Transit Fare Affordability: Findings From a Qualitative Study

Abstract

Low-income groups use transit in greater numbers than others. There is little scholarship, however, about how they afford the fare. Using interviews with 25 low-income residents and 15 transportation and social service professionals, this study provides a complex description of fare affordability. It finds that low-income riders are often unable to pay for trips that fulfill daily necessities and discretionary purposes. They manage to travel by evading the fare, exploiting free transfers, forgoing goods, borrowing, and using free fare cards provided by agents of the welfare state. Professionals are largely unaware of the many ways that riders regularly compensate for low funds including the large-scale interventions made by the welfare state into public transportation. Fare evasion enforcement and pricing can pose challenges to low-income riders. By incorporating knowledge on the role that welfare plays in enabling low-income ridership, policy makers can expand access to transit for low-income riders.

Keywords

public transportation equity welfare qualitative methods decision making

Introduction

Public transportation, when accompanied with sufficiently dense, mixed land uses, provides a low-cost alternative to driving, and can create equitable access across the income spectrum. As the fare effectively gates this promising infrastructure, its affordability to low-income riders is important. In the United States, transit fares are low by many standards but expensive to a growing number of riders at the bottom end of the income distribution. This research explains how the poor afford public transportation using narrative biographical interviews with 25 low-income residents and semi-structured interviews with 15 professionals (social workers, transit advocates, and planners).

Different branches of the transportation literature address various elements of the question of how the poor afford public transportation, namely how to specify transportation affordability, and whether and how price, income, and subsidies affect ridership among the poor. On the topic of overall transportation affordability, there are studies and policy tools largely based in theories of expenditures and necessity (e.g., Fan & Huang, 2011; Litman, 2015). This research suggests a definition of affordability derived from experience and that more directly pertains to transit-dependent populations. Regarding the effect of price and income on ridership, this research contributes qualitative, contextualized data from low-income riders to economics-based explanations of low-income ridership and price. While the incidence of transit subsidies and changes to fare structure on different income groups have been well researched (e.g., Hickey, Lu, & Reddy, 2010; Pucher, 1981), the extent to which the public and private sector intervene to provide direct user subsidies is unclear and relatively unstudied. This research begins to fill that gap for one case: New York City.

This research approaches the question of how the poor afford public transit by learning about individual experiences of low-income people. The individual rider makes purchases, budgets, borrows, and participates in activities that require travel. As described in the following literature review, the results of these habits and behaviors have been studied in the aggregate, using quantitative methods. To learn about the habits and behaviors themselves is to investigate the delicate, often personal ways that people manage scarce resources. The appropriate methods for this type of complex, personal investigation are qualitative: interview and observation.

This research chooses as its case a publicly provided facility which is widely considered a necessity, public transportation in New York City. New York’s transit is anomalous in the United States; no other transit system is nearly as large or well used. The transit fare is a price on both mobility and urban access (Sclar, Lönnroth, & Wolmar, 2014). By choosing a successful case of a state institution distributing collective goods, the research points to considerations for other facilities gated by user fees in income-bifurcated cities. Specifically, it highlights how programs within the welfare system help users overcome the fee, often in an ad hoc manner, and how individuals tackle the barrier presented by fees even as they consider those fees broadly acceptable and fair.

This research finds that transit’s user fees are a barrier to the poor to overcome through compensating behaviors and by intervention from various arms of the welfare state. Those behaviors and interventions are not captured by transportation statistics. It finds that the observed preference for single ride fares is in most cases the result of constraints.¹ Single ride fares are often combined with fare evasion and exploitation of free transfers, whereas unlimited ride fare cards (i.e., the rider pays once for the privilege of taking unlimited trips within a given time period) are highly sought and widely shared. It further finds that low-income riders are more likely to evade the fare, exploit free transfers, and rely on fragmented systems of generosity and welfare than to forego goods. On the occasions when they do forego goods, they experience those travel behavior decisions as compromising other necessities such as food, telephone service, rent, and laundry. Together these findings suggest that ridership is supported by problematic behaviors of riders themselves, and by public and private institutions tied to the provision of welfare goods (e.g., emergency food, social services, and medical care). In addition, the research finds that professionals involved in the daily lives of the poor and in public transportation planning and advocacy are largely unaware of the welfare-based interventions in transit affordability. Finally, the research develops a definition of fare affordability based on experiences of low-income riders: the ability to travel on transit without risk of deprivation, arrest, or being refused admission.

Literature Review

As an increasing share of urban residents is in the lower end of the economic spectrum (Berube, 2014), it becomes relevant to ask whether user fees are universally affordable. Transportation scholarship is loquacious on matters of equity, with considerable research comparing transportation options and commute times between marginalized and higher income populations (e.g., Garrett & Taylor, 1999; Giuliano, 2003; Pucher & Renne, 2003; Sanchez, 2008; Shen, 2000). It is, however, largely quiet on fare affordability. Economic theory, where much of travel behavior and transit ridership scholarship is based, imputes affordability from statistics on consumption: If a good is broadly consumed by low-income users, it is presumably affordable to them. The explanation for low-income ridership is that travel is relatively inelastic; riders will afford the fare by foregoing more elastic goods, as their consumption can be more easily curtailed (Balcombe et al., 2004). There is little empirical evidence to either confirm or challenge the presumption that low-income riders’ access to this critical utility is maintained solely by people buying fewer other items. Likewise, while there are numerous examples of the intersection of welfare and public transportation in practice, there are few studies of how these programs make transit affordable or whether and where they are necessary. The literature’s engagement with these three topics is addressed below: transit affordability; the relationship among income, price, and transit ridership; and subsidies and benefits for low-income transit riders.

Transit Affordability

In practice, affordability is measured in the aggregate by comparing a price to household income. Housing cost burden is the percent of household income spent on housing; U.S. federal policies typically prescribe that more than 30% is a high housing cost burden, and more than 50% is severe (Kutty, 2005). There is no U.S. cost burden standard for transportation, although there are indices combining housing and transportation costs. The U.S. Housing and Urban Development and Department of Transportation’s Location Affordability Index states that 45% of income spent on combined housing and transportation costs is “affordable.” Among transit commuters, the median cost burden of commuting is 3.5% compared with 5.0% for those driving to work; among the working poor it is 5.8% for transit users, and for all other workers it is 2.9% for transit users (Roberto, 2008).² That is, the median transit rider spends 3.5% of income commuting, and the median motorist spends 5% of income commuting. Blumenberg (2003) and others have analyzed transportation expenditures (for all trip types, rather than just commuting to work) as a share of total household expenditures, and found transportation accounts for between 17% and 21% of total expenditures.

