Science and National Pride

Abstract

This study is the first attempt to study media representations of nanotechnology in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Content analysis has been used to investigate the potential risks and benefits of nanotechnology, centering on the dominating frames, themes, actors, and tone and on the geographical focus of the articles published in the Iranian daily press between 2004 and 2009. The results will offer a new perspective to the ongoing discussion on the social aspects of nanotechnology, looking at it through the lens of a different culture, religion, language, and sociopolitical system.

Keywords

nanotechnology newspapers qualitative content analysis Iran

Introduction

Despite its relatively long history, dating back to the 1980s, nanotechnology is often considered as a new and revolutionary technology. It has attracted the interest of researchers across the whole world—not only in the developed countries but also in the developing ones.

During the past 10 years, nanotechnology has become one of the most important research areas in the Islamic Republic of Iran, alongside the widely discussed and controversial atomic program. Since 2001, the Iranian government has been investing in new laboratories and new centers for nano-research, aiming to make the country a regional and international leader in nanotechnology. In 2003, the Iran Nanotechnology Initiative Council (INIC) was established to coordinate Iranian nano-research, aiming to invest more than $30 million in this field (Farshchi, Khatiboleslam, Ibrahimi, & Abadi, 2011). By 2010, Iranian scientists had published 1,917 articles in international scientific journals, which gave Iran the 14th place in the world in the Institute for Scientific Information ranking of published nano-related papers.

In the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada, research on nanotechnology has been followed by studies of its social, ethical, and legal aspects, including the public perception and media representations of nanotechnology (Einsiedel, 2005; Gaskell, Ten Eyck, Jackson, & Veltri, 2005; Priest, 2008; Satterfield, Kandlikar, Beaudrie, Conti, & Harthorn, 2009). These studies revealed differences between countries in the way of presenting nanotechnology in the media, showing the importance of considering cross-national differences in the process of science communication.

The development of these studies was influenced by the assumption that the way people perceive new technology (in its early stage) is very often affected by the media coverage. However, most of these studies were focused on Western countries, especially English-speaking ones.

This study is the first attempt to investigate the press coverage in Iran—a country that differs significantly from the United States or European Union (EU) countries in terms of culture, religion, economy, and sociopolitical system. It aims to find out to what extent these differences could be mirrored by the frames and themes used in the debate on emerging technologies, in particular nanotechnology.

Public, Media, and Science

Until recently, one of the dominating views regarding the relationship between the general public and science was the one described by Steven Maynard-Moody (1995), Professor of Public Administration at the University of Kansas, who stated,

Most scientists and most citizens believe that although the products of science can be used for good or evil, science itself is detached from and not responsible for the social consequences of its own discoveries. In this view, research on the structure of matter remains untarnished no matter how grotesque the results of an atom bomb detonation or how dangerous the storage of atomic waste. (p. 5)

Although one can argue about whether this was a prevalent attitude in 1995 when these words were written, the fact remains that it was a dominating conception of the relationship between science and society during the post–World War II decades characterized by the growing research development in the United States and many Western European countries. Dorothy Nelkin (1987) observes also that at that time there was “the widely held belief that science is distinct from politics and beyond the clash of conflicting social values" (p. 71), which resulted in almost overwhelmingly positive media coverage of science and technology.

However, this attitude started to be challenged in the 1970s with the rise of public concerns on the use of nuclear power, the ozone controversy, and with later controversies related to biotechnology; genetically modified foods; animal and human diseases, in particular epidemics and pandemics; and most recently the climate change debate. In many cases, the controversies among the public resulted in particular political decisions and regulations (Cobb & Macoubrie, 2004).

In response, scientists, industry, and policy makers pointed out two main elements responsible (according to them) for the rise of the controversies. The first one was the “public’s ignorance," the lack of subject-specific knowledge that results in a lack of acceptance for the new technology (“deficit model”). The second element that was supposed to be responsible for causing public concerns regarding emerging technologies and various scientific issues was media. According to this view, media coverage has a direct effect on people’s opinion on particular issues (the “magic bullet” effect). However, as observed by many scholars, both of these assumptions have been found to be (at least partially) unproven. Neither a high level of scientific knowledge nor exposure to scientific media coverage automatically results in high support for some specific technology (or “irrational” rejection of others). As argued by Susanna Priest (2003),

Media audiences make active choices about what to read or watch and how to interpret it, and opinion formation is a complex process involving values, beliefs, priorities, concerns, allegiances, associations, and patterns of trust. It is not in any way a simple function of what a news story tells a reader to think. (p. 7)

Nevertheless, it has been observed by various scholars (Goodman & Goodman, 2006; Schäfer, 2012; Weingart, 2005) that especially people without any prior knowledge in a particular area may form their opinions based on the information delivered by the media, especially newspapers.

