Abstract
This article provides an Eastern perspective on the fusion of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Moving from the perspective of being to nothingness, I look at predicate logic and the basho of nothingness. Based on examinations of being within the pre-dichotomized gestalt of lived experience, I argue that phenomenology and hermeneutics are inseparable. The holistic perspective suggests that researchers adopt basho as a unit of analysis and take relational persona as an analytical perspective. The article concludes with a discussion on embodied being and an alternative view of transferability. It is expected that qualitative researchers engage in philosophical hermeneutics and cross-cultural dialogues to extend understandings of relational being and create new possibilities for qualitative inquiry.
How does an Eastern philosophy of nothingness enlighten qualitative inquiry? One may think of attending methodological training and honestly applying a method in practice, but what Nishida’s philosophy entails is to engage in a world of relationships. As an important underpinning of qualitative inquiry, philosophical research is centered around the notion of being. Although both Eastern and Western scholars strive to extend the understanding of being, they approach it from different perspectives. Phenomenological and hermeneutic researchers in the West explain being by providing explanations on the complexity of human existence. Whereas Husserl (1975) looks at intentionality from a phenomenological perspective, Gadamer (1975/1985) adopts philosophical hermeneutics with a focus on linguisticality, the meta-structure before language takes form. Different from individual and purposeful meaning making that is separated from the world, intentionality in phenomenology suggests co-created meaning based on relational existence within the world. Similarly, linguisticality is not a linguistic skill or tool that could be utilized regardless of subjects’ state of mind within concrete contexts. Rather, linguisticality describes the capability to unfold meaning both within texts and between the lines when one positions oneself as an integral part of the world. It is the method of methods that generates, integrates, and renovates meaning. Freeman and Vagle (2013) further examine contextualized meaning by grafting phenomenology and hermeneutics. “Intentionality is the ‘being’ of being and linguisticality is its ‘method’” (p. 728). These Western perspectives resemble an Eastern holistic cosmological view through which the world is portrayed as a harmonious integrity.
Different from the focus on being in Western philosophy, understanding of nothingness serves as a basis for philosophical inquiry in the East (Dilworth, 1970). Nishida Kitaro (1958), a Japanese philosopher, examines the being of being from its corresponding side of mu no basho (the place of nothingness). As an extension of linguisticality that portrays the intentionality of being against Cartesian dualism, the logic of basho from an Eastern perspective further unfolds oppositional being and its root in nothingness. The nothingness perspective deepens the understanding of being by portraying a pre-dichotomized integrity of the world. As a response to this special issue of “unsettling traditions,” the relational perspective reveals the complexity of the ontological and methodological wholeness.
Nishida conceptualizes nothingness as an indescribable and infinite place that is different from the Cartesian nihilism (Shaner, 1987). From a dualistic standpoint, Descartes regards nothingness as a cease of existence and devalues the static condition of meaninglessness. By focusing solely on causal and tangible relationships, this mind–body dualism denies the meaning of transcendental experience that provides possibilities for knowing. In contrast, from a non-dualistic and interconnected perspective, Nishida describes nothingness as a free-flowing fullness that positively creates possibilities of being. As a place for all beings, nothingness is not enveloped by another place and is named as non-being. However, different from non-existence, nothingness becomes a de-ontological basho (place) wherein being is manifested as ends instead of means before the mind body dichotomization. Basho of nothingness as the relational wholeness is both intentionality and linguisticality. Only when ontology and methodology stay as a whole can being be emanated and reach its deepness from within.