Cost and expenditure thresholds (based on burdens) are by necessity arbitrary and sensitive to all other prices in a given context. Carruthers, Dick, and Saurkar (2005) improve upon the method with an alternative metric specifically for public transportation. They measure the share of the bottom quintile’s income needed to take sixty 10 kilometer transit trips per month. In New York that number is 10%, as it is for Chicago and Los Angeles, the only other two American cities in the index. These three American cities make up the more affordable end of the middle third of the 27-city index; Brazilian cities are least affordable; Bangkok, Prague, and (surprisingly) London are the most affordable. Serebrisky, Gomez-Lobo, Estupiñán, and Muñoz-Raskin (2009) find this a promising indicator to track changes to affordability over time.

Specifying transit affordability as a cost or expenditure burden facilitates comparisons across geographies and demographics. At the individual level, affordability may be experienced in important ways by households that have very low incomes and expenditures which often exceed their incomes. To understand the mechanism of affordability (that is, how individuals or households manage to afford a necessity) requires a close study of household and personal budgets, best accomplished through interview (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). There are numerous examples of qualitative studies of poverty and deprivation (e.g., Edin & Shaefer, 2015) as well as studies that connect social exclusion with lack of access and mobility (e.g., Delbosc & Currie, 2011); however, there has yet been no qualitative study of transit fare affordability that the author is aware of.

Income and Transit Ridership

Transportation planners and scholars understand the fare and ridership in terms of price elasticity: the ratio of the proportional change in ridership to the proportional change in price, or fares. Low-income groups are observed as having high rates of ridership that is less sensitive to price (B. D. Taylor, Miller, Iseki, & Fink, 2009). However, while “public transport fares are well investigated in the economic literature” (Borndörfer, Karbstein, & Pfetsch, 2012, p. 2591), “the effect of income on fare elasticities is not well researched” (McCollom & Pratt, 2004, p. 36).

The relationship between ridership and income can be complex. In the United Kingdom, for example, “Income has a positive impact on public transport demand, but with an offsetting negative impact, particularly in the bus market, through its effects on car ownership” (Paulley et al., 2006, p. 305). There is little research on how income directly affects an individual rider’s sensitivity to the fare. It may be logical that lower income transit passengers would be more responsive to price because of their constrained financial resources (Cervero, 1990; Garrett & Taylor, 1999, assume this is the case), but it is also logical that they are less price elastic as they are less likely to own automobiles and take fewer discretionary trips; collinearity between income and car ownership confounds the modeling (Amador, González, & Ortúzar, 2008; Paulley et al., 2006; Preston 2001). There is likewise scant research on how income groups’ differing marginal utilities of income effect their sensitivity to the fare (Viauroux, 2011).

One reason different income groups’ varying fare elasticities are not well researched is that the fare is not found to be a major factor determining aggregate ridership. Early models concluded that reducing travel time is at least as effective as reducing the fare for increasing ridership (Winston, 1985). Later work confirmed and expanded on the finding: The important factors for ridership are land use and service levels (B. D. Taylor et al., 2009). A policy maker with an agenda of increasing ridership, then, will look to transit network density or bus speeds rather than the fare.

Jara-Díaz and Videla (1989) assert another reason that income has been “forgotten” in demand models of public transport. They suggest that demand theory refers to the behavior, habits, and tastes of the developed world. They show that the income effect on public transport demand increases in areas of Santiago, Chile, with higher poverty. “Mode choices by individuals in the lowest income group are twice as sensitive to income as those with double income, and six times more sensitive than those earning three times the money” (Jara-Díaz & Videla, 1989, p. 22). They conclude that transport demand should be specified by income group. Those few transport scholars researching affordability have cited this finding (e.g., Carruthers et al., 2005; Serebrisky et al., 2009). Fan and Huang (2011), studying Minneapolis, MN, similarly conclude that transportation affordability should be measured against population-specific standards.

In summary, quantitative studies show that while low-income groups are observed to prefer transit, it is unclear the extent to which income or price explains the observation. As ridership is a necessity for low-income transit-dependent individuals, and quantitative studies are confined to observation, quantitative studies will only be able to detect ridership results from dramatic fare changes. In practice, the fare is kept relatively steady through politics and policy, as discussed below.

Subsidies and Benefits for Disadvantaged Riders

For public transportation in many U.S. cities, including New York, the price of the fare is neither consistent with economic principles nor with sound business practice, but instead is considered political (Cudahy, 1990; Hood, 1995; Kirby, 1982). As a result, the average bus fare in the United States has increased at a slower rate than inflation since at least 1991 (American Public Transportation Association, 2015). U.S. transportation agencies rely on government subsidies for approximately 60% of operating revenue.³ These subsidies in effect keep the fares low.

Serebrisky et al. (2009) argue there is a spectrum of subsidies in public transportation from supply- to demand-sided. Supply-side subsidies accrue to the transit agencies and can be conditioned upon performance. Performance conditions typically include ridership goals or bus frequencies, and they can also include metrics of disadvantaged rider benefit. Demand-side subsidies accrue to the riders and fall into four methods of targeting: means tested, categorical (e.g., senior and student discounts), self-selection (when redundant services of differing quality and cost are provided), and geographic.

The main effect of supply-side subsidies in the United States, including in New York City, is to keep the fare relatively low. These subsidies are redistributive to the extent that transit riders are lower income than the taxpayers from whom the subsidies are generated. “Subsidizing inferior or necessity goods” by keeping their price low “generates self-selection of beneficiaries since higher income households consume much less of the good than low-income households” (Serebrisky et al., 2009, p. 734). That is, keeping the price of a good like transit low is progressive in places like Los Angeles where the poor tend to ride and the non-poor drive. The poor will self-select by consuming the inexpensive subsidized good, and the non-poor will opt out of the beneficiary group by driving. In New York City, all income classes ride transit; it is closer to a normal good than an inferior good, although it remains a necessity. In that case, the most progressive subsidies are demand-sided: They promote transit affordability by directly targeting the poor, for example through direct user subsidies or means tested fares.

Demand-side subsidies benefit targeted categories of riders. U.S. transit agencies are mandated as federal funding recipients to charge half price for fares for disabled riders and senior citizens (American Public Transportation Association, 2010).⁴ These subsidies are only as progressive as members of the targeted categories are uniquely poor.

