Transparency and Accountability—The Case of Public Procurement Practices in Switzerland

Abstract

This article assesses the links between accountability and transparency in the case of the public procurement system in Switzerland. It focuses on the relationship between the two concepts through the prism of the theoretical frameworks developed by previous authors, using data gathered through experts’ interviews. Findings demonstrate that the relationship can be bidirectional and highlight the importance of both the nature and the quality of information. It also redefines the various ways around which transparency and accountability interrelate by extending the previous contributions on the matter. It especially points out that transparency and accountability can be more easily implemented together with proactive dissemination of information. At the same time, mechanisms of control should also exist to ensure more accountable governmental organizations. In this sense, all experts insist on the necessity to keep efficient surveillance bodies in place.

Keywords

accountability transparency public procurement national infrastructure Switzerland

Introduction

Transparency and accountability are often associated in contemporary research and practice. From a normative perspective, their prevalence can be explained by their intrinsic value, widely recognized in most studies and growingly praised by civil society organizations and governments themselves. The instrumental value of transparency and accountability is also often hailed, as they may bring great benefits to a large set of actors, including governments and societies (Heald, 2006), mainly by reducing the democratic deficit. The instrumental value of transparency refers to its presupposed beneficial effects on citizen participation and trust, and its expected power to curb corruption. When considered as a mechanism, accountability may allow revealing injustices and identifying those responsible through a public ritual of rendering of accounts (Braithwaite, 2006). These two “abstract nouns” (Hood, 2010) are often positively associated, raising high expectations of good governance in the public sector: “transparency is providing new opportunities both to enforce rules and standards and to hold accountable those who purport to act in the public interest” (Florini, 2003, p. 196). Consequently, as much hope has been placed in this combination, it remains essential to better understand how the two concepts interrelate and how they can be analyzed regarding specific public policies.

Although numerous articles have addressed this issue (see, for example, Bovens et al., 2014; Gaventa & McGee, 2013; Hale, 2008), few articles have developed a global, conceptual perspective, and created a theoretical/analytical framework to study the specific relationship between transparency and accountability. To the extent of our knowledge, only three authors have adopted such a global perspective in Public Administration (PA) or related fields: Fox (2007) developed an analytical framework; Hood (2010) identified binary relations; and Meijer (2014) distinguished three different routes that could characterize the relationship. Gulbrandsen (2014) and Ferry et al. (2015) have applied it to concrete cases more recently while Mabillard and Zumofen (2017) have amended and merged the various frameworks developed previously into a more comprehensive one.

From a conceptual point of view, “horizontal” accountability (toward citizens and other stakeholders) may be reinforced by transparency if governments open up and move closer to the public (Truman, 2007). Indeed, the horizontalization of government—governmental bodies are partnering with other actors to deliver services—requires “horizontal forms of accountability [to] meet the requirements of the democratic constitutional state, that is, transparent responsibilities, well-defined interested parties, a good information supply, debate opportunities and sanctioning options” (Michels & Meijer, 2008, p. 171). However, transparency does not always increase public accountability (Murphy et al., 2017), an assumption that calls for a deeper analysis of the interaction between the two concepts. It should also be specified that contextual factors (political, social, and economic) affect the way bureaucrats are willing to adopt more transparent and accountable practices (Welch & Wong, 2001). Moreover, transparency and accountability refer to different realities according to languages (Fox, 2018) and the political system. For instance, although matters of national interest and defense remain largely secret in all systems, they are more strongly protected and extended to other policies in more dictatorial states. Accountability in Western democracies is usually defined as the attribution of responsibility, blame, and praise to specific actors and institutions, and the possibility to hold them to account eventually (March & Olsen, 1995). Transparency in the public sector refers to the availability of information enabling external stakeholders to monitor the workings or performance of government bodies (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012).

Here, we address the relationship between transparency and accountability through the case of public procurement. This specific study, carried out in a particular context (Switzerland), will enable us to better identify the interactions between transparency and accountability. This will be done based on past analyses conducted by Hood (2010) and Meijer (2014), who specifically identified the connections between the two concepts. Moreover, our approach will build on these contributions to further test the framework created by Fox (2007), which was later extended by Mabillard and Zumofen (2017). These perspectives remain relevant and essential to any study focusing on the relationship between transparency and accountability. Therefore, they will be further used and commented in our contribution. Regarding a central issue for public-sector managers—the awarding of public markets—we investigate the following research question (RQ): How can the relationship between transparency and accountability be best described based on previous studies?

