Abstract
Postmodernism involves the view that knowing is subjective or interpretive. Narrative therapy, which draws on this approach, places emphasis on the interpretation of the client’s subjective experience—the intrapsychic perspective. This perspective, which represents a return to an earlier development, is however not a logical or necessary consequence of postmodernism. In refiguring family therapy/psychology, and thus going beyond narrative therapy, what remains to be determined is how postmodernism as well as the phase of development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective—as incorporated by general system theory (i.e., the interactional approach)—can be applied in a meaningful and integrative way.
Keywords
Postmodernism is a highly significant philosophical development (Cloete, 2002; Hoffman, 1993; Moules, 2000; Phipps, 2004). Its main premise is that the act of knowing is subjective or interpretive and, thus, the knower is unable to acquire direct or objective knowledge (Benhabib, 1984; Cloete, 2001; Rorty, 1979). Within the field of family therapy/psychology, this development has been associated with the emergence of narrative therapy.
Narrative therapy is based on the idea that we are unable to comprehend events objectively and that all we have are stories or narratives about them (Hoffman, 1993). Accordingly, the role of the therapist is to interpret how the client is storying his or her world, the attendant meaning, and then to help the client reauthor a more helpful, satisfying, and open-ended story (White & Epston, 1990). Narrative therapy, thus, entails a strong emphasis on the interpretation of the individual’s subjective experience, an approach referred to as the intrapsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
The intrapsychic perspective, which represents an early development in psychology, has to do with the investigation of subjective experience (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967). This is distinct from the later interpsychic perspective that limits observation to that of behavior (Watzlawick et al., 1967). The latter perspective was incorporated by systems theory/cybernetics—the notion that when we observe phenomena together, rather than discretely, we discover how in combination they affect one another (Bertalanffy, 1968)—a foundational premise in family therapy (Phipps, 2014).
Therefore, narrative therapy is associated with a shift back to an earlier period of theoretical evolution—the intrapsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Such a development, though, in the field of family therapy would seem to be a necessary and logical consequence of the advent of postmodernism. This assumption and line of development, however, warrant closer examination.
Postmodernism
An extremely broad movement, postmodernism spans philosophy, literature, art, culture, film, architecture, media, economics, politics, social sciences, feminism, science, and religion (Moules, 2000). As a result of the postmodern movement, many of the achievements of various disciplines, including those of science and philosophy, have been brought into question (Lyotard, 1984). Ultimately, postmodernism is a philosophical development that engages in the time-honored debate about the question of knowledge (Cloete, 2001). It has to do with the claim that—contrary to the claim in modernism—there are no grounds, rational or otherwise, for the possibility of knowledge. In other words, postmodernism represents an extreme form of skepticism regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, whether it be scientific knowledge or any other (Cloete, 2001). To explain this development further, it is necessary to examine the traditions of modernism and postmodernism more closely.
Although modernism has a number of different meanings, within the context of the postmodern debate it generally refers to a tradition that dates back to the 18th-century philosophers of the French Enlightenment (Habermas, 1987). Essentially, these philosophers placed great faith in human reason, believing that true knowledge about the world could be acquired by appeal to reason (Cloete, 2002). Thus, they initiated a project to establish, on the basis of reason, objective science, universal morality and law, as well as autonomous art. They believed that this project would result in the general unfolding of truths about the world and the betterment of humanity (Pocock, 1995). By the 20th century, however, many argued that the optimism of this project had been shattered (Habermas, 1987) and this marked the beginning of postmodernism.
Within postmodernism, it is argued that there are no grounds for determining what counts as true knowledge. On the basis that the act of knowing is subjective or interpretive, the knower is unable to acquire direct or objective (including neutral and universal) knowledge and, thus, is unable to determine unequivocally its truth (Cloete, 2001). Thus, the knower can never know what Kant referred to as, the Ding an sich, that is, the thing in itself (Bateson, 1979), or, as Rorty (1979) says, the mind cannot mirror nature. This also means we have no “God’s eye view,” whether by appeal to observation and experience or reason, from which we can evaluate knowledge claims (Rorty, 1991, cited in Durrheim, 1997, p. 177). Moreover, because the act of knowing is interpretive, it is the knower that tends to “language,” “perform,” or “bring forth” the known (Benhabib, 1984; Moules, 2000). Accordingly, then, as Rorty (1991) asserts, “there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones—no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of fellow-inquirers” (p. 165)—that is, all that is known is purely a function of the historical and cultural constraints of the knower/s (Cloete, 2002).
