Turnout as Consent

Abstract

The dominant view assumes that people vote to influence election outcomes. As such, most assume that campaign contact, election competitiveness, and the probability of one’s voting influencing the outcome of an election are the primary forces motivating voter participation. However, some people may view elections as a referendum on system performance and may participate in elections regardless of the electoral outcome. Voting is one means for the public to express their consent to be governed. If so, we should expect higher voter participation in systems that generate public approbation. This article uses a national survey experiment, a cross-national panel of thirty-five advanced democracies, and aggregate voter turnout data to demonstrate that people in systems that control corruption, govern effectively, and have fair judicial processes are more likely to vote. This is because systems that treat people fairly in their day-to-day operations make people feel valued by their political system. Particularly when the probability of changing the composition of government with a single vote is small, voting is a tacit endorsement of the existing regime.

Keywords

procedural fairness voter turnout comparative political behavior corruption

Introduction

Voting behavior has captured the attention of scholars for more than half a century.¹ Yet, despite several decades of serious thought, scholars are still trying to understand that which motivates citizens to participate in the electoral process by casting a vote. While some frame voting as an irrational behavior (Blais 2000; Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968), others argue that voting is the logical result of particular social (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), institutional (Blais 2006; McAllister 1986; Powell 1986), demographic (Gallego 2007; Leighley and Nagler 2014; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), or biological (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008; Fowler and Dawes 2008) mechanisms. Regardless of the specific mechanism thought to influence electoral participation, nearly every study of voter turnout assumes that the individual vote calculus is motivated in part by the election, the campaign, or the candidates. That is, most assume that people participate in elections because they have some interest in the outcome of the elections.

Yet, some people participate in elections regardless of the outcome. Whether their social network encourages them to vote, voting has become habitual, or they simply feel some civic duty to vote; many people participate in elections irrespective of electoral outcomes (Blais 2000; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). People who are dissatisfied with their government may choose to abstain from electoral participation because they feel that participating in elections lends legitimacy to a regime with which they are displeased. Conversely, some may vote because it is an implicit endorsement of their government. Put simply, some people participate in elections when they are satisfied and refuse to participate when they are displeased with government performance. Particularly when the probability of changing the composition of government through a single vote is small, participating in an election is a tacit endorsement of the existing regime.

More than a half century has passed since Schattschneider (1960) argued that in its ideal form, a democratic system aspires to involve every citizen in the electoral process and is not content to represent the simple majority of the population that participates. Although we have learned much about the institutional arrangements and individual motivations that influence voter participation, many advanced democracies involve the same proportion of voters that they have for decades. Much of the voter turnout literature approaches the topic from the perspective of political campaigns. Recently, the literature has focused on techniques to mobilize voters in particular elections. As a result, the literature tends to conflate voter mobilization with voter turnout. The two are conceptually distinct. Political campaigns are motivated to mobilize some groups while discouraging participation from others. As such, we should expect campaigns to use particular tactics that both mobilize and demobilize, like negative advertising.

Conflating these concepts might explain the view that U.S. voters are more likely to participate in elections when they are upset with the current regime. Political parties and election campaigns motivate electoral participation through divisive, combative politics. Ideally, democratic systems seek broad voter participation from every segment of society. These governments are not content with simply winning elections at any cost, but try to use elections as a vehicle for the public to express its will. In the decades since Schattschneider, the literature has yielded productive insights, but has not really discovered how democratic systems can motivate greater proportions of the population to participate voluntarily in the electoral process. Perhaps this is because we have focused too much on how electoral institutions influence voter participation and have neglected the influence of nonelectoral institutions (i.e., judicial systems, bureaucracies) on individual motivations to participate in the electoral process.

One of the most consistent findings to emerge from social psychology is the influence that perceptions of institutional fairness have on individual political behavior (Doherty and Wolak 2012; Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975). Thus, the fairness of day-to-day government operations inform people about the value that the system of government places on individuals within the system. The interactions people have with the arbitrating institutions of government (courts, civil service, and bureaucracy) deal with issues that are highly salient to those involved and occur relatively frequently (Rohrschneider 2005). When people receive unfair treatment in their interactions with these institutions either because of corruption or their lack of political clout, the message they receive is that ordinary citizens do not count in their political systems. As such, we should expect lower electoral participation in elections in such systems. Even if the government promised a free and fair electoral process, those who think that their government is not committed to true equality would likely abstain, rather than endorse such a system of government.

