Conservation-Based Rural Development in Namibia

Abstract

Using a survey of communal conservancies in Namibia, we find that they provide some direct economic benefits to conservancy members, but that indirect benefits promoting development for all residents have not materialized. This partially explains why a high level of discontent with community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) as a development strategy remains, which would need to be addressed with policies that promote a more equitable distribution of benefits from CBNRM. Advocates of CBNRM draw on theories of comparative advantage and collective action to argue that communal conservation efforts enhance the viability of nature tourism as a rural development strategy. We employ a mixed-methods approach to test to what extent CBNRM generates direct and indirect economic benefits, and if these benefits induce participation in communal conservation.

Keywords

economic development community-based conservation nature tourism social justice mixed methods Namibia

Introduction

Nature tourism has gained widespread popularity as a means for promoting rural economic development in remote areas of southern Africa. The strategies used to implement nature tourism regularly involve community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) policies. Although CBNRM takes many forms, it often relies on local residents receiving economic incentives to adopt land-use practices consistent with tourism. Theoretically, the success of benefits-based CBNRM approaches depend on the ability of economic incentives to induce local residents to preserve wildlife for tourist viewing and refrain from using certain land—such as wildlife corridors—for grazing or agriculture. Evaluating CBNRM approaches to rural development requires quantifying their economic effects, but also understanding how economic benefits interact with other factors, such as perceptions of fairness and social justice, to reshape the relationships people have with their natural environment.

Advocates of CBNRM draw on theories of collective action and economic theories of property rights and comparative advantage to argue that the approach promotes both environmental conservation and rural development (Mosimane, 2007; Murphree, 1993, 2009). Proponents of CBNRM use theories of collective action to argue that, under the right conditions, local management of natural resources enhances efficiency and sustainability better than more centralized, top-down approaches (Child, 2004; Long & Jones, 2004). In addition to giving residents a more active role in resource management, CBNRM aims to deliver financial benefits associated with private property ownership to residents of communal lands to incentivize conservation. The explicit assumption is that residents of communal areas will conserve land and wildlife if they derive direct financial benefits from these natural resources (Jones & Murphree, 2004). CBNRM proponents also argue that places with charismatic wildlife species and dramatic landscapes have a comparative advantage in nature tourism compared with other parts of the world (Child, 1996, 2004; Christoffersen, Campbell, & du Toit, 1998). This, plus a lack of similar comparative advantage in agriculture or manufacturing, has contributed to the promotion of tourism in southern Africa by governments, international organizations, and private business as a promising development strategy consistent with environmental conservation (Mitchell & Ashley, 2010; Mowforth & Munt, 2003; Ramutsindela, 2004). In this context, the theory of comparative advantage suggests that revenue from nature tourism provides financial benefits to rural residents who participate in CBNRM initiatives.

Much debate exists over the benefits and drawbacks of CBNRM in Africa, particularly within the development and political ecology literatures. In general, findings suggest that rural residents receive few benefits from CBNRM projects. Some critics argue that the CBNRM approach is too simplistic in its underlying assumptions regarding collective action (Brown, 2002; Cleaver, 1999, 2000; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Others question whether CBNRM initiatives deliver the theoretically predicted economic benefits to local residents (Blaikie, 2006; Kellert, Metha, Ebbin, & Lichtenfeld, 2000) and, even if they do, whether this compensates for the costs to communities (Emerton, 2001; Haller, Galvin, Meroka, Alca, & Alvarez, 2008).

In terms of economic incentives, CBNRM programs commonly promise both direct (i.e., individual) and indirect (e.g., community-wide) economic benefits. However, much of the literature critical of CBNRM makes little distinction between these different types of economic benefits and the varying effects these may have on rural development. Namibian conservancies were established in order for rural residents to receive financial income from the sustainable use of wildlife and from tourism ventures (GRN, 1996a, 1996b). Architects of CBNRM approaches in Namibia predict these economic gains will support direct benefits to member households and indirect benefits in the form of community-wide development (Long, 2004). Direct benefits include rewards that theoretically go to all members, such as cash payments and meat distribution that result from tourism revenue. Other possible cash benefits will reach some member households but not others, including employment opportunities and social support programs such as educational scholarships. CBNRM advocates also predict that conservancies will use some of the tourism-generated income to provide indirect benefits to their communities, such as investments in infrastructure and other types of observable land improvements (Long & Jones, 2004). Although direct benefits have an impact on the individual households that receive them, indirect benefits are more likely to improve the livelihoods for the community as a whole and promote more equitable development.

Using a case study of communal conservancies in Namibia, we employ a mixed-methods approach to test whether CBNRM generates economic benefits for participants, and if these benefits induce participation in communal conservation. We use quantitative and qualitative data to better understand how the theoretical predictions of CBNRM align with actual as well as perceived outcomes. This study provides a nuanced analysis of CBNRM outcomes in Namibia over the past 13 years by distinguishing between direct and indirect benefits, examining whether they materialize, and investigating the influence each type of benefit may have on participation. Thus, this study contributes to important debates concerning CBNRM, its ability to promote rural development, and the extent to which economic incentives influence participation in the collective management of natural resources.

