Pluralistic Ignorance Research in Psychology: A Scoping Review of Topic and Method Variation and Directions for Future Research

Abstract

Pluralistic ignorance occurs when group members mistakenly believe others’ cognitions and/or behaviors are systematically different from their own. More than 20 years have passed since the last review of pluralistic ignorance from a psychological framework, with more than 60 empirical articles assessing pluralistic ignorance published since then. Previous reviews took an almost entirely conceptual approach with minimal review of methodology, making existing reviews outdated and limited in the extent to which they can provide guidelines for researchers. The goal of this review is to evaluate and integrate the literature on pluralistic ignorance, clarify important conceptual issues, identify inconsistencies in the literature, and provide guidance for future research. We provide a comprehensive definition for the phenomenon, with a focus on its status as a group-level phenomenon. We highlight three areas of variation in particular in the current scoping review: variation in topics assessed, variation in measurement, and (especially) variation in methods for assessing the implications of individual-level misperceptions that, in aggregate, lead to pluralistic ignorance. By filling these gaps in the literature, we ultimately hope to motivate further analysis of the phenomenon.

Keywords

pluralistic ignorance scoping review methodological review social psychology

In 1924, Floyd Allport first referred to the illusion of universality, or the situation in which individuals perceive others’ attitudes as being uniform and lacking in variability (Allport, 1924; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Prentice & Miller, 1993). Shortly after, Katz and Allport (1931) introduced pluralistic ignorance as a special case of the illusion of universality, where group members believe others’ attitudes are less variable than they actually are and they mistakenly believe these attitudes differ systematically from their own (i.e., a directional misperception; Miller & McFarland, 1991).¹ Thus, pluralistic ignorance is defined by more than simply inaccuracies in the perception of others’ attitudes, beliefs, and practices; it entails a “mistaken perception of personal deviance” (Miller & McFarland, 1991, p. 288). Although Allport’s first conceptual contribution, the illusion of universality, faded in the literature, interest in pluralistic ignorance persisted.

Ultimately, three publications by Allport and his students, Katz and Schanck, set a foundation for research on pluralistic ignorance (Allport, 1924; Katz & Allport, 1931; Schanck, 1934). Of most note was Allport’s demonstration of pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward accepting racial minorities into fraternities, where most fraternity members mistakenly believed other members were less accepting of racial minorities (Katz & Allport, 1931). The presence of directional misperceptions within groups continues to be applicable to diverse contexts (e.g., alcohol use, sexual behavior, gender bias), observed across cultures (see research on pluralistic ignorance of family-friendly benefit use in the United States and Japan; Mandeville et al., 2016; Miyajima & Yamaguchi, 2017), and has been demonstrably useful to researchers studying person perception and social influence.

Pluralistic ignorance can lead to important and intriguing social influence dynamics; it can result in conformity to group norms that do not actually exist. A person’s conformity to such misperceptions can in turn contribute to the power of those illusory norms—without that person being aware of the role they play in that process (see Vorauer & Miller, 1997). Nonetheless, Allport himself did not pursue the topic beyond his initial investigations. Allport was suspicious of any theorizing that hinted at the existence of a “group mind” (Greenwood, 2003). His insistence that the individual person is the proper unit of analysis for the explication of any social-psychological phenomenon led him to firmly oppose “any explanations that postulated social phenomena beyond the actions and reactions of individuals” (O’Gorman, 1986, p. 338). Pluralistic ignorance, as a group-level phenomenon involving shared cognitions, did not fit well with that perspective.

Pluralistic ignorance was not empirically revisited until the 1960s when Breed and Ktsanes (1961) assessed pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward racial desegregation. This was followed by research on topics related to controversial issues (e.g., religion, education reform, sex; Korte, 1972) and student–teacher relationships (Willower & Packard, 1972). O’Gorman (1975, 1980) published a series of studies, with his most notable work being on pluralistic ignorance of racial attitudes, along with two reviews (O’Gorman, 1986, 1988). In the late 1980s to early 2000s, a group of researchers comprised of Miller, Prentice, and McFarland, among others, systematically investigated the phenomenon. Across numerous publications, they and their colleagues developed studies assessing pluralistic ignorance of alcohol use on college campuses (Miller & Morrison, 2009; Prentice & Miller, 1993; Schroeder & Prentice, 1998), researched antecedents of pluralistic ignorance (Miller & McFarland, 1987; Miller & Nelson, 2002), and published various conceptual reviews and theoretical accounts of pluralistic ignorance (Miller et al., 2000; Miller & McFarland, 1991; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Prentice & Miller, 1996). Since its revival, the phenomenon has maintained a consistent presence in the field, with new publications being released up until the last database search for the current review (May 22, 2020).²

More than 20 years have passed since the last set of pluralistic ignorance reviews employing a psychological framework (e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1991; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Prentice & Miller, 1996); since then, 61 additional empirical articles assessing pluralistic ignorance have been published. Previous reviews took an almost entirely conceptual approach, with minimal review of diversity in topics and methodology.³ Existing reviews are outdated and limited in both their scope and their ability to guide researchers in their own empirical work. This review provides a necessary updated account of the literature from conceptual and methodological perspectives, while incorporating recent research on pluralistic ignorance and providing direction for researchers.

Our scoping review (as described by Arksey & O’Malley, 2005) addresses the broader pluralistic ignorance literature by examining “the extent, range, and nature of research activity . . . where it is difficult to visualize the range of material that might be available” (p. 21). Our goal is to evaluate and integrate the literature on pluralistic ignorance by providing a concrete and comprehensive definition for the phenomenon and mapping the existing literature in terms of topic, method, and measurement variation. By filling these gaps in the literature, we aim to inspire researchers to continue applying pluralistic ignorance to their own unique research interests in an informed manner and motivate further empirical investigation and theoretical development of the phenomenon.

As we discuss below, researchers assessing pluralistic ignorance have primarily focused on documenting the prevalence of pluralistic ignorance across domains and have comparatively neglected empirical expansion of the phenomenon (including assessments of the implications of people’s misperceptions). In turn, researchers have (in reviews, empirical papers, and even footnotes) sporadically made arguments about the definition of pluralistic ignorance, its relationship with other social psychological constructs, and its measurement. The scattered arguments and inconsistent definitions and methods used in assessments of pluralistic ignorance hinder the field’s ability to compare findings across domains and disciplines and effectively extend research on pluralistic ignorance.

To address this issue, we evaluate and integrate the literature by first comprehensively defining pluralistic ignorance. We especially emphasize the fact that pluralistic ignorance is a group-level phenomenon. Although it arises as a result of individual-level perceptions, it is not reducible to those perceptions. Losing sight of this distinction can lead to conceptual confusion (as we will discuss, computing “pluralistic ignorance scores” at the individual level is inappropriate). Highlighting the group-level nature of the phenomenon also leads to the surprising observation that there are studies that are essential for assessing the consequences of pluralistic ignorance that have arguably never been conducted.

To increase clarity, we provide two prototypical examples of the phenomenon. We then highlight the literature reviewed and discuss three areas of variation: (a) variation in the kinds of collective misunderstandings assessed using a pluralistic ignorance framework, which include topics and contexts assessed, (b) variation in methods used to assess pluralistic ignorance, and (c) variation in assessing the implications of the misperceptions that could, in turn, contribute to pluralistic ignorance. None of these issues have been the subject of extensive discussion in previous reviews. We conclude with a discussion of what we believe are pressing future directions that should be addressed to advance research on pluralistic ignorance.

