Strengthening the Role of Science in the Environmental Decision-Making Processes of Executive Government

Increasing Plurality of Scientific Knowledge Sources

Descriptions of complex environmental issues were usually accompanied by expressions of frustration about how to manage the frequently contested and emotional nature of environmental issues to obtain a “good” environmental outcome. Here, ministers characterized their decision-making context as containing a large diversity of knowledge sources about the implications of science-based knowledge and this contributed to uncertainty in their decision making. Environment agencies (direct or commissioned) were identified by all ministers as their primary knowledge source. However, the majority also described receiving information from external sources—private interest groups, nongovernmental organizations, or universities. Often ministers would not seek out these alternative sources but rather these sources would seek them out in the form of lobbying which was either direct (face to face) or indirect (through media sources). However, some also actively sought out information from those they believed to be particularly credible:

. . . you need to make sure that you get out and about and try and get some pretty good ideas from the professionals in the field about what the views are, to help you to ask questions of the officials [bureaucrats]. (Minister—New Zealand)

I was a great believer of trying to talk to all sorts of academics in an informal way, which I did a lot of, because that gave me an alternative view from the civil service. (Secretary of State, minister—United Kingdom)

Ministers also described the politicization of science, where various interest groups presented science-based knowledge that was often in conflict with their environment agency’s or required verification by their agency. Indeed, most ministers described knowledge from lobbyists to be “unusable” due to the perception of vested interests in either maintenance of the status quo or in changing the status quo in ways that were not in the best interest of society:

. . . I mean generally people who want to talk about this have a vested interest in the outcome and so you’re not really getting a lot of objective advice. (Ontario minister—Canada)

. . . people will kind of grab the argument that makes their case, depending upon what political interest they see themselves as either protecting or promoting. (Federal minister—Canada)

Some ministers also described feeling like they were the “judge” of the quality of the science-based knowledge being provided to them and having to “sift through” this knowledge to find the most appropriate source. Here, source credibility was extremely important:

. . . when they [scientists] disagree amongst themselves you have to become like a judge. . . . You just have to say, “OK, I’m getting two completely different stories here. What are their interests, what’s colouring their versions so that based on the same evidence they are coming to different conclusions and how can I take a decision in the public interest.” (Quebec minister—Canada)

You are there as a politician to make judgments and one of the things you have to make judgments about is the advice you are given. (Secretary of State, minister—United Kingdom)

As decisions about what knowledge to integrate into decisions are value laden (Smithson, 1993), the willingness to assess the knowledge from different sources of information was, in part, dependent on the personality of the minister and their interest in detail. As the above quote suggests, in highly contested decision-making contexts ministers were making decisions about “what” knowledge should be included in their decision making rather than deciding on “whether” something should happen. While some ministers felt this was their role, others felt that they were often not able to access credible sources to make a properly informed decision.

Ad Hoc and Advisory Institutional Structures to Mobilize Knowledge

Ministers also described the importance of public opinion and a concern about the potential negative political consequences of decisions as key drivers of both their own, and cabinet’s, decision-making processes on environmental issues. Many ministers described a lack of public engagement in policy and science processes (particularly by academics) as strengthening the position of special interest groups and encouraging opinion-based decision making by government (Lalor & Hickey, 2013). As a result, most ministers in our sample expressed some desire for improved institutional structures and processes for greater inclusiveness and stakeholder participation in both environmental science and decision making. Most ministers also articulated some degree of frustration with the ad hoc nature, or absence, of such structures and processes to facilitate direct communication between the broader scientific community and politicians (ministers and parliamentarians, including shadow-ministers):

. . . there aren’t very good and consistent means for scientists to communicate to government . . . and that communication in the government is reasonably ad hoc. (Victorian minister—Australia)

While most ministers spoke about the challenges of inconsistent institutional structures and processes to mobilize knowledge from stakeholders, some also felt that where they existed, they were generally unable to provide appropriately contextualized knowledge that could be used to make an informed decision in cabinet. Importantly, many ministers also described a lack of satisfaction with the advisory nature of existing structures and processes, lamenting the ability of these to influence public policy because they were only useful to the extent that recommendations were mandated by the premier’s or prime minister’s office.