In the United States, there is no cohesive transit affordability policy aside from categorical discounts for the disabled and the elderly.⁵ To provide parity with tax policies for drivers, there are commuter tax benefits for transit riders attached to the labor force. Both commuter and categorical concessions are universal in that recipients are eligible regardless of income or ability to pay. There is no coordinated or explicit policy of providing fares for able-bodied adults who cannot pay. Anecdotal evidence shows that individuals may be receiving direct subsidies in the form of free transit fares or cash for travel from time to time from charitable organizations or transit agencies (e.g., Blumenberg & Haas, 2001; Edin & Shaefer, 2015). There is, however, limited research on how these direct user subsidies promote transit affordability. Most studies mention fare affordability in passing amid comparisons of pricing policies (e.g., Kirby, 1982; K. C. Taylor & Jones, 2012). Lovely and Brand (1982) describe how a direct user subsidy program emerges from among five alternatives as the most efficient at relieving low-income patrons. Chapple (2001) reviews welfare-to-work policies, including transit passes which are “in essence an indirect wage subsidy” (p. 167).⁶ Blumenberg (2000) includes transit passes among other welfare-to-work programs as well, and further suggests implementing distance-based fares to lower costs for many low-income riders whose trips tend to be shorter; the focus is on equity of fare structure rather than affordability of the fare itself. To the author’s knowledge, there has been no study of the extent of direct user subsidies on the transit dependent in an urban area or their effect on transit affordability for the poor.

Qualitative Studies of Transit Riders

By design, qualitative studies can learn directly from low-income individuals how prices, income, and direct user subsidies relate to their individual experience of mobility and accessibility. There is an extensive literature that uses qualitative methods to understand the travel decisions and other behavior of automobile drivers (e.g., Handy, Weston, & Mokhtarian, 2005; Mokhtarian & Cao, 2008). A few qualitative studies investigate the travel behavior and decisions of low-income individuals (e.g., Lovejoy & Handy 2008). A small number of qualitative studies have addressed transit fare affordability. Two recent efforts, Agrawal, Blumenberg, Abel, Pierce, and Darrah (2011) and Pollack, Williams, Lopez, and Luna (2013), use qualitative methods to delve into low-income individuals’ difficulties affording public transportation.

Agrawal et al. (2011) interviewed 73 low-income residents of San Jose. Pollack, Williams, Lopez, and Luna (2013) used surveys followed up by in-depth focus groups to learn about the mobility and accessibility challenges faced by low-income Latino residents of Massachusetts. Affordability emerged as a major issue. Many respondents had gone without other basic necessities to pay for transportation. Overall, 43% of transit users said that the cost of transit was a major problem and these percentages were higher in areas with more available transit (Pollack et al., 2013, p. 20). Respondents sometimes reduce other household expenditures such as those for food, entertainment, or personal items to cover the costs of travel, and they cluster their transit trips on a single day to take advantage of unlimited ride fares. Direct user subsidies, discussed below, were evident in practice as well: “Many low-income transit riders routinely depend on the receipt of transit subsidies from agencies and organizations that may or may not regularly provide them” (Agrawal et al., 2011, p. 50). Like the respondents in Lovejoy and Handy (2008), the focus group participants in Massachusetts described extensive sharing arrangements among and within households to facilitate mobility.

These qualitative studies suggest that for low-income riders, the fare is an important, necessary expenditure. While the price does not necessarily constrain ridership or trip making, it leads to a more constrained household budget overall. Furthermore, the ability to afford the fare is based in part on direct user subsidies which do not necessarily come from transit agencies.

Summary

There are at least three elements necessary to explain how low-income transit-dependent riders afford the fare: a definition of transportation affordability; an understanding of the relationship between income and ridership; and empirical evidence of any direct user subsidies that have been implemented. The literature on the first two topics has been primarily quantitative; research explains aggregate ridership patterns, and facilitates comparisons across time and transit systems. The third element, the implementation direct user subsidies for transit, has not been systematically researched. The few qualitative studies of low-income transit affordability indicate that riders use problematic mechanisms to afford transit (e.g., foregoing necessities) as well as direct user subsidies provided ad hoc through the welfare system. This research complements the largely quantitative explanations of aggregate ridership and affordability with an account of the mechanisms by which individual low-income riders afford the fare, and how affordability is defined in practice by low-income riders and the social workers and transit planners who help to make the transportation system available to them. This research contributes to the few qualitative studies an in-depth study of fare affordability as experienced by individual transit-dependent low-income riders in New York City.

Methods

This research seeks to understand (a) how low-income New Yorkers afford public transit and (b) how transit planners understand transit affordability. The first question is an empirical, idiographic investigation of action and choice. The subject is the individual low-income New Yorker (the “resident”). This research seeks to learn both what the “residents” do and how they understand their actions and decisions in the context of constraints and resources by using unstructured narrative interviews (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009; Wengraf, 2001). The second research question is directed to key informants in transportation and social work, called “professionals.” For professionals, I used semi-structured elite interviews (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Whereas resident interviews asked about day-to-day experiences and life paths to learn about travel behavior and attitudes, professional interviews asked direct questions about personal and institutional knowledge.

Study Area

This study examines fare affordability in the four boroughs, or counties, of New York City that are connected by subway: Bronx, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens. The boroughs are linked by a local transit system operated by New York City Transit (NYCT), which is a property of the state regional agency, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA); the fare card is called the MetroCard. While other transit properties operate in New York City, residents make most daily trips by walking and on NYCT buses and subways. Table 1 shows that the lowest and highest income groups are least likely to use unlimited ride fare cards. Overall, however, higher priced fare card types are well used by lower income groups. Fare card prices are in Table 2.

Table 1.

Fare Card Use by Income, 2008.

	Less than $25,000	$25,000 to $49,999	$50,000 to $74,999	$75,000 to $99,999	$100,000 to $149,999	$150,000 to $199,999	$200,000 or more	Total
Share of income group uses unlimited MetroCards, 2008
Single day fun pass	1.5%	1.7%	1.1%	0.6%	0.8%	0.5%	0.4%	1.2%
7-day pass	13.4%	10.1%	5.0%	4.0%	2.8%	2.8%	1.3%	7.7%
14-day pass	1.6%	1.8%	1.7%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%	0.7%	1.4%
30-day pass	15.8%	24.6%	34.8%	37.2%	35.1%	29.4%	30.4%	27.3%
Total unlimited	32.3%	38.2%	42.6%	42.6%	39.6%	33.5%	32.8%	39.3%
Income of riders and population, 2008
Share of NYCT riders	22.8%	23.8%	16.8%	10.1%	11.2%	4.2%	4.9%	93.7%; 6.3% did not answer
Share of four boroughs population	28.3%	22.3%	16.5%	10.8%	11.2%	4.6%	6.4%	100.0%
Share of U.S. population	23.2%	24.8%	18.8%	12.5%	12.2%	4.3%	4.2%	100.0%

Source. Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA; 2008), U.S. Census Bureau (2008).