Community-Based Conservation in Namibia

Namibia relies heavily on nature-based tourism as a vehicle for economic growth (GRN, 2004). Since the country’s independence from South Africa in 1990, the Namibian government has actively promoted environmental conservation efforts and encouraged wildlife tourism (Barnes, MacGregor, & Weaver, 2002; GRN, 1996a; MET, 1995a). As of October 2009 there were 59 registered communal conservancies, 15 registered community forests, and more than 30 other communities in the process of establishing conservancies (MET, 2009). This rapid adoption of conservancies results largely from strong national and international support of the model, particularly among conservation organizations (NACSO, 2009b). In addition, local communities across Namibia have increasingly sought to establish conservancies to gain rights to tourism-related revenue (Mosimane, 2007; NACSO, 2006). Namibia’s tourism products and services are considered among the most competitive in Sub-Saharan African (Game conservation in Africa: Horns, claws and the bottom line, 2010; WEF, 2009; WTTC, 2009). Tourism revenues accounted for about 15% of Namibia’s total exports, 14% of GDP, and 18% of employment in 2009 (WTTC, 2009).¹ Tourism GDP is expected to achieve annualized real growth of 8.6% from 2003 to 2013 (WTTC, 2004).

Namibia’s procedure for establishing and joining conservancies makes it an interesting example of the potential incentives for collective action. Unlike in neighboring Botswana where membership is automatically conferred upon all individuals living in designated conservancy areas, membership in Namibian conservancies is voluntary (Mosimane & Aribeb, 2005). Although membership is free, people must live within the designated conservancy area and register with the community management committee in order to join. Namibia’s widespread implementation of CBNRM and optional membership policy result in a situation with measurably different degrees of involvement among CBNRM institutions across the country.

To establish a communal conservancy, residents must define the geographic boundaries of the area, have resident support, write a constitution, elect a management committee, and define membership criteria (GRN, 1996b; MET, 1995b). The earliest conservancies formed in areas identified as having high tourism potential, but the option is open to all residents of communal lands (Mosimane, 2007).² Once established, the conservancy receives usufruct rights over common game species and conditional rights over rarer species.³ Participation in communal conservancies requires compliance with national conservation policies promoting sustainable environmental practices, protect biodiversity, and increase wildlife stocks. Conservancy residents have legal rights to enter into profit-sharing arrangements with tourism enterprises (i.e., lodges and hunting concessions) and to locally manage this revenue. Proponents of CBNRM in Namibia argue that conservancies advance conservation goals and promote economic development (Barnes et al., 2002; Jones, 1999; Richardson, 1998). Namibian conservancies are predicted to provide residents with both direct benefits (e.g., employment, dividends of tourism-derived revenue) and indirect benefits (e.g., improved physical infrastructure, environmental sustainability; Murphy & Roe, 2004). Only members receive direct benefits generated by the conservancy and, theoretically, have a larger role in shaping the rules and goals of the institution (Mosimane, 2007). However, all residents of the conservancy must abide by the established rules for managing resources (e.g., bans on illegal hunting) whether or not they are members.

Namibia’s conservancy program, as with most CBNRM initiatives, stresses the importance of financial incentives in getting local residents to participate in natural resource management. However, a variety of noneconomic factors have also been found to influence decisions to opt in or out of CBNRM institutions. In the grey literature on Namibian conservancies, studies have identified noneconomic benefits resulting from conservancies that may promote participation, such as local-level capacity building and strengthened social networks (Ashley, 1998; Long, 2002).⁴ Within the political ecology literature, several studies find that people may refuse to participate in community-based conservation based on noneconomic considerations (Hoole & Berkes, 2010; Hughes, 2001; Neumann, 1998; Ribot, 2000; Schroeder, 1999; Zulu, 2009). In her case study of wildlife corridors in Tanzania, Goldman (2009) shows that residents may pursue tourism as a revenue source but resist CBNRM initiatives for reasons including lack of trust in conservation authorities, political resistance to authoritarian land-use edicts, and preferences for more traditional resource management plans. In Kenya, some resistance to CBNRM in dryland rangelands has been attributed to residents’ anger with corrupt governance structures (Mohammed-Katerere et al, 2012).

This analysis examines conservancies in two regions of Namibia that have extensively adopted the conservancy approach to promote conservation and nature tourism: Kunene and Caprivi. Analyzing the Namibian case offers insights into how CBNRM initiatives work in areas with extremely different geographic and demographic characteristics. Kunene lies in the arid and semi-arid Northwest of the country whereas Caprivi is subtropical and consists of savanna in the Northeast. Due to its dry climate, crop farming is not possible in much of Kunene; thus, the region has a lower likelihood of the crop-related wildlife conflicts typically associated with CBNRM in southern Africa (although livestock farmers still face substantial risks). In Caprivi, wildlife populations of big game species are higher and the majority of residents practice subsistence crop farming, increasing the likelihood of conflicts between people and wildlife with high tourism value (e.g., elephants).⁵ Kunene covers a much larger land area than Caprivi (115,293 km² vs. 19,532 km² respectively). But in terms of population density, the 2001 Population Census reports that Kunene had only 0.6 persons per km² whereas Caprivi had more than four times that amount with 4.6 persons per km² (CBS, 2006). The comparison between these two regions allows us to investigate the influence of factors such as population density, conservancy size, and livelihood activities on participation in CBNRM programs

Method

This study takes a mixed-methods approach, using both quantitative and qualitative analysis to explore different aspects of the CBNRM-development relationship. Specifically, we address three research questions: (a) Do households located in conservancy areas have higher levels of economic well-being than those located outside conservancies? (b) Within conservancies, do households that include a registered conservancy member have higher levels of economic well-being than those that do not? (c) Why do some individuals choose to become conservancy members while others refrain? We also examine whether significant regional differences exist with regards to these issues. To address the first two questions, we estimate regression models by means of ordinary least-squares (OLS) to measure the economic effects of community-based conservation institutions on Namibian households using survey data from 2006. To address the third question, we use content analysis of interview data to analyze the decision-making processes of individuals regarding whether or not to join conservancies.

