Abstract
This article is about the euphoria I experience each time I write about philosophically informed phenomenological research: writing and reading and thinking that began in graduate school and has not let up since. This is the writing that takes me places I never imagined I could go. In this article, I explore how the enraptured, creative experiences I have when writing the idea, and all I let go of or put on hold to keep attempting to write it eventually became a relation of cruel optimism. The article serves as a reminder that writing to fulfill the demands of the entrepreneurial institution gets us something very different than the writing that emerges from a constant desire to engage with words. It gestures toward opportunities to share our work, our ideas, our thinking in ways that move beyond the published, legitimized neoliberal page.
In my Dropbox, I have a folder titled “Journal Articles in Progress.” When I have an idea for a paper or when I collaborate with folks on a paper, I create a subfolder in that main folder and title the subfolder with the idea and the possible journal for submission. A professor suggested this while I was in graduate school to help keep me organized. Once the article is officially published, I move that idea’s subfolder into another main folder titled “Published Articles and Chapters” to continue keeping myself organized. In my “Journal Articles in Progress” folder, I currently have 28 subfolders. Each of those subfolders contains an idea for a paper I’ve attempted to write since 2011 when I graduated with my PhD. They also contain articles to read that might help me think more deeply or differently about the idea, and (several) documents with beginning thoughts, vignettes attempting to get me started in the paper, and/or quotes I think might be useful once I get somewhere in the paper.
Twenty-eight subfolders. That’s 28 articles I have yet to write. Some ideas sit patiently in those subfolders awaiting their turn to be written and submitted for publication. Others, I imagine, attached themselves to me to assist me in writing my way to another idea, an article or book chapter I have actually published. There is one idea, however, that does something different: an idea that came about during my dissertation research about philosophically informed phenomenological research. An idea that took hold of me, transformed how I live in the world, and continues to both haunt and inspire me while it monopolizes seven of those 28 subfolders. Within each of those seven subfolders, there are seven different clusters of possibility (Berlant, 2011) that have split themselves off into at least three different versions of papers I have attempted to write, with the hopes that this new direction will allow that one idea about philosophically informed phenomenological research to come to fruition on the page. That is 21 different papers housing fragments of one idea (and my soul). The kicker? None of those 21 papers have become a published piece.
The story that follows is about this idea that will never be written. Or better yet, this idea that perhaps wants to be written, just not published. More specifically though, this is a story about an optimistic attachment I formed to an idea, perhaps because of what Lauren Berlant refers to as the fantasy of “the good life.” For me, this particular good life fantasy is twofold: Most importantly, it is about dwelling in the space of a writerly text, where the desire for swirling with words leads and darkness is the method (van Manen, 2002). This particular good life fantasy is also, however, about feeling legit enough as a scholar to talk about philosophically informed phenomenological research 1 (i.e., as a guest lecturer in a qualitative research course, as an instructor of a doctoral seminar on phenomenology, as an advisor to doctoral students, etc.). There are various technologies and practices in the neoliberal university that feed this desire to feel legit enough: practices that remind me (over and over) I should have a peer-reviewed publication (or really, several) outside of my dissertation about conducting philosophically informed phenomenological research. 2
According to Berlant (2011), attachments we form to various objects/scenes of desire are inherently optimistic. This is, if we consider optimism as, the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene. (pp. 1-2, emphasis in original)
In other words, we sometimes form attachments to ideas or people or scenes because, on our own, without that attachment, we cannot see the possibility or hope of the “change that’s gonna come”—or the change that’s not gonna come (p. 2). One of optimism’s ordinary pleasures, according to Berlant, is to “induce conventionality, that place where appetites find a shape in the predictable comforts of the good-life genres that a person or a world has seen fit to formulate” (p. 2). Optimistic attachments, then, might help us imagine the possibility of encountering a new and different life/person/way of being/habit; or, they might help us remain settled in the current situation we have formulated for ourselves that we know as comfortable or stable. Either way, at the center of all of this hope and possibility of the change that is or is not coming is this “moral-intimate-economic thing called ‘the good life’” (p. 2). Which is where this story both begins and ends: situated in those fantasies of the good life yet to come.
