Have We Got a Deal for You: Do You Want the Good News or Bad News First?

Abstract

Traditional practice prominently presents offers (e.g., “50% Off”) followed by a quantity (“When you buy two”), duration (“Today only”), or other conditional restriction as a scarcity appeal to increase urgency. Placing a hurdle to clear before purchase eligibility presents the good news of the offer followed by the bad news of the restriction.

We propose and test a sales promotion framework for admission-based experiences showing that leading with the bad news first (the restriction) followed by the good news (the discount) is consistent with consumer news order preferences and changes perceptions of the deal. Our first study confirms consumer preference for bad news before good news in general and ticket offers in particular. The next two studies examine the process by which leading with the bad news (of the restriction first, discount later) increases the salience of the deal (% off). This in turn makes the customer feel in greater control over the offer, thereby making the deal appear to be fairer and more attractive, leading to increased purchase intentions. A fourth study in the field shows presenting the restriction followed by a discount improves click-through and potential revenue compared to presenting the identical offer with the discount preceding the restriction.

Keywords

sales promotions experiences deal frame buyer-seller control news order preference

Retailers and service providers frequently offer sales promotions accompanied by a restriction. Prevailing practice presents an offer in large font followed by some form of restriction in a smaller font, like when Lowe’s offers 20% off plumbing items (when buying 10 or more) or Disney World offers 20% off rooms (at select hotels, on select nights, for a limited time). However, it is an unexamined question as to whether framing the deal with the discount preceding the restriction is necessarily the most effective way to present such offers.

We propose that, counter to current managerial practice, reversing the order in which the restriction and the discount are presented in an offer will be more effective. This is because the presentation order changes the way customers perceive the deal as receivers of good news and bad news. News-givers prefer to lead with good news and end with bad news, but receivers typically prefer the reverse (Linda Marshall & Robert Kidd, 1981). People prefer improving sequences of events, to begin with a loss and end with a gain or positive outcome (Angela Legg & Kate Sweeny, 2014). We argue and show that taking the perspective of the news-recipient (the customer), leading with the restriction (bad news) followed by the offer (good news) increases the salience of the deal (% off). This, in turn, makes the customer feel in greater control over the offer, thereby making the deal appear to be fairer and more attractive, leading to increased purchase intentions.

The basic logic of our argument is that when consumers encounter a deal for admission-based experiences, the choice to purchase brings a hedonic reward with meaningful or memorable pleasures (Alba and Williams 2013). With such affective consumption decisions, feelings of being in control and being offered a fair deal will improve offer-related outcomes. Prior work suggests deal restrictions can lead to feelings of irritation or inconvenience (Inman, Peters, and Raghubir 1997; Raghubir, Inman, and Grande 2004). Indeed, over two decades ago Inman, Peters, and Raghubir (1997) speculated that “framing the restriction as a hurdle that a consumer has to pass [to be] eligible for the deal versus framing the deal as a reward for a consumer who has already spent a fair amount in the store is likely to be differentially effective.” (p.78). However, no research to date has examined this simple but critical proposition to frame the offer as a reward after the qualifications have been met. That is the focus on our research.

We study these effects in the context of admission-based service experiences to understand the price information processing that makes the discount more salient when bad news of the restriction is followed by good news of the discount. Knowing availability is limited for a given date and time, consumers reserve cruises and vacations and buy seats for concerts, movie premieres, and sporting events in advance. For such hedonic admission-based experiences, service operators attempt to capitalize on perceived scarcity by leading with the good news of a discount followed by the bad news of restrictions. Figure 1 contains a variety of examples. Contrary to popular practice, we argue that reversing the order to leave buyers with the good news of the discount will increase the salience of the deal, making buyers feel more in control of the exchange compared to feeling manipulated by the seller.

Figure 1.

Admission-based experiences with offer followed by seller’s restriction (GN/BN).

Research in marketing has not examined how consumers process good news and bad news together, though some work has examined updating expectations in separate sequences of news events (c.f., Guiyang Xiong & Bharadwaj Sundar, 2013; Kopalle & Lehmann, 1995). Research on pricing and promotions for services at the consumer level is scant, let alone for experience services (Wakefield and Wakefield 2018). Theoretically, we contribute to this literature by presenting a promotion framework for ticketed services in the context of advance selling of services (Shugan & Xie, 2000, 2004). We integrate deal salience to help explain why consumers respond more favorably to offers leading with a restriction (i.e., the bad news) followed by the offer (i.e., good news). We hope this paper will spur further research into the structure and framing of sales promotion offers in the services arena.

Methodologically, we contribute a multi-item measure of buyer-seller control in service exchanges predictive of deal evaluation and behavioral intentions. In practice, compared to the traditional good news-bad news frame, we find leading with the bad news (restriction) followed by the offer (good news) leads buyers to feel more in control of the exchange.

Our contribution to the sales promotion and scarcity appeals literature is to examine how merely changing the order of the discount and its accompanying restriction can change perceptions of control and fairness associated with the offer and improve managerial outcomes. Prior work in the scarcity domain has been conducted with consumer-packaged goods, with an offer followed by a quantity, duration, or other conditional restriction to signal short supply and to increase urgency, even if supply is not short and there is no need for urgency (Aggarwal, Jun, and Huh 2011; Inman, Peter, and Raghubir 1997). Examining these signals in the domain of admission-based services, characterized as they are by an inherent time and inventory limitation, allows for an examination of the robustness of these effects across service providers.