Data Sources

Our quantitative analysis uses a survey of 960 households conducted in 2006 by the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET, 2006). The MET survey was conducted in Kunene and Caprivi and included households from eight community conservancies and two control areas (see Figure 1).⁶ The sample includes both participating and nonparticipating households (i.e., households that include at least one conservancy member and households that do not). Kunene and Caprivi were selected for the MET survey due to their high tourism potential and high level of participation in the conservancy program. At the time of the MET survey in 2006, Caprivi and Kunene had the most conservancies registered with 9 and 18, respectively. The two regions combined had more than half of the total conservancies (50) in Namibia (NACSO, 2009a). In addition, these areas allowed for the comparison of an area with high pastoral land use (Kunene) with an area characterized by high agro-pastoral land use (Caprivi). Two well-developed conservancies, two moderately developed conservancies, and one area not yet developed as a conservancy were selected for the survey from each region (SIAPAC, 2006). The inclusion of households located outside conservancies provides a valuable control group in evaluating the economic impacts of CBNRM. An equal probability sample of households was drawn within each of the selected conservancy areas and control areas (SIAPAC, 2006).

Figure 1.

Map of case study areas.

The data set includes information on household demographics and socioeconomic characteristics. However, the data set has some limitations. First, the sample sizes for individual conservancies vary considerably, ranging from a sample of 16 for one conservancy to a sample of 208 for another.⁷ Therefore, the data do not allow for a robust examination of differences in household welfare between conservancies. To deal with this limitation, this analysis pools all sampled households in conservancies and control areas to measure for a general conservancy effect on well-being.⁸ Second, the data are available for only one point in time, not permitting a longitudinal analysis that could control for time period fixed effects. The authors offset some of the shortcomings of the MET data by using qualitative information to analyze changes in conservancies over time and the mechanisms that drive membership.

The qualitative component of this study draws from extensive fieldwork involving 20 case studies conducted in seven of the eight Namibian conservancies included in the MET data set.⁹ The research spanned a 13-year time period and involved unstructured and semi-structured interviews with conservancy residents, oral histories, focus groups, and participant observation. Though different studies had varied objectives, the issue of why people opted for or against joining conservancies was repeatedly addressed. These questions allowed interviewees to elaborate on the reasons behind their decisions. The survey interviews were conducted in Afrikaans or local languages, recorded using notes, and transcribed into English. Sample sizes of the studies varied depending on the purpose of the study and population size of the conservancy, with the smallest sample consisting of 50 households and the largest consisting of 216. The research participants—excluding key informants—were randomly selected in all cases and consisted of both men and women. At least one focus group was conducted in each study and involved various community residents in each case. This analysis draws on the cumulative lessons learned from 13 years of field-level interaction with conservancy residents to analyze the motivations and constraints to membership that were identified, and how they changed over time.

Both data sources provide valuable information about conservancies in Namibia. Because of respondent confidentiality, it is impossible to know whether the households included in the MET 2006 survey were also interviewed at other points in time. However, the MET survey and our case studies all used a random sample of conservancy members and are thus representative of the households located in the areas investigated. Therefore the data are comparable. A key benefit of the MET survey is that it gives income figures derived by one method for a large sample of households within and outside of conservancies. The qualitative data include information on complex household decision-making processes and provide more in-depth information about aspects of well-being that cannot easily be measured monetarily. Used together, these two data sources allow for insights into the complex relationship between economic incentives and participation in communal conservation efforts.

Examining Decision-Making Processes

To understand the reasoning behind decisions regarding conservancy membership, the authors employed the decision-tree method (Bernard, 2002; Gladwin, 1989; Yin, 2003). A decision-tree, like a flow chart, enables researchers to construct a set of “if-then” rules that follow a decision-making process from various choice alternatives to resulting outcomes (e.g., to register or not register in a conservancy). Drawing on extensive case studies on conservancy membership conducted in Namibia between 1997 and 2010, we analyzed the reasons conservancy residents commonly gave to explain their decision to join or not join a conservancy. Similar reasons were grouped under umbrella criteria. These umbrella criteria were organized in a hierarchical fashion based on the order in which each criterion was most commonly discussed to construct a tree diagram. Following Gladwin’s (1989) approach we use previously collected data to conduct a post hoc analysis of the perspectives of conservancy residents regarding the motivations and constraints associated with joining a conservancy, and how these perspectives differ depending on the gender, age, and socioeconomic status of respondents. We also used qualitative analysis of decisions regarding conservancy membership to determine whether or not wealthier households were more prone to join conservancies, or if membership was pursued by households from all socioeconomic groups. This was done to test for possible endogeneity in the regression modeling approach described in the next section.

Modeling Economic Benefits Associated With CBNRM

Drawing from theory and previous empirical evidence, we developed and estimated a regression model to examine the relationship between the existence of conservancies, membership in these institutions, and household economic well-being in Namibia.

The basic form of the model may be presented as:

\begin{matrix} A P C E_{i} = β_{i} + β F e m a l e_{i} + β A g e_{i} + β F a m s i z e_{i} + β E d u c a t i o n_{i} + β D i s t a n c e_{i} \\ + β E m p l o y m e n t_{i} + β P a r t i c i p a t i o n_{i} + β M e m b e r_{i} + β C o n t r o l_{i} + ε_{i} \end{matrix}

where APCE_i is the natural logarithm of consumption expenditures per capita in household i, the beta terms are measures for the demographic, socioeconomic, and physical characteristics of household i as defined in Table 1, and ε_i is a random error term. The dependent variable in the analysis was calculated by aggregating the value of all household food and nonfood expenditures over a 1-month time period. Goods that were obtained through informal economic transactions such as household production and bartering were also included in the figure. The per capita values were calculated by dividing the total value of expenditures by the number of household members. Table 1 presents the definitions for all explanatory variables used in the analysis.

