Sandbagged: Exploring the Political Challenges of Coastal Infrastructure

Abstract

The political, technical, social, and economic challenges related to climate change are well documented. As policy makers are increasingly experiencing the reality of rising sea levels, they are also confronting a fragmented and sometimes fractured intergovernmental system. State and local governments face a delicate balancing act, especially, when it comes to infrastructure and climate change. They must respond to citizens, avoid losing their autonomy, maintain fiscal stability and health, provide a high quality of life, and ensure public safety. The reality of anthropogenic climate change has compounded many of these difficulties, perhaps, most acutely in America’s coastal states and communities. Recognizing these challenges, this article examines the challenges facing coastal communities as they seek to adapt to and build more resilient infrastructure that can mitigate the impacts of rising sea levels.

Keywords

environmental impacts disaster mitigation infrastructure: development and land use infrastructure: research and development legislation policy regulatory issues intergovernmental relations

Introduction

The challenges associated with financing infrastructure are largely intergovernmental and often politically treacherous. They involve a myriad of actors, multiple decisions points and goals, and a variety of potential bottlenecks. Infrastructure construction and repair may also include legal and political obstacles related to site identification, financing, grassroots resistance and distrust, and the acquisition of an array of federal, state, and even local permits/licenses prior to building and/or renovating (Morris, 2017). These challenges exist alongside significant hurdles related to the politics of climate change and limited resource availability among federal, state, and local governments.

The reality of anthropogenic climate change has compounded many of the difficulties described above. Coastal stakeholders, for example, must evaluate the adequacy of their existing infrastructure and forecast what they will need in the future. Armed with this information, they must identify revenue sources and begin the planning process. They must also assess their vulnerabilities related to climate change and rising sea levels. Although wrestling with these particular risks, policy makers must still respond to other needs identified by citizens, maintain overall fiscal stability and health, and provide a high quality of life. Despite the urgency of climate change and the increasing threat of rising sea levels, there is only a small body of policy research that examines the hurdles associated with financing coastal infrastructure projects. Seeking to fill this gap, this article identifies many of the challenges that policy makers are likely to confront as they seek to build and maintain more resilient coastal infrastructure.

Threats to Coastal Infrastructure

Azevedo de Almeida and Mostafavi (2016) identify four main threats to coastal infrastructure: coastal and adjacent inland flooding, coastal erosion, land subsidence, and saltwater intrusion. Because climate change is associated with rising sea levels and more intense precipitation events, these risks are heightened in many coastal areas, especially, those below sea level (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2013, NP).

Flooding

According to Azevedo de Almeida and Mostafavi (2016), rising sea levels increase the likelihood of coastal flooding. This, in turn, may affect the quality of life for coastal communities in several ways:

Public and private beach areas can become submerged for periods of time, which may affect surface level and/or underground infrastructure (if present).

Water levels will rise and threaten to submerge or will submerge affected areas—including areas near buildings and for structures built directly on the water, such as docks and piers, ports, and energy infrastructure.

Infrastructure that is below and/or near sea level may flood even in more inland areas—this can include transportation, electrical, public health and safety, sewer and wastewater systems, and so on.

Erosion

Climate change and rising sea levels contribute to coastal and beach erosion. As rising oceans consume more of the adjacent shoreline, coastal infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable. On the surface, beach erosion displaces soils and sands, which can pose a threat to the structural integrity of surface-level roads, buildings, and other infrastructure. Under the surface, coastal erosion may expose underground systems of infrastructure such as electrical utilities, information networks, sewers, and pipelines (Azevedo de Almeida & Mostafavi, 2016).

Vertical Land Motion

Rising sea levels are coinciding with vertical land motion, especially, along the U.S. East Coast. Scientists have attributed land motion to both natural and man-made causes. During the last ice age, substantial portions of modern-day New England and the Midwest were under large sheets of ice, causing adjacent land areas to bend upward. As the ice thawed and retreated, lands that were once buried by ice are slowing springing upward, whereas areas south of the ice (Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland) are sinking. Yet, even in coastal areas in which lands are rising, the increase is not enough to keep pace with rising sea levels. High groundwater usage is also contributing to vertical land motion. Scientists have observed that land areas between coastal Virginia and coastal South Carolina are sinking at a rate nearly twice as fast as the area’s historical rate (Azevedo de Almeida & Mostafav, 2016; Upton, 2016).

