Abstract
Bio-experts’ portrayals of laypeople are considered problematic. Two discursive action method workshops with 17 participants were organized to discover whether plant experts can engage in reflexive problematization of their own talk about and in front of laypeople and whether plant experts’ analyses may offer insights with regard to the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise. Participants discussed the interactional effects of real-life expert talk. Plant experts’ discussions indicate that they can problematize how their talk-in-interaction helps reproduce the supremacy of technical-scientific expertise. Results also suggest that plant experts may offer complementary insights to social scientists’ analyses of plant experts’ talk.
Keywords
Introduction
The relationship between experts on the one hand and so-called laypeople on the other hand has been considered problematic for various reasons and by different groups. Davies (2008), for instance, found that experts—scientists and engineers—consider laypeople lacking in the ability to judge science correctly. In line with this, Burchell (2007) and Myers (2003) report that bioscience experts often express the belief that journalists “dumb down,” oversimplify, or misrepresent techno-scientific facts (see also Bubela et al., 2009).
Science and technology studies (STS) scholars also found that bioscientists tend to label “lay” concerns as irrational (Burchell, 2007; Cook, 2004, Cook, Pieri, & Robbins, 2004). 1 Many STS scholars find this problematic (Bubela et al., 2009; Burchell, 2007; Cook, 2004; Wynne, 2001, 2006). As Wynne (2005) points out, laypeople tend to be far more knowledgeable than experts credit them for. Moreover, experts’ disregard of lay concerns may negatively affect the expert-society relationship and, ultimately, the usability of research and technologies developed (Leach, Scoones, & Wynne, 2005; Wynne, 2001). For that reason STS scholars propagate dialogue between experts and “nonexperts” or laypeople: interested citizens and prospective users of technology (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2005).
However, Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and Tutton (2007), who studied public engagement activities concerning genetic science, found that these activities do not necessarily challenge the dominance of technical-scientific expertise. Padmos, Mazeland, and te Molder (2006) also found that technical-scientific expertise is still largely privileged over alternative forms of expertise by both experts and laypeople. This may lead to insufficient consideration of alternative but relevant forms of expertise in technology development. To counter privileging of technical-scientific expertise, Kerr et al. (2007) recommend reflexive problematization of expert-lay interactions: The explicit and systematic examination of how technical-scientific expertise gets reproduced, relative to alternative forms of expertise in talk-in-interaction 2 (for an in-depth discussion of reflexive problematization, see Kojic, 2012). Kerr et al. (2007) do not explicate, however, how reflexive problematization in expert-“lay” encounters may be achieved.
Our aim in this article is to explore what happens if experts are given the tools to engage in reflexive problematization, that is, to reflect on the interactional effects of their own and colleagues’ talk with regard to technical-scientific expertise relative to alternative forms of expertise. Up until now, experts’ sense-making of their own talk-in-interaction has been understudied. Experts who by themselves discover the unintended and potentially undesired interactional effects of their talk may be more motivated to adapt their own talk than when social scientists tell them what the effects are of their talk (e.g., see Maudsley & Strivens, 2000). Effect-focused adaptation of talk may eventually positively affect the science-society relationship by decreasing the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise in technology development.
The method we use in our study is the discursive action method (DAM): A method designed to help speakers to systematically reflect on the unintended effects of their talk-in-interaction by letting them stepwise examine real-life fragments of their own and colleagues’ talk-in-interaction. Originally developed for adolescents so as to let them critically reflect on their own health-related interactions (Lamerichs, Koelen, & te Molder, 2009), this is the first time that the method has been applied in the context of expert discourse (for an account of the urgency for such a study, see Veen, Gremmen, te Molder, & Van Woerkum, 2011).
Research Focus and Setup
We decided to ask bio-experts to reflect on the interactional effects of discursive constructions that are used to manage the relationship between technical-scientific facts and “lay” concerns. More precisely, we invited a group of bio-experts who may potentially benefit greatly from reflexive problematization of technical-scientific expertise to participate in DAM workshops: plant experts involved in research on Phytophthora, a major disease in staple crops. Some of the technologies these plant experts develop—for example, genetically modified crops—are persistently met with public controversy (Gaskell & Bauer, 2006; Kerr et al., 2007; Wynne, 2001). Plant experts in the study are plant scientists, representatives of plant breeding industry, and government representatives responsible for plant technologies.
The questions we aim to answer with the analysis of DAM workshops with plant experts are the following:
Can plant experts engage in reflexive problematization, that is, can they be made aware of how their talk about and in front of laypeople projects or generates intended and unintended interactional effects?
Can plant experts discern that their talk about and in front of laypeople tends to reproduce the dominance of technical-scientific expertise, and if so, how this dominance is reproduced?
Can the DAM workshops with experts generate insights that complement the social scientific analyses by Mogendorff, te Molder, van Woerkum, and Gremmen, (2014) and Mogendorff, te Molder, Gremmen, and van Woerkum (2012) and increase our understanding of the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise in science communication?