Defining Pluralistic Ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance has received eight decades of attention in several disciplines, but there is little agreement on a precise definition for the term. (Kitts, 2003, p. 223)

. . . we shall see that pluralistic ignorance is a widespread phenomenon . . . Yet, there is a surprising lack of consensus about how exactly to characterize the phenomenon. (Bjerring et al., 2014, p. 2447)

What is most important from our perspective is that pluralistic ignorance is clearly described as a group-level phenomenon, not as a psychological state of an individual. In contrast, Halbesleben and Buckley (2004) write that pluralistic ignorance “is a social comparison error where an individual holds an opinion, but mistakenly believes that others hold the opposite opinion” (p. 18). Similarly, Prentice and Miller (1993) define pluralistic ignorance as “a psychological state characterized by the belief that one’s private attitudes and judgments are different from those of others, even though one’s public behavior is identical” (p. 244). These are important aspects of pluralistic ignorance—perhaps even necessary ones. But they are clearly not sufficient; they can be characteristic of a limited number of individuals within groups that are not themselves characterized by pluralistic ignorance—that is, pluralistic ignorance is a situation in which many (if not all) members of a group harbor similar misperceptions. Moreover, labeling a person as being “high in pluralistic ignorance” in comparison to others represents mischaracterizing the phenomenon at a very basic level, which we fear could contribute to confusion and lack of consensus among researchers about its very nature (see related discussions by Bjerring et al., 2014; O’Gorman, 1986).

But what kind of group phenomenon is pluralistic ignorance? Some definitions unnecessarily restrict the concept’s range of application. Miller and McFarland (1991) defined it as “the situation in which virtually all members of a group privately reject group norms, yet believe that virtually all other group members accept them” (p. 287). Similarly, Bjerring et al. (2014) stated that pluralistic ignorance occurs

when a group of individuals all have the same attitude toward some proposition or norm, all act contrary to this attitude, and all wrongly believe that everyone else in the group has a certain conflicting attitude to the proposition and norm. (p. 2446; emphasis added)

Given those criteria, few if any cases of pluralistic ignorance described in the literature would qualify as such. Nor do we agree that total unanimity is required for pluralistic ignorance to be an important phenomenon with significant implications. Less restrictive is Korte’s (1972) definition of “absolute” pluralistic ignorance, which “may be regarded as a situation where a majority of persons stand on one side of an issue, while it is generally presumed that the other side of the issue represents the majority position” (p. 579). But this definition is still too limiting. Instead, we advocate for the use of Korte’s definition of “relative” pluralistic ignorance, which is characterized by a situation where “there is significant over- or under-estimation of the extent or strength of agreement with some position” (p. 579). True attitudes and perceived attitudes do not have to contradict one another for the misperception to nonetheless influence those who misperceive the majority.

Miller and McFarland (1987; see also Prentice & Miller, 1996) explicitly reserve the term pluralistic ignorance for “the phenomenon wherein people interpret the similar behavior of the self and others differently” (p. 295). By this definition, pluralistic ignorance must arise from people’s direct exposure to the actions of others in situations where others are misrepresenting their true cognitions (or where their behavior could just be interpreted in that way). Individuals first must have been able to, or must currently be able to, observe others’ behavior (e.g., Halbesleben, 2009). For example, in the kinds of emergency situations featured in the bystander intervention literature (e.g., Darley & Latane, 1968), people might mask their confusion despite genuine concerns that others might need assistance. Individuals in these situations are aware of how their self-presentational concerns constrain their own behavior but underestimate the extent to which others’ behavior is driven by similar considerations (including fear of embarrassment; Miller & McFarland, 1987).

Situating the source of pluralistic ignorance in face-to-face interactions gives rise to many interesting research questions, such as the role of fear of embarrassment in social behavior, along with people’s intuitions about the role of embarrassment as a cause of others’ behavior (Miller & McFarland, 1987; Miller & Prentice, 1994; Sabini et al., 1999). In practice, however, pluralistic ignorance is regularly invoked in the literature whenever group members mistakenly believe that others’ cognitions/behaviors differ systematically from their own, regardless of the source. Inaccurate perceptions might not necessarily derive from a process of making attributions for others’ behavior, but simply from social-category knowledge (Higgins, 1981). Thus, college students might overestimate the extent to which others espouse political correctness (Van Boven, 2000) simply because they have been exposed to that student stereotype. People can also mistakenly infer a group norm simply due to being very familiar with an opinion, even when that opinion is expressed by a minority of group members (Weaver et al., 2007). Regardless, the implications of pluralistic ignorance would be predicted to be the same, however it developed.⁴

In sum, researchers have provided inconsistent definitions of pluralistic ignorance, and from our standpoint many of these variations are too restrictive to encompass the ubiquity of the phenomenon. We define pluralistic ignorance as a group-level phenomenon, wherein individuals belonging to a group mistakenly believe that others’ cognitions (attitudes, beliefs, feelings) and/or behaviors differ systematically from their own (i.e., a directional misperception), regardless of how the misperception arises.

A Brief Note on the False Consensus Effect

Pluralistic ignorance involves people believing that differences between them and other group members are greater than is actually the case. At first blush, then, it might seem to stand in contrast to another well-known social-psychological phenomenon: the false consensus effect (Marks & Miller, 1987; Ross et al., 1977), the tendency for people to exaggerate the extent to which others share their attitudes. False consensus, however, is assessed by means of the correlation between people’s own cognitions/behaviors and what they assume are others’ cognitions/behaviors. That correlation can be quite high—indeed, can even approach unity—even for groups in which pluralistic ignorance clearly exists.⁵ As summarized by Kitts (2003), false consensus is a “relative egocentric bias” at the level of the individual, whereas “pluralistic ignorance represents an absolute error for the entire group” (p. 223). Thus, false consensus (or “social projection”—Krueger, 1998) and pluralistic ignorance can comfortably co-exist (Halbesleben et al., 2004; Monin & Norton, 2003; Sabini et al., 1999).

Prototypical Examples of Pluralistic Ignorance

When introducing pluralistic ignorance—frequently in the context of describing bystander nonintervention in emergency situations (Darley & Latane, 1968)—researchers and instructors often provide two prototypical examples: the classroom and alcohol examples. We find this useful, and as such we briefly describe both. These examples display misperceptions in specific situations (e.g., the classroom example) and in more general perceptions of others (e.g., the alcohol example). They also demonstrate the implications of pluralistic ignorance.

The classroom example requires individuals to imagine a classroom setting in which a professor finishes lecturing on a difficult topic, and then asks the class if there are questions. No one raises their hand, which could indicate to each student a lack of confusion among others. In reality, each student is confused, but the misperception of others’ confusion inhibits them from raising their hand. After all, no one wants to appear to be less intelligent than their classmates. This behavioral inhibition further perpetuates pluralistic ignorance.

The alcohol example requires individuals to imagine a college campus where each student is not comfortable excessively drinking alcohol; however, because individuals see other students drinking large quantities of alcohol, each student misperceives others as being very comfortable with excessive consumption. This misperception inhibits expressions of discomfort. Instead, students conform to the drinking practices, and as a consequence, come to embrace the pro-drinking culture. This behavioral facilitation further contributes to pluralistic ignorance.

The classroom example described has not been empirically assessed, whereas the alcohol example has been widely studied (e.g., Miller & Morrison, 2009; Prentice & Miller, 1993; Rinker et al., 2017; Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). These examples are simple to comprehend, provide clear cases of pluralistic ignorance, and have easily imaginable implications. However, the range of application of pluralistic ignorance expands beyond these contexts, as revealed by the many topics that have benefited from an analysis in terms of the phenomenon (discussed below).

Literature Reviewed

To conduct this scoping review, we searched “pluralistic ignorance” in PsycInfo and PsycArticles, which returned 148 records.⁶ The databases designated 115 as journal articles, 22 as theses/dissertations, 10 as book sections, and one as a book. We first determined which of the 115 journal articles were eligible to be included in our review—that is, which articles were peer-reviewed, empirically assessed pluralistic ignorance, and were available in English. In total, 38 were ineligible. Of these, 15 were strictly review pieces or commentaries (e.g., Halbesleben & Buckley, 2004; Halbesleben et al., 2007), eight were not available in English,⁷ two were lesson plans, two were book reviews, and nine did not directly (and/or appropriately) measure pluralistic ignorance^8,9 (see Figure 1 for a PRISMA flow diagram.)

Figure 1.

PRISMA flow diagram of literature reviewed.