The remaining sections of this article develop the argument and present empirical evidence that the day-to-day operations of government influence voter turnout. The first set of analyses uses a national survey experiment to test the validity of the theoretical concept on the individual level. The second set of analyses uses the third wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) to test the validity of the claim in a cross-section of thirty-five democracies. A final analysis replicates these results with aggregate voter turnout data from these same countries. This article makes two contributions to the literature. First, it demonstrates that fair governance has a direct influence on whether people vote. That is, controlling for the institutional arrangements theorists argue motivate voter turnout, systems with fair arbitrating institutions (courts, civil service, and bureaucracy) have higher levels of voter turnout than systems without. Second, this article demonstrates the mechanism through which fair governance leads to higher levels of voter turnout. Fair governance influences public perceptions of system fairness and this in turn motivates them to participate in elections.

Why People Vote

A vast literature explores the institutional arrangements that influence voter turnout. At the aggregate level, compulsory voting (Blais 2006, 2007; Franklin 1999; McAllister 1986; Norris 2004), electoral competition (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Karp and Banducci 2011; Leighley and Nagler 2014), and having proportional representation (Blais 2007; Blais and Aarts 2006; Jackman 1987) have strong influences on voter turnout. People are more likely to vote in economically advanced democracies (Blais 2007; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Powell 1982) and in more decisive, competitive elections (Blais 1998, 2000; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011).

While aggregate studies inform us about institutional arrangements that can influence broad levels of turnout, voting is ultimately an individual act, subject to a variety of individual-level influences and motivations. For instance, some argue that voting is habitual. Those who develop the habit of voting when they are young, tend to vote when they are older (Plutzer 2002). In addition, political campaigns mobilize voters. People are more likely to vote when contacted by friends, family, or members of a political party who encourage them to vote (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Finally, people are more likely to vote when political parties offer distinct policy alternatives that are relevant to the voter (Leighley and Nagler 2014). However, viewing voter mobilization from the perspective of political campaigns may mask important individual motivations that promote electoral participation. Virtually every political campaign attempts to win the election. Yet, it is unlikely that every voter expects that the vote they cast will be decisive (Aldrich 1993; Downs 1957). People participate in elections for a variety of reasons other than hoping to determine the outcome of the election (Plutzer 2002; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).

The integrity of the electoral process influences the probability of voting. Simpser (2012) argues that rigging elections alters individual electoral participation. People who expect fraudulent elections are less likely to vote (McCann and Domınguez 1998) and those who receive a bribe may become disgusted with the system and choose to abstain from voting, contrary to their original intentions (Simpser 2012). Birch (2010) sees electoral system fairness as an integral part of the rational choice voting model. In this view, the probability of one’s vote being decisive is influenced by the perception of that vote being counted properly. Perceptions that an election will not be fairly administered diminish the probability of voting by decreasing the “probability of a vote being decisive” calculus. However, this view of voting is substantially different from the central argument of this article, which is that the procedural integrity of arbitrating institutions informs the public about the capacity of the entire system to account for their interest. When arbitrating institutions are procedurally fair, contact with these institutions heightens public evaluations of the government and motivates people to participate in elections as an endorsement of the system.

Procedurally Fair Arbitrating Institutions

People tend to place higher value on political processes than outcomes (Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975). Perceptions of procedural fairness have a strong influence on individual support for political leaders (Tyler, Rasinski, and McGraw 1985), institutions (Doherty and Wolak 2012; Gibson 2009; Sondak and Tyler 2007; Tyler 1987, 2006; Tyler, Casper, and Fisher 1989; Tyler and Huo 2002), and public policy (Miles 2014; Rasinski and Tyler 1988). A prominent example of this is how perceptions of the fairness of judicial processes influence support for court decisions (Lind and Tyler 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler 1987; Tyler and Huo 2002). As the true guilt of a defendant is largely unknowable, people use the fairness of the judicial process as a heuristic which determines their support for the decision of the court (Tyler 1984, 1987). This is why people support criminal justice decisions, even when the decision is not in their favor (Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler 1984). Thus, the fairness of procedures provides people important information about government priorities. The outcome is less important than the information that government processes provide people about their relative value to government officials. When one group of people is systematically disadvantaged by government processes, they feel less valued by their government and become less supportive of the system (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010).

Democratic systems of government inform the public about their commitment to individual equality through their judicial systems. Dahl (1989, 188) argues that democratic systems may use the judicial system to represent minorities that are otherwise ignored by the electoral system. By providing an alternative avenue for people to express grievances and obtain redress from their government, a fair judicial system articulates to the public that individual liberties are not selectively protected and demonstrates commitment to preserving equal intrinsic worth in conflict resolution. The courts are the primary vehicle for ensuring that a system provides the rule of law. A system that fails to treat individuals equally under the law may send the message that some people are more valued by the system of government than others, because individual liberties are protected selectively. In such a system, the public may decide to abstain from electoral participation because they do not want to endorse this kind of inequality.