The group of plant experts that participated in the DAM workshops had participated in studies of plant experts’ talk we conducted earlier. Based on these earlier studies two articles have been published: An interview-based study with plant scientists (Mogendorff et al., 2012) and a study of plant expert talk based on mainly expert board meetings (Mogendorff et al., 2014). Both studies uncover recurring discursive constructions of the science-society relationship that sustain the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise.
However, these publications do not shed light on the question whether the experts whose talk was analyzed endorse the findings of the social scientific analyses of their talk, nor do they provide insight into whether plant experts are able and willing to pay attention to the interactional effects of their past and future talk about and in front of laypeople. Plant experts’ ability to adapt the effects of their talk appears highly relevant, given that their relationship with laymen may be directly affected by this talk. Moreover, plant experts are better positioned than social scientists to actually change discursive practices in plant technology science that help reproduce the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise. For these reasons, we decided to organize DAM workshops with plant experts. We decided to approach the same group of plant experts who participated in our earlier studies to participate in our DAM study because that allows us to determine whether plant experts’ own reflexive problematization of plant expert talk offers complementary insights to our earlier social scientific analyses.
Workshop participants were given two fragments of talk, so as to analyze and reflect on what Mogendorff et al. (2012, 2014) identified as key discursive patterns that impact on the use of technical-scientific expertise relative to alternative forms of expertise (Fragments 1 and 2 in this article).
A characteristic of the key discursive patterns found in these fragments is that laypeople figure prominently in them. Mogendorff (2014) found in her PhD research that Phytophthora researchers talk a lot about laypeople, irrespective of laypeople’s actual presence. Moreover, the structure and management of public Phytophthora meetings Mogendorff (2014) examined provide laypeople with little opportunity to set the agenda or to respond directly to individual Phytophthora research presentations. The focus of the talk discussed in the DAM workshops is therefore on expert talk about and in front of laypeople and not on expert-lay dialogue. Moreover, Phytophthora experts were found to treat “people” (interested citizens) and “farmers and breeders” (plant technology users) as laypeople in their talk (Mogendorff, 2014). Therefore, in this article, both users and interested citizens comprise the category of laypeople.
Fragments used in the workshops satisfied two criteria, as based on our earlier analyses: (1) the discursive constructions deployed in the fragments are dominant in experts’ talk and (2) the discursive constructions in the fragments are designed to confirm the superiority of technical-scientific expertise in one way or another.
We successfully organized two workshops in which a total of 17 plant experts participated. The method used during the workshop is the DAM (Lamerichs et al., 2009), a relatively new reflection instrument that starts from participants’ own real-life talk. As Stokoe (2013) points out, people may learn more from reflecting on their own real-life talk-in-interaction than from case-based role-plays with actors.
In the following section literature on bio-experts’ discursive treatment of laypeople relative to technical-scientific expertise is discussed. Additionally, the dominant discursive constructions found in the fragments that are given to experts to reflect upon in the DAM workshops are introduced: display of tolerance of lay views, quoted “lay”-expert dialogue, and interactional metaphorical framing.
Experts’ Discursive Treatment of Lay Concerns Relative to Technical-Scientific Expertise
Experts strive to be treated as experts by their interaction partners. They largely do this by acting like an expert: They invoke their specific knowledge on a subject relevant to the business of a meeting (Carr, 2010). Expertise is relative, whether one is treated as an expert depends on how one’s knowledge relates to the knowledge of others in the interaction setting at hand.
In expert-“lay” encounters, bio-experts generally assert their expertise by invoking their technical-scientific expertise relative to alternative forms of expertise. For instance, Ottinger’s (2013) research on refinery expertise suggests that one way experts try to ensure that only scientific-objective concerns are put on the agenda is by dismissing individual laymen’s experiences with technology as personally motivated, and, therefore, irrelevant to science and policy (see also Mogendorff et al., 2014). In contrast, Ottinger (2013) found that experts’ individual everyday experiences are likely to be treated as valid input (see also Padmos et al., 2006). Cook et al. (2004) found another discursive strategy that enforces the superiority of technical-scientific expertise; they found that bio-experts treat lay knowledge as subjective-emotional or irrational. By claiming that the other is irrational, speakers implicitly present themselves as reasonable and rational (see Locke & Edwards, 2003, on reflexivity); in technology development rationality is considered superior to irrationality.
In agreement with this Epstein (1995) and Bean (2011) found that laypeople may achieve success in expert-lay interactions when they invoke technical-scientific facts to further their cause. Moreover, Kerr et al. (2007) and Mogendorff et al. (2014) found that plant experts still tend to treat lay concerns as subjective-emotional although not as totally irrelevant to science. Plant scientists were found to inoculate the critique that they are insensitive to lay concerns by invoking displays of tolerance of lay views, for example, I understand that [lay views] . . . (Mogendorff et al., 2012). Moreover, during expert board meetings plant experts occasionally state that users’ feelings matter (Mogendorff et al., 2014).
Displays of tolerance of lay views may help experts to demonstrate that they have considered lay concerns but that does not guarantee that lay views have an impact on technology development. On the contrary, Mogendorff et al. (2012) found that displays of tolerance helped plant scientists to claim that lay views do not correspond with scientific criteria and are therefore of limited relevance in science and technology development.
