Steering,Not Rowing? An Analysis of the Political Influence,the Role Perceptions,and the Behavior of Swiss City Councillors in Different Urban Governance Contexts

Abstract

In today’s cities, councillors see themselves increasingly confronted with new forms of political steering focusing more on interaction than on hierarchical decision making and blurring the lines between the public and private spheres. By embedding the concept of governance in a new institutionalist framework, the article investigates the implications of new models of urban governance on the identity, the notion of democracy, the perceptions, and the role behavior of city councillors. It tests two rival hypotheses—an optimistic versus a pessimistic perspective on governance and democracy—and thereby draws on multilevel analyses of a comprehensive survey of all city councillors in Switzerland.

Keywords

urban governance local democracy city councillors

Introduction

The cities and municipalities in the Western world have witnessed profound transformations in recent years and decades. The emergence of new forms of governing affected local policy making and the very nature of local democracy. The oft-cited shift toward a more horizontal style of decision making, toward closer cooperation between state and civic actors in policy networks and informal arrangements—generally framed as governance (Benz 2004; Kooiman 1993; Pierre 2000b; Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1998a)—is observed in most industrialized countries (Bekkers et al. 2007a; Denters and Rose 2005; Kersting and Vetter 2003). Deconstructing this international phenomenon reveals three different major aspects: a spreading of administrative reforms under the heading of New Public Management (NPM); increased collaboration between public actors and representatives from the local business world, local associations, or interest groups in informal networks; and the introduction of new forms of citizen participation. Switzerland serves as a valid example of the identified trend toward new steering mechanisms at the local level: Swiss municipalities experienced a broad wave of NPM reforms starting in the mid-1990s, the already frequent interactions between public and private actors have been intensified, and the involvement of citizens in local decision-making processes is increasing—despite the provision of already elaborate direct democratic instruments. Furthermore, with the regularly recurring Swiss municipality survey (Ladner et al. 2000; Steiner and Ladner 2006) that covers all Swiss communes, we possess detailed information about the implementation of new governing modes.

Until recently, governance research was nearly exclusively preoccupied with functional arguments, while issues of democratic legitimacy were not given sufficient attention (Papadopoulos 2003). Now, there is increased sensitivity to democratic aspects in the governance debate. While studying the democratic legitimacy of new governance models, however, different scholars arrive at different conclusions. Summarizing the arguments that have been put forward, we can distinguish between a pessimistic and an optimistic perspective on governance and democracy (e.g., Kübler and Schwab 2007; Skelcher et al. 2011). The pessimistic perspective draws on liberal democratic theory and regards governing arrangements rooted in rather informal interactions as a challenge or even a threat to representative institutions and local democracy. Scholars of this line of reasoning place emphasis on the missing electoral accountability and the selective inclusion of private actors (Mayntz 1998; Papadopoulos 1998), as well as on the decreased transparency of policy decisions (Papadopoulos 2004). The role and position of elected councils are thereby weakening. However, in an optimistic perspective, the focus lies on the deliberative side of governance. Steering mechanisms based on trust, cooperation, and informal interaction are considered a benefit for local democracy because they provide new channels of participation and mobilization (Bogason 2008) and produce more publicly oriented outcomes and improved civic skills (Hendriks 2009). Elected politicians are thereby expected to define the overall political objectives (Sørensen 2006) and ensure the democratic functioning of governance through metagovernance (see Bogason and Musso 2006; Nyholm and Haveri 2009; Sørensen 2006). Within the dispute of these two perspectives, my analysis focuses on the person of the city councillor. The implementation of new governance models and the associated change of the ideological and organizational context shape the perceptions of city councillors regarding their own political influence, their notion of democracy, and their image of appropriate behavior (March and Olsen 1989, 1996). But how are the councillors’ perceptions and role behavior evolving within new models of governance—in accordance with a pessimistic or rather an optimistic perspective on governance and democracy? Do local councillors increasingly tend to a liberal understanding of democracy? Do they experience a declining political influence and take counteractive measures? Or do councillors view new modes of governance according to the perspective of deliberative democracy and perceive themselves as metagovernors of the developing networks and partnerships? Do local councillors therefore endorse a new role behavior drawing on the managerialist doctrine that politicians should rather steer than row (Osborne and Gaebler 1992)? In the scholarly debate on urban governance, the very relevant issue of the role and cognition of municipal councillors has unfortunately not yet drawn proper attention (see Hansen 2005).¹ In Switzerland, previous research targeted higher state levels (Widmer and Rieder 2007; Widmer and Rüegg 2005) or drew on different case studies (Skelcher et al. 2011) while finding that elected politicians in Switzerland do not confine themselves to the role of metagovernors. In my article, I rely on comprehensive primary data—on a survey conducted in 2008 that involved all Swiss city councillors.² Combining the different data sources allows an investigation of the impact of new governance models on the councillors’ influence, their perceptions, and their role behavior on a broad scale. Should I thereby arrive at different conclusions than previous analyses, my insights into the mind-set of politicians under urban governance could be considered relevant for other national contexts as well.

The following theoretical section “City Councillors in Urban Governance” provides an overview of the debate on governance, discusses the two rivaling perspectives on governance and democracy, and generates hypotheses on the role of city councillors in urban governance. Section “Urban Governance and City Councillors in Switzerland” outlines the local political context in Switzerland, describes the data records, and operationalizes the introduced concepts. Section “The Impact of Urban Governance on Swiss City Councillors” provides quantitative multilevel analyses measuring the impact of different models of urban governance on the notion of democracy, the political influence, and the role behavior of Swiss city councillors. Finally, section “Conclusion” presents and discusses the results.

City Councillors in Urban Governance

Councillors are crucial actors in every city’s politics, but they have often been neglected in the ongoing debate on new, more horizontal forms of decision making (Hansen 2005). Important studies on councillors at the local level often investigate and discuss different aspects of the theoretical concept of political representation (e.g., Eldersveld, Strömberg, and Derksen 1995; Eulau and Prewitt 1973; Rao 1998; Sharpe 1962). In my article, the focus is on the role, the perceptions, and the behavior of city councillors within urban governance. Seen from a new institutionalist perspective, councillors act “on the basis of a logic of appropriateness associated with roles, routines, rights, obligations, standard operating procedures and practices” (March and Olsen 1996, p. 249). Institutions do not determine individual values and preferences, but these are neither exogenous nor stable, but rather shaped by the institutional context (March and Olsen 1989). The behavior of councillors is consequently influenced by their interpretation of political history and recent political events, by the perception of their identity, by dominant images of appropriate behavior, as well as by their own capability for appropriate political action (see March and Olsen 1996).³ With the implementation of new models of urban governance, the “rules of the game” are changing (Lowndes 2009, p. 94). In the following, I will analyze if and how different styles of governance affect the world of the city councillors in Switzerland.

Governance in a New Institutionalist View

Over the past 30 years, the analytical concept of governance gained more and more importance in academic debates in the social sciences. Governance does not have a well-defined outline, but it is generally considered “arrangements in which public as well as private actors aim at solving societal problems or create societal opportunities” (Kooiman 2000, p. 139). So, governance refers to interactions between the public and private sectors, to collaborations to achieve common goals. Thereby, the traditional demarcations between state and civil society are becoming blurred. According to Pierre (2011), governance “looks at the interplay between state and society and the extent to which collective projects can be achieved through a joint public and private mobilization of resources” (p. 5). Governance is often used as opposed to the term government, which stands for the formal institutions of the state that make decisions within specific administrative and legal frameworks backed up by the legitimate hierarchical power of the state (Hambleton 2005). The widely commented shift from government to governance (e.g., Jessop 1994; Kooiman 1993; Pierre 2000b; Rhodes 1997; Stoker 1998a) emphasizes the shifting away from hierarchical, bureaucratic decision making by the state toward more horizontal, cooperative, and informal modes of coordination. In the most pronounced versions of the argument, this shift is seen as “hollowing out the state”—for instance, in Rhodes’ (1997) model of “governing without government” or in the approach of self-governance (Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009). However, according to Pierre (2011), these models are not in line with actual reforms: It seems that governments remain very much at the center of governance. But governments are increasingly dependent on representatives from civil society and their resources, because no single actor—public or private—has the knowledge, information, and action potential to solve today’s complex problems and dominate unilaterally (Kooiman 2000). As a further analytical characteristic, the use of the term governance oscillates between structures and processes (Offe 2008). While governance sometimes refers to institutions, to governing structures (Mayntz 2004), it is also often used as a dynamic concept focusing on the process of steering and coordinating (see Pierre and Peters 2000).