Truth be told, I’m not even sure what the idea that will never be written is anymore. Whatever its “is-ness” was when it first latched onto me in graduate school, the idea seems to have whittled its way down to nothing more than a flickering light off in the distance that appears when I least expect it and disappears just as quickly. Over the years, the idea manifested in different ways with each new iteration of the paper I attempted to write. Sometimes it was as simple as the rhythm of the double-dutch illustrating the philosophical concepts of intentionality in philosophical phenomenology. 3 Other times, it was a love letter about how reading philosophers in phenomenology “rocked my world” (Hughes, 2018) in such powerful and jarring ways that the texts actually shifted how I lived in the world as a human being, rather than simply thinking differently as a qualitative researcher. Sometimes it took the form of analogies like mismatched puzzle pieces or “Academic Operator,” 4 which I called upon to argue for a more “proper understanding” of phenomenology (Giorgi, 2008) in the social sciences. And still other times, it was a rambling of philosophical concepts that felt important to me and to qualitative research, but no matter how I tried to configure those thoughts, they would not congeal on the page.
It was not until I started reading Berlant (2011) that I realized my attachment to the idea that will never be written was much more knotty, if you will, than I first understood. When I decided to dig deeper into the affective structure of my continued and persistent attachment (Berlant, 2011) to writing the idea that will never be written for this special issue, I (slowly but surely) learned that this particular good life fantasy was connected to two different clusters of possibility that seemed to be bundled within the same attachment. Two disparate clusters that both got me something very different each time I attempted to write the idea: euphoric writing moments that I yearn to experience over and over again, and complete and utter frustration/disappointment that I did not emerge from those euphoric writing experiences with a publishable product. Below, I attempt to provide a glimpse into those euphoric writing experiences, to illustrate how those experiences, over time, became both a scene of desire that I wanted to return to over and over, and subsequently, a scene of negotiated sustenance that made this neoliberal academic life bearable—even when those scenes presented themselves ambivalently, unevenly, and incoherently (Berlant, 2011, p. 14).
Writing creates a space that belongs to the unsayable. It is in this writerly space where there reigns the ultimate incomprehensibility of things, the unfathomable infiniteness of their being, the uncanny rumble of existence itself . . . (van Manen, 2006, p. 718)
There is a beautiful euphoria I experience each time I attempt to write about philosophically informed phenomenological research: writing and reading and thinking that takes me places I never imagined I could go. It began when I started reading philosophical phenomenology in graduate school. The texts moved me like no other. It was as if the philosophers I was reading were writing just for me; as if they were writing to help me make sense of a nonsensical world. It was like they knew I would someday need something to think with, philosophical concepts to take up and put to work in my life, as well as in education research, to resee things differently. When I began writing my way through those philosophical concepts—trying to make sense of what the hell I was reading—those writing moments were so powerful that I sometimes did not even know what was happening. I got lost in the magic the first time I wrote my way through the philosophical concepts of Heidegger and Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty in 2008, and I still get lost when I engage with them now on the page in 2018.
I liken these writing moments to magical encounters with the will o’ the wisps, which I’ll explore below, because it is the creativity and mysticism of the wisps (rather than acknowledging how I do not feel academically legit enough to talk about philosophically informed phenomenological research) that gives me hope and possibility of a different writerly, academic life in some near future (Berlant, 2011). Berlant (2011) questions why people stay attached to conventional good-life fantasies, even when the evidence of their instability, fragility, and dear cost abounds (p. 2). I know why. 5 At least regarding this particular good life fantasy I do. Because each time the idea that will never be written reappears, it leads me into these windy and seductive writing processes. These moments where I am “immersed so deeply in the act of . . . writing, everything else, even flesh, falls away” (hooks, 2000, p. 1). Blind Pilot or India Arie or Lauryn Hill or the Lumineers Pandora stations blaring in my earbuds. Martin Heidegger and Sara Ahmed swirling around in my head trying to have conversations with Max van Manen and John Caputo—most times too fast for my fingers to keep up on the keyboard. Sentences and paragraphs and pages almost writing themselves. No acknowledgment of time or people or space. Hours of writing and thinking and rewriting, of rearranging paragraphs so they talk to each other in more productive and insightful ways. Playing with a phrase or sentence for ten or fifteen minutes to bring different kinds of words together in patterns and configurations that move the spirit (hooks, 2000). Because language can move people. It moves me. Constantly.
