Perceptions of Threat,American National Identity,and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Documented and Undocumented Immigrants

Abstract

In this paper, we explore how the effects of perceived immigrant threat, American national identity, and attitudes toward immigration-dominated racial/ethnic groups on perceptions of immigrant contributions differ for documented and undocumented immigrants. We contend that different levels of perceived risk associated with undocumented and documented immigrants activate the effects of immigrant threat and American identity in different ways. We consider the varying effects of general perceptions of immigrant threat, and we also differentiate the effects of American pride (i.e., positive sentiments about being an American) and American exclusion (i.e., negative sentiments associated with criteria needed to be considered an American). We use data from the 2016 to 2017 Voter Study Group surveys, which includes a survey experiment with respondents randomly assigned to documented and undocumented immigrant treatments. We find strong negative effects of immigrant threat perceptions on Americans support for both immigrant groups, with observed effects significantly stronger for undocumented immigrants. Further, while American exclusion has strong negative effects on attitudes for both immigrant groups, American pride depresses support only for undocumented immigrants. We also find that evaluations of Hispanics have effects on perceptions of contributions for documented and undocumented immigrants, though the effect of Asian evaluations is limited to documented immigrants.

Keywords

immigrant threat American national identity documented immigrants undocumented immigrants

Perceptions of threat by outside groups are a strong motivator for both attitude development and behavior. Individuals who perceive that they are threatened by another group are much more likely to develop negative attitudes toward the group seen as threatening, and further they are more likely to engage in behavior deemed necessary to protect their interests (Brewer 1999, 2001). Over the course of American history, Americans have often perceived that immigrants pose economic, cultural, crime, or national security threats, and these Americans are susceptible to information about potential immigrant threats and to elite rhetoric that promotes the view that immigrants represent a threat to some aspect(s) of American society. Perceptions of immigrant threat are thought to shape attitudes about immigration policy and immigrants themselves, and in recent years such perceptions are also thought to motivate voting behavior (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008; Garand, Qi, and Magaña, 2022; Newman, Hartman, and Tabor, 2012). This is particularly the case in the contemporary political environment, where immigration has been a highly contentious issue that feeds political polarization and policy disagreement.

Perceptions of immigrant threat do not necessarily exist in a vacuum. Rather, Americans who have a strong national identity are more likely to perceive immigrants as an outgroup (i.e., as “the other”) and to perceive immigrants as a threat (Garand, Qi, and Magaña, 2022; Schildkraut, 2010). In evaluating how Americans perceive immigrants, it is essential to consider both their perceptions of immigrant (out-group) threat and their level of American (in-group) identity. Furthermore, not all immigrants are evaluated in the same way by Americans. Immigrants who come to the United States with legal documentation may be viewed differently than immigrants who come to the United States without legal documentation (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Hood and Morris, 1998; Wright, Levy, and Citrin, 2016), and the effects of perceptions of immigrant threat and American identity on Americans’ evaluations of immigrants and immigration policies may vary across these different groups of immigrants. Moreover, there is some evidence that the racial/ethnic makeup of immigrant groups may generate threat perceptions relating to increasing diversity and the declining White share of the American population (cf., Craig and Richeson, 2017; Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich, 2018). Simply, some immigrants may activate perceptions of immigrant threat in ways that other immigrants do not.

In this paper, we explore how the effects of immigrant threat perceptions and American identity differ for different kinds of immigrants. Do documented and undocumented immigrants trigger the effects of immigrant threat and American identity in different ways? We use data from the Voter Study Group (VSG) surveys from 2016 to 2017, which includes a survey experiment in which individuals are randomly assigned to documented and undocumented treatment groups. We use these data to test hypotheses about differences in how immigrant threat and American identity influence Americans’ attitudes about the contributions made by documented and undocumented immigrants to American society. We find that both immigrant threat and American identity are strong predictors of immigrant attitudes, but there is considerable variation in the magnitude of these effects for these two immigrant groups. Simply, two components of social identity theory—perceptions of outgroup threat (i.e., immigrant threat) and strength of in-group identity (i.e., American pride) appear to have stronger negative effects on perceived contributions of undocumented immigrants than of documented immigrants. Further, we account for possible effects of race and ethnicity by considering the differential effects of Americans’ evaluations of Hispanics and Asians—the two largest immigrant groups—on the favorability of their attitudes toward documented and undocumented immigrants.

Previous Research

The roles of immigrant threat and American identity in shaping how individuals think about immigration have drawn considerable scholarly attention (cf., Berinsky et al., 2018; Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013; Garand, Qi, and Magaña, 2022; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo, 2013; Mayda, 2006; Newman 2013; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). In previous research, scholars have considered the effects of immigrant threat, particularly the different effects across the various dimensions of threat. Much of the research on the immigrant threat is based on the European context (Dinesen, Klemmensen, and Nørgaard, 2016; Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss, 2012; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Some scholars focus attention only on immigrant threat in general (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Pettigrew, Ulrich, and Christ, 2007), while other scholars consider domain-specific immigrant threat by focusing their attention on economic, cultural, crime, and national security threat (Branton et al., 2011; Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss, 2012; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo, 2013; Manevska and Achterberg, 2013).

The second strain of scholarly research relevant to our paper involves American identity—particularly in terms of how American identity shapes individuals’ evaluations of immigrants. There are multiple dimensions of American identity, and there is some sense in the literature that (1) American identity matters for immigration attitudes and (2) specific dimensions of American identity have stronger effects than others. For instance, some scholars differentiate an exclusionary view of American identity (often described as xenophobia) and a more positive national pride (often described as patriotism) (cf., de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Schildkraut, 2005 2014; Wong, 2010). Regarding immigration attitudes, Schildkraut (2005) and Wong (2010) find that Americans who have an exclusionary view of American identity—that is, those whose sense of American identity separates others into deserving and undeserving groups, depending on whether they meet specific criteria—are more likely to oppose expanded immigration. Some scholars also consider the role of assimilation and adoption of norms associated with American identity; perceptions of whether or not immigrants assimilate or adopt American norms are a powerful predictor of anti-immigration attitudes. For instance, expectations that immigrants learn English is an important defining element of being an American (Theiss-Morse 2009), and there is some evidence that Americans’ exposure to Spanish-speaking populations increases perceptions of immigrant threat and diminishes support for immigration (Newman 2013; Newman, Todd, and Taber 2012). Other scholars contend that acceptance of immigrants is tied to whether they have the historical background and cultural roots associated with Americanism (Huntington, 2004; Theiss-Morse, 2009).