Additionally, Nelkin (1987) has observed a relationship between the coverage of scientific controversies and a drop in consumption of particular products (e.g., produced using a controversial technology). However, at the same time opinion polls showed a high level of people’s trust in science and the scientific community (Nelkin, 1987). Therefore, the media may play a significant role in the initial stages of the debates on emerging technologies, when no prior experiences with these technologies exist and people do not yet know who to trust. In their study of the British media debate on nanotechnology, Anderson, Allan, Petersen, and Wilkinson (2005) stated that the press play a potentially crucial role in framing newly emerging issues, mainly by helping establish the initial parameters of debate, by identifying certain news sources as pertinent and credible, and by providing topic-defining reference points.

In that context, it should be highlighted that this study does not assume that there is a direct relationship between the media coverage and people’s attitude to a particular issue, for example, nanotechnology. It assumes that media coverage is one of the factors that may influence those attitudes, especially in the early stages of the debate. Similar observations have been made by other researchers studying the debates on nanotechnology (Brossard, Scheufele, Kim, & Lewenstein, 2008; Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005; Te Kulve, 2006; Ten Eyck, 2005). One of the ways media may influence those attitude is framing, which will be discussed in more depth in the later part of this article, along with the other elements that are significant in the context of Iranian debate.

Public Attitudes to Nanotechnology

From the very beginning of the development of nanotechnology within universities and spin-offs, voices could be heard that warned policy makers and scientists that they needed to avoid a debacle such as the one caused by genetically modified organisms (Berube et al., 2010). It is believed that this would help avoid a situation when nanotechnology would be rejected on a large scale by members of the general public.

Nanotechnology therefore became a popular case study for science and technology scholars researching emerging technologies, public engagement, and public perception of risks and benefits. During the past 10 years, studies in that area have flourished across the globe. Most of them were focused on public perception of nanotechnology and the cross-national differences in the level of public support for nanoscience (Einsiedel, 2005; Gaskell et al., 2005). Some of these studies also looked at the role of religion in the process of accepting nanotechnology (Brossard et al., 2008). Most recently, Chris Toumey (2011) has investigated various religions’ answers to nanotechnology, observing that while religious beliefs may influence people’s attitude toward nanotechnology, a particular religion’s approach toward nanotechnology does not determine it unequivocally.

The conducted studies have shown that the public has a positive attitude toward nanotechnology and supports its development (Einsiedel, 2005; Priest, 2008; Satterfield et al., 2009; Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). However, Gaskell et al. (2005) observed considerable differences in public perception of nanotechnology between the United States and European countries (15 EU countries and Norway). While 50% of the U.S. public answered positively when asked “Will nanotechnology improve our life?” only 29% of European citizens surveyed shared this opinion. At the same time, 53% of Europeans answered “Don’t know,” while in the United States, this answer was given by 35% of respondents. Doubts about nanotechnology making life better (“It will make things worse”) were expressed by only 4% (United States) and 6% (Europe) of respondents. Authors also draw attention to the differences among the European publics with the highest percentage of the supporters of nanotechnology (“Will improve”) in Luxembourg (45%) and the lowest in Ireland (18%). Although the public’s attitude toward nanotechnology is generally positive, it has been also found that very often people with some knowledge about nanotechnology tend to be more critical about potential risks or its eventual social, legal, or ethical implications (Pidgeon, Harthorn, & Satterfield, 2011; Priest, Lane, Greenhalgh, Hand, & Kramer, 2011).

The only available research on public perception of nanotechnology in Iran was conducted by Farshchi et al. (2011), and it suggests that public awareness of nanotechnology is limited. According to his study, almost 80% of Iranians have heard very little or nothing about nanotechnology. Interestingly the author observed that most of the people questioned believed that nanotechnology would have positive effects and that the benefits outweigh the risks (Farshchi et al., 2011). It must be stressed that this survey was conducted in Tehran, so knowledge about the attitude toward nanotechnology in smaller Iranian cities or the countryside remains unknown. It is impossible currently to compare these results with any earlier studies, since as stated by the authors, “Risk perception studies are very rare in Iran” (p. 3517). Additionally, Hosseini and Rezaei (2011) conducted a study focused on agricultural researchers’ attitudes toward nanotechnology. It was found that most of the surveyed researchers declared very low knowledge of nanotechnology. However, in terms of risks and benefits perception, 75% of respondents claimed that benefits of nanotechnology outweigh the risks.