As an indescribable but meaningful place wherein negations are generated and oppositions unify, nothingness is both transcendental and existential. The place of nothingness is the holistic integrity of “grammatical subject-predicate, ontological being-nothing, epistemological subject-object, logical universal-particular, et cetera” (Nishida & Krummel, 2012, p. 48). Nothingness thus provides an absolute place that envelops all other places. It is the last enveloping to which our thinking, feeling, and acting self penetrates, in which all contradictions have been resolved, and in which the abyss between the thinking subject and the thought object disappears, in which even the opposite position of God and soul no longer exists. (Nishida, 1958, p. 30)
Nishida’s place of nothingness provides an alternative perspective of being and a transformative approach to qualitative research. Although by conducting scientific experiments we find laws and make use of them for human wellbeing, when moving from science to scientism, no one can escape its influence. In fact, “human reason is not the last refuge for human existence” (Waldenfels, 1966, p. 360). Different from technicians who seek objectivity, qualitative researchers engage in a bi-directional relationship with the world. The de-ontological philosophy of nothingness extends the horizon of qualitative inquiry by enabling researchers to possess situational identity. Situational identity is characterized by facticity, the simultaneous attribute of objectifying and being objectified (Dilworth & Silverman, 1978, p. 91). As an integral part of the world, qualitative researchers move away from their a priori selves to selves in relations and contribute their intuitions and feelings to the infinite human fullness. In this respect, the organic view of nothing imbedded in contextual existence generates an alternative all-inclusive moral refuge for being.
Within the moral shelter of nothingness, the wholeness of ontology and epistemology, philosophy and methodology pre-exists their dichotomizations. Before each party is known, the dyads are already emplaced in an infinite enveloping universal. Just like beings as the shades of nothingness are mirrored in the all emptying mirror, individuals as embodiments of infinite human fullness are relational in contexts. Through acting intuitions, individuals manifest the relationship to contribute to human fullness as well as the integrity of the world’s self-formation.
From an Eastern perspective, phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics are like overlapping shades. The all-enveloping place of nothingness provides a moral refuge wherein intentionality in the field of consciousness and linguisticality of inexpressible experience are inextricably emplaced. Rather than prescribing the “what” at instrumental level, the integrity of philosophical and methodological inquires describes the “how” and “why” of being. What Nishida proposes is the logic of predicate that is different from the Aristotalian subject logic. In the following sections, I examine being from the perspective of nothingness with a focus on the differences between subject logic and predicate logic and the methodological significance.
Subject Logic and a Priori Being
What is subject logic and why is the discussion of a priori being important? Literally, subject logic is the logic from the ontological direction of grammatical subject. Following Aristotelian subject logic, a knower as a transcendent being who makes judgments, possesses unique identities. It is important to understand subject logic before moving to predicate logic. Underlying subject logic is hylomorphism. Aristotle proposes that the world of being is composed of form and matter. He regards matter as substantial and form as real and divides substances into first and second (Fujita, 2016). As God is conceptualized as the first substance, subjects do not become predicates (Nishida & Krummel, 2012, p. 54).
The subject logic, however, poses two potential problems. First, since a subject exists as an a priori being, it is transcendent to the real world. The first point is obvious. Because following an Aristotelian logic all judgments are based on consciousness of an all-known subject, the subject–object relationship is dualistic in nature. Second, related to individual identity is the question of continuity–discontinuity. In this regard, the subject logic does not account for possibilities of change (Jiang, 2005). In Zeno’s arrow paradox, for example, an arrow can only be static in each indivisible moment. The static view of subject identity suggests that an individual be considered as a unit of analysis based on a given persona. However, the arrow paradox rests on the premise that the identity of a subject is pre-conceptualized and constant. Otherwise there would not be one but many arrows (Jiang, 2005, p. 452). It is clear that in both cases, an individual as the subject is regarded as transcendent. If a subject is to be taken as a part of the real world, there must be a place wherein the grammatical subject is emplaced. With regard to the all-enveloping place, the Aristotelian subject logic fails to provide an interpretation.