There is also a body of research that explores the effects of immigrant characteristics on both general support for immigration and the determinants of immigration evaluations. Some scholars link favorable or unfavorable immigration attitudes to specific attributes of immigrants, such as the suggestion that high-skilled immigrants are more favored compared to low-skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo, 2013). One major distinction among immigrants that has drawn some attention is that between documented and undocumented immigrants (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Iragashi, Nakai, and Ono, 2023; Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes, 2013; Ramakrishnan, Easterling, and Neblo, 2014; Wright, Levy, and Citrin, 2016). There is a consensus in this body of research that undocumented immigrants are less favorably evaluated than documented immigrants, and we also speculate here that there are strong differences in the determinants of evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants. However, to date, there has been little effort to explore whether immigrant threat (and its components), dimensions of American identity, and evaluations of racial/ethnic groups associated with immigration have different effects on evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants.

Theoretical Arguments

How and why should immigrant threat and American identity have different effects in shaping perceptions toward different types of immigrants? Do Americans who perceive that immigrants pose a threat to American society and/or have a strong American identity evaluate documented and undocumented immigrants in similar ways, or do they evaluate them differently? Do different types of American identity lead to the different patterns of evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants? If so, what explains the differences? Do attitudes toward racial/ethnic groups that comprise the lion’s share of immigrants affect how Americans they think about documented and undocumented immigrants?

In answering these questions, we make the theoretical argument that Americans' responses to documented and undocumented immigrants are based on differences in perceived risk associated with these two immigrant groups, as well as different conceptions of American identity that may influence how Americans think of these two groups. Regarding risk perceptions, we contend that different types of immigrants create varying levels of risk that activate Americans’ perceptions of threat in different ways. For instance, documented and undocumented immigrants undergo different levels of vetting, and documented immigrants are expected to stimulate lower levels of perceived threat—though, it is worth noting, not zero perceived threat—because they have gone through a legal process that includes scrutiny for some potential threats that undocumented immigrants do not undergo. Moreover, because stereotypes are often developed in relatively low-information environments, we suggest that different levels of perceived risk associated with documented and undocumented immigrants may foster different patterns of stereotypes about the relative risks associated with these two groups, with undocumented immigrants more likely to be subject to negative stereotypes emerging from the greater perceived risk surrounding this group. For instance, immigrants who have entered and reside in the United States with legal documentation will not be subject to the same magnitude of stereotypes about potential security threat as immigrants who are in the country without legal documentation. Regarding American identity, we suggest that this is a multifaceted concept, and we contend that there is an important distinction to be made between positive orientations toward the United States (what we term “American pride”) and more negative, exclusionary orientations (what we term “American exclusion”) that emphasize the criteria used to separate individuals from being an American. Moreover, documented immigrants are more likely to fit a favorable image tied to Americans' nostalgic views of the United States as a nation of immigrants, while undocumented immigrants may be seen as violating American norms; given this, undocumented immigrants may be subject to evaluation based both on Americans positive and negative orientations toward national identity.

Risk Perceptions

We suggest that risk perceptions are an important driver of Americans' perceptions of immigrant threat and the subsequent activation of American identity, and this partly explains why Americans view documented and undocumented immigrants differently. We contend that there is significantly less perceived risk surrounding the introduction of documented immigrants into American society. The primary reason lies with the legal process that documented immigrants must undergo to come to the United States. Many legal immigrants come to the United States because of family ties, to work, or to study, and this means that legal immigrants enter into a support network that reduces risk associated with how they will do in a new country. Moreover, in order to be admitted to the United States, documented immigrants must go through a vetting process that reduces concerns among Americans that there will be a serious security or crime issue. To be sure, legal status does not mean that documented immigrants are inoculated from perceptions that they represent an economic or cultural threat, but overall risk perceptions about possible threats that immigrants may represent will be reduced if they go through legal channels to be admitted to the United States. The vetting processes and control over who comes into the United States legally has the effect of ameliorating threat perceptions and reducing the perceptions of risk about potential negative consequences associated with immigration.

On the other hand, undocumented immigrants may be perceived in less certain terms, and the result may be that undocumented immigrants activate threat perceptions in a way that documented immigrants do not. First, those who have entered or settled in the United States illegally have violated the law to do so, and this may create the perception that undocumented immigrants are willing to violate both the law and American norms that are seen as crucial to the assimilation process. Second, undocumented immigrants have not gone through the legally defined, agreed-upon standards for admission, and this means that undocumented immigrants are viewed with a great deal of suspicion, which triggers both the perception of threat and less favorable attitudes among Americans. Third, it is also the case that many undocumented immigrants come to the United States with relatively low levels of labor skills, and this may foster a perception that they have little or no capability to contribute to American society and, subsequently, that they (1) may become a fiscal burden of society, or (2) may be perceived as an economic threat in the low-wage labor market. Fourth, because there is no official monitoring of these immigrants, their legal activities cannot be guaranteed, and crime and security risk may be perceived to be higher for undocumented immigrants than for documented immigrants.¹ Finally, because of the lack of legal status, undocumented immigrants may be less likely to get involved in their communities and hence have reduced opportunities to assimilate into American society. Fairly or not, the reduced assimilation may create for many Americans a heightened perception that undocumented immigrants contribute to the disruption of American culture. Ultimately, immigrants who enter and settle in the United States without going through the normal screening process may be assessed as carrying a higher level of risk. These higher risk perceptions have the potential to reinforce perceptions of threat, both in general and in specific economic, cultural, security, and crime realms. Given this, we expect that documented immigrants will receive more favorable evaluations than undocumented immigrants, and the effects of immigrant threat perceptions on immigration evaluations will be stronger for undocumented immigrants than for documented immigrants.