A cursory glance around the coffee shop to see new rotations of people at the same tables; or down from my home computer to make eye contact with one of my cats who is appalled that I have been in the same space for so many hours without doling out a pat on the head. A gaze toward the outside where I notice how beautiful it is, while simultaneously noting how I don’t really care because it is so much more beautiful here, writing this moment. Finally, a sideways glance to the clock in the top right corner of my screen, followed by a long sigh, wishing this writing moment could be the rest of my day and night. These are the moments I yearn to revisit, to be “swept away by the processes of thinking through certain ideas as well as by their potential to incite and arouse the reader” (hooks, 2000, p. 4). Not having to attend to life. Simply writing this idea.
I like to tell myself that it is this desire to experience writing euphoria again and again, more than the need to be legitimized in the neoliberal university, that feeds my “sustaining inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enable[d] [me] to expect that this time, nearness to this thing [would] help [me] or a world become different in just the right way” (Berlant, 2011, p. 2). In other words, no matter how stuck I get with each new iteration of the idea that will never be written, I continue writing this specific idea as often as the idea permits, with the hopes that this time the paper will be different in just the right way. What is interesting though, is that these two desires—my yearning to experience writing euphoria, and the pull to be legitimized in the neoliberal university—seem to be at odds with one another. They are my Scylla and Charybdis, simultaneously creating ecstasy and obstacles in my writing life. Perhaps this is what makes the attachment a relation of cruel optimism. Berlant (2011) explains further, A relation of cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing. It might involve food, or a kind of love; it might be a fantasy of the good life, or a political project. It might rest on something simpler, too, like a new habit that promises to induce in you an improved way of being. These kinds of optimistic relation are not inherently cruel. They become cruel only when the object that draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially. (p. 1)
The Cruel Optimism of the Wisps
As I mentioned above, the idea that will never be written has not completely shut down my life over these past 6 years, but it has definitely hindered the aim that brought me to it originally. This attachment feels optimistic because of the enraptured, creative experiences I have when writing the idea. It becomes a cruel optimism because of all I have let go of or put on hold to keep attempting to write it. For 6 years. All with the hope that change is gonna come, and I will end up with a published piece about something related to philosophically informed phenomenological research.
Thus, I have found it both beneficial and productive recently to think about the optimistic part of this attachment as these mystical encounters with the will o’ the wisps—like those little blue ones in the movie Brave. I had never thought about the will o’ the wisps outside of the context of Brave, because, well, honestly, I try not to spend too much time drawing on anything produced by Disney to think with (other than critique, of course). My daughter and I watched Brave a few (dozen) times, and the will o’ the wisps kept cropping up in my thinking, especially in relation to ideas for this current paper. 6 In Brave, Merida, the lively, subversive daughter of a Scottish queen and king, encounters the will o’ the wisps in the forest one day. Until this moment Merida has only known the wisps as Scottish lore. But when she encounters them in the forest she realizes they are indeed real and quite magical.
If you have not seen Brave, the wisps are portrayed as these translucent blue, mystical entities that appear and disappear with the blink of an eye (and they make these cool little ethereal noises). The wisps only appear when Merida is not looking for them, and each time they appear they illuminate some kind of path leading Merida into the unknown. If she tries to catch the wisps, they disappear. Some Scottish lore says that the will o’ the wisps are mischievous spirits of the dead, or fairy-like spirits, which lead random travelers off the beaten path (Shandraw, 2012). Other lore says that on certain days these magical flickering lights will suddenly appear to certain travelers around the world.
7
Curious and unsuspecting, the travelers become mesmerized by their whispers, their promises. Yet no matter how long or how fervently they follow, they never quite touch the beautiful beacons whose flickering lights eventually fade and disappear . . . leaving the inquisitors, the dreamers and the treasure seekers lost . . . and alone. (Shandraw, 2012, para. 5)
I like to think about the wisps as the inspiration we sometimes encounter when we are lost in the writing: appearing when we least expect them, flickering with hope, leading us toward some unknown possibility. That is one way I imagine them, anyway. When it comes to the idea that will never be written, I envision them as these mischievous, mystical entities that appear out of nowhere mesmerizing me with their flickering lights and clusters of possibility. No matter how loyal I am to following them, they disappear just as quickly as they come, leaving me lost and alone. Yet, I still feel the need to follow them every time they show up. According to Berlant, this is what the operation of optimism is as an affective form: having that intense need to return to the scene (again and again), where the object hovers in its potentialities. In other words, no matter how many times the wisps appear, taunting me with their clusters of possibility before they disappear, I will follow them. This is not only because I want the published paper to feel academically legit 8 but it is also because I yearn to whirl with words and dance in the ecstatic circle of love surrounded by the evocative and provocative ideas that write themselves onto the page (hooks, 2000, p. 8).
