Social Media and Environmental Activism: Framing Climate Change on Facebook by Global NGOs

Abstract

Analyzing Facebook content produced by 289 global climate nonprofits from 18 countries, this study investigates these NGOs’ framing of climate change. Of the three protest frames, diagnostic was most popular. Of the three aspects of climate change, including impact, action, and efficacy, action was used most frequently, while efficacy was the least common. Messages refer to effects at the present time. NGOs from developed countries are more likely than those from developing nations to discuss climate actions. Climate impacts are more likely to appear in these NGOs’ persuasive messages than efficacy. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Keywords

climate change framing Facebook content analysis strategic communication activism

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been in the forefront of the battle against climate change since the late 1980s and early 1990s when this environmental phenomenon became a public affairs issue (Doyle, 2009). NGOs play an influential role in climate politics, especially at the global level, where they work cross-nationally to mobilize different countries to cooperate for tackling climate change (Corell & Betsill, 2001; Doyle, 2009). With regard specifically to communicating climate change, NGOs have acted as mediators between scientific expertise and the public (Ladle et al., 2005). Additionally, they have used different public relations tactics to gain news coverage and get public attention to the issue according to their particular perspectives (Schäfer, 2012).

Advancements in digital technologies have offered organizations, especially NGOs, cost-effective communication tools to reach a wide range of audiences (Korda & Itani, 2013; Segerberg & Bennett, 2011). Besides, the number of social media users worldwide is growing rapidly. As such, NGOs have increasingly adopted various types of digital platforms to communicate directly to different audience groups (Auger, 2013).

Past research in the area of climate change communication has focused exclusively on NGOs’ adoption and use of these platforms for their advocacy work (Takahashi et al., 2015), how these organizations connect and interact on social media (Vu et al., 2020), or their use of social media to mobilize supports at particular events such as the United Nations’ conferences (Lück et al., 2018; Segerberg & Bennett, 2011). Less well understood is how they construct their social media messages to communicate climate change on a regular basis.

This study investigates how global climate NGOs frame their strategic messages on Facebook, the most widely used social networking site, to motivate and engage audiences. Specifically, it assesses various aspects of messages including climate change impact, action, and efficacy as well as temporality and spatiality of climate impact. Prior research has found extensive evidence of how these aspects of climate change messages can influence members of the public (Doherty & Webler, 2016; Hart & Feldman, 2016; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Little is known about whether they are incorporated in the messages created by NGOs for advocacy purposes. Addressing this lack of academic attention to social media content produced by global climate NGOs is the aim of this research.

Framing is used as a theoretical framework for this study. Specifically, the study integrates framing process approaches (Chong & Druckman, 2007, 2011) with the use of the three macro protest frames conceptualized by Benford and Snow (2000) in studying Facebook messages by global climate NGOs. In doing so, this study contributes to the literature of framing in strategic communication and activism. Practically, it provides a deeper understanding of different message strategies these organizations are using for climate advocacy.

NGOs’ Climate Change Communication and Social Media

As a scientific issue, climate change has usually been perceived as abstract, complex, and distant. Many of its impacts such as changes in the ecological system and sea level rise, among others, have either been poorly defined or lack of day-to-day relevance (Scannell & Gifford, 2013). Scientists, who have strong authority over this issue, do not package their findings well for the many lay audience to understand (Howarth & Morse-Jones, 2019). Additionally, despite an overwhelming scientific consensus on its causes and impacts, climate change has been the target of organized denial machines which have launched well-funded campaigns to manufacture uncertainty about this global environmental phenomenon. These denial machines consist of fossil-fuel businesses, conservative think tanks, contrarian scientists, and politicians (Dunlap & McCright, 2011). Another problem with climate change communication is that the news media, which are bounded by the balance norm, have contributed to the discourse about the uncertainty of climate change as an issue scientists have not agreed upon (Moser, 2010).

NGOs have played an important role in bridging the gap in climate change communication between scientists and other actors including the news media, policy makers, and the public. They help translate information on climate change from the scientific research domain into the language and timescales relevant to policy making and behavioral changes (McNaught et al., 2014). In countries around the world, NGOs have assisted in the promotion of climate change awareness, augmenting lapses of media coverage on the topic and bolstering action in the face of governmental inaction (Laestadius et al., 2013). These methods include sophisticated inside practices such as directly lobbying governmental entities and actors, and outside practices such as specially crafted outreach campaigns, the distribution of educational materials, and complex social media messaging that foster public sentiment toward fighting climate change (Laestadius et al., 2013). NGOs have also organized citizen science groups and projects to foster public engagement with climate change (Groulx et al., 2017).

