Climate Change and Transboundary Waters: A Study of Discourse in the Mekong River Commission

Abstract

In our study of climate change discourse in the Mekong River Commission (MRC) over the past decade, we find that climate change policy strategies are framed as science-based actions. Scale is largely expressed in terms of short-term, immediate temporal horizons that are human-dominated and regionally based. Further, we uncover a broadening of climate change discourse across multiple scales to incorporate justice, integrated water resource management (IWRM), development, and security frames. These patterns not only reflect trends in the larger global water governance and climate change discourse and reinforce historic patterns in the Mekong River Basin, but they also signal more strategic efforts by the MRC and member states to attract donor support. In our examination of links between discourse and MRC climate change action, we argue that the MRC’s climate change actions narrowly reflect the production of studies and project scoping rather than real adaptive actions in the basin. We examine official documents of the MRC over the past decade to better understand how the discourse around climate change is framed and to what extent the discourse is linked to climate change actions.

Keywords

Mekong MRC discourse frames climate change river basin organizations scale governance transboundary waters

To overcome complex collective action problems in transboundary river basins, riparian states may create river basin organizations (RBOs), under the framework of international water treaties, to jointly govern shared resources at the basin scale (Wolf, 2007). RBOs can promote joint cooperation and information sharing and serve as a form to bring together diverse stakeholders (Dombrowsky, 2007; Pahl-Wostl, 2007).

Increasingly, RBOs are seen as potential forums to facilitate dialogue around adaptation to change (Cooley & Gleick, 2011; Eckstein, 2009; Lebel, Xu, Bastakoti, & Lamba, 2010). Climate change will affect water resources in the world’s river and lake basins in various ways. As forecasted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, climate change is projected to increase the frequency and intensity of extreme events such as droughts, floods, or sea level rise, leading to famine, disease, weather-related catastrophes, and refugees (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, & Palutikof, 2008). In fact, it is expected that the majority of environmental changes due to climate change will be felt through modification of the hydrological cycle (Michel & Pandya, 2009; UN-Water, 2009; World Water Assessment Programme, 2009).

RBOs provide a forum to address climate-related challenges for transboundary waters. RBOs may support climate change adaptation by providing the data and analytical basis for understanding the consequences of climate change on a basin’s water resources. An RBO may engage in disaster risk management and mitigation in the form of flood forecasting, warning, and management, thereby playing an important role in dealing with the increasing likelihood of extreme events in river basins due to climate change. In other cases, we might expect that RBOs could engage in developing basin-wide adaptation plans in the context of their overall river basin planning processes.

Despite these potential roles for RBOs in climate change adaptation, we know little about how climate change is treated and addressed by RBOs. Although we are beginning to better understand how adaptation might unfold in the river basin context, scant academic attention has been paid to discourse around climate change in the context of RBOs and how climate change discourse is linked to, or supported by, RBO actions. To address this gap, this article seeks to understand the scope and extent of climate change discourse within an RBO and the relationship between discourse and RBO climate change action. We ask how is climate change framed in RBOs and how is climate change discourse linked to RBO actions?

To answer these questions, we analyze discourse patterns in the Mekong River Basin by exploring how climate change is framed within the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The MRC is an intergovernmental organization charged with the task to implement member countries’ commitment to “promote, support, cooperate and coordinate in the development of the full potential of sustainable benefits to all riparian states” (Art. 2, 1995 Mekong Agreement). It operates in the larger multiscale and multilevel governance context that characterizes water management in the Mekong River Basin (Dore & Lebel, 2010). Its long-standing presence and engagement with various stakeholders in the basin provide an appropriate organizational setting to examine discourse and climate change actions.

We embrace a broad notion of discourse that stretches beyond a text-dominated analysis to include practice or action (Muller, 2008). Building from a long-standing interest in international relations in how discourse articulated by political actors produces policy actions (Milliken, 1999), we draw on the term discourse to analyze how the language and practices of climate change are problematized and produced. In this way, we are keenly aware that talk is cheap, and it is important to consider words and deeds, text and context (Schmidt, 2010, p. 15). Further, we are interested in the “scalar dimensions of practices” of actors (Mansfield, 2005, p. 468; Moore, 2008, p. 217). Analyzing the scales at which climate change is framed and articulated may provide insights into the relative effectiveness or scope of climate change adaptation strategies and measures within the MRC. Earlier research suggests that climate change adaptation should consider environmental changes likely to occur due to different factors at various spatial and temporal scales, recognizing the broader socioeconomic environment and context in adaptation strategies and engagement (Keskinen et al., 2010; Sietz, Boschutz, & Klein, 2011).