Our results also add to the behavioral pricing literature in general, by showing that an identical discount can be perceived differentially valuable when it follows (versus precedes) an accompanying restriction. In contrast to prior work showing losses loom larger than gains or non-gains (e.g., Idson, Liberman, and Higgins 2000; Kahneman and Tversky 1984), we demonstrate that placing the limitation ahead of the discount in keeping with the recipient’s preference for bad news-then-good news changes the value proposition to make it feel more like a choice and less an offer with strings attached.

The process by which the good/bad news order preference drives the effects is important. We argue that leading with the quantity, availability, or limitation followed by the offer increases deal salience and draws more attention to the good news of the offer. Salience refers to deal attributes which stand out or are important in contrast to other stimuli and attention when the consumer selectively concentrates on a specific aspect of the offer (viz., Pieters, Wedel, and Zhang 2007; Van Kenhove, De Wulf, and Waterschoot 1999). Through these routes (salience → attention and consumer control → perceived fairness), leading with the bad news (the restriction) followed by good news (the discount) should be more attractive than good news-bad news and improve purchase intentions and behaviors. Figure 2 illustrates our framework.

Figure 2.

A sales promotion framework for admission-based experiences.

Our studies are conducted in the domain of admission-based experiences specific to ticketed services. We first provide background and theoretical support for the promotion framework for admission-based experiences. We then explore order preferences for good news and bad news in offers among ticket buyers (Study 1), followed by two studies to illustrate the underlying processes in the framework (Studies 2 and 3). A fourth study in the field (Study 4, N = 329,647) replicating the second study demonstrates the practical effects. We conclude with theoretical and managerial implications and future price and promotion research for admissions-based experiences.

Theoretical Framework

Price Promotions

The presence of a price promotion prompts consumers into a reward seeking state of mind (Shaddy and Lee 2020). Deal restrictions present a roadblock thwarting consumer freedom to gain the reward by limiting quantity, duration, or other conditions (Inman, Peter, and Raghubir 1997). For example, fans of the Texas Rangers see the opportunity to “score 50% off Rangers tickets” only to read the very small print below: “Save and redeem by June 25^th, 2019, at 4:59am ET for tickets to select games. Availability limited terms apply. Qualifying [T-Mobile] plan required.” This promotion contains a form of each type of restriction in that quantities (availability) are limited, it is only valid for a certain length of time (duration) and only on the condition the buyer is a T-Mobile customer.

Sales promotions can backfire. Consumers may infer poor brand quality (Darke and Chung 2005, Raghubir and Corfman 1999; but see Davis, Inman, and McAlister 1992). High coupon values can lead consumers to infer unacceptably high prices when the final price is unspecified (Priya Raghubir, 1998). Free gifts can reduce conversion rates when the gift is undesirable (Simonson, Carmon, and O’Curry 1994) and may reduce future sales if the free gift is seen as cheap (Raghubir 2004). Sales promotions deemed to require too much effort (e.g., rebates and cut-out coupons) lower likelihood of use (Fogel and Thornton 2008). Sales promotions following quality (versus value) primes can decrease product evaluations (Deval et al. 2013). Coupons with short durations, particularly for low values, can harm attitudes toward the service operator (Trump 2016). In short, sales promotions can produce unintended outcomes. The question is: Why might deals that offer discounts followed by a restriction backfire? Understanding news order preferences of news-givers and news-recipients helps answer this question.

News Order Preferences

How to give or get bad news is challenging for most people (Abraham Tesser & Sydney Rosen, 1975; Sidney Rosen & Abraham Tesser, 1970). News-givers often try to induce a good mood with good news before sharing possibly unsettling information (Linda Marshall & Robert Kidd, 1981). Interestingly, while most people prefer to give good news followed by bad news, those same people tend to prefer to receive the bad news first (Angela Legg & Kate Sweeny, 2014). In general, people are reluctant to transmit negative information, known as the MUM effect (Mum about Undesirable Messages) to postpone, delay or forego delivering negative information (Sidney Rosen & Abraham Tesser, 1970).

Legg and Sweeny (2014) demonstrate that news-givers egocentric order preferences lead to a focus on their own discomfort in sharing bad news, overlooking the perspective, preferences, and emotions of news-recipients. However, when news-givers were prompted or primed to consider the perspective of the news-recipient, they were more likely to give bad news then good news, in line with recipients’ preferences, and, thereby, reduced negative emotions.

Belief updating (Kahneman and Taversky 1984) adds some explanation to why bad news followed by good news is preferable over the converse, as individuals “tend to discount bad news and embrace good news” (Tali Sharot et al., 2012). Starting with bad news followed by good news follows an upward trajectory, allowing the individual to process information in a biased manner to support a predisposition to respond favorably. In the context of hedonic admission-based experiences, initiating search for tickets to a game or concert indicates optimistic beliefs of finding favorable offers. Receiving the bad news of the restriction and then the good news of the discount allows for updating in the direction of the individual’s bias of finding a deal on tickets.

Douglas Maynard (1997) articulates the News Delivery Sequence (NDS) which posits that participants often make a preannouncement (“Hey, we have good news!”) that may also contain information perceived as bad news or as simply “information” dependent upon context and recipient. Promotions by their very nature appear as a preannouncement of some special offer. The NDS consists of an announcement, announcement response, elaboration, and assessment. We explore the order effect of announcements of good news (discount) and bad news (restrictions), and associated elaboration detailed by salience and attention paid to the good news of the discount.

