What to Make of Gentrification in Older Industrial Cities? Comparing St. Louis (USA) and Dortmund (Germany)

Abstract

Few scholars have studied gentrification in older industrial cities across different national contexts. A review of the literature suggests that gentrification in older industrial cities will look different in systematic ways from gentrification in global, magnet cities that most research has focused on. The literature also suggests that the political and institutional differences in cities located in different national contexts can shape gentrification processes. Our research shows that Dortmund and St. Louis are both undergoing deep processes of economic restructuring with new knowledge workers moving in to neighborhoods adjacent to expanding tech clusters. The speed and magnitude of gentrification, however, is significantly less than reported in strong market cities. Unlike in hot market, global cities, many areas within Dortmund and St. Louis are experiencing little or no gentrification, and the neighborhoods that are experiencing gentrification-like processes vary significantly along important dimensions. Despite important differences in political institutions, the basic pattern of gentrification in St. Louis and Dortmund is similar. In these two older industrial cities, at least, gentrification is a complex and variegated phenomenon that requires more research to be fully understood.

Keywords

economic restructuring older industrial cities gentrification housing knowledge economy

Introduction

Gentrification is a complex phenomenon. At its core, however, is the idea of higher income households moving into lower-income neighborhoods. The 2009 edition of The Dictionary of Human Geography defines gentrification this way: “Middle class settlement in renovated or redeveloped properties in older, inner-city districts formerly occupied by lower income population” (as quoted in Lees et al. 2010, 4). Clearly, people use the term to mean much more than simply the movement of higher income households into lower- income neighborhoods. The originator of the term, Ruth Glass, included other key dimensions as essential to the phenomenon, stating that, once the process begins, “. . . it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working class occupiers are displaced, and the whole social character of the district is changed” (Glass 1964, xviii). Glass’s formulation supports a “unitary” conception of gentrification that posits a necessary relationship between the movement of higher income households into lower-status communities and rising housing costs, the displacement of long-time lower-income residents, and the transformation of the social/cultural character of the area. Following this line of thinking, Eric Clark argues that gentrification may manifest itself in different ways in different places—from global metropolises to Scandinavian fishing villages to rural areas—but the essence of gentrification, the influx of capital that disrupts and displaces communities, is the same everywhere (Clark 2010).

Contrary to a unitary conception, we adopt a contingent concept of gentrification which posits that the various processes associated with gentrification may not occur together. Robert Beauregard argues that gentrification needs to be understood as a complex and even chaotic process: “In fact, there can be no single theory of an invariant gentrification process. . .. The emphasis, therefore, must be placed on contingency and complexity, set within the structural dimensions of advanced capitalism” (Beauregard 2010, 11). Beauregard suggests that broad structural forces of modern capitalism are always implicated in gentrification, but the way these forces express themselves varies in complex ways that are essential to its meaning.

Under a contingent conception, gentrification may take very different forms in different times and places. According to Criekingen and Decroly (2003, 2451) “gentrification is not a tightly constructed process where all the actors (investors, developers, governments, residents, store owners, etc.) behave in highly predictable ways within a step-by-step progression toward a common gentrified fate.”¹ Gentrification, for example, may not necessarily displace lower-income long-time residents, who conceivably could benefit in the form of safer neighborhoods or more retail choices. Other “gentrification-like processes” are possible, including incumbent upgrading by current residents (Criekingen and Decroly 2003), new build gentrification that does not displace prior residents (Davidson and Lees 2010), or state-led gentrification that does not aim to maximize profit but instead to promote livability in disadvantaged neighborhoods (Uitermark et al. 2010). The ability to pull gentrification apart into its different dimensions also allows for processes of neighborhood change that are not so benign. Researchers, for example, have observed that even when the movement of higher income residents into an area does not physically displace longtime residents, widespread feelings of social and political displacement are common (Brown et al. 2019; Frank 2018; Freeman 2005, 2006; Freeman and Braconi 2004; Shaw and Hagemans 2015).

Gentrification may take different forms depending on the broader regional context of economic restructuring and population deconcentration. Most research on gentrification has focused on a relatively small number of global cities sitting atop the urban hierarchy, cities like New York and London where gentrification affects most urban neighborhoods. With powerful global investment flows dominating real estate markets in these cities, not surprisingly, this research has projected a unitary, determinist view of gentrification. Thomas Maloutas argues that the dominant unitary understanding of gentrification grew out of globalized Western cities and then was projected on to a wide range of very different cities in a kind of conceptual colonialism (Maloutas 2011; see also Butler 2007). Arguably, the same thing has happened within Western countries, where research focused on the strongest market cities has supported a unitary view of gentrification that has been projected onto cities further down the urban hierarchy.

Our approach addresses two gaps in the gentrification literature. First, there is a relative dearth of research on gentrification older industrial cities, or what is often called in the American context “legacy cities.” Mallach and Brachman (2013) identify 18 legacy cities in the United States based on a series of variables, including population loss, rapid loss of industrial jobs, and relatively weak housing markets. As we demonstrate later, both St. Louis and Dortmund fit the profile of legacy cities. Research on gentrification in Germany has generally overlooked legacy cities, focusing instead on cities, such as Berlin, where gentrification processes are very advanced (Bernt 2012; Helbrecht 2016; Huning and Schuster 2015; Holm 2016). A second group with considerable evidence of gentrification comprises economically successful and growing cities such as Hamburg (Dangschat 1988), Cologne (Blasius et al. 2016) and Frankfurt (Schipper and Wiegand 2015). Few scholars, however, have studied gentrification in older industrial legacy cities like Dortmund (but see Frank and Greiwe 2012; Frank 2018).² Similarly, in the United States, most gentrification researchers have focused on large globally connected cities on the two coasts. New York City has been studied the most (e.g., Freeman and Braconi 2004; Hackworth 2002; Lees and Bondi 1995; Lees 2003; Marcuse 1985; Newman and Wyly 2006; Schaffer and Smith 1986). Research on gentrification in older industrial in the United States, however, has begun to increase in recent years (Ehrenfeuch and Nelson 2018; Mallach 2015, 2019; Suchland 2013; Swanstrom et al. 2017).