Typically, experts also use discursive constructions that project objectivity or impartiality to ascertain the superiority of technical-scientific expertise. One such discursive construction is the use of reported speech or quotes. Generally, quotes demonstrate that those quoting have direct epistemic access to the quoted sources without necessarily agreeing with the content of quotes (Holt & Clift, 2007). Given that the speakers are not the author of the content of the speech they report, they cannot be held accountable for the sentiments expressed by the quotes but they may deploy them to further their own interactional ends. Journalists’ quote use is well-known; experts’ use of quotes is understudied especially in science and technology development. However, Mogendorff et al. (2014) show how reported dialogue between plant experts and prospective users of plant technology helps ascertain the superiority of technical-scientific expertise in contrasting “rational” expert concerns with “emotional” user concerns.
Metaphorical framing is another popular device in science communication that affects the science-society relationship: The description of the unknown in terms of the familiar and well-known (e.g., see Dewulf et al., 2009; Nerlich & Hellsten, 2004; Sontag, 2002). One particularly popular form of metaphorical framing in bioscience education and communication is the agentification and personification of plants and animals; agentification entails the ascription of agency to nonhumans (Drogosz, 2012), and personification is the ascription to nonhumans of agency and human traits (Dorst, 2011). Our interest here is in the effects of interactional metaphorical framing of Phytophthora (to paraphrase Dewulf et al., 2009): The action accomplished through the use of metaphorical language and how this may help sustain the dominance of technical-scientific expertise.
In the following sections, we explain the method we deployed to enable plant experts to stepwise discuss the interactional effects of their talk, and we present and discuss plant experts’ reflections on the interactional effects of their own talk.
Methodology: The Discursive Action Method
We deploy the DAM to enable plant experts to engage in reflexive problematization of expert talk about and in front of laypeople. The DAM is an instrument that helps speakers reflect on their own talk using discursive psychology (DP), a discourse analytical approach that investigates the actions people project and perform with language and the effects these actions generate (Lamerichs et al., 2009).
DAM deploys the same analytical tools as DP but differs in its overall aim. DP seeks to analyze what (un)intended purposes talk-in-interaction serves in real-time interactions to gain a better understanding of complex societal problems (see also Veen et al., 2011), whereas DAM aims to enable participants to reflect on the interactional effects of talk for their own benefit.
DP/DAM has characteristics and procedures that support reflexive problematization. DAM makes use of the quality of descriptions about oneself or a group in an interactional context generally say something about the person or the group the description is about and also tend to imply something about the other persons, groups or events (cf. Locke & Edwards, 2003). For instance, “lay” and “expert” tend to be treated as oppositional categories. The latter means that a claim about expertise—for example, “experts know about plant science”—implies, at least reflexively, that the negative of the claim holds true for laypeople: “laypeople do not know about plant science.” Another example is that one may emphasize one’s expertise or skills by stressing how difficult the work is that one successfully completed based on the common everyday logic that only complex or difficult problems require noteworthy skills or expertise.
Moreover, DAM includes recipient uptake of utterances in discursive analyses (e.g., Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996). The uptake of utterances by coparticipants in talk-interaction helps DP/DAM analysts to definitely identify the actual interactional effects (Potter, 1996). For instance, if speakers seek to enact their expertise by invoking jargon but coparticipants do not endorse speakers’ jargon-based expertise then the use of jargon is probably not a valid expression of expertise in the interaction setting at hand.
In addition to utterance uptake discursive analysts make use of the “it could have been otherwise stated” quality of descriptions known as the rhetorical principle (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996): comparison between actual and alternative formulations of a message and message responses help discursive analysts to make sense of the actions performed with talk-in-interaction and the effects these actions generate. The rhetorical principle can be applied to any stretch of real-life talk but uptake of utterances can only be applied to dialogical sequences (see also Mogendorff, 2014).
DAM Procedure and Characteristics
Participants in DAM workshops go through various steps to adopt an interactional perspective on talk (adapted from Lamerichs et al., 2009). The first steps entail adopting a focus on effects of talks and relinquishing a focus on the technical-scientific correctness of talk. According to DAM (and DP), people’s words do not need to correspond with reality, or even with people’s thoughts or beliefs. It is important that workshop participants (WPs) learn to separate speakers’ thoughts from the interactional effects that are generated by speakers’ words to generate a safe atmosphere in which participants may critically scrutinize and discuss the potential negative interactional effects of utterances found in the fragments in the company of others.
Another important quality of the method is the recognizability of the materials used. As DAM draws on real-life talk that exemplifies a typical discursive pattern from the participants themselves or their colleagues, it allows for a relatively quick identification with the talk. Participant recognizability helps establish the relevance and the representativeness of discursive constructions in the discussed fragments. Utterances such as “I could have said that” imply familiarity with the discursive constructions in the fragments used.
The discursive functions of talk are explored by looking at how an interactional problem is handled in talk, and what the interactional effects are of the deployed discursive constructions. For that purpose, participants are taught to use the rhetorical principle (see above) and to closely inspect participants’ uptake of utterances as presented in the fragments. This procedure makes it possible for participants to discern boundaries drawn between technical-scientific and alternative forms of expertise, and the effects of this boundary work, for example, how the science-society relationship may be affected by how technical-scientific facts are presented relative to user or citizens’ concerns.