Note. MTA person-level data were manipulated for comparability to exclude residents of Richmond County and those who travel exclusively by automobile. MTA = Metropolitan Transportation Authority; NYCT = New York City Transit.

Table 2.

New York City Transit Fare Prices, 1998-2015.

	Base fare	Single ride	One day	Seven day	Fourteen day	Thirty day	Volume discount (%)	Volume discount minimum purchase
1998	$1.50	$1.50	$4.00	$17.00	n/a	$63.00	10.0	$15.00
2003	$2.00	$2.00	$7.00	$21.00	n/a	$70.00	10.0	$15.00
Change 1998 to 2003 (%)	33.3	33.3	75.0	23.5	n/a	11.1	0.0	0.0
2005	$2.00	$2.00	$7.00	$24.00	n/a	$76.00	20.0	$10.00
Change 2003 to 2005 (%)	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.3	n/a	8.6	100.0	−33.3
2008	$2.00	$2.00	$7.50	$25.00	$47.00	$81.00	15.0	$7.00
Change 2005 to 2008 (%)	0.0	0.0	7.1	4.2	n/a	6.6	−25.0	−30.0
2009	$2.25	$2.50	$8.25	$27.00	$51.50	$89.00	15.0	$8.00
Change 2008 to 2009 (%)	12.5	25.0	10.0	8.0	9.6	9.9	0.0	14.3
2010	$2.25	$2.50	Discontinued	$29.00	Discontinued	$104.00	7.0	$10.00
Change 2009 to 2010 (%)	0.0	0.0		7.4		16.9	−53.3	25.0
2013	$2.50	$2.75		$30.00		$112.00	5.0	$5.00
Change 2010 to 2013 (%)	11.1	10.0		3.4		7.7	−28.6	−50.0
2015	$2.75	$3.00		$31.00		$116.50	11.0	$5.50
Change 2013 to 2015 (%)	10.0	9.1		3.3		4.0	120.0	10.0
Change 1998 to 2015 (%)	83.3	100.0		82.4		84.9	10.0	−63.3

Source. Treffeisen (2013).

The study area is home to a large population of very low income residents and an expansive welfare system. Poverty in the four boroughs of New York City outpaces that of the United States overall, and there is a greater share of residents with very low incomes in the four boroughs than elsewhere. Twelve percent of U.S. families live at or under the poverty level, compared with 28.1% in the Bronx, 20.3% in Brooklyn, 14.9% in Manhattan, and 12.8% in Queens; 13.4% of U.S. households receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits compared with 21.3% of household in the four boroughs (U.S. Census, 2011-2013). Like other cities, New York City delivers cash assistance to work-mandated welfare recipients. The Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA) is the New York State agency that distributes federal block grant funding to localities including New York City. The City’s welfare centers are administered by the Human Resources Administration (HRA) and called Job Centers. Thousands of medical facilities and social service organizations, both private and public, work alongside and connect clients to OTDA and HRA. In 2001, the Single Stop program was launched, bringing public assistance benefits enrollment to community-based nonprofit organizations throughout the city (Single Stop USA, 2015).

Population and Recruitment

Residents were chosen who were interacting with social service agencies and very likely to have income poverty and/or deprivation. Interviewees were recruited from Single Stop Centers. I conducted all interviews in English. Interviews were confidential to encourage candor about sensitive issues. The criteria for inclusion in the resident population were age (21-64), English fluency, presence of children (none above age 2 permitted), and residence in study area (see Figure 1). All were asked about access to a car and while some had relatives whose cars they used on occasion, none borrowed the cars for solo trips or when resources were scarce. I chose recruitment and interview sites from a list of Single Stop centers: two in Manhattan, two in Brooklyn, one in Queens, and one in the Bronx. Interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed by the author. Interviewees were given $15 cash at the conclusion of the interview. The number of interviews was informed by a saturation point (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In the rich variety of experiences, there emerged redundant affordability challenges, travel behaviors, and coping mechanisms.

Figure 1.

Study area counties and home addresses of resident interviewees with pseudonyms.

Resident interviewees are not expected to reflect the general adult population but rather to have the characteristics commonly associated with lower income: greater percentage Black and Hispanic, more disabled, more female, lower education, and lower labor force participation. Table 3 bears out this expectation. The findings reflect the experiences of English-speaking adult New Yorkers who patronize welfare-oriented community centers due to financial difficulties. For example, there are 80 Single Stop Centers in New York City serving 125,000 clients per year (Robin Hood Foundation, 2015), and the findings are applicable to them. In addition to Single Stop Centers, there are hundreds of community-based organizations that serve clients that resemble the resident interviewees demographically and who have had similar experiences with affordability, travel, and the welfare system.

Table 3.

Resident Demographics.

	Residents (N = 25)	NYC four boroughs	United States	Notes
Demographics
Race, White non-Hispanic (%)	0	31.0	62.8	All respondents are Black and/or Hispanic
Sex, Male (%)	40.0	47.6	49.2	All respondents are Black and/or Hispanic
Age, median years	50	33.1-37.5	37.4
Disabled (%)	32.0	10.3	12.3
Foreign born (%)	16.0	38.2	13.0
Employment
In labor force and employed (%)	24.0	56.8	57.5	For NYC and United States, denominator is population aged 16+
Not in labor force (%)	32.0	36.4	36.2
Informally employed (%)	40.0	n/a	n/a
Household size
One-person household (%)	22.0	33.6	27.7
Two-person household (%)	32.0	27.7	33.6
Three-person household (%)	12.0	16.0	15.7
Four-person household (%)	24.0	12.1	13.1
Five-person household (%)	8.0	5.9	6.0
Six-person household (%)	0	2.5	2.3
Seven-person household+ (%)	4.0	2.2	1.5
Highest educational attainment
Less than high school (%)	28.6	20.5	13.7	Only 21 residents provided educational attainment data
High school degree or equivalent (%)	19.0	23.9	28.0
Some college (%)	38.1	14.1	21.2
Associates or bachelors degree (%)	9.5	26.9	26.1
Graduate or professional degree (%)	4.8	14.4	10.9
Household composition
0 children (%)	56.0	48.7	51.5	Counts only respondent’s own children currently living with respondent and below age 18
1 or 2 children (%)	28	41.6	38.3
3 or 4 children (%)	16.0	8.4	9.2

Source. U.S. Census Bureau. (2011-2013). (These data are from U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey Three Year Estimates [2011-2013]. The tables are as follows: demographics DP05 and DP03, employment DP03, household size B11016, highest educational attainment DP02, household composition B17012. The column “Residents” is from original research.)