Postmodernism constitutes a radical challenge to our taken-for-granted world. Moreover, it put paid to the naive, if not hubristic, modernist notion of acquiring objective knowledge. This philosophical development had a significant impact on the field of family therapy.
Postmodernism and Family Therapy
Foreshadowed by the work of Humberto Maturana (1988) and his adoption of the constructivist philosophy—the view that reality is a function of (the constructs of) the observer—the conclusion in postmodernism that all knowing (perception or observation) is inescapably subjective or interpretive, and along with this the emphasis that knowing (observation) is a function of the knower (observer), seemed to render the role of the known (observed) less important than the role of (the subjective experience) of the knower (observer; Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003).
Much of the knowledge that had seemingly been acquired in the field of family therapy’s development centered on systems theory/cybernetics. To understand this better, it is first necessary to review the two main developments that the latter approach(es) tend(s) to incorporate, namely, the movement from the intrapsychic to the interpsychic perspective, and from the lineal to the nonlineal perspective.
Intrapsychic to Interpsychic Perspective
The development from the intrapsychic perspective—the assumption that there are processes in the individual’s mind that are open to investigation (i.e., the psychoanalytic approach)—to the interpsychic one—the assumption that the behavior between “minds” or people can be observed (i.e., the behaviorist approach)—was said to have marked the transition from speculation about the individual’s subjective experience to the observation of behavior. This was important for two reasons. First, it helped to clarify two distinct frames of reference for observation or description: (a) observation of the individual’s behavior (i.e., the interpsychic perspective) and (b) inferences about an individual’s subjective experience upon observation of the individual’s behavior (i.e., the intrapsychic perspective; Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Second, the emphasis on observation and these frames of reference showed the importance of careful and systematic observation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003)—what Bertalanffy (1955, p. 253) referred to as trained observation.
Lineal to Nonlineal Perspective
The development from the lineal (i.e., straight-line) perspective—the (Newtonian) assumption that causal processes are arranged in a lineal sequence (i.e., psychoanalytic and behaviorist approaches)—to the nonlineal one—the assumption that causal processes can be arranged in a nonlineal or circular sequence (i.e., systems theory/cybernetics)—was thought to constitute a revolution in family therapy (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). It helped the field to observe phenomena in the context of a relationship, rather than on their own, that is, to observe the interdependence of phenomena (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Put differently, family therapists were believed to be able, for the first time, to observe interaction or—in the full sense of the word—relationship (Kaslow, 1996; Phipps & Vorster, 2011)—by performing what Bateson (1979) referred to as, double description, that is, observing both sides of a relationship simultaneously. These two developments were incorporated in systems theory/cybernetics.
General System Theory (GST)
Toward the end of World War II, a breakthrough in thinking occurred. This had to do with the idea that it is necessary to study phenomena in the context of a relationship (i.e., as a whole), as opposed to studying them on their own (i.e., as separate parts; Bertalanffy, 1968). This idea, which seemed to surface almost simultaneously in various parts of the scientific world, led to a number of significant developments, including GST and cybernetics.
For some time, there was confusion about the nature of the relationship between the two approaches. Now it is understood that although both approaches have to do with the study of wholes, GST entails the assumption that a system—defined as a system of interacting elements (or parts)—displays part-whole relations that are subject to a number of principles, one of which is self-regulation or feedback—that is, cybernetics (Bertalanffy, 1968; Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003). Thus, GST is superordinate to cybernetics and the original term general system theory is used to refer to systems theory/cybernetics (Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003).
GST involves the observation of the part-whole/interdependent (i.e., nonlineal) relations/behavior (i.e., interpsychic) of a system (Bertalanffy, 1968). It was the application of this thinking—which provided a frame of reference for understanding the family as an interdependent phenomenon—that ultimately consolidated the field that is today known as “family therapy” (Phipps, 2014). With the arrival of postmodernism, however, the basis of this entire development was questioned.
Postmodernism and GST
Applying postmodernism to family therapy, it was now posited that all of the knowledge which had previously been acquired about family functioning and the behavior of a system—the development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective and the lineal to nonlineal perspective, as incorporated by GST—said more about the knower (observer) than it did about the known (observed; Golann, 1987) and, henceforth, needed to be suspended—if not set aside (Vorster, 2003). At this point, the field of family therapy underwent a change of direction and attention, shifting focus increasingly to the role of (the subjective experience of) the knower (observer) and how he or she was interpreting (constructing or storying) his or her reality (Phipps & Vorster, 2011)—resulting in the birth of narrative therapy.
