Moral Absolutism,Self-Deception,and Moral Self-Concept in Men Who Commit Intimate Partner Violence

Abstract

The objective of this study is to show compatible data with the idea that men who commit intimate partner violence are uninhibited about the moral consequences of their behaviors, probably because they feel certainty about the rightness of their moral values and they strongly deceive themselves to maintain a good moral self-concept, and thus a good level of well-being. To do that, we compare their scores with those obtained by an opposite sample regarding the use of violence, made up of professional male psychologists who work in the social field trying to teach others alternative strategies to violence.

Keywords

intimate partner violence moral absolutism self-deception moral self-concept

It is tempting to explain violence by resorting to pathology. However, as suggested recently by Shaw, Quezada, and Zárate (2011), those who perpetrate acts of violence are not necessarily driven by clinical pathologies. Rather, they are uninhibited by concerns over the moral consequences of their actions. When seeing immoral actions, criminal or not, we sometimes deem the people who perform them to be unhealthy (Tengland, 2012). This is especially true when their actions are of a serious nature, for example, involving murder, assault, or rape. All these things can be present in intimate partner violence (Basile & Hall, 2011; Belknap, 2010), particularly in what has been called “intimate terrorism” (Johnson, 2011).

Intimate partner violence constitutes a social problem in most societies (Garcia-Moreno, Jansen, Ellsberg, Heise, & Watts, 2006). It has serious repercussions, both in terms of money (Max, Rice, Finkelstein, Bardwell, & Leadbetter, 2004; Reeves & O’Leary-Kelly, 2007) and health (Coker, 2004), and remains prevalent despite major efforts to reduce and ultimately end it (Garcia-Moreno, Heise, Jansen, Ellsberg, & Watts, 2005). Although it is easy to turn moral evaluations into evaluations of health and illness, and much research has been done with this focus (Bell & Orcutt, 2009; Eckhardt, Samper, & Murphy, 2008; Howard, 2012; Hoyt, Wray, Wiggins, Gerstle, & Maclean, 2012; Swogger, Walsh, Kosson, Cashman-Brown, & Caine, 2012), the contention that intimate partner violence is the result of a specific disorder does not seem to be conclusive (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). An alternative hypothesis is that any kind of violence is deeply rooted in the social structures where people live, the result of socialization processes running parallel with a cognitive system configured to derive the greatest functional benefit out of any given situation (Buss & Duntley, 2011). Specifically, we set intimate partner violence in the moral domain (Jonathan Haidt, 2008), where people have to decide what is right and what is wrong at the same time they are driven to feel good. Thus, the general objective of this study is to show data compatible with the idea that, more than being affected by any pathology, men who commit intimate partner violence are not inhibited by the moral consequences of their behaviors, probably because they feel certainty about the rightness of their moral values, and they strongly deceive themselves to preserve a positive moral self-concept. In such a context, this study raises the following issues: Could a portion of intimate partner violence be related to absolute ideas about what is right and wrong? Do men who use violence against their intimate partner perceive their own self-concept as moral? Do they need high levels of self-deception to keep everything in balance?

Moral Absolutism and Violence

But, what is right and wrong? This is a fundamental question for every society, with each one answering it by developing moral systems, which, in turn, regulate group members’ behavior. From a functionalist approach, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) define moral systems as “a set of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 800). Thus, morality really does vary by culture, class, and era, and works by either constraining or enabling a wide range of admissible behaviors for the members of any social system (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011).

In parallel, and because of natural biases toward the self (Baumeister, 1989; Greenwald, 1980; Greenwald & Krieger, 2006) and the in-group from which a person’s beliefs often originate (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), there is a strong tendency for individuals to consider their own point of view as more correct. That leads them to perceive their own moral beliefs to be the “right” ones (McGregor, 2006; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001). Seeing the world in such a way is pleasant but unrealistic (Triandis, 2009, 2011). Diversity is everywhere, including the moral domain, where a great variety of beliefs and practices can create an appreciable amount of uncertainty and a feeling of being threatened, which humans, in general, are motivated to manage and resolve.