It feels useful, then, for me to continue holding these two desires together in tension, as one cruel optimistic attachment. By doing so, this bundled cluster of possibilities gets me something I could not have otherwise had: motivation to keep on keepin’ on. In other words, neither one of these desires is going to suddenly dissolve on its own because they both get me something. Bundled together, they each promise me something different related to my fantasy of the good life. Berlant suggests that by phrasing our “object of desire” as a “cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what’s incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation of our sense of our endurance in the object” (pp. 23-24). This is because “proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises . . .” (pp. 23-24). Below I draw on one example from my dozens of attempts to write the idea that will never be written, to think through how we (meaning I) sometimes make affective bargains—even if unconscious—to keep ourselves in proximity to the scenes/objects of our desire (Berlant, 2011). This example is meant to illustrate my on-going bargaining, my own sense of endurance in my object of desire, insofar as proximity to the idea that will never be written in any way, shape, or form meant proximity to the bundled cluster of promises attached to it.
In optimism, the subject leans toward promises contained within the present moment of the encounter with her object. (Berlant, 2011, p. 24)
During summer 2017, colleagues who were co-editing a special issue for Qualitative Inquiry sent me the call and invited me to submit an abstract.
This special issue seeks to reimagine the craft of phenomenological and hermeneutic
inquiry. Given that these methodological traditions bear the same name and
commitments as the ontologies from which they emanate, this issue is equally interested
in exploring the complicated ways in which ontology and methodology are bound up with
one another.
OK, I thought, this must be the universe’s way of opening up a deliberate space for me to finally write this blasted paper. I mean, it is an entire issue devoted to different ways of thinking about philosophical phenomenology! I had been reading Schues, Olkowski, and Fielding’s (2011) Time in Feminist Phenomenology to help me think differently about time in neoliberal education for another project, and I decided that instead of writing the idea that will never be written, I would write an entirely different paper for this special issue. A new idea. A fresh phenomenological perspective. Put the old idea to rest: It does not want to be written anyway because it obviously died with the dissertation. This, I understand now, was indeed an affective bargain I was unconsciously making to keep myself in proximity to the scene/object of my desire (the euphoric experiences when writing the idea, and the hope of a published piece to then feel legit enough). Of course, because it was an unconscious affective bargain I was making, I thought I was doing pretty well to move on for real this time (wink, wink).
Weeks passed, along with several attempts at writing the new paper about neoliberal time in feminist phenomenology, and eventually I realized I was not ready to write that paper. I had not read enough and I did not have the confidence to write through that idea yet. Recognizing this, but not knowing where to go next, I decided to do some reading to get my creative juices flowing. I started with Heidegger (1971) because he always seems to help me get my head back in the phenomenological game, so-to-speak. I reread some van Manen (2014), because his ideas and philosophical tracings always inspire me. And I reread Vagle’s (2014) ideas about postintentional phenomenology, because how he brings poststructural thought to bear on phenomenology always intrigues me. As I read and reread, ideas started to flicker: The wisps were not right in front of me, blinding me with their inspirational and creative lights but they were somewhere near, and I could feel them getting closer. Knowing if I tried to chase them down they would disappear, I gave myself over to the texts I was reading to see what would happen. Walk-and-read after walk-and-read, I jotted down notes about Heidegger (1971) and his thoughts about language. I revisited Sartre’s (1948/1950) reminder that writing is a form of acting in the world. I thought back to the call for the special issue on phenomenology and the editors’ request for papers about how methodology and ontology are entangled. I knew something was there, something was resonating with that call and what I was reading. I could feel it percolating in my body, but I was not sure what it was. And then one day I did.
