Sexual Violence Against Men in Civil Conflict

Abstract

Sexual violence against men in conflict settings is neither a rare nor recent phenomenon, yet its absence in academic scholarship and humanitarian initiatives remains glaring. Despite the advances in our understanding of the determinants of wartime sexual violence against women, surprisingly little empirical research exists on sexual violence against men in conflict. Acts of sexual violence are commonly enacted against men in war, yet because they do not fit more narrow definitions of rape, accounts of these experiences are often misclassified as “torture.” Moreover, in many countries experiencing pervasive conflict-related sexual violence, there exist restrictive laws regarding sodomy and homosexuality, reducing the chances that males will report their experiences. Using originally coded data on sexual and gender identity laws and reported incidents of sexual violence in civil conflict, I find that laws that outline the protection of sexual and gender identity expression including the decriminalization of same-sex activity are significantly associated with reports of acts of sexual violence against men. The results speak to the gap in the literature on male sexual violence with tangible consequences for the distribution of humanitarian aid, availability of medical and psychological services for victims, and aims of peacekeeping missions.

Keywords

civil conflict sexual violence civilian victimization

Introduction

Civilian victimization includes a broad array of violent acts (e.g., torture, mutilation, looting of private property) and targeting strategies (e.g., discriminate versus indiscriminate). Recent work has emphasized the need to understand the conditions under which actors commit acts of sexual violence and predict when civilians (particularly members of minority groups) will be targets (Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell 2007; Cohen 2013 2016; Cohen and Nordås 2014; Doctor 2021; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009; Johansson and Hultman 2019; Karim and Beardsley 2022; Leiby 2009; Loken 2017; Nagel 2021; Soules 2023; Wood 2008 2009). Beyond the immediate societal and individual consequences of sexual violence during war, this particular form of violence has important negative downstream consequences for post-conflict peace and reconstruction. However, while early research into wartime sexual violence suggested that most conflicts involve some level of rape and sexual abuse of women specifically (Benard 1994), sexual violence against males is often underreported (Sivakumaran 2007); moreover, the empirical literature on sexual violence has largely ignored reports of male victims. Why is male sexual violence understudied and underreported?

This is the first study to evaluate empirically the effect of domestic laws on reports of sexual violence against males in civil conflict.¹ In so doing, this research contributes to the burgeoning positivist literature on gender and civilian victimization in conflict studies. Using new data on sexual and gender identity laws and reported incidents of sexual violence in conflict, I find that laws that outline the protection of sexual and gender identity expression including the decriminalization of same-sex activity and gender expression are significantly associated with increased reporting of acts of sexual violence against men in civil conflict. The results speak to the gap in the literature on male sexual violence with tangible consequences for the distribution of humanitarian aid, availability of medical and psychological services for victims, and aims of peacekeeping missions.

Below, I review the state of the literature on sexual violence perpetrated against men in conflict and aver that the currently accepted definition of gender-based violence (GBV) may be contributing to the dearth of quantitative research in the area, as well as the under-reporting of male sexual violence during wartime. Next, I turn to my core argument concerning the distinction in the impetus for sexual violence perpetrated against men and how domestic laws regarding sexual and gender identity expression may work to increase the identification and reporting of men as victims of sexual violence in specifically civil conflict. I then discuss the original data coding of domestic sexual and gender identity laws and the findings from the empirical analyses. I use a series of statistical tests, including an instrumental variables analysis, to identify patterns in reporting sexual violence against men in civil conflict based on the presence or absence of these domestic laws. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for the study of male sexual violence and a call for further research.

Sexual Violence Against Men in Civil Conflict

Despite the progress that has been made regarding the causes of sexual violence against women, surprisingly little empirical work, particularly cross-national, has been conducted on male sexual violence. In part, this is due to the systematic under-reporting of male sexual violence both from authorities and from victims. Acts of sexual violence such as genital mutilation, enforced sterilization, and forced penetration are commonly enacted against men (Sivakumaran 2007), yet because they do not fit narrow definitions of sexual violence, men’s accounts of these experiences are often misclassified as “torture” (Carlson 2006; Carpenter 2006).

The definition of gender-based violence (GBV) is itself contested, and no single conceptualization has been universally accepted; most definitions broadly characterize GBV as violence targeted toward an individual because of their gender or as a result of “gendered power inequities” (Carpenter 2006, 85). Though such descriptions are gender-neutral, their interpretation and application in legal settings have led to a functional focus on the experiences of women as victims of violence in conflict. This gender disparity is exacerbated when the study of GBV is narrowed to perpetration of sexual violence. The attention devoted to female victims in this domain is certainly not unwarranted, as women and girls have long disproportionately been the victims of sexual violence in times of both peace and conflict. It is problematic on many fronts, however, for our knowledge of men as victims: understanding the determinants and prevalence of sexual violence against men depends on a functionally gender-inclusive definition of GBV.

Narrow definitions of sexual violence are just one contributing factor to the misclassification and under-reporting of sexual violence against men. Although the empirical literature on male sexual violence is sparse, significant qualitative interviews offer insight into this phenomenon and the lack of reporting, particularly from the victim’s perspective. The causal impetus for the act of male sexual violence is intimately linked to many male victims’ own reticence to report this violence. Interviews with victims suggest that male sexual violence is not simply born out of biological, sexual motivations, as opportunistic theories would suggest² but is a deliberate act intended to shame its victims. Sexual violence is an act of power and dominance (Sivakumaran 2007). This is not unlike the motivations for sexual violence against women. For women, whose sexual virtue is almost deified in many cultures, rape is a literal attack on the woman victim, as well as a design to impugn her virtue and that of her larger community, which is required to protect the sexual virtue of its women (Hansen and Wahlberg 2008; Koo 2002). In cultures wherein women’s political participation is already tenuous, sexual violence can further act to remove the role of women in political life.