Saltwater Intrusion

Another way rising sea levels threaten coastal communities is through saltwater intrusion. In short, saltwater intrusion happens when saltwater contaminates and/or mixes with freshwater sources. Intrusions into underground infrastructure are particularly pernicious as they can damage underground drinking water supplies, corrode underground utilities, pipelines, damage underground transportation systems (subways), and harm other infrastructure that is vulnerable to salt water.

Challenges

The politics surrounding coastal infrastructure are littered with potential obstacles. Climate change–specific factors, decentralized authority, significant costs and other budgetary factors, and varying institutional priorities all serve as possible impediments to addressing and adapting to rising sea levels. The specific causal factors are quite often blurred and work together to complicate efforts to build or rebuild coastal infrastructure.

Challenge 1: What Exactly Is Coastal Infrastructure?

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS; 2017) identified several critical categories of infrastructure, as shown in Table 1. U.S. DHS (2018, NP) defines critical infrastructure as “so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof.”

Table 1.

Infrastructure Along the Coast.

Infrastructure category	Description
Highways and roadways	Includes national, state, and local roads and highways, bridges, and tunnels
Mass transit and rail	Includes buses, subways, commuter rail systems, and Amtrak systems
Aviation	Includes airport terminals, runways, taxiways, and air traffic control systems
Water transportation	Includes coastal and inland waterways, ports, and support properties, equipment, and facilities
Water containment	Includes dams, seawalls, levees, reservoirs, watersheds, and sources of freshwater (lakes, groundwater, and rivers)
Food, agriculture, and water	Includes systems for cleaning and distributing drinking water, wastewater, and sewage treatment systems including on-site septic systems Includes farms, restaurants, and other places where food is produced and/or manufactured
Electrical/power generation	Includes systems for producing, distributing, and consuming electricity (residential, commercial, industrial)
Health care	Includes hospitals, clinics, laboratories, and other publicly and privately owned assets necessary to protect citizens from terrorism, infectious disease, and man-made and natural disasters
Information and communication	Includes hardware, software, and other information technology systems and services often designed to protect information
Financial services	Includes banks and other financial institutions
Government, commercial, and manufacturing	Includes physical and electronic assets that serve citizens and other stakeholders

Within each broader category outlined in Table 1 are subcategories of infrastructure. Modern infrastructure ranges from “brick and mortar” assets such as physical facilities and plants to wireless and electronic networks that function solely in cyberspace (U.S. DHS, 2017). Infrastructure may also be owned and/or operated by public or private sector actors. Differences may also relate to the following in Table 2.

Table 2.

Comparing Private and Public Infrastructure.

Sector	Source of differences	Impact
Public	Risk evaluations and perceptions of regulators and members of the public Oversight bodies and regulatory agencies Federal, state, and local regulations Permits and licenses Other priorities/needs that compete for lawmakers’ time and attention Funding and/or revenue streams (long-term and short-term)	These debates and decisions are largely in the realm of politics and policy making although some decisions are more visible as compared with others and can dramatically impact the private sector. Public institutions have distinct cultures, rules, and priorities/goals usually set forth in statute that may or may not align well with one another. They also have different agendas and ways to make decisions, budget limitations, oversight bodies/functions, and policy constraints.
Private	Upfront and ongoing maintenance costs Mandates, responsibilities, and priorities of shareholders Resiliencies and vulnerabilities Operating models and assumptions Financial health of organization Funding and/or revenue streams (long-term and short-term)	These organizations represent the private sector—likely meaning that the profit margin and other indicators of financial health are critical drivers to decision making. Like the public sector, organizations are likely to hold unique and in some cases idiosyncratic decision-making protocols, must respond to various oversight/enforcement bodies, permits, and policies, utilize operating processes that may not “speak” to one another, have various ways to evaluate the external environment and culture.

Today’s infrastructure also functions interdependently. In other words, if one piece of equipment, asset, or sector fails or is negatively affected, it will likely have a cascading impact on other sectors and systems.

Infrastructure investment necessitates the cooperation and coordination among various public and private agencies and levels of government. Table 3 summarizes the federal agencies with designated authority over the nation’s critical infrastructure. For these sectors, the federal agency is responsible for the “identification, prioritization, assessment, remediation, and security of their respective internal critical infrastructure” (White House, 2013).

Table 3.

Critical Infrastructure.