Moral absolutism, understood as the degree to which people believe that their own definition of morality is objectively correct (Peterson, Smith, Tannenbaum, & Shaw, 2009), has been related to “moral exporting,” a behavior that arises to confirm certain ways of thinking about morality with the explicit purpose of bringing others into line with the self, rather than the self into line with others. Peterson and colleagues (2009) think of moral absolutism as an individual difference in the perception of the objective truth of one’s own set of moral beliefs, stemming from epistemic motivations for certainty. The higher individuals score on moral certainty, the more they endorse the idea that morals should not vary by culture, person, or situation because they are “true” according to a standard that transcends these factors. Moreover, higher scores on this measure reflect the degree to which people see their own set of moral values as the only correct set to be adopted, to the extent that deviations from this set of values in a given person or culture constitute immorality.

According to this, it is no surprise that moral absolutism is related to greater support for violent conflict. Specifically, moral absolutism seems to strengthen the relation between religiosity and support for violent warfare (Shaw et al., 2011). It seems that moral absolutism leads to a moral licensing effect in such a way that feelings of moral certainty satisfy a person’s need to feel moral, rendering good acts unnecessary to feed this need and allowing these individuals to indulge in moral laxity. Research on moral licensing indicates that when a person feels that he or she is moral enough in a given domain, his or her motivation to be moral in others decreases (Khan & Dhar, 2006; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2006; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). People seem to adjust their moral behavior accordingly. They up-regulate it when they feel they are not moral enough and down-regulate it when they feel that they are already moral people (Shaw et al., 2011).

The idea that the more people think they are right about some moral principle, the more they are willing to fight for it has been advanced by some authors in recent years. Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister et al., 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) see threatened egotism as a particular cause of aggression at the individual level and moral idealism as the cause of the major violent atrocities of the 20th century. Through many empirical studies, Skitka and colleagues (Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Skitka, 2002, 2010; Skitka & Mullen, 2002) show that the degree to which people view issues through a moral lens (moral convictions) is an important predictor of discrimination against those who do not share their moral point of view. Graham, Haidt, and colleagues (Graham & Haidt, 2012; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010) illustrate that the process of sacralizing objects according to sacred values, as well as the attendant process of developing a vision of evil as constituted by whatever threatens those objects, can lead to violent actions, even if those sacred values are radically opposed to violence, such as nurturance, care, or peace.

As a result, it can be concluded that absolute moral beliefs and inflated moral self-images seem to pose a risk to peaceful coexistence. Not only may they explain many different unethical behaviors, intimate partner violence among them, but they may also serve to justify them.

The Role of Self-Deception

Self-deception is defined as the tendency to view oneself in an unrealistically favorable light. It is a non-intentional bias in perceiving the self, unlike impression management, which represents an intentional self-presentation tactic. It has been argued that it is an important component of subjective well-being (Baumeister, 1989; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Erez, Johnson, & Judge, 1995; Paulhus, 1991; Robinson, Moeller, & Goetz, 2009; Scheier & Carver, 1985) and a primary base of good mental and physical health (Kinney, 2000; Scheier & Carver, 1985). From this perspective, self-deception protects people’s beliefs and desires from a conflicting reality, leading it to be considered a defensive strategy adopted by individuals who are having difficulty coping with a threatening world. The hedonic consequences for the self-deceiver are considered to be the primary outcome of self-deception.

From an evolutionary perspective (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), it has also been argued that self-deception is an offensive strategy evolved for deceiving others, whether by convincing them of specific lies or, more generally, convincing them that one is better (e.g., more moral, stronger, smarter). It would be a useful tool in negotiating the social world, where hedonic consequences are not an important endpoint themselves, but only a means to achieving advantages in relationships with others. Taking into account that people are impressed by others’ confidence in themselves (Buss, 2009), bolstering our image of ourselves and enhancing our self-confidence increase our chances of being influential.