Narrative Therapy
Toward the end of the 20th century, it was widely held that the field of family therapy had undergone the narrative turn (Bertrando, 2000; Botella & Herrero, 2000; Carr, 1998; Hoffman, 1993; Neimeyer & Mahoney, 1995; Zimmerman & Dickerson, 1994). In this respect, the narrative approach was said to have eclipsed, if not replaced, GST. Although some theorists, such as Becvar and Becvar (1996), claimed that it represented a continuous (i.e., logically consistent) development of GST, other theorists, like White and Epston (1990), argued that it was discontinuous (i.e., altogether logically separate). Whether the narrative approach represents a continuous or discontinuous development of GST will be discussed further on, however, what is important for our purposes here is that narrative therapy had seemingly gained prominence in family therapy. Nonetheless, it is important to note that narrative therapy is not so much a single, unified approach in family therapy, as an emerging tradition with a growing number of proponents and a diverse set of ideas and views as to how to apply the narrative metaphor or analogy.
One such approach that gained early ascendancy within this tradition, and which will be emphasized in this article, is that of Michael White and David Epston. In 1990, they coauthored the book, Narrative Means to Therapeutic Ends, which not only demonstrated in pragmatic terms how narrative could be applied as a metaphor in family therapy, but also outlined the basic philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of narrative therapy, or what White (2007) later referred to as narrative practice.
The basic thesis of narrative therapy is that as human beings, we tend to story our experience. We do this to make sense of our lives, to ascribe meaning, and to express ourselves (White & Epston, 1990). Storying is, thus, said to be a fundamental human experience and activity, a selective or interpretive process that shapes our lives, and problems occur when these stories are unrepresentative of our actual or lived experience (White, 1998). Accordingly, the thesis in narrative therapy is in keeping with the emphasis in postmodernism that it is the knower who performs or interprets reality—in this instance by storying (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Closer examination of narrative therapy, however, also shows something else.
Narrative therapy ultimately involves the application of an intrapsychic perspective. As this has already been extensively examined in the precursor paper by Phipps and Vorster (2011) entitled, “Narrative Therapy: A Return to the Intrapsychic Perspective?” only the essential observations, in this regard, as they pertain to narrative therapy’s philosophical background, theory, aims, and method will now be recounted.
Philosophical Background
Two other aspects of the philosophical background to narrative therapy that require explanation include social constructionism and hermeneutics. With regard to social constructionism, in narrative therapy, it is held that reality is a socially negotiated story or narrative told by the individual. In this respect, White (1998, p. 225) said, “The personal story or self-narrative is not radically invented inside our heads. Rather, it is something that is negotiated and distributed within various communities of persons and in the institutions of our culture.” It is evident from this that narrative therapy incorporates a social constructionist influence: The view that reality is an artifact of social or communal interchange (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
Hermeneutics
According to the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, hermeneutics has to do with the attempt to understand the behavior of persons in terms of their experience and inner motivation, that is, inner life (Gallagher, 2004). Drawing on the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz who said that social scientists adhering to the hermeneutic or interpretive approach had realized they were free to draw on various analogies or metaphors, White (1995) argued that the use of the narrative metaphor in family therapy was indicated. What is important to understand from this is that narrative therapy—the application of the narrative metaphor—is informed by hermeneutics, a philosophical tradition that incorporates an intrapsychic emphasis (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
Theory
The basic theory of narrative therapy is that experience is storied; this story constitutes or brings forth the individual’s “reality”; no story can ever include the entire richness of the individual’s lived experience; and problems occur when the story he or he is telling—the dominant or problem-saturated story—is unrepresentative of his or her lived experience (White, 1990). One aspect of this theory that warrants closer attention has to do with the assumption about experience. Although social constructionist philosophy is based on the view that all experience is interpretive, it does not entail an overt assumption about the nature of that interpretation for the individual. The assumption that the individual’s experience is storied—as in narrative therapy—necessarily entails speculation about the nature of that interpretation for the individual, thereby invoking an intrapsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
Aims
A central aim in narrative therapy is to assist the client to reauthor an alternative, more helpful, open-ended story. Ultimately, though, reauthoring amounts to a form of reframing. Reframing, which is derived from GST, involves the notion that if an event is situated in a new context, the meaning of this event simultaneously changes (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). That reframing is intrinsic to narrative therapy is clear from its propositions and the application thereof. More particularly, experience is considered an interpretive act and it is the frame or the interpretation that provides the context for meaning (White, 1998). Accordingly, the aim of narrative therapy is to help the client to reframe or reinterpret his or her experience by developing a new story. White (1995) disputed that reauthoring is tantamount to reframing on the grounds that reauthoring is collaborative, while reframing is supposedly not. This, however, confuses technique with the way in which it is applied (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Ultimately, reauthoring does amount to a form of reframing and, furthermore, unlike in GST where the therapist does not attempt to understand the subjective meaning associated with the new context, in narrative therapy the therapist does. Put differently, reauthoring involves the intrapsychic application of reframing.