In China, NGOs work to situate the impacts of climate change within a larger national discourse, moving the threat of climate change as solely as externalized to one that will affect all Chinese (Liu & Zhao, 2017). In Africa, NGOs have tailored climate change messaging to reflect the realities of increased agricultural hardships and social vulnerabilities stemming from a warming planet, working to educate its populace on strategies for adaptation to climate change effects (Ford et al., 2015). In Afghanistan, Bhutan, Kiribati, Nepal, and Tuvalu, NGOs take on many roles, operating as knowledge brokers for building climate change awareness, providing adaptive strategies, and operating as information repositories that bolster scientific scholarship (McGregor et al., 2018). The communication capabilities of NGOs may, in many cases, rival or exceed the abilities of their local or national governments, weaving together strong media practices and framing expertise for successful message distribution (Wozniak et al., 2015).

Climate change is a contested area that is characterized by competitions among industry, scientists, NGOs, and policy makers, with each aiming “to frame the issue according to their particular agenda” (Koteyko et al., 2015, p. 149). As those stakeholders increasingly turn to social media to disseminate information and raise support (Schäfer, 2012), there have been new opportunities and challenges for communication researchers in exploring online dynamics of climate change–related debates (Koteyko et al., 2015). Most previous studies examining online communication on climate change focus on Twitter (e.g., Anderson & Huntington, 2017; Holmberg & Hellsten, 2015; Veltri & Atanasova, 2017), and thus more study is needed to explore patterns of climate change communication on other platforms.

Framing in Climate Change Communication

Framing has been widely used as a framework to understand how actors highlight certain aspects of a topic and how such a portrayal affects audiences’ perceptions of the topic (Chong & Druckman, 2007, 2011; Entman, 1993; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). A frame in communication “organizes everyday reality” and “is part and parcel of everyday reality” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 193). In terms of frame building processes, scholars focused on how strategic actors emphasize a certain set of “considerations” to persuade audiences (Chong & Druckman, 2007, 2011; Entman, 1993; Levin et al., 1998). For example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) argued that a frame is a main organizing principle for making sense of events through emphasizing or deemphasizing certain information. According to Entman (1993), to frame is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52).

Previous studies on framing approaches to collective actions offer helpful guidance (e.g., Fitzgerald, 2009; Lau, 2019; Snow & Benford, 1988). In particular, Snow and Benford’s (1988, 1992, see also Benford & Snow, 2000) research on framing processes and social movements provides specific categories for analyzing movement frames. Snow and Benford argued that movement organizers use framing to interpret events or conditions in ways “that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (1988, p. 198). They proposed three core categories of frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational based on the how they might be used to promote collective actions. A diagnostic frame is intended as a “a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration” (p. 199). For example, in the climate change movement context, a diagnostic frame might highlight how carbon pollution from transportation affects everyday quality of life. The prognostic frame emphasizes “a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199). This frame foregrounds strategies for addressing a problem. Finally, the motivational frame accentuates “a call to arms” and is used to encourage people to participate in a collective action (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 199).

Recent studies applied the aforementioned frames in analyzing collective actions or government strategies concerning climate change–related issues. For example, Wahlström et al.’s (2013) study examined similarities and differences within the climate movement by analyzing framing used by participants in climate demonstrations. Their study found that climate activists use “global justice” or “system change” in their prognostic framing (Wahlström et al., 2013, p. 117). Grotenbreg and van Buuren (2017) used the movement framework in examining governments’ facilitation strategy for sustainable energy innovations. Analyzing government policy documents, the scholars concluded that the use of diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational frames depended largely on policy goals. Framing can be influenced by numerous factors that constitute the larger context in which the communicator and receiver rely on to encode and decode the meaning of the message. Vu et al. (2019), identified several nationally macro factors (e.g., economic development, government effectiveness, press freedom, climate severity) that influence how climate change is framed in the news. Of the factors, economic development has the strongest effect on news framing of climate change. In NGOs’ framing of strategic messages on climate change, taking into account contextual factors is even more important as one of their primary purposes is to mobilize the audience through developing local resonance (Han, 2014). Thus, this study asks about the use of the social movement frames by NGOs and whether levels of economic development in each of the countries would influence the way these frames were used:

Research Question 1: What are the differences in protest frames use in NGOs’ Facebook messages on climate change? What are the differences in frame use on Facebook between climate change NGOs from developed and developing countries?