The choice by news-givers to lead with good or bad news is driven by the egocentric need to control the exchange of information in favor of self-interest over others. In other business realms, managers seek to control the negative impact of bad news to manage impressions (Jenkins, Anandarajan, and D’Ovidio 2014), to increase control over earnings reports by delaying the release of bad news (Mendenhall, Nichols, and Palepu 1988), and to deal with the discomfort of giving bad news to employees (Richter et al. 2016). The key question in the minds of news-recipients is the timeliness or timing of the information that reflects whether the news-giver is focused on their own preferences or the receivers. Just like investors evaluate the timeliness of releasing bad financial news (viz., Krishnan 2005) or top management turnover (Burchard et al. 2021) as manipulative or controlling, consumers evaluate the timing of the order of good news and bad news relative to the receivers’ preferences.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the reversal of leading with the restriction is expected to change the salience of the offer and the perception of who is in control of the exchange. Consistent with the preference of hearing bad news before good news, the cognitive ease (Schwarz 2004) of the “if/ then” logic of the choice frame increases salience. Leading with the restriction will also increase perceptions of who is in control of the exchange because the buyer opts in by choosing to agree with the terms of the restriction. In return, the buyer is offered a reward (the deal) rather than tempted by a deal and then learning the offer is conditional with strings attached. Going forward, the BN/GN frame refers to the bad news/good news order, when a sales promotion leads with a quantity, duration, or condition to purchase followed by the offer. The GN/BN frame refers to the traditional mode of delivering good news/bad news with the offer first followed by a restriction based on quantity, duration, or other condition to purchase.

Hypotheses Development

Buyer Versus Seller Control

Inherent in the decision to share good news or bad news first is the desire to control the exchange with recipients. News sources control both the means (viz., media/technology) that disseminate information and the content including the order of the information disseminated (Rindova et al. 2006). News-givers tend to favor controlling the flow of information out of concern for their own discomfort in giving bad news over allowing the receivers to “get the bad news out of the way” in line with the receivers’ preferences (Marshall and Kidd 1981). News-givers focus on their own anxieties and default to controlling the exchange of information in sync with their preferences to share good news followed by bad news. In contrast, as Legg and Sweeney (2014) note, recipients would rather “save the best for last” or “end on a high note.”

In the context of promotional offers, receivers will process whether the outcome is dependent upon their own actions rather than feeling controlled by others (c.f., (Judith Chipperfield et al., 2012). As with other exchanges, the receiver interactively determines the valence of the news and how good or bad it is (Maynard 1997). Recipients are oriented to evaluate news as either good or bad, dependent upon the way it is presented (Freese & Maynard, 1998). We argue that as the receiver elaborates and assesses the sequence of news contained in the deal, the order of the restriction and offer determines perceptions of the news-givers intent to control or manipulate the exchange in the sellers’ favor. Presenting an offer with the discount in large point font followed by small print with restrictions or disclaimers is apt to be interpreted as the seller seeking control over the buyer.

The foregoing suggests the GN/BN frame leads consumers to perceive the seller is more in control of the exchange rather than providing the information in the sequence desired by customers. Therefore,

H1: The GN/BN frame increases perceived seller (versus buyer) control compared to the BN/GN frame.

Perceived Deal Fairness

When considering the order of presentation of good news or bad news, we expect in price information processing terms that offers made in line with the news-givers preference to protect the firm’s self-interests rather than in the interest of consumers will be seen as less fair. Conversation analysts suggest the sequence of news announcements can determine if recipients perceive consecutive occurrences as containing good or bad surprises (Sacks 1987). Sharing surprising information by the news-giver with negative outcomes for the recipient may be perceived as procedurally unfair (Jocelyn Evans et al., 2017). Changes in policies announced by the news-giver that comes as a surprise with adverse consequences for the recipient are seen as unfair (Bailey, Jenkins, and Barber 2016).

Lu et al. (2020) find when consumers feel controlled and exploited, it results in reduced price fairness. Namasivayam (2004) finds greater perceived control in the service exchange is linked to perceived fairness. Consumers consider the motive of the seller in determining fairness (Campbell 2007). Encountering otherwise enticing offers followed by a restriction in the form of quantity required, limited availability, or other conditions to get the deal may make potential buyers feel like the restriction imposes limits of freedom of choice. That is, the deal seems less fair. The more consumers feel like they do not have control, the less fair they perceive the deal to be. Thus,

H2: The greater the seller control, the less the perceived fairness.

Deal Evaluation

Prior research has shown that deals perceived to be fairer will be evaluated more positively (Carlson and Weathers 2008; Lee and Monroe 2008; White, Breazeale, and Collier 2012). Sharing good news of a discount to generate interest in an offer followed by bad news that the buyer must jump through specified hoops to qualify for the deal may seem interactionally unfair to buyers. Poor delivery of bad news distances the news-giver from the news-recipient, thereby violating key tenets of fair interpersonal treatment (c.f., Lavelle, Folger, and Manegold 2016). Unfair prices lead to psychological disutility (Guo and Jiang 2016). Hunt and Kernan (1991) report that consumers equate deceptive advertising to inequitable, unfair treatment. When prices change from free-to-fee services, consumers evaluate fairness of the deal that subsequently influences attitude toward the company (Cziehso, Shaefers, and Kukar-Kinney 2019). Accordingly, we anticipate:

H3: The greater the perceived fairness of the deal, the more positive the deal evaluation.

We now turn to a second route through which the BN/GN versus the GN/BN frame of the order effect can affect consumer judgment: attention and salience.

Attention and Salience

Attention theory relates to the limits of our ability to view and later report on several things seen at once. Individuals first visually scan before distinguishing between elements and selecting salient objects or elements upon which one prioritizes focus (Schankin and Schubo 2009). Focal attention is when individuals analyze a particular object or element in one’s view in more detail and selective attention is when one selects one element upon which to focus among other (distracting) stimuli (Duncan 1984). In the context of offers for admission-based services, we are interested in the elements of an offer that stimulate or draw attention or notice from individuals exposed to the sales promotion.