It is also possible that risk perceptions play a role in how Americans evaluate documented and undocumented immigrants by encouraging the creation of stereotypes to describe these groups. Stereotypes about groups are fostered by low-information contexts, with individuals attributing characteristics to group members based on partial (or no) information. Given the role of information in stereotype formation, one can speculate that Americans will have less favorable views toward undocumented immigrants than documented immigrants. Americans are likely to have less contact with undocumented immigrants, who are likely to reduce contact with others and “live in the shadows” because of their legal status. This creates a context that promotes stereotypes—especially negative stereotypes—about undocumented immigrants.

American Exclusion versus American Pride

Not only do risk perceptions shape one’s perception of different types of immigrants, but we suggest that different understandings of American identity could lead to different perceptions associated with various types of immigrants as well. In previous studies, scholars have noted that there are different categories of Americanism (Huntington, 2004; Schildkraut, 2010; Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). One of the categories defines Americanism as ethno-culturalism, which emphasize specific attributes associated with being an American and a set of rigid boundaries that define group membership. Here we describe this form of American identity as American exclusion, which we define as the degree to which individual perceive American identity as exclusionary by placing limits on who can be considered as American. For Americans who score high on the American exclusion dimension, one must meet specific standards, such as having American ancestor, speaking English, and following certain customs and norms, to be considered as American (Huntington, 2004; Schildkraut, 2010; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Other scholars define American identity in terms of favorable attitudes that individuals have toward their home country, akin to patriotism. This conception of American identity focuses on the positive attitudes that individuals have toward the United States (Theiss-Morse, 2009; Wong, 2010). We refer to this dimension of American identity as American pride, which is most closely equated with moderate patriotism or love of country. The American pride scale focuses on positive feeling toward the United States rather than set the exclusionary standard on who can be defined as American.²

Differentiation of these dimensions of American identity may help us to understand how different types of Americanism shape individuals' evaluations of various groups of immigrants. We contend that individuals who hold exclusionary attitudes about being an American—for example, who believe that true Americans should be born in the United States, should have American ancestors, should speak English, etc.—are more likely to hold general antipathy toward immigrants, regardless of documentation status. However, Americans holding exclusionary attitudes should be particularly negative in their evaluations of undocumented immigrants, who they may perceive to be less likely to assimilate into the American culture and meet the standards that are associated with American exclusionary thinking. On the other hand, Americans who adopt an American pride orientation and who express positive feelings about being an American are likely to be hold less favorable evaluations of undocumented immigrants, but they may actually have positive views toward documented immigrants who have been through the immigration process in accordance with U.S. law and who may be perceived as more likely to assimilate into the American culture.

Race/Ethnicity of Immigrant Groups

There is evidence that at least some Americans are concerned about (and perhaps perceive threat from) demographic trends tied to immigration and birth rates that will results in Whites becoming a minority in the American population around mid-century (Craig and Richeson, 2017; Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich, 2018). Over the past several decades, Hispanics and Asian have been the two largest immigrant-based groups in this country (Lopez, Bialik, and Radford, 2018), and we suggest that how Americans evaluate Hispanics and Asians can have important (but distinct) effects on how they think about documented and undocumented immigrants. Specifically, while both Hispanics and Asians comprise a large share of the number of documented and undocumented immigrants in the United States, Hispanics are generally more likely to be associated with undocumented immigration (Baker 2017), are framed by the media less favorably, and are viewed by the general public in a less favorable manner than Asian Americans (Kohut et al., 2006). We expect that adopting favorable views toward Hispanics increases the likelihood that individuals favor both undocumented and documented immigrants, since Hispanics are (and are likely to be perceived as being) well represented in both immigrant groups. Conversely, negative views toward Hispanics should decrease the positivity of evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrant groups. On the other hand, we expect that those who regard Asian Americans favorably (unfavorably) are more likely to regard documented immigrants positively (negatively); however, because Asian Americans represent a smaller share of undocumented immigrants and are less likely to be associated with undocumented immigration, we expect that the relationship between evaluations of Asian Americans and evaluations of undocumented immigrants will be significantly attenuated.

Hypotheses

Given the foregoing discussion, we suggest the following hypotheses:

H₁:

Perceptions of immigrant threat will have a negative effect on evaluations of both documented and undocumented immigrants, though the effect for undocumented immigrants will be stronger than the effect for documented immigrants.

H₂:

American exclusion will have a negative effect on evaluations of both documented and undocumented immigrants, though the effect for undocumented immigrants will be stronger than the effect for documented immigrants.

H₃:

American pride will have a negative effect on evaluations of undocumented immigrants, while American pride will have a null or weakly positive effect on evaluations of documented immigrants.

H₄:

Evaluations of Hispanics will have a positive effect on evaluations toward both documented and undocumented immigrants.

H₅:

Evaluations of Asians will have a positive effect on evaluations of documented immigrants but will have a null effect on evaluations of toward undocumented immigrants.

Data and Methods

As noted, the goal of this paper is to explore differences in how immigrant threat and various manifestations of American identity shape Americans’ perceptions about the degree to which documented and undocumented immigrants make positive contributions to American society. We speculate that immigrant threat and American identity have different effects for documented and undocumented immigrants, since these two groups come to the United States under different circumstances and with different levels of vetting and legal status. We suggest that documented immigrants are less likely than undocumented to activate threat perceptions, and different dimensions of American national identity may also help to shape how Americans view these two groups. Further, we expect Americans' evaluations of Hispanics and Asians—two groups that comprise a large share of immigrants—to activate threat perceptions about demographic changes in the United States and hence to influence in varying ways Americans' evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants.

In order to test our hypotheses, we use data from the Voter Study Group (VSG) survey, a panel study that includes waves for 2011, 2012, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The VSG survey is well suited for exploring the research questions addressed in this paper. The dataset includes in the 2017 wave survey items measuring Americans perceptions of the contributions made by documented (legal) and undocumented (illegal) immigrants; moreover, the 2016 wave of the VSG includes several items relating to American identity, and the 2017 wave includes items measuring four different types of potential immigrant threat.