Predicate Logic and Embodied Being
Nishida’s predicate logic provides a different perspective. Predicate logic is the logic toward the direction of predicate. Different from the Aristotelian proposition that subjects cannot become predicates, predicate logic appears to rest on the assumption that predicates cannot become subjects (Fujita, 2016). With regard to the two problems of subject logic, predicate logic provides accommodations. First, predicate logic is pre-logical or de-logical as a “non-substance ontology” (Jiang, 2005, p. 456). Rather than understanding the world from the perspective of the a priori knower, Nishida examines the non-dualistic ground before the subject–object dichotomization. He positions one’s engagement in the world within a place of “experience-cum-reality” (Nishida & Krummel, 2012). Second, logic of predicate is logic of changes. Predicate logic signifies a perspective change from acting to seeing epistemologically (Nishida, 2011). Nothingness is not regarded as an empty place but a source that generates abundant possibilities and meanings. Emplaced in a universal of nothingness, beings are embodiments of self-contradictions and simultaneities of static and change. In the following sections, I expand on the concept of basho (place) and predicate logic. Although the concepts are sometimes used interchangeably, I discuss them in separate section with regard to the two problems of subject logic as well as intentionality and linguisticality.
Basho as a Turn to Nothingness
When talking about basho (place), one who is familiar with Western philosophy may think of Plato’s chora or Aristotle’s topos, a receptacle that holds ideas. Different from Plato’s chora as a static receptacle, Nishida conceptualizes basho to be a dynamic self-forming source with amorphous boundaries (Nishida, 2011). Basho that envelops beings serves as a predicate: “a basho cannot be the subject of a judgement in that same basho” (Wilkinson, 2009, p. 106). In other words, a basho is a place wherein beings are generated and go to extinction. Judgments are not shaped by all-known subjects but co-created within overlapping predicates in contexts. Nothingness wherein all beings are emplaced is an all-enveloping basho.
What does it mean to think with the basho of nothingness in terms of its structures? Nishida seeks to understand meaningful experience through his investigation into the relationship between the three worlds: “the natural world,” “the world of consciousness,” and “the intelligible world” (Nishida, 1958, p. 29). The first world is the natural world, a world of physical beings. To be means to retain physical forms. The second world is a world of consciousness, or oppositional beings. In this world, to be means to be conscious. The third world is a world of intelligible beings. To be means to engage in self-negation. The three worlds are not simply different layers. Instead, each world is like a place full of gestalt forces. Each world wherein meanings are actualized is a part of another world that leads toward the intelligible world.
Emplaced in the place of nothingness, subjects are no longer transcendent. It is through acting-intuitions that subjects project the world within themselves. Latent being becomes being through self-manifestations and goes into nothing by emptying itself. As the boundary between being and nothing is fluid, being and nothing are reflective than categorical. Basho “in the abysmal depths of—but also engulfing, environing—consciousness, is the mirroring mirror transcending all beings as its mirror images” (Nishida, 2011, p. 49). Within the basho of nothingness, the manifestation of beings become a part of the world’s self-formation (Nakumura, 1993).
Nishida’s logic of basho deepens the understanding of intentionality. “Consciousness was intentional in that it was always directed toward something ‘outside’ of the human mind—and this directedness also connoted interconnectedness” (Freeman & Vagle, 2013, p. 729). The negation of being and non-being proposed by Nishida resembles Husserl’s (1975) Noetic and Noema. However, different from Husserl who examines the concepts from the perspective of transcendental being within the field of consciousness, Nishida looks at relational being from the view of nothingness. Nishida conceptualizes a third world wherein the negation is emplaced. Within the third world, consciousness is not merely consciousness of something based on one’s mechanism of the brain but the acting intuition through which one flexibly co-construct meaning together with other members. Both is and is not, subject and object, being and non-being resolve and reform. Accordingly, “the ‘intelligible world’ is not another world, a world of transcendence, but the innermost center of our real world” (Nishida, 1958, p. 34). The intelligible world is like a background on which beings that are constantly changing cast their shadows.
Being in Relations Following Predicate Logic
What does predicate logic suggest with regard to continuity–discontinuity? Nishida does not start from the a priori subject with a constant identity. Instead, he places the subject within the place of predicate. Given the negation within the place of nothingness, individual identity is co-created and relational. As Maraldo (1989) argues, “What gives an individual its individuality is rather its place in a world that is determined by its actions in relation to other individuals” (p. 472). Here individuality is defined in relation with others.