Governance is more of a simple analytical framework than an elaborate theory, and it suffers from a fundamental “ideological emptiness” (Fenger and Bekkers 2007; Frederickson 2005). Scholars often use the concept in a rather technical way—The shift from government to governance is perceived as a value-neutral transfer of problem-solving capacity to civic actors. This transfer is, however, not a purely technocratic exercise, and the overarching rules of governance are far from neutral (Lowndes 2009). The emergence of new governing modes is always related to new ideas, political values, and ideologies. The implementation of NPM reforms, for instance, is clearly interrelated to such values as efficiency, competition, and individual freedom. So, to understand the hidden ideologies, to grasp the creation of new governance institutions, and to analyze the behavior of important actors within governance, it seems very promising to apply a new institutionalist approach (e.g., Pierre 1999). Embedded in new institutionalist thinking, the governance concept benefits from its analytical profundity. A normative institutionalist perspective ensures that the normative dimension to urban politics is not lost (Lowndes 2009), and it provides tools to analyze and understand better how the rules and routines of governance arenas as well as the corresponding values and norms shape and guide individual behavior (March and Olsen 1984, 1989).

Governance research is often geared to different models or modes of steering. These typologies distinguish between different governance types with respect to the inclusion of key actors or to the governing style—for instance, hierarchy, market, network, and community (Pierre and Peters 2000), or governance at a distance, multilevel governance, market governance, network governance, and societal self-governance (Bekkers et al. 2007b). Following partly Pierre’s (2011) reasoning,⁴ I define three models of urban governance: managerial, pro-growth, and community governance. Managerial governance draws on the broad literature on reforms of public administration (e.g., Kickert 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). It focuses on output-oriented steering; the overarching political values include choice and competition in public services as well as efficiency and professional management in public administration. The overall goal of managerial governance is to create a market-like exchange between the producers of urban services and the citizens who are mainly perceived as customers (Heinelt 2008; Pierre 1999). The instruments needed to achieve this objective can be summarized under the heading of NPM. NPM reforms involve a much wider deployment of market-type mechanisms for the delivery of public services, a shift toward measurement and quantification, an emphasis on consumer orientation and contract-like relationships, and a preference for more specialized “flat” structures (Pollitt 2003, pp. 27-28). Key actors in managerial governance are the managers of organizations producing and delivering services—Professional participation is clearly more important than the involvement of political elites (Pierre 1999). Pro-growth governance builds on new approaches targeting the collaboration between politics and business that have for instance been labeled public–private partnerships (e.g., Stoker 1998b) or urban regimes (Stone 1993). It therefore stands for a steering model relying on close interactions between the political elite and the local business world to boost the local economy (Pierre 1999). Overarching values include the common interest in local economic development, a privileged position for private capital in urban politics, and a somewhat elitist understanding of governing. Instruments to enable economic growth range from tax incentives and fiscal policies to urban planning, infrastructural development, and measures to increase the quality of life. Key participants in pro-growth governance are the local business elite as well as senior elected officials sharing an interest in boosting the local economy (Pierre 1999). Community governance eventually bases upon new participatory approaches (e.g., Fung 2004; Heinelt 2008) and refers to the involvement of civic actors in political decision making and implementation. Clarke and Stewart (1992) used this term to describe the empowering of the public as “community” that involves “the right to participate in and wherever possible determine issues affecting the community through direct control and through such institutions as neighborhood forums or community councils” (p. 7). So, the emphasis in the community governance model is on participatory decision-making and problem-solving strategies that involve the citizens, associations, and neighborhoods concerned. Possible instruments include for instance public conversations, participatory budgeting, citizen juries and panels, surveys, and organizations such as parents’ associations. Under community governance, the community functions as the crucial key player in the decision-making process (Somerville 2005).

Governance and Democracy: Two Perspectives

The shift toward new governing styles and the implementation of a specific governance model are accompanied by the inclusion or exclusion of different actors, by a certain distribution of political power, and by alterations in the local decision making and implementation. As March and Olsen (1984) stated, “The organisation of political life makes a difference” (p. 747). The design of political institutions shapes political democracy (March and Olsen 1984) and it is not only formal organizations that matter. Informal conventions, partnerships, and networks are equally important in influencing individual identities, preferences, and behavior (Lowndes 2009)—and thereby affecting the nature of democracy. Regarding the specific interdependencies between governance and democracy, we can distinguish between a rather pessimistic perspective and a more optimistic view in the scholarly debate (e.g., Kübler and Heinelt 2005; Kübler and Schwab 2007⁵; Skelcher et al. 2011). These two perspectives rely on different models of democracy theory and are therefore guided by different assumptions about the implications of governance on the form and functioning of democracy.

The pessimistic perspective is based on liberal democratic theory, which draws a clear distinction between the political system and its environment (see Held 2006). So, the transfer of political influence and action potential to private actors within the context of new governing models is perceived as a threat to democracy and its representative institutions. The shift to governance results in a “democratic dilemma,” a conflict between “system effectiveness” and “citizen participation” (Dahl 1994). Citizen participation and democratic institutions are constrained because traditional forms of participation and democratic accountability are becoming less relevant (see Heinelt 2004). Private actors within governance arrangements typically lack elective legitimacy (Mayntz 1998) and the policy decisions taken are difficult for representative bodies to control (Papadopoulos 1998). In the pessimistic perspective, the newly implemented governance arenas are characterized by a selective inclusion of actors, unequal positions and resources of involved actors, and a lack of transparency in policy processes (see Klok and Denters 2005; Papadopoulos 2004). So, in an aggregative way of understanding democratic institutions, governance reduces democratic accountability and leads to a weakening of elected councils (Papadopoulos 1998, 2004; Scharpf 1993). This disenfranchisement relates particularly to the elaboration of policy alternatives as well as to the selection of policy options (Kübler and Schwab 2007).

The optimistic perspective on governance and democracy draws on the deliberative model of democracy (see Held 2006)—an advancement of republican democratic theory inspired by Habermas’s (1992) discourse theory. In this perspective, the increasing cooperation between public and private sectors within service agreements, informal networks, or neighborhood forums is perceived as a benefit for society and local democracy. Emphasis is thereby placed on the discursive quality of interactions and on reasoned deliberation directed toward identification of the common good (see Sørensen and Torfing 2007a). So, governance opens up new channels of participation and mobilization (Bogason 2008) and fosters deliberative decision making (Kübler and Schwab 2007). According to the proponents of deliberative democracy, its benefits consist of “informed rational decisions, fairer, more publicly oriented outcomes, and improved civic skills” (Hendriks 2009, p. 175). In the optimistic perspective, the representative institutions do not necessarily lose importance—The role of the elected council, however, requires a modification (Hambleton 2007; Hansen 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2002; Sørensen 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). With the shift to governance, politicians are expected to take on a more strategic role and ensure the democratic functioning of governance through metagovernance (see Bogason and Musso 2006; Nyholm and Haveri 2009; Sørensen 2006). In this regard, metagovernance relates to defining the overall political objectives (Sørensen 2006) and “involves the management of complexity and plurality” (Jessop 1998, p. 42). So, newly emerged governance arrangements can be democratically anchored in elected councillors (Sørensen and Torfing 2005).