When consumers encounter the BN/GN frame, they self-select into the offer if the restriction (bad news) is acceptable given the reward (good news). This self-selection should make the offer more salient while increasing the attention directed to it. The desired quantity, duration, or condition acts as a filter to attract the attention of buyers who pre-qualify themselves to attend to the offer. Consumers searching for cruises, vacations, sporting events, concerts, ski lift tickets or other admission-based experiences sold in advance should be more attentive to offers that begin with the number in the party (e.g., buy two, get two free; with four in the party), the duration (e.g., weekday afternoon matinee when someone is off work), or other conditions that suit their interests. We explore these reasons in the first study.

In contrast, beginning with the offer operates as a broad funnel to attract many potential buyers to the offer (e.g., save 50%). The accompanying restriction then narrows the scope to those willing to accept the restriction (e.g., when you do or buy X), leaving the recipient to update with the bad news. For those unqualified or disinterested, following with the restriction detracts from the offer, reducing its salience relative to the bad news of the restriction. Consumers may be attracted to the offer in the traditional GN/BN frame but may be distracted by the seller’s restriction on who gets to enjoy the exchange given the quantity, duration, or conditions. The seller’s preference for leading with good news to attract attention is thus overshadowed by the receiver’s focus on the restriction that follows.

Therefore, compared to the GN/BN frame, the BN/GN frame should make the offer more salient (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Schleifer 2013) or more heavily weighted in evaluating the deal. The structure of the bad news/good news frame lends itself to if-then reasoning (e.g., “If I want to go on a Bahamas cruise the week after New Year’s, then I get a deal.”). The if-then reasoning aids cognitive ease (Schwarz 2004) fitting with news recipients’ preferences. The GN/BN frame, instead, produces cognitive discomfort as the consumer processes the offer but hits a potential hurdle to achieve the desired goal, out of step with recipients’ desire to face the hurdle first. As salience of the good news of the offer presented in the deal increases, so should attention to the good news. Thus,

H4: The BN/GN frame increases attention to the offer compared to the GN/BN frame.

H5: The BN/GN frame increases the salience of the offer compared to the GN/BN frame.

H6: The greater the salience the greater the attention to the offer.

Attention, Salience, and Buyer-Seller Control

As argued in H1, the BN/GN frame should lead to feelings of being more in control of the exchange. Greater attention also leads to perceptions of greater cognitive control (Lavie et al. 2004), particularly in the context of hedonic consumption; (Zhang, Ziao, and Nicholson, 2020). Individuals engaged and interested in meaningful online interactions may perceive greater control (O’Brien and Toms 2008). When consumers choose to pay greater attention to an offer, they are in control of the attention they direct to that offer and the amount of time and thought they give it. The BN/GN frame causal thinking (viz., “If I do X, then I get Y.”) should enhance this perception of control (Perry, Chipperfield, and Stewart 2010). Said differently, when the consumer self-selects into the message, s/he attends to the message and finds the offer salient. When the offer is framed as a choice one could make, the consumer should perceive the offer as a reward received for incurring a cost. The consumer should process the deal as a bonus for buying and being a customer (or fan). Customers encountering the BN/GN frame should perceive that it is easy to get the deal they want. They focus on offers that they perceive gives them greater control. Therefore,

H7: The greater the attention to the offer the greater the buyer control.

From an integrated information processing perspective, attentional focus, stimulus salience and attentional control are interrelated (Peschard and Philippot 2016). From a neurological perspective, salience is critical to initiate cognitive control (Menon and Uddin 2010). Making valued attributes salient to individuals leads to greater perceived control in decision-making (c.f., Blekher, Danziger, and Grinstein 2020). For example, package location and height in grocery stores may make some package elements have low salience, thereby increasing perplexity, and reducing shopper attention, control and subsequent choice (c.f., Ambler et al. 2004). In the context of admission-based experiences, as the offer (e.g., 50% off) becomes more salient and obtainable, feelings of being in control of the exchange should increase. Formally:

H8: The greater the deal salience the greater the buyer control.

Attention and Fairness

Consumers pay attention to offers they think are fair (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba 2003). Fundamental to price information search is finding fair prices. Fair promotions correspond with fair prices (Xia, Kukar-Kinney, and Monroe 2010). Deals that attract (positive) attention or notice are more apt to be fair and those ignored to be less fair. Price frames frequently influence price fairness and fairness in turn leads to positive evaluations and subsequent purchase intentions (Weisstein, Monroe, and Kukar-Kinney 2013; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004). Thus:

H9: The greater the attention to the offer the greater the perceived fairness.

Purchase Intentions

Control theory (c.f., Skinner 1995) holds that individuals seek control in social interactions and greater control generally leads to subsequent relevant behaviors. The context of an offer for hedonic purchases increases cognitive fluency and perceived control, as does purchase intentions (Zhang, Xiao, and Nicholson 2020). Visitors to social media stores perceive less restriction (and more control) over purchase channels, thereby increasing purchase intentions (Sembada and Koay 2021). The same is expected in the context of value propositions in the form of (digital/online) sales promotions that allow the participant greater choice or control over the decision to engage in the experience. Thus,

H10: The greater the buyer control the greater the likelihood of purchase.

The sales promotions literature consistently shows that positive deal evaluations lead to higher purchase intentions (e.g., Inman et al. 1997, Raghubir and Corfman 1999). To be complete, we include this path:

H11: The greater the deal evaluation the greater the likelihood of purchase.

