The Prophetic and the Prosperous: Religious Ideologies and the Maintenance of Group Consciousness

Abstract

Integral to the development of group consciousness is the establishment of independent entities, which allow individuals to develop a common identity and solidarity. In the case of African Americans, the black church has facilitated racial group consciousness by bringing blacks together and advocating a belief system that emphasizes justice and community, commonly referred to as the social gospel. In contrast to the social gospel, the prosperity gospel emphasizes individualism and material gain. Scholars and critics argue its growth in the black religious discourse may erode the group cohesion developed by the social gospel. Using a unique data set that measures support for these religious belief systems and black group consciousness, I find support for these assertions. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that the nature of these relationships is contingent upon exposure to religious institutions.

Keywords

black politics religion and politics group consciousness ideology

In his discussion of collective behavior, Blumer (1939) notes that for mass political action to develop there must be “esprit de corps,” a sense of common understanding and commitment. Whether it be labor disputes in nineteenth-century England (Steinberg 1996), Poland’s Solidarity Movement (Osa 1996), or American college students protesting Apartheid (Hirsch 1990), a sense of collective consciousness is integral to generating mass action (Mansbridge 2001). In the case of African Americans, racial group consciousness has been essential to explaining partisan attachments, policy preferences, and political behavior (Dawson 1994; Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989). Integral to the development of group consciousness is the establishment of independent entities, which allow individuals to develop a common identity and solidarity (Blumer 1939). Scholars routinely use the black church an example of these types of institutions (Dawson 1994; Reese and Brown 1995).¹ They argue that beyond being a place where blacks can regularly meet, black churches are a wellspring for racial group consciousness because they present a prophetic religious tradition emphasizing actively working to achieve equality for all (Harris 2012; Harris-Lacewell 2007a). This religious tradition, commonly referred to as the social gospel, is presented as central to the black religious experience by a variety of scholars and activists (Barber and Wilson-Hartgrove 2016; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Paris 1985; Wallis 2005). Despite this common image, several scholars contend the authoritarian, otherworldly, and insular nature of many black churches obstructs the development of racial group consciousness and collective behavior (Frazier [1964] 1974; Myrdal 1962; Reed 1986).

Conventional wisdom, since the civil rights movement, argues there is a positive relationship between black religion and black group consciousness. However, recent attention to the multidimensional nature of the black religious experience questions this relationship and has reignited the debate as to whether the black church promotes racial group consciousness (Harris 2012; Harris-Lacewell 2007a). Specifically, scholars and commentators note the rise of the prosperity gospel as a message that weakens group cohesion. As Mitchem (2007, 108) states, “Prosperity preaching generally stresses the individual person’s will over history as the God-approved route to overcoming racial oppression. This preaching will also stress the importance of the individual over the community.” These assertions about the political consequences of the prosperity gospel indicate, under certain conditions, exposure to black churches may erode black group consciousness. The 2016 election captured these concerns as several clergy connected to the prosperity gospel endorsed Donald Trump’s candidacy (Butler 2016; Gjelten 2017; Weigel 2016). Specifically, Harris-Lacewell (2007a, 2007b) and Harris (2012) contend the prosperity gospel’s teaching will erode the belief in a black collective struggle, while the social gospel fortifies this belief.

These concerns have been discussed in the broader commentary about black politics and among scholars of black politics; however, there has been no rigorous testing to see if the perceived relationships between the social and prosperity gospels and black group consciousness exists. The purpose of this study is to empirically test these arguments about the connection between religious belief systems and group cohesion. Using a unique data set that allows me to operationalize support for these belief systems and black group consciousness, I find empirical support for these arguments. The social gospel is positively associated with group consciousness, while the prosperity gospel has a negative correlation. Furthermore, the results demonstrate exposure to religious institutions influences the application of these beliefs to group consciousness.

Beyond the implications for the racial and ethnic and religion and politics literatures, this study illuminates the need for scholars to be attentive to how indigenous institutions can both increase and impede collective action. Furthermore, this work highlights the responsiveness of group consciousness to countervailing forces and offers insight into the impediments groups face in mobilizing themselves to protect their interests.