Critical infrastructure sectors	Federal oversight agency
Chemical	Department of Homeland Security
Commercial facilities	Department of Homeland Security
Communications	Department of Homeland Security
Critical manufacturing	Department of Homeland Security
Dams	Department of Homeland Security
Defense industrial base	Department of Defense
Emergency services	Department of Homeland Security
Energy	Department of Energy
Financial services	Sector-Specific Agency: Department of the Treasury
Food and agriculture	U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of Health and Human Services
Government facilities	Department of Homeland Security and General Services Administration
Health care and public health	Department of Health and Human Services
Information technology	Department of Homeland Security
Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste	Department of Homeland Security
Transportation systems	Department of Homeland Security and Department of Transportation
Water and wastewater systems	Environmental Protection Agency

Source. White House (2013).

Note. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers designs, builds, and maintains roads, bridges, water pipes, dams, and levees through a network of private and sector partnerships.

Table 3 belies the complexity and diversity associated with managing the nation’s infrastructure. Under the umbrella of transportations systems, for example, the decisions of other federal agencies, states, and localities shape infrastructure quality/construction, prioritization, repairs, and investment. Aviation infrastructure may also be privately owned/funded or a combination of subnational and substate agencies, which can lead to conflicts over applicable priorities, funding, and goals. Similar intergovernmental and intersectoral dynamics are evident with infrastructure considered part of maritime transportation, mass transit, freight rail, postal, and pipelines (U.S. DHS, 2018). Successful infrastructure projects frequently navigate the governance challenges related to stakeholder coordination, financing, and priorities.

Thus, one of the key challenges to the management coastal infrastructure is that the weaknesses, risks, and opportunities are often context specific and unique to the particular system. One example is shown in Table 4, which enumerates many of the risks identified by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority in New York City by type of infrastructure.

Table 4.

Potential Mass Transit Impacts.

Climate change impact	Anticipated impacts to transportation infrastructure
Sea level rise	1. Impacts to ship clearance heights below bridges 2. Impacts to railroad and subway tracks 3. Sand and sediment on bridge structures and infrastructure 4. Corrosion of track and other equipment due salt water exposure 5. Increased flooding of assets, facilities, and rights of way
Coastal flooding and storm surge	1. Inundation of electrical equipment leading to power failures and/or structural damage 2. Inundation of fleet vehicles, equipment, machinery, and facilities 3. Saltwater intrusion leading to corrosion to impacted equipment, structures, machinery, wiring, and electronics 4. Inundation of plants, equipment, machinery, substations, and power distribution systems 5. Soil erosion in facilities and yards, tracks and line structures, and rights of way 6. Excessive debris 7. Overloading of drainage systems
Extreme winds	1. Damage to lines and above ground rail systems 2. Excessive debris on tracks, yards, and rights of way 3. Damage to maintenance facilities and yards
Heavy precipitation	1. Water damage throughout system 2. Increased runoff entering into below ground assets 3. Increased water intrusion and need for additional pumping 4. Potential impact to substations, signaling, and power distribution systems 5. Potential structural damage in facilities and passenger stations 6. Potential damage to tracks and embankments 7. Erosion from flooding in and around facilities and yards 8. Overloading of drainage systems

Source. Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA; 2017).

Challenge 2: Risk Perceptions and Climate Change

The complicated relationship between climate change politics and citizens’ risk evaluation can impede effective infrastructure planning, investment, and management. Gerber and Neeley (2005), for example, observed greater levels of citizen support for policies designed to mitigate air pollution when such actions would lessen the respondent’s personal and community’s exposure to the related risks. Johnson and Scicchitano (2000) also found a linkage between citizens’ risk evaluations and an increased likelihood of subsequent political mobilization. In short, as risk evaluations increased, affected citizens became more politically active (Harclerode, Lal, Vedwan, Wolde, & Miller, 2016; Lewis & Tyshenko, 2009).

Risk evaluation researchers have identified several factors that shape how individuals perceive and evaluate their exposure to risk (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). Importantly, these factors may offer some insights into why citizens and groups may mobilize or be reluctant to mobilize in favor of infrastructure spending:

Is the risk random or routine?

Has the risk been voluntarily assumed?

Is the risk controllable?

What is the likely and potential damage?

Is it man-made or naturally occurring?

Does it place vulnerable populations at risk?