This article is structured as follows: First, the theoretical mechanisms underpinning the relationship between transparency and accountability are explained, mostly using PA literature. Second, the case context is presented to provide details about public procurement in Switzerland, including transparency and accountability concerns. Third, the qualitative approach, together with the selection of the experts and their profiles, are exposed. Finally, the findings, based on data gathered through 15 semi-structured interviews of public procurement experts coming from various professional fields, are discussed and integrated in the reflexions about the relationship between the two concepts. They offer relevant and meaningful insights on how transparency and accountability interact in a specific case in which they are both considered as crucial aspects by all interviewees.

Theoretical Considerations

Today, the two concepts are used together because of their significant role in good governance policies. The flourishing of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives (TAI) is a typical example of this phenomenon. As such, they are considered as co-dependent principles in the normative literature. According to Armstrong (2005), “transparency without accountability becomes meaningless and makes a mockery of sound public administration. Accountability depends on transparency or having the necessary information” (p. 1). If this rationale seems straightforward, it does not provide a definitive clarification of the interactions between the two concepts.

In the PA literature, transparency is also often referred to as a significant variable ensuring accountability of democracies. As a result, “transparency of governments towards their societies is seen as a necessary factor of government accountability and responsiveness” (Grigorescu, 2003, p. 644). Transparency is mostly defined as a dimension of accountability (Bovens, 2007; Koppell, 2005) as accountable public organizations and bureaucrats “must explain or account for their actions” (Pina et al., 2007). From a legal point of view, Freedom of Information (FoI) laws, which enable citizens to submit requests to get access to administrative documents, are presented by Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros (2006) as a “crucial step towards the solution of the accountability deficit.”

The positive relationship between transparency and accountability has been reconsidered in practice by Riddell (2014). Communication of decisions and disclosure of information have led some officials or government bodies to change their way of working and become more cautious. From a conceptual perspective, two challenges can be identified. On one hand, transparency cannot be reduced to disclosure alone; it also refers to well-processed and fully understood information. On the other hand, consequences for administrative bodies rarely arise from transparency; sanctions are rarely imposed on administrations that disclose information. In this sense, limiting accountability to a function of answerability diminishes the control of accounting agencies (Schedler, 1999). Consequently, accountability requires a more subtle and granular understanding to establish the foundations for further analysis, including the essential role of surveillance bodies within the administration.

Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives

Although transparency and accountability have been extensively studied, few authors have adopted a general, conceptual point of view, developing analytical frameworks. To the extent of our knowledge, only three scholars have created such frameworks to address the relationship between the two concepts. In his attempt to grasp the interaction between the two concepts, Fox (2007, p. 668) identifies two different types of transparency (opaque and clear) and accountability (soft and hard). According to him, there is an overlap when the “capacity to produce answers permits the construction of the right to accountability.” This issue has been more specifically addressed by Hood (2010). In his view, transparency and accountability can be bound in three different ways. The first kind of relation is called “Siamese twins,” where the two concepts are used interchangeably and they are not distinguished. In the second type, called “matching parts,” they are considered separable in principle and contribute hand in hand to good governance. The final combination highlights potential tensions between the two notions. It is referred to as an “awkward couple.” In this last case, unclear information or overload may lead to less accountable administrations, as illustrated by Ferry et al. (2015). Finally, the last attempt to identify the mechanisms underpinning this interaction is Meijer’s (2014) article, in which the close connection between accountability and the instrumental value of transparency is underlined. Three different “routes” are proposed: Transparency can facilitate accountability, strengthen accountability, or reduce the need for accountability.

These theoretical developments prove that the relationship between transparency and accountability can vary according to the environment and object of study. Although some contributions have focused on it, especially on transparency as a form of accountability or on “accountability as transparency” (Roberts, 2009), few articles have addressed this issue empirically. Bauhr and Grimes (2014) explain that if transparency can contribute to increasing accountability, such a relationship may be undermined by corruption in the absence of other reforms. Transparency is here regarded as a necessary but insufficient precondition of accountability. In other words, “Unless transparency reforms are accompanied by other institutional arrangements, transparency may do more harm than good with respect to citizens’ civic mindedness and propensity to participate in accountability efforts.” (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014, p. 310). Gulbrandsen (2014) has, for example, focused on the practice of nonstate certification programs and has shown a beneficial effect of transparency on accountability. However, in their analysis of the two concepts, Im et al. (2013) have shown that transparency initiatives in Korea have resulted in selected public-sector responsiveness: Because reasons for enhanced transparency were mostly grounded on political gains, governments were held to account regarding policies for which they could garner support. This situation led to a clear disjunction between public-sector responsiveness and transparency. In another study, drawing upon Hood’s (2010) contribution, Ferry et al. (2015) have pointed out the potential mismatch between the two notions (the “awkward couple” interpretation) in the case of English local government. According to this study that applied O’Neill’s (2006) approach to a specific field, citizens often lack the necessary skills and knowledge to analyze the available data. As a result, downward accountability cannot be fully exercised because of the growing pressure to publish raw data, which often remain too technical and inaccessible to citizens.