The Cooperative Campaigns Analysis Project (CCAP) conducted the original national survey with 45,000 respondents in December 2011 through the online firm YouGov, with a follow-up interview sometime between January and November of 2012. The Voter Study Group then chose 11,168 respondents from the 2012 CCAP survey for the third interview in 2016, with 8637 (77 percent) completing this third wave. A fourth panel wave with 5000 respondents was collected in July 2017. We use respondents who completed both the 2016 and 2017 waves of the survey as our sample for this study.³

Dependent Variables

We have two primary dependent variables, both of which relate to Americans' perceptions of immigrants' contributions to American society. Respondents in the 2017 panel wave were randomly assigned to receive one of the following two questions, from which we create two variables:

Overall, do you think illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain? (N = 2,814)

Overall, do you think immigrants legally residing in the U.S. make a contribution to American society or are a drain? (N = 2,791)

We create one dependent variable representing perceptions of contributions by documented (“legally residing in the United States”) immigrants, as well as a second dependent variable for undocumented (“illegal”) immigrants. Each of these variables is coded on a three-point scale, with “mostly make a contribution” coded 2, “neither” coded 1, and “mostly a drain” coded 0. The fact that survey respondents are randomly assigned to receive documented and undocumented immigrant prompts means that there is no overlap in respondents for each of these two variables, and random assignment gives us some causal leverage in identifying the direct effects of documentation status on evaluations of immigrants’ contributions to American society.

There is a considerable difference in responses to these two questions. A supermajority (72.6 percent) report that they perceive that documented immigrants make a contribution, while only 44 percent of respondents perceive that undocumented immigrants make a contribution. Moreover, only 15.7 percent of respondents describe documented immigrants as mostly a drain, while a plurality of respondents (46.1 percent) perceives that undocumented immigrants are mostly a drain.

Independent Variables

We consider the effects of two sets of independent variables in shaping Americans evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants. First, we estimate the effects of Americans’ perceptions of immigrant threat on how Americans think about various immigrant groups. In the 2017 wave, VSG respondents were asked a series of questions about possible threats posed by immigrants in the areas of cultural life, national security, crime, and the economy. The wording of the questions is as follows:

And would you say that the United States’ cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?

Do you think that the United States’ national security is generally made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?

Do you think that the United States’ crime problems are generally made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?

Do you think that the United States’ economy is generally made worse or better by people coming to live here from other countries?

Responses to each of these questions are coded on a 10-point scale, ranging from 0 (immigration makes things worse) to 9 (immigration makes things better). We create a general immigrant threat scale based on a principle-components analysis of these four items (Eigenvalue = 3.149; variance explained = 0.7871); this variable is scaled so that a high score represents strong perceptions of immigrant threat.

Second, for the American identity concept, we create two scales that represent different components of American identity. In the 2016 wave of the VSG, there were numerous questions asked about American identity, and we use these items to create an American pride scale (representing positive views about being an American) and an American exclusion scale (representing exclusionary views about who should and should not be considered an American). These two scales can be thought of as representing in-group identity (American pride) and out-group expectations (American exclusion). We suggest that these two scales will have different effects on immigrant evaluations. For the American pride scale, we use the following six items:

1. I would rather be a citizen of America than any other country.

2. There are some things about America today that make me feel ashamed (reversed coded).

3. The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans.

4. Pride in America: the way democracy works.

5. Pride in America: Its history.

6. Pride in America: Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.

The first three variables are coded on a four-point scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree); the three pride variables are also measured on a four-point scale, ranging from 0 (not proud at all) to 3 (very proud). Our American pride scale is created using a principal components analysis of these six items (Eigenvalue = 3.191, variance explained = 0.532). For the American exclusion scale, we use answers to the following six VSG items:

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is as being American?

1. To have been born in America.

2. To have American citizenship.

3. To have lived in America for most of one's life.

4. To be able to speak English.

5. To be Christian.

6. To be of European heritage or descent.

Each of these variables is coded on a four-point scale, ranging from 0 (not at all important) to 3 (very important). Here again, we use a principal components analysis for these six items to create an American exclusion scale (Eigenvalue = 3.312, variance explained = 0.552).

We also include variables to represent Americans' evaluations of Hispanics and Asians, two racial/ethnic groups that comprise a substantial proportion of American immigrants. We use feeling thermometers from the 2017 survey wave to measure evaluations for each of these two groups, ranging from 0 (very negative feelings) to 100 (very positive feelings). We would expect that the Hispanic and Asian feeling thermometer variables to be positively related to Americans' views toward both documented and undocumented immigrants, though the magnitude of these effects may vary across the two groups.

Control Variables

We also include a range of control variables in our models, all of which are measured during the 2017 wave of the VSG survey. First, we include in our models two political attitude variables shown to have a strong effect on immigrant evaluations: (1) partisan identification, measured as a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican), and (2) liberal-conservative ideology, measured as a five-point scale ranging from 0 (strong liberal) to 4 (strong conservative). We also include several demographic and socioeconomic variables, all of which are measured during the 2017 wave of the VSG survey: (1) education, measured on a six-point scale ranging from 0 (less than high school completed) to 5 (postgraduate degree); (2) family income, measured on a 16-point scale ranging from 0 (less than $10K per year) to 15 (income greater than $500K per year); (3) gender, coded 1 for women, and 0 for men; (4) Black racial self-identification, coded 1 for Black respondents, and 0 for other respondents; (5) Hispanic ethnic self-identification, coded 1 for Hispanic respondents, and 0 otherwise; (6) Asian racial self-identification, coded 1 for Asian respondents, and 0 otherwise; and (7) age, measured in years; and (8) church attendance, ranging from 0 (never) to 5 (more than once a week).