However, the shame induced on male victims of wartime sexual violence is arguably distinct from that of women in two respects: sexual violence against men is specifically an attack on their sexual and gender identity. First, sexual violence against men in conflict is an attack on men’s sexual identity. Being a victim of male sexual violence, particularly penetrative rape, is often perceived by witnesses, community members, and even aid workers, as evidence of homosexuality. This is especially the case as civil conflict often occurs in contexts where homosexuality is illegal if not simply stigmatized (Solangon and Patel 2012). For example, in countries within Africa, like Uganda, where anti-gay legislation and discrimination, hostility, and violence toward homosexuals is commonplace, the media describes male sexual violence as “endemic” to conflict (Storr 2011). Yet, despite its anecdotal regularity, the Médecins Sans Frontières, for example, only documented six percent of its sexual violence victims as male (Médecins Sans Frontières 2009; Solangon and Patel 2012).

The homosexual myth around male sexual violence originates in “classical” views of masculinity, namely, that men ought to be “strong, assertive, sexually dominant, and heterosexual” (Herek 1986, as quoted in Davies 2002, 204). In this narrative context, non-sexually dominant males are viewed as “gay” or “other” explaining why—even in cases of female perpetrators of sexual violence against male victims—the sexual identity of the man is called into question, or the act of violence is dismissed as impossible (e.g., the related myth that males cannot be raped, particularly by females). This is evident even in our usage of language to describe sexual violence against males; male rape implies “male on male rape.” Male rape usually is not referring to the female rape of male victims; special reference must be made to these cases for the audience to include male victims of female perpetrators into their consideration (Sivakumaran 2005). Moreover, Sivakumaran (2005) notes the difference between “male on male rape” and “homosexual rape” more specifically. Not all male perpetrators of male sexual violence are homosexual; some scholars would suggest that even the majority of male perpetrators of sexual violence against other males are heterosexual (Pinar 2001; Seaton 2002). The very assumption is evidence of the stigmatization of male victims of sexual violence. Sivakumaran (2005) argues this implicit homophobia has directly impacted human rights legislation surrounding male rape and ultimately the reporting and classification of cases of male sexual violence.

Second, the sexual subordination of male rape victims is an act challenging men’s gender identity. A content analysis of interviews with male survivors of sexual abuse reports victims’ fears of having “lost their manhood,” an internalization of the cultural emasculation of male victims (Lisak 1994). Depending on the nature of the conflict, the gender identity of male victims of sexual violence may be challenged on one or multiple dimensions. Eichert (2019) notes that this process of feminization (or “othering”) subordinates these males in victims’ roles, impacting the male victim on an individual level, as perpetrators weaponize a victim’s masculinity and bodily integrity; on a group level, as perpetrators signal their own masculinity to in-group members, further “othering” out-group victims; and on a community level, as perpetrators assert their dominance, politicizing gender norms throughout the community (Eichert 2019).

While women victims of sexual violence similarly experience the lowering of status, ostracization, and even death as a potential penalty for their abuse, women victims of sexual violence arguably do not experience the same loss of gender identity, perhaps even more so in societies which assign little status to the identity of “woman” in the first place. Losing their gender identity is a distinct feature of sexual violence against men. Because of the attack on sociocultural norms of power, female rape of males is also often viewed as an emasculation of men. Thus, the shame imparted to male victims is arguably essentially different from the shame imparted to female victims. Although Eichert (2019) argues that the theoretical distinction between “homosexualization” and “feminization” is practically irrelevant in cases where a male victim is subjected to severe punishment for being raped, considering the distinct motivations for male sexual violence is more than theoretically important. That male sexual violence is causally distinct from sexual violence against women is also meaningful in understanding what policies or interventions may lead to its prevention.

Domestic Laws and the Reporting of Male Sexual Violence

The efficacy of endorsing human rights legislation in reducing instances of abuse has long been the subject of debate in the scholarly literature (for a sampling of this vast literature, see Abbott and Snidal 2000; Cassel 2001; Cingranelli and Richards 2010; Conrad and Ritter 2019; Fariss and Dancy 2017; Goodman and Jinks 2003; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Hill 2010; Moravcsik 2003; Neumayer 2005; Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons 2006 2009; Vreeland 2008; Welch, DeMeritt, and Conrad 2021). Among scholars, diverse viewpoints emerge: some contend that human rights laws lack effectiveness in curbing abuses, while others find these laws to be beneficial in certain contexts, particularly in democratizing or established democratic regimes (Neumayer 2005; Simmons 2006 2009). While the first wave of research on this subject largely examined the role of international human rights treaties, Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011) and Lupu (2013), among others (Powell and Staton 2009), contend that domestic institutions are as important, if not more so than international rights laws themselves, in establishing effective human rights regimes. A subsequent wave of research focusing on domestic laws, beyond the judicial enforcement of international human rights laws, has shown originally drafted domestic legislation to be particularly effective in preventing human rights abuses (Haglund and Richards 2018; Richards and Haglund 2015).

