Roles of Social Scientists in Crisis Media Reporting: The Case of the German Populist Radical Right Movement PEGIDA

Abstract

This article examines the visibility of social scientists in the context of crisis media reporting by using the example of the German populist radical right movement PEGIDA. Based on previous research, a role typology was developed to serve as a framework for the empirical study. A content analysis of German newspapers demonstrates that social scientists are quite visible in the media coverage of PEGIDA and are presented mainly in the role of intellectuals. At the same time, new roles for social scientists are also discernible. Based on these findings, an extended role typology was developed to provide points of reference for further research.

Keywords

science communication crisis media reporting populist radical right social science social scientist role theory PEGIDA content analysis

Introduction

In recent years, Western societies have witnessed the rise of nationalism and populism (Mudde, 2011). Whereas in the late 1990s, the success of the populist radical right party FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) in Austria still was regarded as a European anomaly and even led to diplomatic sanctions by other European Union member states, comparable parties are now gaining momentum all over Europe, threatening established orders. Following Mudde (2007), populist radical right movements are characterized by nativism, authoritarianism, and populism: They proclaim that states should be inhabited only by the native group (belonging to the “nation”), that there is a need for a strictly ordered society, and that politics should express the general—the people’s—will, which they juxtapose with the interests of a “corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2011, p. 12). The rise of the National Front in France and the permanent undermining of democratic principles by the Hungarian governing party, FIDESZ, are but two prominent yet paradigmatic examples of the new right-wing populism. In Germany, the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) movement, which is the focus of this study, was established in autumn 2014 in the Saxon capital of Dresden and led to an acute societal crisis with massive and partly violent protests by PEGIDA followers and opponents and a completely perplexed and helpless political and societal elite (Geiges, Marg, & Walter, 2015).

A societal crisis can be described as a phase in which a society is on the verge of a structurally dangerous transition. In such a crisis situation, emphasis is placed on maintaining or redefining societal constellations (Weichert, 2008, p. 311). The current crises of Western democracies have brought about fundamental questions: On the one hand, what are the reasons behind great parts of the Western world embracing nationalist ideologies and how are these ideologies able to divide democratic societies? On the other hand, and even more pressing, what are the most effective responses and strategies for coping with the new right-wing populism? Not least because of the populist campaign and election victory of Donald Trump in the United States, public outcry for both journalism and academia to take a more active role in public discourse and to raise their voices against antidemocratic developments has grown louder (Macri, 2017).

From a communication science perspective, mass media are regarded as performing an important societal function in public crisis monitoring and resolution (Görke, 2008). The manner in which crises are processed or overcome requires the media “to demonstrate strategies for solutions or at least provide commentary on sociopolitical issues” (Weichert, 2008, p. 312). Scholars responding to societal developments become most visible when they enter the public discourse and appear as speakers in the media coverage (Brewer & Sigelman, 2002). In doing so, they fulfill journalistic requirements for commenting and assessing (Bachl & Vögele, 2013; Hagen, 1992) and are presented in different roles. Previous science communication research has shown that social scientists especially assume not just the role of “objective experts” in mass media but also that of “public intellectuals” (Cassidy, 2014), which differs fundamentally from the role of objective experts. Whereas the latter becomes visible when referring to scientifically backed knowledge, the role of the intellectual goes beyond the framework of scientific evidence to explain societal phenomena. Accordingly, it is supposed that these role sets bring about different normative demands and evaluations by journalists, academia, and society (Gattone, 2012).

Based on these observations, this article examines the media presence of social scientists in acute societal crises using the example of media coverage of the German PEGIDA movement. The case is considered especially relevant for analyzing the role of social scientists in crisis media reporting due to its unique development: PEGIDA started as a spontaneous movement of a small group of people. Within weeks, the initiative attracted several thousand people from all over Germany who joined weekly demonstrations to march for a new nationalism. These demonstrations received substantial media attention, but as participants refused to speak to journalists or politicians, the media were stuck in an “information void” (Geiges et al., 2015). It was thus extremely difficult for journalists to categorize the PEGIDA movement, to name its causes, or to propose potential solutions for it (Geiges et al., 2015). The bewilderment on the part of both the media and politicians led to a demand for social scientific knowledge and assessment—but even scholars were caught off guard by the movement and its activities. As a result, social scientists contributed not just toward offering an explanation on how to deal with the phenomenon in the public debate on PEGIDA; rather, the public presentation of (at times hastily) produced studies as well as generalizing statements and far-reaching explanations drew criticism from the academic community and the public alike. The role of social scientists and the value of their assessments became the object of media coverage themselves.

Against this backdrop, this article addresses the following questions:

How do social scientists appear in media reporting related to PEGIDA?

Which roles are ascribed to social scientists in the course of crisis media reporting?

How are social scientists evaluated in their different media roles?

To answer these questions, the article is structured as follows: The next section reviews research on public communication on social sciences and social science actors. Based on the state of the art of research focusing on the roles of social scientists in knowledge production, policy advice, and mass media reporting, the article then develops a role typology that serves as the basis for the empirical study. The analysis of the PEGIDA discourse occurs within the framework of a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of print media coverage by leading German newspapers and regional Saxon newspapers during the period from October 2014 to February 2015. The results show, on one hand, that individual social scientists are particularly visible in the media discourse on PEGIDA. On the other hand, the different roles of social scientists are discernible in the course of the media coverage on the right-wing movement. Based on these findings, the initially developed role typology is expanded upon, providing points of reference for further research.