Method
To help the client to generate a preferred story or to reauthor his or her life, the method employed typically involves (a) externalizing the problem, (b) searching for unique outcomes, and (c) revising the individual’s relationship with the problem (White & Epston, 1990). At a more general level, narrative therapy involves the use of storytelling, the telling and retelling of a story, and the (intrapsychic) assumption that storytelling is a means by which the individual’s subjective experience can be altered (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
From the foregoing, it is therefore apparent that narrative therapy incorporates an intrapsychic perspective. Narrative therapy entails (a) an hermeneutic philosophy—and the derivation thereof of the narrative metaphor—with a clear intrapsychic emphasis; (b) the intrapsychic assumption that the individual’s experience is storied; and (c) the use of reframing (i.e., reauthoring) and storytelling with an intrapsychic orientation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). This conclusion warrants a few observations.
Narrative Therapy as Intrapsychic
Understanding that narrative therapy entails an intrapsychic emphasis does not mean that interpsychic observation or descriptions cannot also be made within this approach. However, limiting observations to interpsychic ones would not only be inconsistent with the essential thinking in narrative therapy, but more significantly, no provision is made to distinguish the intrapsychic from interpsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
Furthermore, that narrative therapy does not draw a distinction between an intrapsychic and interpsychic perspective does not render the conclusion that narrative therapy tends to contain an intrapsychic emphasis any less significant: Because the intrapsychic and interpsychic perspectives constitute two distinct frames of reference for observation or description and an intrapsychic observation or description is one step removed from an interpsychic one, the two perspectives do not constitute a binary opposition but rather two logically distinct frames of reference (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). This issue will be addressed in more detail later.
Identifying that narrative therapy incorporates an intrapsychic perspective, whereas GST draws on an interpsychic one, confirms that narrative therapy (a) is not a continuous development of GST, and moreover (b) has returned—considering that the intrapsychic perspective represents an earlier occurrence in clinical psychology and psychotherapy—to an earlier phase in the field’s development. As explained previously, this development is considered acceptable, if not warranted, because narrative therapy is, itself, a logical and necessary consequence of postmodernism.
Whether such a conclusion is valid requires careful consideration. To do this, it is first necessary to revisit Minuchin’s (1998) observations about the field of family therapy, and narrative therapy, in particular.
Minuchin’s Observations
Minuchin, in his article “Where is the Family in Narrative Family Therapy?” highlighted that narrative therapy had moved away from system principles and had returned to an emphasis on traditional, individual, human psychology. Herein, Minuchin (1998) began with the question, “How was the narrative practice that has grown out of social constructionist theory dealing with ‘relationships’ of family members?” In considering this question further he asked: Can narrative practice growing out of social constructionist theory deal with the patterns of relationship between family members [?]…. Or must it focus only on the way each individual family member makes sense of the family reality? In other words, can a narrative therapist work with the family as a social system? (Minuchin, 1998, pp. 398–399) Instead of observing the way in which family members affect [emphasis added] each other in their transactions, creating patterns [emphasis added] that enhance and constrain the view of self and others, these narrativists tend to privilege the discourse of individual members. Other family members are made the audience.… The family, that natural interpersonal context … disappears from practice. (Minuchin, 1998, p. 399) Narrative therapy has moved away from systemic principles in order to highlight context and culture.… In the process, theorists seem to have misplaced the family—that prominent, intermediate locus of context and culture within which people live—and practitioners have returned to an emphasis on individual human psychology. (Minuchin, 1998, p. 403)
Response to Minuchin
Consider, for example, Combs and Freedman (1998, pp. 407–408) who, in replying to Minuchin (1998), stated: If we understand him as he would wish to be understood, the observation of these interactions is the sine qua non of family therapy. We, on the other hand, believe that the interactions we see are profoundly influenced by our presence. To us, meaning-making is a radically interactive activity. Our perceptions, and the judgments we make on the basis of them, are shaped by our relationship with everyone else in the room, moment by moment. Minuchin is right in saying that we don’t observe the interactions of family members, but he misunderstands our reason for not making such observations. He believes that we have “… returned to an emphasis on individual human psychology that is not only traditional but does not fit the parts of postmodern theory that emphasize social relatedness.” We, instead, believe that we are so thoroughly caught up in the webs of social relatedness that we can’t get far enough outside them to observe interactional patterns. Our avoidance of the kind of observation that is so dear to Minuchin comes from a radical focus on relationship, not from a preference for individual psychology.