Considering the representation of ideas through discourse often includes a study of frames, narratives, myths, stories, and more (e.g., Hajer, 2003; Roe, 1994). Here, we use the term frame to refer to a definition of an issue or problem, which emphasizes some aspects at the expense of others (Dewulf, Brugnach, Termeer, & Ingram, 2013; Schön & Rein, 1994; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Research on the social construction of societal problems suggests that the way in which an issue is framed has important implications for the policy solutions that are subsequently devised (Stone, 1989).

We examine MRC documents over the past decade as evidence of official discourse of the MRC. There is historical indication that MRC official documents can signal a shift in the MRC’s approach to basin management (Jacobs, 2002). We approach the official texts deductively, identifying instances where climate change appears in the text and then coding the texts based on the designated categories for policy strategies and scale, which were crafted from a careful reading of the literature. We develop and test propositions related to the scope and extent of policy strategies as well as the scale of climate change frames in the MRC.

While our research is a single case study with limited generalizability, by analyzing discourse and climate change actions in the MRC, our study can make a valuable contribution to the academic research around transboundary water governance and climate change adaptation. By examining how this case confirms or diverges from other discourses around climate change, we can better learn how RBOs engage in or diverge from global discussions. Further, this research has implications for broader river basin management, climate change adaptation, development strategies, and stakeholder participation in transboundary basins.

First, we briefly present the climate change challenges and institutionalized cooperation in the basin. Next, in our literature review, we outline research around climate change and scalar water governance discourse, calling particular attention to earlier research conducted on the Mekong River Basin and the MRC. We build from this literature to craft our propositions. Then, we present our findings derived from the detailed analysis of MRC documents over the past decade with attention to two elements of the discourse: policy strategies and scale. We discuss these results and their implications in light of policy developments and climate change actions in the basin. Finally, we summarize our findings in our conclusion and outline next steps in research.

Climate Change and the Mekong River Commission

Climate Change Challenges

Originating in China, the Mekong River flows through the states of Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, and Cambodia, before it empties into the South China Sea in Vietnam (see Figure 1). It stretches about 4,900 km from the Tibetan Plateau to its most southern point at the Mekong Delta, being the 10th longest river in the world (MRC, 2003). For the more than 66 million people living in the Lower Mekong River Basin, the river supports vibrant agricultural production and fisheries activities and is thus a crucial source of livelihoods, income, and socioeconomic development (MRC, 2010a).

Figure 1.

The Mekong River Basin.

The Mekong Region is undergoing rapid transitions socially, economically, and environmentally (Keskinen, Kummu, Käkönen, & Varis, 2012). New pressures are emerging in the basin, including population growth, urbanization, and increasing demands for agricultural and fisheries production (Biswas & Seetharam, 2008; Kirby et al., 2010). The increasingly rapid pace of hydrodevelopment in the upstream of the Mekong basin is threatening the integrity of the river system and posing concern for lower basin states, which are dependent on the basin for livelihoods (Molle & Floch, 2008; Pearse-Smith, 2012; Sneddon & Fox, 2012).

Although the understanding of climate change consequences for the Mekong River Basin remains limited, scenarios developed (e.g., Eastham et al., 2008; Hoanh, Jirayoot, Lacombe, & Srinetr, 2010; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008; Johnston et al., 2010) can provide some preliminary insights into how climate change might impact the basin. Research suggests that seasonal water shortages and extreme flooding may be exacerbated in the basin (Eastham et al., 2008). Increasing temperatures may increase the risks of droughts and threaten agricultural production (Eastham et al., 2008). Whether the overall consequences of climate change will bring losses or benefits, or some combination, to the basin and how these will be distributed across riparian people and states are still to be determined.

History of Transboundary Cooperation

The Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin was signed in 1995 by the four downstream states Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Cooperation is, however, based on a longer tradition commonly referred to as the “Mekong Spirit” (Jacobs, 1994). In Article 1 of the 1995 Agreement, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam agree to “cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin” (Art. 1, 1995 Mekong Agreement). To implement this commitment, the 1995 Agreement establishes the MRC, which is in charge of implementing the objectives of the Agreement. It relies on a governance structure consisting of a high-level ministerial decision-making body (Council), a more technical operationalization body (Joint Committee), and the MRC Secretariat as well as national coordinating entities (National Mekong Committees).

An Evolving RBO

Initially conceived as a water resources governance organization, the MRC first focused on water resource issues and related matters such as irrigation, forestry, and environment. By 2005, the MRC began to shift toward more development-related matters. Under its previous CEO, Jeremy Bird, the MRC has, however, shifted its focus back to the sustainable management of the river basin and to the promotion of environmentally sound natural resources use. This includes an increasing acknowledgment of change in the basin—including climate change as well as human-made environmental change, with hydropower dams being a particularly contested topic (MRC, 2010b). Accordingly, the MRC has increasingly turned toward the various challenges the basin is facing and strengthened its activities in areas such as sustainable hydropower development, environmental monitoring and assessment, as well as the socioeconomic aspects of river basin development (e.g., on hydropower, refer to MRC, 2009a, or for environmental issues, refer to MRC, 2010c).