State of Research—Social Scientists in the Media

Social sciences have largely remained in the shadows in communication studies research on public science communication, and the manner in which journalists treat socioscientific issues as well as the visibility of social scientists in the media have rarely been reviewed (Cassidy, 2014; Schäfer, 2012; Scheu & Volpers, 2017). This lack of research is especially striking when compared to the state of the art of science communication research in other disciplines. For instance, in a meta-analysis of 215 scientific publications on mass media science coverage, Schäfer (2012) was able to demonstrate that in the period from 2000 to 2010, no more than 4% of studies dealt with social science and humanities coverage. In contrast, 94% of studies dealt with natural, technological, and life sciences. This finding is all the more surprising given that existing comparative studies on discipline-related media coverage demonstrate that subjects and actors from the social sciences and humanities clearly occupy a central place in mass media coverage. This fact is shown in a study on the medialization of 15 disciplines in German print reporting (Kohring, 2014) as well as by Summ and Volpers (2015), who came to a similar conclusion in their study on media coverage regarding science in German print media. But, their study is based on an expanded definition of science journalism that goes beyond the science sections and specialized science journalists and is defined in general by references to scientific actors and subjects in the entirety of media reporting (Schäfer, 2012; Wormer, 2008). When analyzing media coverage from this perspective, it becomes evident that in a comparison of disciplines, references to social science and humanities subjects actually occur most frequently in the press, followed closely by medicine and life sciences but with a considerable absence of other scientific subjects (Summ & Volpers, 2015, p. 7; cf. Albæk et al., 2003).

However, these studies point out not only the prominent position of the social sciences in public science communication but their special role as well: Social sciences and humanities do have their place in science sections of mass media, mainly to popularize scientific knowledge (the “popularization mode” of science journalism; Schäfer, 2007); but, more often, social science subjects and actors emerge outside the spectrum of classic science media reports (Summ & Volpers, 2015; cf. Blöbaum, Scheu, Summ, & Volpers, 2013; Brantner & Huber, 2013). This constellation means that social science subjects and actors do hold a firm place in media coverage, but this is hardly regarded as factual science media coverage: “One thing seems clear: social science and humanities research appears to be both everywhere and nowhere in public communication” (Cassidy, 2014, p. 193).

The Role Concept and Its Application to Social Scientists

In accordance with these observations, the question is raised of how social science actors are present in the media and which roles they play. The role concept has frequently been found applicable for the analysis of public communication, referring to “either the expectation of society [. . .] in relation to the behaviour of individuals or the expectations of corresponding social behaviour” (Haug, 1994, p. 25; own translation). Behavioral expectations relate to norms in “mostly institutionally specified relationships” (Schäfers, 2013, p. 78; own translation). A social role does not correspond to the personal agent in his or her totality (Merton, 1985, 1957), but it is rather assumed and determined in each case through the “over-individualised norms in social positions” (Schäfers, 2013, p. 79; own translation). The social role concept therefore holds that an individual in society always exercises a variety of roles and that linking these various roles and positions in a person brings with it the interaction of otherwise separate spheres of society (Merton, 1985; Dahrendorf, 2006). The roles scholars play in these different societal spheres have also been the focus of research in science and technology studies and science communication. Based on the state of the art, we found several typologies referring to different role sets of social scientists in their interactions with society. Although these typologies are merely analytical in nature (Stehr & Ruser, 2016) and do not necessarily address scholarly roles in mass media, they can be useful for our analysis of the roles of social scientists in public communication.

“Any analysis of social science must begin with the observation that social research [. . .] always emerges in a specific context with particular constraints and opportunities and within the framework of specific cultural norms and conventions” (Gattone, 2012, p. 176). Against this backdrop, focusing on the production of social science knowledge within the scientific system, Stehr and Ruser (2016) distinguished three roles which social scientists can play and which determine their positioning at the intersection of science and society: The role of the “technician” refers to a model whereby the scholar focuses on the production of instrumental knowledge. These scholars “deal with transferring and applying knowledge [. . . their role] consists of choosing an appropriate means to reach particular goals given specific criteria of relevance” (Stehr & Grundmann, 2010, p. 12). In contrast, the role of the “advisor” and “meaning producer” characterizes a system whereby social scientists no longer limit themselves to respond to a given problem but rather “become instrumental in making a case” (Stehr & Ruser, 2016, p. 9). In assuming these roles, social scientists contribute to the creation of new realities and thus influence political and societal decision making. For the field of active policy advice, the model introduced by Pielke (2007) has gained considerable attention despite some foundational theoretical shortcomings (Brown, 2008; Ruser, 2017). Pielke suggested distinguishing four roles of scholars: the “pure scientist,” the “science arbiter,” the “issue advocate,” and the “honest broker.” Whereas all of these roles are considered legitimate, they each carry different normative challenges. For instance, the pure scientist and science arbiter serve as “neutral” information providers (Turner, 2003) but might “slip into stealth-issue-advocacy” (Pielke, 2007, p. 3) when claiming scientific impartiality. In contrast, the issue advocate tries to impede political decision making by selecting strategic information. Last, the honest broker pursues decision alternatives by clarifying different policy options. Although Pielke (2007) applied these roles to all types of scholars, there might be differences in the actual roles that scholars are able to play. As Merton (1968, p. 264) stated, there is a considerable degree of indeterminacy in the social scientist’s findings “in so far as they bear upon projected action,” as they often do not have “the authority of reliable forecasts adequate for the purpose in hand” and thus have only limited potential to fulfill the role of technician (Stehr & Ruser, 2016) or pure scientist (Pielke, 2007), they must instead engage in a more general assessment. Following Gattone (2012, p. 181), social scientists consequently act as intellectuals in public affairs “provided that they act strategically and find creative ways to challenge conventional beliefs and infuse some degree of truth into the domain of public discussion.” Turner (2003) highlighted the important fact that the roles of social scientists are not only the outcome of their self-presentation but also of the audience’s expectations and perceptions. He argued that in Western knowledge societies, public perception of scientific expertise is closely connected to scientific authority. The validity of (knowledge) claims and the “practical efficacy” of research is evaluated in regard to inner scientific rigor and control (Ruser, 2017).