Table 1.

Definitions of Explanatory Variables.

Variable name	Definition
Female	Household is headed by a female^a
Age	Age of the household head^a
Famsize	Number of family members residing in the household over the past 12 months²
Education	Grade level of educational attainment of the household head^a
Distance	Averaged number of kilometers to nearest facility (primary school, health clinic, police station)^b
Employment	Household head is formally employed^a
Participation	At least one household member participates in a nonconservancy related community-based organization (water point committee, community forest, farmers’ group, women’s group, peer educators’ group, drama group, football club, woodcarving group, basket group, community police, school board, church organization, traditional authority, Red Cross, youth group, dancing group, or drought committee)^b
Member	At least one household member is a registered member of a conservancy^a
Control	Household is not located within a conservancy^a

Note: ^aSource: 2006 MET Household Survey data (MET, 2006).

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from 2006 MET Household Survey (MET, 2006).

Equation 1 is estimated for households in Kunene (n = 484) and for households in Caprivi (n = 471). A Chow test identified the presence of a structural change across these two regions (i.e., linear regression parameters were not equal across Kunene and Caprivi households). The two regions share the same economic and conservation policies, but differ markedly in terms of geography, agro-climatic conditions, infrastructure, livelihoods, and development levels. These factors can influence the level of engagement in community conservancies due to their impacts on wildlife distribution, agricultural practices, and other factors. We therefore estimated the model separately for households in each of these regions.¹⁰

Results and Discussion

Regional Variation Across Namibian Conservancies

As shown in Table 2, the MET 2006 survey data illustrate that the characteristics of conservancies investigated in this study differ considerably by region.¹¹ For example, conservancies in Kunene tend to cover a large spatial extent and have low population densities, whereas the opposite is true for Caprivi. Residents of Kunene conservancies tend to be wealthier than their Caprivi counterparts, although poverty is widespread in both regions (CBS, 2006). Moreover, the percentage of households with at least one conservancy member is much higher among Kunene conservancies in the sample than those in Caprivi and the finding is statistically significant, χ²(1, N = 955) = 140.35, p < .01 (77% and 23%, respectively).

Table 2.

Characteristics of Conservancies Included in Analysis.

Conservancy name	Region	Area (Km²)	Population density per km²	Per capita income N$ (2005)	% of registered conservancy members (2006)	Age of conservancy (2006)	Number of households in MET 2006 survey sample
Torra	Kunene	3522	0.34	1648.36	91.7	7	16
#Khoadi/Hoas	Kunene	3366	0.95	169.27	50.8	7	116
Ehirivopuka	Kunene	1975	1.27	138.25	81.6	4	192
Puros	Kunene	3568	0.07	4477.07	93.8	5	48
Salambala	Caprivi	930	8.28	118.28	12	7	48
Mayuni	Caprivi	151	15.89	395.60	30	6	80
Kwandu	Caprivi	190	22.63	73.58	23.8	6	208
Kasika	Caprivi	147	10.20	66.68	51.6	1	32

Note: Sources: NACSO, 2009a; MET, 2006; CBS, 2006.

Considering all households in the MET sample, the difference between Kunene and Caprivi mean monthly per capita expenditure values was statistically significant, t(510) = 5.21, p < .01, with Kunene households having a higher mean value than those in Caprivi (N$523 and N$195, respectively). Kunene’s higher mean per capita expenditures most likely results from region’s proximity to Windhoek, Namibia’s capital, and to uranium-mining areas. Kunene households thus have relatively more access to remittances and other market-based income opportunities. In addition, most of the Kunene region falls south of the Veterinary Cordon Fence, which is an area declared free of foot-and-mouth disease, whereas Caprivi is located north of the fence in an area where free roaming buffalos and the uncontrolled movement of animals across Namibia’s borders with Angola and Zambia are blamed for spreading livestock diseases. Livestock is an important asset for rural Namibians, so households located in areas south of the cordon fence (e.g., Kunene) have an economic advantage over households located in the northernmost areas of the country (e.g., Caprivi) due to healthier cattle and thus better access to international meat markets.

Economic Effects of Conservancies on Household Well-Being

Table 3 presents the results for the regression models of Kunene and Caprivi households that test for the presence of economic benefits associated with conservancies.¹² In addition to conservancy related variables, we include a variety of control measures in the model. We include four demographic variables—gender of household head, age of household head, family size, and education level of household head—to capture their possible effects on economic well-being. With regards to the demographic variables, only family size and education level yielded significant results in both models. The parameter estimate for the family size variable is negative, signifying that larger family size has an adverse effect on per capita consumption expenditures. This finding comports with those of other studies that also report larger households (which tend to have more children) are more vulnerable to poverty (Krishna, 2006; Krishna, Janson, Radeny, & Nindo, 2004; Lipton & Ravallion, 1995). However, as Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995), Meenakshi and Ray (2002), and Orbeta (2005) have noted, the existence of size economies in household consumption, and the possibility that children can achieve a given level of welfare at lower expenditures, suggest caution against assuming that larger households will be poorer, even when family size has a dampening effect on per capita expenditures.

Table 3.

Regression Results for Kunene and Caprivi Households.