As Snow and Benford (1988) pointed out, social movement organizers use their strategic messages to frame or “assign meaning to and interpret relevant events in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists” (p. 198). Framing involves linking the movement’s interpretive orientations with individual interests, values, and beliefs. Snow and Benford (1988) referred to such a linking process as frame alignment in which social movement organizers identify what information would resonate most with their target audience. For a complex scientific issue like climate change, this process is particularly important. Recent research studies have found that how a message on climate change is framed can exert significant effects on audience support for policies (Bolsen et al., 2019) or motivate people to take actions (Bain et al., 2016).

Research in framing has discovered an emphasis on several aspects of climate change including impacts, actions, and efficacy in messages about this global phenomenon. This is in line with Chong and Druckman’s (2007, 2011) argument that to persuade audiences strategic actors focus on a certain set of considerations. First of all, highlighting impacts or consequences of climate change such as severe weather conditions, drought, or deforestation and others (Johnson, 2012) is one of those (Hart & Feldman, 2014). However, studies have found mixed results about the effectiveness of this message element. For example, O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) documented audience disengagement with climate change after being shown the images of its impacts (e.g., flooded suburban house, forest fire, and a polar bear jumping across gaps in ice). Using the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992), Chen (2016) reported stronger effects of a lower dose of fear appeals rather than higher one in climate change messages on participants’ motivation to take actions. Bilandzic et al. (2017) found that gain-negative frames (e.g., “If we act resolutely against climate change, the sea level will not rise. Small island states will not be threatened by shoreline erosion and coastal floating”) exert the strongest influence on participants. As such, scholars have advised to be cautious in using fear appeals in climate change communication because they can be effective under specific conditions but can also easily backfire (Stern, 2012). While previous research has explored the presence of impacts of climate change in news content (Hart & Feldman, 2014; Smith, & Joffe, 2009), to our knowledge none has been done on social media strategic messages by NGOs. Thus, this study asks,

Research Question 2a: To what extent do global climate NGOs discuss impacts, actions, and efficacy of climate change? What are the differences in the discussion of climate change impacts between NGOs from developed and developing countries?

Communicating climate change effects is important for the public to understand and eventually take actions to mitigate the impacts of this environmental phenomenon. Psychological distance aspects such as perceiving climate change as a geographically distant phenomenon or something that happens in future times, have repeatedly been cited as a barrier to engaging the public with climate change (Brügger et al., 2016). This argument is built on the construal-level theory, which concerns with how distance affects people’s perception, decisions, and behaviors (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Extant research has documented mixed findings. For example, Chu and Yang (2018) found significant effects of spatial distance on participants’ policy support. Specifically, participants who watched a video about climate change in the Unted States were more likely than those who watched a similar video about other countries in Asia to support policies that regulate “carbon dioxide as a pollutant” and provide “tax rebates to people who purchase energy-efficient vehicles.” Haden et al. (2012) reported that presenting climate change effects as local issues motivated farmers to adopt mitigation measures. While extensive research has found evidence supporting the psychological distance hypothesis, results from others have recorded no significant effects of it on audiences (Schuldt et al., 2018), indicating a need for further testing (Brügger, 2020). Drawing from the construal level theory’s argument, this research asks about the presence of two psychological distance aspects in strategic messages by global climate NGOs:

Research Question 2b: How do climate NGOs use temporality and spatiality aspects of climate change impacts in their Facebook messages? What are the differences the use of temporality and spatiality in discussing climate change impacts between NGOs from developed and developing countries?

Strategic communication on climate change has centered on what message elements could elicit audience actions. This is a vast field of interdisciplinary research with scholars taking approaches from multiple disciplines such as psychology, sociology, environment studies, or social movement. For example, Stern et al. (1999) offered a useful framework to understand climate actions. The framework includes value, belief, and norm as drivers of the public’s support for fighting climate change.