We retained 77 articles. Within the articles were a total of 138 independent studies (not including pretests or manipulation checks with insufficient details). Of the 138 studies, 116 involved direct measurement of and results pertaining to pluralistic ignorance, an experiment to manipulate pluralistic ignorance, and/or a pluralistic ignorance-based intervention; two used strictly qualitative methods, and the remainder used quantitative methods or a combination of methods. The remaining 22 studies described in those papers did not measure and/or directly manipulate pluralistic ignorance and were not included in our review.

Of the 77 articles, 61 (79%) first authors were affiliated with U.S. institutions. The remaining first authors were affiliated with Canada (n = 5), Japan (n = 3), Belgium (n = 2), the United Kingdom (n = 2), Australia (n = 1), China (n = 1), Lebanon (n = 1), and Singapore (n = 1). Samples were also largely U.S.-based. Of the 116 studies, 90 (78%) only sampled participants located in the United States. We also observed a tendency to sample college students, with 72 studies (62%) reporting the use of samples fully consisting of students.

Pluralistic Ignorance Topics Assessed

In this section, we highlight the research topics assessed, note trends in topic assessment, and emphasize a potentially significant distinction between different instances of pluralistic ignorance. We categorized the 77 articles based on the prominent and/or unique topic of interest (see Table 1 for topic categorization and Table 2 for example findings from selected articles). Within the 116 studies, 79 (68%) assessed pluralistic ignorance of a cognition, 22 (19%) assessed pluralistic ignorance of a behavior, and 15 (13%) assessed pluralistic ignorance of a cognition and behavior. The three most prominent topics included alcohol use, sexual and dating norms, and drug use. Nonetheless, researchers have assessed a variety of topics using this framework, which highlights the generalizability of pluralistic ignorance and the utility of assessing pluralistic ignorance across subfields and specialties. More critically, however, the variety indicates that researchers are primarily interested in the application of pluralistic ignorance to specific topics (19 topic categories were represented by only one or two articles) as opposed to systematically investigating the phenomenon itself.

Table 1.

Pluralistic ignorance article categorization by topics assessed (N = 77).

Topic	Article(s)
Alcohol use (n = 9)	Bourgeois and Bowen (2001) Hines et al. (2002) ^a Miller and Morrison (2009) Prentice and Miller (1993) Rinker et al. (2017) Schroeder and Prentice (1998) Segrist et al. (2007) Suls and Green (2003) Wild (2002)
Body image/perceptions of physical attractiveness (n = 3)	Flave-Novak and Coleman (2018) Jones et al. (2014) Park et al. (2007) ^a
Bullying (n = 2)	Sandstrom and Bartini (2010) Sandstrom et al. (2013)
Conflict avoidance (n = 2)	Saito and Ohbuchi (2007) Saito and Ohbuchi (2014)
Consumer-related behavior (n = 1)	Miller and Nelson (2002) ^a
Disease prevention (n = 1)	Tam et al. (2004)
Divorce and marriage (n = 2)	Stalder (2012) Perryman et al. (2018) ^a
Drug use (n = 6)	Barman-Adhikari et al. (2017) Brener et al. (2015) Henry et al. (2011) Hines et al. (2002) ^a Jawad et al. (2015) Smith-Simone et al. (2008)
Education (n = 3)	Buzinski et al. (2018) Vitagliano and Licata (1987) Willower and Packard (1972)
Environmental concerns (n = 4)	Geiger and Swim (2016) Major (1997) Monin and Norton (2003) Taylor (1982)
Ethics (n = 1)	Halbesleben et al. (2004)
Gender bias (n = 2)	Do et al. (2013) Van Grootel et al. (2018)
Family-friendly benefits (n = 2)	Mandeville et al. (2016) Miyajima and Yamaguchi (2017)
Justice system (n = 3)	Berman (1976) Cook and Lane (2014) Grekul (1999)
Kindness (n = 1)	Jung et al. (2014)
Lesbian, gay, and bisexual stigma (n = 2)	Bowen and Bourgeois (2001) Perryman et al. (2018) ^a
Media influence (n = 2)	Hines et al. (2002) ^a Park et al. (2007) ^a
Mental health service use (n = 1)	Karaffa and Koch (2016)
Perceptions of personal problems (n = 1)	O’Gorman (1980)
Politics (n = 2)	de Larios and Lang (2014) ^a Miller and Nelson (2002) ^a
Race-related attitudes (n = 5)	Betz et al. (2013) Breed and Ktsanes (1961) O’Gorman (1975) Shelton and Richeson (2005) Van Boven (2000)
Radicalism (n = 2)	Korte (1972) Schanck (1934)
Receptiveness to feedback (n = 1)	Isenberg (1980)
Religion and spirituality (n = 3)	de Larios and Lang (2014) ^a Grant et al. (2009) Strosser et al. (2016)
Revenge (n = 1)	Boon and Yoshimura (2014)
Risk-taking (n = 1)	Pruitt and Cosentino (1975)
Sexual and dating norms (n = 10)w	Boon et al. (2014) Chia and Lee (2008) Cohen and Shotland (1996) Hertzog and Rowley (2014) ^a Hines et al. (2002) ^a Kenyon et al. (2015) Lambert et al. (2003) Reiber and Garcia (2010) Vorauer and Ratner (1996) Wesche et al. (2016)
Sexual violence (n = 4)	Dardis et al. (2016) Flezzani and Benshoff (2003) Halbesleben (2009) Hertzog and Rowley (2014) ^a
Shyness and embarrassment (n = 3)	Harris and Wilshire (1988) Miller and McFarland (1987) Sabini et al. (1999)
Vegetarianism (n = 1)	Kitts (2003)
Work-related attitudes (n = 4)	Munsch et al. (2014) Munsch et al. (2018) Westphal and Bednar (2005) Zhu and Westphal (2011)

Note. Publications are categorized by primary and/or unique topic of study. “Radicalism” encompasses studies that assessed pluralistic ignorance of various topics/issues deemed to be associated with radical changes in society at the time of the study, such as drug use, sexual behavior, religion, educational reform, and gambling.

Publications appear in more than one topic category.

Table 2.

Overview of pluralistic ignorance findings from selected articles.

Topic	Authors and Sample^a	Pluralistic Ignorance Finding	Example Implication
Alcohol use	Segrist et al. (2007): 209 male high school students; M age = 15.60 years	Participants mistakenly believed other high school students drank more (both in frequency and quantity).	Facilitate drinking
Drug use	Brener et al. (2015): 57 medical staff (one third male); M age = 39 years	Participants mistakenly believed other health workers were less supportive of specific support services for patients who inject drugs.	Inhibit support for services
Education	Buzinski et al. (2018; Study 1): 99 undergraduates	Participants mistakenly believed other students spent less time studying for their examination.	Inhibit studying
Family-friendly benefits	Miyajima and Yamaguchi (2017; Study 1): 299 male Japanese workers; M age = 39.2 years; age range = 20 to 49 years	Participants mistakenly believed other male employees harbored more negative attitudes toward paternity leave.	Inhibit taking paternity leave
Sexual and dating norms	Boon et al. (2014; Study 1): 98 female and 78 male undergraduates; M age = 20.8 years; age range = 17 to 30 years	Participants mistakenly believed other students were more accepting of and engaged in more infidelity.	Facilitate infidelity
Sexual and dating norms	Lambert et al. (2003): 136 female and 128 male undergraduates	Participants mistakenly believed other students were more comfortable hooking up.	Facilitate hooking up
Work- related attitudes	Munsch et al. (2014; Study 1): 199 female and 210 male Amazon Mechanical Turk workers; M age = 32.5 years	Participants mistakenly believed other workers harbored more negative attitudes toward flexwork (i.e., flexible workplace conditions).	Inhibit flexwork

Note. M = Mean. Example Implication = Example expected or observed implication of misperception.

Sample demographics (i.e., gender distribution, mean age, and age range) are reported where available.

Trends in Topics Assessed and Prominent Examples

The majority of research on pluralistic ignorance applies the phenomenon to contexts considered politically driven “hot” topics and/or issues posing public health concerns (e.g., substance use, risky sexual behavior; see Table 1). The misperception is often maladaptive, where individuals, if they were to conform to the misperceived majority, would be harming themselves and/or others (see Table 2). For example, in Karaffa and Koch’s (2016) assessment of pluralistic ignorance of police officers’ willingness to use mental health services, the officers misperceived other officers as being less willing to use services. If officers were to conform and not utilize services when needed, that could be detrimental to their mental health. Because pluralistic ignorance topics tend to assess maladaptive misperceptions, the associated implications are often of high importance and call for norm-based interventions (see Miller & Prentice, 2016).