Accordingly, the roles of social scientists in the context of media coverage are not only determined by those who assume these roles but are also—and especially—constructed by the media (Scheufele, 2005). Workings, selection criteria, modes of journalistic presentation, and the general structural conditions of mass media, such as the editorial line, impede how social scientists become visible in the public sphere. Even when scholars are eager to contribute to the public debate and position themselves in the role of the honest broker, their self-perception might differ tremendously from the role constructed for them within media coverage. However, their authority and legitimacy will be evaluated by the respective audience (Turner, 2003).

Media Roles of Social Scientists

Based on the general assumptions of social science, studies focusing on the media roles of social scientists show that these scholars assume a more open stance in the public arena than their colleagues from other disciplines. They “show a less strict demarcation between internal scientific and public communication and between scientific and general knowledge” (Peters, 2013, p. 14103). They are also presented differently in mass media coverage: On political talk shows, in business reports, or via feature articles, social scientists act not only as scientific experts (technicians or pure scientists) but also as public intellectuals (meaning producers, issue advocates, and honest brokers) and therefore become primarily visible as commentators and advisers in the context of political and societal problems (Cassidy, 2014; cf. Albæk et al., 2003). In this constellation, they appear more widely than scholars from other disciplines “as deliverers of a special orientation knowledge that is only available to them” (Kohring, 2014, p. 141). Hence, they are also dealt with more strongly in opinion formats (Summ & Volpers, 2015) and in the context of problem-oriented media coverage on subjects of societal relevance (Albæk et al., 2003; Peters, 1994). However, media roles of social scientists can also entail stealth-issue-advocacy (Pielke, 2007). As a study by Brewer and Sigelan (2002) on the roles of political scientists in media reporting on political campaigns demonstrated, these scholars most often only serve as “color commentators” in media reporting: “what political scientists say about campaigns when they are quoted in newspapers typically provides building blocks for the pervasive ‘gaming’ of election campaigns by the mass media” (Brewer & Sigelan, 2002, p. 32). Whereas it is assumed that the scholars are partly “witting participants,” they cannot be completely absolved for playing their part in the framing of the political game.

Summarily, the roles of social scientists becoming visible in mass media reporting can be divided into two ideal-type alternatives: The role of objective experts and the role of public intellectuals (see Table 1). As objective experts, social science actors report on research findings in the mass media and communicate established knowledge using scientific criteria. Their function is to contribute to the explanation of ascertainable social science knowledge and societal problems and, ideally, to make the workings and routines of (social) science more transparent (Klimmt & Sowka, 2013). Consequently, social scientists assume the role of public intellectuals primarily for the task of classifying, commenting, and evaluating (Fuller 2006). Their function therefore concerns interpreting the latest social phenomena and sociopolitical developments, such as the recent rise of populist radical right movements and the dissemination of a new nationalism, allowing them to exert a central influence on public opinion: “Their capacity to independently address matters of contemporary concern has contributed to the dynamics of public opinion” (Dahlgren, 2012, p. 96).

Table 1.

Ideal-Type Roles of Social Scientists in the Media.

Ideal-type roles	Objective expert	Public intellectual
Action	Reporting on research results and communicating proven knowledge using scientific criteria	Classifying, commenting, and evaluating
Function	Contributing to public understanding of explainable social science phenomena and the functioning of (social) science	Public interpretation of social phenomena and sociopolitical developments
Function		Influencing public opinion
Example	“Technician” (Stehr & Ruser, 2016), “Pure Scientist” (Pielke, 2007), “Color Commentator” (Brewer & Sigelan, 2002)	“Meaning Producer” (Stehr & Ruser, 2016), “Issue Advocate” (Pielke, 2007), “Public Intellectual” (Cassidy, 2014)

Note. Authors’ own table.

Social Scientists in the PEGIDA Discourse

Societal Crisis and Its Consequences

A societal crisis is a disruptive event that is perceived and thus socially constructed as “a serious threat to the basic structures or fundamental values and norms” of society (Rosenthal, t’Hart, & Charles, 1989, p. 10). Such a crisis is always the result of a process of repression, one in which institutions and individuals initially overlook the signs of social change (Diamond, 2006). The state of crisis brings about high uncertainty for all involved actors, who thus strive to overcome the perception of instability by seeking causes and making attributions of responsibility (Rogers & Pearce, 2016). From a constructionist perspective, societal crises also need to be assessed as media constructs (Kepplinger, Brosius, Staab, & Linke, 1989). Mass media play a vital role in crisis monitoring and assessment:

Journalism selects and synchronizes crisis monitoring, thus enabling society to process new information and uncertainty in a meaningful manner. As a rule, however, foreign crisis monitoring by journalism is not merely copied and further digested. Journalistic crisis communication rather takes place in the medium of the current situation [. . .] In other words, journalistic organizations select those crises, which thus become an event in the public system that can be monitored at that time. (Görke, 2008, p. 125; own translation)

Moreover, the journalistic selection and framing of issues and speakers play a vital role in crisis perception (Horsley, 2016). Politics, however, are expected to respond and solve crises effectively. Research focusing on political crisis management has found that political actors “are pursuing more comprehensive policies that use the same general response system to handle any type of event” (Schneider & Jordan, 2016, p. 17) and thus might shape the expectations of journalists and society (Horsley, 2016). Yet, there are situations where this “all-hazards” approach is not applicable to societal upheavals.