A summary of the measurement of each of the variables in our analyses is found in Appendix Table A1, and descriptive statistics for the variables in our models are found in Appendix Table A2.⁴

Empirical Results

Immigrant Threat

We begin by considering the effects of immigrant threat perceptions and American identity on how Americans think about the contributions made by documented and undocumented immigrants. In Table 1, we report ordered logit estimates for our models of evaluations toward documented and undocumented immigrants.⁵ As one can see, general perceptions of immigrant threat have a strong negative effect on perceptions of contributions by both legal immigrants (b = −1.098, z = −10.97) and illegal immigrants (b = −1.619, z = −14.18). The magnitude of the coefficient for undocumented immigrants is 47 percent higher than the magnitude of the coefficient for documented immigrants, and based on the results from our full interaction model (see Table 2) we can say that the difference in immigrant threat coefficients for documented and undocumented immigrants is statistically distinguishable from 0 (z = −3.50).

Table 1.

Ordered Logit Estimates for Models of Perceptions of Contributions to the United States Among Documented and Undocumented Immigrants, With Immigrant Threat Scale, American Identity Scales, and Attitudes Toward Hispanics and Asians, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group Survey.

	Legal Immigrants		Illegal Immigrants		Difference
	b	z	b	z	b	z
Immigrant threat scale	−1.098	−10.97***	−1.619	−14.18***	−0.524	−3.50***
American pride scale	0.069	0.68	−0.418	−4.31***	−0.487	−3.46***
American exclusion scale	−0.430	−4.65***	−0.378	−3.90***	0.051	0.38
FT: Hispanics	0.011	3.04***	0.022	4.58***	0.010	1.70*
FT: Asians	0.010	2.39**	−0.011	−2.32**	−0.021	−3.31***
Partisan identification	−0.030	−0.67	−0.304	−6.42***	−0.274	−4.23***
Political ideology	−0.176	−1.83*	−0.321	−3.21***	−0.145	−1.05
Education	0.112	2.12*	−0.038	−0.65	−0.150	−1.90*
Household income	0.024	1.05	0.013	0.52	−0.010	−0.30
Gender	−0.292	−2.04*	−0.053	−0.35	0.238	1.14
Race: Black	−0.250	−0.87	−0.325	−1.11	−0.075	−0.18
Ethnicity: Hispanic	−0.031	−0.09	0.546	1.58	0.577	1.21
Race: Asian	0.815	1.13	0.053	0.11	−0.760	−0.87
Age	0.023	3.75***	0.009	1.42	−0.015	−1.68*
Church attendance	−0.087	−2.07*	0.092	1.98*	0.180	2.85**
N	1,558		1,487
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo R²	0.495		0.726
χ²	588.24		1,274.14
Prob (χ²)	0.0000		0.0000
Percent predicted accurately	0.780		0.808
Proportional reduction in error	0.151		0.646

Note. The fifth column of this table represents the difference in b coefficients for individuals receiving the “legal immigrants” and “illegal immigrants” treatments. The final column represents the Z statistic testing the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients for individuals receiving the “legal immigrants” and “illegal immigrants” treatments is equal to 0. The Z statistic is based on a full interaction model in which each independent variable is interacted with the immigration treatment variable, coded 1 for respondents who received the “illegal immigrants” treatment and 0 for respondents who received the “legal immigrants” treatment. The results for the full interaction model are found in Table 2.

***prob < .001, **prob < .01, *prob < .05.

Table 2.

Ordered Logit Estimates for Perceptions of Contributions to the United States Among Documented and Undocumented Immigrants, Combined Sample, With Interactions for Undocumented/Documented Sample Variable, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group Survey.

	(1)		(2)
	b	z	b	z
Illegal immigrant prompt	−2.380	−21.54***	0.744	0.98
Immigrant threat scale	−1.268	−17.72***	−1.097	−11.02***
Immigrant threat scale * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.524	−3.50***
American pride scale	−0.191	−2.81**	0.069	0.68
American pride scale * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.487	−3.46***
American exclusion scale	−0.388	−6.01***	−0.429	−4.65***
American exclusion scale * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	0.051	0.38
FT: Hispanics	0.014	5.05***	0.011	3.03***
FT: Hispanics * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	0.010	1.70*
FT: Asians	0.002	0.73	0.010	2.39**
FT: Asians * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.021	−3.31***
Partisan identification	−0.167	−5.25***	−0.030	−0.67
Partisan identification * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.274	−4.23***
Political ideology	−0.254	−3.79***	−0.176	−1.83*
Political ideology * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.145	−1.05
Education	0.043	1.13	0.112	2.11*
Education * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.150	−1.90*
Household income	0.023	1.39	0.024	1.05
Household income * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.010	−0.30
Gender	−0.194	−1.92	−0.291	−2.04*
Gender * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	0.238	1.14
Race: Black	−0.214	−1.03	−0.250	−0.87
Race: Black * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.075	−0.18
Ethnicity: Hispanic	0.264	1.14	−0.031	−0.09
Ethnicity: Hispanic * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	0.577	1.21
Race: Asian	0.421	1.08	0.814	1.13
Race: Asian * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.760	−0.87
Age	0.014	3.35***	0.023	3.75***
Age * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	−0.015	−1.68*
Church attendance	−0.008	−0.27	−0.087	−2.07*
Church attendance * illegal immigrant prompt	---	---	0.180	2.85**
N	3,045		3,045
McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo R²	0.664		0.682
χ²	2052.45		2,211.35
Prob (χ²)	0.0000		0.0000
Percent predicted accurately	0.786		0.794
Proportional reduction in error	0.467		0.486