Second, relatively few researchers have studied gentrification across different national contexts. Again, scholars doing cross-national urban research have focused almost exclusively on global cities (see Bernt 2012; Carpenter and Lees 1995; Eade and Mele 1998; Lees 1994). Besides the role of the broader economic context, many researchers have emphasized that politics and political institutions can have powerful impacts on gentrification processes (see Bernt 2012; Cybriwsky et al. 1986; Wyly and Hammel 1999). Research on older industrial cities in the United States often emphasizes the role of suburbanization, driven by the fragmentation of local government, in contributing to their market weakness (Mallach and Brachman 2013). Older industrial cities that lack this high level of population deconcentration driven by institutional fragmentation may behave differently. By conducting research solely within one national context, researchers have held the policy/institutional context relatively constant. German cities, like Dortmund, do not have nearly the level of fragmentation as American cities. A comparative case study of gentrification in two older industrial cities located in different national contexts, enables us to better explore how political institutions and policies shape neighborhood change.³

The plan of the article is as follows. First, we review the literature to derive hypotheses about how gentrification may play out differently in older industrial cities in different national contexts. Second, we document the broader economic context in Dortmund and St. Louis that conditions gentrification processes. In the third section, we examine neighborhood-level processes of gentrification in the two cities. Next, we examine how the political institutions and policies influence gentrification processes in Dortmund and St. Louis. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for understanding the meaning of gentrification in older industrial cities and what further research is needed to better understand this phenomenon.

Gentrification in Older-Industrial Cities: What to Expect?

Broadly speaking, the forces that drive gentrification can be broken down into demand factors and supply factors. Demand factors measure the presence of potential gentrifiers—higher income households with a preference for urban living. Supply factors address the presence of housing and neighborhoods that are attractive to the gentry. Supply and demand factors cannot be understood apart from the political/institutional context.

Demand Side: Economic restructuring in the advanced Western economies has contributed to the decline of traditional blue-collar jobs and the emergence of a differentiated service sector. Early research on gentrification emphasized the importance of concentrations of white-collar administrative functions in downtowns (Berry 1985, 91–5; Lipton 1980). More recently, the focus has shifted to the clustering of knowledge-based industries in cities. This clustering is driven in part by traditional agglomeration economies. Thick urban labor markets, for example, give employers access to a pool of skilled and specialized workers. Clustering also enhances innovation by facilitating face-to-face encounters that generate knowledge spillovers when skilled professionals exchange tacit knowledge (Glaeser 2011; Morretti 2012).⁴ Increasingly, knowledge-based industries do not just concentrate in central business districts but extend along tech corridors that link anchor institutions such as universities and medical complexes. These “innovation districts” stimulate regional economic growth by spinning off new technologies and start-up businesses (Katz and Wagner 2014).

Due to their historical dependence on manufacturing, older industrial cities are not as far along in accumulating concentrations of professionals in new knowledge-based industries. Clusters of knowledge workers in older industrial cities are smaller and wages are lower (Moretti 2012, 94–5). The gap between cities that are integrated in global flows with large concentrations of knowledge workers, such as San Francisco or Munich, and those that continue to struggle with the loss of manufacturing jobs, such as St. Louis or Dortmund, is widening. Moretti (2012) calls this “the great divergence”; Richard Florida terms it “winner-take-all urbanism” (Florida 2017, Ch. 2). Thus, compared to global magnet cities, we can expect older industrial cities to have fewer potential gentrifiers and, generally, they will be paid less, reducing the upward pressure on rents.

Supply Side: The supply side speaks to the presence of housing and neighborhoods attractive to the gentry. Gentrifiers are attracted to architecturally distinctive historic housing and the presence of empty factory buildings that can be converted into loft housing. The location of the housing also matters. Houses located near clusters of professional employment, or with good public transit connections to those jobs, are more attractive to the urban gentry. They are also drawn to distinct urban milieu, areas with urban amenities, such as trendy restaurants, coffee shops, clothing stores, and cultural institutions such as theaters and museums. Richard Florida argues that creative knowledge workers are also attracted to diverse, tolerant urban neighborhoods (Florida 2002).⁵

Older industrial cities often possess a rich supply of architecturally significant housing stock in historic neighborhoods that are attractive to the urban gentry. Many of these areas are located near clusters or corridors of expanding professional employment. In some cases, developers have converted remnants of the city’s industrial past, such as shoe factories near downtown St. Louis, into loft housing.⁶ However, many neighborhoods in older industrial cities that would be attractive to urban gentry are rough around the edges. Deindustrialization has left behind pockets of poverty and crime that can discourage gentrification. Compared to global magnet cities, residents have less discretionary income available to stimulate more cosmopolitan consumer choices. Finally, there is some evidence that older-industrial cities are less tolerant toward alternative lifestyles such as gays.⁷

While older industrial cities do not have as many exciting, amenity-rich neighborhoods as the largest global cities, one advantage they do have is less expensive housing. Neil Smith argues that gentrification targets areas with “rent gaps”—areas with a large gap between the current rent and the potential rent that could be realized if the property were redeveloped (Smith 1979).⁸ According to Smith, investors profit by developing luxury housing in previously deteriorated neighborhoods. Individual homebuyers will also be interested in neighborhoods with large rent gaps where they can profit from rising home prices. In older industrial cities, deindustrialization, disinvestment, and depopulation have left behind many neighborhoods with architecturally significant homes, close to centers of professional employment, which often sell for remarkably low prices—at least compared to hot market global cities.

One factor influencing gentrification that is not connected in a systematic way with older industrial cities is the ethnic and racial make-up of the population. Loic Wacquant argues that the Black ghetto in Chicago is fundamentally different from the immigrant banlieue outside Paris (Wacquant 2007). Nevertheless, the gentry may avoid neighborhoods with residents who are visibly different by skin color, dress, or language from the majority. Researchers have found that African-American neighborhoods in the United States are less likely to gentrify (Hwang and Sampson 2014). At the national level, cities with more immigrants tend to have more gentrification, but at the neighborhood level, the relationship is more complex. The urban gentry tends to avoid neighborhoods with large numbers of immigrants associated with existing racial hierarchies (Hwang 2015). Older industrial cities in the United States tend to have lower levels of immigration but large African-American populations (that could deter gentrification). In German cities, immigrants—arriving as guest workers from Southern Europe or more recently as refugees from troubled regions of the world—constitute the largest minority group. These arrival neighborhoods are easily identified and they may discourage gentrification.

Supply and demand factors driving gentrification are shaped by the political and institutional context. Although many studies have documented ways that governments promote gentrification, there is mounting evidence that governments can play many different roles. In a comparative study of gentrification in New York and Berlin, Matthias Bernt argued that “policies supporting gentrification can co-exist with policies modifying, or even putting a halt on, gentrification at the same time and same place” (Bernt 2012, 3046).

The contrasting political institutions and policies in Dortmund and St. Louis give us an opportunity to explore their effects on gentrification. American cities are highly dependent on the local tax base to fund public goods and services and therefore have a strong motive to support gentrification and shun redistributive policies to help low-income households stay put (Peterson 1981). A study of gentrification in the Netherlands pointed out a difference between American and Dutch cities (that also applies to German cities): “Municipal agencies . . . do not have to attract middle-class households to strengthen their tax base, as in the United States, since cities receive more of the their resources from the national state“ (Uitermark et al. 2010, 510). Other things being equal, therefore, we expect Dortmund city government will be less motivated to support gentrification than city government in St. Louis.