Study 1 explores order preferences in general and among ticket buyers. Study 2 examines H1–H3 and the role of seller control on fairness perceptions and deal evaluations. Study 3 goes on to test the remainder of the hypotheses including buyer-seller control, and particularly the roles of salience and attention and how they flow through to perceptions of control, fairness, deal evaluations, and purchase intentions. Figure 3 contains the hypothesized model including the paths for H1 to H11. Study 4 examines the external generalizability of the effect by testing the effect of the order frame (tested in Study 2), in the field. Each study is now described.

Figure 3.

Hypothesized model.

Study 1

Method

Sample

Two panels were generated with Lucid, a national research company, to study order preferences for bad and good news. The purpose of the first panel was to simply update order preferences among the population to mirror the only two studies we could find that asked people which one they preferred to receive first. Both papers focused primarily on students showed that 78% to 88% prefer to receive bad news first (Angela Legg & Kate Sweeny, 2014; Linda Marshall & Robert Kidd, 1981). Similar to the focus of these studies, a panel of 473 people representative of the Midwest, Northeast, South and West population regions were asked, “Suppose someone comes to you and says, “We have good news and bad news. Which do you want to hear first?” The answers “Good news then the bad news” and “Bad news then the good news” were presented horizontally and counterbalanced at random. Nearly two-thirds (66.2%) preferred bad news then the good news. Demographics did not significantly influence preferences.

The second panel of adults (18 to 62 years old) representative of the four regions in the United States was generated to examine ticket buyers apt to search and evaluate ticket offers. Individuals (N = 278) who somewhat frequently (61%), frequently (31%) or very frequently (8%) purchased tickets to sporting events, concerts, and movies were asked just prior to the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays, “Assume you are searching online for two tickets to take someone with you for some fun over the holidays. Which would you most likely buy?” The responses to those answering sporting events (34%), concerts (33%), or movies (33%) were piped into the following question, “For [those] tickets, which offer gives you the information in the order you prefer?” Respondents chose from the counterbalanced options, presented at random, and horizontally displayed in identical font size:

When you buy two	Get 50% Off
Get 50% Off	When you buy two

Results

The summed frequency of purchasing sporting events, concerts, and movie theatre tickets produced a significant main effect (F_2,277 = 4.18, p = 0.016) on order preference. Overall, only 31% of those who somewhat frequently purchased tickets preferred the BN/GN order but preference for BN/GN increased to 47% among frequent ticket buyers and 51% among very frequent ticket buyers.

The choice of ticket type (sports vs concerts vs movies) the respondents were considering also produced a main effect (F_2,277 = 3.49, p = 0.032) on order preference. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the ticket type. In sum, frequent and very frequent ticket buyers of sporting events and concerts are more likely to prefer BN/GN.

Figure 4.

The effects of purchase frequency and ticket type on order preference.

Following these questions, respondents were presented with the selection they chose for BN/GN or GN/BN order and asked, “Why did you prefer the order you chose?” The most frequent (37%) response among those favoring BN/GN were affective or evaluative in nature such as “because I like it (better),” “is a better deal,” or simply because “it’s good” or “a good price.” Many (18%) noted it “makes more sense” or “sounds better.” Others mentioned “it tells you how many you have to buy to get the discount” and “it puts the information in a way that attracts only those buying 2 tickets.”

Discussion

This initial, exploratory study confirms the general notion that given a choice most people prefer bad news to precede good news. Specific to the order of promotional offers containing a restriction, the results suggest the likelihood that the BN/GN frame may work well among frequent ticket buyers. We now examine these processes in more detail in testing our hypotheses.

Study 2

Method

Sample

A panel of individuals verified to have high interest (63.2%) or very high interest (36.8%) in following and watching NBA basketball (N = 270) was recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in an online between-subjects experiment manipulating the GN/BN or BN/GN frame of an online ticket offer. Participants were predominantly male (63.9%), unmarried (54.6%), and median age of 35. Over 95% of respondents passed an attention check inserted in the latter part of the survey. The study was conducted on Black Friday of Thanksgiving week. The choice of sample and timing was to increase the level of realism of this hypothetical study using a vignette.

Procedure and Measures

Study participants were instructed: “Assume you are a customer (previous attender) of this NBA team. Today, on Black Friday, you receive the following email ticket offer early in the morning. Take a moment to read the message and offer your opinions.” Participants randomly assigned to the GN/BN frame (coded as “0”) received the offer presented in Panel A in Figure 4. Participants randomly assigned to the BN/GN panel (coded as “1”) received the offer presented in Panel B in Figure 5.

Figure 5.

Stimuli used for study 2 and study 4.

Following the offer, deal evaluation (α = 0.926, M = 5.46, SD = 1.03) was measured with three 7-point bi-polar scales (“A bad buy—a good buy,” “not worth the cost—worth the cost,” and “a bad deal—good deal”) along with a single-item 7-point fairness scale (very unfair—very fair; M = 5.43, SD = 1.13) from Campbell (1999). Perceptions of seller control was measured with five items (α = 0.805; M = 3.30, SD = 2.06) with 11-point (0–10) Likert scales (not at all—extremely) developed to describe the offer. Table 1 contains the seller control items, means and standard deviations, including means for the GN/BN and BN/GN frames.

Table 1.

Seller Control (α = 0.805; M = 3.30, SD = 2.06; 11-Point, 0-10 Scales).