Toward a New Framework

In the present article, we pursue this trend by evaluating the interactions between transparency and accountability empirically. Regarding the contrasting results observed in the abovementioned contributions, this article builds on the initial work undertaken by Fox (2007). Taking a refined perspective, it extends Fox’s framework by adding a fundamental distinction between compromising and noncompromising information, as developed by Mabillard and Zumofen (2017) (see Table 1). Consequently, this approach complements existing studies and aims to strengthen the findings through the addition of a new category (the content of information). Therefore, it helps to better describe the relationship between transparent and accountable practices, and in this way raise their implications in terms of both practice and research.

Table 1.

Interactions Between Transparency and Accountability (Based on Mabillard & Zumofen, 2017).

		Transparency		Accountability
		Active	Passive	Answerability	Enforcement
Content of information	Noncompromising	Dissemination		Responsibility
				Institutional answerability
	Compromising		Access to information		Sanctions
					Remediation

Two types of transparency and accountability have been redeveloped in this extended framework. Active transparency refers to the proactive, voluntary disclosure of information by public bodies. It is less codified than passive transparency, which involves the constrained release of information (not voluntarily disseminated but following a request or inquiry). The latter form of transparency is particularly interesting in Switzerland as a federal law (LTrans) entered into force only very recently, in 2006. Although the LTrans is not extensively used in international comparison, some scandals—especially in public procurement—have been revealed through requests for official information, emanating mainly from journalists. More importantly, it has provoked a shift in the public sector, transparency having replaced secrecy as the norm in daily operations of administrations (Cottier, 2014). Accountability can, on one hand, be regarded as a form of answerability. In this sense, it can be defined as the obligation for public officials called to account to respond to questions formulated by various stakeholders such as the press or interest groups. On the other hand, it can also refer to enforcement and goes further than answerability. As good behavior can be rewarded and bad behavior can be sanctioned, either by legal authorities or by accounting agencies, public accountability is an omnipresent intrinsic value of the Swiss democratic system that applies to public procurement procedures.

Based on these categories, the framework exposes four different ways in which transparency and accountability interrelate:

Dissemination and responsibility: In this situation, active transparency implies a form of answerability of the administration (e.g., press release). Mostly, noncompromising information is communicated. Although accountability and responsibility can be differentiated in certain cases (Bivins, 2006), public officials and organizations are considered here to assume their responsibilities by communicating about decisions and policies.

Institutional answerability: It involves both passive transparency and accountability. The use of the FoI law leads in this case to the unveiling of information, merely provoking comments and explanations (the nature of information is however noncompromising). This situation corresponds to the case when transparency and accountability “meet” according to Fox’s (2007) approach.

Access to information and sanctions: The content of the information is compromising and transparency happens mostly through the submission of requests. Using the FoI legislation (passive form), requesters call for accountability from public bodies, who can subsequently sanction bad behavior or wrongdoing. This refers to the “enforcement” type of accountability.

Disclosure and remediation: This time, accountability precedes transparency and takes the form of internal answerability and enforcement. A given problem, due to the compromising nature of information, can be solved internally before it is shared with the general public. The identification of organizational dysfunction or inappropriate behavior is therefore dealt with, blamed, and/or punished according to the situation, which is then communicated to the public. In the absence of external pressure, this scenario may also hide the problems at stake.

From Theory to Applied Cases

As mentioned above, numerous contributions have addressed the issues of transparency and accountability; however, only a few of them have mobilized an analytical framework in a systematic way. Obviously, advocates of TAI have argued that both concepts go hand in hand and contribute to better governance. Apart from this normative literature, most contributions regard them as two sides of the same coin, or usually consider transparency as an inevitable prerequisite to accountability. In other words, there can be no accountable governments without transparent practices. However, going beyond these assumptions requires empirical evidence from applied cases.

In this article, we investigate diverse scenarios using the framework presented above. To extend the initial efforts undertaken by Hood (2010) and Meijer (2014), we reflect more deeply on the nature of the relationship between the two concepts in the particular case of public procurement. They are both considered as central aspects in the awarding of public contracts to companies as transparency ensures equity in the adjudicating process. Moreover, it may limit abuse of auctioneers’ discretion and collusion among bidders can be destabilized (Ohashi, 2009). As integrity is an essential pillar of procurement systems, it is expected that officials can be held accountable for their actions. In the absence of accountability, additional costs may arise, therefore leading authorities to less cost-efficient public expenditures (Soudry, 2007). Thus, public procurement offers fertile ground for the analysis of the transparency–accountability relationship.