The Role of City Councillors in Urban Governance

The dispute between the two perspectives on governance and democracy is now taken a step further and is being applied to the person of the city councillor. The trend toward governance implies the rise of new ideas, norms, and political values. This emergence of a new overarching institutional framework influences the notion of what is appropriate behavior. Governance as networks, partnerships, or contracts affects the identities, perceptions, capacities, and routines of the actors involved (Sørensen and Torfing 2007b). Thereby, it may consequently change the behavioral patterns of these actors due to a modified perception of their own identity, a different image of appropriate behavior, or changing capabilities for appropriate action. But how are the roles and perceptions of political players affected and what behavior is regarded as appropriate in the new institutional context? In my analysis, I try to further develop the two rivaling perspectives on governance and democracy and apply them to the mind-set and the environment of the city councillors.

Seen from a pessimistic perspective, councillors regard the institutional change as negative and problematic for local democracy. The blurring of boundaries between state and society is perceived as a threat to democratic accountability and to the institution of the city council. So, councillors increasingly endorse a liberal understanding of democracy, which clearly distinguishes between public and private sectors. From a pessimistic stance, the shift to new forms of urban governance clearly involves a loss of power of the city council (Papadopoulos 1998, 2004). So, councillors perceive their position as less influential—their identity as sovereign rulers is weakening. Consequently, the notion of normatively appropriate behavior changes. The translation of the overarching rules of governance into actual behavior always happens through constructive interpretation (March and Olsen 1996). In a pessimistic perspective, city councillors try to counteract the ongoing political shifting, which is perceived as a danger to local democracy, to the transparency of decision making, and to political equality. So, they extend their controlling activities regarding the public administration to enhance the position of the council—regarding this behavior as normatively appropriate in the given situation.

In an optimistic perspective, city councillors develop a positive view on newly implemented governance models. They acknowledge the benefits of these additional participatory channels, the increasing discursive quality of interactions, and the inclusion of a wider range of actors into political decision making and implementation. With the shift to urban governance, councillors therefore adopt a rather deliberative notion of democracy. Furthermore, they do not experience a transfer of political power from representative institutions to private actors, but still perceive themselves as influential actors in a rather deliberative democracy. The overarching political values and ideologies of governance affect the councillors’ perception of their role, their identity, and their image of appropriate behavior. In line with several scholars (e.g., Bogason and Musso 2006; Hansen 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2002; Nyholm and Haveri 2009; Sørensen 2006; Sørensen and Torfing 2009), they regard a more strategic role in defining the overall political objectives and metagoverning the developing networks and partnerships as appropriate behavior. Due to the institutional change, the councillors’ identity corresponds to a greater extent to the image of a metagovernor managing deliberative decision making in public–private interactions, enabling the inclusion of civic actors, and ensuring the democratic functioning of governance.

So, my theoretical framework comprehends two superordinate rivaling hypotheses—the pessimistic and the optimistic views on governance and democracy—and for each hypothesis, three subhypotheses referring to the councillors’ perceptions and behavior in new governance contexts. Figure 1 summarizes the assumed effects of urban governance on the councillors’ notion of democracy, their influence, and their role perception and behavior—according to the two subordinate theoretical perspectives.

Figure 1.

Theoretical framework: Effects of urban governance on city councillors’ perceptions and behavior.

Do new political steering models prepare the way for a changed identity and modified role behavior of elected politicians? How do councillors interpret governance arrangements, and how are the effects on local democracy conceived? According to which perspective—pessimistic or optimistic—do councillors act or do we have to reject both hypotheses? And do the assumed effects differ depending on the prevailing model of governance? Answers to these questions are highly relevant for the scholarly debate on governance and for the further development of local steering models, as they promise deeper insight into the mind-set of local politicians, potentially unintended consequences of the expanded interplay between state and society, and the changing nature of local democracy.

Urban Governance and City Councillors in Switzerland

The Swiss city councils find themselves traditionally in a position between a strong government, due to the presidential form of local government,⁶ and a strong public, due to elaborate direct democratic rights. But local governance has changed profoundly in recent decades: NPM reforms spread throughout the country, the cooperation between state and private actors has intensified, and city governments began introducing new forms of citizen participation in decision-making processes. Thus far, the implications of these new governing models on the identity, the perceptions, and the behavior of Swiss city councillors have never been assessed on a large scale. Previous research only targeted a higher state level, the cantons (Widmer and Rieder 2007; Widmer and Rüegg 2005), or was based upon different case studies (Skelcher et al. 2011). The results of these studies indicate that elected politicians in Switzerland are rather reluctant to adopt metagoverning role behavior. In the following section, I will shortly present the local democratic system in Switzerland, operationalize the different models of urban governance, and give an overview on the Swiss councillor survey and the variables used in the following analyses.

Swiss Local Democracy

The Swiss polity is a federalist three-tier system composed of the national state (the Confederation), 26 federated states (cantons), and around 2,600 municipalities.⁷ The communes, the lowest level of the political system, enjoy considerable autonomy, which mainly consists of the right of local self-administration and the right to enact own legal norms (Häfelin and Haller 2001). The degree of autonomy is dependent on cantonal legislation, but in either case it involves levying local taxes. The communes generate 46% of their revenues with taxes and 24% with local fees and charges. Transfers from higher political levels are comparatively low, with only 18% being transferred down, which is the lowest fraction throughout Europe (Ladner 2002; Steiner 2000). So, local governments in Switzerland are highly dependent on tax revenues from the general public and local businesses.

As the most significant feature of Swiss municipalities is their small size (Ladner 2002), cities⁸ account for only 5.2% of all municipalities. Thus, two-thirds of the Swiss cities appoint a local council, while in one-third of the cities, the legislative function is served by the assembly of local citizens.⁹ Compared with other local territories or higher levels of government, the position of cities is not especially strong. Despite the increasing economic power of urban areas and the introduction of a new federal agglomeration policy aiming at strengthening horizontal and vertical cooperation in city regions, the key players in Swiss federalism still remain the cantons—as in other federalist countries (Kübler, Schenkel, and Leresche 2003).

Models of Urban Governance

To measure my theoretically specified models of urban governance—managerial, pro-growth, and community governance—I draw on the regularly recurring Swiss municipality survey (Ladner et al. 2000; Steiner and Ladner 2006), more precisely on the polls conducted in the years 1998 and 2005. These surveys covered all Swiss communes; they were addressed to the municipal chief executive officers and achieved a very high response rate of approximately 80%. The questionnaire approaches numerous aspects regarding organization and financial means of the administration, crucial actors in local politics, form and functioning of local democracy, as well as the implementation of reforms and new models of governing.¹⁰

Managerial governance strives for competition in public services and efficiency in public administration. It understands the production of public services as a market-like exchange between producers and consumers (Heinelt 2008; Pierre 1999) and places an emphasis on professional management. Managerial governance is therefore measured by the extent of the following NPM key instruments that Swiss cities implemented until 2005: the division of strategic and operational tasks, the delegation of operational tasks to the administration, and the introduction of global budgets, product definitions, performance agreements, and controlling. The implementation of NPM in Switzerland started in the middle of the 1990s and spread throughout the country. About 70% of the cities gained experience in that field, while nearly half of them implemented key elements of NPM (Kübler and Ladner 2003; Ladner 2001). It was mainly members of the local executive, the mayor, or the public administration who initiated NPM (Steiner 2000). So, NPM reforms primarily grew inside the administrative system of a city, while parties and their representatives in the council played a minor role in initiating such reforms. The Swiss version of NPM reserves an important strategic role for democratically elected bodies (Kübler and Ladner 2003), but if and how councillors consequently adapted their role behavior remains an open question so far.