Besides framing climate vulnerability, scholars have suggested the incorporation of specific solutions as well as adaptation and mitigation actions into the framing of climate change to engage the public and increase the materialization of its support (Corner et al., 2015; Moser & Dilling, 2004; NESTA, 2008). Although scholars and activist organizations have recommended one of the more effective strategies in climate change communication for stronger engagement is to clearly state the course of action (Morton et al., 2011; NESTA, 2008; Scannell & Gifford, 2013), only a limited amount of research has examined climate actions in strategic messages. There have been, however, a few studies that examines the presence of climate actions in news content. For example, Hart and Feldman’s (2014) analysis of U.S. network news stories showed that climate change actions are framed primarily in terms of political conflict. Stories emphasize political disputes over whether and how climate change should be addressed and power battles between nations, groups, or individuals. Climate communication messages help identify actors, including governmental agencies, researchers, citizens, NGOs, international organizations, and businesses that are involved in combating this environmental phenomenon (Nerlich et al., 2010). Previous research on linguistic aspects of climate change in Zimbabwe showed the importance of collaborations between the government, news media, and local and international NGOs in educating local communities on climate actions (Makwanya, 2013). Thus, this study inquires,

Research Question 3: To what extent do climate change NGOs discuss actions to fight climate change? Who are the actors to take actions? What are the differences in the discussions of climate actions and actors between NGOs from developed and developing countries?

Efficacy refers to individuals’ perception that a problem can be addressed and that they are able to participate in actions needed to solve the problem (Hart & Feldman, 2016). This concept has its root in several frameworks in behavioral research including Witte’s (1992) expanded parallel process model and social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1989). A substantial body of research has examined how efficacy, as a framing device, can cognitively influence audiences in taking up actions on climate change. For example, Bostrom et al. (2019) recorded both direct and indirect positive relationships between participants’ stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self-efficacy beliefs and their support for reducing the risks of climate change. Feldman and Hart (2016) found that messages emphasizing the internal, external, or response efficacy of political actions to address climate change exert greater influence on participants’ hope and fear. Additionally, exposure to efficacy information indirectly boosts participation via hope. Other researchers have taken a similar approach: exploring the effects of framing climate change in light of the gain/loss, with many finding that gain frames to be more effective than loss frames (Morton et al., 2011; Nabi et al., 2018; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). Messages of hopelessness, depression, apathy (Bieniek-Tobasco et al. 2019), and fearfulness (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009) are associated with lower levels of efficacy to act on climate change. Witte and Allen (2000) found that strong fear appeals with high-efficacy messages result in more significant behavior change than strong appeals with low-efficacy messages. Acknowledging the importance of efficacy in climate change communication, this study asks,

Research Question 4: To what extent do climate change NGOs discuss efficacy of fighting against climate change in their Facebook messages? What is the use of different types of efficacy (i.e. positive/negative individual self-efficacy and positive/negative institutional self-efficacy)?

Although prior research has found extensive evidence of the effects of the three elements (i.e., impacts, actions, and efficacy) in the strategic framing of climate change, research that explores the presence of these three elements in strategic climate messages is scarce. A few studies have assessed efficacy in news media content (Bolsen & Shapiro, 2018; Hart & Feldman, 2014; Stoddart et al., 2017) or in UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) documents (Vanhala & Hestbaek, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, none has examined the strategic messages on climate change produced by global NGOs, who are playing an important role in raising awareness of and mobilizing the public to take actions on climate change. Given the fact that the three message elements in focus here have been found to influence the audience differently (Hart & Feldman, 2016), an assessment of whether or not global NGOs, as strategic communicators of climate change, are adopting strategies suggested by extensive research in the field of climate change communication is necessary. This study asks about the utilization of these elements in NGOs’ social media messages:

Research Question 5: What are the differences in global climate NGOs’ discussions of climate change impacts, actions, and efficacy in their Facebook messages?

Protest framing (Benford & Snow, 2000), to a great extent, looks at the overall, dominant frame in each of the messages. From the message construction perspective, a question still exists on how the three framing devices including impacts, actions, and efficacy have been used in constructing messages for strategic purposes. Thus, this study asks:

Research Question 6: What is the use of the three aspects: climate change impact, action, and efficacy in the construction of protest frames in NGOs’ Facebook messages?

Method

This study used content analysis of Facebook posts by global climate NGOs to understand how these organizations strategically communicate climate change using the most popular social media platform. There were several steps in our selection process. First, these organizations were members of the Climate Action Network (CAN), “a network of NGOs working on climate change from around the world” (CAN, 2019, p. 2). As of early 2018, 1,100 global climate NGOs had been listed as members of this alliance. Although it does not include all climate NGOs around the world, it is by far the most complete list of these organizations. Two graduate students looked for and verified these organizations’ Facebook accounts. Second, only organizations based in countries where English was an official language were selected. After these steps, the sample was left with 289 climate NGOs from 18 countries.