The German PEGIDA Movement

Against this backdrop, the case of the PEGIDA movement, which was initially formed in the Saxonian capital of Dresden in October 2014 and then established offshoots across the country, is of special interest. The movement, which emerged from a single, private Facebook conversation about German involvement in the wars in Syria and Iraq by a small group of hitherto apolitical people (Geiges et al., 2015), appeared suddenly in the public sphere and consequently triggered a large-scale societal crisis in Germany (Geiges et al., 2015; Nachtwey, 2016). On October 20, 2014, the first PEGIDA rally, with 350 participants, took place. This rally marked the beginning of what developed into weekly demonstrations that quickly grew to include several thousand participants. In addition, the movement and its Dresden founders used social networks such as Facebook and Twitter to make their voices heard among their Germany-wide followers.

PEGIDA followers are characterized by large variation in terms of age and social stratum, but the majority are middle-aged males from the Dresden region who are well educated and employed full time (Geiges et al., 2015). The movement’s members share a strong sense of regional patriotism and the feeling of being left behind and politically impotent (Geiges et al., 2015). During PEGIDA protests, they have condemned the “foreign infiltration” (Überfremdung) of Germany and spoken out against “religious wars” on German territory. Characteristic of PEGIDA from the outset is the use of symbolically laden terms, dates, and places. While the movement has referred to the peaceful revolution in 1989 in the former German Democratic Republic that eventually led to German reunification by using terms like “Monday demonstrations” (Montagsdemonstrationen) and the slogan “We are the people” (Wir sind das Volk), it has also resorted to Nazi terminology (Geiges et al., 2015). Albeit xenophobic in their rhetoric, leaders and participants of the movement have distanced themselves from the extreme right wing.

PEGIDA, which was officially included in the Register of Associations in December 2014, quickly inspired imitators in other German, as well as European, cities, for example, in Prague and Amsterdam; other movements (e.g., LEGIDA in the city of Leipzig) succeeded in garnering widespread attention via their proximity to the right-wing nationalist camp and through violent clashes with police and counterdemonstrators. Yet, no other city has had a similarly high number of participants as Dresden, which includes approximately 25,000 people as of January 2015. With the PEGIDA movement growing, several countermovements have been established across Germany and have had a huge number of attendees—in most cases, larger than their PEGIDA-inspired counterparts. An important characteristic of the PEGIDA movement is its hostile attitude toward mass media, which has been expressed by the reactivation of the Nazi term “lying press” (Lügenpresse). PEGIDA leaders and most participants have refused to speak to journalists, politicians, and even academics, who have thus been unable to communicate with the protesters. This information void has further compounded the helplessness felt by societal elites in attempting to deal with the movement and resolve the crisis.

In spring 2015, however, the movement’s popularity waned considerably. This was triggered largely by the resignation of PEGIDA’s chairman, Lutz Bachmann, on January 21, 2015, which coincided with a criminal investigation and allegations of incitement after he posted pictures of himself on Facebook posing as Adolf Hitler. PEGIDA’s other board members distanced themselves from him and also resigned. At the same time, the movement’s right-wing nationalist behavior appeared to scare away many followers, and the number of participants in PEGIDA’s Monday demonstrations has since rapidly declined.

Although many commentators in spring 2015 were convinced that the PEGIDA movement would disappear from the public stage as quickly as it had arrived, subsequent developments have made it clear that the movement will endure for much longer: Especially in the course of the so-called “refugee crisis” beginning in summer 2015 (Barlai, Fähnrich, Griessler, & Rhomberg, 2017), the movement has again gained momentum. To date, demonstrations flying the PEGIDA flag have occasionally taken place in cities all over Germany. Although the movement has declined in popularity considerably, it has nonetheless managed to develop from a grassroots initiative to a German reality. Accordingly, PEGIDA has lost its crisis-laden character and with it the attention of politics and media has sharply declined.

Method

A quantitative and qualitative content analysis was performed to capture the roles of social scientists as ascribed by the media in the context of PEGIDA coverage. As part of the quantitative content analysis, the salience of social science speakers in the mass media discourse on PEGIDA was first ascertained. In the second step, it was then analyzed to determine which roles the actors were most visible in. A codebook was created based on role-theoretical assumptions about the two ideal role types: expert versus intellectual. In addition to formal criteria, the following were also recorded: the social science actors who spoke and the ways in which they spoke, references to scientific research, evaluations of PEGIDA by social scientists as well as journalists or other speakers, and the assessments and statements of social science actors. For the content analysis, print editions of the conservative newspapers Die Welt (Welt) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the left-leaning newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Die Tageszeitung (taz), and the local newspaper Sächsische Zeitung were reviewed for the period between October 15, 2014, and February 28, 2015. This period was determined based on the development of the PEGIDA movement, which emerged in October 2014 before seeing its popularity wane considerably and even lose widespread attention by February 2015. The analysis was based initially on a survey of all articles on Lexis Nexis containing the keyword PEGIDA in the headline or subheadline, which amounted to a total of 554 articles (Level 1).