Predicate logic provides a relational perspective of being. Whereas being means physical being in the first world, it also refers to conscious being in the second world. Just as the world of consciousness is emplaced in the intelligible world, intuitive activities through which judgments are generalized is at the same time a part of the formation of the place of nothingness. Free will both determines and is enacted in a holistic basho that contains self-contradictions (Nishida, 2011). The simultaneity of being in regard to the structure of the three worlds suggests that subjects are both static and changing, shapes and are shaped by their self-manifestations in relation to other members.
As our subjectivity both determines and is determined by our actions (Krummel, 2015), to understand being that is both static and changing is to take a holistic worldview. With regard to continuity–discontinuity, the holistic perspective suggests a perspective changing from the acting to the seeing (Nishida, 2011). Following traditional subject logic, consciousness itself relies on a transcendent subject and an a priori proposition. Accordingly, knowing is a form of acting. To know is to cast the image of objects on a mirror. However, a determined free will cannot be called free will. Different form the knower in subject logic, the knower is also the known in predicate logic. Just as the perspective of subjects changes with contexts, beings are generated and go to extinction within the background of predicate as a mirroring mirror. As a result, to know means to see without the presence of an all-known seer. Through acting intuitions, one experiences the formation of oneself as well as the world. Nishida conceptualizes “this endless dynamism as an internal mirroring of its own process within itself, in the sense that the resulting content appears within the very dynamism of the process of determination” (Nishida, 2011, p. 9). Within the place of nothingness, the oneness of seer and seen cannot been differentiated.
Nishida’s predicate logic also provides a deep structure for understanding linguisticality. Similar to Nishida’s discussions on the simultaneity of being in negations within the three enveloping worlds, Gadamer (1975/1985) refers to simultaneity in his work as the timelessness of literature. For him, to understand means to co-create with the author the meanings of a work for today than to stick to what it means in the past. Although Gadamer develops the concept of linguisticality as a structure before language takes form to interpret simultaneity as one of his key ideas, his interpretations of the indescribable are somewhat limited by his scope of being. In this regard, Nishida’s predicate logic provides a theoretical perspective of the underlying structure as nothing that is vital to understand the flexibility of simultaneity and existence.
To conclude, Nishida’s basho of nothingness following a predicate logic is significant with regard to both Aristotelian subject logic as well as phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiry. Nishida’s discussion on the fluidity between the phenomenal and intelligible world as well as the simultaneity of being as non-being extends understandings of Husserl’s intentionality and Gadamer’s linguisticality. Within Nishida’s oneness basho, intentionality and linguisticality exists as an integrity. In the following sections, I discuss the methodological implications of Nishida’s philosophy of nothingness based on personal narratives. I suggest we take basho as a unit of analysis and adopt relational persona as an analytical perspective.
Basho as a Unit of Analysis
During the time I worked part time in a library in a mid-west research university, I was exposed to a variety of publications from different cultures. I remembered one day I saw a Japanese journal cover of sparkling stars in the sky. The picture, as it says on the cover, is about a piece of romantic literature. Later I read the short piece carefully but found no words of “being in love.” Apparently, the stars in the sky are disconnected to a state of being in love in both its literal and metaphorical sense, but the immanent connotations between the lines contain the possibility of manifesting a state of being romantic. In other words, although readers may not share same interpretations with the author, the invisible but latent connotation that holds the connectedness provides a place for co-creation. In this context, saying nothing is saying something firmly. The absence of relevant words actually creates a broader horizon together with infinite possibilities in imagination. The beauty deep in the literature is not static and ready-made but to be co-created beyond texts given contextual dynamics.