Data were downloaded in March 2018 using Facebook API. The timeframe was one full year starting from March 16, 2017 to March 15, 2018. A random sample of 4,350 posts was drawn from a total of 19,890 posts that contained either “climate,” “climate change,” “global warming,” or “greenhouse gases.” After discarding posts that were duplicates—mostly those that were shared or reposted and that were links with only a few words, the final sample included 3,979 posts.

Content Analysis

A codebook was developed with 25 items including those on protest frames, impact, action, and efficacy mentions, temporality and spatiality aspects of impacts as well as which group of actors should take actions. Some of the items were adapted from Hart and Feldman (2014). Four coders including a faculty member and three graduate students in mass communication participated in the coding. First, after a training session, the faculty member, who was the lead coder, coded 450 randomly selected posts. Those 450 posts were divided equally between three graduate students. The first round of coding did not achieve satisfactory intercoder reliability. Results from kappa’s tests showed only 56% of the coding decisions reached the acceptable threshold of 0.75 or higher. The second training round was held for reconciling. Another 450 posts were randomly selected for coding. Test results indicated acceptable intercoder reliability with Cohen’s kappa coefficients ranging between 0.75 and 1 (see Supplemental Appendix 1). The average score was 0.79 (Lombard et al., 2006). The rests of the posts, including the 450 posts that did not see satisfactory intercoder reliability, were divided between the four coders.

Measures

Protest frame categorization was adopted from Benford and Snow (2000). There were three master frames including diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational as well as an option for other. We coded only for the dominant frame in each of the posts.

Impact was measured by counting how many times different types impact of climate change/global warming (e.g., heat wave, sea level rise, warming temperature, species extinction, natural disaster, etc.) were mentioned in each Facebook post.

Temporality of an impact was coded (1 = present; 0 = nonpresent) by identifying whether the impact happened in the past, happens now, or will happen in the future. There was an option for unclear.

Spatiality of an impact was coded (1 = present; 0 = nonpresent) by determining whether the impact happened locally, nationally, or globally. There was an option for unclear.

Action was measured by counting how many times different climate change mitigative or adaptive actions (e.g., limiting the use of fossil fuel/coal, using clean energy, forestation, calling congresspeople, participating in a social movement) were mentioned in each of the Facebook posts.

Actor was coded (1 = present; 0 = nonpresent for actions mentioned) by identifying whether an action mentioned in a post was attributed to any of the following groups: individuals, business, and government. The fourth option is “unclear/undetermined.”

Efficacy was measured by counting how many times a post mentioned that actions taken to mitigate/adapt to climate change were (or not) possible. Efficacy also had four subcoding items that were coded (1 = present; 0 = nonpresent) including individual positive/negative self-efficacy and institutional positive/negative efficacy. (See Figure 1 for sample coding).

Country’s development status was a binary variable including “developed” and “developing,” depending on where the NGOs were based. The categorization was adopted using data provided by the United Nations (2018) on the world’s economic situation and prospect.

Results

The sample included 3,979 Facebook posts with an average word count of 68.99 (SD = 77.5). Of the 289 organizations, 47 were from developing countries (16.3%); the rest (242, 83.7%) were from developed nations.

In answering Research Question 1, which was about social movement frame use, of the 3,979 posts, more than one third (34.6%) used diagnostic. Prognostic and motivational, each accounted for over one fourth of the messages (26.8%). About one tenth (11.8%) were undetermined. Results from Pearson’s chi-square tests revealed that there were no differences in how climate NGOs from developed and developing countries had used the diagnostic and prognostic frames. However, there was a statistically significant difference in the use of the motivational frame between the two groups with organizations from developed countries tending to use this frame more often than those from developing nations χ²(1) = 23. 38, p < .001.

In answering Research Question 2a, descriptive data showed different types of impacts of climate change were mentioned in 1,168 posts (29.4%) with a total of 2,512 mentions. The mean of climate change impact mentions was 2.15 times (SD = 2.12) when divided by the total number of posts mentioning it. When divided by the total number of posts in the whole sample including both those that mentioned impacts and those that did not, the mean was 0.66 times (SD = 1.56).