In the second step, articles in which one or more individual social science actors were at least mentioned and/or had actually been written by the social scientists themselves (e.g., guest contributions, commentaries) were taken into account for further analysis. All actors working in the social sciences and affiliated with a university or research institute were deemed relevant. The field of social sciences was broadly captured, covering disciplines such as religious studies, history, and philosophy. This approach was taken because the classification of individual social science or humanities disciplines is treated very differently at different German universities and also abroad. This approach assumes, however, that the same public conditions apply to humanities scholars as they do for social science actors, since the former work not only hermeneutically but also increasingly empirically. The number of articles included in the analysis based on these conditions amounted to 54 (Level 2). The quantitative content analysis was performed with three coders. Intercoder reliability reached almost full conformity for all formal categories. Krippendorff’s alpha for the content categories in focus lay between .6 and .8.

A qualitative content analysis was also performed and served mainly to capture the assessments of social scientists in their respective role constructs and to call attention to any deviations from the ideal types outlined earlier. Next to this, the 54 articles from Level 2 were analyzed in the scope of an interpretive evaluation strategy oriented to the analytical model of Kuckartz (2014). This includes paraphrasing, keyword indexing, and thematic comparison as a basis for social scientific conceptualization and theoretical generalization of qualitative data. The assessment was carried out on the basis of previously deductively derived categories, which were supplemented inductively over the course of the analysis.

The results of both surveys are presented and discussed in a condensed manner below. Due to the methodological approach, however, the only conclusions that could be made are those that refer to mass media constructs of social scientific roles and are thus largely determined by journalistic norms, selection, and working criteria (Hagen, 1992; Kepplinger, 2011).

Results

Development of Media Coverage

The progress of media coverage on PEGIDA clearly shows that the movement was picked up by the media only hesitantly—and mainly in Dresden as the starting point of the protests—but increased significantly as more people attended the demonstrations. Numerically, the most extensive coverage can be found in taz (N = 151), followed by Sächsische Zeitung (N = 129), FAZ (N = 105), Welt (N = 92), and SZ (N = 76). It can clearly be seen that the coverage rises particularly when there is an event and then decreases afterward. Key events that led to an increase in media attention included the founding of PEGIDA on December 19, 2014, the large demonstration in Dresden with 25,000 participants on January 12, 2015, and the Germany-wide counterdemonstrations attended by more than 100,000 participants. The appearance of PEGIDA board member Kathrin Oertel on the popular political talk show Günter Jauch also attracted much attention. The coverage then decreased relatively continuously and analogously to the dwindling number of participants at protests, caused in part by the criminal investigation of PEGIDA founder Lutz Bachmann, the resignation of several board members, and the split of the movement (Geiges et al., 2015). Figure 1 shows the course of the media coverage.

Figure 1.

Numbers of articles in analyzed print media referring to the PEGIDA movement.

Presence of Social Scientists in the Media Coverage

An analysis of the media coverage with respect to the actors presented shows that social scientists were named or quoted in 9.7% of all articles and therefore a total of 54 articles (n = 554); the 54 articles featured a total of 79 individual references to social science actors. Overall, social scientists were less present in the media coverage than other societal actors. Actors from the PEGDA movement (67.6% of all articles, n = 554), political actors (57.4%), civil society members (46.4%), media representatives (18.1%), police/justice officers (16.2%), and representatives of churches/religious communities (12.3%) were far more likely to be visible; only economic actors were less present (2.3%).

An intermedia comparison shows that social scientists were on average implicated slightly more often by taz (11.9% of all articles, n = 151) and FAZ (10.4%, n = 105). They were less present in Sächsische Zeitung (9.3%, n = 129), SZ (9.2%, n = 76), and Welt (4.6%, n = 92). The chronological course of the media coverage referring to social scientists followed the overall course of reporting, with more than three-quarters of the relevant articles having been published between January 5, 2015, and February 8, 2015. The articles referring to social science actors were mainly found in the politics (33.3%, n = 54) and regional (24.1%) sections; this latter figure can be explained by the coverage in Sächsische Zeitung, where PEGIDA primarily represents a regional event. Isolated reports can also be found in other media, such as when nationwide counterdemonstrations are reported. Furthermore, topic-oriented and fact-based news and reports (64.8%, n = 54) dominated over opinion formats such as commentaries, interviews, and guest contributions (22.2%).

References were made to a total of 40 different social scientists in the articles analyzed, in which some individual actors were particularly visible. These mainly included those scientists who published studies over the course of the PEGIDA protests and therefore attracted greater media interest. One such scientist is Hans Vorländer, professor of political science at the Dresden University of Technology (TU Dresden), who presented an initial study on PEGIDA at a press conference on January 14, 2015, which was later criticized on the basis of methodological shortcomings (Vorländer, Herold, & Schäller, 2015). Vorländer was named in six articles. A second study was presented to the media on January 19, 2015, by sociologist Dieter Rucht from the Berlin Social Science Center, in collaboration with others including political scientist Piotr Kocyba from the Chemnitz University of Technology (TU Chemnitz) (Daphi et al., 2015). Both scientists were referred to in nine articles. Political scientist Werner Patzelt (also from TU Dresden) was particularly visible, both in connection to his study published on February 3, 2015, and also due to his already high media profile over the course of January 2015. Citations and statements from Patzelt were found in 18 of the 54 articles. Other scientists (all of whom belong to the board of the Council for Migration, a scientific advisory body to the German government, with around 60 scientists), including Werner Schiffauer, an anthropologist at the University of Frankfurt/Oder; Andreas Zick, a sociologist at Bielefeld University; and Naika Foroutan, a social scientist at Humboldt University in Berlin, were represented a total of six times. Two articles are attributable to Hans-Thomas Tillschneider, a scholar in Islamic Studies (University of Bayreuth).