How citizens, private sector actors, and policy makers answer these questions has profound implications to the politics behind coastal infrastructure. If, for example, policy makers view the risks associated with rising sea levels as manageable and with minimal impacts, then their skepticism and resistance to supporting calls for additional infrastructure makes sense. However, if policy makers believe that rising sea levels are largely out of the realm of human control and that the impacts will be significant, then supporting new infrastructure spending makes intuitive sense.

The politics of climate change and related sea levels are largely centered on many of the questions identified by Slovic et al. (1980). Guber and Bosso (2009) argue that climate change, as an issue, has a number of characteristics that shape risk evaluations. Climate change and rising sea levels are not random or sudden events that clearly show gaps in the regulatory status quo. In addition, citizens cannot see “change” happen or ocean levels rise. In addition, climate change, as a topic, still has a considerable amount of technical uncertainty as to whether specific events are caused by anthropogenic activities or by naturally occurring forces. The overall effect is that citizens’ risk evaluations of climate change as well as the resultant need for infrastructure investment is likely to vary.

Climate change–related risk evaluations interact with citizens’ pre-existing socio-economic and political beliefs. Scholars have observed significant differences between democrats and republicans as it relates to climate change science and attitudes. McCright and Dunlap (2011) observed a 44-point difference between the percentages of self-identified liberals and democrats who believed that global warming had already began as compared with self-identified conservatives/republicans. Those with strong political beliefs are also more likely to intentionally select and interpret climate change research in a way that aligns with their pre-existing beliefs.

Differences in risk perceptions and climate change attitudes are likely to have significant implications for debates about infrastructure needs due to rising sea levels. Conservative and republican identifiers are more likely to seek out information that downplays the risks of climate change and sea level rise. For some, this may translate into being less receptive to calls for increased infrastructure spending, that is, it is unnecessary. In addition, if conservative and/or republicans do not believe in the severity of climate change risks, they may be less likely to be supportive of spending related to climate change adaptation or mitigation.

Florida and its local governments are emblematic of the political challenges related to climate mitigation, adaption, and infrastructure. Critics of the state’s Republican Governor Rick Scott charge that he has not acted quickly enough to guard against climate change, has failed to prepare the state for rising sea levels, and has not adequately supported coastal infrastructure projects (Dennis & Fears, 2017). The City of Miami Beach, for example, has invested resources to raise roads, to build additional stormwater infrastructure, and to place additional stormwater pumps in the city. The stormwater program is funded entirely through the city with sporadic state support (Dennis & Fears, 2017). Dennis and Fears (2017) noted a similar lack of state involvement in the Tampa Bay Region. Pinellas County leaders have taken a number of actions without state involvement: hiring a climate scientist and participating in a multicounty network designed to address climate-related problems.

The lack of federal and/or state involvement for climate change infrastructure is problematic for a number of reasons, summarized below:

State and federal involvement is particularly helpful in minimizing the costs of coordination—this may be especially important for regional planning efforts, cost-sharing, coordinating multistate or county infrastructure projects, and so on.

State and federal involvement is particularly helpful in terms of expertise and information gathering and sharing. This is important, as coastal infrastructure requires expertise in hydrology, engineering, urban planning, social sciences, ecosystem science, and resource economics.

State and especially federal involvement reduces free riding behavior by subnational governments often by establishing and enforcing statewide or national performance standards.

State and federal involvement may be important sources of funding (including loans, transfers, loan guarantees, grants, and other revenues).

It should be noted that other states have invested significantly in climate change infrastructure. Several coastal states, for example, are members of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and California is seen as a world leader in carbon mitigation (Ostrom, 2010).

Challenge 3: Costs

Infrastructure is expensive in terms of its upfront, ongoing, maintenance, and repair costs. In 2014, total infrastructure expenditures by federal, state, and local governments topped US$416 billion, as shown in Table 5 (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2017). Of that, subnational governments spent US$320 million, whereas the federal receipts approximated US$96 million (shown in Table 4). Yet, even with substantial public investments, a 2016 report by the American Society of Civil Engineers [ASCE] found a US$1.4 trillion gap between what is needed (US$3.3 trillion) and planned investments (US$1.8 trillion; ASCE, 2016). Tight federal, state, and local budgets have added to the infrastructure gap identified by ASCE, as shown in Tables 6 and 7.

Table 5.

Spending on Infrastructure (in Billions of 2014 U.S. Dollars).