Public Procurement in Switzerland

Switzerland is no exception when it comes to public procurement, which remains central in terms of public spending. Public procurement purposes for all Confederation, cantons, and communes mount up to US$40 to US$45 billion (Chambre de commerce, d’industrie et des services de Genève, 2015) in which an approximate 25% is spent by the Confederation alone (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2016). At the national level, public procurement practices are governed by the Federal law on public markets (FLPM). Among the most important features of the legislation, equity of treatment and protection of the workers should be guaranteed. This is ensured through the transparency (or publicity) of the calls about public works. At the same time, the contract officer commits to not disclose any confidential information about the bidders. Apart from this exception (i.e., business secrets), documents related to public procurement are subject to the LTrans (Waser & Merkt, 2019).

Lawyers play a central role in public procurement in Switzerland. They assist both the bidders and the public authorities, they are involved in adjudicating bodies, and they help contractors in their appeals against a negative decision. Although it does not fully cover the complex legal foundation of the procurement system in Switzerland, we focus here on the Ordinance on public markets, which serves to regulate the financial thresholds for public procurement. The latter specifies that simap.ch is the only platform publishing all calls. This platform is regarded as a more transparent way to communicate about public works, as there are 27 different regimes (26 for the cantons + 1 for the Confederation). Its consultation is free of charge. The Ordinance requires that contracting authorities publish every year control systems to ensure the publicity of criteria used to decide which company qualifies for a specific contract and which does not.

Despite this legal guarantee, there is a transparency problem related to the lack of harmonization (the 27 regulations mentioned above). Nevertheless, recent processes to overcome this problem are ongoing. Moreover, the language used to describe the procurement contract does not guarantee equal treatment (there is no systematic translation), as it requires huge efforts for some companies to understand the more technical terminology. This has been highlighted by experts as an aspect which can harm equal treatment more often than initially thought. Between 2009 and 2012, it has been noted that 80% of all offers had been attributed to enterprises from the German-speaking part of Switzerland (464 of 580). Discrimination is not the main explanatory factor because companies from the French- and Italian-speaking regions had a higher rate of success when bidding for a contract.¹ The main problem lies in their low level of participation (17.6%) due to language barriers, mainly nontranslation of contracts written in German (Radio Télévision Suisse [RTS], 2014).

Moreover, based on her investigations, Parvex (2017) points out that the public procurement system remains rather opaque and poorly controlled. According to her investigation, gré à gré contracts—which can be awarded directly to companies, without going through the bidding system—awarded by the Confederation reached CHF 1,046 million in 2015, or 1 out of 5 francs spent by the national government (Parvex, 2017). The total amount has increased sharply between 2011 and 2015, from around CHF 300 million up to over CHF 1 billion. These contracts remain problematic from a transparency perspective as they are not following the adjudicating process, which is subjected to openness—transparency of the bids, of exclusions, of negotiations, and possible interruptions.

It is precisely because of the absence of ex ante transparency that accountability of the process is called into question by Parvex (2017). Accountability remains central as it enables public bodies to cope with expectations generated within and outside organizations. Regarding public procurement, it has been defined in several accounts as the possibility to communicate about the project and how the funds have been used wisely (Diggs & Roman, 2012). In Switzerland, civil society organizations, media, and the wider public are not fully empowered, which remains a barrier to effective accountability according to OECD (2009) guidelines. Moreover, the limited availability of information explains the unexpectedly poor score (under the European average) of Switzerland regarding public procurement in the European Public Accountability Mechanisms (2019) ranking. In line with these comments, the interviews conducted in this study with experts in the field will help us to better understand how transparency and accountability interrelate, in the cases of both open calls and gré à gré contracts.

Table 2.

Profile of the Interviewees.

Professional area	Function	Selection criteria	n = 15
Public bodies	Public servant	Surveillance of public procurement practices	1
Politics	Members of the Parliament	Interventions in Parliament about issues of public procurement	3
Academia	Professors	Strong expertise in the Federal law on public markets	3
Law	Lawyers	Members of adjudicating bodies, strong expertise in the Federal law on public markets	3
Consultancy	Senior consultants	Members of adjudicating bodies, strong expertise in the Federal law on public markets	2
Media	Journalists	Have written or uncovered scandals about public procurement practices in Switzerland	3

Note. Length of interviews: M = 28 min (longest 69 min, shortest 14 min).

Method

Qualitative methods appear as the best option to collect coherent data about the relationship between transparency and accountability. Indeed, it is described as an interpretative and naturalist approach to understand the world the purpose of which is to study or give a sense to phenomena in their natural environments, according to people’s perception and sense (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).