Setup and Participants of Conducted DAM Workshops
Two DAM workshops with in total 17 Dutch plant experts were conducted, recorded, and analyzed to explore whether plant experts can reflect on how talk manages central interactional dilemmas in plant science. 3 Typical of plant experts’ talk about and in front of laypeople is that it exhibits relatively little dialogue. In the workshops, therefore, the emphasis lies on applications of the rhetorical principle.
WPs’ involvement with Phytophthora research varied. They have conducted, supervised, or managed Phytophthora research; communicated findings to laypeople; and/or designed and facilitated communication activities dealing with crop breeding. All participants had knowledge of Phytophthora and crop breeding; two participants were also communication professionals.
A workshop consisted of an introduction to DAM, discussion of fragments in two or three small groups per workshop, and a plenary discussion in which implications of the small groups’ findings were discussed. Fragments were discussed in five small groups in total for approximately 1 hour and this yielded 8 hours of recorded talk-in-interaction the introduction and plenary sessions included (an individual workshop lasted 2.5 hours). During small-group discussions, the workshop leader (first author) and her assistants (second and fourth authors) circulated to observe how participants were doing and to clarify the DAM procedure. Last, WPs discussed the implications of their findings during a plenary discussion.
Fragments and Auxiliary Questions for Workshop Participants
WPs were given three fragments that demonstrate how plant experts typically deploy displays of tolerance in interviews, quotes of users during Phytophthora expert meetings, and metaphorical framing of Phytophthora in their talk about and in front of laypeople (Mogendorff, 2014). WPs are encouraged to read-aloud the provided three fragments several times before they analyzed the fragments with help of auxiliary questions that accompanied the fragments. Reading-aloud serves to help WPs to become familiar with the content of the fragments in their oral form and the transcript symbols used in standard DP and DAM transcription. Reading the fragments aloud helps because they are verbatim transcribed and because the “ehm’s,” pauses, incomplete sentences, and changes in speed and pitch typical of spoken language are maintained in the transcript. The latter is a requirement for DP and DAM analysis; interactional effects may differ slightly with changes in emphasis, word-order or other nonverbal aspects (see the appendix for the transcription symbols). 4
After WPs had familiarized themselves with a fragment including the transcription mode, their analysis was guided by auxiliary questions such as “What is the speaker’s dilemma here?” If WPs hypothesize what the speakers’ interactional challenges are, they may more easily identify and appraise the interactional effects. Another auxiliary question was, “Of what could the speaker be accused here?” We also asked the plant experts to consider possible alternative formulations to what was being said in the provided fragments. In doing so, WPs worked with the aforementioned rhetorical principle (see also Lamerichs et al., 2009).
Results: Plant Experts About the Interactional Effects of Their Own Talk
During workshops, participants made jokes and were critical of their own and others’ talk; they appeared to feel secure enough to appraise the provided fragments of talk-in-interaction. The discursive patterns and the dilemmas the fragments managed looked familiar to WPs, as utterances such as “I could have said that” and “that is indeed a problem” indicated. The secure environment and familiarity of WPs with the fragments thus made it notably easier to understand the fragments; reading them aloud also helped.
Below plant experts’ talk about interactional effects is presented per fragment: the fragment that WPs were asked to reflect on is introduced including a brief summary of the social scientific analysis of the fragments as found in Mogendorff (2014) and Mogendorff et al. (2012, 2014). Introductions are followed by WPs reflections on the discursive patterns found in the workshop material and the findings of the plenary discussions during workshops. WPs’ reflections on talk-in-interaction were transcribed verbatim in keeping with social scientific transcription conventions. All excerpts of talk cited in this article were transcribed and translated from Dutch to English by the first author.
Fragment 1: Use of Reported Dialogue
Mogendorff et al. (2014) analyzed plant experts’ references to users in Phytophthora expert board meetings that aim to increase the user-friendliness of plant technologies. The talk analyzed covers 8 meetings in 2 years. From this corpus, WPs examined Fragment 1 that demonstrates how plant experts typically deal with user concerns. The decision support systems (DST) mentioned in Fragment 1 are designed to advise farmers and breeders on what agrochemicals to spray in what order, so as to prevent their crops being affected by Phytophthora. When farmers will spray agrochemicals partly depends on the weather, partly on the lifecycles of potatoes and Phytophthora, and partly on farmstead characteristics. People in Fragment 1 are users of the DST.