Note. It should be noted that the quantified data are in some cases misleading. For example, many interviewees regularly care for and financially support children although none is their own child who currently resides with them and is below 18. Some interviewees work full-time as a welfare-related requirement but are considered unemployed because they are paid stipends, not wages. Many interviewees have volatile incomes; reporting an annual amount would misleadingly indicate the resident’s resources on a given day or week. The data in the tables should not be interpreted as evidence of the interviewees’ daily activity, resources, or expenditures. Income, commonly included in descriptive statistics, was excluded for this reason.

Several sets of professionals were recruited. One was planners and advocates whose primary work is on public transportation. Another was social service professionals who work with low-income New Yorkers firsthand. A third set combined the two: social service professionals who were members of transportation-related coalitions or had participated in transportation-related advocacy work. Transportation professionals were identified by their affiliation with recent transportation-related advocacy campaigns. Social service professionals were a convenience sample taken from the Single Stop centers. In total, professional interviews were with social workers (five, plus one group of four), two administrators of welfare services at private organizations, one attorney who works with homeless families (referred to as “the Attorney”), transit advocates (five including one who is also a planner), and one transit planner at a transit agency.

Findings

This research found that although interviewee trip making is usually not sensitive to the fare, the fare is not necessarily affordable. Several behaviors facilitate ridership: Interviewees describe foregoing presumably more elastic goods, borrowing, fare evasion, using direct user subsidies (usually in the form of welfare-provided fare cards), and exploiting free transfers. Most interviewees combine compensating mechanisms. Table 4 shows the behaviors interviewees described undertaking regularly and currently. Table 5 describes their resources. The interviewees can be divided into two groups: the 11 who forego goods and/or skip trips, and the 14 who do not. Of the former, only one receives at least one free MetroCard per week compared with five of the latter; none relies on a household member for his MetroCard compared with three of the 14; and only one has a relatively high income, compared with six of the 14. To summarize, those with fewer resources have more difficulty affording the fare. Each of the compensating behaviors is discussed in the following sections.

Table 4.

Coping With the Fare.

	Foregone goods					Other compensating behaviors
Case	Food	Housing	Phone	Laundry	Hair	Skipped trips	Fare evasion	Borrowing	Transfer exploitation	Total
Brittany				x		x		x	x	4
Felicia						x	x	x	x	4
Jennifer				x	x		x		x	4
David	x	x							x	3
Vicki				x	x			x		3
William						x		x	x	3
John	x								x	2
Lisa				x					x	2
Patricia					x			x		2
Robert			x				x			2
Christopher							x			1
Emily								x		1
Karen						x				1
Teresa									x	1
Total	2	1	1	4	3	4	4	6	8

Table 5.

Resources Currently Available to Resident Interviewees.

Case	SNAP	Subsidized housing	Free or cheap housing	Free phone or no phone	Free two-trip card at least 1x/week	Carfare stipend	Carfare or cards from household members	Income that well exceeds expenses	Total
Henry	x	x	x		x			x	5
John	x	x	x	x		x			5
Susan	x	x	x			x	x		5
Teresa	x	x		x	x			x	5
Yolanda	x	x	x	n/a	x			x	5
Angela	x	x	n/a		x		x	n/a	4
Diana	x	x		x		x			4
Felicia	x	x	x		x				4
Lisa	x		x	x		x			4
Robert	x	x	x					x	4
Wendy	x	x	x					x	4
Brittany	x		x	x					3
Nicholas		x	x					x	3
Patricia	x	x		x					3
William	x	x	x						3
Christopher	x				x				2
Jennifer	x	x							2
Karen		x		x					2
Michael			x					x	2
Sandra		x					x		2
Vicki	x			x					2
Zachary		x	x						2
David				x					1
George			x						1
Total	17	17	14	9	6	4	3	7

Note. Subsidized housing: interviewees reside in explicitly subsidized housing, such as Section 8, homeless shelters, and supportive permanent housing. Free or cheap housing: interviewees reside in housing which requires of them $300 per month or less in financial contribution. Free phone or no phone: interviewees received a free cell phone through government programs or paid by family members, or have no phone. Free two-trip card at least 1x/week: interviewees receive one round trip MetroCard or more per week from an agent of the welfare state. Carfare stipend: interviewees receive $30 per week or $112 per month from an internship or volunteer position, typically arranged through welfare agencies. Carfare or cards from household members: interviewees rely on a household member for transportation. This is a regular, routine behavior; interviewees expect to receive the money or fare card, unlike those who borrow cards or cash on occasion. Income that well exceeds expenses: individual income is more than $1,000 per month and more than double household expenses. SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.

Foregone Goods

Economics presumes consumers forego more elastic goods to purchase less elastic goods such as fare cards. Seventeen interviewees (68%) did not describe foregoing goods; however, many of those did not regularly purchase the goods most mentioned by the others. Nine had free or extremely cheap housing (two reside in homeless shelters). Others had no telephones. Seven of the eight interviewees who do forego goods have very little or zero disposable income, and those goods which they compromise include necessities such as food, housing, and laundry. Some of these goods are subsidized by the welfare state, as are at least a part of their transportation expenses. Whether the subsidies are insufficient or the resident fails to adequately budget can be determined only on a case-by-case basis. Overall, for these interviewees, transportation is among the daily necessities reluctantly traded by these low-income residents with few other resources.

John exemplifies how public resources play a role in affording transit. John is a full-time handyman undergoing methadone treatment. He receives about $100 from his drug treatment center per month to compensate for travel expenses. He lives on couches and air mattresses in two apartments, both in public housing, and contributes groceries and cash to both. He buys unlimited weekly MetroCards every 2 weeks when he gets paid. His food subsidy has been reduced to $100 per month, and he has insufficient disposable income left for food. He describes buying pot pies for lunch and stretching them out over a week—staying hungry—because he does not have enough money to buy more.

Social service professionals confirmed the findings from residents on foregone goods. The Attorney’s primary work is with homeless clients who are owed carfare from HRA. Carfare is a colloquial term referring to any out-of-pocket expenses for traveling, including money for gas, and transit and taxi fares. The term carfare is also used by HRA and many social service providers to mean travel-related payments to clients. The Attorney puts affordability in the context of daily necessities. “I’ve heard of people who are getting a lot more food stamps than they’re getting cash assistance. So they’ll maybe trade some of their—buy food for someone so they can get MetroCard or more cash.”⁷ Other professionals could not speak to what goods each client foregoes specifically to pay for transportation, but they generally discussed what goods clients are foregoing to be able to live day to day. These include health care, housing, and telephone service.