With regard to a sample of males convicted of domestic violence offenses, both objectives are relevant. On one hand, these individuals need to deceive themselves to protect their well-being from a threatening reality and, on the other hand, such a strategy may serve them to better deceive those who have to judge them (psychologists and judges). Thus, they are likely to be strongly affected by self-deception, and self-deception could be the variable that mediates between absolute moral beliefs and a positive moral self-concept.

Objectives and Hypotheses

This study has three specific objectives: (a) to evaluate, for the first time, in a sample of men in court-mandated treatment for having perpetrated violence against their partners, their levels of moral absolutism, self-deception, moral self-concept, and psychological well-being, and their moral behavior playing the reciprocity game; (b) to compare these scores with those obtained from an opposite sample regarding the use of violence, made up of professional male psychologists who currently work in the social field trying to teach others strategies that represent alternatives to violence; and (c) to relate all these scores in a mediation model where, to maintain a good level of moral self-concept, the high levels of moral absolutism in men who use violence against their partners would explain moral self-concept through self-deception. The resulting picture, if coherent, should allow us to focus on new variables and functional mechanisms to better understand this kind of violence and to better prevent it.

Men who commit intimate partner violence should exhibit greater moral absolutism and greater self-deception because of their imperious need to feel they are moral enough in a context where they have been judged by the court. If men who use violence feel that they are right about their moral beliefs, despite the fact that the morality of their behavior has been questionable, then their self-concept and their levels of psychological well-being should be at least equal to those men who do not use violence. Moreover, moral absolutism and self-deception could work together as functional mechanisms to maintain a positive moral identity when there is something that threatens it. If so, the relationship between moral absolutism and moral self-concept will be mediated by self-deception in the sample of men who, on one hand, feel they are moral enough but, on the other hand, are being judged for their violent behaviors. Such a mechanism should not be present in men who do not perceive their moral self-concept as threatened and have no need of absolute moral beliefs. Finally, and according to the moral licensing effect, the motivation to behave ethically following a moral identity boost may actually be diminished because the need to view oneself as a moral person has already been satisfied (Merritt et al., 2010). If so, one would expect men who usually use violence in their intimate relationships to exhibit more unfair behavior in the Ultimatum Game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 2005), simply because their high levels of moral absolutism and self-deception allow them to live in a situation where their moral self-concept is very positive. Based on all these related assumptions, the specific hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): There will be significant differences between men who commit intimate partner violence and men who do not in terms of self-deception and moral absolutism. The former will have higher scores.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): There will not be significant differences between men who commit intimate partner violence and men who do not with reference to psychological well-being and moral self-concept.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Self-deception will mediate the relationship between moral absolutism and moral self-concept in a sample of men who use violence against their partners, but not in the sample of men who do not use violence in their intimate relationships.

Hypothesis 4 (H4): There will be significant differences between both samples with regard to the amount of money they distribute to a stranger. Men who usually use violence in their intimate relationships will seek a more inequitable split of money in the reciprocity game.

Method

Participants

Participants were 101 males convicted of domestic violence offenses and who began court-mandated psychological treatment lasting 12 weeks. During the second session, they were asked to voluntarily participate in a research project under anonymous conditions. All of them accepted. The average age was 37 (SD = 9.41), with ages ranging from 19-68. Only 20% of the sample had a university education. Regarding nationality, 70% were Spanish, 25% were Latin American, and 5% were Eastern European, North African, or Central African. The severity of their crimes was unknown, but we can infer that some degree of homogeneity spurred the judges to make the same decision about them (psychological intervention instead prison). None of them had psychiatric disorders diagnosed.

The opposite sample was made up of 110 men who intervene against violence in their professional capacity as psychologists. This criterion allows us to claim that in theory, they use violence in small measures and constitute an opposite sample regarding the use of violence. Empirically, most of them (95%) reported not having fought with anybody in the past year. The snowball technique was used to recruit them and an anonymous online questionnaire hosted on a web page to gather their answers. Specifically, we contacted 30 psychologists from different organizations and asked them to distribute the web link among two or three colleagues, working as psychologists in the social field, so that they also answer the questionnaire. The average age was 35 (SD = 9.32), ranging from 23-61. Regarding nationality, 95% were Spanish.