Media Roles of Social Scientists

Based on the ideal-type differentiation of expert and intellectual roles, the analysis of the roles assigned in the media coverage measures the media presentation of social scientists. Of particular interest is the degree to which scientific research is explicitly referenced in connection with the social scientists in the articles analyzed or referred to in their statements. Furthermore, the analysis ascertained the extent to which the assessments referred to scientific research or were made without an obvious reference to scientific research in the media coverage. As part of the analysis of the media coverage, a link between social scientists and scientific studies was seen as an indication of the stronger positioning of the expert role, whereas a reference to general assessments of the PEGIDA movement and the political situation by the scientific actors indicated a more intellectual role.

Social Scientists in the Role of Experts

Overall, it appears that references to scientific studies exist in only one-third of the articles that refer to scientific actors (N = 17, n = 54). This indicates that social scientists tend not to be presented as objective experts in the context of the media coverage on PEGIDA. The aforementioned studies on the PEGIDA movement were addressed in only 10 articles. Nevertheless, this role type is visible in the course of the presentation of available empirical results on the social events in the context of PEGIDA.

The non-representative study found that around one-third of the protesters are right-wing nationalist xenophobes. But the majority are concerned and outraged citizens. (Welt, February 4, 2015; own translation)

The group cautioned against generalizing statements on their study as these are by no means representative. [. . .] The group explicitly broke away from the view of other social scientists that “normal” citizens were out on Dresden’s streets with PEGIDA. Approval of the extreme right-wing positions is conspicuously high, although the respondents clearly belong to the moderate part of PEGIDA. (FAZ, January 20, 2015; own translation)

Overall, references to the quality of the studies were rarely given. All three studies showed only nonrepresentative results due to methodological problems and limited access to the field. The knowledge gained from the scientists—and their expert status—was therefore limited. However, this is only mentioned in passing in the media coverage, as the aforementioned examples on the studies of Patzelt (2015) and Daphi and colleagues (2015) demonstrate.

Even an explicit assessment of the social scientists in terms of their expert status in the case of PEGIDA is done at best in individual cases. But, there are some examples in the media reporting in which the assessment of expert status is delegated to other social scientists and thus allows insight into the scholarly discourse and conflicts.

A week ago, the Technical University of Dresden published a study on PEGIDA protesters whose relevance for the protest researchers in Berlin is, however, doubtful. (Welt, January 25, 2015; own translation)

Moreover, conflicts over how social scientists are perceived in the expert role were visible when the assessments of the social scientists allegedly went beyond their (objective) knowledge. This was a criticism made against the political scientist Patzelt and his public statements on the PEGIDA movement:

The political scientist from Dresden endeavors to be an expert and speak to the conscience of politicians [. . .] But the professor does not always [. . .] draw strict boundaries between objectifying science and subjective positioning. (taz, January 13, 2015; own translation)

The media role of the social scientist visible here is one that is constituted between that of the objective expert and the public intellectual.

Social Scientists in the Role of Public Intellectuals

In principle, it is evident that social scientists are brought into media coverage more frequently in connection with general assessments and commentaries and are therefore presented primarily in the role of the intellectual. Corresponding statements can be found in more than one-half (55.6%, n = 54) of all articles with respect to social science actors. As a rule, there are no explicit references to scientific research in these articles. However, differences can be seen in the quality of the commentaries, which in turn indicate different media constructions of the intellectual role.

To begin with, the social science actors with overall scores, diagnoses, and prognoses on PEGIDA are presented. The analysis of PEGIDA by the chairman of the Council for Migration, the anthropologist Werner Schiffauer, is quoted as follows:

[T]he fact that so many people understand the angry Saxon citizens shows a deep rift in society with respect to immigration, said Schiffauer. (taz, January 6, 2015; own translation)

Comparably, political scientist Werner Patzelt is cited with his assessment of the movement’s foundations:

It is clear that PEGIDA has referred to a representation gap, as the Dresden political scientist Werner Patzelt terms it: Some of the citizens, especially in Saxony, do not feel represented by the established parties and the media. (taz, January 30, 2015; own translation)

Other scholars are cited in connection with the effects that PEGIDA might have for Dresden and are cited as stating that the right-wing movement could impair the image of the city:

The demonstrations of the asylum-critical alliance PEGIDA threaten to damage Dresden. According to Frank Roselieb, Managing Director of the Institute for Crisis Research at the University of Kiel, “the PEGIDA marches are bad for the image of Dresden, at least if it looks as if this is the prevailing opinion in the city” [. . .] “PEGIDA strengthens an image that is economically damaging to the city,” says Wolfgang Donsbach, communications scientist at the Dresden University of Technology. (Sächsische Zeitung, December 4, 2014)

The sociologist Dieter Rucht forecast the further development of the movement, stating that PEGIDA had “crossed the zenith. The inflow would go back.” However, that should not soothe anyone, his colleague Kocyba is cited as saying, since “The people disappear just as little as their belief in the ideology does” (Sächsische Zeitung, January 20, 2015; own translation).