	Frame
Item	GN/BN M (SD)	BN/GN M (SD)
Feels like a restriction they put on me to get a ticket.	2.80 (2.75)	2.61 (2.52)
Takes advantage of me for being a fan.	2.86 (2.86)	2.75 (2.72)
Makes me feel everything is under their control.	4.50 (2.82)	3.86 (2.66)
Makes it difficult to get the deal I want.	2.93 (3.11)	2.60 (2.49)
Feels like strings are attached.	4.61 (2.12)	3.44 (1.97)
Overall ^a	3.56 (2.12)	3.05 (1.97)

^aThe GN/BN and BN/GN frames are significantly different (F = 4.21, p = .04).

Results

SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende, and Becker 2015) was employed to test the hypothesized relationships. We performed a 5000-bootstrap resampling of the data as recommended. In addition to Cronbach alpha, the Composite Reliability (CR) and Average Variance Extracted (AVE) for the multi-item measures of seller control (CR = 0.863; AVE = 0.560) and deal evaluation (CR = 0.911, AVE = 0.774) demonstrate good reliability.

A manipulation check for realism (1-7, unrealistic-realistic) indicates no significant differences between the frames (F = 1.32, p >0.25). On average participants found the offers to be realistic (M = 5.80, SD = 1.05).

The deal frame (GN/BN = 0; BN/GN = 1) significantly influenced seller control perceptions (−0.126, t = 2.07, p < 0.01). As expected, the traditional GN/BN frame (M = 3.56) was seen as significantly more under the seller’s control (F = 4.21, p = 0.04) compared to the BN/GN frame (M = 3.05), supporting H1 (see Table 1). In turn, the greater the seller control, the lower the perceived fairness of the deal (−0.393, t = 7.04, p < 0.01), supporting H2. Finally, supporting H3, the greater the perceived fairness, the more positive the deal evaluation (0.614, t = 12.80, p < 0.01).

We tested whether fairness mediated the path between seller control and deal evaluation as argued in the theoretical development and displayed in the conceptual model (Figure 2). Seller control has a significant indirect effect on deal evaluation (−0.245, t = 6.42, p < 0.01). The bias corrected confidence intervals (−0.317 to −0.168) for the fairness→deal evaluation path in the full model did not contain zero, indicating that fairness mediated the path from seller control to deal evaluation. A model without fairness showed that seller control had a significant negative effect on deal evaluation (−0.271, t = 4.544, p < 0.01). With fairness in the model, that path was no longer significant (−0.016, t = 0.287, p > 0.70). Overall, the model explained 38.5% of deal evaluation and 15.4% of deal fairness.

Discussion

As hypothesized, consumers in the traditional GN/BN frame, with the discount presented before its accompanying restriction, saw the offer as more under the seller’s control. Compared to the BN/GN frame (where the restriction preceded the discount), consumers in the GN/BN frame perceived that the 30% discount with the select seats and limited time frame felt more like a restriction, with strings attached, that takes advantage of them (as a fan), offered the seller greater control and made the deal more difficult for them to obtain (i.e., the five-item seller control scale). This perception of seller control flowed through into perceptions of lower deal fairness (H2), and, finally, lowered deal evaluations (H3). Conversely, the BN/GN frame, where the restriction precedes the discount, was perceived to give the seller less control, perceived as fairer, and was more favorably evaluated than the GN/BN frame.

The results affirm the news order preference literature. The findings invoke the key construct of the level of control in an exchange between buyer and seller as a key antecedent to perceptions of fairness and deal evaluations. Theoretically, it also adds to the sales promotion and scarcity literatures by showing how reversing the order of two identical pieces of information can reduce negative affect associated with a restricted offer.

From a managerial point of view, the results of Studies 1 and 2 show that the current managerial practice of starting off with a discount and then presenting the restriction in small font may not be optimal and can have unintended consequences. Finally, from a methodological point of view, the “seller control” five-item scale may be used by other researchers examining the role buyer and seller control play in service experiences. Though this measure captures seller control, we lack evidence that the BN/GN frame leads to consumers perceiving greater control of the exchange and subsequent evaluations. Study 3 addresses this limitation.

Additionally, while there are two restrictions in the frame (select tickets and only until 3pm), the experimental condition only changed the order of the former, leading it to be a discount-restriction-restriction in the GN/BN condition and a restriction-discount-restriction in the BN/GN frame. Study 3 addresses this concern by using an offer that only has one restriction.

Study 3

In Study 3 (see the model in Figure 3), we expand our measures to include seller-buyer control, while adding the hypothesized processes and outcomes consistent with our sales promotion framework (H4-H11), specifically salience and attention and how these influence perceptions of control, fairness, deal evaluations and purchase intentions.

Method and Procedure

Participants (N = 310) were recruited from an online Amazon Mechanical Turk panel (Male = 51.3%; Unmarried = 56.1%; Median Age = 35, range 18–70). Of these, 86.1% had bought a ticket to a music, sports, arts and theatre, tfamily show, or other event in the previous 12 months, suggesting they would be familiar with the hypothetical scenario presented to them. Individuals were assigned at random to either a BN/GN (“When you buy two tickets save 50%”) or GN/BN (“Save 50% when you buy two tickets”) frame, with the latter replicating an actual Ticketmaster sales promotion. See Figure 6.
Figure 6.
Study 3: Ticketmaster GN/BN versus BN/GN frames.