Corruption has a negative influence on voter turnout. While some argue that corruption might increase voter turnout when the public responds to the vote-buying mechanisms corruption is intended to produce (Johnston 1983), substantial evidence documents the erosive influence corruption has on voter turnout. Kostadinova (2009) argues that corruption diminishes voter participation in elections because it erodes popular belief that citizens can influence political outcomes—a necessary component of civic engagement. Corruption diminishes public trust in the institutions of government (Chang and Chu 2006), influences attitudes about how well the bureaucracy functions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003), and reduces perceptions of system legitimacy (Seligson 2002), all of which might dampen voter participation (Kostadinova 2009; Mishler and Rose 2005; Stockemer 2013).

However, corruption may have a different influence on voter participation. Beyond the erosive effects discussed in the previous section, corruption sends the public a message about how much the system of government values one individual relative to another. Particularly, when people are forced to pay bribes to obtain public services that should be provided to everyone equally; corruption cheapens the value of codified rights because these rights are protected based on one’s ability to purchase them through a corrupt system (Warren 2004). A system that selectively protects individual liberties through corrupt practices sends the message that the government places a premium on one’s ability to pay. Thus, voter apathy comes not from a perception that people cannot change the system (Kostadinova 2009) but because people think that the government does not care about them (Doppelt and Shearer 1999).

Finally, systems in which the implementation of law is influenced by external political pressure may send the message that politically relevant individuals matter more than others. People expect civil servants to be free to implement policies without undue political pressure (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). A system may be completely democratic in its selection of representatives and throughout the policy-making process, but if the government fails to deliver the desired goods through fair policy implementation, people may be less likely to endorse the system with a participatory vote.

The current literature places too much emphasis on election processes and outcomes and too little on how procedurally fair governance influences the vote/abstain calculus. While the dominant view leads us to assume that people vote when they think that their vote is decisive (Aldrich 1993; Downs 1957) or influences the composition of government (Lijphart 1999), it is also likely that people vote when the government sends the message that it values its citizenry (Doppelt and Shearer 1999). Voting is only costly if one is concerned with the outcome of an election. Yet, political behavior and institutional support derived through perceptions of procedural fairness are not outcome dependent. Electoral participation is a means for public feedback about government performance that extends beyond the policy platforms of political parties. Viewed from this perspective, voting is one means for the public to express their consent to be governed, regardless of the electoral outcome. If so, the cost of participating in elections is really dependent only on the relative cost of casting a vote compared with the importance of endorsing one’s own system of government. Information costs are negligible, because the government provides a steady stream of information about the relative value they place on their constituents through their daily interactions via the arbitrating institutions of government. When governments treat people fairly through equality in governance, the public receives the message that the government cares about all its citizens. This in turn motivates greater public participation in elections as an endorsement of the existing regime.

The preceding discussion leads to two hypotheses examined in the next section. First, the fairness of arbitrating institutions will have an indirect influence on voter participation. The degree to which the courts, civil service, and bureaucracy in a system treat people equally in their day-to-day operations will influence individual perceptions of system fairness. Those who perceive the system to be fair will be more likely to participate in elections, and those who think that it is unfair will be less likely to vote (H1).

Second, the procedural fairness of the arbitrating institutions of government (courts, civil service, and bureaucracy) will have a direct influence on voter turnout in the system. All things being equal, people in systems with procedurally fair arbitrating institutions should be more likely to vote (H2).

Method and Results

These hypotheses are tested via two survey instruments and replicated with aggregate voter turnout data. Ultimately we want to know how the psychological mechanisms operate on the individual level and then measure the strength of the relationship in a variety of institutional contexts. The first experiment is embedded in a national survey of U.S. adults to maximize both the internal and externally validity of the concept. The second set of analyses uses the third wave of the CSES which contains nationally representative surveys from thirty-five advanced democracies.

Demonstrating a statistical association between the procedural fairness of the arbitrating institutions in a system of government and the probability of voting in that system would provide suggestive evidence of the theoretical model. To strengthen the quality of the evidence and deal with endogeneity concerns, I use an experimental approach which manipulates the features of the macro-level variable to show how changes in the procedural fairness of the arbitrating institutions cause people to alter their intentions to vote. Ostensibly, the survey experiment could be conducted in any advanced democracy because the psychological mechanisms are not context dependent; this survey is conducted in the United States. While the United States is a poor approximation for the ideal in some regards, it is ideal in others. However, the U.S. system has comparatively low voter turnout; relatively frequent local, state, and national elections; and a strong separation of powers which could introduce context-dependent bias into the results. Respondents in the United States may view elections differently than those in other countries.