As an ideology which helps individuals organize their world and seek out others to help them achieve their goals (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Miller et al. 1981), group consciousness is one of the most salient aspects of understanding collective political behavior (Conover 1984). Group consciousness calls into question structures that interfere with the group’s attempts to reach its goals, sees any attempt to stagnate the advancement of their interests as illegitimate, and calls upon a collective response to these threats (Gurin, Miller, and Gurin 1980). Because of this, group consciousness is more than a psychological attachment to the group; it is also the recognition of systemic threats and committing to collective action to challenge these threats.

In the case of racial group consciousness, the member of the racial group perceives a common bond and a collective commitment to protect the racial group from antagonists and works to advance the group’s position in society (W. O. Brown 1931). African Americans have been central to the study of racial group consciousness. Scholars have found their high level of group consciousness accounts for political attitudes, partisanship (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Philpot 2017), vote choice (Philpot and Walton 2007), and higher than expected levels of political participation (Shingles 1981; Verba and Nie 1972).

The political importance of being black has existed since the colonies, but the idea of a collective commitment to confronting social inequalities and advancing the goals of the group has waxed and waned in black political history. In the first half of the twentieth century, Ferguson (1938), Gamson (1968), and Singer (1962) asserted the lack of political solidarity prevented blacks from advancing their political interests. Banfield and Wilson (1963) contend this lack of solidarity was rooted in a class conflict. The collective activities of the civil rights and black Power movements broke down these class barriers to create a cohesive political unit (Smith 1978, 1981). Events, such as Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns and the Rodney King incident, helped maintain high levels of group consciousness. More recently, events regarding police brutality and bias in the justice system have served as a source for maintaining high levels of groups consciousness (A. Brown 2015).²

It was once thought black group consciousness would quickly dissipate with political and economic gains (Wilson 1980), but research at the end of the twentieth century found that this did not occur (Dawson 1994; McClerking 2001). African Americans continue to endorse higher levels of group consciousness than other racial groups (Sears and Savalei 2006). However, recent commentary on black group consciousness casts doubt on the endurance of high levels of black group consciousness. Specifically, scholars note the increased emphasis on individualism and racial conservatism among African Americans (Harris 2012; Tate 2010). Using urban politics as an example, Spence (2012, 2013) argues the growth of neoliberalism in black politics diminished role of race and increased the salience of class. Harris-Lacewell (2007a, 2007b) and Harris (2012) link this shift in black collective identity to a shift in the black religious discourse. They argue the social justice message of the black church has given way to individualism and wealth accumulation, which has eroded black group consciousness.

The mere existence of the black church and the black religious experience is the announcement of black racial solidarity. Many of the earliest black congregations were created out of black protest of discrimination in white churches. Within this institution, that was black owned, operated and maintained, blacks developed a religious, political, and social narrative that challenged the idea they were at the bottom of a divine racial hierarchy (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Pinn and Pinn 2002; Raboteau 2001; Randolph 1999). These actions formed the link between religion and black racial identity. Allen, Dawson, and Brown (1989) point to black religious practices, such as worship service attendance, as key in the formation of black group consciousness. Furthermore, numerous studies demonstrate black religiosity, in a variety of forms, promotes identity and empowerment (Calhoun-Brown 1999; Ellison 1991). The enduring argument for this relationship is beyond being one of the few historically independent institutions for blacks, black churches broadcast a message intertwining social justice with salvation.³ This religious belief system, commonly referred to as the social gospel, maintains every Christian has an obligation to both herself and to society as a whole (Curtis 2001). Furthermore, the social gospel calls on Christians to be vigilant in recognizing and challenging exploitation and oppression. The rhetoric of the social gospel was an essential part of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s efforts to mobilize blacks and whites during the civil rights movement. Contemporary research on the black religious experience, contends the high level of support for the social gospel explains why black churches provide higher levels of social services provisions (Chaves and Higgins 1992; Owens 2007) as well as the political gap between black and white Evangelicals (McDaniel and Ellison 2008; McKenzie and Rouse 2013). Research has shown an implicit relationship between the social gospel and black group consciousness. Reese and Brown (1995) find messages promoting civil awareness and participation breed racial group identity as well as the belief of a racial power imbalance. Calhoun-Brown (1996) finds blacks who report exposure to messages promoting political engagement, in their place of worship, also express high levels group consciousness. Harris’s (1999) demonstrates how the promotion of an “oppositional civic culture,” in black churches, generates feelings of injustice and support for collective action.