Even when laws do not lead to better on the ground practices, they can work to reveal existing abuse (Goodman and Jinks 2003). For example, domestic sexual violence laws are likely to result in more rape claims (Bachman and Smith 1992), regardless of the underlying true rate of rape, suggesting that such laws, if they work, do so by first increasing awareness and documentation of abuses. Bollen notes: “Ironically, it is possible that a nation which is relatively open may appear lower in rights and liberties simply because violations are more likely to be reported to the outside world” (1986, 580–581). Practitioners and activists are often a bit more hopeful, arguing that changes in laws can work to create change in norms and beliefs, and over time, changes in behavior (Abbott and Snidal 2000).

Indeed, with respect to women, research by Haglund and Richards (2018) found that domestic laws regarding violence against women can be successful in post-civil war states in changing the “culture of impunity” (Asia Justice and Rights 2015, as quoted in Haglund and Richards 2018, 280). Arguably, the adoption of such laws has led to increased accountability and reporting of women victims of sexual violence (Dolan 2017),³ if not necessarily changes in behavior. To be sure, while the implementation of these types of domestic laws has not stopped sexual violence against women and girls, in the least, such legislative changes have impacted the recognition of sexual violence as a tactic of war utilized against women in conflict.

While the establishment of these domestic laws has strengthened the recognition of the severity of sexual violence against women in these countries (Haglund and Richards 2018), the same is arguably not the case for men. There is simply not the legal recognition of gender-based crimes, including sexual violence impacting men as well as women, on an international or domestic level, which can work against the recognition and reporting of male sexual violence (Dolan 2017). The absence of the legal recognition of males as victims of sexual violence in conflict has led to significant under-reporting, both by victims (e.g., lack of recognition of the nature of the event itself by the male victim) and by others (e.g., witnesses, police, and even doctors and aid workers).

At the same time, in many countries experiencing pervasive conflict-related sexual violence, there exist restrictive domestic laws regarding sodomy and homosexuality; these laws incite fear and shame in male victims, reducing the chances that they will report their experiences (Eichert 2019; Touquet and Gorris 2016). For example, male sex workers in India describe an internalization of the country’s laws and norms surrounding male sexual violence. Rape, without protection, is pervasive, often leading to social isolation, unemployment, and homelessness (Ganju and Saggurti 2017). Respondents frequently report psychosocial distress, feelings of intense shame and isolation, leading to low self-efficacy and an inability to challenge or report abuse. Interpersonally, the stigma around homosexuality leads to disparities in seeking essential aid and health care (Ganju and Saggurti 2017). Even as the international community develops an awareness of sexual violence against males, domestic laws threaten to subject male victims of sexual violence to prosecution in cases when the aggressor is male. Doctors and aid workers who are trained to identify male sexual violence as such become reluctant to do so in cases where domestic laws may additionally penalize male victims for homosexuality (Gorris 2015).

Sexual violence against males is not only underreported because of potential prosecution, in many states, sexual violence against males is not legally codified. For example, in Hong Kong, Section 118 of the Crime Ordinance (Cap. 200) defines rape as the “non-consensual penile penetration of a woman’s vagina.” That the domestic legal definition of rape only describes the male rape of the female restricts the legal capacity to identify and prosecute male perpetrators of sexual violence against other males (or sexual violence perpetrated by women against male victims). Decriminalization of homosexuality allows for the legal recognition of males as possible victims of rape (and other forms of sexual violence), particularly by other males.

Similarly, such heteronormative rape laws deny the potentiality of female perpetrators. Gender identity laws work against the “feminization” or “othering” of male victims. As these laws protect the rights of individuals to gender identity and expression potentially different from that traditionally associated with their assigned sex at birth, strict male-female binary divisions, and associated assumptions about dominant and subordinate hierarchies, are relaxed, with consequences legally and communally. Male victims of sexual violence, who may otherwise be seen as in a subordinate—and thus, from the perspective of traditional gender hierarchy, feminine—role, can be victims and be male. From a legal standpoint, gender identity laws allow male victims to be identified and reported; moreover, gender identity laws destigmatize perceptions of male victimization, reducing shame and fear in reporting, both as an individual victim and as witnesses to sexual violence against men. Male victims do not have to be feminized or othered to be recognized as victims of sexual violence.

Thus, we would expect that the adoption of domestic laws, specifically those respecting homosexuality and gender identity, should increase awareness, identification, and reporting of male sexual violence in civil conflict.

Hypothesis 1

Domestic laws that protect rights of sexual expression will increase the likelihood of reporting sexual violence against males in civil conflict.

Hypothesis 2

Domestic laws that protect gender identity rights will increase the likelihood of reporting sexual violence against males in civil conflict.