However, the same is true of any country which might be used as a test case. Respondents in any country might reflect the cultural bias of their particular system. Yet, because there is no reason to assume a priori that cultural bias influences the relationship between perceptions of fairness and electoral participation, the United States is an ideal test case for the following reasons: First, respondents in the United States are comfortable with participating in Internet surveys. A vast literature of Internet survey protocols has been developed for the U.S. context and is rigidly followed in this experiment. Second, the separation of powers combined with a nonvoting political culture makes the U.S. context a “hard case” for the hypothesis. Separation of powers makes it difficult for the public to assign the proper credit or blame for government performance. A nonvoting political culture makes it less likely that respondents will view elections as the ideal way to express displeasure with government performance. If the experiment were to take place in a system where the civil service, bureaucracy, or courts were more closely aligned with elected officials (as they are in most advanced democracies), one could argue that the findings simply reflect a public using elections to influence the composition of courts, bureaucracies, or the civil service. However, the United States lacks a logical connection between the arbitrating institutions of government and the electoral process. As such, demonstrating the psychological connection between fairly functioning arbitrating institutions and electoral participation in the United States suggests that the findings are not conflating perceptions of fairness and something else related to elections.

A nonprobability sample of 1,391 subjects was recruited by Clear Voice Research to participate in a study about governance. Of these, 23 percent were Republicans and 35 percent were Democrats. The study was fielded from June 11 to June 18, 2012. The sample appears to resemble the U.S. population in most respects, including age, gender, income, and political interest.² Respondents were presented with vignettes describing a hypothetical society (see Table 1). To minimize the influence of individual demographics on the system evaluations, respondents were instructed to imagine themselves as an outside observer and to evaluate the society as a whole without regard to their personal interests (Mitchell et al. 1993; Mutz 2011).

Table 1.

Vignettes for Experiments.

Procedurally fair	Corruption and unfair bureaucracy	Corrupt with unfair courts/bureaucracy
Green is a self-governing society with free and fair elections. The people of Green come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. Green is consistently praised for its record protecting individual liberties and civil rights. Women earn equal pay relative to their male counterparts and the people of Green rarely complain about racial inequality. Government services are efficient and those that attempt to bribe officials are swiftly brought to justice. Government officials in Green display no tolerance for corruption of any kind; in fact, the news media are allowed considerable access to investigate corruption with vigilance. Government officials convicted of corruption lose their position in society, go to jail, and are required to return gifts/money received. The court system in Green is free from racial or economic bias and even the most minor cases receive adequate attention from the judicial process. Green has one of the world’s strongest economies with a consistently low rate of unemployment.	Green is a self-governing society with free and fair elections. The people of Green come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. Green is consistently praised for its record protecting individual liberties and civil rights. Women earn equal pay relative to their male counterparts and the people of Green rarely complain about racial inequality. Government services are inefficient and individuals frequently provide a small bribe to Government employees to expedite the process. Government officials in Green occasionally go to considerable lengths to hide their misdeeds from the public news media. Government employees often complain that politicians put pressure on them to implement policy in a way that will help them win an election. The court system in Green is free from racial or economic bias and even the most minor cases receive adequate attention from the judicial process. Green has one of the world’s strongest economies with a consistently low rate of unemployment.	Green is a self-governing society with free and fair elections. The people of Green come from a variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds. Green is consistently praised for its record protecting individual liberties and civil rights. Women earn equal pay relative to their male counterparts and the people of Green rarely complain about racial inequality. Government services are inefficient and individuals frequently provide a small bribe to government employees to expedite the process. Government officials in Green occasionally go to considerable lengths to hide their misdeeds from the public news media. Government employees often complain that politicians put pressure on them to implement policy in a way that will help them win an election. The court system in Green convicts racial minorities and poor people at a higher statistical rate, and often it seems that the wealthy are able to purchase acquittals because their expensive attorneys have the contacts and skills necessary to get evidence declared inadmissible. Green has one of the world’s strongest economies with a consistently low rate of unemployment.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the vignette conditions.³ In each vignette, the system has a strong economy, electoral freedoms, and women and minorities that do not complain about how they are treated by their government. In the procedurally fair condition, the bureaucracy is efficient and attempts to limit bribery, the courts are unbiased, and corrupt public officials are swiftly and publicly brought to justice. In the partial treatment group (bureaucracy), respondents are informed that “government services are inefficient and individuals frequently provide a small bribe to government employees to expedite the process,” and that “government employees often complain that politicians put pressure on them to implement policy in a way that will help the politician score political points.” These two statements reflect the essence of the argument that corrupt systems and systems with inefficient bureaucracies treat individuals differently based on their ability to use monetary or political currency to purchase services.

The full treatment condition (bureaucracy plus courts) is designed to incorporate both the theoretical argument of this article and the empirical measures found in the worldwide government indicators that are used in the cross-national analysis. In the full treatment condition, respondents read a vignette that is identical to the partial treatment vignette except for a change in the language regarding the court system. Instead of reading that “the court system is free from racial or economic bias and even the most minor cases receive adequate attention from the judicial process,” respondents read,

The court system in Green does a poor job of protecting private property, and often it seems that the wealthy are able to purchase acquittals because their expensive attorneys have the contacts and skills necessary to get evidence declared inadmissible.