Even though the social gospel receives high praise, it is not the only belief system within the black religious discourse. The prosperity gospel stands as an antagonist. It emphasizes that strong individual faith will allow people to experience the “good life” on earth such as, material possessions, health, or social relationships (Bowler 2013; Harrison 2005). At its core, the prosperity gospel argues the resurrection story demonstrates Christians will be victorious and have the ability to attain perfect health and flourish financially (Lee 2007). Prosperity gospel ministers contend Christians are not to live a dreary life on earth to be rewarded in heaven. Instead, God wants the faithful to enjoy prosperity on earth as well as in heaven and the amount of prosperity received is linked to their faithfulness (Harrison 2005; Van Biema and Chu 2006). The prosperity gospel’s emphasis on faith and the actions of a higher power should not be confused with otherworldliness, which urges people to ignore the problems of the world and focus on heavenly rewards (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Nelsen and Nelsen 1975). In contrast, the prosperity gospel urges followers to enjoy riches on earth and in the afterlife.

Even though critics have treated the prosperity gospel as an alien to the black religious discourse, it draws on beliefs central to the black religious experience. More so than other racial groups, blacks are more likely to believe in a God who is actively involved in their lives (Cone 1997; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Thurman 1975), which is a tenet of the prosperity gospel (Bowler 2013; Harrison 2005; Mitchem 2007). Early twentieth-century movements, such as Charles Manuel “Sweet Daddy” Grace’s United House of Prayer and Father Divine’s Peace Mission, articulated several of its elements, such as strong faith leads to good health (Raboteau 2001). In the 1970s and 1980s, Frederick J. Eikerenkoetter (better known as Rev. Ike) and Johnnie Coleman resurrected this message in their respective congregations in Boston and Chicago. Although these preachers were on the fringes, current prosperity gospel preachers have become part of the mainstream black religious discourse (Harris 2012; Mitchem 2007). Through the development of media empires, including books, magazines, movies, and nationally televised programming, individuals, such as Frederick K. Price, T.D. Jakes, Creflo Dollar, and Eddie Long, are household names. Furthermore, they have been able to influence multiple aspects of black religious and social culture (Harrison 2005; Lee 2005; Mitchem 2007).

The prosperity gospel’s proponents argue its growing popularity is linked to its ability to empower individuals; however, critics argue it creates the illusion problems can just be prayed away (Hendricks 2006). Critics point to the actions of prominent figures, such as Eddie Long and Creflo Dollar, as examples of its deleterious effect on black collective politics. Long, who had a weekly attendance of twenty-five thousand and a national audience (Bowler 2013), told a group of civil rights veterans they should “forget racism” (Blake 2006). Dollar, who has a weekly attendance of thirty thousand, several wide selling books, and nationally televised programs (Bowler 2013), vehemently argues against seeking redress from wrongs, such as slavery, contending strong faith is the only way to vanquish racism (Dollar 1997, 157).⁴

Harris-Lacewell (2007a, 2007b) contends that unlike the social gospel, which compels individuals to recognize and combat racial inequality, the prosperity gospel increases attention to individual failings. Harris (2012) views the social gospel as a source of communal beliefs, while the prosperity gospel erodes these beliefs. Spence (2015) argues the rise of the prosperity gospel has contributed to rhetoric and policies that blames poverty on a lack of individual effort as opposed to structural impediments. These messages undercut the belief in a collective struggle and erodes the willingness to contribute to group goals. These assertions are supported by studies of black congregations, who find many prosperity gospel congregations deemphasize race (Harrison 2005; Mitchem 2007). McDaniel’s (2016) analysis of the relationship between these beliefs and black political attitudes finds prosperity gospel support is linked to attitudes that violate traditional black politics, such as attributing poverty to laziness. In contrast, he finds social gospel supporters attribute poverty to a lack of jobs.

In line with these arguments and findings, this paper maintains the religious belief systems are important for understanding black group consciousness. I expect the social gospel to be positively associated with it, while the prosperity gospel will be negatively associated.