Because pluralistic ignorance topics tend to be “hot” topics, it is possible that pluralistic ignorance is time-sensitive, with attitudes quickly evolving during points of cultural transition. But some forms of pluralistic ignorance seem to be stubbornly persistent. We highlight two such lines of research: pluralistic ignorance of alcohol use and of sexual attitudes and behavior.

Alcohol use

Pluralistic ignorance of alcohol use was consistently and extensively analyzed from 1993 (Prentice & Miller, 1993) to 2017 (Rinker et al., 2017), likely because of its pressing health implications among adolescents and young adults. Researchers found that individuals misperceive others as being more comfortable drinking alcohol, and in assessments of implications, found that (at least some) individuals conform to this misperceived majority (Prentice & Miller, 1993; Rinker et al., 2017; Segrist et al., 2007). Researchers also implemented interventions to reduce alcohol use and found that teaching individuals about pluralistic ignorance could reduce conformity (i.e., people drank less alcohol; Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). The trajectory of this research is ideal, as it established the prevalence of pluralistic ignorance, measured implications, and delved into applied research through the creation of a pluralistic ignorance-based intervention (for another representation of this research trajectory, see Buzinski et al., 2018).

Sexual attitudes and behavior

Researchers have extensively assessed pluralistic ignorance of sexual behavior and related attitudes; however, we should note that the type of sexual attitude and behavior assessed varies. Research topics range from pluralistic ignorance of hooking up (Lambert et al., 2003) and cheating/concurrency (Boon et al., 2014; Kenyon et al., 2015) to pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward sexual violence (Dardis et al., 2016). Researchers have displayed continued interest in studying this topic from a pluralistic ignorance perspective, with publications dating from 1972 (Korte, 1972) to 2016 (Dardis et al., 2016; Wesche et al., 2016). For example, Reiber and Garcia (2010) determined that students mistakenly overestimated their same-sex peers’ comfort engaging in sexual behaviors. Individuals might conform to this misperceived majority by engaging in sexual activity outside their sexual comfort zone.

Further Categorizing Pluralistic Ignorance

There are countless ways to further distinguish between instances of pluralistic ignorance (e.g., by their causes, their implications, the social groups impacted). Thus far, however, the only categorization we uncovered was one characterizing pluralistic ignorance as displaying (or not displaying) a conservative lag (Miller & Prentice, 1994). Researchers who explicitly characterize their findings based on this criterion often note the existence of a conservative lag, where group members misperceive others as continuing to harbor traditional, long-standing attitudes (cf. Korte, 1972). This characterization is understandable, as notable investigations have taken place during points of politically based attitudinal transition (e.g., research assessing pluralistic ignorance of race-related attitudes during and following the Civil Rights Movement in the United States; Breed & Ktsanes, 1961; O’Gorman, 1975). However, there are also instances where pluralistic ignorance cannot be obviously categorized as showing (or not showing) a conservative lag (e.g., pluralistic ignorance of studying behavior). As such, we propose another method of categorization that we believe would be more empirically useful and could guide future research programs. We advocate for categorization based on whether the misperception facilitates or inhibits attitudinal and behavioral expression—that is, the individual-level “end result” of the misperception.

To the extent that pluralistic ignorance affects behavior, it does so by inhibiting people from expressing their true attitudes or behaving consistently with them—what Kuran (1995) refers to as “preference falsification.” But just as attitudes can make themselves felt via both the facilitation and the inhibition of behavior, the consequences of hiding, denying, or falsifying one’s attitude can lead to actively engaging in attitude-inconsistent behavior or to the suppression of attitude-consistent behavior. As a result, pluralistic ignorance implications can generally be categorized as either facilitating or inhibiting attitudinal and/or behavioral expression. In other words, a misperception can encourage (facilitate) individuals to act in line with the misperceived majority and/or discourage (inhibit) individuals from acting in line with their personal opinions, so as not to deviate from the misperceived majority (for examples, see Table 2). This classification could stimulate more research assessing the individual-level implications of pluralistic ignorance, and it leads to a number of questions deriving from the classification: Why do some misperceptions facilitate, while others inhibit, behavior? Does one type of implication lead to conformity that is more resistant to change? How do these implications relate to the causes of pluralistic ignorance?¹⁰

Of the 39 studies that assessed pluralistic ignorance-related implications, 18 (46%) observed facilitating effects, 15 (38%) observed inhibiting effects, three (8%) observed facilitating and inhibiting effects, and three (8%) observed null effects.¹¹ To emphasize the usefulness of this categorization, we elaborate on each below.

Pluralistic ignorance as a facilitator

Pluralistic ignorance that facilitates attitudinal and/or behavioral expression results in individuals acting in ways with which they do not agree. A prominent example of pluralistic ignorance facilitating behavior is in the context of alcohol use on college campuses. If students misperceive others as being more comfortable drinking alcohol, this misperception might encourage students to drink more alcohol. In fact, in an intervention study, those who learned about pluralistic ignorance of alcohol attitudes—thus, learning about the misperception—drank less alcohol 4 to 6 months later compared with those in the control condition (Schroeder & Prentice, 1998). By learning about the cognitive bias, individuals in the experimental condition were able to avoid the urge to conform to the misperceived majority (see also research by Dardis et al., 2016; O’Gorman, 1975; Zhu & Westphal, 2011).

Pluralistic ignorance that facilitates behavior might lead individuals to experience negative consequences, and the decisions that led to that behavior might later be second-guessed. When this happens, the resulting feelings of regret will be more intense than the regret that follows from pluralistic ignorance-induced inaction—at least in the short term (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Furthermore, regret about actions taken will elicit relatively “hot” emotions such as anger, embarrassment, and disgust (Gilovich et al., 1998). Moreover, it is well-established that people not only judge others more harshly for negative outcomes resulting from commission of an action than for negative outcomes resulting from inaction (Cushman et al., 2006; Spranca et al., 1991), but also judge themselves more harshly (DeScioli et al., 2011). To the extent that self-recrimination and cognitive dissonance results, people might be especially driven to justify overt, attitude-inconsistent behaviors facilitated by pluralistic ignorance (e.g., participating in bullying, binge drinking), which could lead to increasing commitment to that course of action (Cooper, 2007). Thus, behaviors facilitated as a result of pluralistic ignorance have the potential not only to be rationalized but also to intensify.

Pluralistic ignorance as an inhibitor

There are many instances in which pluralistic ignorance is associated with inhibition of attitudinal and behavioral expression, thus promoting passivity. The classroom example demonstrates this inhibition, where pluralistic ignorance of classmate confusion (i.e., underestimating confusion among others) inhibits students from asking questions when they otherwise would. In an empirically tested example, a study on pluralistic ignorance of bullying revealed overestimating the extent to which others are comfortable and support bullying to be associated with lower likelihood of intervening in a bullying situation (Sandstrom & Bartini, 2010; Sandstrom et al., 2013; see also research by Geiger & Swim, 2016; Halbesleben, 2009; Mandeville et al., 2016).

As previously noted, in the short term, the regret people feel as a consequence of their inaction will be less intense than the regret triggered by actions. But inaction regret has been found to increase with the passage of time (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). When people retroactively bemoan how pluralistic ignorance inhibited them from engaging in behavior that would have been more in line with their attitudes, feelings of sadness and despair are likely to be experienced (Gilovich et al., 1998). As also previously discussed, people are likely to judge themselves less harshly for negative outcomes resulting from inaction, or behavioral omission, than for negative outcomes resulting from commission of an action. As a result, behavior inhibited by pluralistic ignorance is less likely than facilitated behavior to trigger self-reflection. Thus, people may passively allow behaviors inhibited as a result of pluralistic ignorance (e.g., not challenging sexist or racist remarks) to persist without feeling the need to rethink them.