Previous research demonstrates the importance of procedural fairness in public evaluations of the court system (Lind and Tyler 1988; Peffley and Hurwitz 2010). However, prior research focuses on court outcomes unrelated to private property. The measure of court efficacy used here focuses on the degree to which courts protect private property and socioeconomic equality under the law. This treatment condition is theoretically consistent with a system devoid of fairly functioning arbitrating institutions and is empirically equivalent to the cross-national measure of procedurally fair arbitrating institutions, used in the next section.

After reading the vignette, respondents indicated the degree to which they thought the electoral system, government services, government officials, and the justice system treated all people fairly and equally. They were also asked if the courts can be trusted to give a fair trial in the system (all measured on a 7-point scale with higher scores indicating increased support). These scores were then combined into an index that measures individual evaluations of system fairness (Cronbach’s α = .957). After evaluating the fairness of the hypothetical society, respondents were asked to evaluate how democratically the society was being governed (measured on a 10-point scale with 10 meaning completely democratic), and finally respondents indicated how likely they would be to vote in Society Green (0 = never, 10 = every election). As I am dealing with a hypothetical system, I measure intended frequency of voter participation rather than actual voting behavior.

Figure 1 displays how the experiment influenced perceptions of system fairness in the hypothetical society. Those in the control condition reported significantly higher levels of perceived system fairness than those in the partial or full treatment groups (F = 322.2, df = 2). This suggests that corruption, unfair bureaucracies, and an unfair justice system erode individual evaluations of system fairness. We know that corruption, poorly functioning bureaucracies, and unfair judicial processes erode public trust and government legitimacy (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Seligson 2002; Tyler 1987), but the findings here suggest that they also influence public perceptions of how fairly the system functions. Do perceptions of system fairness influence the likelihood of a person voting? This is tested with a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model that includes controls for the treatment group and perceptions of system fairness as a predictor of intended voting frequency in Green. The findings are displayed in Table 2.

Figure 1.

Perceptions of hypothetical system fairness by treatment condition.

Table 2.

Reported Voter Turnout in a Hypothetical System.

	(1)
Intercept	0.565*** (0.037)
Partial treatment	−0.045* (0.016)
Full treatment	−0.034 (0.028)
Perceived system fairness	0.368*** (0.043)
R ²	.13
Observations	998

Source. Author’s data.

Entries are regression coefficients from ordinary least squares models estimated in R 2.15. The variables are scaled 0–1 to reduce the size of the estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed test).

Table 2 models the direct effect of system fairness evaluations on hypothetical voting behavior. The first two independent variables compare the probability of voting by experimental condition, relative to the baseline (control) condition. On average, those in the partial treatment group reported significantly lower levels of intended voting frequency than those in the control, while those in the full treatment group were statistically indistinguishable from the control group. This is mildly unexpected, yet not wholly inconsistent with the theoretical model, because the experimental groups are designed to manipulate perceptions of fairness and not to replicate any particular society. Consistent with the theoretical model, the findings in Table 2 show that higher evaluations of system fairness are associated with higher levels of voter turnout (t = 8.65). In addition, the substantive influence of perceptions of fairness on reported voting intentions is quite large. The perceptions of fairness scale is coded from 0 to 1, which makes the interpretation of the results in Table 2 straightforward. All things being equal, a respondent at the maximum of the procedural fairness perceptions scale is predicted to placed themselves at 9.32 on the ten-point probability of voting scale. Conversely, a respondent at the minimum on the perception scale is predicted to place themselves at 5.64 on the ten-point probability of voting scale. Those who think that the process is fair say that they are 65.24 percent more likely to vote than those who do not. As public evaluations of system fairness increase, so does reported intentions to vote in the hypothetical system (H1).

The experimental nature of these findings suggests a causal relationship between the degree to which arbitrating institutions are procedurally fair and intended voting frequency. When systems of government treat people fairly, it heightens public evaluations of system fairness which in turn motivates people to participate in the electoral process. This empirical support for the theoretical model suggests that for some, electoral participation depends on processes external to the election campaigns. This implies that voting is not solely an opportunity to select new leaders, rather electoral participation seems to involve an endorsement of the existing regime. When the arbitrating institutions of government function fairly, people are more likely to participate in elections as an endorsement of the system.