Media Coverage of Nanotechnology

Alongside the studies of public perception, social scientists have studied media coverage of nanotechnology. As mentioned before, although there is no direct relation between media content and people’s opinions, the media may influence people’s attitudes toward an emerging technology in the early stage of the debate through framing. Knowledge about media coverage at this stage may facilitate understanding of public opinion on a particular question or issue related to the emerging technology. Many studies on the media representations of nanotechnology have been conducted in many countries during the past 10 years. Most studies covered the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom (Allan, Anderson, & Petersen, 2010; Anderson et al., 2005; Faber, MacKinnon, & Petroccine, 2005; Fitzgerald & Rubin, 2010; Friedman & Egolf, 2005; Gorss & Lewenstein, 2005; Laing, 2005; Stephens, 2005; Weaver, Lively, & Bimber, 2009; Wilkinson, Allan, Anderson, & Petersen, 2007), Germany (Donk, Metag, Kohring, & Marcinkowski, 2012; Grobe, Eberhard, & Hutterli, 2005; Zimmer, Hertel, & Böl, 2008), Denmark (Kjærgaard, 2008), The Netherlands (Te Kulve, 2006), Italy (Arnaldi, 2008), Norway (Kjølberg, 2009), Slovenia (Groboljsek & Mali, 2012), and Poland (Lemańczyk, 2012). Additionally, Dudo, Choi, and Scheufele (2010) conducted a study of 21 U.S. newspapers focusing on nano-food only. The sources that were most frequently used were both national and regional daily newspapers, as well as weekly magazines and, more rarely, web pages. Other research projects included studies on visual representations of nanotechnology used in the media (Nerlich, 2005, 2008).

These studies have shown that the dominating tone of the nano-coverage was positive and that newspapers were especially focused on the future applications of nanotechnology, scientific progress, and research achievements in this area. The most popular frames were progress, scientific discovery, and potential business benefits (Gorss & Lewenstein, 2005). The frame that was mostly used in the discussions around negative aspects of nanotechnology was the “Pandora’s Box” frame—a well-known cliché used frequently during debates about biotechnology, genetics, genomics, and now synthetic biology. The main difference in the nano-coverage across the studied countries was the fact that U.S. media tend to be more interested on economic benefits, while West European or Canadian media are more focused on the risks and safety issues related to the use of nanotechnology. Nevertheless, this question did not dominate the press coverage, and the overall tone was positive. This predominantly positive tone has been observed in all countries where media coverage of nanotechnology has been studied.

As to differences between various countries, some scholars also focus on differences between particular newspapers. Anderson et al.’s (2005) study of media coverage of nanotechnology in the U.K. press showed that articles related to nanotechnology appear more often in “elite newspapers"; this pattern has also been found in the United States by Gorss and Lewenstein (2005). Furthermore, Zimmer et al. (2008) also focused on the main actors in the debate on nanotechnology in German newspapers.

One overarching observation regarding media coverage on nanotechnology across the world is that it appears more limited than other debates on emerging technologies, for example, biotechnology, readily observed when comparing the number of published newspaper articles. Nanotechnology has simply not achieved what Nisbet and Huge (2007) describe as “celebrity status” in media (as the stem cell debate or debates around various aspects of biotechnology). As observed by Zimmer et al. (2008) who studied the German media debate on nanotechnology, nano-coverage is in general in its initial phase. Additionally, it has not become controversial in the same way as biotechnology—there is no “Dolly the sheep” of nanotechnology so far. Te Kulve (2006) observed that the initial phase of the debate is characterized by the less antagonistic or contrastive reporting patterns, which are usually developing during the later stages when the issue is becoming more controversial.

In the context of this study, it should be highlighted that there are no studies on media coverage of nanotechnology in Iran. This gap in the literature provides a justification for this study, which will cover a new field that remains rather unknown to science communication scholars in the Western world. The main research interest will be themes and frames used in this debate along with the general tone of the articles and actors active. This will allow us to gain knowledge about the main characteristics of this coverage and provide background for further studies in the field, which seem to be needed, considering the low number of studies on the ethical, legal, and social implications regarding nanotechnology development in Iran or most other countries in that region.

Nanotechnology and Media in Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran differs significantly, in terms of science policy, socioeconomic system, or media market, from other countries studied before in the context of media debates on nanotechnology. Therefore, it seems necessary to provide background information about Iranian science, nano, and media policies.

After the Islamic Revolution, Iran became a theocracy with the Supreme Leader as the head of state and with a great deal of influence on the legislative process as well as on most of the decisions made by the government or parliament. In the same way as the economy or education, science policy is subject to central planning, which constitutes a significant element of the policy- and decision-making process in Iran. Religion-based law, politics, and ideological issues were additional elements that affected the development of Iranian science after the Islamic Revolution. One Iranian physicist stated, “Back then, people talked about ‘Islamic physics’ and ‘Islamic science’. It took a long time for them to understand that physics is physics and science is science” (Koenig, 2000, p. 1484). The political tensions with some Western countries led to the international isolation of the country, not only in terms of diplomacy and economy but also in the area of scientific research. The once strong relationships with U.S. universities ceased to exist.