***prob < .001, **prob < .01, *prob < .05.

This difference can be shown in the patterns of predicted probabilities for positive and negative immigrant contributions. We present scatterplots showing the effects of immigrant threat on the predicted probabilities of perceptions of positive contributions (Figure 1(a)) and negative contributions (Figure 1(b)) for documented and undocumented immigrants.⁶ As one can see, there are considerable differences in how immigrant threat is translated into perceptions of immigrant contributions for these two groups. Turning first to positive perceptions, we see that individuals who do not perceive immigrants as a threat are similarly likely to perceive that documented (0.977) and undocumented (0.939) immigrants make positive contributions. However, as perceptions of immigrant threat increases, there is a strong divergence in the downward slopes of the curves for documented and undocumented immigrants. For documented immigrants, there is a strong decline in perceptions of positive contributions as immigrant threat increases. At the highest level of immigrant threat, the predicted probability of seeing a positive effect of documented immigration is 0.335; this represents a shift in probability of 0.642 across the range of the immigrant threat variable. However, for undocumented immigrants, the decline is even more precipitous. At the highest level of immigrant threat, the probability of perceiving a positive contribution from undocumented immigrants is only 0.021; going from the lowest to the highest value on the immigrant threat scale results in a change in probability of perceptions of positive effects for undocumented immigration of 0.918. For perceptions of negative contributions (Figure 1(b)), a similar (but opposite) pattern emerges. As immigrant threat increases, the probability of perceptions of negative contributions for documented immigrants increases from 0.009 to 0.438, for a change of 0.429 across the range of the immigrant threat scale. On the other hand, for undocumented immigrants, the probability of perceived negative contributions increases at a much higher rate, from 0.025 (for the lowest value of immigrant threat) to 0.948 (for the highest value); this represents a change across the range for the immigrant threat of 0.923. Clearly, the effects of immigrant threat on positive and negative evaluations of immigrant contributions to American society are considerably stronger for undocumented immigrants than for documented immigrants.

Figure 1.

Predicted probabilities for positive and negative documented and undocumented immigrant contributions, by immigrant threat scale, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group survey. (a) Positive contributions. (b) Negative contributions.

American Identity

We also find some interesting patterns in the effects of our two measures of American identity. For our American pride scale, there are some significant differences in how this variable is related to perceptions of contributions by documented and undocumented immigrants. We see in Table 1, for instance, that American pride is unrelated to how Americans perceive the contributions of documented immigrants (b = 0.069, z = 0.68), but American pride has a strong negative effect on how individuals perceive the contributions of undocumented immigrants (b = −0.418, z = −4.31). These coefficients are statistically different from each other (z = −3.46). This is illustrated in Figure 2, in which we present predicted probabilities for perceptions of positive immigrant contributions (Figure 2(a)) and negative immigrant contributions (Figure 2(b)) as a function of the American pride scale. For documented immigrants, the curve is relatively flat, with perceptions of positive contributions of documented immigrants actually increasing from 0.799 to 0.846—a small and nonsignificant change of 0.047. On the other hand, there is a strong decline in perceptions of positive contributions by undocumented immigrants; as one moves from the lowest to the highest value on the American pride scale, there is a decline in the probability of perceptions of positive contributions for undocumented immigrants of 0.445 (from 0.681 to 0.236). For perceptions of negative contributions (Figure 2(b)), the pattern is roughly flipped. Increases in American pride result in an increase in perceptions of negative contributions for undocumented immigrants (from 0.157 to 0.562, or a change of 0.405), while increases in American pride has a negligible effect on perceptions of negative contributions for documented immigrants (i.e., a change from 0.090 to 0.067, or −0.033). It is clear that Americans having pride in their own country has a strong negative effect on how they evaluate the contributions of undocumented immigrants but little effect on how they evaluate the contributions of documented immigrants.

Figure 2.

Predicted probabilities of positive and negative documented and undocumented immigrant contributions, by American pride scale, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group survey. (a) Positive contributions. (b) Negative contributions.

The American exclusion scale has a strong negative effect on perceptions of immigrant contributions for both documented (b = −0.430, z = −4.65) and undocumented (b = −0.378, z = −3.90) immigrants. Simply, Americans who hold exclusionary views relating to what it takes to be an American are about equally likely to have positive views about the contributions made by immigrants, both documented and undocumented (z = 0.38). One can see from Figure 3(a) that the negative effects of the American exclusion scale on perceptions of positive immigrant contributions extend both to documented and undocumented immigrants; across the range of the American exclusion scale, documented immigrants shift downward by 0.242 (i.e., from 0.934 to 0.692), while undocumented immigrants shift downward by 0.370 (i.e., from 0.599 to 0.229). For perceptions of negative immigrant contributions, across the range of the American exclusion scale documented immigrants increase their predicted probability by 0.122 (from 0.027 to 0.149), while undocumented immigrants increase their predicted probability by 0.362 (from 0.210 to 0.572). It would appear that the American exclusion scale depresses perceptions of positive contributions and increases perceptions of negative perceptions for both documented and undocumented immigrants, controlling for the effects of other independent variables, though the slightly larger effect for undocumented immigrants is not statistically different than the effect for documented immigrants.

Figure 3.

Predicted probabilities of positive and negative documented and undocumented immigrant contributions, by American exclusion scale, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group survey. (a) Positive contributions. (b) Negative contributions.

Evaluations of Hispanics and Asians

We can also consider the effects of Americans evaluations of Hispanics and Asians on their perceptions of the contributions to American society made by documented and undocumented immigrants. For Hispanics, we see that there are positive coefficients for both documented (b = 0.011, z = 3.04) and undocumented (b = 0.022, z = 4.58) immigrants. Simply, more favorable evaluations of Hispanics result in a greater sense that documented and undocumented immigrants contribute positively to American society, though the magnitude of the effect is significantly higher—about twice the size for our undocumented model compared to our documented model (z = 1.70). We can see this in Figures 4(a) and 4(b). For positive immigrant contributions, we find that moving from the lowest to highest value on the Hispanic feeling thermometer variable increases predicted perceptions of positive contributions for documented immigrants by 0.185 (from 0.687 to 0.872). The effect is a bit stronger for undocumented immigrants, with the probability of perceiving a positive contribution rising from 0.115 for those with the most negative views toward Hispanics to 0.528 for those with the most favorable views, for a shift of 0.413. For perceptions of negative immigration contributions, the shift is modest for documented immigrants—from 0.152 to 0.055 (−0.097)—but is considerably more substantial for undocumented immigrants (−0.492, from 0.754 to 0.262). It would seem that evaluations of Hispanics have an effect on evaluations of both documented and undocumented immigrants, though the effect is clearly stronger for undocumented immigrants.