Minuchin’s Conclusion Unwarranted
Seemingly then, Minuchin’s (1998) concerns that the field had moved away from the observation of the relationship or interaction between individuals—and, hence, the family—back to traditional individual psychology were unfounded, if not misguided. There was, in fact, no value in the interpsychic perspective, per se, and perhaps more importantly no real value in the entire phase from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as incorporated by GST. Thus, it was unnecessary for family therapists to consider the interpsychic perspective and even the distinction between the interpsychic and intrapsychic perspectives for the purposes of observation or description. Moreover while therapists, as noted previously, were now free to adopt any metaphor, they were encouraged—by White (2007)—to select the (postmodern) narrative metaphor—over the (modern) system one. The response to Minuchin (1998) and the assumptions therein, however, require a closer look.
Reexamination of the Response to Minuchin
The explanation that the individual’s subjective perception is so thoroughly socially informed that he or she is unable to get far enough away from it to observe the interpersonal behavior of others is invalid (Phipps & Vorster, 2011) for the following reason. Given that, as noted previously, the intrapsychic and interpsychic perspectives do not represent a binary position but rather two logically distinct frames of reference, whether an observer chooses to adopt the assumption that perception can or cannot be objective (i.e., modernism/postmodernism) and/or causal processes are or are not arranged in a lineal sequence (i.e., lineal/nonlineal), this assumption is logically separate from whether he or she chooses to observe or describe that phenomenon from an intrapsychic or interpsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Thus, the explanation put forward by Combs and Freedman (1998) confuses two logically distinct frames of reference: (a) the observer’s subjectivity, whether individually informed—as in constructivism—or socially informed—as in social constructionism; and (b) the intrapsychic-interpsychic perspective (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Put differently, the understanding that the individual’s perception is necessarily subjective is logically separate from whether the individual chooses to limit himself or herself to intrapsychic or interpsychic observations about others (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). The argument that the interpsychic perspective should be set aside rests on the illogical assumption that, because the individual (i.e., the therapist) cannot get far enough outside of his or her own head (i.e., subjective perception), it is unnecessary to draw a distinction between whether he or she chooses: (a) to observe the behavior of another (i.e., the interpsychic perspective) or (b) to infer about the individual’s subjective experience upon the observation of his or her behavior (i.e., the intrapsychic perspective; Phipps & Vorster, 2011). In the final analysis, observance of the postmodern assumption that the individual’s perception is necessarily subjective does not forego the need for adherence to an interpsychic perspective or the intrapsychic/interpsychic distinction for the purposes of observation.
Deviation in Family Therapy
On reexamination then, although the invocation of the intrapsychic perspective in narrative therapy may seem to be a logical and necessary consequence of postmodernism, this is not the case. It does not follow logically that, because the individual’s perception is subjective (postmodernism), he or she should necessarily choose to infer about another’s subjective experience (intrapsychic perspective) rather than observe their behavior (interpsychic perspective). Therefore, in reviewing the logical line of development—notably the transition from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as incorporated by GST—it would appear that the return to the intrapsychic perspective—as is the case with narrative therapy—constitutes a potential deviation in family therapy. This confusion and resultant deviation has several implications for family therapy.
Implications for Family Therapy
First, it would appear that a core and dynamic period of development—that from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as incorporated by GST—has been unnecessarily discarded.