Instruments

Moral absolutism

The Moral Absolutism Scale (Peterson et al., 2009) was used. It contains six items and measures the degree to which participants think their own moral values are reflections of an objective moral landscape. Participants were asked to rate the degree to which they agreed with six statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) (e.g., “Right and wrong are not usually a simple matter of black and white,” “There are many shades of gray” [R], “There is really only one proper way to think and behave morally”). Cronbach’s alpha for the scores was .705 for the sample of violent men and .787 for the opposite sample.

Self-deception

The Self-Deception Enhancement (SDE) subscale from the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Response (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991) was used. The 20-item SDE measures sincere beliefs in desirable self-descriptions on a 7-point scale, ranging from completely false to completely true (e.g., “I never regret my decisions,” “I am fully in control of my own fate,” “I am a completely rational person”). Cronbach’s alpha was .825 for the sample of violent men and .878 for the opposite sample.

Psychological well-being

The Self-Acceptance subscale from the Psychological Well-Being Scales (Ryff & Keyes, 1995), as revised by Van Dierendonck (2004), was used, which constitutes a eudemonic measure of psychological well-being (PWB). High scores mean that the person possesses a positive attitude toward the self; acknowledges and accepts multiple aspects of the self, including good and bad qualities; and feels positive about his or her life to date. The response scale was a 5-point continuum, ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. Cronbach’s alpha was .825 for the sample of violent men and .808 for the opposite sample.

Moral self-concept

The Morality subscale of the Six-Factor-Self-Concept Scale (Stake, 1994) was used to measure moral self-concept. It contains six adjectives related to morality (i.e., loyal, truthful, law-abiding, faithful, trustworthy, and honest). Participants indicated, on a 5 point-scale, how accurately each adjective described them (0 for never true of me, 4 for always true of me). Cronbach’s alpha was .824 for the sample of violent men and .812 for the opposite sample.

The ultimatum game

This situational test was use to assess how participants play the reciprocity game (Güth et al., 2005). Participants were asked to report how they would distribute 3,000 Euros to a stranger, knowing that if the stranger turned down the offer, both of them would lose it all. Discrepancy was calculated by subtracting the amount of money they would keep for themselves from what they would give to the stranger.

Results

One-way ANOVAs reveal the differences and the similarities among the two groups (Table 1). As hypothesized, men who use violence against their partners score higher in moral absolutism and self-deception than men who, at least theoretically, do not use violence in their relationships (H1). They also show a greater discrepancy between the money they decide to keep for themselves and what they give to the stranger (H4). Men who use violence keep, on overage, $450 more than men who do not. Both samples score equal in psychological well-being and, paradoxically, though expected, men who use violence against their intimate partners show a more positive self-concept than men who do not (H2).

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics, One-Way ANOVAs, and Effect Sizes in the Sample of Men Who Use Violence Against Their Intimate Partners and in the Sample of Professional Male Psychologists.

	Men who use violence (N = 101)		Psychologists (N = 110)
	M	SD	M	SD	F	p	Power	Eta-square	Cohen’s d
Moral absolutism	2.99	1.019	1.37	0.945	141.74	.000	1.00	.414	1.65
Self-deception	3.66	0.944	3.18	0.851	12.85	.000	.976	.084	0.535
Moral self-concept	3.48	0.510	3.31	0.482	6.65	.011	.625	.021	0.342
Psychological well-being	2.82	0.745	2.98	0.687	2.53	.113	.286	.011	0.221
Discrepancy ultimatum game: “Money for me—Money for the other”	$983	1,208	$533	868	.939	.002	.731	.039	0.433

Regarding the effect sizes, we can see in Table 1 that eta-squared, which is a measure of variance, is very high for moral absolutism. Another common measure of effect size is Cohen’s d. In this case, we can see that for moral absolutism, the two groups’ means differ by more than one and a half standard deviations, which means a large effect size or a very substantial difference. Cohen’s d for self-deception and discrepancy in the Ultimatum Game is about .5, which represents a moderate effect size. Only for moral self-concept can we say that the difference is limited, although it is statistically significant.