Acknowledging various shortcomings in effective river basin management, the MRC is currently undergoing an institutional reform process that aims at strengthening member country ownership and strengthening the RBO in its river basin management capacities. This process mainly consists of identifying core river basin management functions and the technical, financial, and human resources required to effectively fulfill them as well as increasing member states’ ownership in providing these resources themselves instead of relying on external resources.

Broadly speaking, the MRC has been regarded as relatively successful in mitigating conflicts and maintaining cooperation in the basin (Ha, 2011; Schmeier, 2013). But the MRC also faces various shortcomings. Some see the MRC as ineffectual, sidelined by its own member states, heavily influenced by donor involvement, and marked by mistrust and miscommunication (Lebel, Garden, & Imamura, 2005). Historically, some donors have looked upon the MRC more as a technical and managerial vehicle for operating projects and programs, and less as an organization for water governance in the basin (Hirsch & Jensen, 2006, p. xxii). The two upstream riparians—China and Myanmar—are not included in the MRC, making geographically integrated river basin management difficult.¹

Responding to Climate Change

Responding to the potential consequences of climate change, the MRC launched the Climate Change Adaptation Initiative (CCAI) in 2009. As a regional initiative, it is designed to facilitate climate change adaptation planning and implementation in priority locations throughout the Lower Mekong Basin (MRC, 2009b). The program is the result of both stakeholder (and especially donor) desires to understand the potential impacts of climate change on the basin and experiences with extreme weather events in the region in 2008 and 2009 (the Mekong flood and cyclone Nargis and typhoon Ketsana, respectively; MRC, 2009c, 2009d). AusAID, the former Australian development agency, helped fund the design and early implementation of the CCAI (MRC, 2009e).

The program exhibits institutional capacity building actions such as the proposal or development of new decision-making rules or processes like committees and task forces, according to recent research (Heikkila, Gerlak, Bell, & Schmeier, 2013). Yet, it falls short on other types of technical or social adaptive capacity in contrast to the MRC’s Flood Management and Mitigation Program and MRC’s Initiative on Sustainable Hydropower (Heikkila et al., 2013).

Discourse and Scalar Politics in the Governance of Transboundary Waters

Policy scholars have long-studied discourse around environmental issues to better understand how discourse enacts particular political and institutional change (e.g., Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994). Discourse can been seen as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Discourse may shape what is thought of as policy options and can delimit the range of policy actions and actors, thereby serving as precursors to policy outcomes (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Litfin, 1994). Some scholars have called attention to the use of discourse to highlight or subvert particular dynamics of state relations (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).

There is a growing body of environmental and water-specific research examining climate change discourse and framing. Some work looks at the dialog between power and knowledge by which the social understandings of climate change have been constructed (Pettenger, 2007). Other research suggests that the contemporary discourse around climate change has been dominated by a managerial, science-driven frame (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2007) that frames climate as catastrophe (Boykoff, 2008; Hulme, 2008). Vulnerability is a key feature of climate change discourse in both human-security framing and scientific framing around climate change (O’Brien, Eriksen, Nygaard, & Schjolden, 2007). At the other extreme, climate change has been framed in terms of opportunity for technological innovation or greater efficiency (Paterson & Stripple, 2007). In light of discourse emerging around climate change globally, and given the breadth and scope of emerging challenges in the Mekong River Basin, we might expect to find multiple frames invoked around climate change policy strategies (Proposition 1).

Some scholars study scale-based discourse to better understand how scales are used to frame problems and solutions, incorporate or exclude actors, and challenge or legitimize power asymmetries (Harrison, 2006; Mansfield & Haas, 2006). Scale can be seen as the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used to measure, rank, or study a phenomenon (Gibson, Ostrom, & Ahn, 2000). Individuals and groups may chose multiple-scale discourse to call attention to an issue and then may to shift or change scales to expand or limit the suite of available solutions, or to abandon those deemed unsuccessful (Harrison, 2006).

Earlier research on the Mekong Basin uncovers a regional discourse that is heavily focused on development (Bakker, 1999; Molle, Forna, & Floch, 2009; Sneddon & Fox, 2006). Actors privilege particular scales in their dialog and maneuver between and cross scales to heighten influence or power in the basin, according to Lebel et al. (2005). Building from this earlier research around questions of scale and discourse in the Mekong Basin, and given the nature of the MRC as a regional organization, we might expect that climate change is framed predominately at the regional scale (Proposition 2).