Topics Assessed: A Conclusion

In sum, the diversity of pluralistic ignorance topics assessed highlight the framework’s flexibility, generalizability, and utility. Researchers have applied pluralistic ignorance to numerous “hot” topics and issues posing public health concerns, and they assess pluralistic ignorance in these contexts because they care about the implications associated with misperceptions. We argue that those implications vary on the basis of whether pluralistic ignorance facilitates or inhibits attitudinal and behavioral expression.

While we conclude that topic diversity is an overall strength for pluralistic ignorance research, the benefits of measurement diversity in this situation are less clear. Confidence in a scientific conclusion is increased when findings are consistent across methods, and measurement variation provides researchers with the freedom to make informed decisions about research designs. Alternatively, it is possible for different methods to not converge and, in some cases, measure different underlying constructs. Problematic diversity in measurement methods could thus complicate comparing and contrasting pluralistic ignorance findings and conducting certain systematic reviews, such as meta-analyses, and could serve as a barrier that researchers must overcome in designing their own assessments of pluralistic ignorance, including the often important assessments of its implications. In the following sections, we fill a gap in the literature by highlighting variation in measures of pluralistic ignorance, methods used in pluralistic ignorance research, and the individual-level scores researchers use to assess the implications of pluralistic ignorance. We provide recommendations and encourage researchers to make informed decisions when developing studies.

Measuring Pluralistic Ignorance

Based on our review, the three prominent methods of measuring pluralistic ignorance include the utilization of discrete, comparative, and proportional questioning (see Tables 3 and 4 for selected examples of each question type from the literature on substance use and sexual cognitions/behavior, respectively). Discrete questions involve participants responding to virtually identical questions for their own cognitions/behaviors and their perceptions of others’ cognitions/behaviors. Comparative questions involve participants reporting their own cognitions/behaviors and using those responses as a point of reference for their perceptions of others. Proportional questions can involve any one of a number of reports of one’s own cognitions/behaviors, but include participants reporting their perceptions of the percentage or proportion of other people who hold a belief, endorse an attitude, or engage in a behavior.

Table 3.

Selected discrete, comparative, and proportional questioning in literature on pluralistic ignorance of substance use.

Question Type	Citation	Self		Perceptions of Others
Question Type	Citation	Question	Response Options	Question	Response Options
Discrete	Bourgeois and Bowen (2001)	How do you feel about 18 to 20 year old college students drinking alcohol? (p. 435)	7-point Likert-type: extremely negative to extremely positive	Indicated how much they thought the typical resident in their building would feel about 18- to 20-year-old college students drinking alcohol. (p. 435)	7-point Likert-type: extremely negative to extremely positive
Comparative	Prentice and Miller (1993)	How do you feel about the university’s new policy banning kegs on campus? (p. 250)	11-point Likert-type: totally opposed to totally in favor	Compared to you, how does the average Princeton undergraduate feel about the university’s policy banning kegs on campus? (p. 250)	5-point Likert-type: much more negative to much more positive
Proportional	Smith-Simone et al. (2008)	Reported smoking of cigarettes, cigars, and water pipes. (p. 1621)	Categorical: never, ever, current	What percentage (0% to 100%) of Johns Hopkins University freshmen would you say have tried or used this product (insert cigarette, cigar or waterpipe) in the past 30 days (even 1 or 2 times)? (p. 1620)	Answered between 0 and 100

Note. Questions and response options in italics are quoted from the article; those not in italics were described in the article.

Table 4.

Selected discrete, comparative, and proportional questioning in literature on pluralistic ignorance of sexual attitudes and behavior.

Question Type	Citation	Self		Perceptions of Others
Question Type	Citation	Question	Response Options	Question	Response Options
Discrete	Dardis et al. (2016)	When girls go to parties wearing slutty clothes, they are asking for trouble. (p. 165)	5-point Likert: strongly disagree to strongly agree	Indicated how they thought the average male at their university would respond (p. 166)	5-point Likert: strongly disagree to strongly agree
Comparative	Halbesleben (2009)	How comfortable are you with this joke? (p. 212)	5-point Likert-type: not at all comfortable to extremely comfortable	Compared with you, how comfortable are the others in this session with this joke? (p. 212)	5-point Likert-type: Much less comfortable to much more comfortable
Proportional	Chia and Lee (2008)	Indicated comfort with having sexual intercourse at four dating stages (p. 61)	6-point Likert-type: very uncomfortable to very comfortable	Estimated the percentage of students who feel comfortable having sexual intercourse at four dating stages (p. 61)	Answered between 0 and 100

Note. Questions and response options in italics are quoted from the article; those not in italics were described in the article.

Discrete Questioning

Discrete questions (used in n = 92 studies) provide researchers with flexibility in determining response options and allow for clear conclusions regarding pluralistic ignorance using within-subject designs. Many researchers rely on Likert-type or quantitative response options (e.g., bipolar attitude scales), although others have created more unique methods of measurement. For example, Jones et al. (2014) assessed pluralistic ignorance of attractiveness standards by having participants select images of individuals (scaled in terms of cosmetics use) on the basis of their own perceptions of attractiveness and their perceptions of what others view as attractive. Using discrete questioning, researchers can make direct comparisons between individuals and their perceptions of others. Furthermore, researchers using discrete questioning can clearly display results by highlighting mean differences in self- and other-scores (for an example of concise data presentation, see Hertzog & Rowley, 2014).

A few studies used discrete questioning with a between-subject design, where participants either reported personal cognitions/behaviors or perceptions of others’ cognitions/behaviors (e.g., Munsch et al., 2014; Vorauer & Ratner, 1996). We acknowledge the primary benefit of this approach—by reducing the extent to which participants are prompted to compare themselves (usually more positively) with others, the researchers reduce the possibility that estimates of others are contaminated by social desirability bias (Kypri & Maclennan, 2011; Melson et al., 2011; Sandstrom & Bartini, 2010).¹² While researchers can still reach conclusions about the prevalence of pluralistic ignorance by assessing the group-level discrepancy between self- and other-responses, they should do so with full awareness of the limitations of this approach—their ability to assess the individual-level implications of pluralistic ignorance will be constrained, as making individual-level predictions about such implications typically involves within-participant comparisons (see discussion below).

Overall, discrete questioning is the most flexible method to implement, produces the most comprehensible and comprehensive results with few limitations, can be implemented using both between- and within-subject designs, and can be used to predict implications of pluralistic ignorance. Of the methods reviewed, we recommend using discrete questioning with a within-subject design, where the order of the self- and other-questions is counterbalanced (to test for social desirability effects).

Comparative and Proportional Questioning

Although we recommend the use of discrete questioning, a directional misperception can still be detected using comparative questioning (used in n = 7 studies) and proportional questioning (used in n = 22 studies), and we note that both allow researchers to draw unique conclusions not readily available through the use of discrete questioning. For example, comparative questions more directly measure an individual’s subjective feeling of being different from others—that is, comparative questioning measures perceptions of others relative to oneself. Two people who report identical personal cognitions/behaviors and perceptions of others’ cognitions/behaviors on a discrete measure might have dissimilar subjective feelings of being different. To supplement this loss of information, comparative measures could reveal how much pressure people feel to conform to the misperceived majority.

Proportional questions allow for the assessment of the directional misperception without direct comparison of the self to others, because the self- and other-questions will be qualitatively different (in question wording and response scales), which may reduce social desirability concerns. As opposed to calculating the directional misperception through a comparison of self- and other-scores, proportional questions compare the actual proportions of the sample to the proportions estimated by participants. Proportional questions yield information regarding within-participant illusions of universality, as opposed to group-level illusions of universality, where researchers can gauge the extent to which individuals view the majority of others as harboring a cognition or taking part in a behavior.

Comparative and proportional questioning can thus provide unique information. Nonetheless, if researchers are interested in assessing subjective experiences of feeling “different” than most others and/or the extent of a within-person illusion of universality, we recommend that they use comparative/proportional questioning in addition to discrete questioning. This is not common in the literature—in our review, only one study incorporated a combination of discrete and comparative/proportional measures in the assessment of a single construct as we have suggested here (Munsch et al., 2018).