Results of an independent t test indicated there were no differences in the discussion of climate impacts between NGOs from developed (M = 0.66; SD = 1.56) and developing countries (M = 0.67; SD = 1.56), t(3,785) = −0.154, p = .88.

Regarding Research Question 2b, which ask about the temporality aspect of climate change impacts, 742 (63.5%) posts referred to impacts at the present; 112 (9.6%) discussed impacts that had happened in the past; 220 (18.8%) were about impacts that would happen in the future; The rest (8.1%) were unidentifiable. In terms of spatiality of climate change impacts, 258 (22.09%) posts referred to impacts to local communities; 289 (24.74%) focused on the national level; 282 (24.14%) mentioned impacts at the global level; while more than one-fourth were unclear about where those impacts happened. Chi-square test results indicated that there were no statistically significant differences between the use of three temporality and three spatiality aspects of climate change impacts between NGOs from developed and developing countries.

Research Question 3 focused on the mentioning of actions and whether these actions were attributed to a specific group of actors. Of the 3,979 posts, more than half (2,147 posts, 58.72%) referred to actions to fight climate change. The total number of times actions were mentioned was 4,106, with an average of 1.91 (SD = 1.71). When divided by the total number of posts in the whole sample including both those that mentioned actions and those that did not, the mean was 1.08 (SD = 1.60).

Results of an independent t test indicated NGOs from developed countries (M = 1.12; SD = 1.61) were more likely than those from developing countries (M = 0.87; SD = 1.56) to mention climate actions, t(3,788) = 3.203, p < .01.

Of the 2,147 posts, 301 (14.02%) attributed the actions mentioned to individuals’ behavioral changes; 967 (45.04%) to individuals’ political activities; 299 (13.93%) to businesses and technology innovations, and; 660 (30.74%) to governments.¹ Results from Pearson chi-square tests indicated there was a statistically significant difference between the presence of individuals’ political actions between the two groups of NGOs, χ²(1) = 36.78, p < .001. This means NGOs in developed countries are more likely than those in developing countries to say that individual political actions can help fight climate change. There were no differences between how NGOs from developed and developing countries attribute climate actions to groups of actors (e.g., individual behavioral changes, businesses, and governments).

Research Question 4 was concerned with the use of efficacy in climate NGOs’ Facebook messages. According to descriptive data, efficacy was mentioned 1,507 times in 926 posts (24.4%) (M = 1.63; SD = 1.35, when divided by the total number of posts mentioning it (559 times of positive individual efficacy; 571 times of positive institutional efficacy; 26 times of negative individual efficacy, and; 351 times of negative institutional efficacy). When divided by the total number of posts in the whole sample, including both those that mentioned efficacy and those that did not, the mean was 0.4; SD = 0.97. Results from an independent t test indicated a statistically significant difference in the use of overall efficacy between NGOs from developed (M = 0.41; SD = 1.0) and developing (M = 0.28; SD = 0.73) countries t(3,788) = 2.865, p < .01. Pearson’s chi-square test results demonstrated that climate NGOs from developed countries were more likely than those from developing nations to use negative institutional efficacy, χ²(1) = 9.45, p < .01. There were no differences between the two groups in their use of other types of efficacy.

Research Question 5 was about the differences in the use of the three climate change aspects: impacts, actions, and efficacy in NGOs’ Facebook messages. According to the results from our repeated-measure ANOVA with Greenhouse–Geisser corrections, there were significant differences in the means of the use of the three climate change aspects F(1.73, 522.37) = 271.55, p < .001. We used Greenhouse-Geiser because Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ²(2) = 100.7, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that overall, climate actions were mentioned most frequently (M difference (actions and impacts) = 0.42, p < .001; (actions and efficacy) = 0.69, p < .001). Climate change impacts was significantly more likely to be mentioned than efficacy (M difference = 0.26, p < .001).

In answering Research Question 6, which asked about the use of impacts, actions, and efficacy in the construction of the three social movement frames, results from our one-way ANOVA indicated a significant difference in the use of the three climate aspects in the three frames F(2, 316.32) = 127.35, p < .001. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections demonstrated that climate impacts were mentioned most frequently in diagnostic frame (M difference [vs. prognostic] = 0.90, p < .001; [vs. motivational] = 0.88, p < .001); climate actions appeared most often in posts that used prognostic frame (M difference [vs. diagnostic] = 1.42, p < .001; [vs. motivational] = 0.66, p < .001). Efficacy were most likely to be mentioned in prognostic than in the other two frames (M difference [vs. diagnostic] = 0.36, p < .001; [vs. motivational] = 0.32, p < .001).