Fragment 1
1 Researcher: Another point that keeps coming back
2 is eh the accumulation of agrochemicals eh
3 because last year was of course a dry spring=
4 Policymaker: =yeah
5 Researcher: eh or yes dry first part of the season
6 that the syste:ms advised longer spraying intervals
7 (0.3)
8 eh two (.) three weeks
9 Researcher: . hhh and
10 eh they say (q) ↑ yes but then
11 and then I keep-the protection level goes down (q)
12 (q) and I need to keep spraying those agrochemicals
13 because the level of protection builds up (.) eh
14 and when the weather changes then I have
15 at least a reasonably protected crop eh (q)
16 whereas
17 you need to spray at the right moment
18 and then your crop is protected just fine
19 what you did before that↑ does not matter (.) (q)
(Mogendorff et al., 2014: 147)
In this fragment, users’ emotions rather than their knowledge are made relevant by a researcher (Line 9). And after that, in Lines 10 to 19, the researcher enacts a dialogue between we—scientists—and users of the technology—they. This so-called reported dialogue allows researchers to demonstrate that their claims are based on actual dialogue with users. The contrast made between the scientist perspective and the user perspective serves to show that user concerns are hard to reconcile with scientific concerns. The latter is reinforced by the fact that feelings are less valued than knowledge in technology development. Overall, the enacted dialogue in Fragment 1 enables plant experts to shelve user concerns (see Mogendorff et al., 2014, for a more extensive analysis).
Workshop Participants About Fragment 1
WPs do not really consider the dialogue in the fragment to be a true exchange:
WP7: It is not a dialogue, it is a quoted dialogue. WP4: A quote that is not your own words. You are not responsible for its content. WP2: Directive [the scientists in the quote] as in: you need to do it . . .
Also, WPs say that the dialogue is well-structured, attractive, and ensures that the speaker keeps the attention of his [sic] audience. Moreover, they agree that the contrast made in the dialogue between experts and users produces distance between experts and users:
WP5: Scientists are presented as rational, self-assured. Users are presented as conservative and hesitant. WP4: The quote could have been more neutral. Now as it is, [the quote] plays more on the person.
According to WPs, the reported dialogue in Fragment 1 serves different discursive functions:
WP2: With it [the quote] you come closer to people, you make things more concrete. And with it [the quote] you say: “I understand what the sensitive issues are.” And that the problem is not with the DST [decision support technology]. WP8: The researcher shows with the dialogue that he has had contact with farmers; that he has stood in the clay with his feet. He derives authority from that. And [he shows] that he knows best.
What if the researcher had not “quoted” a dialogue? WPs agree that the reported dialogue demonstrates that plant scientists have knowledge of user concerns:
WP9: If there was not a dialogue [in the fragment] between scientists and users, he [the scientist] may have been accused of being pig-headed. WP5: Then the expert [in the fragment] may be accused of lack of knowledge of the user perspective on things. WP12: Without the quoted dialogue, he [the scientist] would appear to be nagging, obstinate.
Furthermore, WPs provided alternatives to talking about user concerns in dual terms and voice disadvantages of the use of reported dialogue in Fragment 1:
WP8: It would be better NOT to talk about science versus farmers. In the actual DSTs [decision support technology], differences between farmers and scientists are respected. You could also do that [respect differences] in dialogue. There is no talk about differences between farmers and differences between potatoes, although they are respected in the DST. WP11: Now [with the dialogue], he [the scientist] does not explain why it does not matter whether it [agrochemicals] built up. He could have done that instead, stick to the facts.
The researcher in the fragment was also considered not to act very empathetically:
WP2: The researcher could have said: “farmers need to make choices as well. So, I can understand that.” That would have been more empathic [than what he actually says].
To sum up, workshop participants recognized what discursive actions plant experts performed with reported dialogue. WPs indicated that this device helps plant scientists to project the image that they have sufficient access to user concerns, so as to present themselves as best equipped to determine what should be done in technology development without appearing to be pig-headed. Furthermore, the talk about users in oppositional “we” (scientists) and “they” (users) terms was seen as not conducive of an exploration of merits of actual user concerns. WPs also mentioned that the reported dialogue appeared to disrespect important differences between users, and diverted attention away from potential problems with the DST itself.
Fragment 2: The Discursive Construction of the Science-Society Relationship
Fragment 2 was given to WPs to examine because it shows how plant scientists typically discursively manage the science-society relationship in the context of public GM controversy without renouncing their scientific independence:
Fragment 2
1 Scientist: EVERYONE MAY THINK WHATEVER THEY LIKE isn’t it? (.)
2 Interviewer: mmh=
3 Scientist: =and make their own choices=
4 Interviewer: =yes (.)
5 Scientist: thus that I mean as well
6 there is a piece of irrationality in that whereof you think=
7 =that is almost impossible to direct
8 (0.7)
9 or maybe you can but often it is directed by
10 (0.3)
11 things suddenly become scarce or something like that (.)
12 or eh popular or modern instantly (.)
13 that are trends people follow
14 and they are usually not scientific.
15 Scientist: thus people have the perception (.) of (.) that is true (.)
16 I have that too (.) as a consumer (.)
17 Interviewer: yes=
18 Scientist: =
19 that is often not true
20 ((13 lines omitted))
21 Scientist: we as researchers (.) I want to say
22 (0.6)
23 may also be (.) irrational in private life (.)
24 but as a scientist (.) I think (.)
25 You
(See also Mogendorff et al., 2012, pp. 737-739)
Mogendorff et al. (2012) argue that the scientist displays his tolerance of lay views (Lines 1-3), and simultaneously shows that he has access to lay views and purports to know how lay views are produced, namely, in an unscientific manner (Lines 6-14). Moreover, the scientist acknowledges that scientists may also be irrational in private life (Line 16 and Lines 21-23).