	Highways		Mass transit and rail		Aviation		Water transportation		Water resources		Water utilities
	Federal	State and local	Federal	State and Local	Federal	State and local	Federal	State and local	Federal	State and local	Federal	State and local
2004	57.523	138.088	15.278	50.188	19.512	22.736	3.056	5.617	10.008	16.339	6.512	99.651
2005	53.818	136.438	14.596	47.064	20.079	20.664	3.786	5.269	10.079	15.855	5.521	98.351
2006	52.322	136.970	13.931	45.776	19.372	19.310	3.668	5.498	9.874	16.568	5.340	99.927
2007	47.833	135.397	13.382	44.225	17.882	19.841	3.960	5.729	9.142	18.018	5.114	105.027
2008	46.453	132.943	13.424	45.947	17.674	20.201	3.980	5.744	9.130	17.812	4.815	105.877
2009	47.743	128.416	15.125	50.918	18.258	21.454	4.146	6.027	10.088	17.567	4.459	113.759
2010	51.735	122.021	17.716	48.966	18.345	21.985	4.253	5.799	13.444	16.313	6.920	111.350
2011	51.217	115.743	15.748	48.152	17.415	20.393	4.366	5.482	12.534	16.613	6.297	108.547
2012	48.533	116.798	15.668	48.372	17.193	19.047	4.363	5.501	11.027	16.645	5.942	102.884
2013	46.621	115.034	14.757	51.635	16.546	19.772	4.224	5.852	9.854	17.069	5.112	104.912
2014	46.318	118.345	15.509	52.908	16.02	20.027	4.249	5.573	9.832	18.335	4.361	104.544

Source. Congressional Budget Office (2015, 2017).

Table 6.

Underinvestment in Infrastructure Through 2025 (in Billions of 2015 U.S. Dollars).

Infrastructure sector	Planned investments 2016-2025	Estimated needs	Estimated gap 2016-2025
Surface transportation	941	2,042	1,101
Water/wastewater	45	150	105
Electricity	757	934	177
Airports	115	157	42
Inland waterways and marine ports	22	37	15

Source. American Society of Civil Engineers (2016).

Table 7.

Underinvestment in Infrastructure Through 2040 (in Billions of 2015 U.S. Dollars).

Infrastructure sector	Planned investments 2016-2040	Estimated needs	Estimated gap 2016-2040
Surface transportation	3,312	7,646	4,334
Water/wastewater	52	204	152
Electricity	1,893	2,458	565
Airports	288	376	88
Inland waterways and marine ports	69	112	43

Source. American Society of Civil Engineers (2016).

Despite significant budget expenditures in recent years, estimates point to a funding gap that amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars.

The recent economic downturn has reduced the dollars available to support infrastructure investment. Based on data from the National Governors Association (2012), for example, more than half of the states imposed budget cutbacks in 2009 and 2010. A majority of local governments reported that they were less able to meet their 2010 fiscal needs as compared with 2009 (Perlman & Benton, 2012). In 2017, many state and local governments were still facing fiscal stress with over 25 states reporting major budget deficits. In 2017, for example, five states (Connecticut, Oregon, Alaska, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) reported deficits near or above US$1 billion, whereas lawmakers in Louisiana, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin confronted deficits of approximately US$600 million (Rueben & Auxier, 2017; Wooldridge & Smith, 2017).

Scholars have also identified a number of additional intergovernmental factors that are constraining infrastructure spending, especially, at the state and local levels (Francis & Sammartino, 2015). First, they are confronting uncertainty from federal lawmakers, who have discussed the need for significant reforms to entitlements, education, public assistance, infrastructure, immigration, and the tax code. Importantly, each of these programs may limit the availability of federal dollars for infrastructure or could change state and local fiscal responsibilities. Second, market changes, including the growing popularity of online sales and the increasing use of the shared economy has reduced revenues available to subnational lawmakers. Third, lawmakers at all levels of government have sought to cut taxes, especially, property and income taxes, which again restricts the dollars available for infrastructure projects (Gale, Krupkin, & Rueben, 2016). Fourth, the cost of many public services, including infrastructure, has increased (Gordon, Auxier, & Iselin, 2016).

The current budgetary environment presents a significant challenge for those seeking infrastructure investment. Coastal infrastructure is expensive, there are limited resources available, and governments have a backlog of projects. Table 8 outlines several coastal infrastructure options with a focus on potential costs, effectiveness, and implementation barriers (NOAA, 2013).

Table 8.

Common Coastal Infrastructure Options.