Methods and Approach

To test our propositions, we examine the MRC’s climate change discourse. We analyze four distinct categories of MRC communications: Annual Reports (2001–2010), Annual Work Programmes (2003–2012), News Releases (2005–2013), and Speeches (2004–2013). These communications represent official MRC discourse; they are produced by the MRC Secretariat (in cooperation with the respective MRC programs and MRC’s member countries and often supported by external consultants) and describe the work of the MRC across the different programs and initiatives.

The Annual Reports and Annual Work Programmes similarly report on program achievements year to year and signal the official activities of the MRC. Annual Reports and Work Programmes are the MRC’s main way of communicating its policies, strategies, and activities. Furthermore, these are regular publications through which the MRC represents changing strategic orientations of the RBO as guided by its member states. News Releases and Speeches² of the MRC indicate more select messaging of the MRC and its members to the larger global and regional communities. In total, we examined 223 MRC communication documents: 10 Annual Reports, 10 Annual Work Programmes, 107 News Releases, and 96 Speeches. See the Appendix for coding data figures.

We approach the official texts deductively, identifying instances where climate change appears in the text and then coding the texts based on the designated categories for policy strategy and scale, which were crafted from a careful reading of the literature.³ See Table 1 for our policy strategy and scale definitions and select illustrations from MRC documents. Our unit of analysis is the text around which the term climate change appears in the document. In this way, there may be many instances of climate change framing in one unit of analysis.

Table 1.

Defining Frames in MRC Climate Change Discourse.

Frames	Definition	Example in MRC official discourse
Policy strategies
Science	Strategies focused on scientific studies and inquiry	The analysis of climate change effects and their influence on water resources will overlay the entire basin-wide modeling work to provide an assessment of additional changes to be expected in the medium to long term (Work Programme, 2012)
Security	Strategies aimed at ensuring security and reducing insecurity	Providing water security for the population of the basin is at the heart of adaptation to climate change (Speech, 2010)
Justice	Strategies targeting justice or equity issues	The Mekong region is one of the most vulnerable in the world to the long-term impacts of climate change, due to a relatively high proportion of people living on low incomes and regional low government capacity to deal with the issue (News Release, 2010)
Development	Strategies referencing donor aid and development work	A new and exciting initiative on climate change and adaptation for the Lower Mekong river basin will be launched early in 2008 with support from AusAID and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (Annual Report, 2007)
Integrated water resource management (IWRM)	Strategies addressing IWRM	H.E. Mr. Preecha Rengsomboonsuk, Minister of Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Chairman of the Thai National Mekong Committee—Reducing vulnerability to flood through flood plain management should be prioritized among Mekong transboundary issues that need to be addressed in an Integrated Water Resources Management context. The focus should include consideration of possible impacts of climate change together with maintaining the Mekong environment, natural resources, and ecosystem functions to support people’s livelihoods (Speech, 2011)
Scale
Local	Issues or strategies aimed at the community level	The MRC announces that villagers who live on or near water resources in the Mekong Basin should be given more of a voice in the planning of future infrastructure and other water development projects (News Release, 2009)
National	Issues or strategies aimed at the country level	Many of the potential negative impacts—in the shorter term from proposed Mekong water projects, and in the longer term from climate change—could be across national boundaries. This underscores the critical need for cooperation between countries. …The MRC Technical Conference that preceded this Summit presented positive experiences of cooperation. This included: management of hydropower schemes to optimise energy generation and mitigate negative impacts; transboundary management of flooding and flow patterns; and, examples of how nations can work together to address impacts of climate change. (Speech, 2010)
Regional	Issues or strategies aimed at the Mekong region or Mekong River Basin	The extreme dry periods were a reminder of the importance of the issue to the people and the environment in the Basin. Lessons learned from these droughts demonstrated the relevance of a better understanding of the impacts of climate change throughout the region, as there will likely be an increase in the severity of droughts in the coming decades (Annual Report, 2010)
International	Issues or strategies that go beyond the Mekong to include international actors, events, etc.	Ahead of the Summit, a 2-day conference on Transboundary Water Resources Management in a Changing World was also organized in Hua Hin by the MRC to provide a forum for more than 200 international water experts from nongovernmental organizations, River Basin Organisations and state agencies for discussions on transboundary water and related resources management and development, enabling participants to share both international and domestic experiences in addressing future challenges on the issue (Annual Report, 2010)

Note. MRC = Mekong River Commission.

We might well have completed our research after our examination of MRC discourse. Rather, we wish to go beyond language and probe MRC climate change actions to reveal and understand links between RBO discourse and climate change action. To better understand the scope of RBO actions around climate change, we look beyond this official discourse to scholarly research and climate change-specific documents and reports of the MRC.