The wisps suddenly appeared when I was writing through what I had been reading, and they were flickering so brightly I almost could not write fast enough to keep up. According to Heidegger (1927/1962), we should always be asking what it is philosophy can do with us, rather than what we can do with it. Without going into an entire dissertation about this idea (because I did that in 2011), to take up the philosophy of phenomenology, for me, is to exist differently in the world: through a more thoughtful attunement to everyday goings-on that we might otherwise take for granted. To live, to be in the world phenomenologically, is to live in wonder, in curiosity. Living in wonder, suggested Heidegger, is a disposition that has a dis-positional effect: It dis-locates and dis-places our taken-for-granted understanding of the world (van Manen, 2018). Existing this way, more possibilities open up for us to (re)notice phenomena that have been normalized or buried over or covered up. This kind of covering-up as a disguising, wrote Heidegger, is “both the most frequent and the most dangerous, for here the possibilities of deceiving and misleading are especially stubborn” (p. 60). Even though sometimes phenomena are bound up so constructively within different structures, they present themselves as something “clear”—requiring no further justification. (p. 60).
These were the ideas that the wisps always seemed to inspire me to dance with on the page. As I wrote my way through them on that particular day, I felt it throughout my body that this was the paper. It felt new, but it was not new. It was the idea that would never be written, but a totally different paper, all in one. I wrote what felt like dozens of pages about the ideas that were swirling. (It was actually just over two pages, single-spaced, but it feels like a novel sometimes when you’re in it, you know?) It felt so amazing, so hopeful, so possible. The wisps were burning brightly and the good life was in my reach: this was the paper, and I was going to pump out the entire thing that day, I was sure of it! And then the doorbell rang. (Yes, I’m serious.) I remember it as if it is happening now as I type these words. I had my phone on “do not disturb,” I was not checking email, and the words were leaping out of my fingers onto the page. I had all the things. And the $%#& doorbell rang. I did not have to answer it (and I know now to never ever to answer it again). But that day I did. I opened the door to see two really sweet Mormon sisters standing in front of me. They introduced themselves and their purpose for stopping by (at 2 p.m. on a Wednesday) and asked if I would be interested in having them come in to talk to me about whatever they were talking about. I remember exactly what they were wearing, their skin, their eyes, their hair. As they talked, however, I only saw their mouths moving. I could not hear what they were saying because I kept thinking, OMG, OMG, OMG, I answered the effing door! Why did I answer the door? I politely explained that I was terribly busy, thanked the sisters for stopping by, closed the door, and bolted back over to the computer to reengage the wisps.
Darkness
Not the computer screen. The wisps. The flickering lights had faded. Again. Frantic, I read the two and half pages of text I had written and thought, Well what the hell was that supposed to be? And that question quickly spiraled into other (quite unproductive) questions, such as: What do I do now? Why did I answer the door? What if that was the last time I ever get the opportunity to write this idea? What if I NEVER publish this stupid-useless-nobody-gives-a-shit-about-this-idea-anyway paper?
What is cruel about the attachments we have to certain objects/scenes of desire, according to Berlant (2011), is that we who have X in our lives think we will not persevere through the loss of those objects/scenes of desire, even though their presence consumes or threatens our well-being. Berlant suggests this is because whatever the content of the attachment is, the continuity of its form provides something of the continuity of our sense of what it means to keep functioning in life (p. 24). In other words, sometimes we might not be able to let go of an attachment—even if it is unhealthy for us to have this attachment (e.g., being in an abusive relationship, returning to some kind of food as a vice, or perhaps less extreme, continuing to try to write an idea that does not want to be written), because the very idea of that attachment’s consistent existence as a possibility in our lives provides us with some kind of consistent sense of hope to keep moving forward.
Feeling like I would not persevere through the loss of (yet again) attempting to write the idea, I desperately tried to rekindle the flame. I searched for a few of the older iterations of papers I had written about the idea and, defeated and depleted, decided I would simply compile chunks of all the papers into one. I would force all of those years of attempts to exist together in one space and see what that got me. I sifted through at least half a dozen versions of the idea, copying favorite chunks and pasting them into a new document. Screw the wisps. This was happening. What was actually happening, however, was that my attachment to the idea that will never be written was impeding my original aim of writing that paper. I could not recognize it though because of the fantasy that I wanted so badly to become a reality. Berlant describes fantasy as the “means by which people hoard idealizing theories . . . about how they and the world ‘add up to something’” (p. 2). She questions, however, what happens when our fantasies “start to fray—depression, dissociation, pragmatism, cynicism, optimism, activism, or an incoherent mash?” (p. 2). As my own fantasy began to fray, an incoherent mash indeed settled upon my computer.