Second, and in line with the effect of adopting an intrapsychic rather than an interpsychic perspective, observations and descriptions of interpersonal functioning, such as those proffered in narrative therapy, necessarily entail more speculation. They are not less relevant or significant for the field—they are simply more speculative (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
Third, part of the shift in emphasis, concomitant with postmodernism and therefore narrative therapy, to the observer’s (knower’s) subjectivity—the impossibility of observer objectivity—the concept of trained observation has been unnecessarily discarded along with that of objective observation (Golann, 1987; Phipps & Vorster, 2011; Vorster, 2003). Put differently, the development from the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective—which helped to identify two logically distinct frames of reference for observation or description and, thereby, highlighted the significance of methodical and systematic observation, or what Bertalanffy (1955) termed trained observation—was needlessly abandoned, along with the earlier modernist concept of objective observation: Trained observation was erroneously equated with objective observation (Phipps & Vorster, 2011). Having critically considered the potential implications of this confusion and subsequent deviation in development, it is now appropriate to examine the future of family therapy.
Refiguring Family Therapy
In refiguring family therapy/psychology and going beyond narrative therapy, the essential challenge thus lies in determining how the contributions of both postmodernism—and where appropriate narrative therapy—and the intrapsychic to interpsychic perspective, as embraced in GST, can now be meaningfully and logically therapeutically incorporated. Because this article involves a meta-perspective on developments in the field, considerations about the future practice and development of family therapy will be limited to general (i.e., process) rather than specific (i.e., content) observations—the subject of which is another paper.
In reflecting on postmodern contributions, it is important that therapists operate with a heightened awareness of their choice of frame of reference for observation. Such awareness, which includes the distinction between the intrapsychic and interpsychic perspectives, will add greater acuity to their observations and descriptions (Phipps & Vorster, 2011).
Another key development, seemingly derived from the increased sensitivity toward the observer’s and, in this case, the client’s, frame of reference, involves—as is clearly illuminated in narrative therapy—a renewed emphasis on a person-centered approach to psychotherapy. Given that the person-centered approach incorporates greater sensitivity and respect for the client as well as a therapeutic environment often characterized by empathy, congruence, and unconditional positive regard, this approach should serve as the bedrock for the practice of family therapy (Vorster 2003, 2011).
In addition, the issue of trained observation requires reconsideration. Having mistakenly assumed that trained observation is equated with (the modern notion of) objective observation and therefore needed to be similarly rejected, trained observation should now assume a central place in family therapy. In any field of human enquiry, not just in family therapy, careful and systematic observation and description of phenomena are fundamental to growth, development, and understanding.
The foregoing considerations are also testament to the imperative of integrative approaches in family therapy (Kaslow & Lebow, 2004; Phipps, 2014). To ensure that such approaches develop along integrative and not simply eclectic lines—an all too familiar occurrence in both psychotherapy and family therapy—ongoing attention should be given to the logical line of development in family therapy; thereby according new and emerging developments systematic and integrated application in this ever-evolving, diverse, and complex field.
Finally, it should also be apparent from this article that the observation (i.e., interpsychic perspective)—in a trained way—of interaction and patterns of interaction (i.e., nonlineal perspective)—that is, GST or, more specifically, what others have referred to as the interactional approach (Green & Phipps, 2015; Jackson, 1961; Phipps, 2011; Vorster, 2011; Vorster, Roos, & Beukes, 2013; Watzlawick & Weakland, 1977)—is one of the keys to family therapy. Although the notion that our clients’ difficulties can be resolved simply by altering their perceptions is one that holds instant appeal—especially as it offers such a hopeful, inspiring, and empowering view of the human context and, moreover, family therapy—it is important to recognize that, in adopting such an approach, the therapist inevitably slides back to a focus on the individual, that is, he or she tends to describe the client’s relationship(s) from the client’s side (i.e., a lineal punctuation), while simultaneously invoking an intrapsychic perspective.
In contrast to this, the adoption of an interactional approach—that is, the trained observation of interaction and the patterns of interaction—not only draws on an interpsychic perspective, but more importantly yields observation of relationship (Kaslow, 1996), in the true sense of the word, that is, a nonlineal approach. Therefore, the continued application of the interactional approach—or, specifically, Bateson’s (1979) double description (i.e., describing both sides of the relationship simultaneously)—as it pertains to the future practice, course, and development of family therapy is essential—lest we, as family therapists, years from now return to Minuchin’s (1998) earlier question, but this time asking ourselves, “Where is the family in family therapy?”
Footnotes
Acknowledgments
Special mention is extended to Florence W. Kaslow, PhD, ABPP, Chair of the ABPP Foundation, for her help in elucidating the ideas in this article as well as to James W. Phipps (2005-2013), the first author’s eldest son, whose life and love served as the inspiration for this work.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.