Data and Method

Although scholars and social commentators have articulated the prosperity gospel as an antagonist to the social gospel and racial group consciousness, there is little empirical evidence to support these claims. To test these relationships, I use the 2012 Religious Worldviews Study, a stratified national sample of registered and unregistered black and white adults who identified as Christians. Using funding from the National Science Foundation, I administered the survey via GfK Knowledge Networks between October 4 and October 17, 2012.⁵ The survey has 1,146 respondents (599 white and 547 black), and a completion rate of 60 percent.⁶ Most national surveys, such as the American Election Study or the General Social Survey, lack adequate measures of the religious belief systems under investigation. Even specialized religious surveys, such as the “Baylor Religion Survey” or Pew Forum’s “2006 Spirit and Power: Survey of Pentecostals in the United States,” do not provide adequate measures of the social and prosperity gospels. These data provide the opportunity to operationalize these beliefs and establish their relationships with group consciousness. Given the nature of the study, the analysis will be limited to the black respondents. Although these data are cross-sectional and cannot provide evidence of growth or decline in support for religious belief systems, they allow me to assess their prevalence and relationship with group consciousness.

The discussion of the social and prosperity gospels has pitted them as intense adversaries; however, they are not mutually exclusive (Harris 2012). Because of this, I conceptualize and measure these belief systems as being distinct dimensions of religious belief. Each belief system is operationalized with a distinct battery of questions taken from McDaniel (2016). The social gospel (α = .63) is an eight-item measure including four positively worded items and four negatively worded items. The positively worded items indicate a religious duty to protect the less fortunate and reduce inequalities. The negatively worded items relate to beliefs about the more individualistic and otherworldly aspects of religion. The prosperity gospel (α = .67) is a six-item measure that includes four positively worded items and two negatively worded items. The positively worded items reflect a belief health and wealth are achieved through proper expressions of faith and those who are unable to achieve these goals either lack morality or do not express their faith properly. The negatively worded items reflect the belief that one’s faith is not directly linked to success.⁷ The list of items for each of the measures can be found in Table 1.⁸ The measures used in the analysis are the factor scores generated from factor analyzing the individual items. The religious belief system measures were further tested using Confirmatory Factor Analysis with a method factor to account for correlated measurement error (for a detailed discussion of this method see Nelson 1999, 340–3; Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000, 376; Weisberg, Haynes, and Krosnick 1995, 256–8). The outcome from this analysis further supports the belief that these measures represent the respective concepts. These results can be referenced in the appendix. To distinguish the measures from already established measures, such as egalitarianism and individualism, the religious belief system items were placed in a factor analysis with items used to measure egalitarianism and individualism. The outcome of this analysis was four distinct factors which represented each of the four concepts under investigation. Furthermore, an examination of the correlations between the four concepts shows weak to moderate relationships. Finally, for ease of interpretation, the factor scores and all other variables presented are standardized to range from zero to one (Achen 1982, 70–1).

Table 1.

Components of the Religious Belief System Measures.

Statement	% good
Social gospel (α = .63)
God instructs us to protect the poor.	64.8
Failure to confront social unfairness is a sin.	28.4
Social justice is at the heart of the Gospel.	37.6
Social and economic fairness are the core teachings of Christ.	45.7
God is more concerned about individual morality than social inequalities.^a	35.1
Addressing social issues distracts people from achieving salvation.^a	15.6
Building the kingdom of God on earth is only about bringing people to Christ, not changing social structures.^a	38.8
We should only be concerned about bringing people to Christ, not equality.^a	29.2
Mean	0.53
25th percentile	0.47
50th percentile	0.50
75th percentile	0.59
Prosperity gospel (α = .65)
God rewards those who live moral lives with material possessions.	24.4
God punishes those who have been immoral by taking their material possessions.	18.0
The reason why people of faith fail is because they do not express their faith correctly.	16.9
Poverty and illness are indications of sinful behavior.	8.40
Your faith only provides spiritual growth, not earthly rewards.^a	26.1
Whether or not you are faithful, the risks in life are still the same.^a	25.5
Mean	0.40
25th percentile	0.25
50th percentile	0.46
75th percentile	0.50

Reverse worded items.