Data and Empirical Analyses

To analyze the effect of these domestic laws on reports of sexual violence against males in civil conflict, I use data on the victims of sexual violence from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Cohen and Nordås 2014) in conjunction with the Uppsala Conflict Data Project’s (UCDP) dataset of internal armed conflicts that reach a 25 battle-death threshold between the years 1989 and 2011.⁴ The unit of analysis is the conflict-dyad-year following the UCDP inclusion criteria. The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset captures six dimensions of sexual violence: prevalence, perpetrators, victims, forms, location,⁵ and timing (Cohen and Nordås 2014). I employ their definition of sexual violence as including any of the following: (1) rape; (2) sexual slavery; (3) forced prostitution; (4) forced sterilization as well as sexual mutilation, and (5) sexual torture (Cohen and Nordås 2014; see also Wood 2009). I use information on the reported sex of the victims of sexual violence, male or female, from this dataset.⁶ A dichotomous variable, male sexual violence, is coded one if the rebel group or state involved in the conflict reportedly committed sexual violence against men and zero otherwise.⁷

Measuring Same-Sex and Gender Identity Rights

Data on domestic laws, specifically laws passed to protect same-sex activity and the right to self-defined gender expression, were coded for all states over the study period using primary and secondary academic sources, including sources found in LexisNexis Academic, Keesing’s Record of World Events, Factiva, as well as encyclopedias of LGBT rights by country. The process was conducted chronologically from the first country-year observation until the last country-year observation in the dataframe, the period in which the state was considered to be in a civil conflict with one or more rebel groups (according to the UCDP’s inclusion criteria), including dyad-years prior to 1989 if the war occurred in the period 1989–2011. Information on the type of right was recorded, the date of its passage, and the source(s) were coded.

Based on this data, I then created two dichotomous measures indicating the presence of one or more domestic laws protecting same-sex activity and gender identity, respectively. The dichotomous variable same-sex activity laws is coded as one if one or more laws protecting engagement in same-sex activity were in effect in the country in a given year, and zero otherwise. Specifically, these are laws legalizing same-sex activity for males or females. The dichotomous variable gender identity laws is coded as one if one or more laws protecting a person’s gender identity/expression are in effect in the country in a given year, and zero otherwise. For example, these are laws permitting a legal gender change on government issued documents (e.g., driver’s license), or laws stating that legal gender change is recognized as a constitutional right.⁸

Rights impacting same-sex activity and gender expression differ substantially from country to country and over time. Laws decriminalizing same-sex activities are present in all regions across the globe and in approximately 33 percent of all conflict-dyad-years. Laws protecting rights to gender identity/expression are rarer; specifically, gender identity laws exist in countries experiencing civil conflict in approximately 7 percent of all conflict-dyad-years. During the period of the study, as a proportion of the total number of conflict years in the region, laws protecting sexual or gender identity rights are most prevalent in the Americas and least prevalent in Africa. Homosexuality is criminalized more in Africa than in other regions across the globe during the study period. Moreover, Africa does not have legal protections for gender identity/reassignment during the conflict-dyad-years included in the study period. Please see Appendix Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 for descriptive statistics. I assess the dual hypotheses using these two key measures of domestic laws regarding sexual expression and gender identity.

Alternative Explanations

I include theoretically informed covariates that prior literature indicates likely impact the probability of reporting male sexual violence in civil conflict and are correlated with domestic sexual expression and gender identity rights. These include covariates at the rebel group level, characteristics of the conflict itself, state characteristics, and measures of international intervention.⁹

First, at the group level, I include a measure of territorial control from the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013) as previous research suggests that abuse is more likely to occur in areas of contested control (Kalyvas 2006).¹⁰ Stronger rebels are both more likely to gain and control territory as well as the local population, providing more powerful rebels with the opportunity to commit unimpeded acts of civilian victimization and sexual violence. I account for this by including an indicator of troop strength, measured as the number of rebel troops (and state troops, natural log transformed), coded from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.¹¹ In addition, I control for rebel contraband funding and recruitment practices of the group (Cohen 2013; Sawyer and Andrews 2020; Soules 2023), specifically, whether they engage in rebel abduction which Cohen (2013) shows to be associated with sexual violence. Rebels with access to contraband funding may be less accountable to the local population, and therefore exhibit less restraint with respect to civilian abuse. Conversely, rebels that engage in more democratic governance practices, such as including civilians in the elections of leaders (Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer 2021), are more likely accountable to the local population. Thus, I incorporate a measure of rebel democratic governance, specifically a dichotomous variable indicating that the rebel leader came to power via elections (Cunningham and Sawyer 2019), as research suggests leader selection practices impact the likelihood of sexual violence (Sawyer, Bond, and Cunningham 2021).

With respect to characteristics of the conflict, I include two dichotomous measures of the nature of the conflict incompatibility, whether it is fought over territory or religion (as opposed to an ethnic conflict), as some researchers argue that civilian victimization is more likely to occur in wars over specific intractabilities (e.g., ethnic conflict, Bloom 1999; Plümper and Neumayer 2006). The intensity of the conflict, particularly conflicts with a high degree of fatalities, may also be related to civilian victimization. As conflict fatalities may create disorder that works to decrease command control and provides opportunities for agents to commit sexual violence, I incorporate a measure of battle deaths (natural log transformed) from UCDP.¹² Finally, as reports of sexual violence against men are likely correlated with reports of sexual violence against women, I include a dichotomous measure of reports of sexual violence against women coded from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Cohen and Nordås 2014).¹³

At the state level, I include controls for factors likely correlated with laws protecting rights and male civilian victimization. First, I include a dichotomous measure of democracy coded from the revised Polity IV index (Gleditsch 2013) as whether a state is democratic is likely correlated with both the passage of domestic rights laws and civilian abuse.¹⁴ Drawing on the work of Bloom (1999) and Plümper and Neumayer (2006) that suggest civilian victimization is more common in ethnic conflicts, I include a measure of ethnic fractionalization at the country level.¹⁵ Similar to democracy, GDP per capita is expected to act as a constraining force against the use of sexual violence against civilians during wartime (Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell 2007).¹⁶ Conversely, as the state’s population increases, the potential opportunity for sexual violence increases. I include the size of the state’s population (natural log transformed).¹⁷

Finally, I account for the likely impact of international intervention on both domestic law processes and civilian victimization practices. I include a dichotomous measure of external financial support provided by other states, rebels, or international actors external to the civil conflict to the rebels and the state using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support Dataset.¹⁸ I also account for external military intervention using a dichotomous indicator of direct military intervention from D. Cunningham (2010).