	Dependent variable
	Per capita expenditures
Explanatory variable	Kunene district^a	Caprivi district^a
Intercept	5.138** (18.1)	3.986** (19.3)
Female-headed household	−0.213 (−1.8)	−0.066 (−0.75)
Age	0.004 (1.1)	0.013** (4.6)
Family size	−0.067** (−5.33)	−0.058** (−4.3)
Education level	0.082** (4.9)	0.077** (6.8)
Distance to facilities	−0.081 (−1.3)	0.002 (0.1)
Participation	0.336** (2.8)	0.003 (0.0)
Formal employment	0.215 (1.5)	0.193 (1.7)
Conservancy member	0.292* (2.1)	0.400** (3.41)
Control	−0.019 (−0.1)	0.137 (1.36)
N	484	471
Adjusted R²	0.19	0.17

Notes: *Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.

Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Model is estimated via ordinary least-squares (OLS), t statistics in parentheses.

The parameter coefficient for education level has a positive sign and is significant, suggesting that households headed by more educated people tend to have higher per capita consumption expenditures. This finding is consistent with other studies of household economic well-being in rural areas (Ellis, 2000; Fields, 2001; Manikiw, 1995). With regards to the age measure, the parameter estimate for age of household head had a positive sign, although the results are only significant for the Caprivi model. The positive association between elderly household heads and expenditures in Caprivi may be explained in part by the provision of old age pensions in Namibia for persons aged 60 and above (CBS, 2006; Pelham, 2007). As previously noted, poverty in Caprivi is higher than in Kunene, so government pensions could have a stronger influence on household expenditures in that region.

We included a variable, employment, which measures if the household head has a job in the formal sector, but the parameter coefficient is not significant in either model. This may be a function of the low level of formal employment among households in the survey sample. The model includes a variable, distance, as a composite measure of the number of kilometers a house is located from the nearest public services (i.e., primary schools, health clinics, and police stations). The distance parameter coefficient is insignificant in both regions, a surprising finding because isolation has been identified as a key driver of rural poverty (Chambers, 1983; Christiaensen, Demery, & Paternostro, 2005). However, because distance to a public service facility does not measure the quality of transportation networks or the level of service provision, proximity to services may not be a reliable proxy for isolation. A primary school that lacks textbooks and trained teachers may not have the same impact on households as a better quality school (Easterly, 2001). The same holds for poorly equipped clinics and police stations.

A measure of household participation in community groups, participation, is included in the analysis because many empirical studies have found that higher levels of community involvement are correlated with more productive economic performance of households (Bebbington & Perreault, 1999; Putnam, 1993; Rodríguez-Pose & Storper, 2006; Zak & Knack, 2001). The parameter coefficient for participation in community groups and associations has the expected positive sign in both models and is statistically significant in the Kunene model. These results suggest that community participation has an expenditure-enhancing effect for Kunene households, but not for those in Caprivi. One possible explanation is that lower population densities and isolation of settlements in Kunene increase the benefits associated with formalized participation in organizations that influence community life, because informal face-to-face interactions are less common.

The model includes two variables to test for the predicted direct and indirect economic benefits of CBNRM institutions. One variable, control, identifies households located outside of conservancies while the other, member, identifies those households located within conservancies that include at least one registered member of the institution. The theoretical underpinnings of CBNRM predict that conservancies provide direct benefits for their members (e.g., cash payouts of tourism-revenue dividends) and indirect benefits (e.g., infrastructure improvements) to member and nonmember residents of the community. If these claims are true, then the expected relationship between location outside a conservancy and household well-being is negative (because households not located in a conservancy would not benefit from indirect, community-wide benefits). Next, the expected relationship between conservancy membership and household expenditures is positive (because member households should receive more direct financial benefit than all other households included in the study).

With regards to the conservancy membership variable, the parameter coefficient was positive and significant in both models suggesting that membership brings economic benefits to households. Although our regression analysis provides only a snapshot at one point in time, the direction of causality (i.e., that membership leads to higher economic well-being) is supported by our qualitative findings, discussed in more detail in the following section, which indicate that individuals from lower and middle income households join conservancies to access economic opportunities, such as jobs, that are only available to conservancy members. Much of the interview data used in this analysis comes from studies done when conservancies had recently been established (e.g., 1999-2002), while the quantitative survey was conducted in 2006. Taken together, our findings suggest that, over time, membership improves the economic conditions of poorer individuals relative to nonmembers and people living outside conservancies. These findings comport with those of Bandyopadhyay, Humavindu, Shyamsundar, & Wang (2004) who found the benefits derived from conservancies comprise a larger share of the overall income for poorer households than for wealthier ones.

We find no evidence in either model that nonmembers who live in conservancies are better (or worse) off than those who live outside conservancies. This suggests that conservancies have not resulted in the types of indirect benefits that accrue to all community residents (e.g., better transportation networks, schools, water pumps, and health clinics). There are various ways in which this may be explained. First, infrastructure improvements may exist, but fail to improve the economic position of households. Qualitative work, however, finds little evidence of significant improvements in infrastructure or access to basic services. A common complaint expressed in interviews with conservancy residents, particularly in Caprivi, was that they had been promised community improvements, including better roads and improved access to potable water, when conservancies were being established, but those improvements had yet to materialize.