There is substantial support for the prosperity gospel (M = 0.40; 95% confidence interval [CI] = [.39, .42]), but it is significantly (p value = .00) less popular than the social gospel (M = 0.53; 95% CI = [.52, 54]). The correlation between these two measures is a moderate negative relationship (r = −.35; p value = .00). The lack of a strong negative correlation demonstrates these belief systems oppose each other but are not polar opposites. Using the white sample as a comparison, there are no racial differences in support for the social gospel (white M = 0.56), but blacks are more supportive of the prosperity gospel (white M = 0.30). The measures are also negatively correlated in the white sample (r = −.24, p value = .00); however, this negative relationship is weaker among whites (p value = .06). This supports Harris-Lacewell’s (2007a) and Harris’s (2012) arguments that the conflict between these beliefs systems is more intense in the black religious community.

Group consciousness is operationalized using the four dimensions highlighted by Jackman and Jackman (1973); Gurin, Miller, and Gurin (1980); and Miller et al. (1981): group identity, polar power, system blame, and a commitment to collective action. Two items measure group identity: linked fate and polar affect. The linked fate measure assesses the extent to which respondents believe their life chances are linked to what happens to other blacks. Polar affect is measured by subtracting the white feeling thermometer score from the black score. Polar power assesses the extent to which the respondent believes they are in a power struggle with another group. It is measured by subtracting the amount of influence respondents believe blacks have from the level of influence they believe whites have. System blame is measured using a seven-point forced choice item that attributes black unemployment to individual failing, such as a lack of skills, or as a systemic problem, such as discrimination. Commitment to collective action is measured using a seven-point forced choice item with the belief blacks should work individually at one end and the belief blacks should organize on the other. The black group consciousness measure is the factor score from factor analyzing these measures. The measure has a mean of 0.55 (95% CI = [.58, .67]).

The model also accounts for other religious and social factors that influence both support for the religious belief systems and group consciousness. Religious characteristics are measured using the three dimensions of religion, belonging, behaving, and believing (Leege and Kellstedt 1993). Belonging is measured using the primary traditions highlighted in the study of black religion: Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, Pentecostals, and black congregations in predominantly white denominations (Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Pinn and Pinn 2002). Blacks in predominantly white congregations and those who do not affiliate with a church are the comparison category. Behaving is measured using frequency of worship service attendance. The believing measures are biblical literalism and images of God. Biblical literalism taken from the American National Election Study. The model accounts for images of God through the assessment of presence and judgment.

Social demographics are accounted for using age, sex, education, income, and ideology. The age measure is the natural log of the respondents’ age. Women make up 57.4 percent of the sample. Education is the highest degree received, while income is total family income. The median respondent has some college experience and a total family income between $40,000 and $49,999. Ideology is a seven-point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The sample is liberal leaning with a mean of 0.44 and less than a fifth (18.6%) of the sample identifies as conservative.

Results

Using the social and prosperity gospels, as examples, this paper contends variation in religious belief systems manifests itself in political behavior by influencing the level of racial group consciousness. The social gospel, which promotes social justice and communal beliefs, should be positively associated with group consciousness, while the prosperity gospel, which promotes gains through individual faith, will be negatively associated with it. To test these claims, group consciousness is regressed on the belief systems along with other religious and social demographic measures.

It would be remiss to begin the discussion of the results without considering some of the issues associated with the hypothesized relationships. Harris-Lacewell (2007a, 2007b), Harris (2012), and Spence (2015) contend these gospels produce variations racial group consciousness. However, it could be argued, variations in racial solidarity produce these gospels and people in turn use this to select their churches. These data cannot demonstrate the proper causal relationship or provide an emphatic answer regarding church selection; however, numerous studies offer evidence the causal direction posited is justified. First, McDaniel (2016) finds that frequency of hearing sermons about protecting the poor is related to support for the social gospel, but that exposure to these messages is not related to prosperity gospel support. More importantly, for this study, he also finds that exposure to sermons about racial equality is not related to support for either gospel. A second reason to reject the selection argument is that several of the prosperity gospel’s tenets have long been a part of the black religious discourse and its recent formulation has been a part of the black religious discourse for more than three decades (Bowler 2013; Harrison 2005; Mitchem 2007). Considering that religious values are developed at a young age (Fowler 1981), support for the prosperity gospel is the expected outcome of a religious socialization process that began at an early age. Third, people may be brought to prosperity gospel congregations for reasons outside of religious and political issues. McDaniel (2008) finds factors, such as worship service style, knowing someone at the church, or providing children’s activities, are more important for church selection than specific religious teachings or political views.⁹ Studies of prosperity gospel congregations note they are aware of these nonreligious factors and construct their worship services and programs to attract new members (Bowler 2013; Harrison 2005; Mitchem 2007). Once a person joins, they invest significant resources instructing them how to carry out their faith (Harrison 2005).¹⁰ Furthermore, clergy who are overzealous in their use of the prosperity gospel and ignore social justice issues face potential challenges from their members (for an example of a conflict see Mitchem 2007, 37–9).