Interviews with a population of experts (n = 15) were conducted in the span of 3 months. Experts were selected according to information retrieval techniques. Conducting expert interviews serves to shorten time-consuming data gathering processes, particularly if the experts are seen as “crystallization points” for practical insider knowledge and are interviewed as surrogates for a wider circle of players (Bogner et al., 2009). In this case, individuals coming from various professional fields constituted the population of experts as to represent the widest possible spectrum and thus reach the crystallization points mentioned above. These diverse profiles have helped us to represent different target groups and perspectives, enriching the content accordingly. Anonymity was guaranteed throughout the entire process to obtain inputs that would not be limited or compromised.

Experts were questioned based on a semi-structured interview grid. This technique is especially suitable when open responses in the interviewee’s own words rather than a “yes or no” type of answer are expected. All interviews have been recorded, transcribed in verbatim using a standard transcription protocol. Transcripts were reviewed by the interviewer for accuracy and then coded in a content analysis software (NVivo). The coding process was twofold: The data were, on one hand, assembled by question and, on the other hand, grouped by thematic. The thematic analysis was performed through a codebook developed by the authors. It involved the creation of an evolving node structure initially based on an early concept identification (initial coding). Then, the analytical process allowed for categories and codes to emerge from the data itself. They were used to complete and refine the initial conceptual node structure. This interpretive coding process (Mason, 2017) helped organize the large amount of data collected by making sense of experts’ accounts, so that we could interpret their meaning to make the salient themes emerge. It also helped respond to our RQ while providing information about the context.

To make sure that no side of the study would be forgotten, interviews were conducted until data saturation (Bowen, 2008). Data saturation is regarded as the moment in data collection and analysis when new information produces little or no change to the codebook (Guest et al., 2006). In this case, we got a reliable sense of thematic exhaustion and variability within our data set after 12 interviews and data saturation was confirmed after the 15th. Indeed, the last interviews did not substantially lead to the emergence of new, critical information regarding the transparency–accountability relationship and, more broadly, regarding our RQ. In this sense, new data would have yielded redundant information (Moser & Korstjens, 2018).

Findings

Following the qualitative approach preferred in this study, all experts interviewed have clearly highlighted the issues at stake regarding the dissemination of information and accountability regarding public procurement in Switzerland. As a result, their informed opinions helped us in the first place to better evaluate transparency and accountability practices in this context. This evaluation remains essential and will enable us to respond to the RQ of this study, as presented in the last subsection of this part.

Transparency and Accountability in Public Procurement

The use of a centralized website (simap.ch) that compiles all the bids makes it easy to have an overview of all the public procurement contracts that any company could bid for. Despite being rigid and not agile enough, as mentioned by several experts, the existence of this website guarantees the respect of active transparency in the awarding of public contracts in Switzerland. This is highlighted by Respondent 7 (R₇): “Yes, I think it is clear enough. There is a system, a website called SIMAP, and everyone has access to it.”² The availability of clear, precise, and complete description of the expectations of the public body as well as the procurement criteria retained (and their respective weighting) to evaluate the bids can be easily found on the website. Consequently, all the interviewees agreed that such pieces of information were adequately displayed, thus reinforcing active transparency in this case.

However, although transparency of the awarding process should be systematic, the existence of exception clauses makes it possible to get around according to some experts, especially external stakeholders. These exception clauses being broadly defined, some offices often use them to avoid the lengthy and resource-consuming process of public awarding. Indeed, the amount of contracts awarded using the gré à gré exception clause has recently increased, a tendency mainly explained by the easiness and quickness of the gré à gré procedure. This way of avoiding a public awarding process is criticized as it also escapes transparency through a lack of traceability (Parvex, 2017). To avoid using such process, some offices are reported to divide the mandates in pieces so that each piece does not exceed the legal financial threshold above which the awarding process should automatically be launched. According to several experts interviewed here, trust and familiarity with contractors also play a major role as taking the risk to award the work to an unknown enterprise is something that public bodies are often afraid of.

Experts also note that governmental entities are often very reluctant to give access to documents, particularly if such documents may be contested in court. As a result, administrations refuse to grant access to some items, forcing journalists to use the Swiss FoI law (LTrans) to obtain them. Those legal processes reveal themselves to be lengthy and expensive, making some journalists give up their demands on the way. In this sense, R₁ insists on the fact that “the LTrans allows for the timeframes to be extended,” showing the difficulties sometimes faced by information requesters.