Figure 4.

Predicted probabilities of positive and negative documented and undocumented immigrant contributions, by evaluations of Hispanics, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group survey. (a) Positive contributions. (b) Negative contributions.

For evaluations of Asians, the effects on perceived immigrant contributions are starkly different for documented and undocumented immigrants. We see that more favorable evaluations of Asians are significantly associated with more positive views toward documented immigrants (b = 0.010, z = 2.39); conversely, individuals with unfavorable evaluations of Asians also have less favorable perceptions of documented immigrant contributions. On the other hand, how Americans evaluate Asians is negatively related to the perceived contributions of undocumented immigrants (b = −0.011, z = −2.32). Specifically, individuals who have favorable views toward Asians are less favorable in their assessments of the contributions of undocumented immigrants. In Figures 5(a) and 5(b), we can see this process at work. For documented immigrants in Figure 5(a), one can see that increases in Asian feeling thermometer evaluations increase perceptions of positive contributions from 0.705 to 0.862—a shift of 0.157. For undocumented immigrants, the opposite is true: moving from the lowest to highest value on the Asian feeling thermometer results in a shift in perceptions of positive contributions of −0.268 (from 0.579 to 0.311). The opposite pattern is observed for perceptions of negative immigrant contributions. Across the range of the Asian feeling thermometer variable, the shift in negative perceptions is −0.082 (from 0.141 to 0.059) for documented immigrants and 0.244 (from 0.233 to 0.463) for undocumented immigrants.

Figure 5.

Predicted probabilities of positive and negative documented and undocumented immigrant contributions, by evaluations of Asians, 2016–2017 Voter Study Group survey. (a) Positive contributions. (b) Negative contributions.

Based on these results, it appears that when Americans think about documented immigrants, they consider how they think about both Hispanics and Asians. For both groups, there is a positive effect of feeling thermometer evaluations on perceptions of positive immigrant contributions. The story is more complicated when we consider how Americans consider the contributions of undocumented immigrants. In this instance, feelings toward Hispanics dominate, with Hispanic evaluations having a very strong positive effect on evaluations of undocumented immigrants. This suggests that those with negative evaluations of Hispanics are most likely to perceive that undocumented immigrants make a negative contribution to American society. But for Asian evaluations, the effect on perceptions of positive contributions by undocumented immigrants is negative, indicating that individuals with the most favorable evaluations of Asians are the ones who see the most negative contributions of undocumented immigrants. We suggest that Americans think about both Hispanics and Asians when they are evaluating the contributions of documented immigrants, but they primarily think about Hispanics when it comes to evaluations of undocumented immigrants.

Pooling Documented and Undocumented Subsamples

It is also possible to combine our two dependent variables into a single variable representing respondents’ perceptions of immigrant contributions in order to estimate (1) differences in Americans’ evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants, and (2) differences in the effects of independent variables for these two groups of immigrants. In order to do this, we begin by merging the documented and undocumented immigrants’ items into a single variable; this variable represents how Americans judge the contributions of immigrants in general, some of whom are described as “illegal” and others of whom are described as “legally residing in the United States.” We also create a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for those respondents who received the “illegal immigrants” prompt, and 0 for those who received the “immigrants legally residing in the U.S.” prompt. We can then estimate our models with the (combined) immigrant contribution variable as the dependent variable, with the dichotomous variable representing whether respondents received the undocumented/documented prompt as an independent variable. We can also include a series of interactions for our immigrant status variable, on one hand, and each of the independent variables in our model, on the other. This permits us to estimate explicitly the degree to which the effects of our independent variables—especially perceptions of immigrant threat, American pride, American exclusion, and evaluations of Hispanics and Asians—differ for documented and undocumented immigrants.⁷

Our pooled results are reported in Table 2. In Model (1), we present our model estimates without interactions. The coefficient for the illegal immigrant prompt tells us the effect of receiving the illegal immigrant prompt compared to receiving the legal immigrant prompt, controlling for the effects of other independent variables in the model. As one can see, Americans rate the contributions of undocumented immigrants to American society as being considerably much lower than for the contributions of documented immigrants (b = −2.380 z = −21.54). This translates into a substantial gap in the proportion of respondents who perceive legal immigrants as making a contribution (0.871) compared to the proportion of respondents who perceive illegal immigrants as making a contribution (0.385). We also see that perceptions of general immigration contributions are influenced by perceptions of immigrant threat (b = −1.268, z = −17.72), American pride (b = −0.191, z = −2.81), American exclusion (b = 0.388, z = −6.01), and evaluations of Hispanics (b = 0.014, z = 5.05), though evaluations of Asians do not have a general effect on immigrant evaluations.

In Model (2) of Table 2, we present the results for a full interaction model of perceptions of immigrant contributions, with interactions for our illegal/legal immigrant prompt and each of the other independent variables in the model. This model permits us to estimate differences in the effects of each independent variable for those receiving the documented and undocumented prompts to the question relating to perceptions of immigrant contributions to American society.⁸ We find that the effects of several key variables on immigrant evaluations differ, depending on whether respondents received the documented or undocumented prompt. Specifically, the negative effects of immigrant threat for documented immigrants (b = −1.097, z = −11.02) are strengthened considerably for undocumented immigrants, as shown with the interaction coefficient (b = −0.524, z = −3.50), and the null effects of the American pride scale for documented immigrants (b = 0.069, z = 0.68) becomes a negative effect for undocumented immigrants (interaction b = −0.487, z = −3.46). The American exclusion scale has a negative effect on immigration evaluations for documented immigrants (b = −0.429, z = −4.65) that is statistically indistinguishable from the effect for undocumented immigrants (interaction b = 0.051, z = 0.38). Further, Americans' evaluations of Hispanics have a strong positive effect for documented immigrants (b = 0.011, z = 3.03) that becomes even more strongly positive for undocumented immigrants (interaction b = 0.010, z = 1.70). Finally, we find considerable differences in the effects of Asian evaluations on perceptions of the contributions of documented and undocumented immigrants. For documented immigrants, evaluations of Asians have a positive effect on immigrant evaluations (b = 0.010, z = 2.39), but the effect is in the opposite direction for undocumented immigrants (interaction b = −0.021, z = −3.31).