While we can expect St. Louis city government to be more supportive of gentrification than Dortmund, there are other reasons to expect gentrification pressures to be lower in the American context. Municipal and school district fragmentation in the American metropolitan areas increases economic and racial segregation, leaving behind high levels of poverty and deprivation in older central cities that can push potential gentrifiers to the suburbs (Bischoff 2008; Rothwell and Massey 2010). Besides being pushed out of central cities by higher crime, taxes, and inferior public goods, middle-class and affluent households may also be attracted away from gentrifying neighborhoods by the fiscal and public goods advantages of affluent suburban municipalities and school districts (Nechyba and Walsh 2004).

Based on our literature review, we can hypothesize what gentrification will look like in older industrial cities like Dortmund and St. Louis. First, we expect gentrification in these two cities to be slower than hot market magnet cities, with less upward pressure on rents.⁹ We can expect gentrification to be concentrated in neighborhoods located near centers of professional employment with attractive older housing stock that has been devalued by disinvestment and depopulation. Gentrification will be less likely to happen in neighborhoods with large numbers of racial minorities or immigrants. Comparing Dortmund and St. Louis, we expect local government in St. Louis to be more supportive of gentrification than local government in Dortmund. Finally, we hypothesize that the attractions of suburban living will reduce the demand for housing in gentrifying neighborhoods more in St. Louis than in Dortmund.

Given the limitations of a case study and our inability to control for confounding variables, we are in no position to “test” these hypotheses in any definitive fashion. We will, however, be able to determine whether the evidence supports or contradicts the hypotheses for our two cases. These findings, while tentative, suggest avenues for future research. In the next section, we trace the broader trends shaping gentrification in Dortmund and St. Louis before proceeding, in the following section, to examine gentrification at the neighborhood level.

The Broader Context of Gentrification in Dortmund and St. Louis

With a population of 602,566 in 2018 Dortmund is the largest city in the Ruhr, West Germany’s former industrial core, originally one of the largest industrial agglomerations in Europe. While the city has medieval origins and developed as a trade center due to its location on transportation routes, massive urbanization only started in the late 19^th century, when the city experienced a rapid industrialization driven by the expansion of steel mills, coal mines and other industries such as breweries. Instead of following the concentric model of development developed by the Chicago School of Human Ecology (Burgess 1967), Dortmund has a polycentric urban structure; smaller villages and towns developed around mines and industries surrounding the central city. As a result, Dortmund has a relatively small urban core for a city its size.

The development of the City of St. Louis is similar to Dortmund but also diverges in important ways. St. Louis began as a mercantile city with its location on the Mississippi River giving it a huge advantage during the steamboat age. When railroads replaced steamboats as the main form of transportation in the mid-19th Century, St. Louis fell behind cities like Chicago. In 1874, St. Louis finally opened a railroad bridge across the Mississippi and during the following decades it prospered as a center of manufacturing. The concentration of manufacturing and administrative functions gave the metropolitan area a monocentric form. However, with the dominance of the automobile in the 1950s, White flight to the suburbs left a progressively weakened urban core.

St. Louis and Dortmund have both been labelled “shrinking cities.” One study of 71 shrinking cities around the world ranked St. Louis as #1 and Dortmund ranked #52, based on the percentage population decline from peak to trough (1950 to the 2000s) (Cox 2014, 20–1). Clearly, the decline in manufacturing jobs contributed to population losses in both cases. Following the post-war boom years, deindustrialization wiped out much of Dortmund’s economic base, causing a steep rise in unemployment and other social problems (Thieme and Laux 1996). The number of workers employed in manufacturing declined from 92,000 in 1970 to 26,000 in 2015—from about one-third to only about 10% of the total workforce (Figure 1). From its peak in 1970, the city lost 77,761 inhabitants or 12.0% of its population by 2011 (Figure 2). Since then Dortmund has slowly begun to regain population, coinciding with an overall trend of reurbanization in larger German cities (Herfert and Osterhage 2012).

Figure 1.

Manufacturing jobs in Dortmund and St. Louis, 1967 to 2016.

Figure 2.

Population trends, Dortmund and St. Louis, 1950 to 2016.

St. Louis also suffered from deindustrialization but it declined further and faster than Dortmund—and it is still slowly losing population. From 1967 to 2012, the City of St. Louis lost 87.5% of its manufacturing jobs, many of them with good pay. The population of the City of St. Louis fell 64.7% from its peak of 856,796 in 1950 to 302,838 in 2018 (Figure 2). These figures on population decline are somewhat deceptive, however. Since the “Great Divorce” from St. Louis County in 1875, the City of St. Louis has not expanded its borders and now contains only about 11% of the metropolitan area population. With the exception of the 1970s, the population of the St. Louis metropolitan area has grown modestly every decade. The precipitous decline in the city’s population is mostly due to residential decentralization (suburbanization), not deindustrialization. The White middle class fled to more prosperous suburban cities and school districts, leaving behind a city with a depleted tax base and rising demands for services from a poorer population.

Both Dortmund and St. Louis are well on their way in the transition from manufacturing to a knowledge-intensive, service-based economy. Germany, which is known for its success in advanced manufacturing, has maintained manufacturing as a steady share of national income, while the United States has witnessed a precipitous drop in manufacturing’s share of GDP (Uchitelle 2017, 9). In both countries, however, the share of the workforce employed in manufacturing has declined. Compared to St. Louis, government in Dortmund has been more active in promoting economic restructuring, which is still ongoing but quite advanced (Butzin et al. 2006; Maretzke 2008). Dortmund was one of the first German cities to respond to worries about a projected skills shortage and the economic development department (Wirtschaftsförderung Dortmund) runs a long-established skills monitoring program. With the encouragement of city government, the economic base of the city has diversified.

Policy makers have promoted restructuring by focusing on specific economic clusters and the redevelopment of brownfield sites for new knowledge-based industries (see Map 1). Modelled on Silicon Valley, the Technologiezentrum was developed beginning in the 1980s in an area close to the university (Irle and Röllinghoff 2008). The so-called Dortmund Project, a public-private partnership between the city, Thyssen-Krupp, the main industrial corporation holding much of the land, and the consulting firm McKinsey, laid the groundwork for re-using several larger brownfield sites such as Phoenix West (Vogelpohl 2017). Apart from already existing service-sector employment in insurance and engineering, newer innovative sectors have emerged in the fields of information technology and biotech, as well as higher education and research. Few large global corporations are headquartered in Dortmund, but the city does host a significant number of medium-sized companies that are sometimes market leaders within their economic niches. From 2009 to 2017 the number of employees in professional/technical jobs increased by 20% from 31,660 to 38,264.¹⁰

Map 1.

Map of Dortmund with case study neighborhoods and centers of knowledge-intensive employment.