Climate Change Discourse in the Mekong River Commission: Our Findings

Heightened Attention to Climate Change

Overall, our analysis of MRC texts reveals increasing attention to climate change within the MRC. Figure 2 displays both the frequency of climate change in Annual Reports and Work Programmes between 2001 and 2012, and the frequency of climate change in news releases and speeches between 2004 and 2013.⁴ Increases in attention occurring in 2008 correspond with MRC discussions to craft a new climate change program—the CCAI. Beginning in 2009, we see climate change described as one of the MRC’s “core issues” with the CCAI as the MRC’s response to climate change (MRC, 2009f). By 2010, almost every news release mentions climate change (23 of 25) on a diverse array of topics (i.e., announcing new funding around climate change, calling attention to a regional conference discussing matters of climate change, etc.).⁵ While attention to climate change in MRC Annual Reports and Work Programmes remains high, we see a leveling out of attention to climate change in News Releases and Speeches. This is not altogether surprising, given the MRC’s overall decreased use of News Releases and Speeches in recent years.

Figure 2.

Count of official MRC climate change discourse over time.

The MRC’s then CEO refers to the extreme “vulnerability” of the people and economy of the basin to climatic variations with more frequent dry periods and more intense flooding (MRC, 2007a, 2009g). Leaders from the region have referred to climate change as a “scourge” or “threat” to the region that “adversely” affects people’s health and livelihoods, puts “pressure” on natural resources, and creates “harmful” and “unpredictable” effects (e.g., MRC, 2010e). In this way, discourse in the basin reflects more global climate change discourse that is characterized by fear and vulnerability (Hulme, 2008; O’Brien et al., 2007).

Science and Emerging Policy Strategy Frames

We find that climate change policy strategies are framed most in terms of science-based strategies. The science frame comprises some 43% (or 86 instances) of MRC official discourse. The science frame is illustrated by attention to the importance of modeling as a powerful tool in planning and observing changes in response to climate change (e.g., MRC, 2005, 2008a, 2009d). Monitoring networks, to measure water levels, rainfall, and other climate details, is seen as critical to assist with flood forecasting in the basin (MRC, 2008a). Further, we find a heavy emphasis on the integration of existing data, collection of relevant primary data, multidisciplinary impact assessment, and use of state-of-the-art assessment tools (MRC, 2008b).

Beginning in 2006, we see a justice frame emerging to occupy some 14% (or 27 instances) of MRC text over time. By 2010, there is a measurable though still comparatively small increase in justice in the discourse, demonstrating a shift toward weaving poverty alleviation and concern for the poorest into climate change actions. Climate change was also linked in the discourse directly to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A year later, in 2007, a justice frame emerges. It comes to characterize 22% (or 43 instances) of MRC discourse. Here, we find reference to the need for donor aid to support climate efforts and program implementation, and dialog with development partners.

Beginning in 2009, we see a security frame (12%, or 24 instances) and an integrated water resource management (IWRM) frame (10%, or 20 instances) emerging in the MRC’s climate change discourse. Security around climate change is framed largely as food security, with climate change posing threats to potential food security and the need to adopt strategies to promote food security, but we also see security framed as environmental, water, and resource security. IWRM is framed as a strategy to deal with climate variability. In recent years, we see gender mainstreaming and responsiveness as a focus for trainings on climate change. Table 2 reports the counts in policy strategies to address climate change.

Table 2.

Policy Strategies to Address Climate Change in MRC Discourse, 2001–2013.

Policy strategy	Count
Science	86 (43%)
Justice	27 (14%)
Development	43 (22%)
Security	24 (12%)
Integrated water resource management	20 (10%)

Note. Counts of instances when a policy strategy was linked with climate change. MRC = Mekong River Commission.

While the science frame has been the dominant frame, consistently invoked in MRC climate over time, we find that other policy strategy frames outnumber science in 2013. There are two instances of both justice and security in 2013 but one instance of both IWRM and science. In contrast, the development frame appears five times in 2013. Figure 3 displays the framing of climate change policy strategies over time.

Figure 3.

The framing of climate change actions over time, 2005–2010.

In addition, we find that it is not uncommon for several frames to be utilized together. For example, at the 17th meeting of the MRC Council, in January 2011, before the Donor Consultative Group, H. E. Ms. Khempheng Pholsena, Minister to the Prime Minister’s Office Head of Water Resources and Environment Administration, Chairperson of Lao National Mekong Committee, and Member of the MRC Council for Lao PDR, stated that climate change puts “at risk the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) the region” and adaptation planning and implementation in the Mekong River Basin can “contribute to the MDGs, poverty eradication and improved food security” (MRC, 2011a, p. 1). In this way, we see both development and security frames invoked around climate change policy strategies at the regional scale. In a 2010 news release announcing a meeting organized by the MRC of international water experts, countries are called upon to “strengthen risk management and emphasize water security for the poorest people in the basin” (MRC, 2010f, p. 1). Here, we uncover multiple frames, including science, security, and justice, as well as national and regional scales.