The situation started to change in the 1990s, especially after the presidential election in 1997 won by Mohammad Khatami (considered to be a reformist). The new policy included a rise in public expenditures on research—from 0.55% of gross domestic product in 1999 to 0.67% in 2007—and an opening toward Western scientists and research institutions. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, the number of collaborative U.S.-Iranian scientific papers rose from 388 in 1996 to 1,831 in 2008 (Coghlan, 2011).

One of the results of the new approach toward science introduced by President Khatami (1997-2008), and to some extent continued by his successor Mohammad Ahmadinezhad, was a steadily rising number of Iranian patents and scientific papers published by Iranian scientists.

Nevertheless, Iranian science is still struggling with the same problems as during the first 15 years of the Islamic Republic, namely, central planning, which not only ignores many socioeconomic aspects but is also time-consuming (Ashtarian, 2010). Additional elements that continue to impede the development of Iranian science are economic sanctions and embargos on import of various products or even subscriptions of some popular science journals (Mehrdad, Heydari, Sarbolouki, & Etemad, 2004). All these affect the development of Iranian nanotechnology.

The history of Iranian nanotechnology dates back to 2003 when the INIC was established. Initially a budget of £12 million was set for the development of nano-research with an additional £8 million for the support of new nano-companies (Farshchi et al., 2011).

During the past 10 years, there has been a steady growth in the number of articles published in international peer-reviewed journals, and according to some authors (Ahmadvand, 2009; Farshchi et al., 2011), Iran is among the 20 countries with the highest number of nano-related articles.

According to Farshchi et al. (2011), there are currently over 7,300 Iranian nano-scientists working at 144 faculties or research centers within 58 Iranian universities. The main one and considered to be the most prestigious research center is the Institute for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology at Sharif University in Tehran. Iranian nano-researchers are mostly active in the areas of materials science, physics, chemistry, polymer science, biochemistry, pharmacology, instrumentation, metallurgy, and spectroscopy. There are 33 “exclusive nano-labs” supervised by INIC and 30 nano-products that are already produced in Iran (Farshchi et al., 2011).

Still, Iranian nanotechnology is struggling with problems such as limited financial resources, migration of scientists, international isolation caused by political tensions, and economic sanctions. Additional problems are the lack of coordination of actions undertaken by various actors, limited collaboration, lack of relevant legislation, and the limited participation of the private sector (Aala, Larijani, & Zahedi, 2008; Ghazinoory & Ghazinouri, 2009). The Iranian private sector is actually inactive in the area of nano-research, which is financed primarily by the government through the Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology. At the same time, most of the companies that are active in this field are state owned or in some way controlled by the state (Ghazinoory & Ghazinouri, 2009).

In terms of media market, Iranian politicians and religious authorities have a significant influence over the media market in the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the constitution, radio and television broadcasting must be state owned (Dehghan, 2009; Malek & Rad, 1994). Although Iranian law accepts the existence of privately owned newspapers, they are subject to censorship by the government (as are the state-owned media).

The press market is dominated by four daily broadsheets—Kayhan, Hamshahri, Ettela’at, and Iran—and all of them are state owned (Dehghan, 2009). It needs to be stated that although most of these newspapers have nationwide circulation, they are often unavailable in the countryside. The main source of information for about 80% of Iranian citizens is state-owned television and radio (Freedom House, 2011). In his study of the Iranian media, Mohammad Rawan (2001) argues that outside the big cities, the “modern mass-media cannot replace the traditional media, mosque, and minbar” (p. 192; minbar is the place in the mosque were the imam/prayer leader sits and lectures [pulpit]). However, it remains unclear what consequences it may have for science communication, since Rawan’s study focused on communicating political, religious, and socioeconomic issues. Due to the lack of relevant studies, it was not possible to gain more detailed information about the readership of the newspapers in the country.

Method and Materials

This study has been conducted using qualitative content analysis—an approach that combines quantitative methodological rigor with flexibility, ability to conduct more in-depth analysis, and the possibility of answering the “why” questions offered by qualitative methods. This method emerged as an answer to the shortcomings of a purely quantitative approach. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in media studies, where content analysis has gained high popularity, many researchers are not trying to separate qualitative content analysis from the quantitative one, seeing them as “complementary and part of a continuum of analysing texts” (Macnamara, 2003, p. 5).

In qualitative content analysis, the text is categorized and classified through the process of coding. However, unlike in quantitative content analysis, there is no single preestablished coding scheme. The codes and categories are developed during the process of analysis and are subject to the researcher’s constant revision. Although one can use a set of preestablished categories (Macnamara, 2003; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009), in general, codes and categories should emerge from the text during the analysis. Strict use of the same preestablished categories for the analysis of the each corpus could result in omitting some potentially relevant country-specific features of the coverage. Furthermore, analysis of the articles resulted in developing categories that were not observed in the existing literature on the subject. This study therefore combines both approaches to coding—using a preestablished (but flexible) coding scheme that was enhanced and revised during the process of analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994).