The place that holds the interpretations of being and non-being captures the key of the basho of nothingness. In understanding the romantic literature, the unit of analysis is neither the main characters in love nor the sparkling stars alone but how the characters and the scenery are related as a whole in a larger background. It does not deny being but instead makes being meaningful by positioning it as relational. With regard to the structure of the nothingness place, the unit of analysis of character-in-relation probably has three interrelated levels:
Being: Participants and artifacts in research.
Non-being or oppositional nothing: The ways in which participants are related to artifacts given contexts in research.
Absolute nothing: The contexts that enable communication and generate transferability in research.
Basho as a unit of analysis of character-in-relation opens up possibilities for deep and dynamic understandings. The three levels correspond to the three worlds, “the natural world,” “the world of consciousness,” and “the intelligible world” (Nishida, 1958, p. 29). Just as each world is emplaced in another world, the consciousness being is also situated in contexts. Taking basho as a unit of analysis suggests that individual identities is not a “given” but an imminent relational co-creation through acting intuition. Moving beyond intentional relationships that are transcendental and essential, post-intentionality enables flexible and existential manifestations of both mind and body together with apparent and latent selves sustained among otherness (Vagle, Clements, & Coffee, 2017). From a post-intentional standpoint, meanings are fluid and non-essential (Freeman & Vagle, 2013). Meanings and validity are not determined but co-constructed in the gestalt of the changing reality.
To take basho as a unit of analysis is not merely to change an analytical framework. Through a holistic perspective, basho as unit of analysis suggests that we reconsider traditional researcher–participant relationship as well as research design. Although it is common to conceptualize researchers as the ones who conduct research and participants as those to be researched, reflected in the understanding is an underlying subject–object dichotomization. The holistic world view through the analytical framework of basho positions researcher and participants as members in relation. In addition, although it is common for researchers to write an outline, develop a framework, and apply a proposal honestly in practice, it is difficult for them to make constant and timely adjustments along with the changing dynamics in contexts. The lack of flexibility makes the proposal a “given” with some information about the participants rather than an integral and dynamic co-creation with participants. In cases wherein a proposal deviates from its original meaning of providing guidance, it is not unusual for qualitative researchers to start with the context and end up with another proposal afterward. In contrast, when researchers engage in a relationship with participants, authentic understanding can be achieved. Different from outlining principles for implementation based on one methodology, a proposal can be narratives that combine different methodologies. Based on contextual dynamics, researchers develop a sense of appropriateness in the degrees they take from each research methodology. For example, one may build a fluid and holistic understanding on a clear bottom-up categorization of the phenomena by combining grounded theory (Yin, 2011) and philosophical hermeneutics.
Relational Persona
As a person who speaks three languages and socialized in two cultures, I was often asked to make translations. Although people may think it easy to translate by replacing words with words, I usually act as a mediator between people who speak different languages and from different cultures. To make the cultural meaning between the lines explicit, I have to explain based on different logical systems.
Similarly, most translated works involve a perspective change. (Xu, 2015), a scholar on Nishida philosophy, gave Kawabata Yasunari’s Snow Country, a classic Japanese novel as an example. Kawabata’s original sentence “国境の长いトンネルを抜けると雪国であった” (Crossing the long tunnel is the snow country; Xu, 2015, p. 35) was translated as “The train came out of the long tunnel into the snow country” (Karabata, 1956/1996, p. 3). “The train” as the subject of the sentence in the English translation was originally not included in the Japanese edition. Although the two versions share similar meaning, they express different connotations. The Japanese edition adopts a changing perspective co-created by readers, the character on the train and the train (Xu, 2015). The sentence invites readers to think. Who was on that train? Why did he travel to the snow country? In contrast, the translated edition changes the focus to the train by providing a series of captures of the train in different locations with the tunnel. As the translation assumes an all-known spectator role, the space for imagination disappears.
The differences in perspectives suggest the distinction between Aristotelian subject logic and Nishida’s logic of predicate. In research following subject logic, identity is an attribute that is unique to a subject. To understand means to take each participant as a case and identify a unique persona. In contrast, in predicate logic identity is relational.