Fare Evasion

Interviewees beat the fare in several ways, with varying degrees of legality. The boldest was to hop over the turnstile or otherwise sneak onto the subway platform without swiping a fare card (two residents), and the most common (four residents) was to underpay with change on the bus. While bus drivers are instructed to “challenge the fare,” according to Transit Advocate 4, they often allow those who underpay to ride. Several interviewees describe beating the fare by asking for a swipe from someone exiting the subway station who presumably has an unlimited card. Finally, it is possible—but illegal—to buy a cheaper swipe at the subway station from someone with a tampered or unlimited card.

Many interviewees often observe fare evasion, and several spoke at length about their own experiences. For Robert, fare evasion is an unpleasant necessity. When he runs out of money to get to work, “Think about now I’ma have to sneak in or now I have to hustle some change, you know start hitting people up for quarters, you know it’s stressful.” Yolanda likewise relates fare evasion to desperation and lack of money.

There’s been times that I’ve had to ask him [her child’s father from whom she fled to a domestic violence shelter] for like a $5 or $10 little advance or whatever so he would give that to me so I can get my child to school. Or sometimes I’ve risked jumping on the back of the bus and I do not—gosh I dread the day I would get caught for that cause it’s so silly, but I mean I only do it—I’ve only done it if it was something that I’m trying to get my daughter to school. It’s not like I was just jumping on there for the fun of it.

Christopher beats the fare by waiting for swipes. He does this even when he could buy a fare. He also recalls swiping strangers in when he had an unlimited card when he was working. His experience is more positive than that of Robert. “I mean I know it’s illegal . . . Is it wrong? Ah, I guess it depends how do you look at it, is it wrong or not. You know I’m not stealing from nobody.” Regarding him swiping people in when he had the unlimited card, “Sometimes swipe in and just walk out. Sometimes I just hit the machine just for the hell of it. I’m like I’m sticking it to the man [laughs].” He has sold swipes in the past, but says he does not do it any longer. He also avoids asking for swipes because, he explains, it is considered panhandling and illegal.

Some paid the bus fare with insufficient cash or with a card with insufficient fare, and boarded with the tacit permission of the bus driver. Felicia is a frequent fare beater on the bus and describes dropping in as little as a nickel to ride. Many interviewees observe bus drivers allowing those with insufficient fare to ride. Lisa says, “I think it’s an unwritten rule that if a person gets on the bus and they don’t have the fare, or they don’t have enough, whatever they put in is sufficient.”

Several interviewees observed fare evasion on Select Bus Service (SBS). SBS is a part of the NYCT bus system that uses off-board fare payment and an honor system: Instead of paying when they board, riders pay at a sidewalk kiosk, keep the receipt as proof of payment, and board through any door of the bus. Nicholas sees police on SBS often. “When I go to take my daughter to school in the morning you see them. They’re always there and they’re writing up a bunch of tickets to people.” (They’re waiting?) “Yeah. And it’s mostly because the machines don’t work so people just don’t care, they don’t want to wait and they just get on the bus.”

Henry describes how people who receive free MetroCards from welfare-related agencies often sell them. He knows this is “fraud” and stops short of saying he has sold cards. However, he says he knows working people who use food pantries and would like to get a free card every day for their commute. He says they often buy $2.00 swipes in the station, but buying a welfare-issued two-trip card from someone like him is better, “If you know somebody it’s much more convenience then you know you don’t have to go through all that stress.”

Fare evasion is a contested issue. Interviewees generally feel fare beating is fair, and only problematic if one is caught or when bus drivers allow some fare beaters to board and not others. Sandra is afraid of fare beating, including giving people swipes, because her son is a police officer. Teresa always pays for her son who is near the height limit, “just not to be stopped.” Jennifer regularly uses her father’s senior discounted MetroCard illegally. William often has an unlimited card, and “I don’t like to because I found out you’re not supposed to but yeah I’ll swipe a person on the bus.” He says he does not ask for a swipe or jump turnstiles for fear of getting caught, “ I’m always figuring that I’ll be the one that they want to process . . . ” Lisa grew up with fare beating as a normal part of survival in poverty. “My mother had six kids. If we had to go somewhere and we didn’t have, she brought slugs, believe me.” And now, as a middle-aged woman, she observes, “Ok when the cost of living goes up and your income is not that much then you are at the mercy of someone’s good graces to swipe you in or on.”

Borrowing, Lending, and Sharing

Nearly all interviewees describe borrowing, lending, and sharing fare cards or carfare. Many fluctuate between being recipients and providers. Some undertook these behaviors for work trips. For others, the behavior enables more discretionary trips. Patricia recalls borrowing an unlimited MetroCard from a neighbor on a Saturday to go to Macy’s for a sale. She used the card for several more trips that day, “I figured, why not? I could stop off and get off and then take the bus again.” Her “extra” trips included more stores.

Nearly all interviewees receive free MetroCards or cash from family and friends with no obligation for reimbursement. For example, Jennifer’s father buys a few “extra” senior discounted cards when he goes to the station, stockpiles them, and gives them to her. (This is also a form of fare evasion.) Vicki accepts money from her partner’s children out of state so that she can afford to attend a daily training. “Like this week I didn’t have it. And son call home. And I said to him I don’t have the money for the MetroCard. And he wired me some money to buy it for the week.” Likewise, interviewees are often the providers of free MetroCards or carfare for their family and friends. Others will give away cash. Karen has given money to her sister for transportation, “many times . . . She didn’t have any carfare to go look for a job, any carfare to go handle her business, they messed up her [public assistance] case.” In two cases, carfare or MetroCards were loaned with an expectation of reimbursement: One interviewee regularly borrowed small sums from a shopkeeper for MetroCards; another requires his younger brother to return his MetroCard refilled. Finally, interviewees often share MetroCards within their households or workplaces. Usually this is with an unlimited MetroCard. David says, “When my son for example if he has to go to two different sites for work. I have an unlimited, I’ll lend it to him, he gives me his card which is per ride.” Brittany’s mother loaned her her unlimited MetroCard to run an errand on the weekend. She made some extra trips that day. “And then I went to my friend house. Boyfriend house . . . Since I had the MetroCard and I took advantage and I was gone.”