However, in Lines 18 to 25, the scientist proceeds to contrast lay concerns (Lines 1-16) with scientific facts. The import of this is that scientists cannot simply incorporate concerns that are produced in the private sphere in technology development that is ruled by public scientific standards. Scientists are also presented as having knowledge of lay and scientific concerns. The latter suggests that scientists are best equipped to decide when and where nonscientific concerns may be included in technology development (see Mogendorff et al., 2012, for a more extensive discussion of fragments such as these). Control over when and where relevant forms of expertise are included in technology development together with downgrading lay concerns relative to scientific concerns enables scientists to maintain the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise.
Workshop Participants About Fragment 2
WPs almost all considered the utterance everyone may think whatever they like isn’t it? (Line 1) to be potentially disrespectful of the views of laypeople because of the isn’t it at the end of the utterance:
WP3: More like, everyone may think whatever they like as long as it is scientific. Then it is ok. WP5: He says this [everyone may think whatever they like isn’t it?] but isn’t it indicates that he [the speaker] actually means the opposite.
5
WPs agreed unanimously that the scientist in the fragment clearly suggests that people are ill-advised to think whatever they like; that is, if people want their concerns to be taken seriously in technology development. They also agreed that everyone may think whatever they like isn’t it? projects the subsequent discussion of the downside of the implied “live and let live” stance: You feel there is a but coming . . .
In Fragment 2, the scientist presents himself as a researcher and a consumer. WPs saw that this scientist’s presentation indicates that nonscientists may end up not being listened to because their expertise is presented as nonexclusive:
WP3: It [claiming membership in the lay category] means that he doesn’t really need the input of consumers. WP4: It [the scientist claiming membership in the lay category] shows that scientists can see things, in a different, broader perspective. WP2: He [the scientist] knows it all. That is a stereotype of course; he doesn’t really know it all.
Moreover, two WPs mentioned that claiming membership in the lay category may weaken the scientific standing of the scientist. An admission of irrationality in everyday life may suggest that one has the ability to act irrationally as a scientist too:
WP4: It [claiming membership in the lay category] may harm his scientific reputation. It means that he may be irrational sometimes as a researcher.
For the most part, however, WPs considered the contrast made between the lay and the scientific perspective functional for scientists. To the WPs, the overall effect of the interactional pattern in Fragment 2 appears to be that scientists ascertain that, in the end, they know best; they alone have access to both scientific and lay knowledge. This interpretation is reinforced given that the scientific perspective is also presented as superior to the lay perspective:
WP7: It [the contrast] is clearly functional in that it projects an image of the scientist as reasonable and knowledgeable about scientific and lay issues. Lay issues are also portrayed as less. So, he establishes the superiority of scientists about how things should be done. WP8: Scientists follow rules; lay people do just what they like.
To sum up, WPs discern that displays of tolerance of lay views that are contrasted with statements about science do not so much project empathy and tolerance as help plant scientists to effectuate the image that they are ultimately best equipped to judge when and where lay concerns should be considered in technology development and that this helps plant scientists to discursively uphold their scientific independence, or rather the superiority of technical-scientific expertise.
Fragments 3a and 3b: Personification of Phytophthora
Plant experts have been trying to defeat Phytophthora for decades. So far, they succeeded in producing crops that can temporarily withstand Phytophthora. This raises the question whether plant science may eventually control Phytophthora definitively.
The 17 WPs discussed Fragment 3a and Fragment 3b in which plant scientists deploy different discursive construction to explain Phytophthora and its management. Fragment 3a was given to WPs because the contrast between Fragment 3a and Fragment 3b was deemed to aid them in their analysis. Fragment 3a represents the standard way in which Phytophthora is presented: Agency is ascribed to Phytophthora.
Fragment 3a
1 Prof1: And in fact you could say that ehm ehm you (.)
2 Phytophthora’s potential to create new isolates
3 that are much more aggressive
4 than the existing isolates has increased enormously
(Mogendorff, 2014, p. 108)
The portrayal of Phytophthora in Fragment 3b is personified—agency and human traits are ascribed to nonhumans (Dorst, 2011). The personification metaphor is found only in public Phytophthora meetings (Mogendorff, 2014).
Fragment 3b
In this fragment Prof2 explains how Phytophthora makes a potato ill (Mogendorff, 2014, p. 108):
1 Prof 2: And eh when when a ehehm Phytophthora thinks↑
2 (q) yes this does not work this is a potato↑ (q)
3 then he can mutate (.)
4 thus make a somewhat different little Phytophthora protein 6
5 that is not recognized by the potato (.)
6 and then he cons it ((the potato)) and then eh he dies
7 well yeah where there is a need there is a way (.)
8 ((line omitted))
9 that is looking for resistance genes of the potato
10 and several mechanism (.) these little proteins Phytophthora makes
11 that fight eh that is eh at the heart of the matter
Mogendorff (2014) found that in particular the personification of Phytophthora—it thinks, deceives, and fights—in Fragment 3b helps to project the image that plant science may eventually be able to best Phytophthora, whereas the attribution of agency to Phytophthora in Fragment 3a does not. Personification of Phytophthora implies reflexively that the cunning Phytophthora needs strong capable opponents in the guise of plant experts and, by extension, that technical-scientific expertise offers superior insights and technology to control Phytophthora.