The corpora consist of 106 articles published in the Iranian daily newspaper Hamshahri between January 1, 2004, and December 31, 2009, that is, the first 5 years of the INIC. Hamshahri is one of the four largest Iranian daily broadsheets with the circulation of about 400,000. The reason other newspapers are not included in this study is related to their accessibility. None of the available newspaper databases cover the Iranian press, while the web archives provided by each newspaper cover usually the past 12 to 15 months. The only exception was Hamshahri. Searches have been conducted with Google Site Syntax Search, using two keywords: “nano*” and “fanavari-ye nano” (nanotechnology). The choice of the keywords was based on the analysis of keywords used by the authors of previous studies of media debates on nanotechnology (Anderson et al., 2005; Kjølberg, 2009; Te Kulve, 2006; Wilkinson et al., 2007; Zimmer et al., 2008). The use of an asterisk (*) after “nano” allowed searching for any word beginning with “nano,” for example, “nanoscience,” “nanoparticles,” “nanotechnique,” and so on. Articles dealing only partially with nanotechnology or its application, economic news, information in which nanotechnology did not play an important role, advertisements, and articles where “nano” was used as part of particular product name (e.g., Tata Nano) were excluded from the sample.

The next stage involved coding of the corpora. Coders were looking for particular frames, themes, and general tone of the article, as well as the geographical focus and actors (i.e., people/institutions that were active, mentioned, or cited in the article in the context of nanotechnology [sources]). In the case of frames, themes, and actors, a coder could choose more than one frame/theme/actor (for the full coding scheme, see Table 1).

Table 1.

Coding Scheme.

Themes	Benefits versus risks
Application	Benefits only
Financial	Both
Generic research	Risks only
Politics	None
Policy and regulation
Safety and risks
Other

Actor	Tone

Scientists	Positive
Interest group	Neutral
Business	Negative
International organization
Politician
Media
Military
Moral authorities
Public opinion
None
Country focus
Iran
Other countries
Comparison
None

Since this study deals with both themes and frames, it is necessary to first define each of these terms. Themes represent here the sole subject of the article (i.e., “What is the article about?”), for example, the new nano-application or scientific research. On the other hand, framing is a way of making some issues more salient or characterizing them in a way that would cause some specific associations among the audience. According to the definition (very often used in other framing studies) offered by Gamson and Modigliani (1987), frames are the “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events. . . . The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (p. 143). In such a way, an individual is able to understand the new information and make sense of the world around him or her (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In the case of the debates on emerging technologies, frames have been often studied in the context of biotechnology (Herring, 2010; Nerlich, Dingwall, & Clarke, 2002; Nisbet & Lewenstein, 2002) and even in some cases nanotechnology (Anderson et al., 2005; Arias, 2004; Arnaldi, 2008; Donk et al., 2012; Gorss & Lewenstein, 2005). The coding of frames in the current study was based on the framing typology adopted by Gorss and Lewenstein (2005) with five additional frames developed during the process of analysis (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Framing Typology.

Progress	Report of technical development
Economic prospects	Nanotechnology’s effect on the economy
Ethical	Nanotechnology is either morally necessary or morally repugnant
Pandora’s box	Developing nanotechnology will create unforeseen ills
Runaway	Nanotechnology may spiral out of human control
Public accountability	Coverage about ethical, legal, and societal implications; influence over research and development
Long way away	Applications of nanotechnology will be in the distant future
Confluence	Nanotechnology represents a confluence of technologies, including biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science
New industrial revolution*	Articles where nanotechnology and its development are framed as a new industrial revolution
Hope*	Hopes related to nanotechnology and its “infinite” applications
Entertainment*	Articles that focus on entertaining aspects of nanotechnology rather than real science, such as nano-sized images of human cultural artifacts (guitars, abacus, logos, maps) or nature (flowers, crystals, mountains), abstract art created using scanning tunneling microscopes and many more
Nano-enthusiasm*	Extreme form of enthusiasm for this nanotechnology, its applications, nano-research, and everything related to “nano-”
A Pole can do it*	Articles discussing the progress in nanotechnology in Iran, highlighting at the same time the strong position of Iranian science; the element of “national pride” is the main distinguishing characteristic of this frame

Note. The framing typology, excluding frames marked with *, was adapted from Gorss and Lewenstein (2005).

Robert Weber (1990) suggests that to achieve a high reliability for the coding procedure, the coding process should be conducted by more than one person. However, many previous studies have been coded by only one person. Stephens (2005), in his research on news narratives about nanotechnology, coded 85% of the material himself. In this study, a sample of 50 articles has been coded by a native speaker of Persian (who is not specialized in nanotechnology) to determine the consistency of the coding scheme. However, due to the qualitative character of this study, intercoder reliability was not measured using tests typical for quantitative studies (Krippendorff’s alpha or Cohen’s kappa). As suggested by Schilling (2006), agreement regarding particular categories was achieved through discussion between the researchers and coders. These discussions covered mostly problems such as the extent to which the coding scheme was covering all the aspects of the debate observed by the coders. As a result of the discussions, additional frames and themes have been added to the coding scheme. It was also found that in the case of the general tone, the initial division (very positive, positive, neutral, negative, very negative) was too detailed and was thus limited to three categories.