Like Dortmund, St. Louis is also transitioning to a knowledge-based innovation economy. The percentage of the population over the age of 25 with a bachelor’s degree or higher increased from 10.0% in 1980 to 34.1% in 2017.¹¹ St. Louis has clusters of employment in medical services, education, biotech, and financial services. The vast majority of the new economy jobs are located in the Central Corridor, a swath of geography stretching west from the banks of the Mississippi River in downtown to the suburbs (Map 2). Health services, educational institutions, and information services are the three largest job categories in the Central Corridor. Only 2.7% of the jobs in the Central Corridor are in manufacturing, well below the regional average of 7.8%.¹² The largest employers in the City of St. Louis in 2015 were located in the Central Corridor: Washington University (17,031), BJC HealthCare (14,869), and Saint Louis University 9,954 (City of St. Louis 2018, 223).

Map 2.

Map of St. Louis: Central Corridor and Gentrifying Neighborhoods.

Similar to Dortmund, St. Louis city government has partnered with the private sector to promote the growth of new knowledge-based industry clusters. Like Dortmund, the City of St. Louis has formed a public-private partnership to stimulate innovation districts (Katz and Wagner 2014). City government has granted substantial powers to private organizations that do the active planning. A nonprofit, Cortex Innovation Community, has led and planned the development of a cluster of tech-related start-up companies on former industrial land located between Washington University and Saint Louis University. The State of Missouri and the City of St. Louis gave Cortex Innovation Community the power of eminent domain (the authority to force landowners to sell), the power to abate taxes, and the ability to approve or reject building plans. Begun in 2002, by 2019 it had 425 companies supporting 6,000 tech-related jobs that will expand to 15,000 when fully built out (https://cortexstl.com/; accessed March 9, 2020)

Clearly, both Dortmund and St. Louis have one of the basic ingredients for gentrification—a growing number of professionals in knowledge-based industries. In both cities, concentrations of the emerging knowledge-based jobs are growing and many knowledge workers are choosing to live in nearby neighborhoods. In that basic sense, “gentrification-like processes” are occurring in both cities. Below we examine these processes to determine whether the movement of higher-income professionals into previously lower-status neighborhoods is accompanied by the other phenomena usually associated with gentrification: rapidly rising rents, the displacement of longtime residents, and the transformation of the social/cultural character of the area.

Neighborhood Change in Dortmund

In the next two sections, we examine the pattern of gentrification in Dortmund and St. Louis neighborhoods. We first identify neighborhoods in Dortmund and St. Louis that are experiencing gentrification-like processes—areas that have moved up socioeconomically in recent years or have experienced an influx of higher income professionals. We then go on to examine the geographical pattern of gentrification and, as much as we can with limited data, the consequences of gentrification, such as economic pressures on long-time residents, changing demographics of neighborhoods, and the emergence of local discourses about gentrification. Before beginning, it is important to note a significant limitation of cross-national research on neighborhood change in Germany and the United States: data in the two countries is often not comparable.¹³ We utilize quantitative data but rely mostly on qualitative case studies of neighborhoods, drawing on local studies, government documents, newspaper accounts, and our own personal knowledge and observation of neighborhoods in the two cities.

Before turning to neighborhood change in Dortmund, we need to point out two important differences between German and U.S. cities. First, unlike in the U.S., a majority of households in German cities rent. In Dortmund, 70% rent and only 30% own their homes (NRW Bank 2017) and in the more centrally located neighborhoods the share of renters is even higher. In German cities, such as Dortmund, the demand for housing in gentrifying neighborhoods is mostly for rental units—not for condos or single-family homes. Second, almost all larger German cities have increasing population. After 2010, this includes cities undergoing economic restructuring after industrial decline. Such an overall context of reurbanization is a potential driver of gentrification processes as housing demands in urban areas are rising. In contrast to the situation in many U.S. cities, in West German older industrial cities vacancy rates are low, even in disadvantaged neighborhoods.¹⁴

We have chosen to examine three gentrifying neighborhoods in more depth: Dorstfelder Brücke, Hörde, Hafen (see Map 1). In recent years, all of them have experienced growing populations, falling unemployment, and increasing employment (Table 1). The three neighborhoods occupy different locations within the socio-spatial structure of Dortmund, which is characterized by a North-South divide that has remained markedly unchanged over time. In general, the neighborhoods north of the main railway lines are working-class and of lower socio-economic status, while those to the south are more middle-class.¹⁵ One prominent exception to the overall North-South divide is the traditional working-class neighborhood of Hörde, which is located in the southern part. Some areas immediately south or east of the city center, such as Kreuzviertel, have the characteristic features of gentrified neighborhoods, yet they have historically been predominantly middle-class and have not experienced significant displacement of lower-income groups (Osterhage and Thabe 2012). The neighborhoods most commonly referred to in local debates about gentrification in Dortmund are traditional working-class neighborhoods. They are either in the inner city, such as Dorstfelder Brücke and Hafen, or as in the case of Hörde further out near former sites of large industrial complexes.

Table 1.

Data for Selected Dortmund Neighborhoods.

NeighborhoodsDistricts	Population			Unemployment rate			Social welfare recipients^a		Transition to Gymnasium as secondary school^b
NeighborhoodsDistricts	2013	2017	2012–2017 in %	2010 in %	2017 in %	2010–2017 in %	2017 in %	2007–2017 in %	2004/2005 in %	2017/2018 in %
Dorstfelder Brücke Dortmund-West	11,880	12,456	+4.8	16.6	12.9	−3.7	17.9	−5.1	8.0	35.8
Hörde Hörde	23,118	25,227	+9.1	20.2	14.8	−5.4	24.3	−5.4	23.8	32.6
Hafen Nordstadt	17,565	18,501	+5.3	24.8	19.6	−5.2	34.7	−0.2	17.2	28.5
Dortmund	583,659	601,779	+3.1	13.1	11.0	−2.1	17.8	−0.2	37.5	38.5

Sources: Data from Statistical Office of Stadt Dortmund, author’s files and Stadt Dortmund (2018a).

In German SGB II-Empfänger, share of persons aged under 65 years.