Results

Table 1 reports the results of four probit models examining the effect of domestic laws protecting same sex activity on the probability of reports of male sexual violence in a given conflict-dyad-year. I iteratively add covariates in Models 1–4 accounting for characteristics of the rebel group (Model 1), conflict dynamics (Model 2), state characteristics (Model 3), and international intervention (Model 4). The results reported in Table 1 provide substantial support for the argument. Across all model specifications, domestic laws protecting rights to same sex activity increase the probability of reports of male sexual violence (p < 0.05) while accounting for differences in characteristics of the rebel group (Model 1), conflict dynamics (Model 2), state characteristics (Model 3), and international intervention (Model 4).

Table 1.

Probit Models—Sexual Expression Laws and Reports of Sexual Violence Against Men.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men
Same-sex laws	0.389***	0.459***	0.532***	0.510**
Same-sex laws	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.200)	(0.201)
Territorial control	−0.0350	−0.106	−0.0569	−0.0722
Territorial control	(0.120)	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.159)
ln (Troop size – Rebel)	−0.00333	−0.0407	0.0127	0.0242
ln (Troop size – Rebel)	(0.0344)	(0.0448)	(0.0493)	(0.0501)
ln (Troop size – State)	−0.0259	−0.0650*	−0.178***	−0.145***
ln (Troop size – State)	(0.0339)	(0.0383)	(0.0546)	(0.0538)
Contraband funding	0.309*	0.358	−0.0442	−0.130
Contraband funding	(0.183)	(0.229)	(0.245)	(0.255)
Rebel abduction	−0.424**	−0.443	−0.0522	0.00200
Rebel abduction	(0.210)	(0.300)	(0.289)	(0.296)
Rebel leader election	0.0567	0.0796	0.120	−0.0852
Rebel leader election	(0.311)	(0.356)	(0.359)	(0.385)
Incompatibility		0.131	0.257	0.117
Incompatibility		(0.146)	(0.164)	(0.166)
Religion		−0.0365	−0.0142	−0.00476
Religion		(0.0276)	(0.0259)	(0.0281)
ln (Battle deaths – Best)		0.150***	0.135***	0.158***
ln (Battle deaths – Best)		(0.0428)	(0.0469)	(0.0490)
Sexual violence – Women		−0.694***	−0.710***	−0.742***
Sexual violence – Women		(0.133)	(0.146)	(0.153)
Democracy			0.171	0.291
Democracy			(0.199)	(0.208)
Ethnic fractionalization			0.946**	0.770**
Ethnic fractionalization			(0.376)	(0.375)
ln (Population)			0.156**	0.110
ln (Population)			(0.0681)	(0.0697)
ln (GDPpc)			0.177	0.193*
ln (GDPpc)			(0.111)	(0.105)
Intervention				0.602**
Intervention				(0.262)
External funds – Rebel				−0.374**
External funds – Rebel				(0.170)
External funds – State				−0.263
External funds – State				(0.184)
Constant	−1.247**	−1.122*	−4.003***	−3.830***
Constant	(0.496)	(0.611)	(1.305)	(1.298)

Observations	1127	876	843	843

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

On average, same-sex laws increase the predicted probability of reporting sexual violence against males in civil conflict by approximately 7.41 percentage points (p < 0.05), from approximately 6.04 percent to 13.45 percent.¹⁹ In addition, the analyses suggest several other factors impact the probability of reports of male sexual violence including the size of the state’s army, battle deaths, reports of sexual violence against women in conflict, the level of ethnic fractionalization in a country, and external intervention in the civil conflict (both financial support to the rebels and military intervention). On average, as the size of the state’s army increases, from the first quartile to the third quartile,²⁰ reports of male sexual violence decrease by approximately 3.64 percentage points (p < 0.01), from approximately 10.37 percent to 6.73 percent. On the other hand, battle deaths on average increase the predicted probability of reports of male sexual violence by approximately 5.77 percentage points. As battle deaths increase from the first to the third quartile,²¹ the predicted probability of reports of sexual violence against males increase from approximately 5.11 percent to 10.88 percent (p < 0.01). Sexual violence against men is less likely to be reported in civil conflicts with reports of sexual violence against women (p < 0.01). In civil conflicts where sexual violence is reported against women, the average predicted probability of reporting sexual violence against males is approximately 4.06 percent, as opposed to conflicts where sexual violence against women is not reported, approximately 14.00 percent. Ethnic fractionalization is positively associated with reports of sexual violence against men; specifically, an increase in ethnic fractionalization from the first to the third quartile²² is associated on average with a 3.54 percentage point increase in reports of sexual violence against men, from approximately 7.32 percent to approximately 10.86 percent (p < 0.05).