Participants were instructed to assume they were in Chicago with a companion and decided to look for two tickets to an event, prompting a visit to www.ticketmaster.com. Participants viewed a Ticketmaster screen listing events followed by otherwise identical screens from the Ticketmaster website. On average, study participants spent 113 seconds reviewing the webpage. Participants then completed measures of attention, salience, perceived control, perceived fairness, deal evaluations, and purchase intentions. Participants largely agreed the scenario and offer were realistic, with the BN/GN frame somewhat more realistic (M = 5.74) than the GN/BN frame (5.50) that replicated the actual Ticketmaster offer (F = 3.25, p = 0.073).

Attention as Captured by Hotspots

The offer contained nine “hotspots.” A hotspot is defined as an area on a webpage where participants can click to indicate which elements attracted their attention. The specific instructions were: “Click once on the spots on this offer you like. Double-click on the spots you do not like.” Accounting for whether or not a spot was clicked allows us to calculate which elements of the webpage garnered attention. By requesting responses of liking or disliking, we were able to identify the overall valence (positive or negative) of each element of the offer. Critical to our investigation, one hotspot was the discount (“Save 50%”) and another was the restriction (“When you buy two tickets”). Thus, we were able to examine the differential attention and valence associated with these two attributes as a function of the order in which the two were presented.

Salience and Attention

In addition to the hotspots to capture salient aspects of the deal, participants were asked, “What stood out most about this offer?” with a counterbalanced single-item 7-point bi-polar scale (When you buy two tickets–Save 50%; M = 5.34, SD = 1.91). Higher numbers signify greater salience of the discount and lower numbers signify greater salience of the restriction. Attention to the deal was measured with three 7-point Likert scales (Is stimulating; One I’d definitely notice; Would draw my attention; α = 0.86).

Buyer and Seller Control

To expand upon the seller control measure from the second study, we developed six bi-polar statements (α = 0.84). For each randomized pair of statements, participants had to choose which statement best represented their opinion (e.g., “Feels like strings attached” = 0 versus “Feels like a bonus for buying” = 1). Each buyer control statement was scored as a “1” and each seller control statement chosen was scored as a “0.” This led to a six-item choice scale that could range from 0 (complete seller control) to 6 (complete buyer control), with higher numbers representing perceptions of higher buyer control. Table 2 contains the statements and the percentage of the respondents that selected the buyer control item for each statement pair in the GN/BN (M = 3.48) and BN/GN (M = 3.92) frames.
Table 2.
Buyer-Seller Control Items by Deal Frame.

Seller control % choosing buyer control Buyer control

Item Frame Item

Coded as 0 if selected. GN/BN BN/GN Coded as 1 if selected

Feels like a restriction they put on me to get a ticket 62.6% 68.6% Feels like a reward I earn for incurring a cost

Feels like strings are attached 59.3% 64.1% Feels like a bonus for buying

Makes me feel everything is under their control 55.9% 54.6% Makes me feel everything is under my control

Makes it difficult to get the deal I want 63.2% 72.2% Makes it easy to get the deal I want*

Takes advantage of me for being a customer 54.7% 76.9% Rewards me for being a customer

Lets them offer what they want to sell 52.1% 55.3% Lets me choose what I want to buy

Mean scale score (0–6) 3.48 3.92

Adjusted for demographics and buying frequency. Significantly different (p = 0.05).

Deal Evaluations and Perceived Fairness

As in the second study, deal evaluation (α = 0.93, M = 5.47, SD = 1.16) was captured with three 7-point bi-polar scales (a bad buy—a good buy; not worth the cost—worth the cost; a bad deal—a good deal) and deal fairness with the same single-item (M = 5.35, SD = 1.27).

Purchase Intentions

For purchase likelihood, participants were asked how likely they would be to purchase tickets with this offer (M = 5.28, SD = 1.45), using three 7-point bi-polar scales (unlikely–very likely; not probable–probable; impossible–very possible; α = 0.95, counterbalanced and randomized).

Results

We again employed SmartPLS to analyze the data. We performed the recommended 5000-bootstrap resampling of the data (Joe Hair et al., 2017). An examination of cross-loadings reveals all items load with the appropriate constructs (see Table 3) showing evidence of discriminant validity. Table 4 contains the Cronbach alpha, composite reliability measures, construct correlations, and the average variance extracted (AVE), all of which demonstrate acceptable internal consistency and scale reliability (Nunally & Bernstein, 1994). Convergent validity is supported as the AVE of each construct exceeds 0.50 and discriminant validity is supported in that the square root of the AVE (seen in bold on the diagonals) is greater than the off-diagonal values in the corresponding row and column (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Table 3.
Study 3 Construct Item Loadings and Cross-loadings.

Attention B-SControl DealEval Fairness Frame PurchaseIntention Salience

Frame 0.227 −0.019 0.197 0.166 1 0.041 0.212

Salience 0.296 0.233 0.284 0.234 0.212 0.223 1

Attention1 0.857 0.335 0.684 0.424 0.200 0.574 0.237

Attention2 0.903 0.404 0.651 0.439 0.235 0.595 0.330

Attention3 0.886 0.409 0.598 0.387 0.160 0.573 0.206

PI1 0.601 0.533 0.670 0.486 0.007 0.947 0.183

PI2 0.647 0.576 0.715 0.528 0.056 0.968 0.225

PI3 0.632 0.563 0.693 0.479 0.053 0.943 0.229

BS1 0.370 0.776 0.42 0.373 −0.023 0.481 0.145

BS2 0.337 0.800 0.419 0.411 −0.039 0.473 0.177

BS3 0.251 0.728 0.343 0.320 −0.058 0.388 0.142

BS4 0.382 0.763 0.397 0.341 0.021 0.466 0.191

BS5 0.352 0.703 0.388 0.290 0.050 0.439 0.241

BS6 0.198 0.674 0.270 0.262 −0.053 0.324 0.133

Deal1 0.690 0.471 0.939 0.589 0.270 0.686 0.300

Deal2 0.697 0.483 0.918 0.488 0.091 0.681 0.243

Deal3 0.661 0.475 0.945 0.574 0.185 0.670 0.251

Fair 0.473 0.454 0.590 1 0.166 0.523 0.234

Table 4.
Study 3 Reliability Measures, Construct Correlations and Fornell-Larker Criterion.