Perceptions of Benefits and Costs to Conservancy Membership

Our findings contradict those of Blaikie (2006) and others who assert that CBNRM does not provide financial benefits to rural participants. Regression results indicate that members of conservancies receive an economic premium for participation in conservation collectives that does not accrue to nonmembers or residents of areas without conservancies. That, combined with the fact many residents of conservancy areas are not conservancy members, suggests a question: why do some people choose not to become conservancy members given the benefits that membership confers? This disconnect is particularly striking given that, in Namibia, communities must come to a consensus on a conservancy before it can be established. However, despite conservancy efforts to increase membership over time, we find that membership rates remain largely stagnant in Caprivi. In some cases, there is evidence that membership has in fact decreased in Caprivi over time. For example, 96% (N = 158) of the Salambala residents who participated in the 1997 survey reported being a member compared with just 44% (N = 82) of residents surveyed in 2007. However, evidence suggests that membership tends to increase in Kunene over the lifespan of a conservancy. For example, in #Khoadi/Hoas 44% (N = 44) of survey respondents reported being a member in 1999 compared to 67% (N = 56) in 2007.

Figure 2 summarizes the decision-making process described by interview and focus group respondents. The decision-tree figure illustrates the logistical and ideological constraints on membership. It also shows that the primary motivations for joining conservancies were economic, whereas the environmental goals of conservancies acted as a constraint on membership. Opposition to wildlife conservation was consistently given as a reason for not pursuing membership, whereas the prospect of employment opportunities was consistently cited as a reason to join. The following paragraphs discuss the decision criteria in the rank order that they factored into the decision-making process.

Figure 2.

Membership decision-tree diagram.

As shown in Figure 2, lack of eligibility (actual and perceived) is one of the initial barriers to registering in a conservancy. People who have not satisfied residency requirements of the conservancy are not eligible to join. It is also not uncommon for people who have migrated to a conservancy area to be unaware of the eligibility criteria. Consequently, they believe they cannot register, even after fulfilling residency requirements. Other nonmember residents reported that longer-term residents did not want them to join the conservancies. This is exemplified by the story of one Mayuni resident who in 2009 said he had migrated to the conservancy 7 years previously and married a person born in the area. He believed he satisfied the residency requirement for the conservancy but said, “When I ask [to join the conservancy] they tell me I am not able.” These findings support the view of Rodríguez-Pose and Storper (2006) that insufficient checks on community power can result in elite capture of economic benefits. In the case of conservancies, that may translate to the erection of barriers to membership for certain households despite their eligibility.

For eligible individuals, their status in the household provides the next consideration in the decision-making process. Heads of household join conservancies based on their own criteria, and their decisions have a direct impact on the choices of female spouses and young adult dependents.¹³ Participant observation and field studies find a household head’s decision not to join a conservancy will act as a constraint on a spouse or a dependent’s decision. Interestingly, this constraint is present regardless of the gender of the household head. Spouses and dependent young adults in households headed by members tended to base their decision on whether or not they saw a role for themselves in the conservancy. In initial stages of conservancies, women and young adults commonly reported that there was little reason for them to join conservancies because they were not involved in wildlife management in their community. Such responses changed over time as many conservancies introduced more programs designed to appeal to women (e.g., tourism craft markets) and to younger members (e.g., sports programs).

Although older members continue to play the leading role in conservancy decision making, over time they have increasingly recruited younger people to join. This is so in large part because literacy rates tend to be very low among older people in Namibia. This trend has led to younger, more educated people playing more active roles in conservancies. The establishment and operation of joint ventures with tourism enterprises such as lodges or hunting concessions involves detailed negotiations and recurring financial audits. As such, literate members are believed to strengthen the position of the conservancy vís a vís outside investors.

Lack of knowledge about the conservancy and limited mobility are also limitations that prevent people from joining a conservancy, even if they are inclined to do so. For example, 50% (N = 3) of nonregistered individuals who gave a reason for not joining the conservancy in the 1997 Salambala study reported it was because of lack of information. In the 1999 case study of #Khoadi/Hoas, only 13% (N = 13) of interview respondents reported that they were well-informed about the conservancy. In the initial years of a conservancy, nonmembers often reported that they did not register because they believed they were already members, for they had agreed to the formation of a conservancy in their area. “Why should I have to agree again?” was a common response given by nonmembers in both Caprivi and Kunene. Another common constraint was whether or not the conservancy’s registration outreach process, usually conducted within the conservancy’s first year of establishment, managed to reach and inform all potential members. In these cases, people with limited mobility and those without transport are unable to go to the conservancy office to register if the outreach process does not come to them.

However, the longer a conservancy has existed in an area, the less likely nonmembers are to report lack of knowledge or access as barriers to conservancy membership. Eventually, information about the conservancy reaches most residents and over time people have at least one opportunity to get to the conservancy office to register if they wish. Yet, as conservancies become more established, a new set of constraints to membership emerges: ideological opposition to conservancy goals and negative experiences with conservation authorities.

One common constraint in more established conservancies involves disagreement with the goals underlying the conservancy. Residents expressed dissatisfaction with wildlife management practices, such as limiting hunting of certain game species and increasing wildlife counts with high tourism value. Nonmembers in older conservancies reported that they did not support conservancies, and thus did not join, because the organization contributed to higher levels of crop raiding by wild animals and did not adequately compensate farmers for their agricultural losses. “The animals used to stay far from the fields because they knew we would shoot them,” one resident of Mayuni conservancy explained in 2009, “but with the conservancy the animals have increased in number and, because we can’t shoot them, they are not afraid of eating in our fields.” This was a widely expressed sentiment and comports with that of other studies on CBNRM institutions in Africa. Neumann (1998), Duffy (2006), and King and Peralvo (2010) find that residents may be ideologically opposed to Western-style conservation, especially if the promised local benefit sharing is not sufficient compensation for the resident population’s loss of power to control, use, and access previously open-access resources.