To provide additional empirical evidence regarding the role of religious institutions in shaping support for these belief systems, I conducted a study of four churches in a southwestern city. The results, which are detailed in the appendix, demonstrate that the congregations can be differentiated by their support for these belief systems. In addition, the analysis of congregational exposure found that respondents who had regular and long-term exposure to the congregation were more likely to express levels of support for the prosperity gospel that were closer to the congregational mean. These results do not prove selection bias should be rejected; however, they are evidence that congregations matter.

Transitioning to the results from the regression analysis, the results demonstrate the hypothesized relationships. The social gospel is associated with higher levels of group consciousness, while the prosperity gospel is associated with lower levels. As stated above, for ease of interpretation, the variables are standardized to range zero to one, with corresponding values in between. Because of this, the coefficients represent the size of the difference in support for group consciousness between the lowest and highest values of the independent variables. Furthermore, the discussion of the predicted values refers to differences in support for the religious belief systems for the modal respondent, who is a Baptist woman at the mean level of all other variables.

The results, in Table 2, demonstrate that those with the highest level of support for the social gospel have a group consciousness score nineteen points higher than those with the lowest level of support. The predicted values demonstrate that those at the lowest level of social gospel support have a moderate level (0.44; 95% CI = [.36, .52]) of group consciousness, while those at the highest level of support possess a high level (0.63; 95% CI = [.56, .71]). For the prosperity gospel supporters, there is an eleven-point difference between those at the low and high ends. The predicted values demonstrate that a person with the lowest levels of support has a level of group consciousness near the mean (0.59; 95% CI = [.54, .64]), while those with the highest levels of support are well below the mean (0.48; 95% CI = [.41, .55]). A comparison of the coefficients for the religious belief systems shows they are statistically distinct (p value = .00).¹¹

Table 2.

OLS Analysis of the Relationship between Religious Belief Systems and Group Consciousness.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Social gospel	.194**	.092
Social gospel	(.071)	(.151)
Social Gospel × Attendance		.160
Social Gospel × Attendance		(.209)
Prosperity gospel			−.112*	−.047
Prosperity gospel			(.052)	(.105)
Prosperity Gospel × Attendance				−.110
Prosperity Gospel × Attendance				(.152)
Biblical literalism	.032	.030	.026	.023
Biblical literalism	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)
God involved	.080*	.078*	.088**	.086**
God involved	(.031)	(.032)	(.031)	(.031)
God judgment	.057*	.054^†	.039	.038
God judgment	(.029)	(.029)	(.028)	(.028)
Worship attendance	−.032	−.117	−.022	.022
Worship attendance	(.032)	(.116)	(.032)	(.070)
Catholic	−.001	.000	−.007	−.006
Catholic	(.045)	(.045)	(.046)	(.046)
Baptist	.022	.022	.013	.013
Baptist	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)
Methodist	.016	.015	−.004	−.004
Methodist	(.056)	(.056)	(.055)	(.055)
Pentecostal	.056	.056	.049	.050
Pentecostal	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)
Nontraditional	.002	.006	−.011	−.010
Nontraditional	(.028)	(.029)	(.028)	(.028)
Female	.003	.002	.005	.004
Female	(.019)	(.019)	(.018)	(.019)
Age (logged)	.080^†	.085*	.066	.067^†
Age (logged)	(.041)	(.042)	(.041)	(.041)
Education	.138*	.138*	.130^†	.128^†
Education	(.069)	(.070)	(.068)	(.068)
Income	.033	.034	.021	.024
Income	(.042)	(.042)	(.041)	(.041)
Conservative	−.025	−.025	−.016	−.017
Conservative	(.041)	(.041)	(.041)	(.041)
Constant	.188**	.243*	.363**	.339**
Constant	(.069)	(.100)	(.064)	(.072)
R ²	.097	.098	.081	.082
n	429	429	437	437

Source. 2012 Religious Worldviews Survey.