Pro-growth governance relates to close interaction between the political and the business elite sharing the interest of boosting the local economy (Pierre 1999). In the present article, it is operationalized through the estimated influence of private enterprises and local commerce on local politics. According to Ladner (2005), networking activities between the city executive and business representatives have always been quite common in Swiss local politics. As the municipalities are strongly dependent on tax revenues, they are thus dependent on good relations with the local business world. But with increasing competition between cities due to the globalization of economic relations, cooperation between local governments and economic elites has become even closer and more pronounced (see John 2001). In Switzerland, the trend toward closer cooperation between political and economic elites has been demonstrated in a longitudinal analysis of the city of Zurich (Devecchi 2012).¹¹

Community governance stands for a stronger participation of civic actors in political decision making and implementation; it focuses on problem-solving strategies that involve the citizens, associations, and neighborhoods concerned. The indicators to capture community governance include the following measures: the extension of the instruments of initiative and referendum, the organization of information events for the public, and the inclusion of citizens in the planning of community projects. Thereby, the more informal instruments—information events and participatory urban planning—are more frequent in Switzerland: they have been introduced in 45% of all cities (information events), respectively in 42% of the cities (participatory urban planning). The reason for such initiatives presumably corresponds to Heads’s (2007) findings, according to which “the most common reason stated for encouraging civic participation practices is that the public sector will gain ‘better informed’ decision-making, through facilitating deeper involvement by stakeholders” (p. 447). In Switzerland, participatory instruments have a close connection with the traditional political process, as van der Heiden and Krummenacher (2011) showed in their analysis of 48 deliberative planning processes. Participatory elements are mostly initiated by politicians—often with the intent to increase the legitimacy of policy decisions—which not only facilitates the implementation of the decisions taken by such citizen forums but also increases at the same time the risk that the participatory process is biased by the politicians’ goals (van der Heiden and Krummenacher 2011).

Swiss City Councillors Under Scrutiny

The councillors’ political influence, their preferred notion of democracy, and the different role perceptions and role behavior were surveyed in 2008 in a comprehensive inquiry¹² covering all 4,162 city councillors in Switzerland. A detailed description of the survey is provided in Table A1 of the appendix. So, for the first time in Switzerland, we can directly measure the impact of new models of governance on the environment and the mind-set of city councillors.

As the first dependent variable, we take a closer look at the councillors’ preference for a certain model of democracy. Depending on whether a single city councillor regards the shift from government to governance as either positive or negative, he or she will presumably develop a different notion of democracy. We thereby distinguish between the model of liberal democracy, which clearly separates the state from society, and the model of deliberative democracy, which emphasizes the benefits of new possibilities of participation and the rising discursive quality in governance. A preference for liberal democracy is measured according to the councillors’ agreement with statements that stress equal political participation by all citizens, the high importance of elections, and the preference of local policies to a prior aggregation of individual preferences.¹³ The preference for the model of deliberative democracy is captured by the councillors’ agreement with statements emphasizing an active and direct participation of citizens, a consultation of citizens prior to taking policy decisions, and an involvement in policy negotiations of all actors concerned. Furthermore, it is measured according to the degree of support for hypothetic reforms, such as citizen consultation procedures and codecision procedures, where citizens can discuss and make binding decisions on certain local issues. Without considering the mode and character of urban governance, Swiss city councillors generally show a slight preference for the deliberative notion of democracy. On average, they score 12.8 out of 19 on the scale of deliberative democracy, while on the scale of liberal democracy, they reach 6.3 out of 12.

The second dependent variable is the political influence of the city council, which is measured with a question regarding the influence of different actors over the local authority activities. In comparison with other state and private actors, the councillors rank themselves fourth. They allocate most influence in local politics to the mayor, the local executive as a whole, and the heads of the public administration. So, it seems that at the local level in Switzerland, we find a particularly strong government and an influential public administration that shape local politics considerably.

Finally, the councillors’ role perception and role behavior are operationalized. Thereby, I distinguish between a controlling role that is linked to a pessimistic perspective on urban governance and a metagoverning role that is an expression of a rather optimistic view on governance and democracy. Role perception and role behavior are measured through the perceived importance of the tasks of “controlling the municipal activity” and “defining the main goals of the municipal activity,” as well as through the councillors’ actual contribution regarding these tasks. Independent of the prevailing governance model, Swiss councillors consider the controlling task and the goal-setting role predominantly of great or very great importance (72.7% and 77.4%, respectively). Regarding their actual role behavior, the average values are somewhat lower; 39.0% of city councillors define their contribution with respect to the controlling activity as great or very great, while 40.1% perceive their contribution regarding the metagoverning role behavior as great or very great.

The Impact of Urban Governance on Swiss City Councillors

Swiss city councillors are situated in different governance contexts and are therefore exposed to specific values, norms, rules, and routines. In the following sections, I will analyze if and how the organization of local politics shapes the councillors’ notion of democracy, their identity, and their role perception and behavior—and how much explanatory power is thereby assigned to individual attributes. To capture the potential influence of governance arrangements at the city level as well as of control variables at the individual level and city level, I apply multilevel models based on maximum likelihood estimation. At the city level, city size is integrated as a control variable because in several studies it turned out to be a significant factor regarding local politics in Switzerland (e.g., Ladner 2002; Ladner and Steiner 2003).¹⁴ Regarding individual characteristics, Heinelt (2012) showed that sex, age, and political orientation make a significant impact on councillors’ notion of democracy throughout numerous European countries. Besides these three individual features, I also include the councillors’ education level in the estimated models.¹⁵

First Dependent Variable: Councillors’ Notion of Democracy

The results of the multilevel analysis in Table 1 show that the implementation of new governance models leads to a significant preference of the city councillors for the model of deliberative democracy. This outcome only applies to managerial and pro-growth governance, though. So, for these two governance models, the optimistic hypothesis is corroborated—Councillors develop a positive understanding of the stronger involvement of the private sector in political decision making, they acknowledge the benefits of a wider political participation in informal networks, and they support the emphasis on discourse and reasoned deliberation. Individual preferences for a certain model of democracy are therefore not invariant, but rather affected by the overarching institutional framework, and by the emerging political values and rules. However, the pessimistic hypothesis postulating that the shift to urban governance is perceived as a threat to democratic accountability and councillors therefore tend to a liberal understanding of democracy needs to be rejected. The analysis does not provide significant results in any governance model. Swiss city councillors are obviously not worried about the blurring of boundaries between state and society, but approve the initiated path with their thinking.

Table 1.

Multilevel Model on the Impact of Urban Governance on the Swiss City Councillors.