Exploiting Free Transfers

The MetroCard provides free transfers between modes for up to 2 hr. Same-mode transfers are limited to one direction; for example, a rider cannot board a northbound bus and then get a free transfer to a southbound bus on the same line. An unlimited card has no time or directional limit on transfers, and can be used at the same station or same bus route 18 minutes after the first swipe. These features were well-known to most interviewees. In many cases, interviewees describe altering their trips and going well out of their way to save a fare when they did not have an unlimited card.

For some interviewees, this means rushing between appointments. Lisa explains, “If I don’t have an unlimited then I have to worry or I have to strategically, strategically plan . . . So like if the appointment’s not long, get out within that gap.” She further describes regularly choosing bus and subway lines to ensure she only pays a single fare. William times his appointments to save on the fare. Brittany describes “trying to do everything in the same place so I can have that transfer” when she does not have an unlimited card. For others, exploiting free transfers entails changing mode choice or adding a walking trip. David takes the bus only when he wants to exploit free transfers. He recently took the subway from work to a supermarket, then walked with his groceries to a bus that would take him home to avoid paying a second fare. He says he would make this trip differently if he had an unlimited card.

For one interviewee, transfer exploitation is cleverly combined with fare beating. Jennifer regularly makes trips from Queens to Manhattan for medical appointments. She boards a bus, pays a single fare in cash, and gets a paper transfer. Then she uses the transfer to pay for her next bus within Queens. At the end of that long bus ride, she asks the driver for a transfer hoping he will not remember that she already paid with a transfer. She uses the second transfer within Manhattan. Jennifer says this “usually works.”

Skipped Trips and Mode Shifts

Studies of aggregate travel behavior show that low-income transit-dependent riders are fairly price inelastic, and that the fare is not a major determinant of ridership. Consistently, the interviewees in this research ride public transportation regardless of their income or price. As shown in Table 4, only four of 25 resident interviewees forego trips when they cannot pay. None recalled when the fare was last increased, and only a few noted how much it had been raised. None described a point when mobility was limited due to lack of funds, although many described periods of severe economic deprivation. Many emphasized the necessity of transportation in their lives, and their tendency to spend meager resources on transportation.

The following experiences and observations generally underline that low-income riders will ride regardless of cost. Nicholas lives in a homeless shelter with his daughter and works in a pizza shop for cash. When asked the last time he was without an unlimited card he replied, “I don’t even remember. I just always have it.” Wendy recalls collecting bottles to pay for transportation, and emphasizes its necessity, “I mean you gotta start somewhere, you gotta move around.” Vicki is very poor and sometimes “cannot get 25 cents much less $2.50,” but she manages to travel at least twice a day, often by borrowing money. Likewise, Lisa says “I’ve been in the position where I’ve had to literally scrounge together change to get to work to get my paycheck to make sure I could cash it so I could get back home.”

The necessity of paying for transit is perceived by the riders themselves as a lack of choice and powerlessness. Inelasticity, then, can be broadly considered as not just the observation of a revealed preference but of the consequence of constraints on mode options and trip making. Christopher typifies many interviewees when he says, “I can’t do a damn thing about it. You gotta pay.”

For several interviewees, price occasionally directly affected ridership. Brittany will skip trips when she has a pay-per-ride card. She recalls, with some reluctance, that she has skipped her high school equivalency class when she has been short of transportation money. When asked whether she attends church, she says. “I do sort of. It depend on my MetroCard situation. If I have a MetroCard I’m going, if I don’t, I’m not.” Karen likewise says she will forego trips, which are all Access a Ride, when she does not have the fare. She qualifies those trips as discretionary. “Lot of times I don’t have money I have to say forget it . . . I hold on to Access a Ride money, I try to. There’s sometimes I can’t go . . . It’s not an emergency like I just won’t do it.” Felicia has also skipped trips due to lack of transportation money. Nearly all of her trips are welfare-related. “If I don’t have the carfare I have to reschedule. [Referring to welfare-issued two-trip MetroCards] Cause they’ll give you the Metro [Card] when you get there but how you gonna get to there to get it?”

Welfare State Interventions in Transit Fares

Agents of the welfare state, including the workers at government agencies and organizations that contract with the government to provide social services, emergency cash and food, job training, and so on, distribute thousands of fares to New Yorkers every day. The agencies, whether they are public or private, purchase the cards from MTA retail, at full cost, and distribute them for free or as a reward or incentive for program participation. At some distribution sites, for example medical offices, there is an explicit policy guiding staff who distribute free fares, whereas at others it is left to the discretion of a social worker or administrator. Medical facilities can be reimbursed for the part of the expenditures; other providers may be eligible to use government or private grant monies for the expense, but not in all cases. Overall there is no coordinated policy regarding transit fares for welfare recipients. Free fares distributed to low-income individuals are usually two-trip MetroCards, but some distribute weekly unlimited cards. Medicaid recipients receive free two-trip MetroCards at some medical facilities or free MetroCards for multiple trips in the mail depending on the medical provider.

HRA gives free MetroCards to welfare recipients and applicants in amounts that depend on stage of application and compliance; homeless individuals are generally given MetroCards at these offices. Some nonprofit organizations which are contracted by the State and City offer MetroCards as incentives for attending programs. In 2010, the Food Bank for New York City implemented a program which allows approximately 200 food pantries to distribute MetroCards. Other outlets include certain court appointments; harm reduction programs which mandate frequent, often daily, appearances; and at independent, privately funded community-based churches and nonprofit centers. Homeless individuals receiving public assistance are eligible for an increased stipend for transportation added to their cash assistance. HRA instructs case workers to add carfare for homeless individuals not already receiving free MetroCards through another mandated program. In practice, most eligible recipients do not receive carfare; court hearings each year result in thousands of dollars of owed carfare being recovered. In other cases, recipients are overpaid: They receive both carfare and free MetroCards.

Eighteen interviewees (72%) had received a free MetroCard at some point; six (24%) were receiving one or more two-trip MetroCards every week at the time of the interview. For example, Diana receives carfare from two welfare-related sources. She gets $30 carfare each week because she receives cash public assistance and is required to attend training every day, and she receives $101 each month for volunteering with a nonprofit organization to escort an elderly disabled woman to church on Sundays. Those seven interviewees who have never received free MetroCards via welfare are less connected to the welfare state than other interviewees.

Professionals’ Knowledge of Welfare State Interventions

Nearly all professional interviewees, and all residents, had heard of the widespread practice of private contracting agencies distributing occasional MetroCards. The social workers and welfare advocates expressed the greatest familiarity. Among the transportation professionals, two were unaware of the practice. The four who had some familiarity with the practice were all involved with community organizing. Professional interviewees were largely unfamiliar with the official transportation policies of the HRA and Medicaid. Only one social worker expressed awareness of HRA’s carfare policy, wrongly stating that policy had been discontinued. Half of the welfare advocates and social workers were aware of free MetroCards being given to Medicaid enrollees at doctor’s offices. The only welfare advocate who knew about HRA’s policy was the attorney who specializes in recovering carfare owed to homeless clients. All transportation professionals noted that social services are not part of their planning and organizing efforts or professional networks.