Workshop Participants About Fragments 3a and 3b
WPs considered the portrayal of Phytophthora in both fragments as correct and familiar: “It is vague talk, typical of how professors talk.”
However, in Fragment 3a little hope is offered that science may eventually control Phytophthora, whereas Fragment 3b offers much hope that plant scientists may eventually succeed:
WP8: Of Fragment 3a you could say that Prof1 propagates: “We should stop eating potatoes.” It is hopeless [the fight against Phytophthora in potato crops]. Prof 2 says: “There are possibilities, there is hope. You cannot eradicate it [Phytophthora] but you can manage it.”
WPs discussing the fragments together in small groups, realize that the differences in portrayals of Phytophthora management in Fragment 3a and Fragment 3b concur with differences in how Phytophthora is discursively presented:
WP2: In Fragment 3a, Phytophthora is portrayed as a pathogen that becomes more aggressive as if it is out of control. The impression you get from this is that nothing can be done to contain Phytophthora except perhaps spray till Phytophthora is truly dead. WP6: Prof2 personifies Phytophthora. Phytophthora thinks; Phytophthora is a challenging opponent. WP3: It is almost as if a war is going on between Phytophthora and scientists [referring to Fragment 3b]. That may be a smart move to get money for research. He [Prof2] is talking about tackling underlying mechanisms [of Phytophthora], fundamental research. Fragment 3a is more about applied research.
Fragment 3a and Fragment 3b are also perceived to differ in what they project about the science-society relationship:
WP7: Prof2 attempts to talk in ordinary language so that people who are not familiar with scientific language may understand it. WP10: In part, the language is patronizing; the use of diminutives such as little protein [in Fragment 3b] may suggest that people, citizens are not taken seriously [by scientists]. WP1: Fragment 3b is also more interesting and entertaining. With Prof2, Phytophthora is a little bit like a funny animal. WP3: Prof2 is telling a story; Prof1 is factual/paints the depressing reality.
To summarize, WPs were able to discern that the personification of Phytophthora in Fragment 3b generates other effects than the agentification of Phytophthora in Fragment 3a. According to WPs Fragment 3b propagates a positive image of science’s ability to successfully handle the societal problem of Phytophthora. The latter also implies a positive image of technical-scientific expertise; Phytophthora is portrayed as a strong and cunning enemy that requires a strong opponent—plant science. However, WPs maintained that the portrayal of Phytophthora in Fragment 3b may also project disadvantageous effects. The use of diminutives and also the personification metaphor in Fragment 3b may be interpreted as belittlement of laypeople, as not taking lay concerns seriously. WPs also expressed the concern that plant scientists may risk not being taken seriously because the use of personification may evoke laughter and come across as nonscientific.
Plenary Sessions
In the plenary session of the workshops, WPs reflected on what they discovered in the small group discussions. They marveled at what could be learnt from looking at the alternative wording of utterances, what (unintended) interactional effects they project. WPs differed in how they related to fragments: Some identified functions as neutral analysts; others mentioned what they would do (differently). WPs also identified what they assumed to be disadvantageous effects of the discursive constructions used.
WPs concluded that the Fragments 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate in an exemplary fashion that plant experts engage little in dialogue with laypeople. They also surmised that the framing of lay concerns and expert concerns in dual terms, as exemplified by Fragments 1 and 2, helps plant experts avoid such dialogue with laypeople. WPs recognized that reported dialogue in expert talk has its specific uses. According to them, plant scientists thus project an image of themselves as know-it-alls. The same was said to be projected in Fragment 2, where scientists contrast unruly lay concerns with rule-based science. Furthermore, WPs were concerned that displays of tolerance of lay views did not represent real tolerance or empathy. Workshop participants were charmed by the personification metaphor, in the sense that it was considered effective in projecting the idea that funding of Phytophthora research may be worthwhile. However, personification was also considered risky in that it may generate the effect that laypeople find themselves patronized—everyone knows that plant diseases cannot think and act like people. The use of diminutives in the personified Phytophthora fragment was believed to strengthen the latter projection.
More generally, WPs agreed that the talk about and in front of laypeople partly projected undesirable effects. They concluded that they should engage more in dialogue with laypeople and that experts should avoid language that could be interpreted as patronizing or polarizing, that is, that the use of diminutives and too much talk in dual or oppositional terms should be minimized.
During workshops there was little time to discuss in depth implications for future talk in front or with laypeople. A difficulty participants mentioned in evaluating and possibly reformulating utterances was that utterances often project different effects simultaneously. 7 For WPs the difficulty lies in getting rid of the negative effects without losing the positive effects of the utterances.
Conclusions and Discussion
Can plant experts be made aware of how their talk about and in front of laypeople projects or generates intended and unintended interactional effects? And is it possible to make them sensitive to the notion that expert talk tends to reproduce the dominance of technical-scientific expertise in particular? It appears that it is.