The Framing of Scale: An Emerging Multilevel Governance Effort?

We examine the scalar dimension of climate change discourse within the MRC to better understand how the MRC frames scale. In terms of temporal dimensions, we observe little attention to long-term time spans and far greater attention to the immediacy and short-term nature of the challenges posed by climate change. Phases of the CCAI, referred to in MRC documents, represent a short-term nature of organizational planning and strategy. Similarly, in terms of more ecologically constructed scales, we observe virtually no recognition or discussion of climate change impacts on nonhumans. By 2010, we do see an occasional mention of the interaction of fisheries, forestry, agriculture, water quality, and wetlands, and how they work together, which illustrates only isolated attention to ecosystem-related attributes and processes in MRC official discourse (MRC, 2010g).

Spatially, we observe that attention to region dominates MRC official discourse occupying some 51% (or 119 instances) of MRC text. An example of this regional scale discourse can be seen when the MRC announces a new partnership with ASEAN in the development and management of the Mekong water resources to build the capacity of the executing agencies of Asian countries to manage and mitigate flood risks, to provide better forecasts, as well as assisting the countries and their communities in mapping out resilience measures to adapt to changing climate (MRC, 2010h). Table 3 reports scalar frames and climate change.

Table 3.

Scale and Climate Change in MRC Discourse, 2001–2013.

Scale	Count
Local	21 (9%)
National	74 (32%)
Regional	119 (51%)
International	19 (19%)

Note. Counts of instances when scale was linked with climate change. MRC = Mekong River Commission.

By 2009, we also see an expansion of scale in MRC discourse to the local, national, and international. Local frames are found 9%, or in 21 instances in the MRC text. An example of attention to the local can be found in an MRC document that speaks of the role of villagers who live on or near water resources in the Mekong Basin to be given more of a voice in the planning of future infrastructure and other water development projects (MRC, 2009h). We also observe discourse around the international with linkages to international initiatives, such as the MDGs (e.g., MRC, 2010d), present 8% (or 19 instances) of the time. Finally, we observe a significant increase in discourse at a national scale, representing 32% (or 74 instances). By 2010, the national scale is invoked in 29 different instances, and the local scale is invoked in 10 instances in MRC documents, in contrast to 39 references to the regional scale.

We see multiple spatial scales invoked simultaneously in the official text. For example, the MRC’s 2011 Work Programme goal states that

Key water and water use parameters, trans-boundary impacts and other sustainability issues of water utilisation and management, and threats to livelihoods posed by climate change and other emerging environmental issues are researched, analysed, and assessed for national and regional responses. (MRC, 2011b, p. 12)

In this way, both regional and national frames are embraced and interrelated in MRC climate change goals. Figure 4 reveals the framing of scales over time.

Figure 4.

The framing of scale over time, 2005–2010.

Discussion

Our investigation of climate change discourse within the MRC reveals heightened attention to climate change within the RBO over the past decade. This mirrors climate change discourse at the global level that rose quickly after 2009 when water became included in global UN climate efforts and dialog (Pahl-Wostl, Conca, Kramer, Maestu, & Schmidt, 2013). The increased attention to climate change in recent years in MRC discourse corresponds well with the adoption and subsequent implementation of the MRC’s CCAI. It also corresponds with the establishment of linkages between the CCAI and each of the MRC Programmes, as evidenced in MRC documents and MRC Programme activities.

Climate change discourse in the MRC reflects broader global climate change discourse that is characterized by fear and vulnerability (Hulme, 2008; O’Brien et al., 2007). Given the extremely high dependence of riparian communities on the river and its resources, and their related vulnerability to any change occurring in the basin, this discourse can be described as realistic. Framing climate change as a threat to the overall socioeconomic development of the basin facilitated the development and the implementation of the MRC’s main climate change program—the CCAI.

We examined MRC documents over the past decade with attention to two key elements of climate change discourse: policy strategies and scale. Generally, we find support for the two propositions we crafted based on our reading of the literature around these issues but with some interesting nuances. First, we observe multiple frames invoked around climate change policy strategies, reinforcing our Proposition 1. Notably, we find the science frame to be most dominant frame, both over time and in terms of raw numbers. Our findings around science-based actions support prior research on global climate change discourse suggesting that climate change discourse is highly science-based (Adger et al., 2001; Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2007). They are also in line with more general approaches to river basin management of the MRC and thus support earlier findings which report that MRC discourse is heavily dominated by technical and scientific expertise and a propensity for modeling (Hirsch, 2006; Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). In terms of links between discourse and action, we find that scientific data and information is thereby produced by the MRC itself (in collaboration with member states and supported by international experts) through various reports focusing on change in the basin (refer, e.g., to MRC, 2009b, 2009c, 2010a), and information provided by other agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank and a number of academic institutions.