External funding provided to rebels is associated with a decreased predicted probability of reports of sexual violence against males in civil conflict by approximately 4.50 percentage points (p < 0.05), from approximately 9.82 percent to 5.32 percent. Conversely, civil conflicts with military international intervention are on average more likely to see reports of sexual violence against males by approximately 10.36 percentage points, from approximately 7.60 percent, absent intervention, to approximately 17.96 percent, with international military intervention (p < 0.05). International intervention may be more likely to occur in conflicts with civilian victimization; it may also be the case that international intervention provides the resources, and the witnesses, to report male victimization.

Table 2 reports the results of four probit models examining the effect of domestic laws protecting gender identity on the probability of male sexual violence in a given dyadic-conflict year. Similarly, I iteratively add controls in Models 1–4 for characteristics of the rebel group (Model 1), conflict dynamics (Model 2), state characteristics (Model 3), and international intervention (Model 4). Across all model specifications, domestic laws protecting rights to gender identity increase the probability of reports of male sexual violence (p < 0.05) while accounting for differences in characteristics of the rebel group (Model 1), conflict dynamics (Model 2), state characteristics (Model 3), and international intervention (Model 4).

Table 2.

Probit Models—Gender Identity Laws and Reports of Sexual Violence Against Men.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men
Gender identity laws	0.641***	0.791***	0.930***	0.868***
Gender identity laws	(0.174)	(0.209)	(0.271)	(0.275)
Territorial control	−0.0621	−0.174	−0.122	−0.136
Territorial control	(0.117)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.157)
ln (Troop size – Rebel)	−0.00820	−0.0433	−0.00714	0.00506
ln (Troop size – Rebel)	(0.0338)	(0.0440)	(0.0485)	(0.0500)
ln (Troop size – State)	−0.0369	−0.0797**	−0.214***	−0.183***
ln (Troop size – State)	(0.0336)	(0.0375)	(0.0559)	(0.0550)
Contraband funding	0.282	0.367	0.0225	−0.0666
Contraband funding	(0.173)	(0.225)	(0.245)	(0.260)
Rebel abduction	−0.232	−0.344	−0.0853	−0.0607
Rebel abduction	(0.200)	(0.301)	(0.292)	(0.301)
Rebel leader election	−0.0465	−0.0457	0.0253	−0.173
Rebel leader election	(0.313)	(0.361)	(0.375)	(0.402)
Incompatibility		0.222	0.365**	0.241
Incompatibility		(0.158)	(0.175)	(0.182)
Religion		−0.0592**	−0.0311	−0.0235
Religion		(0.0289)	(0.0274)	(0.0293)
ln (Battle deaths – Best)		0.138***	0.120**	0.140***
ln (Battle deaths – Best)		(0.0418)	(0.0475)	(0.0497)
Sexual violence – Women		−0.682***	−0.662***	−0.704***
Sexual violence – Women		(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.153)
Democracy			0.253	0.378*
Democracy			(0.200)	(0.215)
Ethnic fractionalization			0.181	0.0873
Ethnic fractionalization			(0.302)	(0.321)
ln (Population)			0.195***	0.148**
ln (Population)			(0.0713)	(0.0741)
ln (GDPpc)			0.00894	0.0433
ln (GDPpc)			(0.120)	(0.118)
Intervention				0.630**
Intervention				(0.249)
External funds – Rebel				−0.291*
External funds – Rebel				(0.172)
External funds – State				−0.273
External funds – State				(0.191)
Constant	−0.999**	−0.883	−2.110	−2.109
Constant	(0.486)	(0.616)	(1.300)	(1.326)
Observations	1127	876	843	843

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Substantively, gender identity laws increase the predicted probability of reporting sexual violence against males in civil conflict by approximately 16.88 percentage points on average (p < 0.01), from approximately 7.09 percent to 23.97 percent.²³ Similar to the results with respect to same-sex laws, the analyses reported in Table 2 indicate consistent results with respect to several other variables including the size of the state’s army, battle deaths, reports of sexual violence against women, external intervention in the civil conflict, and specific to the analyses reported in Table 2, the size of the country’s population. On average, as the size of the state’s army increases, from the first quartile to the third quartile,²⁴ reports of male sexual violence decrease by approximately 4.55 percentage points (p < 0.01), from approximately 11.03 percent to 6.48 percent. As battle deaths increase from the first to the third quartile,²⁵ the average predicted probability of reports of sexual violence against males increases by approximately 5.12 percentage points, from 5.40 percent to 10.52 percent (p < 0.01). Reports of sexual violence against males are less likely to co-occur in civil conflicts with reports of sexual violence against women by approximately 9.37 percentage points (p < 0.01), a decrease from an average predicted probability of approximately 13.60 percent to 4.23 percent.

The size of a state’s population is positively correlated with reports of male sexual violence. Specifically, as the size of the population increases, from the first to the third quartile,²⁶ the average predicted probability of reported male sexual violence increases by approximately 3.28 percentage points (p < 0.05), from approximately 6.37 percent to 9.65 percent. Independent military intervention increases the average predicted probability of reporting sexual violence against males, by approximately 10.86 percentage points (p < 0.05), from 7.57 percent to 18.43 percent.

Relatedly, we may expect that these types of domestic rights laws would increase the reporting of any target of sexual abuse, male or female. Parallel models, reported in Table 3, examining changes in reports of sexual violence against women during the same period do not show a statistically significant, positive association between same-sex (Model 1) and gender identity laws (Model 2) and reports of sexual violence against women. In fact, gender identity laws have a statistically significant, negative association with reports of sexual violence against women (Model 2; p < 0.01). Together, the results suggest that these laws do not increase the reporting of sexual violence against women but are specifically associated with identifying and reporting sexual violence against males. Moreover, in as much as changes in reports represents analogous changes in the true rate of sexual violence, laws that protect gender identity may also work to decrease sexual violence against women (Model 2; p < 0.01).