The integrity that creates space for understandings from a non-dualistic perspective suggests a change in understandings of identity. To describe the bi-directional relationship and the co-constructed identities in context, I develop the concept of relational persona. Following the predicate logic, relational persona has three levels:
Individual identity: participant’s different characters in research.
Relational identity: the gestalt relationship between participants and researchers in research.
Holistic identity: the holistic feelings conveyed based on the relationship between researchers and participants in contexts.
Relational persona following a predicate logic suggests a research perspective change. Rather than zooming in to focus on participants from an on-looker perspective, the researcher is emplaced in a changing context together with the participants. In other words, researchers are simultaneously participants to be researched, and participants are also subjects that shape the imminent relationship. In this regard, the relational persona also has implications for reconstructing the way data are analyzed and organized. A common way to organize data is either by cases of differences or by themes based on similarities across cases for common patterns. In both circumstances, however, researchers present sided views without uncovering the underlying structure upon which the oppositional phenomena is built. From a holistic perspective, researchers and participants with both similarities and differences are related as a whole in contexts. As meanings are co-constructed through relational dialogues among subjects and participants, variations in socialization experience in the cultural context and degrees of engagement in the community lead to difference in understanding. Based on a relational view, to research is to co-construct imminently from inside rather than to deconstruct from outside.
Embodiment and Transferability
As an extension of the discussion on basho and relational persona, I further discuss embodiment and transferability. In traditional research, the conceptualization of a transcendent subject fails to describe the integrity of bodily self as an integral part of the world. Nishida’s place of nothingness suggests that being be viewed as “embodied.” In a non-dichotomized world, an embodied subject is both the subject and itself an organic part of it. Through dialogical interaction with the environment and based on acting intuitions, the subject’s growth coincides with the process of the world’s self-formation. The self can be conceived as a “unifying point that posits knower and known, that is, subject and object, form and matter, in mutual opposition within the interior of the consciousness of what we call self”(Nishida, 2011, p. 54). The connection between the subject and the world captures the complexity of human experience. To understand the dynamism of self-contradiction through embodiment, one reflects on both the mind and the body–mind status.
The Eastern perspective also provides an alternative understanding of transferability. Traditionally, it is common for readers of qualitative research to make generalizations unidirectionally. Whereas researchers provide thick descriptions, readers compare the case researched with other contexts and make judgments based on similarities. This way of making generalizations is based on two assumptions. First, phenomena that look alike from outside possess similar connotations for researchers and readers. Second, a totalization of similar phenomena is equal to the whole regardless of the possible variations of meaning given changes in contexts. Apparently, the statements are true only in rare cases. Qualitative research holds transformative than instrumental value. Just as being is emplaced in nothing, transferability both among cases and within the world as an integrity goes beyond what works to what enlightens. Rather than seeking for concrete forms of similarities, it is suggested that “we accept a rough but useful point of departure in order to arrive later at a more elaborated, still not exact, but even more useful understanding” (Larsson, 2013, p. 40). By co-constructing within basho as contexts, the gestalt of similarities and differences unfolds themselves the intertextual and connoted meanings.
Concluding Thought
Nishida’s philosophy provides an Eastern perspective on being and nothingness and the fusion of phenomenology and hermeneutics. The alternative view of being from nothingness suggests that qualitative research is both philosophical and methodological. As “our embodied being mirrors and participates in this self-formative process of the world” (Krummel, 2015, p. 799), an embodied view reflect an unraveling of mind and body. By approaching changes from inside, the imminent manifestation leads to resolution between human and nature form its originating point. The Eastern perspective of “oneness” creates possibilities for re-conceptualizing phenomenological and hermeneutic research. Basho as a unit of analysis and relational persona contribute to methodological discussions on intentionality and linguisticality. It is expected that qualitative researchers engage in cross-cultural hermeneutic dialogues to extend the relational perspective in practice.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