A second deterrent to membership, negative experiences and disillusionment with CBNRM, also manifests in longer established conservancies. In field studies, it became more common for people to express dissatisfaction with conservancies throughout their establishment. In the words of one Torra respondent in 2007, registration is “a waste of time [since] conservancy management committees do what they want even if other people don’t want it.” This sentiment was echoed by many respondents, both in Caprivi and Kunene. Disillusionment with economic benefits was also common. Although many people in both regions acknowledge that the conservancy has brought some economic benefits, these are often described as insufficient or unequally distributed throughout communities. “Many people who belong never get jobs, only a few people get them,” and “the meat the conservancy gives only lasts one meal,” are two individuals’ responses from 2003 fieldwork that typify people’s views of unmet anticipated benefits. Evidence of member dissatisfaction is supported by survey data; for example, in studies conducted in Torra, #Khoadi/Hoas, Sorris-Sorris, Ehirovipuka, Kwando, Mayuni, and Salambala in 2002, 31% (N = 143) of responses regarding problems with the conservancy referred to unfair practices. Participant observation conducted over the 13-year time span of these studies also indicates that dissatisfaction with conservancies tends to involve disagreements with the ways benefits are distributed, often described as unfair, particularly with regards to employment. “You have to know someone important who will speak for you or you will never get [a job],” said one Mayuni resident in 2009.

However, we find the economic opportunities offered by conservancies can sometimes override opposition to the conservancy’s mandate and counter the negative experiences of peers, especially for lower-income households. Participant observation by the authors revealed that it was not uncommon for people to join conservancies, despite their problems with the conservancy goals or the disappointment of peers, because they themselves sought the potential socioeconomic benefits. This finding supports those of Neumann (1998) and others who find that economic incentives can pressure impoverished communities to comply with conservation practices. One of the authors repeatedly observed that individuals would go to the conservancy office to register if the community learned that the conservancy was about to announce job vacancies. Some of these same individuals had expressed opposition to the conservancy goals or a feeling of discouragement from witnessing the disappointment of peers in interviews just a short time before.

Interview data reveal that the need for employment and other economic development opportunities are key motivations for establishing conservancies, but economic considerations mattered more for some individuals than others. A detailed examination of wealth and power as it relates to conservancy membership is beyond the scope of this article. However field-level interaction with conservancy residents suggests wealthier individuals do not seek paid employment through the conservancy. These individuals tended to be more concerned with maintaining their access to grazing land, because wealthier households generally owned more cattle and saw conservancy membership as a way to protect their access to certain resources. These findings comport with those of King and Peralvo (2010) in their study of community conservation in South Africa. In contrast, middle and lower-income households consistently identified potential economic benefits as the main motivation for joining a conservancy. This observation was supported by interview responses, such as a resident of Mayuni in 2009, “We need jobs and you have to belong to get them.” In contrast, wealthier individuals opposed to conservancy ideology tended not to join. “They want to take my land,” said another Mayuni resident in 2009, in explanation of why he was not a conservancy member. He further elaborated that he had a family member employed in Katima Muilo, the regional capital of Caprivi, and he did not need the conservancy for anything.

A central concern is that employment generated by conservancies does not meet the demand for jobs. Because jobs tend to be the greatest income-enhancing benefit for members, competition for them is high. Thus many conservancy members are disappointed, especially those who remain unemployed but still bear the costs associated with wildlife conservation, even if they do derive some small economic benefit. Without wage employment or large dividend shares, CBNRM benefits cannot compete with income generating activities such as livestock farming (Gaomab, 2005). These findings are consistent with those of Emerton (2001) who finds that economic benefits must compensate for opportunity costs of foregoing alternative land-use practices to motivate people to participate in CBNRM initiatives.

The motivations for and constraints on membership were similar across Kunene and Caprivi. However, bans on hunting game and, as a result, the higher rates of human–wildlife conflicts in Caprivi seem to be a major source of dissatisfaction in that region. Moreover, the population density of Caprivi increases dissatisfied individuals’ opportunities to share their grievances via face-to-face contact with other residents. Larger populations in Caprivi also mean that any conservancy benefits must be stretched across more households than in the less populated Kunene conservancies.

Rural communities in Namibia establish conservancies to promote economic development via nature tourism. Residents have high expectations of these institutions and many express dissatisfaction with the benefits they receive and lack of area development. This is especially true in Caprivi, where farmers experience considerable human–wildlife conflict. Benefits that accrue to members are more immediately realized, while community-wide benefits do not materialize as quickly or at all. In interviews with residents at the time the conservancies had recently been formed (e.g., 1999-2002), poorer households expressed more interest in joining these institutions due to the economic benefits associated with membership. By 2006 (when seven of the eight conservancies included in this analysis had existed for 4 to 7 years) we do find that membership is associated with higher levels of economic well-being. This is likely the result of significant benefits that accrue to some individuals, such as jobs, and of smaller but more widespread benefits, including distribution of game meat. Inevitably, some people benefit more than others, a situation that was repeatedly described as unfair by conservancy residents in interviews and focus groups.

Conclusions

Ultimately this analysis reveals that the theoretically predicted direct economic benefits for participants in CBNRM initiatives, even when they materialize, cannot adequately compensate for practices that are viewed as unjust or unfair by community residents. Considerations of equity and fairness matter to people in their everyday lives and this affects how they respond to policy prescriptions regarding their use of natural resources. Given this finding, policies linking environmental conservation and economic development require more attention to local concepts of equitable development to successfully incentivize sustained participation in conservation initiatives.