Beyond this dominant science frame, in our study of the MRC’s climate change discourse, we see some indication of a broadening of frames to challenge the dominant science frame. The security frame reinforces basin efforts around member country cooperation and efforts toward integrated river basin management and calls for greater participation from the dialog partners—China and Myanmar—to prevent a regional crisis in the basin. This finding purports well with earlier research which found hydrodevelopment of the Mekong framed as an environmental security issue dating back to the 1990s (Bakker, 1999), and more recent frames of climate change adaptation as an international security issues with a subsequent emphasis on infrastructure in the basin (Lebel et al., 2010). In our analysis, however, we find security to be framed largely as food security in line with earlier research that usually refers to hunger that may trigger various conflicts (Blakeney, 2009). Our reading of food security in MRC discourse is more akin to the anthropocentric “human security” discourse of the early 1990s (e.g., Homer-Dixon, 2000). It also supports recent studies of security discourse highlighting adoption of food security in the security discourse more globally (Fischhendler & Katz, 2012). Despite the adoption of the security frame, we find little climate change action that can be linked to the discourse.

The justice frame, which calls attention to stakeholder inclusion and fairness in adaptation, is reflected in CCAI’s engagement and action in demonstration projects of climate change adaptation that would immediately benefit local populations. Demonstration sites within countries are important in the CCAI to test the methodologies and tools for vulnerability assessment, to support capacity building, and to identify best suitable adaptation options. Program officials suggest that lessons learned from the demonstration sites can be “upscaled” to the regional level (MRC, 2009f, 2011b). For example, some actions—like flood forecasting—would be conducted at the regional level given the transboundary nature of the activity but informed by lessons from demonstration sites at local and national scales. Yet, surprisingly little progress has been made in establishing demonstration sites and sharing lessons learned to be able successfully to scale up.

We also see the rise of a development frame in the MRC climate change discourse. Increasingly, climate change adaptation is becoming a focal point of development discussion globally (Le Blanc, 2009). There is a growing recognition of the need to develop strategies to respond to ongoing global change while simultaneously meeting development goals (Reid et al., 2010). Although we see heightened use of the development frame in 2013, the link to development that we uncover in MRC climate change discourse is predominantly an appeal to donors for increased funding to support climate change adaptation measures to address more global scale development initiatives such as the MDGs. In this way, it falls short of real links between development and climate change action emerging in climate change adaptation and development research. Donor support for the MRC is necessary according to the MRC for implementation of the CCAI (MRC, 2011c). So too is stronger regional cooperation among the MRC Member Countries and between MRC and Development Partners and other Partners necessary to support the CCAI viewed as central to implementation (MRC, 2013).

Emerging frames around IWRM in the Mekong River Basin as a paradigm of water resource management have also been emerging in the MRC discourse. This reflects global discourse around IWRM approaches that have characterized water management over the past two decades (Rahaman & Varis, 2005; UN-Water, 2008), as well as research that highlights IWRM in the Mekong (Mehtonen, Keskinen, & Varis, 2008; Varis, Rahaman, & Stucki, 2008). The effective implementation of IWRM is linked to achieving water security, according to MRC discourse. References to IWRM indicate a responsiveness of the MRC to donor-driven concepts and the incorporation of external management practices into its own approaches. Earlier research has highlighted how material incentives can be used to enrolling stakeholders into a particular discourse (Mukhtarov & Gerlak, 2013), or how IWRM discourse has been employed to justify a shift toward the investment role of the MRC (Hirsch, 2006). We uncover workshops and training materials designed to bring a gender mainstreaming focus to IWRM-related practices as evidence of links between discourse and action.

In terms of scale, our second issue of interest, we find support for our Proposition 2 that climate change discourse is framed predominantly at the regional scale. The discourse around scale reflects broader historic discourse patterns in the basin that emphasize development and infrastructure and privilege regional scales. This supports a good body of prior research highlighting a pervasive development mind-set in the basin that emphasizes cooperative interstate relations (Bakker, 1999; Lebel et al., 2005; Molle et al., 2009; Sneddon & Fox, 2006). Through its CCAI program, the MRC reinforces its long-standing role as an important regional actor and source for technical and scientific information in the region (Dore & Lazarus, 2009). It continues to position and frame the MRC as a privileged role as arbiter and facilitator of cooperation, as “a major knowledge broker in the region” (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009, p. 334), that operates as “a trusted regional hub for information collection and knowledge generation” (MRC, 2007b, p. 7).