Conclusion

In this paper, we consider the effects of perceptions of immigrant threat, American identity, and evaluations of immigration-dominant racial/ethnic groups on Americans perceptions of immigrant contributions to American society. Our study differs from previous research in that we explore how immigrant threat and American identity shape how Americans think about two different types of immigrants: documented vs. undocumented immigrants. Our core argument is that different types of immigrants activate threat perceptions and American identity in different ways. Americans think considerably more favorably about the contributions to American society made by documented immigrants compared to undocumented immigrants, and the determinants of evaluations of these two immigrant groups differ considerably. We suggest that Americans are more likely to perceive that undocumented immigrants constitute a threat, and subsequently variables measuring immigrant threat should have a stronger effect on how Americans think of the contributions by undocumented immigrants than on how they think about the contributions of documented immigrants. Furthermore, undocumented immigrants should be more likely to activate Americans’ sense of national identity, since undocumented immigrants may be seen as violating American law and Americans’ sense of national integrity. Hence we suggest that American identity—both American pride and American exclusion—should have a stronger effect on evaluations of undocumented immigrants than documented immigrants. Further, we suggest that recent patterns of immigration are related to concerns held by many Americans about demographic changes that will render the United States a majority-minority country around mid-century; subsequently, we contend that how Americans think about two immigration-dominated groups—Hispanics and Asians—is related to how Americans evaluate the contributions of documented and undocumented immigrants.

Our empirical results are generally supportive of our arguments. First, our immigrant threat scale has a consistently negative effect on perceptions of immigrant contributions, both for documented and undocumented immigrants. It is noteworthy, however, that the negative effect of immigrant threat on perceptions of immigrant contributions to American society is considerably and significantly stronger for undocumented immigrants than documented immigrants. Americans who perceive that immigrants represent some combination of cultural, economic, national security, and crime threat are less likely to see immigrants—especially undocumented immigrants—as making a positive contribution to American society.

Second, we subdivide American identity into American pride and American exclusion components, and these components of American national identity work differently. American pride does not affect evaluations of documented immigrants, but it has a significant negative effect on evaluations of undocumented immigrants. On the other hand, our American exclusion scale—which captures Americans' beliefs about the criteria that individuals must meet in order to be considered an American—has a roughly similar negative effect on the evaluations of contributions to American society by both documented and undocumented immigrants.

Third, we suggest that the implicit threat to the prevailing demographic composition of the United States can be magnified as a function of how Americans think about immigrant-dominant racial/ethnic groups. We find that Americans’ evaluations of Hispanics and Asians have implications for their evaluations of the contributions of documented and undocumented immigrants. Evaluations of Hispanics have a positive effect on perceptions of positive contributions by both documented and undocumented immigrants, though the effect is stronger for undocumented immigrants. When Americans think about both documented and undocumented immigrants, Hispanics come to mind, and Hispanic evaluations shape perceptions of both immigrant groups. But when Americans think about Asians, it appears that they primarily connect evaluations of Asians to their assessments relating to the contributions to American society of documented immigrants but not undocumented immigrants.

These findings have important implications for how we study American immigration attitudes. It is imperative that scholars working in this research program differentiate evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants. Our findings for documented and undocumented immigrants are quite different, with some key variables (i.e., immigrant threat, American pride, and attitudes toward Hispanics) having stronger effects for undocumented immigrants, as expected. These findings make it clear that one cannot treat all immigrants as a homogenous group, but rather scholars must differentiate immigrants based on theoretically relevant characteristics that can affect not only how they are evaluated but also variation in the determinants of perceptions of immigrant contributions.

Where do we go from here? The research agenda on the connections between immigrant threat, American identity, and immigration evaluations is a full one. First, it is important to explore the role played by different dimensions of Americans' perceptions of immigrant threat in shaping evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants. We have explored here the effects of general perceptions of immigrant threat, but it is possible that some dimensions of immigrant threat perceptions—for example, cultural, national security, crime, and economic—may have varying effects on evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants. For instance, it is likely that perceptions of national security threat may have a stronger effect on evaluations of undocumented immigrants than documented immigrants, since the former have not undergone the formal vetting process that the latter have undergone. Second, it is important to consider how American identity and immigrant threat perceptions work together to shape evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants. Is the effect of perceptions of immigrant threat on immigrant evaluations stronger among individuals who have a strong American identity, and is this magnifying effect stronger for undocumented immigrants? This would fit with what we might expect from social identity theory—that is, that the effects of out-group threat are magnified as a function of individuals’ attachments to what they perceive as being threatened. Finally, we suggest that more work needs to be done on the determinants of immigration evaluations relating to a wide range of immigrant groups. Certainly, more research is needed on how Americans view documented and undocumented immigrants, but it is also important to expand the research program to identify what it is specifically about these two groups that conjures up different evaluative criteria. Moreover, we need to know more about how these variables shape attitudes toward immigrants from specific countries and regions. What stereotypes are generated when individuals are presented with the stimulus of an immigrant from one country or another? When an American hears a question about, say, a Canadian immigrant, what perceptions and stereotypes are activated differently than when an American hears a question about, say, an Iranian immigrant? These are important questions that should be explored in future research.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental Material - Perceptions of Threat, American National Identity, and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Documented and Undocumented Immigrants

Supplemental Material for Perceptions of Threat, American National Identity, and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Documented and Undocumented Immigrants by Dan Qi and James C. Garand in Political Research Quarterly

Footnotes

Author’s Note

This is a substantially revised version of a paper presented at the 2019 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28—September 1, 2019. We are grateful to the editor and to two anonymous reviewers for invaluable and constructive comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

Dan Qi

James C. Garand

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

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