The German school system separates children after elementary school into different secondary school “tracks.” Out of these, only Gymnasium provides immediate access to university studies after graduation.¹⁶

Located immediately west of the city center, the dense and diverse neighborhood of Dorstfelder Brücke, with a population of 12,456 in 2017, is often referred to as gentrifying. The main axis is Rheinische Straße, with an eclectic mix of ethnic retail stores and restaurants. Traditionally a working-class area, the neighborhood’s social indicators have improved (Table 1). The unemployment rate dropped from 16.6% in 2010 to 12.9% in 2017 and is now only slightly above the city average of 11.0% (Stadt Dortmund 2017a). Similarly, the previously high share of recipients of social welfare has declined by 5.1% between 2010 and 2017 and now mirrors the city average (Stadt Dortmund 2018a). Another indicator suggesting socio-economic improvement of the neighborhood is the high increase in elementary school students transitioning to Gymnasium, the highest “track” of secondary schools in Germany.¹⁶

From a supply side, its location next to the city center and the prominent “U” building makes Dorstfelder Brücke a candidate for gentrification. Formerly part of the large Union brewery, the “U” was redeveloped as a cultural flagship starting in 2010 when the whole Ruhr Area held the title of European Capital of Culture (Lauderbach 2012). It hosts a museum, exhibition spaces, and other entertainment functions. Building on its location, the city has attempted to revitalize the neighborhood around arts and media activities.¹⁷ Adopting creative quarter ideas, the city government rebranded the neighborhood as “Unions-Quartier.” The neighborhood became part of the federal-state program Urban Redevelopment West (Stadtumbau West) between 2008 and 2018, receiving 17.9 million Euros in public and private funding (Brown et al. 2019). Notwithstanding its potential for gentrification, the transformation of the neighborhood has been slow so far, which can be attributed to the relatively large share of rent-controlled, mostly social housing units in the area. Rent increases in Dorstfelder Brücke are thus the same as the overall citywide increase.¹⁸

Hörde, a traditional working-class neighborhood with a 2017 population of 25,227, is another locally discussed example of a gentrifying neighborhood (Frank and Greiwe 2012).¹⁹ The neighborhood is located in the South of Dortmund and is surrounded by middle-class areas. It is undergoing a process of upgrading through the adjacent large-scale Phoenix redevelopment of a former steel production site, comprised of Phoenix West, an office park focusing on innovative firms, and Phoenix Lake, a new artificial lake surrounded by high-quality landscaping, upscale residential developments, and new office buildings (see Map 1). Much of the rise in housing prices in the area is due to newly built upmarket housing on previously vacant land around Phoenix Lake (see Davidson and Lees 2010 on new-build gentrification). Adjacent Hörde has experienced spillover effects, such as the renovation of the housing stock, transition of rental into owner-occupied housing, and new upscale retail and restaurants (Frank and Greiwe 2012).

Although the potential for displacement in Hörde is real, there is no statistical evidence yet suggesting a significant displacement of lower-income residents. As one study put it: “[w]e observe partly heated gentrification debates without empirically demonstrable gentrification processes” (Frank 2018, 2). Even more than in Dorstfelder Brücke, the socio-economic indicators for Hörde have improved; with unemployment reduced by 5.4% between 2010 and 2017 (compared to city average of −2.1%) and social welfare recipients down by 5.4% (compared to city average of −0.2%) between 2007 and 2017 (Table 1).

In both Dortmund and St. Louis the demographic changes we observe in neighborhood undergoing gentrification-like processes could be due not to physical displacement but to differential replacement: As residents move out for reasons that are unrelated to gentrification, they may be replaced by residents who look different from them.²⁰ Who moves into a neighborhood may be more important in changing neighborhoods than who moves out. We do not have the data to test this proposition, but the relatively modest increase in rents (Stadt Dortmund 2018b) suggests that displacement from rising rents is not the major cause of the demographic shift. Even without involuntary displacement the change in the make-up of the neighborhood can have negative effects on long-time residents who remain. There is strong evidence in Dortmund of what Susanne Frank calls “symbolic displacement or symbolic gentrification” (Frank 2018, 23, see also Shaw and Hagemans 2015). Such symbolic displacement is associated with the new concentration of middle-class lifestyles and consumption patterns in the new development around the lake and its encroachment on adjacent working-class Hörde.²¹

Hafen is located within the district of Nordstadt, the city’s largest working-class district. In contrast to the above mentioned cases, Hafen (population 18,501) is only recently discussed as a neighborhood, which may experience gentrification. These discussions—mostly initiated by local neighborhood initiatives—are a response to plans by the city to redevelop now largely derelict or unused parts of Dortmund harbor, which borders the neighborhood to the north. In Hafen, 41% of the population does not hold German citizenship. Its role as an important arrival space for migrants means that on average about one fifth of the neighborhood’s population is being exchanged every year (18.5% in 2018). As a Nordstadt neighborhood, it suffers from the negative image of the whole district, which is sometimes portrayed as an example of failed immigrant incorporation or as an area with high crime rates (e.g., Ahr and Aisslinger 2017). In Hafen, the unemployment rate of 19.6% is almost double that of the city average (11% in 2017).

From a supply side, Hafen hosts a high proportion of older housing stock of potential interest for gentrifiers, a concentration of urban amenities, as well as a diverse urban street life. While social indicators clearly identify Hafen as a disadvantaged neighborhood, the levels of deprivation have somewhat improved in recent years, albeit not to the degree of Hörde or Dorstfelder Brücke (see Table 1). Students, typically seen as a pioneer group in early gentrification stages are increasingly choosing Hafen due the lack of affordable housing in other inner city neighborhoods. A survey by the Nordstadt neighborhood management shows that most renovations of buildings within Nordstadt are in the Hafen neighborhood (Quartiersmanagement Nordstadt 2019). In some pockets of Hafen, slight increases in rent have been noted (Brown et al. 2019). Notwithstanding its potential, Hafen, as well the larger district of Nordstadt, still remains remarkably resistant to gentrification. The high population turnover is mostly due to low rents and an influx of immigrants and students, rather than rising rents caused by gentrification.

The three Dortmund neighborhoods experiencing gentrification-like processes show substantial variation, pointing away from a unitary understanding of gentrification to one that is more complex and contingent, varying by spatial context. All are increasing in population and employment, but there is thus far little evidence of displacement from rising rents. In a real estate market that is still majority renters, the dynamics of change through re-investment are less pronounced than in hot-market cities. Rents in Dortmund remain low, particularly when compared to hot-market cities. Among the ten largest German cities, only Leipzig in East Germany has lower average rents than Dortmund. The average rent for new rental contracts in Dortmund was approximately 7.0 Euros per square meter in 2018, which is far below more dynamic German cities, such as Munich (17.9 €/m²) or Berlin (11.4 €/m²). Compared to 2008, the rents have increased considerably in the ten largest German cities; the annual increase of 1.4% in Dortmund is, however, below the increases in Berlin (2.0%) or Munich (1.6%).²² In addition, about 10% of the rental units in Dortmund are in social housing with rent control (Stadt Dortmund 2017b). In the three neighborhoods examined here, population change appears to be mostly due to differential replacement not direct displacement from rising rents. It is important to note that in two cases, Dorstfelder Brücke and Hörde, top-down strategies by city government are driving neighborhood change. In the first case, urban regeneration is linked to creative/cultural economies and in the latter to development of new (upper-) middle-class housing. For Hafen, plans to redevelop the adjacent harbor area are also expected to have an impact on the housing market. Whether these neighborhoods will face significant displacement pressures in the years ahead is an open question.