Too much variation in measurements of pluralistic ignorance can create difficulty in comparing and contrasting results. It is especially unclear when researchers change their measurements across studies within one manuscript. Moving forward, we recommend the consistent use of discrete questioning in examinations of pluralistic ignorance (for the reasons stated above), and, if desired, for researchers to combine discrete questioning with comparative and/or proportional questioning.

A Brief Note on “Others”

As indicated above, assessing pluralistic ignorance requires one to measure people’s estimates of the cognitions/behaviors of the other members of a group to which they belong. Who exactly these “other” people are varies; examples from the literature include “fellow university undergraduates,” “the American public,” “your peers,” “your same-gender peers,” “other people in your community,” “the average student at your university,” and “ the average businessperson.” Needless to say, any group could potentially be defined for the purpose (e.g., “people who wear black socks”). However, given that researchers’ interest in pluralistic ignorance is almost always inseparable from their interest in its implications, the perceived norms that research participants are asked to estimate will ideally be those of a meaningful reference group with respect to the ultimate behavior of interest.

Researchers might also consider the specificity and abstractness of the reference group. For example, Wild (2002) manipulated the abstractness of the reference group by assessing perceptions of same-gender friends, same-gender coworkers, and the average Ontario man or woman (matched on participant gender). Wild then compared pluralistic ignorance across reference groups. We encourage researchers to similarly investigate multiple reference groups if the “ideal” one is not clear for the investigation.

Research Design Variation in Measuring Pluralistic Ignorance Implications

Although the definition of pluralistic ignorance does not include any assumptions about its implications, researchers regularly consider them. Indeed, and as we have previously noted, it is an interest in such implications that often motivates the identification of pluralistic ignorance in the first place. However, researchers differ in how they make this connection. Whereas some directly measure implications, others make reasonable inferences about what they would be (e.g., Karaffa & Koch, 2016). For those who do measure implications, the process by which they do so varies. In this section, we place emphasis on research design variation in measuring the possible consequences of pluralistic ignorance so as to provide direction for future research on implication assessment. We hasten to add, though, that aside from experimental studies that manipulate perceptions of others’ attitudes and behaviors, none of the studies can establish that their findings would not replicate in the context of a group that was not characterized by pluralistic ignorance. We again remind the reader that pluralistic ignorance is a group-level phenomenon.

As with most research in psychology, researchers assessing pluralistic ignorance use cross-sectional, experimental, and longitudinal (i.e., delayed measurement) methods. Although cross-sectional and experimental designs have benefits, including reduced participant burden, controlled environments, and, in experimental studies, the ability to draw causal conclusions, they also have limitations, including generalizability issues and the reduced ability to draw conclusions regarding long-term implications. To simply establish the existence of pluralistic ignorance at a certain point in time, a cross-sectional study will suffice. However, the strongest conclusions about pluralistic ignorance implications come from both longitudinal and experimental designs, where researchers can observe changes in line with the misperceived majority. As such, we recommend that researchers supplement their cross-sectional studies with longitudinal and/or experimental studies as to build the repository of research necessary to fully understand how pluralistic ignorance affects behavior. Next we review examples of research assessing pluralistic ignorance implications using cross-sectional, experimental, and longitudinal designs.

Cross-Sectional Designs and Experimental Designs

Of the 39 studies that assessed implications, we categorized 23 (59%) as cross-sectional and eight (20.5%) as one-session experimental. In cross-sectional and one-session experimental designs, outcome measures usually involve anticipated behavior (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1993), in-the-moment decisions (e.g., Jung et al., 2014), and/or retrospective accounts of behavior (e.g., Sandstrom & Bartini, 2010; Sandstrom et al., 2013).

Cross-sectional design examples

As an example of a cross-sectional design, Prentice and Miller (1993) assessed pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward an alcohol use ban and used responses to two anticipatory questions as their outcome variables (e.g., “how many signatures in protest of the ban would you be willing to go out and collect?,” p. 250). Another example comes from Jawad et al.’s (2015) research on pluralistic ignorance of waterpipe smoking among youth, where the researchers predicted previous waterpipe reported by participants use as a function of misperceptions of others’ waterpipe use. As a third example, Sandstrom et al. (2013) predicted self-reported behavioral responses to bullying as a function of overestimation (vs. underestimation) of others’ acceptance of bullying.

Experimental design examples

As an example of an experimental design, Jung et al. (2014) assessed pluralistic ignorance of kindness, specifically pay-it-forward behavior, and manipulated pluralistic ignorance by telling (or not telling) individuals how much others paid in the pay-it-forward chain. Those without the information paid more in the pay-it-forward chain because they mistakenly assumed others were more generous. Another example comes from Miller and Morrison’s (2009) work on pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward alcohol use on college campuses. Miller and Morrison manipulated information about others’ attitudes as being either pro- or anti-alcohol and then measured willingness to express personal opinions regarding alcohol use. When individuals with pro-alcohol attitudes received corrective information indicating that others’ attitudes were not as positive as they perceived, they became less willing to express their pro-alcohol attitudes.

Longitudinal Designs and Examples

We categorized eight (20.5%) studies as longitudinal. Longitudinal designs allow researchers to draw conclusions about processes across time (e.g., long-term conformity to the misperceived majority) and establish temporal precedence (e.g., showing that misperceptions at Time 1 predict behavior at Time 2); however, participant attrition is a concern, and there are constraints on drawing causal conclusions from correlational longitudinal designs. As an example of a longitudinal design, Rinker et al. (2017) assessed pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward alcohol use over a 6-month period. In addition to measuring attitudes, the researchers assessed alcohol intake per week and negative alcohol-related consequences 3 and 6 months after baseline. Another example comes from Mandeville et al.’s (2016) work on pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward using family-friendly benefits, where they assessed personal and perceptions of others’ preferences toward using benefits and actual benefit utilization at two time points (1 year apart).

Variation in Using Pluralistic Ignorance-Related Individual-Level Scores as Predictors

Researchers wanting to predict the implications of the pattern of self- and other-related beliefs underlying pluralistic ignorance must also determine how they will use their measures to do so. A common approach is to create specific “individual-level scores” based on the measures and use these scores as predictors.¹³ We again specify, however, that pluralistic ignorance is a group-level phenomenon and that what these analyses reveal are the correlates (or in some cases, consequences) of the individual-level scores that collectively contribute to pluralistic ignorance in a group. These same correlates or consequences could still be observed in groups not characterized by pluralistic ignorance. Notably, researchers also assess factors that predict and moderate these individual-level scores (see discussion below), but here we focus on their use for predicting implications. Importantly, the calculation of an individual-level score will vary based on the method of measuring pluralistic ignorance, so researchers should think through all of these aspects when designing their studies (even if implication assessments are exploratory).

When researchers use proportional and/or comparative questioning to measure pluralistic ignorance, they might rely on the other-score as the primary predictor (e.g., Halbesleben, 2009). When researchers use discrete questioning, they might also rely on the other-score (e.g., Flezzani & Benshoff, 2003), or they might rely on other- and self-scores as simultaneous predictors or controls, where appropriate (e.g., Brener et al., 2015). Sometimes, other scores are directly reported by participants, whereas other times they are experimentally manipulated (e.g., Geiger & Swim, 2016). Of the 39 studies that assessed implications, 18 (46%) used other-scores or personal- and other-scores in their analyses/reported results (with no interactions between the two).

Of the 39 studies, 10 (26%) featured analyses including an interaction between self- and other-scores (e.g., Zhu & Westphal, 2011). When using discrete questioning, this analysis accounts for the main effects of self- and other-scores and the interaction between them (effectively an assessment of the effects of the self-other discrepancy; see discussion below). Some researchers took what is arguably an even more sophisticated statistical approach—for example, Munsch et al. (2018) used a combination of polynomial regression and response surface analysis, which included self-scores and their squares, other-scores and their squares, and the interaction between self- and other-scores in the model (see also Mandeville et al., 2016). In combination with the use of discrete questioning to measure pluralistic ignorance, we recommend a statistical approach that includes self- and other-scores and their interaction in assessments of pluralistic ignorance implications—that is, the use of a model that partials out the variance accounted for by the main effects of self- and other-scores, allowing for a direct assessment of the unique variance explained by their interaction.