Our findings indicate that Namibian conservancies deliver some economic benefits to members. However nonmember households located in conservancies fare no better (or worse) than households located outside conservancies. These findings suggest that conservancies deliver some direct economic benefits (e.g., jobs, cash payouts) to their members, but that indirect benefits (e.g., improved infrastructure) that are shared by community residents have not been realized. The existence of membership benefits lends some support to the idea that comparative advantage in nature tourism and collective management of resources promotes rural development. Economic considerations are strong motivators concerning whether or not to join conservancies, especially for poorer households. Indeed, many poorer residents reported joining conservancies in search of jobs despite expressing considerable reservations. Disillusionment with economic benefits was a major reason for deciding against membership, which suggests that the level of direct benefits may be insufficient to motivate people to participate. People may perceive the level of benefits as not worth their time if increases in human well-being are perceived as too small. People also noted that conservancies distribute direct financial benefits unevenly throughout communities and neglect development projects, such as support for schools and clinics, which could improve livelihoods for all residents.

We find that rural residents may decide against joining conservation collectives based on noneconomic factors, including opposition to increasing wildlife stocks and perceptions that the conservancy management committee does not act in the best interest of the community. Residents often expressed high levels of dissatisfaction with what they perceived to be unfair actions of the conservancy management. In spite of the evidence of direct economic benefits for participation, we find that rates of conservancy membership have declined in some areas, particularly in Caprivi. The reported dissatisfaction with inequitable treatment and declining membership indicate that collective action in these conservancies is coming under threat, as lower rates of participation and fragmentation of social cohesion make decision making and cooperation within the collective more difficult (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Gruber, 2010). This suggests that CBNRM policies overemphasize the role of direct economic benefits in driving local participation in community-based conservation and rural development. In the Namibian case, people also place a high value on community-wide benefits that promote social cohesion and collective well-being.

By employing a mixed-methods approach, our study results illustrate that the motivations leading people to participate in community conservation efforts or not are more complex than those generally predicted by economic theories underlying CBNRM. Fundamentally, it is envisaged that communities will conserve wildlife because of the economic advantages of developing a nature tourism industry. But even though there do appear to be economic benefits from nature tourism—or at least benefits to conservancy membership—there is a great deal more complexity in the decision-making process than this picture suggests. In particular, this study indicates that perceptions of unfair distribution of benefits drive much of the discontent with CBNRM-based rural development strategies. People act on such things as perceptions of fairness as well as perceptions of economic advantage (Becker & Murphy, 2003; Sen, 2009). Thus, individuals may forgo the possibility of direct economic benefits, particularly if they appear small, when expectations of fairness are not met. If not addressed by policy, these perceptions might threaten the future stability of collective action in conservancies because it may contribute to declining participation and decision making in the community.

Investigating CBNRM highlights some of the challenges local inequality poses for economic growth. CBNRM initiatives have the potential to increase inequalities within communities because job creation in the nature tourism sector is unlikely to result in full employment in many areas. If community-wide benefits that improve livelihoods for all residents are slow or fail to materialize, increasing inequality could fragment social cohesion and, thus, inhibit the effectiveness of group decision-making as well as suppress economic development. And not every CBNRM institution is guaranteed to attract investors in tourism or other sectors. Agglomeration theories suggest that physical infrastructure and industry location have cumulative effects, and rural areas with low initial levels of tourism-friendly infrastructure are at a disadvantage in attracting capital investment compared with relatively better endowed areas. To be fair, this is not a feature unique to rural development strategies involving CBNRM. Theories of economic development do not predict that growth will occur evenly when or if it does happen. Nor do these theories make a normative judgment that growth should be equitable. The development literature offers a multitude of studies showing that economic growth in rural areas is a highly uneven process; however, the success of CBNRM initiatives may be particularly sensitive to local perceptions of injustice that often accompany fast increases in inequality. Because community buy-in is an integral component of these programs (particularly with regards to sustainable resource use), large numbers of people opting out of CBNRM institutions will likely have widespread detrimental effects to collective actions to conserve natural resources (e.g., poaching).

Large economic benefits, such as employment, can often override resistance to conservation goals, but most CBNRM initiatives as currently implemented do not provide enough people with this level of benefit to ensure widespread and continued community participation. This reinforces the importance of indirect community-wide benefits, such as improved infrastructure, and the need to examine cases where they do not materialize sufficiently to improve collective household well-being. Because they are shared by all residents, these community-wide benefits have the potential to increase local resident satisfaction with CBNRM initiatives if access to these resources is perceived as fair and just, thereby enhancing the possibilities for successful development outcomes.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) for providing access to the data used in this analysis, as well as Hina Muashekele, Selma Lendelvo, and the staff at the Multidisciplinary Research Centre at the University of Namibia for their support of this research. We also thank Mike Lahr, Mandy Weibel, Stewart Duncan, and several anonymous reviewers for comments on previous versions of this article, as well as Joshua Niederriter and Dorothea Simpson for research assistance. Any errors are of course the responsibility of the authors.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) Program [BCS 1042888].

Notes

Author Biographies

Julie A. Silva is Assistant Professor of Geographical Sciences at the University of Maryland, College Park. Her research investigates the regional effects of globalization on poverty, inequality, and social exclusion in both advanced and developing countries. She has received funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation’s Faculty Early Career Development (CAREER) Program and from NASA’s Land-Cover/Land Use Change Program for Early Career Scientists for her research on parks and protected areas in southern Africa.

Alfons W. Mosimane is the head of the Life Science Division of the Multidisciplinary Research Center of the University of Namibia (UNAM). He holds degrees from the University of Namibia and the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. He has worked for UNAM as a researcher, lecturer, and project manager for the last ten years, and is an author of six book chapters and over thirty research reports on economic, governmental, and conservation issues in Namibia.

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