These assessments point to another characteristic of the intellectual role according to which social scientists are presented: Numerous articles were found in which the quoted comments explicitly referred to political action while putting forward political recommendations. For example, the political scientists Vorländer and Patzelt are cited as appealing to politicians to respond to demands for greater participation and to engage in a discussion with the demonstrators:

Vorländer recommended a response to the demands for more referendums because the protesting citizens would then be enlisted in sharing responsibility, as is the case in Switzerland. (taz, January 15, 2015; own translation)

Patzelt recommended to policy makers to enter into an objective, public debate on immigration and integration with the moderate faction of the demonstrators. (FAZ, February 4, 2015; own translation)

Social scientists are no longer depicted in the role of the independent intellectual in this context but rather as political persons. This role type, which is assessed quite critically within media reporting, is characterized by social scientists pursuing their own interests and using public recognition to exert influence on the discourse according to their own political and personal objectives. In the media coverage on PEGIDA, the Dresden-based political scientist Werner Patzelt in particular came into the spotlight. As the media assumed that he sympathized with the movement, he was named a PEGIDA apologist (PEGIDA-Versteher, taz, January 30, 2015) and therefore the role of a politicized intellectual following his own strategic interests was attributed to him:

Patzelt [. . .] belongs [. . .] to the intellectuals who have an irritatingly nuanced and empathetic perspective on large numbers of their fellow Dresden citizens who are demonstrating under the PEGIDA flag. [. . .] You can now suspect that the professor somewhat inflates PEGIDA, regards it positively, or uses it for his own purposes. (taz, January 24, 2015; own translation)

The Islamic studies scholar Thomas Tillschneider is presented in a similar light. He had expressed public sympathy for PEGIDA and was thus depicted by the media in this context as being for the most part a political person:

One of the board members of the student parliament is outraged that a teacher from his university provides PEGIDA allies “seemingly objective” arguments for the alleged veracity of their positions. He is convinced that xenophobia will spread here under the guise of scientific argumentation. (SZ, January 15, 2015; own translation)

A further variation of the intellectual role, which is particularly visible in the context of media criticism, is evident when the social scientist is denied the competence and prerogative of interpretation to assess and comment on the PEGIDA movement and is presented in the role of the pseudo-intellectual. As an example, the statements of the philosopher Byung-Chul Han are dismissed in clear terms as pseudo-scientific, an indication that his intellectual role is not entirely accepted:

Or swing jingling speeches like the philosopher Byung-Chul Han, who said the real problem with PEGIDA was not xenophobia [. . .] What you think you might find “underneath” in a psychoanalytical manner should not be allowed to lead to a depoliticization. (FAZ, December 18, 2014)

Conclusion and Outlook: Roles of Social Scientists in the PEGIDA Discourse

With the emergence of populist radical right movements in most parts of the Western world, calls have grown louder for scientists to stand up to populism and contribute to the public debate (Macri, 2017; Stehr & Ruser, 2016). This study focused on the appearance of social scientists in crisis media reporting, their ascribed roles in media reporting, and the evaluation of these roles. Results of the content analysis for the case of the German PEGIDA movement show that social scientists are visible in the media discourse, albeit to a lesser extent than other societal actors. It is also remarkable that such a small number of social science actors dominate the debate in the respective time period. By analyzing scholars’ media roles, it was shown that against the backdrop of the ideal-type bipolar differentiation of the role of objective expert and public intellectual, both role types can be found. In the media coverage on PEGIDA, social scientists were treated as experts who reported on their scientific findings and were tasked with contributing to public understanding of the phenomenon (Cassidy, 2014). But, the admittedly small media representation of social scientists in the expert role leads to at least two possible assumptions: On the one hand, a reason for the low visibility in media coverage could be that the social scientists were hardly regarded as experts in the course of journalistic workings and selection processes, probably due to the unreliable state of research. On the other hand, social scientists themselves—for the very same reasons—could have refused to act as public speakers because they did not feel proficient enough to comment on the developments. Consequently, they rarely appeared in the expert role in the media coverage. In contrast and in accordance with previous research (Albæk et al., 2003; Cassidy, 2014; Summ & Volpers, 2015), scholars were presented in the role of the intellectual much more often, as they offered assessments and interpretations of the movement, moralized, and expressed political opinions.

There are, however, variations in the role types that can be used to expand the original role typology. It appears that different social scientists who, in the case of PEGIDA, possessed only limited, case-specific empirical expertise were in a few cases presented in the role of objective experts. More often, the generalizations and commentaries in the studies presented led to an altered media perspective of the scientist, who was then—quite critically—devalued as an alleged expert at best and someone who presented his or her subjective view instead of actual objective facts. The role of the alleged expert can be positioned between the role of the objective expert and the public intellectual and is characterized by an overall critical journalistic assessment.

As outlined above, the role of the intellectual was more often attributed to scholars in the PEGIDA discourse but still not in an uncritical manner. Especially, the perception of political positioning led to criticism by some journalists. It is assumed, however, that this was especially the case when the position taken by the scholar did not reflect the political convictions of the journalists and/or the editorial line of the newspaper (Brewer & Sigelan, 2002; Hagen, 1992). Journalists might therefore have insinuated that the social scientists exploited their status in order to insert their political interests into the public sphere. Accordingly, they were less likely to be portrayed as public intellectuals oriented toward the public good and more likely to be depicted as political persons pursuing subjective interests. Particularly in the case of the political scientist Werner Patzelt, and also with regard to the professor for Islamic studies, Thomas Tillschneider, accusations of partisanship from the ranks of the scientific community became visible in the media discourse. In these cases, and also with regard to the assessment of empirical studies, journalists seemed to use other scholars’ assessments to prove their own evaluations of the social scientists’ trustworthiness (Turner, 2003). By referring to contrary opinions from academia, journalists appeared to back their own evaluations of information and knowledge that, from an epistemological point of view, they cannot fully own (Jasanoff, 2011) and thus offering insights into the fabric of academic norms and the mechanisms of the attribution of reputation (Fähnrich, Janssen Danyi, & Nothhaft, 2015).