Calculating New Variables

However, we would be remiss to not acknowledge that researchers might choose to calculate new variables using the self- and other-scores obtained through discrete questioning, taking one of two different approaches. In one approach, researchers directly calculate a self-other discrepancy and use it as a primary predictor in analyses—that is, a difference score between personal and perceptions of others’ cognitions/behaviors (e.g., Flave-Novak & Coleman, 2018; Sandstrom & Bartini, 2010). Six studies (15%) included self-other discrepancy scores in their models. Note, however, that a model that uses a self-other discrepancy score as the sole predictor does not account for the main effects of self- and other-scores, and in turn the conclusions reached could differ from those deriving from the model we previously suggested, where the self- and other-score interact to predict the outcome.

In another approach, researchers calculate and use an accuracy score—that is, a difference score between each person’s perception of others’ cognitions/behaviors and the sample mean score for personal cognitions/behaviors (e.g., Buzinski et al., 2018; Sandstrom et al., 2013). Seven studies (18%) included accuracy scores in their models. The accuracy score is intuitively meaningful, representing how accurate or inaccurate a person’s beliefs are about a particular tendency in the group. Note, however, that because the same quantity is subtracted from each person’s other-estimate, what results is a linear transformation of that score. Thus, the correlation between the accuracy score and any outcome will be identical to the correlation between the untransformed estimate and those same outcomes. This feature of the accuracy score may not be apparent to readers of the articles that report them. We hasten to add, though, that accuracy scores can be quite meaningful and useful at the group level of analysis. A comparison of the mean accuracy scores of two or more groups, or subgroups of a population, will reveal the relative extent to which pluralistic ignorance exists in those groups.

Unfortunately, minimal discussion exists in the literature on how self-other discrepancy scores and accuracy scores are qualitatively different (see also Mandeville et al., 2016). Self-other discrepancy scores represent a perception of personal difference from others, whereas accuracy scores, especially when comparing across groups, represent the ability to accurately perceive others. Importantly, self-other discrepancy scores and accuracy scores as predictors will result in different model coefficients and are worthy of careful consideration when one is chosen for analysis purposes.

There are benefits to researchers having diversity in their measures and analyses, but there are issues associated with a lack of acknowledgment of these differences and limitations of analysis choices. Mandeville et al. (2016) argue that both self-other discrepancy scores and accuracy scores should be included in research examining the implications of pluralistic ignorance (specifically, models should include both scores, their squares, and their interaction as predictors). Miyajima and Yamaguchi (2017) explain that self-other discrepancy scores can provide information regarding the magnitude of a discrepancy, but not information regarding a misalignment in attitude valence (e.g., two people could have the same discrepancy score, but the score would not necessarily distinguish between whether an individual harbored a positive attitude while perceiving slightly less positive attitudes among others or whether an individual harbored a positive attitude while perceiving negative attitudes among others). Munsch et al. (2018) highlight the reliability issues related to using discrepancy scores in regression analyses. Critiques aside, we should note that these scores can still provide informative results. Analyses using self-other discrepancy and accuracy scores to predict individual-level implications can be useful, especially when these results assist in describing the (often complex) patterns to readers. However, for more rigorous tests of the relationships, we recommend the use of predictive models that include (at the very least) self- and other-scores and their interaction.

The Future of Pluralistic Ignorance

Pluralistic ignorance continues to be applicable to many issues assessed by researchers (within and outside social psychology). Previously in this review, we provided a concise definition of pluralistic ignorance and addressed outstanding questions about it and its relationship with other social psychological phenomena. We evaluated and integrated the diverse literature to highlight variation in pluralistic ignorance topics assessed, in methods used to assess pluralistic ignorance, and in pluralistic ignorance measurement, and we provided guidelines for researchers regarding how to assess pluralistic ignorance moving forward. But other challenges remain for future investigations.

As we have previously noted and emphasized throughout this review, pluralistic ignorance is clearly a common phenomenon that applies to many attitudes and behaviors—the existing literature is robust enough for us to confidently make this claim. However, of the 116 studies we reviewed, only a minority (n = 39) assessed implications of pluralistic ignorance, and expanded implication assessment is clearly the most important next step for this research. Many of the novel topics we covered in this review serve as a guide to the issues that researchers need to address when conducting these investigations—namely, determining whether investigations are of implications characterized by facilitation or inhibition, deciding how to measure pluralistic ignorance, distinguishing between individual-level scores, and, importantly, correctly characterizing pluralistic ignorance as a group-level phenomenon, while still effectively addressing its individual-level implications. In this final section, we highlight several additional areas of research in need of further investigation and clarification that are similarly informed by our review, and that we believe are particularly important for continued empirical expansion of the pluralistic ignorance literature.

Where Does the Illusion of Universality Fit In?

Until now, we have neglected to discuss in detail the issue of the illusion of universality (i.e., when individuals mistakenly perceive others as being uniform and lacking in variability; Allport, 1924). We did so because it is inconsistently acknowledged in relation to pluralistic ignorance. For example, Prentice and Miller (1993) highlight evidence for the illusion of universality by comparing the variance (via an F test) of self- and other-attitudes, whereas Schroeder and Prentice (1998) do not report this comparison. Boon et al. (2014) explicitly discuss the illusion of universality in a footnote and remark on this inconsistency in the literature. They opted to not discuss relevant findings, and instead focused on the observed directional misperception. Researchers have also posited the illusion of universality as being a moderator of the relationship between individual-level scores and pluralistic ignorance implications, where individual-level scores might have stronger implications for behavior in situations where there is a greater illusion of universality (Miller & Prentice, 1994).

Allport suggested that the illusion of universality should be a necessary criterion for pluralistic ignorance, but we disagree. Imagine a population in which people accurately perceive the shape of an attitudinal distribution that is normal with a fair amount of spread. If what those people believe to be the mean attitude and the true mean attitude significantly differ, most individuals are likely to falsely believe that few others share their attitude. A directional misperception exists, and we believe this is sufficient for concluding that pluralistic ignorance is in evidence. Considering the illusion of universality instead as a moderator, we might find that instances of pluralistic ignorance where the illusion of universality is present result in more extreme conformity and an escalation of the pace by which attitudinal and behavioral changes take place; however, to our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been directly assessed. Future research should aim to establish the role of the illusion of universality and its place in the pluralistic ignorance phenomenon.

What Conditions Cause Pluralistic Ignorance?

There are still many open questions regarding the causes of pluralistic ignorance. We argued previously that direct observation of others’ behavior is not necessary for pluralistic ignorance to develop, as some have suggested (Miller & McFarland, 1987; Prentice & Miller, 1996). Indeed, college student misperceptions of other students’ attitudes toward drinking alcohol is likely in part developed through direct observation of others’ drinking, but it is unclear the extent to which this observation must occur for individuals to generalize to the larger population—that is, the proportion of group members that must be observed, how often such observations need to occur, and so on (see work by Weaver et al., 2007). It is reasonable to presume that such misperceptions could also develop from established stereotypes about students at a specific school, from representations of general college students in the media, and/or from gossip (see also Boon et al.’s, 2014, discussion of causes pertaining to pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward dating infidelity). We urge researchers to investigate how group-level misperceptions form in their assessments. We expect that causes differ across contexts and require different intervention approaches. More research is needed to build the database necessary to begin to draw these conclusions.

What Factors Predict and Moderate Pluralistic Ignorance-Related Individual-Level Scores?