Indeed, some governmental entities have used appeals to delay the process to make journalists abandon their request. If they invoke costs, reluctance is often due to the willingness not to communicate about compromising information. This may, for instance, refer to multiple gré à gré contracts that were passed with the same companies, thus avoiding public calls. Such practices, even if legal, demonstrate that governmental entities are not fully transparent, as they sometimes use legal processes to avoid disclosing certain documents. Moreover, the sensitivity of this issue is reflected in the recent attempt of the central government (Federal Council) to exclude public procurement from the LTrans (Flückiger & Junod, 2017). However, information could also be legitimately kept secret according to the exceptions’ regime covered by the LTrans. In this case, the requests submitted by external stakeholders (often represented by journalists) are clear examples of passive transparency.

On the side of accountability, while a large majority of interviewees describe this process as being fair and honest, three interviewees’ opinions were more contrasted. This minority evoked the fact that procurement criteria can easily be chosen to favor one or another enterprise and guide the decision process toward a precise contractor. According to R₃, “it is upstream, when procurement criteria are defined, the way they are written has a decisive influence on the awarding process and on who will the contractor.” More dramatically, the language barrier can reinforce this when the bidders lack the skills to understand the calls properly. In this sense, experts mention that costs associated with the whole process of attribution may lead to low levels of answerability, especially because most offers are not translated in the three national languages or because of the duration of the process. In this case, the responsibility of government bodies is not assumed as information is not equally disseminated among the potential bidders, and government bodies cannot be held fully accountable.

Regarding the justifications offered to the enterprises that submitted an offer and were not selected, a grid of predefined procurement criteria, including ratings, is issued. No additional information is provided concerning why such scores were decided, and companies do not automatically receive information concerning the scores of the other bidders nor the details of the winning bid that was finally chosen. In this regard, experts agree that such practices would possibly harm the contractor as soon as crucial business information and secrets could be revealed. This last aspect is of crucial importance, as underlined by R₁₃: “there are companies which try to take advantage of the appealing process to obtain business information and secrets from a competing company.” Nevertheless, in most cases, the justifications could be more detailed without any breach of confidentiality or data protection.

The current appealing system requires a formal contract award protest. While most enterprises would probably like to have more detailed justifications concerning their scores, experts argue that they would not necessarily appeal against the awarding decision nor enter in a costly judicial process and possibly distort a trust relationship with the governmental entity concerned, especially considering that they may work together again. Thus, this appealing system seems to diminish some sides of answerability from the administration by creating an artificial barrier. Nevertheless, answerability as equal treatment (fairness) for all companies that submit a bid was described as mostly reached by the large majority of interviewees.

The sanctions to be applied by a government entity in the case of corruption or infringement in the awarding process remain extremely rare. They do exist but regard mostly damages and interests paid to the appealing enterprise in the case of a proven distorted awarding process. However, according to R₈, “decisions concerning damages and interests paid to a bidder who has been evicted in violation of the law, frankly they are not numerous at all.” Moreover, these decisions do not apply as accountability enforcement on their own. The only real sanction that exists concerns the cases of corruption in which the public officials convicted are dismissed and later exposed to penal prosecutions.

Other types of processes that may apply to government entities could also lead to sanctions. For example, a closer and systematic scrutiny by the Swiss Federal Audit Office (SFAO) could be perceived as such. If inadequate behaviors or suspicion of such behaviors exists, R₁₄ explicitly stated that the SFAO could command an audit on the government entity concerned to check whether the processes are fair and adequate. Such audit, if it reveals malfunctioning structures, could lead to sanctions such as dismissal or complete reorganization of the audited entity.

Interactions Between Transparency and Accountability

The different forms of transparency and accountability described in this article mainly derive from the research paths developed by Hood (2010) and Meijer (2014), enriched by the analysis of our interviews’ content in the case of public procurement. As a result, the previous literature complemented and exemplified through the expertise of the interviewees allows for a better explanation the interactions between transparency and accountability in the Swiss context. Therefore, the experts’ insights provide us with the opportunity to respond to the RQ of this contribution, using the most updated analysis framework presented above.

Responsibility Assumed Through Active Transparency

The first case refers to proactive dissemination of information (active transparency) and responsibilities on the public bodies’ side. Regarding public procurement in Switzerland, dissemination of information concerns mainly the use of a centralized website. Transparency is here mainly targeted to companies. This voluntary release of information has been highlighted by all experts as a crucial condition to ensure integrity in the process. When such a condition is respected, the relationship between transparency and accountability can be interpreted as “Siamese twins” (Hood, 2010). Growing transparency leads to more horizontal accountability, as better access to information is provided by public organizations to the relevant stakeholders (Meijer, 2014). In the case of noncompromising information, all interviewees underline that although answerability could be improved, responsibility is generally assumed and government entities can be held to account. The publicity and standardization of the bids (for companies) are good examples. Some experts highlighted the need to favor this type of situation because it remains the best option for an administration to be both accountable and transparent, but others also mentioned the need to protect crucial business information and/or secrets. Nevertheless, such a justification should not hide the whole process of attribution. In this sense, journalists and the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner have welcomed the decision of the Parliament to uphold the principle of freedom of information in public procurement. Other interviewees have also clarified their position in this regard, as shown by R₁₄, who is “clearly against the exclusion of [public procurement] from the existing legislation on transparency.”