Table 3.

Probit Models—Sexual Expression and Gender Identity Laws and Reports of Sexual Violence Against Women.

Variables	(1)	(2)
Variables	Sexual Violence – Women	Sexual Violence – Women
Same-sex laws	0.120
Same-sex laws	(0.157)
Gender identity laws		−0.899***
Gender identity laws		(0.240)
Territorial control	−0.0755	−0.0783
Territorial control	(0.108)	(0.109)
ln (Troop ratio)	0.0513*	0.0552*
ln (Troop ratio)	(0.0292)	(0.0294)
Contraband funding	−0.608***	−0.726***
Contraband funding	(0.177)	(0.183)
Rebel abduction	0.503**	0.677***
Rebel abduction	(0.211)	(0.216)
Rebel leader election	−0.551**	−0.491*
Rebel leader election	(0.268)	(0.288)
Incompatibility	−0.255**	−0.393***
Incompatibility	(0.117)	(0.125)
Religion	−0.0844***	−0.0837***
Religion	(0.0220)	(0.0223)
ln (Battle deaths – Best)	0.00370	0.0196
ln (Battle deaths – Best)	(0.0315)	(0.0319)
Democracy	−0.523***	−0.486***
Democracy	(0.142)	(0.139)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.746***	0.839***
Ethnic fractionalization	(0.272)	(0.239)
ln (Population)	0.0706	0.0447
ln (Population)	(0.0467)	(0.0487)
ln (GDPpc)	−0.200***	−0.0542
ln (GDPpc)	(0.0730)	(0.0802)
Intervention	0.878***	0.950***
Intervention	(0.226)	(0.226)
External funds – Rebel	−0.119	−0.198
External funds – Rebel	(0.125)	(0.124)
External funds – State	0.282**	0.378***
External funds – State	(0.119)	(0.118)
Constant	1.279	0.592
Constant	(0.862)	(0.881)
Observations	843	843

Robust standard errors in parentheses

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Additional Robustness Checks

In additional analyses, reported in Appendix Tables 17 and 18, I include a control for gender equality (following Cohen (2013), operationalized as the fertility rate in the country in a given year).²⁷ While the results suggest some negative relationship between fertility rates and male sexual violence which may corroborate more opportunistic theories of sexual violence (Paglia 1993; Thornhill and Palmer 2000), or in support of this research’s theoretical perspective, that male sexual violence is less likely to be reported in less gender equitable societies, it is not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Critically, while taking into account differences in gender equality, the results with respect to same-sex and gender identity laws remain unchanged: sexual expression and gender identity laws are a statistically significant predictor of reports of sexual violence against men in civil conflict (p < 0.05).

Similar to a country’s regime type, the rebel group’s political ideology may be correlated with grassroot movements to pass (or block) laws regarding sexual and gender identity and likely hold implications for top-down orders (and bottom-up actions). Based on the existing literature, we may expect more conservative religious groups to use male sexual violence as a form of shaming enemies, out of line foot soldiers, or civilians. We might also expect leftist organizations to have more explicit (and cultural) prohibitions against sexual violence (Wood and Thomas 2017), which, in turn, will likely impact reports of male sexual violence. In Appendix Tables 19 and 20, I include dichotomous controls for Islamist and leftist rebel groups (coded from Wood and Thomas’ 2017 data on rebel political ideology and female participation). Reports of sexual violence against men are more likely to occur in civil conflicts fought against Islamist rebels than conflicts fought against other rebel groups (p < 0.01). Conflicts fought against leftist rebels are no more (or less) likely to observe reports of sexual violence against men than those fought against other rebel groups (p > 0.10).

Addressing Endogeneity

The probit models provide evidence that these domestic laws increase the reporting of male sexual violence in civil conflict. However, the adoption of these domestic laws may be endogenous to reports of sexual violence against men. As a first step, I include models (reported in Appendix Tables 21 and 22) with same-sex and gender identity laws recorded at time, t, and reports of male sexual violence recorded in the subsequent year, t + 1. Same-sex and gender identity laws remain statistically significantly and positively correlated with reports of sexual violence against males in the subsequent year (p < 0.05). While this is a first step in addressing potential endogeneity, it is insufficient to address issues of omitted variable bias. In Table 4 below, I report the results of two instrumental variables models using Primary Trading Partner’s (PTP) Historic Catholic Favorability as an instrument for laws regarding same-sex activity (Model 1) and gender identity (Model 2), respectively. Using data on a country’s primary trading partner’s²⁸ historic favorability toward Catholicism, coded from the Government Religious Preference 2.0 dataset (Brown and James (2020)), PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability, measures whether the state’s primary trading partner historically favored Catholicism prior to the nineteenth century.²⁹ PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability meets the criteria for an instrument (i.e., cov (Z, X)

\neq 0

): first, PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability is correlated with whether or not a state passes domestic rights laws concerning same-sex activity and gender expression. Theoretically, we would expect that a state’s primary trading partner’s position with respect to Catholicism would likely impact a given country’s policies and the policies enacted of their primary trading partner. Empirically, the results support the use of PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability as an instrument for laws concerning same-sex activity and gender expression: PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability is statistically significantly correlated with the presence of these laws (p < 0.05).