Cross-National Voting Patterns

One weakness of experimental research is that participants’ attitudes and reported behaviors may be different than in the world that exists outside of the controlled environment. Experimental evidence suggests that the degree to which the arbitrating institutions of government (courts, bureaucracy, and civil service) govern fairly influences individuals’ reported likelihood of participating in elections in a hypothetical system. However, if we were to move beyond the controlled experimental environment, would we see the same pattern? To further scrutinize the hypotheses’ external validity, they are tested using a cross-national data set comprised of nationally representative surveys from thirty-five advanced democracies. Wave 3 of the CSES asked respondents if they had voted in the most recent national election. Although it is common for respondents to overreport voting behavior, previous analyses using this data set have shown the responses to be similar to the actual turnout numbers in the CSES countries (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). One advantage of this particular set of data is the inclusion of system-level variables that can be used to measure the influence of a particular institutional arrangement on individual responses (Blais and Aarts 2006; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais and Massicotte 2002; Jackman 1987; McAllister 1986). Although aggregate data studies may have a slightly more accurate measure of actual voter turnout levels, they cannot measure the relationship between a particular set of institutions on individual attitudes (Hox 1998, 2002; Snijders and Bosker 2011). For this reason, I analyze data contained in Wave 3 of the CSES using a hierarchical logistic regression model with system-level variables as predictors of individual responses.

The measurement model that tests the hypotheses includes controls for the standard demographics that are known to influence voter turnout: age, gender, education, marital status, and partisanship (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Schlozman et al. 1995; Stoker and Jennings 1995; Strate et al. 1989; Verba et al. 1993). In addition, the model controls for national-level institutional characteristics are known to influence voter turnout. Many studies find higher levels of voter turnout in economically advanced societies (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Norris 2002; Powell 1982); however, in older democracies, this amounts to a difference between poor and wealthy countries (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998). For this reason, I use the level of socioeconomic development in a system (Human Development Index or HDI) as a control variable at the country level. Those in more established democracies are more inclined to vote, as are those in consensus model democracies (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). These two concepts are measured with variables that indicate the length and quality of democracy. In addition, systems with greater party choice (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011), compulsory voting, and electoral competition have been shown to have higher levels of voter turnout and the model controls for these. The national-level variable of primary interest is the degree to which the arbitrating institutions (courts, bureaucracy, and civil service) govern fairly. All things being equal, systems with more fair arbitrating institutions are expected to have higher levels of voter turnout (H2).

The fairness of arbitrating institutions is measured using data from the worldwide governance index (WGI) compiled by the World Bank, which includes measures for the rule of law, the control of corruption, and government effectiveness of the institutions in a country. The WGI compiles data from thirty-one expert and public opinion surveys funded by the public and private sectors to create aggregate measures for each country. As such, the WGI scores reflect the biases of those asked to evaluate the systems of government. While some argue that perceptions of national conditions do not objectively measure the institutional arrangements in society, the WGI measures have been validated and used in nearly a thousand scholarly articles.⁴ Although it is possible that the results are simply reflecting some broad correlation of perceptions in the aggregate with perceptions in a particular sample, the findings are replicated using aggregate turnout data (not a survey) with the same results.

The rule of law indictor measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police and the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. The control of corruption indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is used for private gains. This indicator includes both petty and grand forms of corruption. The government effectiveness indicator measures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011). Consistent with (Rohrschneider 2005) these are combined into a single, reliable measure (Cronbach’s α = .96) which is used to estimate the direct effect of procedurally fair governance on individual vote intentions.

As Wald tests are not always reliable tests of statistical significance in multilevel models (Preacher, Curran, and Bauer 2006; Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes 2007), the data analyses include a likelihood ratio test of model fit as national-level variables are introduced. Each additional indicator increases the degrees of freedom by one and the difference in likelihood ratio is chi-square distributed. Statistically significant changes in the likelihood ratio test suggest that the new model is a superior fit to the previous model and that the new national-level variable significantly improves the model (Hox 2002; Snijders and Bosker 2011). Table 3 displays the estimates of the multilevel logistic regression model. Each column displays the model as additional national-level variables are added.

Table 3.

Voter Turnout in Thirty-Five Advanced Democracies.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Individual level
Constant	0.355** (0.145)	−0.592 (2.858)	3.759 (3.203)	51.805 (47.405)
Age	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Gender (male baseline)	−0.058** (0.024)	−0.073*** (0.024)	−0.073*** (0.024)
Education	0.082*** (0.006)	0.083*** (0.007)	0.083*** (0.007)
Marital status	0.569*** (0.024)	0.573*** (0.024)	0.574*** (0.024)
Partisanship	1.176*** (0.026)	1.200*** (0.026)	1.199*** (0.026)
Country level
Compulsory voting	0.675*** (0.152)	0.741*** (0.176)	0.702*** (0.163)	10.546*** (1.707)
Quality of democracy		−0.096 (0.221)	−0.059 (0.204)	1.774 (2.389)
Length of democracy		0.000 (0.001)	−0.000 (0.001)	−0.088 (0.098)
Number of parties		−0.001 (0.009)	0.000 (0.008)	0.140* (0.069)
Electoral fairness		0.274 (0.769)	0.433 (0.710)	3.303 (3.136)
Socioeconomic development (HDI)		1.127 (2.772)	−5.567 (3.787)	−6.828 (57.666)
Electoral competitiveness		−0.053 (0.114)	−0.006 (0.106)	−0.397 (0.972)
Procedural fairness of arbitrating institutions			0.264** (0.109)	5.072*** (1.455)
Likelihood ratio chi-square		2,392.8***	5.48**
Individuals (N)	53,884	53,884	53,884
Countries (N)	35	35	35	35
R ²				.64

Source. CSES Wave 3.