The Need for Better Contextualized Knowledge

When reflecting on the complexity of environmental decision-making in executive government, our sample of ministers identified that the influence of politics on decision making was generally reduced when cabinet had access to appropriately contextualized knowledge that could describe the potential implications of policy options, resulting in improved deliberation and reduced perceptions of political risk:

Sciences’ value to the decision-making, I found and I still believe, is in direct relationship to its ability to be contextualized. (Saskatchewan deputy minister—Canada)

Our participants described contextualized knowledge as having three essential characteristics, identified by McNie (2007) as (a) credibility, (b) legitimacy, and (c) salience. Credible knowledge was described as having been garnered and synthesized through a process that included scientific information from trustworthy sources (generally those that had previously provided good advice and had a “good track record” with ministers). These sources could not be perceived as biased and needed to demonstrate transparency in relation to their funding. Furthermore, science-based knowledge gained credibility if it was the result of a peer-reviewed process or a broad-based consensus of opinion among perceived experts. Legitimate science-based knowledge was described as having considered public opinion and support, being produced with input from communities, and having considered the political, economic, and societal implications of the knowledge. In order to be salient, knowledge had to be easy to understand, to the point and delivered in a timely manner (see also, Lalor & Hickey, 2013). When science-based knowledge was well contextualized to a particular situation, some ministers described policy options being easier to “sell” to cabinet. This was particularly the case if the scientific evidence pointed to a potential human health impact.

Key Consequences

A key consequence of the complexity and inherent uncertainty within a minister’s decision-making context, exacerbated by a lack of contextualized knowledge, was delayed government action and the maintenance of “status quo” (Figure 1):

. . . the Cabinet or the government of the day would rather you do nothing than stir up controversy that may turn out negative. So you’re better off just sort of ignoring problems and carrying on and just let the, you know, the administration go on and don’t say much and just say wonderful green things. (Ontario minister—Canada)

The conditions described above were seen to create what can be described as a “vacuum” of contextualized knowledge around ministers. Under such a knowledge vacuum, the ministers described their own and the cabinet’s decisions as less likely to be based on a formal, tested and inclusive “evidence base” and more likely to be based on ministers’ “common sense” and opinion. Another key consequence was the perception of a lack of accountability to demonstrate how policy decisions were based on evidence. As a result, some ministers described a desire to have greater support in this area:

So you’ve got to give the Minister some support for making the right decision as well as you want to say to government, “You want to make these regulations or whatever, you better make sure you make them on the basis of scientific evidence.” (Ontario minister—Canada)

Lack of Skills and Competences

Most heads of departments described a lack of skill and competence within their agencies to be able to translate science to policy:

. . . They’re good at science but struggle to translate the science into public policy, and there’s a real skills gap there that we’ve not overcome. (South Australian chief executive—Australia)

I wasn’t alone, this was a discussion amongst Deputies about how do you get the staff to bring you something that you can take forward? How do you get them to understand that the science is important . . . you need that. But in addition you need some sort of implications, some sort of priority of this versus other things . . . for whatever reason in environment departments it tends not to come. You have to really dig for it. (Saskatchewan deputy minister—Canada)

For example, one permanent secretary in the United Kingdom told us that increasing extramural scientific capacity, without increasing or at least recognizing the importance of an in-house capacity to understand the science that was being funded, represented a significant issue for the U.K. public service to confront. Some other heads of department felt that their agencies lacked multidisciplinary staff who were able to think across disciplines:

. . . what we lacked were people who were prepared to be adventurous or lateral by applying a solution from one field to another, these cross-communicators, they needed to be sufficiently literate, scientifically, to at least explain their idea from one to the other, but we didn’t have enough of them. (Victorian secretary—Australia)

Furthermore, there was a general perception that a lack of “in-house” science skill could lead to creation of knowledge vacuums around ministers which would allow the more powerful political or economic interests to prevail. This was particularly noted by ministers and heads of departments from Canada’s smaller provinces:

So I could not, with the knowledge I personally had, determine if this was a good permit or not and then the chances would be, being a large industry, they would go over your head to somebody else in government, the Premier’s office, whatever, and object to whatever we were doing. (New Brunswick minister—Canada)

Organizational Culture

Most heads of departments described a lack of understanding within their agencies about the role of science in the decision-making process. Such a lack of understanding was thought by some department heads to be particular to the scientists within their agencies:

You know the scientists didn’t understand for the most part why their science wasn’t enough for a good decision. [ . . . ] the reality is that decisions are never purely scientific decisions, this is about governance not science. (Saskatchewan deputy minister—Canada)

. . . they [scientists] often present the subject so unintelligible to the ordinary individual, notwithstanding the fantastic work that’s done behind the scenes. In order to get political support and public support, you need understanding. (Minister—Ireland)

Some agency heads also described how tensions between policy and science groups, or between science groups resulted in fragmentation into organizational “silos,” which negatively affected their capacity to deliver contextualized knowledge. This was primarily because scientists and policy makers were often perceived to be using different “mental models,” ultimately resulting in difficulties in translation between science and policy:

. . . the single greatest challenge or barrier was the government working in silos. I was surprised at how fractured the organization was. . . . I mean we were forcing cross-blocks, that’s a whole lot of what we were doing. We’d cooperate in our silos . . . rather than breaking down the old regime. (Federal deputy minister—Canada)

Some also described an internal resistance to change within their agency. One chief executive officer from South Australia described feeling “caught” in the history of the agency and the way they had operated for a long period of time, making it difficult to transition to an “enabling leadership role” to foster creativity and adaptation:

. . . so this is the problem; you inherit agencies, you’re limited in your ability to change them, or you think you’re limited, and the status quo is preserved and that’s the real challenge.(South Australian chief executive—Australia)

There was also a general frustration among most heads of departments and some ministers at having to operate within what they felt was an old but still dominant paradigm where it was the “economy versus environment.” They described their constant challenge to balance these “opposing” forces rather than moving toward an approach of “working together” to resolve issues and that this had important implications for the integration of environmental knowledge and sustainability policy across governments:

I think an older model, is what we call the teeter-totter, which is; any advancement on the environment is a cost of the economy. I don’t like the term “trying to balance”. What you are really trying to do is advance both; I mean that is the new model of competitiveness. (British Columbia Deputy Minister—Canada)

The economy versus environment paradigm was also perceived by some ministers and heads of departments to be reinforced by the staff of the agencies who they perceived as resisting change to more collaborative approaches. Furthermore, one Canadian minister felt that the use of the economy versus environment paradigm among senior management led them to be conflict adverse:

. . . they’re conflict adverse. Most of the bureaucracy in Ottawa, certainly the environmental people at a certain level like Director General and below see their level as providing the science to buttress public policy decision made by the government. When you go to Assistant Deputy Ministers or Deputy Ministers, they see their role as getting a political fix. A political fix means minimizing fights, minimizing fights means status quo, so that’s kind of the path, it’s the path of least resistance . . . (Federal minister—Canada)

Inadequate Structures and Processes to Mobilize Contextualized Knowledge to Ministers

Some ministers described their frustration with overly “process”- rather than “results”-oriented agencies, which made access to contextualized knowledge from within their agencies inefficient. For example, one federal minister from Canada felt that a formal request for advice to his deputy minister could result in advice being provided up to 2 weeks after the original question was posed. Furthermore, once an answer was received by the minister it would often be voluminous and require some sort of immediate clarification limiting the salience of the knowledge. As a consequence the minister sought more timely knowledge through other, informal processes, either through direct contact with specific agency personnel (with the knowledge of the deputy minister) or through informal knowledge networks he had established with external individuals or organizations (e.g., university professors). A few ministers in Australia also described their frustrations at their agencies’ lack of ability to hold a long-term perspective:

. . . they were trying to deliver up credible information . . . because it was sometimes thought that that’s what you wanted to receive and I just don’t think that works. There’s a conflict in the department about it how it does that. Pleasing the Minister I suspect is of course one of their roles but you’re meant to please them over a period of time, not daily. So your flow of information should be based on a long term strategy and sound analysis rather than short term issues and I’m not sure if the department was in that mode. (Victorian minister—Australia)

Improved Communication

To reduce fragmentation (“silos”) and achieve greater contextualization of science-based knowledge on environmental issues, most heads of department described a need to improve internal communication between the science and policy communities within their agencies. This was primarily because scientists and policy makers were often perceived to be using different “mental models” and “languages,” ultimately resulting in difficulties in translation. To this end some participants described the need to provide more opportunity for communication through the creation of venues for regular dialogue, thought to be important in creating cohesiveness across the agency to ensure a more synergistic approach to science and policy:

We were promoting the interaction, promoting dialogue, promoting understanding. Understanding that no individual will have the whole picture on any one issue. (Federal deputy minister—Canada)

. . . can social scientists and natural scientists speak out to each, can indeed scientists of disciplines speak to each except through third parties and so on, and could you build networks which facilitated a more open engagement? (Permanent Secretary—United Kingdom)

You’ve got . . . characters sitting around a table and they are all in their own field, but they are not speaking the same language. . . . The scientists are speaking science. The economists are speaking economy, . . . these people have to learn to communicate with each other and you had to put questions in a form that they could do that. (Director General—New Zealand)

Some heads of department also described the importance of having appropriately “skilled” people within their agencies who were able to communicate across both science and policy communities and hence act as “knowledge brokers” who fostered cohesiveness. However, while they recognized this need, they also described a general lack of such capacity within their agencies:

. . . you need a balance of people that are capable of interpreting science in your organization . . . (South Australian CEO—Australia)

This included at the management level. There was a perception among some heads of departments and some ministers that having overly “managerial-type” leaders who did not have “classical” science training, could end up carrying out “administrative leadership” as opposed to “enabling leadership” that fostered creativity and adaption within the agency:

. . . if you then get someone running a department who is just managerial, then they’re running it with a different mission, you know? I’m sort of a bit old fashioned, I like the idea of a conservation or environment department being run by someone who doesn’t have a law or management degree, I think that’s healthy for the public service. I think it’s like a reference point. (Victorian minister—Australia)

As a result, some department heads felt that there was a need to create appropriate career pathways for scientists to move into influentialmanagement and policy positions and to create incentives for knowledge brokers and translators:

I think we probably need a stream of people who are capable of taking a portfolio of science and saying, you can be the communicator, and we’ll pay you accordingly. (Victorian secretary—Australia)

So one of the things that we are trying to do is to try and recruit and provide a career path for scientists so that they can continue to be in influential positions. (Deputy minister—British Columbia)

An important attribute would be the capacity of the civil servants to assimilate lots of scientific and technical data and present it . . . in layman’s terms, for policy consideration because there’s only so much . . . scientific evidence that you can present on any given occasion. (Secretary General—Ireland)

Some heads of department also described the need to break down internal resistance to organizational change through better internal communication and training, and that such a cultural shift would lead to a more cohesive, collaborative approach to addressing problems:

. . . the only way you change it is by getting the dialogue going right, so that instead of the interaction at the junior levels just being about exchanging information, it becomes a sort of a collaborative goal . . . you have to have that to change the culture . . . (Deputy minister—Saskatchewan)

A mindset change that says part of the education of a top quality science or engineering degree is going to be to have the qualities to be very influential, whether in business or in government. So let’s think about that, and let’s think about different career paths, and let’s think about different ways in which we can facilitate two-way movement between organizations. So it’s both cultural, it requires then both cultural and mindset changes in government and in the science and engineering professions and their leadership. (Permanent Secretary—United Kingdom)

Improved Structures

To improve integration of environment across government, particularly within economic agencies, some ministers and most heads of department highlighted the importance of having appropriate structures and processes to break down barriers between government agencies. However, others felt that the establishment of such formal structures and processes to facilitate interdepartmental collaboration would likely fail unless they were grounded in trust. This deputy minister felt that development of such trust could facilitate collaboration on environmental issues:

. . . not everybody can do this . . . it takes a good listener and someone who can make sure the people feel heard and someone who can then make their own department show that. If you don’t do all of those things then people just say, “well that was a waste of my time,” and you haven’t gone any further. Formality is useless if there isn’t a trust . . . that this is genuine and that something will come of it. (Deputy minister—Saskatchewan)

Some participants also described the possibility of exploring new structures and processes to allow greater deliberation and knowledge exchange with external (nongovernment) sources, such as through consensus conferences, citizen jury panels, and the establishment of appropriate legislated structures or frameworks to report environmental data with the same rigor as economic or social data. Establishing links and networks between agencies and nongovernment groups that are multidisciplinary was thought by some ministers and department heads to be extremely important to improve mobilization of scientific knowledge into decision making and ultimately the integration of environment across government:

Most problems are indeed multidisciplinary. So can you create networks which are multidisciplinary and can you build links between departments and external bodies which are multidisciplinary based? (Permanent Secretary—United Kingdom)