Toward Institutional Answerability

The second “scenario” of the analysis framework used concerns institutional answerability. Focused on noncompromising information, it refers to passive transparency—requests submitted by citizens, most often represented by journalists—and answerability from government entities. In this regard, the use of the LTrans is regarded by the interviewees as a great possibility to obtain official documents, which may open a public debate and call the relevant stakeholders into account. Although the process can once again be eased when dealing with noncompromising information, government entities are often reluctant to disclose the requested information. One expert has, for instance, submitted a request and received, after a favorable decision from the Federal Court, a detailed database containing details about contracts awarded by the Confederation to its 40 largest contractors (Masmejan, 2015). This case falls into the scope of Meijer’s (2014) direct route between transparency and accountability as passive release of information to citizens, stakeholders, and the media facilitates horizontal accountability. When these conditions are met, the “Siamese twins” metaphor (Hood, 2010) also applies. However, several experts note that public authorities tend to hold back the communication of potential sensitive information. This assessment once again calls for a crucial distinction between the compromising and noncompromising nature of the information at stake.

Passive Transparency Leading to Sanctions

Specific situations have shown that scandals uncovered by journalists in the case of public contracts awarding can lead to concrete sanctions. The exposure of corrupt dealings has been mentioned by R₆ in particular, following the use of the LTrans. The investigation led by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office and the resignation of the incriminated person provide empirical evidence that disclosure of compromising information can have significant implications. In other cases, sanctions have been enforced by the SFAO after auditing the concerned administrative structures, as highlighted by R₁₄. In this case, transparency and accountability are associated to produce better governance. Therefore, they can be interpreted as “matching parts” in Hood’s (2010) classification. They are separable in principle as transparency happens before accountability, the submission of requests having led to sanctioned malpractice. Nevertheless, the two concepts are closely linked and reinforce each other or, as Meijer (2014) puts it, transparency facilitates accountability. Moreover, several experts mentioned that the push for more accountability may result to increased transparency of public bodies, although the sensitive nature of information may always remain an obstacle to a more systematic diffusion of information.

Remediation Leading to Information Disclosure

As opposed to the third case above, accountability precedes transparency here as measures are taken internally before reaching out to the public, especially when the content of information is compromising. Several interviewees mentioned that such measures were enforced (sometimes leading to sanctions and firing) when wrongdoing or illegal practices were discovered regarding public procurement. A recent example concerns the Federal Office for the Environment, in which two employees have been charged with corruption and unlawful business practices in 2016 (RTS, 2018). The investigation launched by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office in 2010 and the upcoming revelations in the media, following the conclusions of an external audit, show that transparency can strengthen vertical accountability (Meijer’s indirect route). Hood’s (2010) “matching parts” scenario is thus observed, although in a reverse logic: More accountability within the administration does not always need full transparency, and problems can be solved internally before sharing details with the public at large. This example shows that remediation can happen before active transparency when the nature of information is compromising. All experts interviewed in this study agreed on the impact of sensitive information on the process, highlighting again how the nature of the content can shape the interaction between transparency and accountability. This different “scenario” corresponds to the fourth case identified in Table 1 above, which refers to remediation and disclosure.

Therefore, our analysis proves that the nature of information remains essential to fully understand and assess the various ways transparency and accountability interact. When information is noncompromising, the “Siamese twins” interpretation applies as transparency and accountability may happen at the same time (answerability implies transparency in the sense of openness). Through active or passive release of information, transparency also facilitates horizontal accountability, following Meijer’s (2014) direct route. Conversely, when information is compromising, the relation can be mostly interpreted as “matching parts.” However, the fourth case (when accountability precedes transparency) can be considered risky as corrupt practices might be covered in the absence of external pressures, often applied through passive transparency mechanisms. In this sense, the use of the LTrans to reveal maladministration or illegal individual acts can lead to sanctions. Measures to address illicit actions and solve the problems internally often signal that accountability happened before proactive communication. The accountability mechanism refers here to vertical accountability, which applies to the organization itself. Information disseminated to the public at large in a subsequent phase ensures that officials can be held into account.