Similar to our findings around multiple frames in terms of MRC climate change policy strategies, we also uncover a pattern of expansion of climate change discourse beyond a dominant regional frame and toward a multilevel governance approach, including international, national, and local actions. This suggests that support for our Proposition 2 is more nuanced. This increasing emphasis on multilevel governance in MRC’s discourse is supported by these early actions through the CCAI. Examples include the plan to establish a Mekong Panel on Climate Change, a regional body acting as an independent scientific panel, which would bring together actors from different stakeholder groups and different governance levels to develop a joint vision on climate change in the Mekong River Basin that can inform adaptation actions—the latter ones also to be taken at various governance levels (MRC, 2011b). Yet, this activity has been on hold for some time, although it is still on the MRC’s agenda and regarded as an important tool for gathering and exchanging regional knowledge on Mekong-specific climate change issues.

These multilevel governance efforts are also in line with MRC’s general development toward more national and local water resources governance activities on the basis of the subsidiarity principle—implemented in the form of an ambitious decentralization and riparianization agenda, including efforts to overcome weak links between the basin level and national levels (Schmeier, 2010, 2013)—the responsibility for adaptation is significantly broadened. Recent changes in MRC’s mandate and functions (namely, in the context of the core river basin management functions process which aims at (re)defining the MRC’s core functions as well as their respective best implementation level and therewith strengthening the MRC’s river basin management capacity while at the same time increasing member country ownership) and efforts on riparianization will likely push this tendency even more so, with river basin management activities increasingly being shifted to additional national and subnational implementation levels. It is still too early to tell whether actors will privilege particular scales in their dialog, and maneuver between and cross scales to heighten influence or power in the Mekong basin, as they have in the past (Lebel et al., 2005). Moreover, it is unclear whether the multilevel governance approach can help resolve the historic disconnect between the regional and national decision-making landscapes in transboundary water governance in the region (Schmeier, 2013; Suhardiman, Giordano, & Molle, 2012).

Conclusion and Next Steps

Our examination of climate change discourse in the MRC provides a deeper understanding of how one more formally organized and established RBO is thinking about and responding to climate change. Taken together, our findings reveal how climate change discourse in the MRC both reflects broader global water governance and climate change discourse and reinforces historic patterns in the basin, as well as signals more strategic efforts by the MRC and member states to retain and attract further donor support. Although we identify links between discourse and MRC climate change action for our two areas of climate change discourse—policy strategies and scales—we argue that the MRC’s climate change actions narrowly reflect the production of studies and project scoping rather than real adaptive actions. This is in contrast to other MRC programs, like the Initiative on Sustainable Hydropower, which also started in 2009, and has moved beyond mere scoping and planning activities (Heikkila et al., 2013).

These findings highlight a number of policy matters important for broader transboundary river basin management. The scope and extent of discourse around climate change reflect broader trends in the global water governance and climate change discourse about the nature of science but also about the growing influence of water policy paradigms around integration, justice, and security. In practice, acting on these various paradigms will likely require and reveal important trade-offs. Indeed, the implementation of these policy strategies may well suggest relative policy winners and losers. Downscaling climate change adaptation from international and regional scales to national and local ones will be a necessary strategy to heighten the overall effectiveness of adaptation strategies and measures in the Mekong River Basin. Our findings also speak to the influence of development in climate change adaptation. In the case of the MRC, we argue that adaptive action to climate change comes at relatively low economic costs for MRC member states: Cost for action is largely donor funded, and it benefits riparians without major negative consequences due to the no-regret nature of MRC’s adaptation actions. This reinforces historic patterns in the basin and then allows states in the region to focus on what really matters to them—hydropower development.

Our research suggests a number of issues requiring further research. Future research could more directly study whether and to what extent MRC discourse shapes and influences adaptive action over time and across various scales in the basin. For a fuller sense of the climate change discourse within the basin, future studies might engage and study other governmental actors as well as nongovernmental actors and active networks in the basin. Further, a more case-based comparative approach to climate change discourse and action in national governments and local communities, and across river basins, could provide a richer understanding of the relative performance of RBOs to adapt and tackle challenging new problems like those associated with climate change.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Andrea K. Gerlak is the director of academic development for the International Studies Association and an environmental policy faculty associate with the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the University of Arizona. Her research interests are in the fields of public policy, institutional theory, natural resources management, and water governance.

Susanne Schmeier is an Earth System Governance research fellow. She is the coordinator for transboundary water management at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Eschborn, Germany. Her work focuses on transboundary watercourses, river basin organizations, and adaptation to change.

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