As I combined favorite paragraphs from different iterations together on the page, I noticed how analogies and metaphors started appearing one after the other. Reading those ideas together, I eventually noticed (by identifying the themes across all the excerpts like a good qualitative researcher) that in every iteration, I felt the need to explain and/or defend phenomenology, even when that was not the intended purpose of the paper. If the paper was supposed to be about writing as the method in phenomenology, or the incredible uncertainties conducting phenomenological research brings forth, before I could get to those key points, I apparently felt the need to phenom-splain 9 to those who either take up phenomenology with little more than a cursory borrowing of its terms, or those who critique its philosophy in limited ways.
Acknowledging this new discovery and deciding I would write that paper, I finally felt a sense of satisfaction running through my veins. (Of course I did. I was doing all I could to keep myself in close proximity to what my object of desire promised me: the good life.) Thus, I continued living in this reluctance to foreclose the possibility of writing the idea, because even if it did not get me this paper, it would get me something: euphoric writing experiences, possibly another paper, something. I was sure of it. (Again.) Maybe this is the moment where the universe shifts in my favor, I told myself. Maybe this was the fanfiction moment in Brave where Merida actually captured one of the wisps and something magical unfolded—other than an adventure with her mother (spoiler alert!) turning into a bear. 10 Feeling somewhat confident, I sat down and pounded out an introduction. And then another introduction. And then another introduction. A few days later I had roughly 15 pages of solid introductions. The excerpt from the introduction below, for example, was the first of the three I wrote with my new found sense of possibility as my fantasy continued to fray into an incoherent mash:
Recently I was working on a floor puzzle with my 3 year old. It was called “traffic jam” and had several different modes of transportation that were apparently meant to exist together in some random space and moment in time—a plane, a bus, an ambulance, a taxi cab, a fire engine, all jammed together in one section of a city—at least for the purposes of this puzzle, it was possible. It felt awkward to me to work on this disillusioned puzzle but it was also effective, because the specific vehicles allowed me to help my daughter think about each piece’s place within the puzzle as a whole. We’d zoom in and focus on a specific vehicle and talk about what colors and patterns that vehicle had so we could look for those pieces, and then we’d zoom back out to look at the bigger picture. Back and forth, in and out, a thoughtful attunement to the parts-whole-parts of the puzzle. A few times my daughter grew frustrated because, on their own, when they were lying on the floor separated from the overall puzzle, some of the pieces seemed like they should fit in a certain space: the colors and patterns were similar enough to that vehicle, and the shape of the piece—on first glance—might have seemed similar enough to the empty space. But when she attempted to place those pieces in those empty spaces they didn’t fit. As her puzzling patience slowly dwindled, my daughter finally left one of the pieces in a space that clearly wasn’t its match. “That piece fits, mommy,” she said through feigned certainty. “What’s next?”
I realized a few things shortly after that moment: (a) my kid was over not “getting it” and was ready to move on, even if it took her forcing something that clearly didn’t belong—and either pretended to be alright with that, or actually did not understand enough about it to know the difference (though, I’m pretty sure in this case it was the latter). And (b) I had just lived an analogy I’ve written/thought about for almost a decade regarding phenomenology. That realization was almost as awkward as being OK with all of those vehicles trying to exist together on one tiny stretch of highway. Perhaps the most important realization I had that day, however, was revisiting my deep yearning to write this paper. A paper where I sort of talk back to the ways in which phenomenology has been misinterpreted, misunderstood, and/or misappropriated in some social science spaces.
I have always wondered why I feel the need to defend or explain phenomenology, and that experience puzzling with my daughter reminded me that it’s because phenomenology is, more often than not, misinterpreted in so many different ways in social science research. Interestingly enough, how I used to write about people’s misappropriation of phenomenology was to liken it to misfit puzzle pieces hastily gathered and awkwardly inserted into a jigsaw puzzle that is missing pieces. I mean wouldn’t that feel awkward? Imagine you are working on this really cool 1,000 piece dinosaur puzzle and realize that the box is missing a handful of pieces. Not knowing how to complete the puzzle due to its missing pieces, you decide to go and grab some other pieces from the 1,000 piece motorcycle puzzle in the closet to plug in the holes of your really cool—albeit incomplete—dinosaur puzzle. This now leaves you with nothing more than the front fork of a motorcycle where the Velociraptor’s 3.5 inch retractable claw should be and a motorcycle’s instrument panel where the Velociraptor’s feathery little quill knobs should be. Awkward.