Discussion and Conclusion

The qualitative approach provided insights from experts, which, interpreted through the lens of previous studies and, more particularly, Mabillard and Zumofen’s (2017) framework, aimed at better understanding the relationship between the two concepts. On one hand, the content of information added as a supplementary variable helped to define the links between transparency and accountability, and thus confirmed the potential reuse of the framework in other case studies. On the other hand, the cases presented in the “Findings” section show that both concepts cannot be addressed as unidirectional co-dependent variables. In this sense, the content of the recorded interviews proved useful to better explain how the two concepts interrelate in a particular case and context, here public procurement in Switzerland.

Indeed, the results indicate that in some situations, transparency can precede accountability, and in others accountability mechanisms can conversely work within organizations before information is disseminated to the population. Separable in principle, the two concepts espouse the “matching parts” scenario (Hood, 2010), especially in the case of more sensitive information. In the case of noncompromising content, transparency and accountability seem to go hand in hand, embracing the “Siamese twins” scenario (Hood, 2010). The impact of the nature of information, leading to different configurations, thus shows the importance to include this variable in the analysis of the transparency–accountability relationship.

However, the interactions identified above are subject to change and depend on several conditions. When these conditions are not met, they do not ensure the co-dependency of the two concepts as described in Table 1. This is especially the case when information which cannot be processed by citizens prevents public-sector accountability, for instance, when institutional arrangements prove too complex to understand: It is then difficult to hold officials to account (Murphy et al., 2017). In the case of public procurement in Switzerland, language issues can affect the transparency–accountability relationship as responsibility cannot be ensured although information is published. Moreover, the potential absence of remediation and the subsequent dissemination of partial information may also change the relationship, especially when dealing with compromising information. Moreover, the release of incomplete or inaccurate information, resulting in some form of “imperfect” transparency, may lead to a lack of accountability. For instance, the nonpublication of certain calls on the simap.ch platform would prevent accountability from public organizations awarding markets to companies (Parvex, 2017).

This study meets with some limitations. The first regards the selection of the sample: The inclusion of government officials and contractors would have probably provided a broader overview of the topic. However, we have privileged a more neutral perspective by picking external experts. The second limitation refers to the selection of journalists as both experts and proxies for the general public, and the absence of the citizens per se. Further research should also take public opinion into account as integrity and accountability depend on the citizens’ effective oversight role. “In order for citizens and civil society organisations to fulfil an oversight role, as so-called ‘watchdog,’ data availability needs to be paired with timeliness, data quality, processing capacity, effective reporting and whistle-blower channels” (OECD, 2016, p. 15). It would need to take a set of individual- and group-level determinants to see “how transparency’s effects on public sector accountability are influenced by additional variables” (Porumbescu & Im, 2015, p. 135).

In conclusion, this article contains implications for both the theoretical and the policy-making sides. On one hand, it redefines the various ways around which transparency and accountability interrelate by extending the previous contributions on the matter. It shows the importance to take the nature of information into consideration, and the conditions leading to the diverse scenarios mentioned above. It also points out that transparency and accountability can be more easily implemented together with proactive dissemination of information. This finding suggests that, in addition to the possibility to submit requests via the LTrans, sensitive information should not remain secret and be shared with the public to ensure answerability—and possibly sanctions in the case of malpractice. However, many experts agree that transparency should be considered as a delicate balance between business confidentiality and the removal of secret practices. As a result, full transparency is not desirable; when treated as an end in itself, it may even endanger the whole process of public contracts awarding.

On the other hand, this article could give food for thought for practitioners and policymakers who would be committed to improve the law on public procurement in Switzerland. Indeed, it presents concrete examples about the way future policies could head toward to ensure both transparency and accountability in the process of public procurement in Switzerland. First, it remains essential to translate every publication on simap.ch in the three national languages to ensure fairness and grant access to all potential bidders, thereby fully exploiting the potential of information technology. Second, in the same vein, the annual publication of the providers’ list (and the amount spent) for every public office would reinforce both transparency and accountability. Third, a deeper control of the awarding process would also enable external stakeholders, including of course the public at large, to better hold public organizations to account. Finally, enriching the report concerning the adjudicating process with more precise comments (without jeopardizing intellectual property or fabrication secrets) would ensure a greater equity of treatment and move toward better accountability and transparency.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Vincent Mabillard

Notes

Author Biographies

Vincent Mabillard is assistant professor at the Solvay Brussels School of Economics & Management, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium. He obtained his PhD at the Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, Switzerland. His research projects focus on public management and communication.

Raphaël Zumofen is a senior research fellow in the Unit of Public Management and Marketing at the IDHEAP, University of Lausanne, Switzerland. His research interests include mainly public communication, public marketing as well as government transparency and accountability.

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