Robust standard errors in parenthesis. OLS = ordinary least squares.

†

p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. (Two-tailed tests)

These results support the argument that variations in religious belief systems correlate with variations in the levels of black group consciousness. However, many of the arguments regarding these belief systems link them to messages coming from congregations. The religion and politics literature demonstrates interactions with clergy and congregational members influence how individuals link their religious beliefs to politics (Djupe and Calfano 2013; Djupe and Gilbert 2009; McKenzie 2004; Wald 2003; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Harris-Lacewell’s (2004) examination of a predominantly black Baptist church in Durham, North Carolina, demonstrates how elite rhetoric and congregational interaction develop a shared social narrative. Putnam and Campbell’s (2010) case study of a black church, in Baltimore, highlighted how it used training sessions to impart their beliefs and procedures on new members. Finally, as noted above, studies of prosperity gospel congregations note these congregations actively inculcate their beliefs to members (Harrison 2005; Mitchem 2007). Collectively, these studies suggest exposure to religious institutions is important for explaining how these beliefs are connected to politics.

To establish the importance of religious institutions in connecting the social and prosperity gospels to politics, I interacted the belief systems with worship service attendance. The results, in Table 2, demonstrate neither interaction term is significant, meaning differences in attendance do not cause a significant change in the size of the coefficients. However, this does not indicate that the interaction cannot tell us more about how attendance changes the nature of the relationship between the belief systems and group consciousness. Kam and Franzese (2007, 20) state,

each variable involved in the interaction terms of interactive models has multiple effects, neither any single, constant effect, such as might be given by somehow by a single coefficient, nor a main effect and an interactive effect, such as might be given by some pair of coefficients, but multiple, different effects depending on the levels of the other variable(s) with which it interacts.

To obtain a more complete understanding of the interaction term, I examine the nature of the relationship at various levels of worship service attendance. Figure 1, shows the significance of the relationship between the belief systems and racial group consciousness is influenced by attendance. The social gospel’s relationship does not achieve significance (p < .10; two-tailed test) among those who never or rarely attend worship services. For the prosperity gospel the relationship is not significant for those who never, rarely or attend a few times a year. Among those who attend regularly, the relationships are statistically significant. Among the unchurched, we should accept the null hypothesis that there is no substantive relationship between these belief systems and group consciousness. Among those regularly exposed to worship services, there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The results in Figure 1 also demonstrate increased worship service attendance is associated with an increased gap between these belief systems and their relationship with group consciousness.

Figure 1.

Relationship between religious belief systems and group consciousness, given frequency of worship service attendance.

In sum, these results demonstrate variation in religious beliefs correlates with variation in levels of group consciousness. The social gospel is associated with its creation and maintenance, while the prosperity gospel is associated with its demise. However, the discernibility of the relationship between the prosperity gospel and group consciousness is conditional on the frequency of worship service exposure. Their relationships with group consciousness are only discernable among those who regularly attend services. This suggests the importance of the black religious experience in building racial solidarity is not in its ability to bring blacks together, but in its messages.

Conclusion

Group consciousness is critical to understanding collective behavior. By fostering a sense of identity and solidarity, it drives individuals to sacrifice and work for the greater good of the group. Over the past fifty years, African Americans have maintained a high and widespread level of group consciousness relative to other groups. This has assisted in the formation of a coherent and mobilized political coalition. Scholars have argued a primary source for the prominence of group consciousness is the prominence of the prophetic message in the black religious discourse. However, the recent advancement of messages emphasizing prosperity has brought the eminence of church’s prophetic voice into question and led many to question if the black church is helpful or harmful for building black political solidarity (Harris-Lacewell 2007a, 2007b; Harris 2012). This paper is the first to empirically assess how the prophetic and prosperous beliefs systems are associated with racial solidarity.

Using a national survey of black Americans allows me to measure support for the social gospel, prosperity gospel, and racial group consciousness. The results provide evidence the social gospel is associated with the endurance of black racial group consciousness, while the prosperity is associated with its erosion. Furthermore, the results demonstrate the relationship is only salient among those who are regularly exposed to religious services. These findings demonstrate the relevance of Harris-Lacewell’s (2007a) call for increased attentiveness to the ideas that people encounter when exposed to these institutions. Under certain circumstances, institutions associated with group solidarity may actually undermine it.