Results

In total, 109 Iranian articles, published in the newspaper Hamshahri were selected for further analysis and coded. Figure 1 shows how the coverage changed across the studied time period.

Figure 1.

Nano-articles published in Hamshahri between 2004 and 2009.

The study of the general tone of the nano-articles shows that 84% of them are positive and only 2% of articles have a negative tone. Most (73%) of the articles were focused on the benefits of nanotechnology. Articles focused on issues related to the safety and risks started to appear in the second half of the analyzed period, that is, 2007 to 2009. Risks of nanotechnology have been discussed every year but in a very limited number of articles (1-3 per year). The risks of nanotechnology were usually discussed together with benefits of nanotechnology and usually more space was dedicated toward benefits than risks:

In 2004 another research finding proved that C60 can cause damages in a fish brain. However, nanotechnology has also many applications in the area of ecology. . . . In any case nanotechnology is currently developing very fast and in the future, but not ages, it will be involved in all field of science. (Hamshahri, August 31, 2005)

Articles focused on risks started to be published only after 2007 (only one article per year). Interestingly, 17% of articles were focused on neither benefits nor risks. These articles dealt solely with some technical aspects of nanotechnology or the country’s policy toward nanotechnology. The latter is an interesting example of the difference between the Iranian and European or American coverage. Iranian articles very often contain detailed descriptions of experiments conducted by researchers. Authors of these articles use scientific vocabulary that is not necessarily understood by a reader without a scientific background and is usually not used in British, Canadian, or American broadsheets. These articles were often (but not always) written in a neutral tone.

Most articles were focused on other countries, that is, achievements of foreign scientists or nano-companies. Only 29% of articles discussed nanotechnology in the context of Iran and its own research. More than half of the coverage (63%) reports on foreign research (e.g., by covering the latest articles published in international journals such as Nature or Science) or ongoing discussions on nanotechnology in other countries (e.g., regulatory issues). The political tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States (the two countries have had no diplomatic relations since 1979) or the United Kingdom are not reflected in the news reporting on nanotechnology, since the majority of the articles report the achievements of U.S. or U.K. scientists.

The most popular actors were scientists: 73% of the coverage. Their participation in the debate remained at approximately the same level during the analyzed time period. The participation of other actors was rather limited. Institution officials (e.g., representatives of some ministry, local administration representatives, or directors of the INIC) appeared in 6% of articles discussing Iranian nano-policy and strategy in the area of nanotechnology research as well as Iranian successes in this field. However, unlike in the case of the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian top politicians (e.g., President, Speaker of the parliament, or the Supreme Leader) were not active in the press debate on nanotechnology. Business representatives cited or mentioned in the articles were mostly representatives of foreign cosmetic or electronic companies (e.g., IBM).

In terms of themes (both main- and subthemes), the studied articles followed a pattern observed in other studies, with “Application” and “Generic Research” being the most popular themes (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Themes Used in Iranian Articles.

	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009
Theme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme
Application	0	2	15	10	15	5	9	1	6	0	8	4
Politics	3	0	1	2	0	0	2	2	3	1	1	4
Financial	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Policy and regulation	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1
Safety and risks	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	2	0	1	3
Generic research	1	0	17	6	8	10	2	5	1	4	5	6
Other	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	1
Total	5	4	33	20	25	20	15	12	13	7	18	19

The second and the third places are occupied by the themes of “Politics” (17%) and “Safety and Risks” (13%). As mentioned before, risks were usually not discussed in the context of Iran, rather they were discussed in the context of the ongoing debates on nanotechnology in Europe or North America. In the case of the “Politics” theme (articles focusing on state’s support for the nanotechnology and its importance for the whole nation), it is worth mentioning that the chief Iranian politicians (President Mohammad Ahmadinezhad or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) have not appeared in any of the studied articles, which contrasts with the debate on nuclear energy. It could therefore be assumed that despite its importance, nanotechnology has not gained the status of the Iranian nuclear program. This has been observed even by Ghazinoory and Ghazinouri (2009), who argue that government’s support for nanotechnology was slightly declining during the presidency of Mohammad Ahmadinezhad who became president in August 2005. The lack of the politicization of nanotechnology could explain (to some extent) why, despite the political controversies around Iran on the international scene and media’s open hostility toward Western world, these issues have not affected the debate on nanotechnology. U.S. or English scientists are often cited in the studied articles, along with the references to the main scientific journals (especially Science and Nature). The only example of situating nanotechnology in a context of international politics is the use of the term Zionistic regime in a discussion of Iran’s successes in the area of nano-research. This term is used very often by Iranian media and state propaganda to describe Israel.