Discussion

This study examined the use of social movement frames on Facebook content created by global climate NGOs from 18 countries. Understanding how climate change is framed in strategic messages is important as previous research indicated that message framing can influence climate change perception, engagement, and behavioral intention (Gifford & Comeau, 2011; Morton et al., 2011). Findings of this study showed that, overall, climate NGOs preferred the diagnostic frame. This means their climate change messages still focused primarily on identifying “problems” with climate change. Because climate change is a complex scientific issue, there is, indeed, a great need to help the public gain more knowledge of it (Coulter & Coudrain, 2018). On the other hand, such a focus, albeit being important, reflects a sad fact that more than 30 years since climate change became a salient issue in public discussions, and its effects have already been felt in various aspects of life (Hristov et al., 2018; Paquette et al., 2018), communication campaigns to mobilize people to fight this phenomenon still need to devote a large amount of work to providing information on what “problems” are associated with climate change.

This research also investigated the incorporation of three important aspects of climate change (impacts, actions, and efficacy) in strategic messages global climate NGOs sent through Facebook. It found that overall, the NGOs in the sample discussed climate actions most often. The second was climate impacts. Efficacy was least mentioned in their messages. Among those in the sample of this study, NGOs from developed countries tended to discuss actions more than those from developing countries. This could result in several scenarios: information on climate change is still insufficient because of the lack of interests (Vu et al., 2019), and the scarcity of resources prevents governments and people from these countries from taking actions. This aspect of climate change communication by NGOs from developing countries in this study, therefore, was less salient than it was in messages sent by the developed nations in the sample. The fact that these NGOs preferred discussing impacts of climate change is indicative of a disconnect between strategic framing research on climate change and professional practices of these climate change communicators. While recent studies found that messages with fear appeals are not as effective as those that cultivate senses of hope in motivating the public to take actions, climate NGOs in focus here continue to utilize this aspect of climate change in their strategic messages.

Within the sample of this study, climate NGOs from developed countries were also more likely than those from developing nations to attribute the responsibilities for participating in political activities to members. This is understandable as economic development has long been considered a prerequisite of a democracy, where people are encouraged to participate in the political process and express their views on policies (Diamond, 1992). Mobilizing the public to pressure governments to take actions on climate change may have larger impacts on the fight against this environmental problem.

Additionally, the focus on climate actions instead of impacts in the strategic messages analyzed in this study shows a tendency to point to solutions in the communication content by these global NGOs rather than mongering fears about climate change, which, according to previous research in this area, does not seem to work (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). However, it is noteworthy that although all three aspects are critical in strategically communicating climate change, past research indicated that efficacy or hope appeals are important drivers in motivating people to take actions on climate change (Chadwick, 2015; Ojala, 2012). Increasing the use of efficacy in strategic messages may help foster actions and engagement with the campaigns these global climate NGOs are orchestrating.

Findings of this research also suggest that when discussing climate change impacts, global climate NGOs focus more on what is happening rather than what has already happened in the past or will happen in the future. This shows that conveying the urgency of climate change has been well incorporated in the strategic messages these organizations communicate to their audiences. As indicated in the literature on climate change communication (Moser & Dilling, 2004; Nisbet, 2009), emphasis on the urgency of this environmental phenomenon helped engage and encourage members of the public or policy makers to act.

Another finding from this research is that NGOs strategic messages focus primarily on the global and national levels. A possible explanation is that these are global organizations that operate nationally or globally. However, extant research reveals that proximity can trigger actions when people feel the issue is personally relevant to them (Scannell & Gifford, 2013; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). Thus, localizing information on climate change may be helpful in motivating the public.

This study also found that impacts were mentioned most often in messages with diagnostic frames; actions appeared most frequently in those with prognostic frames. This is logically sound as a diagnostic frame is concerned with problem identification while prognostic is about suggesting solutions. Surprisingly, efficacy was used most in prognostic instead of motivational. This indicates a minus point in how the global climate NGOs, in this sample, constructed their motivational messages. Functionally, the inclusion of efficacy may help instill some sense of possibility and hope, which is helpful in motivating audiences to act.