Apart from the notion of the social scientist as a political person, there is another nuance of the intellectual role that deserves further consideration. Here, scholars are not accepted as intellectuals. Instead, they are assumed to have a lack of persuasive power and are openly criticized and denied the analytical skills to interpret the phenomenon by the journalists themselves. In these constellations, they are removed from the role of public intellectuals and are then, at best, relegated to the role of pseudo-intellectuals (Ruser, 2017).

Table 2 summarizes the findings and possible conclusions about the media roles of social scientists in the context of acute societal crises using the example of PEGIDA and offering possible starting points for further studies in the field.

Table 2.

Typology of Media Roles of Social Scientists in Acute Societal Crises Using the Example of the PEGIDA Discourse.

Media roles	Objective expert	Alleged expert	Public intellectual	Politicized intellectual	Pseudo-intellectual
Presupposition about the social scientist	Has scientific expertise	Has only limited expertise	Has the right to interpret and accept	Assessments guided by subjective interests and political positions	Lacks persuasive power, denied interpretative skills
Characteristics ascribed by media	Explains phenomena based on research results	Explains phenomena but presents subjective opinions, not objective scientific perspectives	Evaluates and interprets the movement, gives objective “advice” to politicians	Comments and appeals to politics, pursues own preferences under the guise of science	Pursues subjective interests aimed at public attention
Possible function of the social scientists’ role in the context of media coverage	Contributes to public understanding	Critical reflection of expertise	Contributes to public opinion	Critical reflection of intellectuality and credibility of social scientists and/or increasing public interest addressing subjects and creating scandals

Note. Authors’ own table. PEGIDA = Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West.

Undoubtedly, our study has several limitations. Conclusions about the role that social scientists claim for themselves or assume in the context of strategic interests (Pielke, 2007) are not possible based on the data. The same situation applies to the intentions and motives of journalists and their assessments of social science actors, as well as the perception and assessment of the roles assigned to or the potential role conflicts of the social science actors presented to the recipients. Moreover, interpretations of results can only be drawn for the concrete case of the PEGIDA movement and its societal repercussions in Germany. These, however, might offer a foundation for a more comprehensive analysis of the social scientists’ public role in societal crises.

Starting points for further research raise the question of to what extent the findings on the public roles of social scientists can prove to be true for other cases of acute societal crises, in different national contexts, and—in a broader perspective—for other fields of science. Here, different roles of scholars from different disciplines could lend more comprehensive insight into the science-media connection and the role that academia in general plays in crisis journalism.

Moreover, as already stressed, only statements about the media construction of social science actors were emphasized in this study, while both the motives and assessments of the journalists as well as the actors presented could not be portrayed. However, it is precisely at this interface that further questions arise. Based on the results of this analysis, single references to the individual role attributions of the social science actors may be derived. For example, the political scientist Patzelt is quoted as saying that he would regard himself as a “‘public intellectual’ and representative of a practical science” who would “not allow himself to be politically ‘castrated’” (Sächsische Zeitung, February 4, 2015; own translation). Based on these statements, it should be asked which role social scientists claim for themselves in the public and to what extent this self-perception conforms to the role “constructed” for them by the media. Accordingly, the question should be raised about to what extent the role types provided by the media correspond to the self-ascribed roles of the social scientists or to what extent role conflicts become apparent here. Furthermore, it is assumed that social scientists in the role of experts collide with journalistic working routines and values, such as different time horizons (long-term orientation of science versus journalistic time pressures; Klimmt & Sowka, 2013) and forms of communication (e.g., in terms of the practicality of communicating new insights; Peters et al., 2008). When they assume the role of the intellectual, the conflicts between the norms of the scientific system and the role expectations of the public are particularly virulent:

Researchers must contend with these parameters and make choices about how to address topics of interest to them while also meeting the requirements of their profession. Scholars approaching their work as public intellectuals face the challenge of having to straddle these two sets of ethics. (Gattone, 2012, p. 175)

Finally, this leads to questions of reception and effects and opens up a perspective on the authority and legitimacy of social science experts attributed by the respective audiences (Turner, 2003).

Looking back to the starting point of this article, we find ourselves in turbulent times, where scholarly explanation and assessment are in high demand. However, this analysis showed that scholarly expertise is not always sufficient to address societal crises, and the role of the public intellectual might fall victim to political interests and personal agendas. Given the high degree of trustworthiness that is attributed to science (Bauer, 2015) and public expectations that (social) science should contribute to overcoming problems in society (Stehr & Ruser, 2016), “science journalists have been subjected to a long-standing criticism for being more cheerleaders than critics of science. Even so, there are examples of journalists who illustrate in detail what this role might look like in practice” (Trench, Fahy, Irwin, & Riedlinger, 2016, p. 2). Ultimately, it seems that both media and academia will need to better prepare to function not only as public crisis mediators but also as science critics to meet their responsibilities in societal crises.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

Birte Fähnrich, PhD, is a postdoctoral fellow at the Chair for Political Communication, Faculty of Communication and Cultural Studies at Zeppelin University (Friedrichshafen, Germany). Earlier, she was interim professor for Organizational Communication at the University of Greifswald. She holds a PhD from Leipzig University. Her research interests include science communication, political communication, and strategic communication.

Corinna Lüthje, PhD, is project leader of the project “Mediatized science communication in traditional and post normal fields of research,” which is funded by the German Research Council, at the Institute for Media Research at Rostock University. Before, she was interim professor (Chair Structures of Public Communication) at the Technical University of Dresden and worked as a postdoctoral fellow at Hamburg University in a project on hazard communication. She holds a PhD from Hamburg University.

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