The use of the “Safety and Risks” theme remained at the same level across the analyzed time period (1-2 articles per year), achieving a small peak in 2009 (4 articles). The “Policy and Regulation” theme was not used until 2008, when it occurred for the first time in 2 articles. The regulatory questions were usually discussed in the context of other countries, not in the context of Iran and its own legislation.

The study of frames shows some similarities between Iranian coverage and press debates conducted in other countries. The most popular frames were “Progress” (78% of) and “Hope” (59%; see Table 4).

Table 4.

Frames in Iranian Nano-Articles.

	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009
Frame	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme	Main	Subtheme
Progress	4	0	27	2	20	1	7	4	7	1	9	3
Economic prospects	0	1	0	3	1	0	1	3	0	2	0	1
Ethical	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pandora’s box	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Hope	0	3	4	14	0	14	3	6	0	9	5	6
Runaway	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public accountability	1	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	2	4
Long way away	0	0	1	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	3
Confluence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New revolution	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Entertainment	0	0	1	7	0	5	0	6	0	2	1	2
National	0	1	0	1	1	1	3	2	4	0	0	6
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	10	10	66	49	50	48	29	35	24	21	36	45

An interesting feature observed in the Hamshahri articles was the use of the “National” frame. Since 2006, more and more articles were dedicated to Iranian nanotechnology and were mostly focused on comparing Iran with other countries, especially those in the Middle East. This phenomenon has been captured by the “National” frame introduced during the analyses of the corpora. This was used in almost 20% of the articles and can be explained with the following examples:

In the beginning of our works on nanotechnology, Iran was on 51st place in the world in terms of articles and had the sixth place in among the Muslim countries. Last year we reached the first place among the Muslim countries, excluding Turkey, and 19th place among in the world. We even left behind the Zionistic Regime. (Hamshahri, February 15, 2009)

Currently Iran has the first place in nanotechnology among the countries of this region and in this respect Iran counts as a most advanced country among the Muslim countries. (Hamshahri, February 11, 2008)

Today, various countries in the world, e.g. Japan, America [United States], China, India, Taiwan, South Korea, Israel, European Union and Russia are heavily competing with each other to occupy the first place in the world in nanotechnology. Even Japan and America called this field the top technological priority of their countries. Of course, Iran’s position in that field, in comparison with other fields of science, is better and the distance between us and the developed countries in the area of nanotechnology is shorter than the distance in other fields. In terms of publication of nanotechnology articles in Institute for Scientific Information journals, in 2004 Iran occupied 42nd place in the world. (Hamshahri, May 22, 2007)

Another frame that became more popular toward the end of the analyzed period was the “‘Public Accountability” frame, which refers to the coverage that discusses the ethical, legal, and societal implications of nanotechnology, including people’s influence over research and development. However, in most cases the articles were forwarding news published abroad, reporting the results of research on public perception of science, or citing foreign nongovernmental organizations that were calling for attempts to inform the public about nanotechnology or to increase public’s influence over nano-research. Frames used in the Iranian context were slightly different, that is, nanotechnology was discussed in terms of potential benefits for the society rather than in terms of risks that should be controlled. A useful example is the interview with an Iranian researcher, Iman Maradi, published March 2, 2009. Maradi points out that in Iran, nano-scientists do research without considering whether it will be useful for country’s society or not. The background assumption in that interview is that nanotechnology is good and the only question is how Iranian society may benefit from it.

The “Economic Prospects” frame can be found every year among Hamshahri nano-articles, with the highest number in 2007 (four articles). Other frames such as “Pandora’s Box,” “Long Way Away,” or “Runaway,” which had been relatively popular in the Western coverage of nanotechnology, were used sporadically and irregularly (one to five articles across the whole analyzed time period).

Discussion and Conclusions

The study of the Iranian coverage of nanotechnology (on the examples from the newspaper Hamshahri) shows that it followed, to some extent, the tendencies observed in other countries in terms of the most popular frames, themes, actors, or tone of the articles. In 2004, the debate was more focused on “Progress,” “Applications,” and “Generic Research.” It was also overwhelmingly positive. Additionally, many articles were focused on research details, reporting the scientific progress using very technical and scientific language. It could be argued that journalists were using such language to enhance the credibility of their articles and the new technology—by using more scientific terminology and potentially creating the impression that the article was written by an expert in the field. However, it is not known whether these particular journalists were actually specialized in science (or whether they were scientists), since such information is not provided by the publisher.