To test the model, mediation analyses were performed by evaluating the indirect effects in terms of the Sobel Z. An SPSS macro provided by Preacher and Hayes (2004) was used. Results show that the expected mediation effect of self-deception emerged, with an indirect effect of .135, Sobel Z = 2.55, p < .05. The bootstrapped 99% confidence interval around the unstandardized indirect effect did not include zero (.0039 / .2231). The direct effect of moral absolutism on moral self-concept became insignificant after introducing the mediator, which reflected a full mediation, b(YX.M) = .055, p > .01. This confirms H3 and allows us to conclude that self-deception serves as a full mediator between moral absolutism and moral self-concept in the sample of men who use violence against their partners. To provide a more definitive examination of these links, reverse causation was ruled out, using moral absolutism as a mediator and self-deception as the independent variable. In this case, the indirect effect was insignificant (Sobel Z = 0.994, p > .05).

Regarding the opposite sample, the mediation effect of self-deception did not emerge. The path between moral absolutism and moral self-concept was insignificant, b(YX) = .040, p > .05, as was the path after controlling for self-deception, b(YX.M) = −.003, p > .05.

Discussion

Although there is no study available that examines samples of men who commit intimate partner violence regarding these moral concepts, there is prolific research in the moral psychology field (Haidt, 2008) that links different versions of strong moral beliefs (moral convictions, moral absolutism, or sacralized values) and violence (Baumeister et al., 1996; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Skitka, 2010). There is also a well-established relationship between a strong moral self-concept and a decrease in the motivation to be moral in other domains (moral licensing effect; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Based on the knowledge of the double role played by self-deception to protect well-being and to better deceive others (Triandis, 2009; Trivers, 2000; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), we hypothesized that intimate partner violence could be understood, in part, as a behavior associated with absolute moral beliefs (moral absolutism) and self-serving biases (self-deception). Both, according to this hypothesis, work together to protect one’s moral self-concept and psychological well-being, especially in situations where they are threatened, as must be the case in the context of males convicted of domestic violence.

If we assume that the reality in which such men live continuously threatens their self-image as moral persons and, thus, their well-being, their idealized convictions about the self or their worldview could come to the rescue as a kind of offensive defensiveness (McGregor, 2006). This would make self-deception even more needed than usual.

To test these hypotheses, we compared two opposite samples with regard to the use of violence (men who actually use violence against their partners and professional male psychologists who actually work to prevent this behavior). The results showed that men who use violence against their intimate partners held more absolute moral beliefs (moral absolutism) and exhibited higher levels of self-deception. Paradoxically, they felt as moral and as good as the opposite sample, or even better. Looking deeper into the data, we found that the relationship between moral absolutism and moral self-concept was fully mediated by self-deception in the sample of men who use violence against their partners, but not in the sample of non-violent men. All these results lead us to portray our sample of men who use violence against their partners as much more morally absolutist and highly self-deceived, and with a very strong moral self-concept of themselves (loyal, truthful, law-abiding, faithful, trustworthy, and honest). The more they feel confident in their moral beliefs, the more they deceive themselves; and the more they deceive themselves, the more they feel good about themselves. Self-deception working as a full mediator seems to allow them to claim or believe to be acting morally while they are, in fact, acting worse than selfishly (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). They would reap all the emotional benefits of falling outside the optimal margin of self-deception (Baumeister, 1989), while the practical risks are borne by their intimate partners. Such a functional mechanism for themselves turns out to be rather dysfunctional for their partners.