Participants’ critical remarks on discursive patterns in their own and others’ talk show that they felt secure enough to discuss their own talk-in-interaction in the presence of others. Discursive patterns in the fragments discussed WPs also recognized as existing in their own real-life professional practice. More generally, participants were able to understand and acknowledge the action-orientation of talk: What people say does not necessarily reflect people’s thoughts or reality and may generate unintended effects. For instance, WPs understood that the reporting of dialogue does not necessarily mean that this dialogue has exactly taken place in the way it is reported, but that enacting the dialogue in a specific way serves a particular function. Therefore, we can conclude that the DAM conditions of producing a secure environment with recognizable data have been met, enabling the participants to successfully shift their focus from the content of what is said to the interactional effects of talk.
The workshop participants noted that the reported dialogue in dual “we” and “they” terms in Fragment 1 and the contrast in form, not content, between lay concerns and scientific concerns in Fragment 2 offered plant scientists opportunities to maintain the dominance of technical-scientific expertise in plant technology development. Finally, in reference to Fragments 3a and 3b, the participants acknowledged that how Phytophthora is presented to laypeople matters greatly, depending on the kind of interactional metaphorical framing deployed. The metaphorical framing of Phytophthora in Fragments 3b in particular was appreciated as putting emphasis on the importance of technical-scientific expertise in successful Phytophthora management.
We were also interested in the question of whether the DAM workshops with plant experts could offer additional insights to our earlier analyses (Mogendorff et al., 2012; Mogendorff et al., 2014) and generate new insights in the hegemony of technical-scientific facts. Workshop participants’ conclusions largely endorsed the analyses as presented in Mogendorff et al. (2012, 2014). Additionally, WP’s observations provided insights that complemented these studies. WPs saw more acutely than Mogendorff et al. (2012, 2014) that utterances may simultaneously enhance and undermine plant scientists’ professional positions. With regard to Fragment 1, WPs agreed that the reported dialogue device in dual “we” (scientists) and “they” (users) terms, came at the cost of paying attention to relevant in-group differences between user groups, and diverted attention away from potential problems with technology (see also Mogendorff,2014). In Fragment 2, WPs noted that claiming membership in the lay category possibly undermines the rationality of the plant scientist’s professional identity. The personification metaphor in Fragment 3a was found to generate positive effects and to potentially undermine plant scientists’ reputation as serious professionals.
These additional insights are relevant in that they illustrate that DAM workshops with experts may be useful not only in motivating experts to engage more and differently, in actual dialogue with laypeople, but also in increasing our understanding of why and how the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise persists in science communication (for a strikingly similar form of expert hegemony, see Veen, te Molder, Gremmen, & van Woerkum, 2012, on celiac disease). Participants’ utterances with regard to how their positions as experts may be affected by their discursive upgrading or downgrading of lay concerns, suggest that reducing technical-scientific hegemony also requires paying attention to how these subtle but persistent strategies are embedded and sustained in scientific culture (see also Burchell, 2007). Finally, it appears that examining dominant ideas, as expressed by workshop participants, about what exactly a good scientist is and does may be of help in addressing the hegemony of technical-scientific facts. Participants stress rigorous rule-based data collection and analysis in their representations of science. They neglect to mention that serendipity and scientists’ everyday knowledge, intuition, and creativity also play their part in scientific discoveries. Including these aspects of day-to-day science in experts’ discursive constructions of science may ultimately help generate expert-science representations that allow for the fruitful combination of technical-scientific expertise with alternative forms of expertise.
Recommendations for Further Research
The conducted DAM workshops offered various insights and provided workshop participants with the tools to assess the interactional effects of their talk. The DAM may thus be a successful tool for increasing self-reflexivity in experts and other professionals.
Results also indicate that insight into interactional effects of one’s own discursive behavior may not be enough to radically adapt that behavior and, that there may be “good,” functional grounds for why this is the case. It is clear from the present study that experts can be made sensitive to the idea that irrespective of their intentions, they may convey that science is the epitome of true expertise and also that this is not necessarily visible in, or derivable from, the sheer content of what they say. So they can be made aware of the subtle character of practices that marginalize other-than-scientific expertise, and how the subtlety of these practices does not prevent these practices from being deeply ingrained, perhaps even makes them possible (see also Veen et al., 2012). However, communication will remain nothing but lubricating oil unless it is recognized that experts treat their scientific identity as bound up with “letting science having the final say.” What should be discussed, therefore, is what exactly scientific expertise entails in and for society and what the role of scientific expertise should be, next to other expertise, for example, when it comes to solving societal problems. This is not a typical expert issue, as prioritizing “facts” over “values” can also be found with so-called laymen (cf. Padmos et al., 2006), nor is it a question for individual researchers. Research may reveal how dialogue should be conducted in order to get these questions on the table, and how the cultural context can be conducive for having such dialogue. Experts-in-training who have not yet completely internalized the discursive patterns and professional identities that help reproduce the hegemony of technical-scientific expertise may be of crucial importance here.
Footnotes
Appendix
Authors’ Note
The research reported in this article is part of the successfully completed PhD project, “The Discursive Other: Dynamics in Plant Scientists’ Talk With Experts and the Public.”
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: We like to thank the CSG Centre for Society and the Life Sciences, a part of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), for the grant they provided.