The number of studies in our review that assessed predictors and moderators of pluralistic ignorance-related individual-level scores was quite notable. Of the 116 studies reviewed, 76 (66%) attempted to draw conclusions about at least one potential predictor or moderator. Understanding the variables that predict and moderate these scores provides crucial information for continued research: these assessments shed light on the social cognitive processes that could underlie the development of pluralistic ignorance, they highlight personal characteristics that might magnify or constrain misperceptions of group norms at the individual-level, they expose which populations might be at risk for harboring pluralistic ignorance, and they can serve as an initial step in the development of research addressing the causes of pluralistic ignorance. Although some assessments were seemingly secondary and without a strong theoretical basis, many were informative and provide interesting contributions to the field. For example, Munsch et al. (2014) assessed differences in pluralistic ignorance of attitudes toward flexwork across the type of flexwork (flextime or flexplace) and found that pluralistic ignorance persisted across flexwork type. For both flextime and flexplace, individuals mistakenly perceived others’ as harboring more negative attitudes toward flexwork.

As assessments of this sort are relatively easy to incorporate into investigations (e.g., measures of collectivism, media exposure), we encourage researchers to consider doing so. Even if these analyses are exploratory, they will nonetheless inform research on the topic and better our understanding of what factors influence pluralistic ignorance.

What Other Variables Affect Pluralistic Ignorance-Related Implications?

Researchers also assessed moderators and mediators of the relationships between individual-level indicators of pluralistic ignorance and the consequences of those misperceptions (n = 17 studies included such an analysis). Researchers have discussed variables such as fear of social rejection and negative evaluation (Cook & Lane, 2014; Geiger & Swim, 2016; Schroeder & Prentice, 1998), differences in reactions to ego threat (Prentice & Miller, 1993), and strength of ingroup identification (Miller & Morrison, 2009) as potential mechanisms to explain why some individuals in groups characterized by pluralistic ignorance might be more likely to conform than others. As an example, Geiger and Swim (2016) found that concerns about appearing competent mediated the relationship between perceiving others as doubting climate change and willingness to discuss climate change. Several of the variables identified as potential mediators or moderators relate in some way to the extent to which people care about others’ opinions (Bursztyn & Jensen, 2017), and in turn could be applicable to all situations of pluralistic ignorance (e.g., fear of embarrassment, strength of in-group identification). As already discussed, identifying mechanisms (and the moderators associated with those mechanisms) is important because they can be used to directly or indirectly test process models that link pluralistic ignorance to associated implications, and they can serve as potential areas of intervention. The research in this area is at an early stage, and we encourage researchers assessing the implications of pluralistic ignorance to incorporate the measurement of potential moderators and mediators in their investigations.

What Variables Moderate Pluralistic Ignorance Itself, at The Group Level?

Some variables, then, moderate whether or not individuals within a group will misperceive group norms; other variables moderate whether or not that misperception will have a psychological or behavioral impact on a given individual. Arguably, a more basic question is what variables moderate whether or not pluralistic ignorance will develop within different discrete groups. Miller and Prentice (1994) suggested that pluralistic ignorance is especially likely in groups where the desire “to be a good member of the group” (p. 543) is particularly pronounced. The same, they suggested, would be the case when a group includes salient and powerful vocal minorities. On a related note, because it is reasonable to hypothesize that pluralistic ignorance is more likely to arise in groups that discourage challenging norms, it might be more likely to arise in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures (Triandis, 1995; see Saito & Ohbuchi, 2007, for a related assessment). To our knowledge, no such study has been conducted, which is not surprising, given the paucity of research outside of North America.

More generally, we are not aware of any studies that utilize discrete groups as the level of analysis and compare them in terms of the extent to which pluralistic ignorance is in evidence (e.g., two organizations in which employees’ attitudes are non-sexist but where members of one believe that their attitudes are in the minority). Needless to say, there are also no studies that assess the different kinds of trajectories of such groups in a longitudinal design. Research of that kind would be especially valuable for shedding light on how the effects of pluralistic ignorance can unfold over time (i.e., changes in cognitions and behaviors). Kuran (1995), for example, describes how perceived norm violators embolden others to express their true attitudes, which in turn loosens yet more people’s inhibitions. Chain reactions can result in which small individual-level changes lead to massive and rapid changes at the group level (see also Frank, 1996). To advance knowledge about the causes, dynamics, and consequences of pluralistic ignorance, such admittedly complex investigations will be essential.

New Conceptualizations and Approaches

Although we believe there is immediate need to address the five research questions we discussed earlier, we would be remiss to not acknowledge researchers who have taken other new approaches to study and conceptualize pluralistic ignorance. We want to briefly highlight three cases, as we believe this could inspire further development and expansion of pluralistic ignorance research. The first involves the quickly expanding use of online/media platforms. For example, Hetsroni (2011) coined a new type of pluralistic ignorance, pluralistic media ignorance, which refers to a misperception of media content (e.g., people overestimated the frequency of promiscuous material in the media). Second, researchers have begun to assess pluralistic ignorance using designs that utilize imagined others/situations, as opposed to having individuals report their perceptions of others in ad hoc or existing group situations. This approach has been utilized primarily in research assessing relationship formation. Shelton and Richeson (2005) and Vorauer and Ratner (1996) both assessed relational pluralistic ignorance using vignettes, where participants anticipated the thoughts of imagined others when avoiding intergroup (Black vs. White) contact and when avoiding initiation of romantic relationships, respectively. Using imagined situations, researchers can establish control and more effectively gauge the processes underlying perceptions of others.

Third, Sandstrom and Bartini (2010) call for research on the developmental process of perceiving personal attitudes relative to perceptions of others’ attitudes. At the very least, pluralistic ignorance requires the ability to distinguish between one’s own and others’ cognitions/behaviors. Developmental differences in perspective-taking ability (Birch et al., 2017; Selman, 1980) could be leveraged to test hypotheses about the causes and consequences of pluralistic ignorance (for a description of this research strategy, see Pomerantz & Newman, 2000). Another potentially promising research direction would be the investigation of developmental differences in the implications of pluralistic ignorance. Such influences might peak in adolescence, when responsiveness to peer social influence also peaks (Costanzo & Shaw, 1966; Knoll et al., 2015).

Overall, these novel conceptualizations, approaches, and applications indicate that research on pluralistic ignorance has a promising future.

Limitations

We based our review on articles from psychology database searches and used only one search term (“pluralistic ignorance”). It is possible that there are other articles assessing pluralistic ignorance that were not included. If researchers measured pluralistic ignorance without referring to it as pluralistic ignorance, they would not have been included in this review.

In addition, articles published in medical journals or business/management journals were likely not included in this review. Research and theorizing on pluralistic ignorance can be found beyond the psychological literature. Pluralistic ignorance is being referred to in the fields of economics, management, organizational studies, environmental studies, and medical research, to name a few. Halbesleben and Buckley (2004) provide a concise review of pluralistic ignorance for an organizational research audience, highlighting how pluralistic ignorance has been previously applied in the field and suggesting future directions for applications in organizational-focused studies (e.g., leadership/followership, pluralistic ignorance in labor unions; see also Halbesleben et al., 2007, for a comparatively extensive review). A review of work on pluralistic ignorance from these other sources could be of great benefit, and in turn, our review could assist researchers in other fields in appropriately designing those investigations.

Even with the narrow scope of this review, important and clear variations were observed, and despite the limitations, this review provides an updated conceptual summary and novel methodological analysis of the pluralistic ignorance phenomenon.

Conclusion

Pluralistic ignorance is a social psychological phenomenon that is applicable to many societal issues and public health concerns. As a group-level phenomenon, it has real and significant individual-level implications. In this scoping review, we placed an emphasis on providing an updated summary of research and highlighting diversity within the literature, including, but not limited to, variation in topics assessed, how pluralistic ignorance is measured, and how researchers have predicted the implications of pluralistic ignorance. This review provides direction for future research examining pluralistic ignorance. Much more can and should be said about the empirically assessed antecedents of pluralistic ignorance, the social cognitive processes underlying pluralistic ignorance, the contexts in which pluralistic ignorance is observed, the various implications of pluralistic ignorance (at the individual and group level), among the other new and exciting directions discussed in this review. By making advancements in understanding pluralistic ignorance, researchers can examine pluralistic ignorance with more confidence, apply the phenomenon in more sophisticated ways to their topics of interest, and eventually make applied contributions aimed to reduce societal misperception and undesired conformity with a misperceived majority.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Rikki H. Sargent

Notes

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