Neighborhood Change in St. Louis

The pattern of gentrification in St. Louis has many similarities to Dortmund and some important differences. Given the availability of small-area data, for St. Louis we began by identifying the neighborhoods that experienced significant increases in college-educated, higher income households.²³ Map 2 shows the areas in darker color that qualify as “gentrifying” under our standard. The first thing to notice is that almost all of these neighborhoods are located just south of the Central Corridor.²⁴ These St. Louis neighborhoods are experiencing an influx of younger, highly educated residents. Clearly, even older industrial cities like St. Louis have neighborhoods with large increases in college-educated Millennials, a trend identified by a number of scholars (Cortright 2014; Ehrenhalt 2012).

Supply and demand factors can help explain the spatial pattern of gentrification in St. Louis. As we documented in the previous section, nearly all the new knowledge economy jobs and major urban amenities are also located in the Central Corridor or in the tier of neighborhoods just to the south. These amenities include Forest Park, one of the great urban parks in the nation, containing the History Museum, Art Museum, Planetarium, Science Center, and Zoo—all of which are free to the public. The Central Corridor also has two major universities (Washington University and Saint Louis University), St. Louis Symphony Hall, and a vibrant theater/arts district (Grand Center). The region’s light rail system runs down the heart of the Central Corridor (Bryant 2014). The tier of neighborhoods just to the south of the Central Corridor contain two major urban amenities: the renowned Missouri Botanical Gardens and Tower Grove Park, a historic Victorian walking park. Finally, these near south neighborhoods have architecturally significant brick-frame housing stock, interspersed with walkable retail and smaller parks.

The geographical pattern of gentrification in St. Louis contradicts the geographical pattern that would be predicted by rent gap theory. The neighborhoods just north of the Central Corridor have huge potential rent gaps. Property values plummet north of the infamous “Delmar Divide,” the historical dividing line between White and Black St. Louis that can be traced back to the Jim Crow era of racist housing and land-use policies (Gordon 2008). A few blocks south of Delmar a 3-bedroom home will sell for over $350,000; a similar house located a few blocks north of Delmar will sell for less than $100,000.²⁵ The areas just north of the Central Corridor have many of the supply side characteristics that would predict gentrification. Historic brick homes in the Fountain Park neighborhood are located within walking distance of the largest employer in the region, BJC Healthcare, yet they sell for a fraction of homes located just south of Delmar in the Central West End.

Why are developers not exploiting the rent gap in St. Louis? The most plausible answer is racism and its impact on the long-established landscape of segregation in St. Louis. One study of neighborhood change in St. Louis found that no neighborhood that was majority Black in 1970 and was surrounded by other Black neighborhoods rebounded socioeconomically in subsequent decades (Swanstrom et al. 2017, 340). North St. Louis is almost entirely Black; in 2017 the Fountain Park neighborhood was 95% Black.²⁶ The urban fabric of many neighborhoods south of the Central Corridor is re-densifying, but it remains hollowed out in North St. Louis. In June 2018, 20,287 land parcels in the City of St. Louis were vacant. The vast majority were located north of Delmar, where the vacancy rate in many neighborhoods exceeds 50% and many homes have been torn down.²⁷ The area provides housing for poor African-Americans and suffers from high transiency and crime. Recently, St. Louis has experienced an out-migration of middle and working class African-American families who are moving to the suburbs in search of better schools and safer neighborhoods (Mallach 2019).

The relatively weak housing demand in the St. Louis metropolitan area is another factor that helps explain the unwillingness of potential gentrifiers to target areas in North City with large rent gaps. With no mountains, deserts, or bodies of water to block development, the St. Louis metropolitan area is an extreme case of suburban sprawl.²⁸ For many decades, developers have built more housing units on the suburban fringe than there are new households in the region, leading inevitably to vacancy and abandonment (Bier and Post 2003). Housing demand has lagged far behind supply. Weak market demand gives more room for racial biases to play a role. Potential gentrifiers have many options and can therefore shun Black neighborhoods at little cost. By contrast, in cities with tight housing markets where few neighborhoods have not been gentrified, potential gentrifiers may be much more willing to take a chance on poor, minority neighborhoods.

We chose four gentrifying neighborhoods in different parts of the city for more in depth analysis (Table 2). The first column shows that these neighborhoods all experienced a rise in median home values well above the citywide average. By far, the most dramatic increase was in Downtown West, where gentrification has been driven by the conversion of old shoe factories into loft housing. It is the only one of our four neighborhoods that gained population. Like the development around Phoenix Lake in Dortmund, Downtown West is “new-build gentrification” that did not result in much direct displacement. The other three neighborhoods, by contrast, focus mostly on the rehabilitation of older housing. In these neighborhoods, rising home prices (Table 2) may have pushed out longtime homeowners as property taxes increased, but in that case, at least, they benefited increases in the value of their homes.

Table 2.

Data for Selected St. Louis Neighborhoods.

Case study Neighborhoods	Changes 2000–2017
Case study Neighborhoods	Population	Black population	Median home value	Median rent	Rental units
Benton Park	−624	−753	$84,957	$159	−248
Downtown West	+2,297	+526	$127,796	$332	+1,002
Fox Park	−499	−551	$41,980	$33	−117
Shaw	−1,685	−2856	$71,435	$127	−484
St. Louis	−316	−293	$28,548	$80	+9

Source: 2000 Census (normalized to 2010 tract geographies via the Longitudinal Tract Database) and 2013 to 2017 ACS 5-year Estimates (United States Census Bureau 2018).

Note. For the purpose of this table, data from two tracts are averaged to form Downtown West. All Dollar figures are adjusted to 2017 values using the CPI-U-RS.

Rent changes are a more accurate measure of displacement pressures. The data here (Table 2) shows significant variation across our gentrifying neighborhoods. In the case of one gentrifying neighborhood, Fox Park, rents actually increased less than the citywide average. The largest increase in rents was in Downtown West, but almost all of these were new construction of loft units and therefore the higher rents led to little direct displacement of previous residents. Of course, this ignores the issue of whether the development of more expensive loft housing led to indirect displacement by driving up rents in surrounding housing. The fact that Downtown West witnessed a significant increase in Black population (+24.2%, 2000–2017) does not prove that little indirect displacement occurred but it does demonstrate that this gentrifying area is not becoming predominantly White (a pattern frequently found in hot market cities like San Francisco and Washington, DC).