Entries are estimates from a multilevel logistic regression model estimated using xtmelogit in Stata 12. Standard errors in parentheses. Column 4 entries are estimates from an OLS regression model using aggregated voter turnout data for the CSES 3 countries. Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS = ordinary least squares; Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01 (two-tailed test).

The first column displays the estimates from the individual-level model, which includes a random intercept for each country and compulsory voting as the only national-level predictor of voter turnout. Consistent with previous research, the control variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction. In addition, there is a significant, strong relationship between the strength of compulsory voting enforcement and voter turnout. As we might expect, those who live in systems which strongly enforce compulsory voting laws are significantly more likely to vote.

How do other national conditions influence voter turnout? The second model in Table 3 introduces the remaining national-level control variables into the model as predictors. Although the decrease in log likelihood suggests that this model fits the data better than the previous model, none of the new national-level control variables achieve statistical significance. The individual-level controls remain significant predictors of voter turnout and the direction of the coefficients are consistent with those in the previous model and theoretical expectations. However, systems in which the arbitrating institutions (courts, bureaucracy, and civil service) govern fairly (control corruption, provide the rule of law) are associated with higher levels of voter turnout (model 3). The chi-square test of the likelihood ratio for the model in column 3 is significant at the p < .05 level in a two-tailed test as is the Wald test for the coefficient, which indicates a direct, positive relationship between fairness in governance and voter turnout. Compulsory voting is the only national-level predictor that has a stronger statistical association with voter turnout than the fairness of arbitrating institutions.

Finally, I tested the hypothesis using aggregate voter turnout data, rather than reported data from the CSES data set. The last column in Table 3 uses aggregate voter turnout data from the thirty-five CSES countries with the same national-level variables used in the previous analyses. Once again, the only national-level variables that are significantly associated with higher levels of voter participation are compulsory voting and the procedural fairness of arbitrating institutions. Additional analyses⁵ removed the independent variable of interest from the model to look at how much procedurally fair arbitrating institutions contribute to the explanatory power of the model. The model based on the dominant view of voter turnout has an r² of .49, compared with the model presented in Table 3 (r² = .64). This pattern of findings suggests that people in systems that govern fairly are more likely to vote (H2).

Another approach is to look at how much procedural fairness influences voter turnout from the individual (not system) perspective. How large is the group of voters that does not participate because the system is unfair. One way to estimate this is to look at the model predicted change in voter turnout in countries with multiple elections in the data set and estimate the change in turnout that is explained solely by procedurally fair arbitrating institutions from one election to the next. In the model using aggregate data (Table 3, column 4), a one-unit increase in procedurally fair arbitrating institutions predicts a 5 percent increase in voter turnout. This means that a 0.2 change in the procedural fairness scale accounts for a 1 percent change in voter turnout, all things being equal. According to the raw data, voter turnout in the 2006 presidential election in Mexico was fourteen points higher than the 2009 parliamentary elections. Much of the change in voter turnout is explained by the difference between presidential and parliamentary elections. Yet, in 2009 the arbitrating institutions in Mexico were 0.173 lower on the procedural fairness scale than in 2006. This change accounted for a 0.086 decrease in overall voter turnout. In other words, had the arbitrating institutions in Mexico remained at their 2006 fairness levels, the model predicts an additional 666,260 voters in the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Brazil had two presidential races in the data set. The actual difference in voter turnout in 2010 was five points lower than in 2006. Some of that is explained by the particulars of each election. However, the arbitrating institutions in Brazil became 0.439 more fair in 2010 than they were in 2006. As a result, more people participated in the 2010 elections than would have been expected otherwise. The model predicts an additional 2 percent of voters participated in the 2010 elections because the arbitrating institutions were more fair. Though fewer Brazilians participated in 2010 than in 2006, roughly 3 million voters participated in the 2010 Brazilian presidential elections that would have stayed home otherwise.