Table 4.

Instrumental Variables Analysis.

Variables	(1)	(2)
Variables	Sexual Violence – Men	Sexual Violence – Men
Excluded instrument: PTP Historic catholic favorability
Same-sex laws	2.048**
Same-sex laws	(0.798)
Gender identity laws		3.892***
Gender identity laws		(1.259)
Territorial control	0.0930	−0.0761
Territorial control	(0.171)	(0.142)
ln (Troop size – Rebel)	0.0418	−0.0231
ln (Troop size – Rebel)	(0.0484)	(0.0480)
ln (Troop size – State)	−0.0668	−0.203***
ln (Troop size – State)	(0.0860)	(0.0600)
Contraband funding	−0.00215	0.224
Contraband funding	(0.243)	(0.264)
Rebel abduction	−0.275	−0.480
Rebel abduction	(0.305)	(0.309)
Rebel leader election	0.0115	−0.452
Rebel leader election	(0.347)	(0.356)
Incompatibility	0.0680	0.683***
Incompatibility	(0.171)	(0.241)
Religion	0.0272	−0.0251
Religion	(0.0373)	(0.0298)
ln (Battle deaths – Best)	0.125**	0.0594
ln (Battle deaths – Best)	(0.0554)	(0.0698)
Sexual violence – Women	−0.656***	−0.353
Sexual violence – Women	(0.180)	(0.277)
Democracy	−0.168	0.0991
Democracy	(0.316)	(0.232)
Ethnic fractionalization	2.168***	−0.633
Ethnic fractionalization	(0.758)	(0.452)
ln (Population)	0.0931	0.281***
ln (Population)	(0.0719)	(0.0734)
ln (GDPpc)	0.0570	−0.417*
ln (GDPpc)	(0.149)	(0.251)
Intervention	0.284	0.326
Intervention	(0.343)	(0.334)
External funds – Rebel	−0.279	−0.00392
External funds – Rebel	(0.178)	(0.219)
External funds – State	−0.452***	−0.474***
External funds – State	(0.169)	(0.155)
Constant	−4.373***	0.674
Constant	(1.292)	(2.021)
Observations	808	808

Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

In addition, the instrument should not directly affect the outcome except through the mechanism of the endogenous variable, that is, the instrument should be uncorrelated with the error term (cov (Z, ε)=0). While historical relationships to religious organizations likely impact the passage of laws with respect to sexual and gender identity expression, a trading partner’s historical preference for religious denominations, is unlikely to impact on the ground, present day conflict dynamics in its trading partner’s civil war. Empirically, there are several points of evidence to support the independence of the instrument with respect to male sexual violence. First, since PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability is a historical measure of the country’s primary trading partner’s favorability toward Catholicism, it is non-differentially associated with conflict dynamics in a given year; it does not vary with dyadic conflict-year dynamics and the tactics used in a particular conflict. Moreover, the results of empirical tests support this conclusion: specifically, the Wald test of exogeneity is statistically insignificant at the conventional 95 percent confidence level.³⁰ This test indicates that in the instrumented models, we can fail to reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, suggesting that the instrumented model suitably accounts for potential endogeneity. In sum, the theoretical and empirical evidence suggest that PTP’s Historic Catholic Favorability is an appropriate instrument to address the potential endogeneity of laws with respect to sexual and gender identity expression and sexual violence against males in civil conflict.

The results in Table 4 confirm the results from the previous analyses: the coefficients on same-sex (Model (1) and gender identity laws (Model (2) are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). When employing the instrumental variable analysis, we again find that laws regarding sexual activity and gender identity increase the reporting of sexual violence against men in civil conflict.

Conclusion

Sexual violence against males in civil conflict is as pernicious as it is common; yet, the quantitative literature on conflict and civilian victimization has largely ignored male victims of sexual violence. The inattention to male sexual violence is likely due to the same factors—biases and shame—that led to an under-reporting of male victims in the first place. This research responds to the call by Loken and Hagen (2022) to expand our conceptualization of gender-based violence. Using originally coded cross-national data on domestic laws concerning sexual expression and gender identity, I find consistent evidence that establishing a domestic rule of law that protects sexual and gender identity rights increases the likelihood of reporting male victims of sexual violence in civil conflict.

Critically, these results speak to both the literatures on human rights laws and civilian victimization in civil conflict. Despite the large literature on whether human rights laws “work,” an under-examined area of research is the effect of LGBT laws (see Tschantret 2018 2020 for critical exceptions), particularly on civilian victimization. This research suggests one perhaps unintended consequence of changes in the legality of same-sex and gender identity expression: the perceived potentiality of men as victims of sexual violence. Much research has been conducted on the causes and consequences of sexual violence against women in conflict (Cohen 2013, 2016; Wood 2009). Apart from restricting the narrative of sexual violence to women, framing sexual violence as a strategy of women victimization can diminish the political agency of women and limits the scope of potential solutions for its eradication. Sexual violence against men is often underreported because of bias. In this research, I argue and find consistent evidence that when homophobic and gender biases are legislated against, men can be rightfully identified as victims of sexual violence, as well.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Sexual Violence Against Men in Civil Conflict

Supplemental Material for Sexual Violence Against Men in Civil Conflict by Katherine Sawyer in Political Research Quarterly

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Katherine Sawyer

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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