	Coefficients (SE)
Independent Variables	First Dependent Variable: Notion of Democracy		Second Dependent Variable: Political Influence	Third Dependent Variable: Role Perception and Behavior
Fixed Part	Preference for Liberal Democracy	Preference for Deliberative Democracy	Political Influence of the Council	Role Perception: Controlling	Role Perception: Metagoverning	Role Behavior: Controlling	Role Behavior: Metagoverning
Age	0.015*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	−0.000 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
Education	−0.138*** (0.019)	−0.020 (0.031)	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.012 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	−0.010 (0.010)	−0.013 (0.010)
Left–right self-placement	0.137*** (0.020)	−0.342*** (0.033)	−0.005 (0.009)	0.031*** (0.010)	−0.007 (0.010)	0.042*** (0.010)	0.015 (0.011)
Sex (female)	0.186 (0.116)	0.636*** (0.188)	0.045 (0.050)	−0.111** (0.055)	0.085 (0.057)	−0.105* (0.058)	−0.070 (0.060)
City size	−0.057 (0.090)	−0.200 (0.135)	−0.097** (0.046)	0.015 (0.029)	−0.088 (0.054)	0.076* (0.044)	−0.016 (0.047)
Managerial governance	−0.036 (0.037)	0.143*** (0.056)	0.043** (0.018)	0.021 (0.013)	0.092*** (0.022)	−0.034* (0.018)	−0.003 (0.019)
Pro-growth governance	−0.021 (0.034)	0.109** (0.052)	0.036** (0.017)	0.014 (0.012)	−0.002 (0.020)	−0.002 (0.017)	−0.028 (0.018)
Community governance	−0.134 (0.180)	0.005 (0.274)	0.080 (0.089)	0.048 (0.067)	−0.087 (0.104)	−0.011 (0.088)	−0.067 (0.093)
Preference for liberal democracy			0.022 (0.013)	0.031** (0.015)		0.060*** (0.015)
Preference for deliberative democracy			0.005 (0.008)		0.047*** (0.009)		0.009 (0.010)
Political influence of the council				0.113*** (0.034)	0.260*** (0.036)	0.145*** (0.035)	0.283*** (0.037)
Intercept	6.293*** (0.164)	12.647*** (0.251)	2.362*** (0.156)	2.378*** (0.138)	1.831*** (0.174)	1.533*** (0.151)	1.512*** (0.176)
Random part
Variance city level	0.114 (0.055)	0.210 (0.128)	0.038 (0.013)	0.000 (0.007)	0.054 (0.018)	0.025 (0.012)	0.031 (0.015)
Variance individual level	2.744 (0.122)	7.239 (0.324)	0.491 (0.022)	0.626 (0.028)	0.632 (0.029)	0.665 (0.030)	0.698 (0.032)
n	1,074	1,061	1,040	1,055	1,040	1,047	1,038
Wald χ²	138.12***	165.05***	36.85***	51.47***	124.09***	84.20***	82.28***

p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

The control variables at the individual level also make a significant impact on the councillors’ notion of democracy. Age reinforces the preference for a liberal model of democracy, while education has a negative effect on the liberal attitude. Unsurprisingly, political orientation also plays a role: The stronger the councillors place themselves at the right side of the left–right scale, the higher their preference is for the liberal model and the weaker their engagement with deliberative democracy. Finally, women clearly favor a deliberative understanding of local democracy. These results are in line with Heinelt’s (2012) work, which studied municipal councils in 15 European countries and found that older councillors, male councillors in general, and right-wing politicians prefer the representative model of democracy, while women in municipal councils and left-wing politicians favor participatory democracy.

Second Dependent Variable: The Political Influence of the City Council

The results of the second analytical step match the previous outcomes (see Table 1). Again, the councillors’ perceptions are in accordance with the optimistic perspective on governance and democracy—They do not experience a loss of power of the city council. Despite the emergence of new governance models, the political influence of city councils in Switzerland seems unaffected or even to be increasing a little. Thereby, the effects do not differ depending on the prevailing model of governance. So, the councillors’ identity as sovereign rulers is not weakening, they do not feel excluded from important decision-making processes, or restricted to rubber-stamping policy decisions made elsewhere. Swiss city councillors still regard themselves as influential and important actors in today’s urban governance.

The explanatory power of the tested control variables remains marginal; only the education level and the size of the city have some influence on the perceived political power of the council. Both factors have a negative impact on the council’s influence in local politics. Furthermore, the additionally integrated preferences for a certain model of democracy—liberal ordeliberative—do not achieve a significant effect. The perceived political influence of the municipal council is obviously not dependent on the councillors’ notion of democracy.

Third Dependent Variable: Councillors’ Role Perception and Role Behavior

Alterations in the political organization of a city shape the behavioral patterns of the involved actors through a different image of appropriate behavior or changing capabilities for appropriate action. The results show that the implementation of new governance models has significant implications for the councillors’ role perceptions. These perceptions are influenced and constrained by the institutional frame as well as by individual factors—but according to which theoretical perspective? As in the previous two analytical steps, the pessimistic hypothesis needs to be rejected. The assumption that councillors try to counteract the ongoing shift to governance by extending their controlling activities regarding public administration cannot be sustained. Swiss city councillors neither regard the controlling role as appropriate behavior nor actually exercise this role behavior in a changing context of urban governance. With regard to the optimistic perspective on governance and democracy, the results are somewhat ambivalent. In the managerial governance model, the optimistic hypothesis is corroborated with respect to the councillors’ perception of appropriate behavior. In cities with a strong emphasis on NPM, councillors have adapted to the predominant managerial values—They see their role as defining the long-term objectives of the public service. With an increased shift to managerial governance, the councillors’ identity corresponds to a greater extent to the image of a metagovernor managing the achievement of political goals. However, this finding does not apply to actual role behavior. Swiss city councillors perceive the metagoverning role as appropriate under the prevailing circumstances, but they do not perform their role accordingly. The trend to managerial governance has no significant influence on the councillors’ actual behavior. Furthermore, the models of pro-growth governance and community governance leave the role perception and role behavior of Swiss city politicians unaffected—They do not have a significant impact on the dependent variables. So, whether the political influence of economic elites is increasing or the participation of civic actors in local decision making is broadened, councillors do not see the necessity to adapt their role behavior.

Regarding individual characteristics, we find a significant influence of age, political attitude, and sex on the councillors’ role perception and behavior. Older councillors more highly consider their actual contribution to the metagoverning role behavior than younger representatives. Male councillors and right-wing politicians attribute greater importance to the controlling task and perform this role more frequently as well. An individual preference for liberal democracy strengthens the controlling role perception and behavior—as we would have supposed. Consequently, a preference for deliberative democracy corresponds to a more pronounced metagoverning role perception. The councillors’ estimation of their political influence positively correlates with both behavioral patterns. Furthermore, the size of the city enhances the councillors’ controlling role behavior. So, what city councillors regard as appropriate behavior is clearly structured by the institutional organization of local politics, by their personal characteristics, and by their individual political values.

Conclusion

The trend toward urban governance in Swiss cities has an obvious influence on the councillors’ mind-set. The new political values related to governance, such as the augmented involvement of private stakeholders and more horizontal decision making based on cooperation, mutual trust, and reasoned deliberation, form an overarching ideological framework under which the city councillors operate. Derived from this framework, governance models formulate objectives, instruments needed to achieve these goals, and specify the participating key players. City councillors find themselves in a changing political environment with new standard operating procedures, practices, roles, and routines. As the results of the multilevel analyses have shown, the new rules of the game clearly affect the councillors’ identity, their notion of democracy, and what they perceive as appropriate role behavior. The institutional context matters—and it does so in line with the optimistic perspective on governance and democracy. In the scholarly debate, we can distinguish between an optimistic perspective, which draws on the deliberative side of governance and emphasizes the benefits of the changed ideologies, and a pessimistic perspective focusing on the lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy, selective inclusion of actors, and the missing transparency in governance networks. On the basis of the conducted analyses, the pessimistic hypothesis needs to be rejected. Obviously, Swiss city councillors do not perceive new forms of urban governance as a danger to local democracy, the transparency of decision making, and political equality. They do not tend more strongly toward liberal democracy, do not experience a shrinking of the council’s influence, and consequently do not extend their controlling activities regarding public administration. The optimistic hypothesis, however, is clearly quite powerful in explaining the councillors’ perceptions and behavior. The emergence of urban governance—or more precisely of the models of managerial governance and pro-growth governance—enhances the city councillors’ preference for deliberative democracy and increases the perceived political influence of the council. Managerial governance even changes the perceptions of adequate role behavior. Following the dominant political values in managerial governance, local representatives regard it as appropriate to take on a more strategic role, define the overall political objectives, and manage the new governance arenas. Apparently, the Swiss city councillors have adapted to the managerial logic of governance—They see their role in steering, not rowing. However, the model of community governance does not make an impact on the councillors. It may be explained with the fact that Swiss citizens already have a large say in politics and the newly implemented participatory reforms only comprise minor improvements.