Option	Cost
Infrastructure relocation	Cost varies depending on the infrastructure being relocated and can include the cost for new construction, moving lines, or physical relocation, as well as the cost of the land to which the infrastructure is being moved. Large and expensive infrastructure, such as power plants, sewer systems, and water treatment plants, can be very expensive to relocate, whereas roads and simple buildings are generally cheaper.
Storm surge barriers	The costs of these projects vary from US$100 million to several billion dollars depending on the scale, scope, and complexity of the project. According to NOAA, surge barrier construction costs typically range between US$0.7 and US$3.5 million per meter with annual maintenance costs of approximately 5% to 10% of the initial capital cost.
Beach replenishment	Beach replenishment costs typically fall between US$300 and US$1,000 per linear foot. This estimate includes acquiring materials, transportation, and construction costs. Maintenance costs can be significant, as most beaches need to be replenished every few years.
Sea walls	The costs of seawalls are variable but range US$150 to US$4,000 per linear foot with costs contingent on engineering and construction specifications. Seawalls require significant and ongoing maintenance and have been linked to decreases in tourism.
Levees	Levees cost estimates are between US$1,000 and US$1,500 per linear foot. Again, levees require continuous maintenance.
Sandbagging	Sandbagging is typically seen as one of the most inexpensive options. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for examples, estimates that constructing a 100-ft long, 3-ft high sandbag barrier would cost about US$3,100. Sandbags, however, are typically temporary installations and may harm the esthetic value of an area if used long-term.
Elevated development	Coastal areas may also require or incentivize elevated development into building codes and/or design guidelines. Elevating a new home adds approximately US$2,000 to US$30,000 to the cost of the house. Elevating an existing home can easily exceed US$50,000.

Source. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2013).

Budgetary challenges are likely to influence the behaviors of coastal policy makers in several additional ways. First, conflict may erupt as stakeholders seek support and resources in response to varying legislative priorities, risk evaluations, mandates, and needs. Second, as competition intensifies and resources become more limited, more actors are likely to become involved (Nie, 2003). Finally, Nie (2003) observes that as resources become increasingly limited, conflict is likely to increase in intensity. The scarcity of and competition for limited resources forces lawmakers to make trade-offs and sets the stage for conflict over what programs receive funding and which do not. Compounding each of these challenges is the fact that the benefits of infrastructure are often dispersed across an entire region, whereas its costs are not. The combination of concentrated costs and dispersed benefits can contribute to a citizenry that is difficult to rally and not inclined to mobilize (Wilson, 1995).

Challenge 4: Intergovernmental Relations and Goal Misalignment

Scholars have long articulated that political power in the American system is incomplete and must be shared. Wright (1988) describes contemporary intergovernmental relations as “overlapping” and describes governance as “complex multiunit interactions beyond the nation-state relationship” (Agranoff & Radin, 2015, 141). Wright (1988) also identifies a number of characteristics that shape the behaviors of intergovernmental actors:

Limited and decentralized power

Ambiguity and uncertainty

Interdependence

Competition and cooperation

Bargaining and negotiation

In short, modern policy implementation involves federal and state agencies, local governments, nonprofits, and the private sector (Agranoff & Radin, 2015, p. 142). Each, in turn, is likely to have varying missions, competencies, and goals. These differences may contribute to difficulties in planning, coordinating, and implementing infrastructure programs.

Research dedicated to understanding the intergovernmental failures associated with Hurricane Katrina is helpful to understanding the challenges of coastal infrastructure. Burby (2007) argues that prior to Katrina, federal policy makers (often supported by state and local officials) encouraged coastal development through programs such as flood insurance, the construction of levees and other flood prevention measures, tax inducements and other economic incentives, and disaster relief. According to Burby (2007), these actions contributed to development in risky locations that would have likely remained undeveloped without the policy interventions. Other federal programs have sought impede, dissuade, and/or block developments along the coasts. Two such examples are the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (amended in 1990 with the Coastal Barrier Improvement Act). The former offers subnational governments resources to implement hazard mitigation measures, whereas the latter precludes Federal financial assistance (including flood insurance) in regions that the Department of the Interior has identified as part of the nation’s Coastal Barrier Resource System (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018). Other federal programs indirectly affect coastal development. Examples include the Clean Water Act (creates the basic intergovernmental structure that governs and limits the discharge of pollutants into U.S. waterways), the Coastal Zone Management Act (designed to encourage the preservation of natural coastal resources), and the Endangered Species Act (used to protect threatened and or endangered species). It should be noted that states and local governments also promulgate laws and regulations that affect coastal development patterns and uses (Burby, 1998; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2018).