Puzzling that day with my daughter added another amalgamated layer to this on-going puzzling analogy that seems to lurk on all of my Word documents: even when working with the same puzzle, some pieces will never fit if you aren’t doing the difficult and thoughtful work to see the bigger (philosophical) picture. Rather than reimagining the craft of phenomenological inquiry for this special issue, then, what I hope to add is a (reminder? a perspective? an argument?) that I’ve never known the phenomenologies I read any other way than always, already entangling ontology and methodology. This exploration isn’t meant to be radical or even transformational. Nor is it meant to turn qualitative inquiry on its head by offering some mind-blowing new ideas (because, like others, I’m not sure there are actually any “new” ideas to be had). Rather, it’s meant to offer a few (possibly different, possibly not) perspectives to those who have only learned about phenomenology through introductory qualitative methods texts; or to those who seem to think there is only one phenomenology—a Husserlian phenomenology of essences and reductions. Perhaps this paper will be/become nothing more than a theoretical rant. Or perhaps it will be/become a phenomenology of my experiences with phenomenology’s mishaps over the last decade.
Nothing magical or maddening took place during or after writing that introduction. No wisps leading me to inspiration; no doorbells interrupting the flow. The writing was simply not getting me anywhere, beyond enacting the very puzzle metaphor I was using to critique the ways in which phenomenology is sometimes misrepresented. Just like those who drop phenomenological terms into in their methods sections that do not fit with their overall methodology, I too was trying to force pieces of my phenomenological writing together that did not fit. I kept charging forward though, because I wanted the fantasy to be real; I needed the fantasy to be real, to move on in my writerly, academic life. Berlant (2011) posits that “object loss appears to entail the loss of an entire world and therefore a loss of confidence about how to live on, even at the microlevel of bodily comportment” (p. 16). Living in fear of forever losing my connection to the wisps felt very real in those moments. And even though it may not have resonated in those particular moments, the possibility of not producing a published piece about the idea that will never be written chiseled away at my confidence as a legitimized scholar.
Thus, more reading, more writing, more experimenting to produce something. I attempted a few more versions where I played with multiple genres—dictionary entries, vignettes, found poems, even Bitmojis. I leaned on Caputo (1988) to write a confession about my love for phenomenology. I called on van Manen (2002) to help me describe how phenomenological writing most times feels like writing in the dark; and even more, how finding oneself in those moments is part of what it means to be in the world phenomenologically. With all of these attempts came beautiful, creative writing experiences—tantalizing wisps appearing one after the other—leading me in entirely different directions to, well, nowhere beyond a few more introductions. And the wheels on the bus go round and round . . .
Concluding Thoughts
So here’s the thing: In general, publishing in academia is not all it is cracked up to be. For the most part, it is stressful and inauthentic and the whole thing seems like an antiquated process. Even more, you have to embody some strong-ass armor for some of the reviews others feel the need to bestow upon you. But writing? Engaging in the act of writing is a different story. For me, writing is everything it is cracked up to be. Writing has so much to give, so much to teach, so many surprises, so many insights (Lamott, 1994). The actual act of writing turns out to be the best part for me. “It’s like discovering that while you thought you needed the tea ceremony for the caffeine, what you really needed was the tea ceremony. The act of writing turns out to be its own reward” (Lamott, 1994, p. xxvi).
Sometimes
Sometimes the act of writing turns out to be its own reward. Sometimes you might do all of that writing and produce a piece you are really excited about and proud of, and the rewards are the process and the published piece. Other times you might do all of that writing and produce a piece where you think, Meh, that’s good enough and you click “submit.” The reward there might be more the process than the product. And still other times, you might do all of that writing and not end up with a publishable piece and not experience the reward of the process. Frustrated, you might decide there has to be something in all of that writing worth salvaging, so you mine that vein for all it has and still come up empty. That kind of writing reminds us how difficult the act of writing truly is. It reminds us that language can sometimes annihilate whatever it touches—that no matter what we try, the words continue to substitute themselves, destroying the very things they are meant to evoke. The result from that kind of writing can sometimes be the awful feeling that we might not have anything to say, or that it is impossible to truly “say” anything (van Manen, 2006, p. 719). That kind of writing, for me, is as pleasurable as bathing a cat (Lamott, 1994).