Summary

This research has found that relying on user fees from financially constrained consumers with few choices can have deleterious effects on low-income residents. Ridership is ultimately afforded by foregoing basic necessities, risking arrest, and relying on welfare workers and the generosity of household members, coworkers, and friends. Transportation planners are unfamiliar with the resources and constraints faced by low-income riders and therefore miss opportunities to work across policy spheres (Sanchez, 2008). Transit planning scholars likewise place the fare among regular, or inferior, economic goods, rarely accounting for the unique conditions with which low-income riders face the fare. Without recognizing the importance of welfare and other compensating mechanisms to low-income ridership, transportation professionals may overestimate the ability of low-income individuals to pay for transit and underestimate the demand for unlimited ride fare cards.

The findings suggest that an economics-based understanding of fare prices and low-income ridership is incomplete. Low-income riders trade fares among necessities and within households. With this insight, fare card preference can be interpreted as a result of how constraints and resources, from both welfare and household members, combine for an individual. Furthermore, fare card prices are not necessarily paid by individuals, but by welfare agencies and household members. Paying for travel is experienced as an opportunity for generosity and obligation or entitlement: Low-income riders are glad to facilitate access for others, and in some circumstances have come to expect that their fares will be provided (e.g., by bus drivers and at certain welfare agencies).

This research shows that the distribution of urban access in New York City is, for some low-income residents, determined by social service, and medical and emergency assistance providers. The U.S. welfare system distributes necessities according to a categorical logic that separates the deserving from the undeserving needy, with the primary distinction being attachment to the labor force (Katz, 1996). Low-income individuals have difficulty affording public transit whether employed (formally or informally), disabled, or not working. When a transit agency relies upon the welfare system to distribute fares, it implicitly complies with the welfare state’s values and categorical logic. Not all who need access to transit will receive it via welfare, leaving the generosity of bus drivers, loved ones, and strangers to make up the difference.

Policy Recommendations

A person’s access to the transit system can change because of his luck at using one of the thousands of contracting organizations, any one of which may happen to change its policy or lose the funding it uses to buy fare cards. One organization may start offering fare cards while another may discontinue distribution. MTA currently has no method to discover the state of the practice. One way to begin to rectify the gap in knowledge is through changes to transportation surveys. As they are now written, the MTA’s rider surveys have no way to capture some of the ways that low-income New Yorkers manage to ride transit. Without this information, the surveys administered to riders, which then inform the determination of fare prices and concessions, are incomplete. The findings suggest that MTA’s surveys should ask about free two-trip cards, carfare from welfare and welfare-related organizations, and other cards that riders themselves did not buy. By asking riders directly, the surveys will gain a more comprehensive explanation of ridership and preferences about fares and fare structures. Only a large-scale representative survey, like that conducted by the larger advocates and transit agency, can reveal the extent to which welfare-adjacent organizations are providing transit for riders.

Shifts in fare payment technology can affect transit affordability. Any change that removes the discretion of the bus driver, or that prevents sharing of fare media, will be problematic for those riders who struggle with affordability. For transit advocates and planners promoting off-board fare payment, the finding that low-income riders may expect to underpay the fare is important. Fare evasion on SBS is enforced by the police rather than at the discretion of the bus driver. The authority which would allow an occasional fare beater to access the system with little money is thereby removed from a potentially sympathetic actor to a punitive actor. Fare beaters on the bus are changed from riders accepting a kind favor from a driver to criminals hoping not to be caught. Off-board fare payment creates efficiencies, which benefit all riders; however, these findings suggest that it may incur increased risks and decreased fare affordability for some riders. More study is needed to understand the extent of those costs.

This research suggests that the subsidies targeting the poor are ad hoc and difficult to measure. Formalizing the ad hoc policies (e.g., carfare for the homeless, free fares for those in mandated training programs) would facilitate evaluation and recognize that transport is in practice a component of social services. The challenge in formalizing an affordability policy is to neither under- nor over-distribute fares to individuals who often embody intersecting recipient categories (e.g., in training, homeless, job-seeking, Earned Income Tax Credit recipient, etc.). In addition, any new categorical discount—for example, offering half price fares to public housing residents or cash assistance recipients—risks encouraging those agencies now distributing fares to curtail their efforts.

Alternatively, the State or City could adopt a policy of low-income fare discounts. This would expand categorical discounts to all low-income riders, making transit a stand-alone benefit based on income.⁸ Regardless of prior engagement with the welfare system, those individuals who find the fare unaffordable could become free or discounted fare recipients through Single Stop or other welfare agents or through the transit agency, or some combination of the two. For low wage workers, the City or State could create an income-based variation of the federal commuter tax benefit program. Currently, workers save money by dedicating a portion of their pre-tax income to transportation. A new system could impose a discount that is scaled to reflect the worker’s income. For example, a worker who earns less than a given amount in a month could qualify for a transit card without any reductions to his income.

Finally, it may be worthwhile to consider the option of relaxing the requirement for fares to be direct user fees paid at the gate. As fare payment technology develops and payment becomes more remote and seamless, converting to a tax-based, annual-fee transit system may become more feasible.⁹ A transit agency could, for example, offer an annual fare pass, with an option to buy it with one’s income tax refund. Offering a tax-based fare payment option presents opportunities to scale the fare to correspond with income. For those who choose to buy fares retail—not through taxes—the transit agency could offer a variety of payment plans as well as single trip or daily fare cards. Nonprofit social service agencies could buy annual cards for their clients and manage payment plans the same way supportive housing agencies manage clients’ rent payments. An annual pass, tax-based system could be consistent with a more comprehensive conversion to an honor system (gate-free and all-doors boarding) as passes would be physical evidence of payment. Fare evaders would be those not holding cards, and those holding cards which they do not own; this option precludes the sharing of fare cards within households and workplaces which is now quite common, including as a way to enhance affordability. While these options have complications, they may be worth the consideration of policy makers who recognize that income supports are necessary for citizens of an income-disparate city to enjoy some equality of access.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biography

Alexis F. Perrotta researches the intersection of urban transportation policy and welfare. She earned a doctorate in urban planning from Columbia University (2015). She has over 10 years of professional experience in affordable housing development and policy analysis in the fields of transportation finance and housing.

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