Figure 2 plots the probability of voting by the objective level of system fairness. The CSES sample contains few countries with arbitrating institutions with fairness scores below zero. Yet, in those countries, people are much less likely to vote than in countries with more fair arbitrating institutions. The median level of arbitrating institution fairness in this sample is 3.979 (Japan, 2007). The predicted probability of a person voting in such a system is more than 0.85. A one-standard deviation change in arbitrating institution fairness (2.33) changes the probability of a person voting by plus or minus .13; a change of more than 15 percent. If I explore the data by country, Australia (compulsory voting) clearly is an exception to the model predicted trend, as are Uruguay, Thailand, and Brazil. Yet, the model-based predictions are consistent with the theoretical framework advanced in this article. The more fairly the arbitrating institutions in a system function, the more likely people are to vote (H2).

Figure 2.

Predicted voter turnout by fairness of arbitrating institutions.

It is noteworthy that the only system-level variable to achieve statistical significance in the cross-national model is the variable hypothesized to be statistically significant in this article. This might cause some to assume that the findings are spurious and inconsistent with the existing literature. However, the findings reported in Table 3 are consistent with the current literature and other research that is based on these data (Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister 2011). In addition, much of the literature that expects length of democracy, socioeconomic development, or quality of democracy to influence voter turnout is based on aggregate-level measures and these relationships have yet to be established as a predictor of individual voting behavior.

Ideally, the CSES data set would include individual-level measures that precisely mirrored the national survey experiment. Some individual-level predictors in the CSES data approximate perceptions of system fairness, but are conceptually distinct. For instance, the CSES data contain retrospective evaluations of system performance as well as two political efficacy items. Various models⁶ using these individual-level predictors were fit and the results are consistent with the theoretical model advanced in this article. However, retrospective evaluations of system performance and political efficacy are conceptually distinct and including these measures in the analyses might be confusing. After all, perceptions of fairness in governance (from the experiment) are not the same as perceptions of how well a system has functioned over the last few years (CSES). While recognizing that the various measures of individual evaluations are conceptually distinct, the pattern of findings presented suggests that the theoretical mechanism advanced in this article influences the vote decision calculus. When the arbitrating institutions of government are procedurally fair, the public has higher regard for system performance and this motivates greater voter participation as an endorsement of the system.

Conclusion

This article advances a new perspective on voting behavior. The cost of voting is not the obstacle supposed by the dominant view. If a particular voter is not concerned with the outcome of an election, the benefits one obtains from voting may be enough to outweigh the cost. While the cost of information may be significant if one cares about picking the right leaders, they would be minimal to a person who votes as an endorsement of the system. Finally, with early voting, online registration, motor vehicle registration, and the like, advanced democracies have made it much easier to vote. It would seem that in modern democracies, the act of voting is not as costly or irrational as the dominant view implies.

This article presents substantial empirical evidence that nonelectoral institutions strongly influence electoral participation. First, in a national sample of U.S. adults, perceptions of procedural fairness are significantly associated with reported levels of voting behavior in a hypothetical system. Those who perceived the hypothetical system to be fair were 65 percent more likely to vote than those who did not. In addition, in a broad cross-section of thirty-five advanced democracies, the fairness of the arbitrating institutions has a direct influence on voter turnout. Directly, systems with fair governance have higher levels of reported voting, which is consistent with the results of aggregate voter turnout analysis. All things being equal, a one-unit increase in procedurally fair governance predicts a more than 5 percent increase in voter turnout in a system. This model of voter turnout accounts for variance unexplained by the dominant view. Controlling for most of the institutional arrangements known to influence voter turnout as well as the important demographic variables, this theoretical model is a significant improvement.

This pattern of findings has implications for the study of individual political behavior and institutional future institutional analyses. For some, voting is tacit political system endorsement—an act which signifies consent to be governed. When these people feel valued by their system of government, they are more likely to vote. For these individuals, voting is not motivated by a desire to influence the outcomes of elections, nor by a sense of civic duty; rather, voting expresses validation of the system.

Institutionally, voter participation does not exclusively depend on electoral systems. The procedural fairness of the courts, civil service, and bureaucracy have electoral consequences. Systems of government that function fairly send the message that equality and freedom are more than slogans, but are manifest in everyday government operations. This informs the public that each member of society is valued equally and can motivate greater public participation in elections. Systems of government that aspire to Schattschneider’s (1960) ideal of full democratic participation should recognize the importance of these nonelectoral institutions on voter participation.

Future work should incorporate procedural fairness in their analyses of voter turnout. Unfortunately, the analyses presented here focus exclusively on national elections. Participation in national elections is likely motivated by different mechanisms than that which motivates participation in local elections where an individual vote has a higher probability of making a difference. Future work might also consider how the procedural fairness of local institutions influences participation in local elections.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Russell Dalton, Robert Rohrschneider, Mark Josyln, Sandra Schofield, Becky Whitley, three anonymous referees, and the editors of Political Research Quarterly for helpful comments and suggestions.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

This research would not have been possible without generous funding from the Walter Thompson fund at the University of Kansas and the Joseph P.Harris fellowship.

Notes

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