Two neighborhoods, Shaw and Benton Park, had significant declines in black population from 2000 to 2017—a 61.0% drop in Shaw and 52.7% in Benton Park. This suggests significant displacement perhaps due to rising rents. It is important to note, however, once we subtract the citywide rent increase, the dollar value increases in rents were not great ($79 in Benton Park and $47 in Shaw). Even after these increases, median rents in these two gentrifying neighborhoods in 2017 ($599 in Benton Park and $664 in Shaw) were still relatively affordable. Using the generally accepted affordability standard that households should not pay more than 30% of their income on total housing costs (and assuming utilities would cost $150 per month), the median apartment in Shaw would still be affordable to households making 51.7% of the 2017 metropolitan area median income of $62,931. Gentrification may be driving up rents but they are nowhere near those in hot market cities. In 2017, median gross rent, which does not usually include utilities, was $1,709 for the entire city of San Francisco and $1,424 for Washington, DC.²⁹

If rents in gentrifying neighborhoods are not increasing much faster than the city as a whole, why are low-income and African-American households leaving? We do not have the data to answer this question, but we agree with Mallach and Pooley (2018, 47) that it may be more a matter of “replacement” than “displacement.” As these areas become more attractive to college-educated professionals, the pool of prospective tenants becomes Whiter. When African-American households move, for whatever reason, White households often replace them. Of course, absent interviews or surveys, we do not know what proportion of moves was forced by rising rents (but the data on rent increases suggests this was not the cause of most moves). Especially in Shaw, there was a significant drop in the number of rental units, which could have caused the displacement of African-American renters. We also do not know whether, as the neighborhood became whiter, African-American households felt uncomfortable or culturally marginalized and moved for those reasons (Mallach 2019).

Finally, it is worth noting that the gentrifying neighborhoods in St. Louis are the most economically and racially diverse in the region (see Swanstrom et al. 2017). Some of these neighborhoods, such as Fox Park, are doing a better job of maintaining their diversity. This may be due to the diversity of the housing stock and in some cases the presence of an active nonprofit dedicated to owning and maintaining a supply of affordable units. DeSales Community Development Corporation, for example, owns 242 units of affordable housing in the Fox Park neighborhood (Mallach and Pooley 2018, 12).

In conclusion, how does gentrification in St. Louis compare to gentrification in hot market cities like Washington, DC and San Francisco? First, like cities on the two coasts, St. Louis is experiencing an influx of young college-educated professionals in older urban neighborhoods near clusters of new economy jobs. The pattern of gentrification in St. Louis, however, is different from hot market cities. First, gentrifying areas in St. Louis are smaller and more concentrated than in hot market cities. A national study of gentrification (2000–2013) confirmed this, finding that 40% of the tracts in Washington, DC and 24% in New York City were classified as gentrified compared to only 11% in St. Louis (Richardson et al. 2019). Using a different methodology, we found only 12 census tracts were “gentrifying” (out of 106 total).³⁰ What stands out more is that these gentrifying areas did not uniformly carry with them the other characteristics of gentrification wrapped up in what we have called the unitary view of gentrification. Some gentrifying area saw rapidly rising rents; some experienced declining rents. Most gentrifying neighborhoods had rent levels that were affordable to households making only about half of the median income for the metropolitan area. Some gentrifying neighborhoods experienced sharp drops in Black population; one experienced a significant increase. Contrary to the pattern found in strong market cities, gentrification in St. Louis did not leapfrog into disinvested areas but expanded out slowly from areas of strength adjacent to expanding job centers.

How Institutions Shape the Residential Choices of Knowledge Workers

The growth of jobs in the new knowledge economy is not as great in Dortmund or St. Louis as in global, magnet cities. Nevertheless, workers in the new knowledge economy in both cities are choosing to live close to where they work and they are changing city neighborhoods. Dortmund and St. Louis neighborhoods are changing because of these “gentrification like” processes, but both the magnitude of these structural pressures and the impacts they have on neighborhoods vary between the two cities and across the neighborhoods within them. These differences have much to do with the different institutions that govern these two cities.

Dortmund and St. Louis differ in how tightly the economic restructuring is linked to neighborhood change—in particular, whether the new knowledge workers who work in the city choose to live in the city. Alan Mallach has written about the “uncoupling of the economic city” in older industrial cities in the United States such as St. Louis (Mallach 2015). In 2015, for example, St. Louis residents held only 54,734 (25.2% ) of all jobs located in the city—and the number of jobs held by city residents fell 13.8% between 2002 and 2015 (Table 3). The number of new professional jobs in the Central Corridor is growing, but suburban commuters fill the vast majority of these jobs (Mallach 2015, 451–2). In 2015, 75.8% of those who worked in the Central Corridor lived in the suburbs.³¹

Table 3.

Location of Jobs and Residents, St. Louis and Dortmund, 2002 to 2015.

	2002	2015	2002–2015 change in %
All jobs in St. Louis	215,193	216,977	+0.8
Jobs in St. Louis held by city residents	66,974	54,734	−18.3
Jobs in St. Louis held by non-city residents (commuters)	148,219	162,243	+9.5
All jobs in Dortmund	195,685	218,146	+11.5
Jobs in Dortmund held city residents	117,139	120,641	+3.0
Jobs in Dortmund held by non-city residents (commuters)	78,546	97,505	+24.1

Sources: Dortmund: Stadt Dortmund (2005a, 2016); data source for both: Bundesagentur für Arbeit. St. Louis: U.S. Census Bureau, Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics; available at: https://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/.

The main reason for the relatively weak gentrification pressures in St. Louis is that most potential gentrifiers choose to live in St. Louis suburbs rather than older urban neighborhoods. They are attracted to the suburbs for a number of reasons that are rooted in the history of St. Louis metropolitan development. Unlike many cities in the United States, St. Louis has not expanded its borders since 1876. Independent suburban local governments have passed zoning laws that exclude the poor (Cambria et al. 2018; Gordon 2008). White middle class flight has left behind a central city that is heavily poor and minority, with high levels of crime and other social ills. The poverty rate for the city is more than twice the rate for the metropolitan area as a whole. Funded separately from suburban schools, city schools suffer from a depleted tax base and the challenges of concentrated poverty. Underperforming city schools are a major reason why many flee to the suburbs. As noted earlier, suburbanization has weakened the housing market in North St. Louis leading to contagious abandonment and social decay; for good reason, one observer called North St. Louis a “gentrification-free zone” (Owens 2016).

Compared to St. Louis, neighborhoods in Dortmund are more tightly linked to economic restructuring. As Table 3 shows, city residents hold almost 60% of the jobs located in Dortmund and the number of jobs held by city residents is growing. The polycentric nature of the Ruhr region means that areas outside of the city generally have more of an urban than a suburban feel. During successive waves, smaller villages and towns were often incorporated into larger German cities. In cities like Dortmund, suburban-style neighborhoods with mostly single-family homes are as likely to be located inside the city limits as in the suburbs. Due to this complexity and the smaller relative size of Dortmund’s denser historic housing stock,³² only a handful of neighborhoods can potentially become the “gentrified playground” for new urban lifestyles. Demand for housing in Dortmund is growing, coinciding with an overall rise in middle-class professional jobs in the city. Unlike St. Louis, however, Dortmund has not suffered from massive middle-class flight. Schools are funded out of a common pool of revenue; as a result, middle-class households cannot benefit by fleeing to better-funded suburban schools. In short, the clustering of new knowledge-based professional jobs puts more upward pressure on housing costs in Dortmund than in St. Louis.