Conclusion

This research makes several theoretical and practical contributions to the literature on strategic communication about climate change. Most of all, it is the first that systematically analyze social media content by global climate NGOs to provide insights into how these organizations construct their strategic messages about climate change on Facebook. According to Segerberg and Bennett (2011), NGOs’ roles were brokers or enablers in the wider network structure of collective action. How they convey information about climate change, therefore, has important implications on the public’s understanding, support, and participation in climate actions.

Past research has paid much attention to how climate change is communicated in the news (Schäfer & Schlichting, 2014; Vu et al., 2019). This study is among a limited number of scholarly projects that investigate climate communication by global NGOs (Vu et al., 2020). Climate change is a global phenomenon with effects that transcend national boundaries (Long, 2008). International consensus on various aspects of this phenomenon, from whether it exists, to who is causing it, to who should be responsible for it, or how to fight it, has not been reached. Global NGOs are playing an important role in mobilizing countries and people to take actions (Betsill, 2002; Corell & Betsill, 2001; Doyle, 2009). Findings of this study, therefore, enriches the literature on climate change communication with a focus on strategic communication on the global level.

This study contributes to the literature of framing in that it analyzes the social movement frames by Benford and Snow (2000) and Chong and Druckman’s (2007, 2011) view, which focuses on the process of highlighting subsets of framing elements. Using climate change as a test case, findings of this research suggest that operationalizing diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames when studying climate change communication could be completed by looking at the three important aspects of this issue, including impacts, actions, and efficacy.

Future research should build on the limitations of this study. First, including more global NGOs who communicate climate change in other languages would provide a more complete picture of how strategic messages produced by these organizations are constructed. Doing so would help avoid a skewed sample. It could also provide more insights on climate change messages by NGOs from other countries instead of focusing only on those from English speaking nations. Second, future studies should consider analyzing how NGOs construct climate information framing within the three macro protest frames. Third, testing the effects of each of the three aspects of climate change (e.g., impacts, actions, efficacy) on the audience may provide a nuanced understanding of what would be the best way to communicate this environmental phenomenon.

Supplemental Material

RandRGlobal_Climate_NGOs_-Facebook-Appendix – Supplemental material for Social Media and Environmental Activism: Framing Climate Change on Facebook by Global NGOs

Supplemental material, RandRGlobal_Climate_NGOs_-Facebook-Appendix for Social Media and Environmental Activism: Framing Climate Change on Facebook by Global NGOs by Hong Tien Vu, Matthew Blomberg, Hyunjin Seo, Yuchen Liu, Fatemeh Shayesteh and Hung Viet Do in Science Communication

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This research is funded by The University of Kansas’ New Faculty General Research Fund to Dr. Hong Tien Vu.

ORCID iDs

Hong Tien Vu

Matthew Blomberg

Hyunjin Seo

Yuchen Liu

Fatemeh Shayesteh

Hung Viet Do

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online at

Notes

Author Biographies

Hong Tien Vu is an assistant professor in the School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Kansas. He obtained his doctorate from the School of Journalism, the University of Texas of Austin. His research interests focus on the influence of technologies on both journalism and communication for social change.

Matthew Blomberg is a doctoral student at the University of Kansas. His research interests are in news and source credibility, media and information literacy, cognitive decisions behind media trust, and in combating fake news.

Hyunjin Seo is an associate professor and Docking Faculty Scholar in the School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Kansas as well as the founding director of the KU Center for Digital Inclusion. She is also a faculty associate at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, Harvard University where she was a resident fellow in AY2018-2019. Her research focuses on identifying emerging properties of networked communication and understanding their implications for social change, collective action and civic engagement.

Yuchen Liu (MS, University of Kansas, 2016) is a PhD candidate in the William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of Kansas. Her primary research interest is the use and effects of social media in the areas of strategic communication, public relations, and international communication.

Fatemeh Shayesteh is a doctoral student in the William Allen White School of Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Kansas. Her professional background is in strategic communications. Her research focuses on social media, social change, and gender and sexuality. Recently, she received the Diversity and Inclusion Action Group (DIAG) Applied Research Award to explore digital media functionalities for U.S. LGBTQ college students’ resiliency and recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hung Viet Do is a computer scientist. He works for Trader Interactive in Virginia. His research focuses on analyzing large amounts of online data. He has had experience in machine learning and big data.

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