Does the empiric evidence now allow for the conclusion that the position and the responsibility of Swiss councillors have profoundly changed with the shift to urban governance? Are party politics in today’s municipal councils subordinated, and have local politicians become managers? Have we entered a “postpolitical” era in urban governance (see Pierre 2000a, p. 243)? Interestingly, we can see a contradiction between the councillors’ role perceptions and their actual role behavior. Councillors recite the agenda of managerial governance, but do not act accordingly. They regard metagoverning behavior as appropriate in their position, but do not contribute actively to this role behavior. These findings are in line with Skelcher et al. (2011), who concluded from several case studies that in Switzerland “elected politicians have proved quite reluctant to embrace the new role of metagovernors foreseen by public management reforms” (p. 23). However, it is not an easy task to provide explanations for the prevailing contradiction between role perception and role behavior. One could, for instance, argue that councillors have indeed adopted a new self-conception as strategic metagovernors, but lack the capability for appropriate political action. This assumption, however, does not seem very plausible, because the vast majority of all cities that introduced NPM reforms also established strategic instruments for the council such as global budgets or motions relating to budget or performance. It could also be conceivable that the councillors’ statements came about through a social desirability bias: They maybe answered the question on the importance of certain behavioral patterns according to the dominant image of appropriate behavior. Unfortunately, this possibility is not verifiable. Finally, it seems most likely to me that Swiss councillors effectively regard the strategic goal-setting behavior as quite appropriate in the given institutional context, but that they are confronted with other important institutional forces in practice—such as their belonging to a political party, the demands of the electorate with regard to certain policies, and the pressure regarding their reelection. The role of a network manager is not very transparent to the voters and it does not serve to achieve ideological objectives. So, it is probably not very rewarding for city councillors—neither regarding their political career nor with respect to their personal ideological ideas—to strive toward strategically steering local politics and democratically anchoring governance arenas. In practice, it is certainly more appropriate to submit initiatives in the council on popular issues, current problems, or innovative policies. Although councillors perceive metagovernance as an appropriate task in managerial governance, it is unrealistic to call for an increased managerial engagement. We are obviously not entering a “postpolitical” era in Swiss local politics: City councillors still pursue party politics, worry about details in political decision making, and engage in ideological debates inside the council.

Are these empirical findings relevant beyond the Swiss context and can the conclusions be generalized despite the various peculiarities of the Swiss political system? Elected politicians in consensual democracies (Lijphart 1999) are used to sharing power with representatives from the business world or civil society. So, it does not come as a total surprise that city councillors in Switzerland behave in accordance with the optimistic hypothesis on governance and democracy. It is, however, astonishing that councillors display an obvious contradiction between their role perception and their role behavior. This ambivalent attitude regarding the metagoverning role concept can be considered relevant beyond the Swiss context and should be taken into account in future research on urban governance.

Footnotes

Appendix

Table A2.

Table of Operationalization.

Concept	Question	Indicators (Items of the Questionnaires)	Scale	Survey/Source
Independent variables
Managerial governance	“Which of the following NPM measures were implemented in your municipality in the last 10 years?”	Index capturing the following elements of NPM reforms:	0–6	Swiss Municipality Survey 1998 and 2005
		• Division of strategic and operational tasks
		• Delegation of operational tasks to the administration
		• Global budgets
		• Product definitions
		• Performance agreements
		• Controlling
Pro-growth governance	“According to your personal opinion, how strong is the influence of the following organizations, groups of people, and committees on the local politics in your municipality?”	Index capturing the influence of the following actors:	0–10	Swiss Municipality Survey 2005
		• Private enterprises
		• Local commerce
Community governance	“Have the participation possibilities of the citizen been extended in the last 10 years?”	Index capturing the following elements of participatory reforms:	0–1	Swiss Municipality Survey 2005
		• Extending the instruments of initiative and referendum
		• Organizing information events for the public
		• Involving the citizens in the planning of community projects
Dependent variables
Preference for liberal democracy	“People have different ideas about how local democracy should function. Please indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following requirements are.”	Index capturing the following statements:	0–12	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
		• Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government policies
		• Council decisions should reflect a majority opinion among the residents
		• The results of local elections should be the most important factor in determining municipal policies
Preference for deliberative democracy	“People have different ideas about how local democracy should function. Please indicate how important for local democracy you feel the following requirements are.” (1)	Index capturing the following statements: • Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions. (1) • Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives. (1) • Political decisions should not only be taken by representative bodies but be negotiated together with the concerned local actors. (2) • Codecision procedures, where citizens can discuss and make binding decisions on certain local issues. (3) • Citizen consultation procedure, where citizens are informed about and can support or criticize municipal proposals. (3)	0–19	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
	“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” (2)
	“Below you find a number of reforms that have been introduced in municipalities in different European countries. Irrespective of whether such reforms have been introduced in your own country or municipality, how desirable or undesirable do you consider the following reforms?” (3)
Political influence of the city council	“On the basis of your experience as a local councillor and independently of the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors is over the local authority’s activities.”	• The city council	0–4	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Councillors’ role perception: controlling	“In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you as a councillor?”	• Controlling the municipal activity	0–4	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Councillors’ role perception: metagovernance	“In your experience as a councillor, how important are the following tasks for you as a councillor?”	• Defining the main goals of the municipal activity	0–4	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Councillors’ role behavior: controlling	“In your experience as a councillor, how would you define your contribution regarding the following tasks?”	• Controlling the municipal activity	0–4	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Councillors’ role behavior: metagovernance	“In your experience as a councillor, how would you define your contribution regarding the following tasks?”	• Defining the main goals of the municipal activity	0–4	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Control variables
City size		Number of inhabitants (in December 31, 2006), logarithmized		Swiss Federal Statistical Office
Age	“How old are you?”		20–87 (centered)	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Education	“What is your highest completed level of education?”		0–10	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Left–right self-placement	“There is often talking about a left–right dimension in Swiss politics. Where would you place yourself on a left–right dimension? 0 (left)–10 (right).”		0–10	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008
Sex (female)	“Are you male or female?”		0–1	Swiss City Councillor Survey 2008

Note: NPM = New Public Management.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Larissa Plüss is a research fellow and PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich. Her research interests include urban politics, local democracy, and metropolitan governance. Her recent work has considered the impact of urban governance on the role perception and behavior of European city councillors and will be published in Local Government Studies, as well as the influence and role of municipal councillors in metropolitan governance, which will be published in European Urban and Regional Studies.

References

Bekkers

Victor

Dijkstra

Geske

Edwards

Arthur

Fenger

Menno

. 2007a. Governance and the Democratic Deficit. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Bekkers

Victor

Dijkstra

Geske

Edwards

Arthur

Fenger

Menno

. 2007b. “Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Introduction.” In Governance and the Democratic Deficit, edited by Bekkers

Victor

Dijkstra

Geske

Edwards

Arthur

Fenger

Menno

, 3–11. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Benz

Arthur

. 2004. “Einleitung: Governance—Modebegriff oder nützliches sozialwissenschaftliches Konzept?” [Introduction: Governance—Vogue expression or useful concept of the social sciences?]. In Governance—Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, edited by Benz

Arthur

, 1–28. Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Bogason

Peter

. 2008. “Institutional Theory and Democracy.” In Debating Institutionalism, edited by Pierre

Jon

Peters

B. Guy

Stoker

Gerry

, 22–41. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.