In 2004, the Iranian program for nanotechnology development was relatively new, which could explain why it was not discussed at all in the studied articles. During the first years of the analyzed time period, the tone of the articles was mostly positive and focused on other countries. Actually, the first “alarming” article about nanotechnology was published in 2006. Alongside the discussion of nano-risks, the discussion of public influence and nanotechnology’s importance for society was developing steadily (the “Public Accountability” frame). However, it is worth pointing out an interesting difference between Iranian coverage and the nano-debate in other countries, since this frame was used in Iran in a slightly different context. While the use of the “Public Accountability” frame in Western media was related to “alarming” articles discussing the risks of nanotechnology, in Iran it was often used in articles discussing the positive aspects of nanotechnology. In this context, the necessity for public influence/participation was triggered by the possibilities this technology may create for Iranians. The discussion of potential risks was extremely limited, and the questions of society’s influence over nanotechnology were related not to its potential risks but to its benefits (to ensure that everyone should get access to the new technology). Risks were discussed together with the potential benefits, and risks were usually presented as a minor problem especially when considering the benefits. Risks were also presented as specific problems, not as “potential,” “unknown” risks that may come together with the development of nanotechnology. In general, it can be observed that news about risks took on more of an “informative character," that is, they were mentioned as an element of nanotechnology, but no in-depth discussion on the negative aspects of this emerging technology was provided.

An important element of the Iranian coverage was the use of nanotechnology in state propaganda to highlight the country’s international position (the “National” frame). The considerable rise in its use can be observed after 2006. It was related to the above-mentioned successes of Iranian nanotechnology—construction of the first Iranian scanning tunneling microscope and its strong international position in terms of the number of nano-papers published in scientific journals. What distinguishes the frame’s use among the other countries studied is the strong emphasis on comparisons with other countries. Journalists highlight often the strong position of Iran among developed countries such as the United States, Japan, or EU countries. However, in most cases journalists tended to compare Iran with other Muslim countries or all of the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries, including Israel (described as “the Zionistic Regime”). Nanotechnology also becomes a field for competition with other Middle Eastern countries and becomes a symbol for Iran’s ambitions of being a regional superpower. This could be rooted in Iranian politics and culture for many decades: Even during the former regime, the idea of becoming a local superpower (equal with Western countries) was a dominating element of government policy. In this way, nanotechnology is used as an element of the government’s propaganda of national success, which can be observed in many other areas, for example, the railway development. As in the case of other technologies, Iran is highlighting its own independence in nano-research. This independence (not only in nanotechnology) is Iran’s answer to the economic sanctions and international isolation. The achievements of Iranian nanotechnology are used as evidence that this strategy works.

The use of the “National” frame, not observed in the similar studies focused on other countries, shows the importance of the country-specific context. In Iran, nanotechnology has been pointed to by the government as a strategic area in terms of research and technological development. Iran is one of the few countries that have established a central institution that coordinates its nanotechnological activities. However, in the same way as the government controls all nano-research institutions, it also controls all major papers in Iran, and the private ones are still subject to state censorship. It could be argued that this could have affected the coverage, since it would be highly unlikely that the government would accept articles questioning the aims of the Iranian nano-research agenda or highlighting the potential risks of the technology that became the government’s priority.

Despite these obstacles and the limitation in form of the size of the sample, it could be argued that this study contributes to the existing literature by putting some light on an area (both geographical and culturally) that has not been studied before in the context of the nano-debate in particular, and emerging technologies in general. It shows that despite all cultural and political differences between Iran and Western European or North American countries, the coverage was generally following the same pattern. Based on the observations by Groboljsek and Mali (2012) in their study of media nano-debate in Slovenia and the study of Dutch press coverage by Te Kulve (2006), it could be concluded that Iranian press coverage is in the early stage. It is mostly positive and almost exclusively focused on new applications and generic research. The main country-specific element was the use of nanotechnology as an element of propaganda, highlighting country’s strong international position.

Due to the lack of sufficient data regarding public perception of nanotechnology in Iran and because of the character of the Iranian sociopolitical system, it is hard (at this stage) to relate this study and its result to the particular elements of the Iranian nano-debate and the policy-making process in the area of nanotechnology. Therefore, this study can be treated as a starting point for further research that would include broader variety of media sources and wider range of actors (scientists, policy makers, journalists, and interests groups). That will allow us to understand and gain a full picture of the public nano-debate in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Professor Brigitte Nerlich, Dr. Alison Mohr, Dr. Joan Leach, and Mr. Ben Cleworth for their helpful advice and comments.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The author received a scholarship for PhD students from the University of Nottingham International Office.

Author Biography

Szczepan Lemańczyk received his PhD in science, technology and society from the Institute for Science and Society, University of Nottingham. He graduated from Uppsala University, Sweden, with BA and MA degrees in Iranian Languages and Polish Studies. For his PhD studies, he received scholarships from the Institute for Science and Society and the European Research Scholarship from the University of Nottingham. His research is focused on press in Sweden, Poland, and Iran.

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