Although economic restructuring is putting more pressure on housing prices in Dortmund compared to St. Louis, lower-income residents in Dortmund are better protected from rising rents and displacement. In Dortmund about 10% of the housing units are in social housing where rent increases are limited to inflation (Stadt Dortmund 2017b). The implementation of inclusionary zoning in Dortmund means that new housing construction requires a share of housing units for lower-income households, even in high-rent areas such as Phoenix Lake. Rent control in older industrial cities in the U.S. is extremely rare. Renters in the United States have relatively little legal protection against eviction; in Germany, eviction of renters is legally more difficult (Davies et al. 2017).³³ In the United States, two-thirds of poor renters receive no federal assistance at all (Desmond 2016, 302–3).

The negative consequences usually associated with gentrification, such as the displacement of low-income households from inner-city neighborhoods, are not pronounced in Dortmund yet. Neighborhoods do, however show signs of transformation. In Dorstfelder Brücke gentrification is encouraged by the city but the result has mostly been a moderate clustering of arts and media activities, not an exchange of population on a large scale. Hörde has changed more, mostly due to the new socio-economic mix resulting from newly built housing around nearby Phoenix Lake. The working-class character of Hörde is threatened by the lifestyles of new middle-class neighbors. Even though there is little direct displacement from this “new build” gentrification, spillover effects, such as the upgrading of the older housing stock, can be observed.

St. Louis does have some protections from displacement but these protections vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. To be effective, these policy tools generally require a strong neighborhood nonprofit sponsor. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program has helped to build and rehabilitate housing units that are affordable to low-income families in rebounding neighborhoods (Swanstrom et al. 2017, 340). This does not represent permanently affordable housing, however, because the developer can convert the units to market-rate housing in as little as 15 years. St. Louis has nonprofit-owned housing that protects tenants from large rent increases, but it represents a much lower percentage of the housing stock than social housing in Dortmund.

Conclusion: Gentrification as a Complex and Variegated Phenomenon

Our research on gentrification in Dortmund and St. Louis supports the contingent concept of gentrification as articulated in the quote we cited earlier by Beauregard: “The emphasis . . . must be placed on contingency and complexity, set within the structural dimensions of advanced capitalism” (Beauregard 2010, 11). In our two cities, gentrification is being driven by economic restructuring that is creating clusters of new economy jobs near older urban neighborhoods with attractive housing stock and urban amenities. However, the way these broader structural forces play out in Dortmund and St. Louis differs from strong market cities and they vary significantly across different neighborhoods within our two cities. Given that our research is based on only two cases, our findings are tentative. More research is needed to determine if the patterns we found prevail in other older industrial cities.

As our literature review suggested, compared to hot market global cities, gentrification in these two older industrial cities has occurred at a slower rate with less upward pressure on rents. Rents are increasing in gentrifying neighborhoods but often not much above citywide trends and not enough to cause widespread displacement (though there is evidence in some neighborhoods that displacement pressures are building). Many of the neighborhoods we studied were changing demographically but we were not able to determine whether that was due to displacement pressures from rising rents or to replacement, i.e., different demographic groups replacing those that move in the normal course of housing turnover. In any case, more research is needed to determine why people are moving, including surveys of movers.

The weaker gentrification pressures in our two cities have created a different geographical pattern than that reported for hot market cities. In Dortmund and St. Louis, gentrification-like processes are largely confined to neighborhoods that have always been relatively strong (and are located close to growing job centers). Contrary to research on strong market cities, gentrification in our two older industrial cities avoids areas near centers of professional employment devalued by disinvestment and depopulation. We hypothesize that in a relatively weak housing market, potential gentrifiers have many neighborhoods to choose from and therefore can shun areas with large concentrations of minorities or visible immigrants at little cost.

While Dortmund and St. Louis are similar in their broad patterns of gentrification, their institutional and policy differences provide important contrasts. Municipal and educational fragmentation in St. Louis has driven a process of suburbanization that siphons off potential gentrifiers. Compared to St. Louis, more employees in Dortmund’s new knowledge economy live in the city, intensifying gentrification pressures. Somewhat surprisingly, Dortmund city government, which does not benefit directly from expanded tax revenue generated by rising land values in gentrifying neighborhoods, has made concerted efforts to promote gentrification, most notably in the Phoenix Project adjacent to Hörde. At the same time, however, a larger presence of social housing, along with other policies and legal practices, provide renters in Dortmund with greater protections from displacement than renters in St. Louis, where protections are more of a patchwork depending on the strength of local nonprofits.

Most research on policies to counter the negative effects of gentrification has focused on strong market cities. Clearly, more research on how policy makers have dealt with the unique challenges of gentrification in older industrial cities is needed.³⁴ Fortunately, the relatively slow process of gentrification in older industrial cities offers an opportunity for policy makers to preserve affordable housing while land values are still relatively low.

In conclusion, gentrification is a contingent and complex phenomenon. While generalizations about gentrification in older industrial cities are possible, what is most striking is the contrast between our two cities and strong market cities, as well as the variation across neighborhoods within our two cases. In both cities, gentrification-like processes are changing neighborhoods, but few neighborhoods fit the unitary conception of rapidly rising rents, wholesale displacement of longtime residents, and transformation of the social and cultural character of the area. Gentrification in older industrial cities like Dortmund and St. Louis is complex and variegated. Using one word, “gentrification,” to describe many different processes of neighborhood change is problematic. There is no one pattern of gentrification. Researchers, policy makers, and activists on the ground need to take this into account.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Todd Swanstrom

Notes

Author Biographies

The Des Lee Professor of Community Collaboration and Public Policy Administration at the University of Missouri—St. Louis, Todd Swanstrom is the co-author of Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-First Century (U. Press of Kansas, 3rd edition, 2014). He is currently working on a book with Alan Mallach tentatively titled: The Good Neighborhood: Why It’s Threatened and What We Can Do About It. His applied work focuses on developing a learning network of anchor institutions in St. Louis.

Jörg Plöger is a Senior Researcher at ILS—Research Institute for Regional and Urban Development in Dortmund, Germany. He has published broadly on the nexus of migration and urban change, and more recently on the approaches of knowledge economy employers in restructuring cities. Previously, he worked on the Weak Market Cities project at the London School of Economics and co-authored Phoenix Cities: The fall and rise of great industrial cities (Policy Press, 2010).

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