But there is also another kind of writing: the writing that helps deepen your thinking and takes you places you never imagined going when you began. This kind of writing might not get you anything publishable. Perhaps this kind of writing instead becomes a different way for us to think about the act, the process: those ideas that might help us get smarter, yet do not want to be cemented to the page. Maybe some ideas like to stay in flux, in constant percolation. These could be the ideas that do not like to behave like we are brought up to behave: well-mannered and convivial. These could be the subversive ideas that, like the will o’ the wisps, briefly enter our lives, provide us with some kind of inspiration or movement so what we thought before we began writing is turned on its head, and then disappear as quickly as they arrived. Off to inspire others, providing them that moment of ecstasy as they, too, whirl with words on the page, if only for a brief moment (or a few dozen pages, anyway).
Instead of seeing these encounters as failures (e.g., Ugggggg, I never published that paper about . . .) what if we instead acknowledged these moments as opportunities for movement and growth 11 ? Opportunities to share our work, our ideas, our thinking in a way that moves beyond the published, legitimized neoliberal page. We would not, of course, do this with all of the ideas we encounter. No one would earn their PhD or get promoted/tenured in the entrepreneurial institution. Just with those ideas that refuse, for whatever reason, to be locked down (i.e., written for publication). Phenomenologically speaking, perhaps it is about learning to live and be differently in the world as academics. Maybe it is about acknowledging that while we do work within systems influenced by neoliberal technologies and practices, we can work against those technologies and practices while we are living within them. bell hooks (2000) suggests that, irrespective of our locations within “hierarchical institutions founded on structures of domination where rewards and benefits are awarded in relation to service rendered” (p. 7), we are all vulnerable.
We can all be had, co-opted, bought. There is no special grace that rescues any of us. There is only a constant struggle to keep the faith, to relentlessly rejoice in an engagement with critical ideas that is itself liberatory, a practice of freedom. (pp. 7-8)
Epilogue
Meeting Vietnamese Buddhist monk and activist Thich Nhat Hanh for the first time, George Yancy and bell hooks (2015) described how all she could talk to Hanh about when she arrived to their meeting was how angry she was. hooks felt like she had encountered some kind of racism or sexism all along the way to their meeting, so the first thing that came out of her mouth was, “I am so angry!” Hanh suggested hooks hold onto her anger and use it as compost for her garden. Putting Hanh’s concept to work, hooks noted, . . . [I]f we think of anger as compost, we think of it as energy that can be recycled in the direction of our good. It is an empowering force. If we don’t think about it that way, it becomes a debilitating and destructive force. (Yancy & hooks, 2015, para. 26)
What if we, too, took up Hanh’s concept and put that to work on all those ideas that never want to be published? Rather than festering about what we cannot produce within this epoch of self-audit and self-surveillance, we might instead use those ideas that will never be published as compost for our gardens of inspiration: for ideas yet to come, courses yet to be taught, and future papers yet to be written. Even more, we could use that compost to begin creating new and different kinds of legitimizing practices in the academy.
You write and you write, and you read, and you write some more. Sometimes you publish something from those experiences. And other times you recognize that a particular idea might want to be written but does not want to be published. Instead of having this realization become a debilitating and destructive force in your life, you can instead remind yourself that you have indeed been thoughtfully engaging with that idea for months (or years), thus giving you just as much scholarly legitimacy to share it as a published piece would. And if you happen to belabor that idea for weeks (or months or years) on the written page, rather than ruminating on the attachment you have formed to that particular idea, rather than seeing it as a symptom of your error, a perversion, or some dark truth (Berlant, 2011), you might (re)position it as a scene of negotiated sustenance that makes life in the neoliberal university a little more bearable. At the end of the day, all academics are expected to publish. But not all academics see themselves as writers. As someone who does see herself as a writer and an academic, I have remind myself that writing to fulfill the demands of the entrepreneurial institution gets me something very different than the writing that emerges from my constant desire to engage with words. Even when there might not be any clear benefit or reward, it is the experience of writing that matters (hooks, 2000).
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