The Big Picture

The variety and types of infrastructure, the magnitude of many coastal disasters, and the number of stakeholders create a number of challenges for coastal jurisdictions. The impacts to New York City following Superstorm Sandy are illustrative. The city’s transit sector has assets above and below ground, facilities located in coastal and nearby but noncoastal areas and relies on private and public sector actors. The sector’s infrastructure portfolio includes more than 2,000 miles of track, 5,700 vehicles, more than 300 routes, multiple computer networks, 14 underriver tunnels, 3,600 water inlets, and serves 2.5 million customers per day (MTA, 2017). At its height, Superstorm Sandy affected several interdependent infrastructure systems, as summarized below in Table 9.

Table 9.

New York Infrastructure Impacts From Sandy.

Infrastructure category	Description
Highways and roadways	Highways and roads throughout the affected areas that flooded
Mass transit and rail	Subway tunnels flooded: • Tunnels under the East River (6 tunnels) • Tunnels connecting Queens and Manhattan • Tunnels under the Hudson River • Tunnel under Newtown Creek and Long Island • South Ferry station Ferry systems were also damaged: • The Staten Island Ferry • The East River Ferry • Several private ferries
Aviation	Airports flooded
Food, agriculture, and water production	Drinking Water • Drinking water was uninterrupted • Because of power outages, pumping systems (needed in many high rise buildings) failed meaning that residents were without drinking water and were unable flush toilets/take showers Wastewater • Approximately, 14 wastewater treatment plants released partially treated or untreated sewage into local waterways • Approximately 50% of the city’s 96 pumping stations failed Food • Food supply chain continued to function, although road and bridge closures did cause some disruptions • Because of power outages, refrigeration systems were strained and many failed
Electrical/power generation	Around 2 million people/accounts were without electrical power during the storm
Health care	Hospitals and Nursing Homes • Approximately six hospitals closed during the storm—forcing the evacuation of around 2,000 patients • Approximately 26 nursing homes and adult-care facilities closed during the storm (another five partially closed)—forcing the evacuation of around 4,500 patients Miscellaneous • Approximately, 500 buildings that housed doctors’ offices, clinics, and other outpatient facilities were closed during the storm
Information and communication	Widespread outages across phone, wireless, cable, and Internet services
Government, buildings, commercial, and manufacturing	Approximately, 800 buildings were damaged or destroyed Approximately, 70,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed

The total costs for New York City, according to Mayor Bloomberg, topped US$19 billion with around 75% of that not covered by private insurance (“Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts,” 2012).

Concluding Thoughts

Policy makers, seeking support for infrastructure investment, face a delicate task, especially, when it comes to increasing spending related to climate change and sustainability. These challenges exist within a political framework that is fragmented, highly complex, and is littered with potential roadblocks. They must also navigate hostile and/or indifferent elected officials, maintain fiscal stability and health, and secure millions of dollars from already tight federal, state, and local government budgets. Finally, they must interact with a variety of agencies and private sector owners with varying goals, areas of expertise, known problem-solving strategies, and priorities. Thus, the challenges to addressing infrastructure are simultaneously economic, political, and systematic and present a unique challenge to stakeholders going forward.

So, what is the path forward? Potential solutions are likely to be found in approaches that recognize that an all-hands-on deck is needed, meaning that solutions will involve and cut across levels of government and sectors. The federal government, for example, has resources in terms of expertise and money that states and localities often lack. Yet, the federal government does not possess clear authority to compel changes in local land use policy or to require interlocal cooperation. States and local governments, however, do have the ability to engage in collective or regional action/coordination, to make changes in how land is utilized, and the knowledge to better understand their unique on-the-ground coastal challenges. Although intergovernmental solutions are a strong start, building and/or maintaining more resilient coastal infrastructure also depends the participation of the private sector. The private sector often includes the owners, operators, and providers of various forms of infrastructure. They possess site-level expertise and resources that will further shape the resilience, interconnectedness, and costs of coastal infrastructure. Thus, at their core, effective solutions to the nation’s coastal infrastructure challenges will leverage and integrate the strengths and abilities of public and private actors, institutions, and sectors.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Jonathan M. Fisk

Author Biography

Jonathan M. Fisk is an assistant professor at Auburn University. His research focuses on energy and environmental policy.

References

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Radin

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