Bogason

Peter

Musso

Juliet A.

2006. “The Democratic Prospects of Network Governance.” American Review of Public Administration 36 (1): 3–18.

Bützer

Michael

. 2005. “Direkte Demokratie in Schweizer Gemeinden: Institutioneller Ursprung und politische Praxis im Vergleich” [Direct Democracy in Swiss Municipalities: Institutional Origin and Political Practices]. In La démocratie comme idée directrice de l’ordre juridique suisse, edited by Tschannen

Pierre

, 33–52. Zürich, Switzerland: Schulthess.

Clarke

Michael

Stewart

John

. 1992. Citizens and Local Democracy: Empowerment: A Theme for the 1990s. Luton, UK: Local Government Management Board.

Dahl

Robert A.

1994. “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation.” Political Science Quarterly 109 (1): 23–34.

Denters

Bas

Rose

Lawrence E.

2005. Comparing Local Governance. Trends and Developments. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

10.

Devecchi

Lineo

. 2012. “Von politischen Grabenkämpfen zur kooperativen Planung” [From political trench warfare to cooperative planning]. disP—The Planning Review 48 (4): 45–55.

11.

Egner

Björn

Sweeting

David

Klok

Pieter-Jan

, eds. 2013. Local Councillors in Europe. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS.

12.

Eldersveld

Samuel J.

Lars

Strömberg

Wim

Derksen

. 1995. Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden, and The Netherlands. Boulder: Westview Press.

13.

Eulau

Heinz

Prewitt

Kenneth

. 1973. Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

14.

Fenger

Menno

Bekkers

Victor

. 2007. “The Governance Concept in Public Administration.” In Governance and the Democratic Deficit, edited by Bekkers

Victor

Dijkstra

Geske

Edwards

Arthur

Fenger

Menno

, 13–33. Aldershot: Ashgate.

15.

Frederickson

George H.

2005. “Whatever Happened to Public Administration? Governance, Governance Everywhere.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Management, edited by Ferlie

Ewan

Lynn

Laurence E.

Jr. Pollitt

Christopher

, 282–304. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

16.

Fung

Archon

. 2004. Empowered Participation: Reinventing Urban Democracy. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

17.

Habermas

Jürgen

. 1992. Faktizität und Geltung [Between facts and norms]. Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp.

18.

Häfelin

Ulrich

Haller

Walter

. 2001. Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht. 5th ed. Zürich, Switzerland: Schulthess.

19.

Hambleton

Robin

. 2005. “Leading Localities: Rethinking the Agenda.” In Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement, edited by Haus

Michael

Heinelt

Hubert

Stewart

Murray

, 190–213. London: Routledge.

20.

Hambleton

Robin

. 2007. “New Leadership for Democratic Urban Space.” In Governing Cities in a Global Era: Urban Innovation, Competition, and Democratic Reform, edited by Hambleton

Robin

Gross

Jill Simone

, 163–76. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

21.

Hansen

Karin

. 2005. “Representative Government and Network Governance—In Need of ‘Co-governance’: Lessons from Local Decision Making on Public Schools in Denmark.” Scandinavian Political Studies 28 (3): 219–37.

22.

Head

Brian W.

2007. “Community Engagement: Participation on Whose Terms?” Australian Journal of Political Science 42 (3): 441–54.

23.

Heinelt

Hubert

. 2004. “Governance auf lokaler Ebene” [Governance at the local level]. In Governance—Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, edited by Benz

Arthur

, 29–44. Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

24.

Heinelt

Hubert

. 2008. Demokratie jenseits des Staates. Partizipatives Regieren und Governance [Democracy beyond the state. Participatory government and governance]. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.

25.

Heinelt

Hubert

. 2012. “Councillors’ Notions of Democracy, and Their Role Perception and Behaviour in the Changing Context of Local Democracy.” Local Government Studies. Published electronically April 12. doi:10.1080/03003930.2012.670746.

26.

Held

David

. 2006. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.

27.

Hendriks

Carolyn M.

2009. “Deliberative Governance in the Context of Power.” Policy and Society 28:173–84.

28.

Jessop

Bob

. 1994. “Post-fordism and the State.” In Post-fordism: A Reader, edited by Amin

Ash

, 251–79. Oxford: Blackwell.

29.

Jessop

Bob

. 1998. The Rise of Governance and the Risk of Failure: The Case of Economic Development. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

30.

John

Peter

. 2001. Local Governance in Western Europe. London: Sage.

31.

Kersting

Norbert

Vetter

Angelika

. 2003. Reforming Local Government in Europe: Closing the Gap between Democracy and Efficiency. Opladen, Germany: Leske+Budrich.

32.

Kickert

Walter

, ed. 2007. The Study of Public Management in Europe and the US: A Comparative Analysis of National Distinctiveness. London: Routledge.

33.

Klijn

Erik-Hans

Koppenjan

Joop F. M.

2002. “Rediscovering the Citizen: New Roles for Politicians in Interactive Policy Making.” In Public Participation and Innovations in Community Governance, edited by McLaverty

Peter

, 141–64. Aldershot: Ashgate.

34.

Klok

Pieter-Jan

Denters

Bas

. 2005. “Urban Leadership and Community Involvement: An Institutional Analysis.” In Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement, edited by Haus

Michael

Heinelt

Hubert

Stewart

Murray

, 40–64. London: Routledge.

35.

Kooiman

Jan

. 1993. “Social-Political Governance: Introduction.” In Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions, edited by Kooiman

Jan

, 1–8. London: Sage.

36.

Kooiman

Jan

. 2000. “Societal Governance: Levels, Modes, and Orders of Social-Political Interaction.” In Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, edited by Pierre

Jon

, 138–64. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

37.

Kübler

Daniel

Heinelt

Hubert

. 2005. “Metropolitan Governance, Democracy and the Dynamics of Place.” In Metropolitan Governance: Capacity, Democracy and the Dynamics of Place, edited by Kübler

Daniel

Heinelt

Hubert

, 8–28. London: Routledge.

38.

Kübler

Daniel

Ladner

Andreas

. 2003. “Local Government Reform in Switzerland. More for than by—But What about of?” In Reforming Local Government in Europe: Closing the Gap Between Democracy and Efficiency, edited by Kersting

Norbert

Vetter

Angelika

, 137–55. Opladen, Germany: Leske+Budrich.

39.

Kübler

Daniel

Schenkel

Walter

Leresche

Jean-Philippe

. 2003. “Bright Lights, Big Cities? Metropolisation, Intergovernmental Relations, and the New Federal Urban Policy in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review 9 (1): 261–82.

40.

Kübler

Daniel

Schwab

Brigitte

. 2007. “New Regionalism in Five Swiss Metropolitan Areas: An Assessment of Inclusiveness, Deliberation and Democratic Accountability.” European Journal of Political Research 46:473–502.

41.

Ladner

Andreas

. 2001. “Gemeindereformen in der Schweiz: Strategien, Gemeinsamkeiten und Auslöser” [Local government reforms in Switzerland: Strat-egies, similarities and triggers]. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 7 (3): 1–23.

42.

Ladner

Andreas

. 2002. “Size and Direct Democracy at the Local Level: The Case of Switzerland.” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 20:813–28.

43.

Ladner

Andreas

. 2005. “Switzerland: Reforming Small Autonomous Municipalities.” In Comparing Local Governance: Trends and Developments, edited by Denters

Bas

Rose

Lawrence E.

, 139–54. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

44.

Ladner

Andreas

Arn

Daniel

Friederich

Ueli

Steiner

Reto

Wichtermann

Jürg

. 2000. Gemeindereformen zwischen Handlungsfähigkeit und Legitimation [Local government reforms between authority and legitimation]. Bern, Switzerland: Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Institut für Organisation und Personal.