In addition, and following assumptions driven by the moral licensing effect (Sachdeva et al., 2009), we also found that, without any manipulation, men who use violence against their partners made more unfair offers in the ultimatum game than the opposite sample. This could support the idea that the presence of this mechanism (moral absolutism–self-deception–moral self-concept) may permanently enhance their moral identity. Such an enhancement may serve to license unethical behaviors, which may include violent behavior against the intimate partner.

Study Limitations

The main limitation of this study is that the data are cross-sectional and, therefore, it is impossible to establish a causal link between variables. We do not know whether the high levels of moral absolutism and self-deception found in the sample of men who use violence against their partners are a cause or a consequence, and the same can be said with regard to self-deception and moral self-concept. This limits the conclusions obtained in this study. Another limitation affects the comparative procedure and its control methods. Nevertheless, and because this study constitutes a first attempt to explore intimate partner violence in the moral domain, its comparative and cross-sectional approach could be considered cautious. The findings do support theoretical ideas and empirical data using ecological samples, and may be considered sufficiently consistent to be a good starting point for new studies.

It could also be argued that the self-report method used may be tainted because of willful impression management on the part of the samples, especially by men who use violence and are being judged. However, we are quite confident about the results for two reasons. First, there is research showing that individuals accused of domestic violence may use impression management but, nevertheless, still score higher on specific measures of aggression, despite their attempts to minimize it (Helfritz et al., 2006). Second, we actually hypothesized that they would portray themselves in the most favorable light possible, as the fact that they need to believe this is precisely the problem. Thus, the higher they score in all the self-reported measures, the more they behave as we expect, that is, the more they portray themselves as moral absolutists, self-deceived, and paradoxically, enjoying a high moral self-concept.

In any case, the results have the potential to advance our understanding of the multiple causes and consequences of violence, and may serve to develop more effective approaches to prevention and intervention. Those who behave badly do not necessarily feel bad about it or have a disorder. They may simply be using functional psychological mechanisms to protect a good self-conception in a social system. Thinking of men who use violence against their partners as having functional mechanisms, working together to preserve functional goals inside a social system, may allow psychologists to incorporate new strategies focused, for example, on reducing moral self-concept and controlling for what we could call an abusive use of self-deception. The anticipated resistances should be very strong because we try to make them feel bad in favor of the well-being of their partners. The challenge is to shed light on the multiple interactions between the psychological mechanisms and the social systems that evolve together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).

Conclusion

Men convicted of having used violence against their partners, compared with an opposite group regarding the use of violence, seem to be more morally absolutist and more affected by self-deception. They experience equal levels of psychological well-being and a better moral self-concept. In addition, they are more unfair when playing the Ultimatum Game. These results may make sense if we appeal to a moral domain where individuals have to decide what is right and what is wrong and, at the same time, are driven to feel good. Therefore, they seem to be compatible with the idea that men who commit violence against their partners are uninhibited by concerns over the moral consequences of their actions, as suggested by Shaw and colleagues (2011), because they feel they are moral enough and strongly deceive themselves. The mediation analyses reinforce this conclusion, showing that moral absolutism feeds moral self-concept through self-deception in the sample of men who have been judged guilty of this kind of violence, but not in the opposite sample regarding the use of violence.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (PSI2012-35811) for its support.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Author Biographies

María L. Vecina, PhD in psychology, is assistant professor at the University Complutense of Madrid. She is a researcher in two fields of social psychology: (a) prosocial behaviors (namely, volunteerism and helping in catastrophes and emergency situations) and (b) moral psychology and intimate partner violence.

F. Chacón, PhD in psychology, is full professor at the University Complutense of Madrid and researcher on helping behavior and sustained volunteerism, and more recently, on violent behaviors and guidelines to good practices assessing dangerousness.

J. M. Pérez-Viejo, PhD in psychology, is chief executive of Aspacia Association (Asociación para la convivencia), working on programs to prevent all forms of violence and organizing psychological treatments for men in court-mandated treatment for having perpetrated violence against their partners.

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