The results also illuminate how members of the black religious community have reacted to recent political events, such as the ascendancy of Donald Trump to President of the United States. Several commentators noted that most black churches and religious leaders rejected his message. Those who embraced it where overwhelmingly associated with the prosperity gospel (Butler 2016; Gjelten 2017; Weigel 2016). Despite the rise of prosperity gospel, the social gospel is still vibrant in the black religious discourse. The actions of Rev. William Barber III, who through the North Carolina National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and several other organizations launched the Moral Mondays protests (Barber and Wilson-Hartgrove 2016) and relaunched the Poor People’s Campaign, showcase the strength of the social gospel in black politics. As religious leaders in the black religious discourse respond to the various problems plaguing the black community and the nation, we should expect both belief systems to be used as justifications for their actions.

Finally, more needs to be done to establish the causal order of these relationships. Specifically, what is the nature of the relationship between group consciousness and belief system support and might it be reciprocal? As the study of group consciousness continues, hopefully scholars will remain aware of these issues as they help advance our understanding of the roots of group consciousness and how indigenous institutions can help or hinder group cohesion.

Footnotes

Appendix

To demonstrate the connection between these beliefs and religious context, I conducted a localized study of four predominantly black congregations. These congregation level surveys were administered over a two-month period in the spring of 2012, yielding 103 respondents. Churches 1 and 4 are Baptist churches, Church 3 is a Methodist church, and Church 2 is a Pentecostal church. Through participant observation, I categorized the church pastors regarding their support of the social and prosperity gospels. The pastors of Churches 1 and 4 are more supportive of the social gospel. Specifically, Church 1’s pastor actively frames activities to improve community relations and protecting of poorer city residents as a religious duty. The pastors of Churches 2 and 3 hold higher levels of support for the prosperity gospel. Church 3’s pastor emphasizes that through donating to the church, such as regularly tithing, that one can become successful in their careers, personal relationships and finances.

The results from the surveys, in Table A3, demonstrate that these congregations vary in their support for these belief systems. Church 4’s members are more supportive of the social gospel than Churches 2 (p value = .07) and 3 (p value = .10). Furthermore, Church 3’s members are more supportive of the prosperity gospel than the members of Churches 1 (p value = .05) and 4 (p value = .08).

Beyond congregational level differences, I am concerned with how exposure influences support for these belief systems. To test if exposure mattered, I examine the distance between the respondent and the congregational regarding support for each belief system. The distance measure is the absolute value of the congregational mean subtracted from the respondent’s score on each of the belief systems. I choose to use the congregational mean, because the studies of how congregations socialize members find that the individual congregants are more likely to regularly interact other members, than regularly interact with the pastor. Because of this, most of the socialization comes from other members, not the pastor (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988).To assess the relationship between congregational exposure and support, I regressed the difference for each belief system on years of membership and frequency of worship attendance. The model also accounts for age, sex, education, income, and congregational membership. Years of membership and age are both logged and scaled to range from zero to one.

The results in Table A4 demonstrate that exposure is only related to the prosperity gospel difference. However, years of membership and attendance are in different directions. Years of membership is associated with a smaller gap, while attendance is associated with a larger gap. To clarify this finding, I interacted years of membership with frequency of attendance to see if their relationship with distance is conditional upon each other.

The results in Figure A1 reveal that the interaction term is negative indicating that as years of membership and attendance increase, the gap reduces. However, Figure A1 demonstrates how the nature of the relationship between years of membership and differences changes given frequency of attendance. The results show that membership length lacks a significant relationship with prosperity gospel distance, until the frequency of attendance reaches every few weeks (p value = .08). The length of membership is significantly related to a reduced distance in support for the prosperity gospel among those who attend at least every few weeks. As in the above analysis, exposure to religious institutions moderates how the prosperity gospel’s impact on people’s religious and political beliefs. Figure A1 also demonstrates that as attendance increases the relationship between length of membership and distance changes; however, increased attendance renders this relationship insignificant.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research was funded through a grant from the National Science Foundation. Award No. SES-1061245.

Notes

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