45.

Ladner

Andreas

Steiner

Reto

. 2003. “Die Schweizer Gemeinden im Wandel: Konvergenz oder Divergenz?” [Swiss municipalities in change: Convergency or divergency?]. Swiss Political Science Review 9 (1): 233–59.

46.

Lijphart

Arend

. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.

47.

Lowndes

Vivien

. 2009. “New Institutionalism and Urban Politics.” In Theories of Urban Politics, edited by Davies

Jonathan S.

Imbroscio

David L.

, 2nd ed., 91–105. London: Sage.

48.

March

James G.

Olsen

Johan P.

1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” American Political Science Review 78 (3): 734–49.

49.

March

James G.

Olsen

Johan P.

1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: The Free Press.

50.

March

James G.

Olsen

Johan P.

1996. “Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 9 (3): 247–64.

51.

Mayntz

Renate

. 1998. New Challenges to Governance Theory. Florence, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute.

52.

Mayntz

Renate

. 2004. “Governance im modernen Staat” [Governance in the modern state]. In Governance—Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, edited by Benz

Arthur

, 65–76. Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

53.

Nyholm

Inga

Haveri

Arto

. 2009. “Between Government and Governance: Local Solutions for Reconciling Representative Government and Network Governance.” Local Government Studies 35 (1): 109–24.

54.

Offe

Claus

. 2008. “Governance—‘Empty Signifier’ oder sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm?” [Governance—“empty signifier” or research programme of the social sciences?]. In Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt, edited by Schuppert

Gunnar Folke

Zürn

Michael

, 61–76. Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

55.

Osborne

David

Gaebler

Ted

. 1992. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Plume.

56.

Papadopoulos

Yannis

. 1998. Démocratie directe [Direct democracy]. Paris: Economica.

57.

Papadopoulos

Yannis

. 2003. “Cooperative Forms of Governance: Problems of Democratic Accountability in Complex Environments.” European Journal of Political Research 42:473–501.

58.

Papadopoulos

Yannis

. 2004. “Governance und Demokratie” [Governance and democracy]. In Governance—Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen, edited by Benz

Arthur

, 215–37. Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

59.

Pierre

Jon

. 1999. “Models of Urban Governance: The Institutional Dimension of Urban Politics.” Urban Affairs Review 34 (3): 372–96.

60.

Pierre

Jon

. 2000a. “Conclusions: Governance beyond State Strength.” In Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, edited by Pierre

Jon

, 241–46. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

61.

Pierre

Jon

, ed. 2000b. Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

62.

Pierre

Jon

. 2011. The Politics of Urban Governance. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

63.

Pierre

Jon B.

Guy

Peters

. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

64.

Pollitt

Christopher

. 2003. The Essential Public Manager. Buckingham: Open Univ. Press.

65.

Pollitt

Christopher

Bouckaert

Geert

. 2000. Public Management Reform: An International Comparison. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

66.

Ramirez

Perez

Clemente

Antonia

Navarro

Yanez J.

Clark

Terry N.

2008. “Mayors and Local Governing Coalitions in Democratic Countries: A Cross-national Comparison.” Local Government Studies 34 (2): 147–78.

67.

Rao

Nirmala

. 1998. “Representation in Local Politics: A Reconsideration and Some New Evidence.” Political Studies 46:19–35.

68.

Rhodes

Roderick A. W.

1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham: Open Univ. Press.

69.

Scharpf

Fritz W.

1993. “Versuch über Demokratie im verhandelnden Staat” [Essay on democracy in the negotiating state]. In Verhandlungsdemokratie, Interessenvermittlung, Regierbarkeit, edited by Czada

Roland

Schmidt

Manfred G.

, 25–50. Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag.

70.

Searing

Donald

. 1994. Westminster’s World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

71.

Sharpe

Laurence J.

1962. “Elected Representatives in Local Government.” British Journal of Sociology 13:189–208.

72.

Skelcher

Chris

Klijn

Erik-Hans

Kübler

Daniel

Sørensen

Eva

Sullivan

Helen

. 2011. “Explaining the Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks: Evidence from Four European Countries.” Administrative Theory & Praxis 33 (1): 7–38.

73.

Somerville

Peter

. 2005. “Community Governance and Democracy.” Policy & Politics 33 (1): 117–44.

74.

Sørensen

Eva

. 2006. “Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance.” American Review of Public Administration 36 (1): 98–114.

75.

Sørensen

Eva

Torfing

Jacob

. 2005. “The Democratic Anchorage of Governance Networks.” Scandinavian Political Studies 28 (3): 195–218.

76.

Sørensen

Eva

Torfing

Jacob

. 2007a. “Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Network Governance.” In Theories of Democratic Network Governance, edited by Sørensen

Eva

Torfing

Jacob

, 233–46. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

77.

Sørensen

Eva

Torfing

Jacob

. 2007b. “Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Dynamics.” In Theories of Democratic Network Governance, edited by Sørensen

Eva

Torfing

Jacob

, 25–42. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

78.

Sørensen

Eva

Torfing

Jacob

. 2009. “Making Governance Networks Effective and Democratic through Metagovernance.” Public Administration 87 (2): 234–58.

79.

Sørensen

Eva

Triantafillou

Peter

, eds. 2009. The Politics of Self-Governance. Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

80.

Steiner

Reto

. 2000. New Public Management in den Schweizer Gemeinden. Based on the Research Project “Gemeindereformen zwischen Handlungsfähigkeit und Legitimation.” www.iop.unibe.ch (accessed November 2008).

81.

Steiner

Reto

Ladner

Andreas

. 2006. “Die Schweizer Gemeinden im Fokus—Ergebnisse der Gemeindebefragung 2005” [The Swiss municipalities under scrutiny—Results of the Swiss Municipality Survey 2005]. In Perspektiven für Gemeindefinanzen, edited by Glatthard

Alexander

Isch

Ulrich

, 8–34. Bern, Switzerland: ESG.

82.

Stoker

Gerry

. 1998a. “Governance as Theory: Five Propositions.” International Social Science Journal 50:17–28.

83.

Stoker

Gerry

. 1998b. “Public-Private Partnerships and Urban Governance.” In Partnerships in Urban Governance: European and American Experience, edited by Pierre

Jon

, 34–51. London: Macmillan.

84.

Stone

Clarence N.

1993. “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach.” Journal of Urban Affairs 15 (1): 1–28.

85.

van der Heiden

Nico

Paul

Krummenacher

. 2011. “Bringing the Backstage to the Front: The Role of Citizen Forums in Local Development Planning in Switzerland.” In Interactive Policy Making, Metagovernance and Democracy, edited by Torfing

Jacob

Triantafillou

Peter

, 227–42. Essex: ECPR Press.

86.

Wahlke

John C.

Eulau

Heinz

Buchanan

William

Ferguson

Leroy C.

1962. The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behaviour. New York: Wiley.

87.

Widmer

Thomas

Rieder.

Stefan

2007. “Kantone im Wandel. Reformaktivitäten der Schweizer Kantone zwischen 1990 and 1999: Ursachen, Ausgestaltung und Konsequenzen” [Cantons in change. Reform activities of the Swiss cantons between 1990 and 1999: Causes, configurations and consequences]. Bern, Switzerland: Haupt.

88.

Widmer

Thomas

Rüegg

Erwin

. 2005. “Konsequenzen von Staatsformen für die demokratische Steuerungsfähigkeit. Vergleichende Analysen zu vier Schweizer Kantonen” [Consequences of Different Systems of Government on the Democratic Steering Capacity. Comparative Analyses of Four Swiss Cantons]. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46:86–109.