the democratic process. Our results not only confirm this but also show that the effects of union affiliation on political participation are especially strong for Latinos, particularly in recent elections. All of this suggests that the larger issue of inequality in representation and voice that plagues American democracy is only likely to grow into the future if union membership continues to fall.
Summary and Conclusion
As noted at the outset of this study, popular accounts of the labor movement have labeled it a “dinosaur” for the declines in union membership that have occurred over the past several decades, whereas Latino voters have been dubbed the “sleeping giant” based upon their still yet unrealized potential to emerge as sizable and powerful voting bloc in U.S. elections. The results in this study, however, make clear that the dinosaur could awaken the sleeping giant. Union affiliation not only increases Latino voter registration and turnout but also has an especially strong effect on Latinos when compared with non-Latinos. Our results show further that this effect has only grown stronger in recent elections, corresponding with expanded efforts by organized labor to mobilize Latinos.
While unions remain a force in a few states, the continuing national decline in union membership warrants attention because it carries with it potentially significant political implications. As the results of this study indicate, declining union membership threatens to reduce Latino political participation disproportionately, which speaks directly to concerns about inequalities in voice and representation in American democracy. In the absence of a viable labor movement, current inequalities only seem likely to grow into the future. This is significant because the relative lack of Latino participation inevitably affects Latino political interests and preferences, which are distinctive from other ethnic and racial groups on a number of important issues (APSA Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy 2004b).
Conversely, a revived labor movement seems likely to expand the Latino vote. Of course, reversing declines in union membership is a daunting challenge due to legal obstacles and employer resistance that have hindered organizing efforts (Bronfenbrenner 2009; Kleiner 2001). Nonetheless, a turnaround for the labor movement, while perhaps unlikely, is not impossible. Historically, union growth often occurs in “spurts.” So-called “spurt theory” suggests that the unionization of the workforce usually expands in short periodic bursts after years of stagnation, rather than through steady growth (Freeman 1998). The rapid rise of the CIO in the 1930s and 1940s and the growth of the AFL in the early 1900s are two examples that support spurt theory. Were such a spurt to occur again, a louder and more powerful Latino political voice seems likely to emerge, especially given the fact that Latino workers comprise a larger proportion of the union ranks than ever before and are more likely than whites to support unionization drives (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2009; Waldinger and Der-Martirosian 2000).
A final and reasonable possibility is that unions will remain a force in some states of the country (New York and California) and remain weak in other regions (the South). In this case, the voice of Latinos in the political arena is likely to reach its full potential where labor unions are strong. Where labor unions remain weak, however, Latinos may continue to speak with a relatively soft voice in American politics, further exacerbating political inequalities in these areas and preventing the full potential and realization of Latino political power and interests.
Beyond the important implications that our findings have for political equality and voice, our results also open up a number of possibilities for future research. While our results reveal a clear and strong effect for union affiliation on Latino voter registration and turnout, the causal mechanisms behind this relationship require further systematic investigation. In addition, there is the possibility of disparate effects for union affiliation on the different subgroups within the Latino population. In a similar vein, disaggregating whether Latino union organizing and member mobilization is oriented primarily toward the public sector or the more challenging private sector would be enlightening. This is especially so given that recent research claims that the ability of unions to redress inequities in political voice has been restricted because the ranks of organized labor are increasingly comprised of public-sector employees, who are generally of higher socioeconomic status and are more likely to participate politically regardless of union mobilization efforts (Leighley and Nagler 2007; Rosenfeld 2010). Our results also point to potentially significant electoral consequences as higher Latino turnout often benefits Democratic candidates (Judis and Teixeira 2002). These and other avenues for future research promise to shed more light on the important relationship that this study confirms between union affiliation and Latino political participation.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Kenneth Cosgrove, Michael G. Miller, Christopher Witko, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. A special note of gratitude goes to Michael J. Hanmer for assisting us with the observed-value approach. We also wish to thank Priscilla Cheng, Communications Director of the Los Angeles Country Federation of Labor for her assistance and Maria Elena Durazo, the Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Los Angeles Country Federation of Labor, who generously gave her time to answer our questions.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
1.
The LNS provides data for 8,634 Latino survey respondents. Of these 8,634 cases, several respondents are not U.S. citizens, resulting in missing values for 44 percent of the cases on the survey items that address voter registration and voter turnout.
2.
This number of cases for Latinos in union households is the total before running the multivariate equations. Some of these cases were dropped due to missing values for other variables used in our multivariate equations.
3.
The Current Population Survey (CPS) includes a total of 152,162 respondents in 2010; 150,799 respondents in 2008; 153,255 respondents in 2006; and 156,519 respondents in 2004. Of these respondents, there were 17,864 Latino respondents in 2010; 17,043 Latino respondents in 2008; 17,036 Latino respondents in 2006; and 16,227 Latino respondents in 2004. The CPS, however, asks just 9–10 percent of the respondents about their union membership. This significantly reduces the number of usable cases for analysis. Yet, pooling the CPS data together from 2004 to 2010 still yields 6,567 cases. Within that sample, the CPS asked and received answers from about half of the respondents about whether they registered to vote (n = 3,270) and/or cast a ballot in the election (n = 3,240).
4.
The CPS survey included 164 Latino union members in 2004, 163 Latino union members in 2006, 174 Latino union members in 2008, and 147 Latino union members in 2010.
5.
This number of observations for Latinos in union households is the total before running the multivariate equations. Some of these cases were dropped due to missing values for other variables used in our multivariate equations.
6.
In our CPS model, our central purpose is not only to test the significance of union affiliation on Latino political participation but also to examine whether union affiliation has an especially strong effect on Latinos relative to non-Latinos. Our interest here involves determining whether a specific subgroup of voters (i.e., Latinos) is particularly sensitive to the effects of the primary independent variable (i.e., union affiliation). Nagler (1991, 1994) and Leighley and Nagler (2007) argue that scobit regression models are most appropriate for such designs. We, therefore, ran a scobit regression analysis as an additional test for the CPS model. The results are available in Table 6 of the online supplemental materials (http://prq.sagepub.com/supple-mental/) and are consistent with the results presented in this article, showing that union affiliation is statistically significant and has a greater substantive impact for Latinos than it does for non-Latinos. We opted, however, not to include the scobit results in the final version of this article due to serious criticisms of the technique for being especially sensitive to specification errors (see
, 5).