α CR AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 Attention 0.858 0.913 0.779 0.882

2 Buyer-seller control 0.837 0.880 0.550 0.434 0.742

3 Deal evaluation 0.927 0.953 0.872 0.730 0.510 0.934

4 Fairness 1 1 1 0.473 0.454 0.590 1

5 Frame 1 1 1 0.227 −0.019 0.197 0.166 1

6 Purchase 0.949 0.967 0.908 0.658 0.585 0.727 0.523 0.041 0.953

7 Salience 1 1 1 0.296 0.233 0.284 0.234 0.212 0.223 1

CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance Extracted.

Bolded numbers on the diagonal are the square root of the AVE.

Table 5 contains the results. All of the hypothesized paths reported below were significant (p < 0.05) in the proposed direction. Consistent with the second study and H1, the GN/BN-BN/GN frame produced indirect effects on seller-buyer control via attention (0.07, t =* 3.09, p < 0.01) and salience (0.02, t = 1.84, p < 0.05). Accordingly, as we expected the process to unfold, the BN/GN frame led to greater attention (H4, 0.148, t = 2.58, p = 0.01) to the deal as well as deal salience (H5, 0.212, t = 3.78, p < 0.001). Triangulating the effects, as salience of the 50% off in the offer increased, so did attention (H6, 0.259, t = 4.27, p < 0.001). In turn, as attention to the deal increased, buyers felt more in control of the exchange compared to the seller being in control (H7, 0.422, t = 7.11, p < 0.001). Enhanced salience of the 50% offer also increased feelings of buyer control (H8, 0.112, t = 2.01, p = 0.045). Those reporting they would pay more attention to the deal also evaluated the deal as fairer (H9, 0.340, t = 5.79, p < 0.001). As in Study 2, fairness led to greater deal evaluation (H3, 0.590, t = 13.55, p < 0.001). Similar to the relationship between seller control and fairness in Study 2 (H2), those who felt more in control of the exchange were more likely to believe the deal was fair (0.306, t = 5.15, p < 0.001) and to intend to purchase (H10, 0.289, t = 5.17, p < 0.001). Finally, positive deal evaluations led to greater purchase likelihood (H11, 0.572, t = 11.54, p < 0.001).
Table 5.
Study 3 Results.

H Path B t-value P

H2 Buyer control → Fairness 0.306 5.15 0.001

H3 Fairness → Deal evaluation 0.590 13.55 0.001

H4 Frame → Attention 0.148 2.58 0.010

H5 Frame → Salience 0.212 3.78 0.001

H6 Salience → Attention 0.259 4.27 0.001

H7 Attention → Buyer control 0.422 7.11 0.001

H8 Salience → Buyer control 0.112 2.01 0.045

H9 Attention → Fairness 0.340 5.79 0.001

H10 Buyer control → Purchase likelihood 0.289 5.17 0.001

H11 Deal evaluation → Purchase likelihood 0.572 11.54 0.001

Overall, the model explains 60.8% of purchase likelihood, 31% of deal fairness, 34.9% of deal evaluation, 21.1% of buyer control, and 16.6 % of attention to the deal.

Attention and Salience Checks

The positive coefficient (0.212) in the model supports the frame→salience path for H5. In addition, ANOVA reveals significant mean differences (F = 13.32, p < 0.001) in the salience of the discount for the BN/GN frame (M = 5.67) compared to the GN/BN frame (M = 4.87). That is, compared to the traditional GN/BN frame, the BN/GN frame leading with the restriction (“When you buy two”) led participants to be more likely to indicate that the “50% off” stood out more than “when you buy two.” Conversely, the traditional order of leading with the discount and the trailing restriction led participants to be more likely to report “when you buy two” stood out compared to “50% off.”

We also examined the relationship between salience and valence (coded as dislike = −1, neutral = 0, and like = 1) associated with each hotspot (see Figure 5). As salience of the discount increased on the 7-point scale, so did liking (0.125, t = 2.21, p = 0.027) of the “Save 50%” hotspot. Interestingly, the greater the liking of the discount, the greater the liking (0.185, t = 3.76, p < 0.001) of “when you buy two.” Proportionately, a cross-tabulation reveals that 44.9% of those who liked the “Save 50%” in the BN/GN frame also liked “when you buy two,” compared to only 39.6% of those in the traditional GN/BN frame. In the BN/GN frame among those who liked the 50% discount, 15.9% disliked “when you buy.” In the GN/BN frame, 19.8% disliked “when you buy.” These proportions are significantly different (Χ2 = 89.07, p < 0.001). Together these indicate the BN/GN frame enhances the salience and the valence of the offer itself and the choice (viz., to accept the restriction) of buying two to get the deal.

We accounted for individual differences. Females (0.135, t = 2.63, p = 0.009) and those married were more likely (0.131, t = 2.50, p = 0.013) to pay attention to this deal (to buy two tickets) and less likely to perceive buyer control (−0.148, t = 3.03, p = 0.002) than singles. Gender and marital status did not influence other constructs. Income, education, and age did not influence attention or any other model constructs. Those who more frequently purchased tickets in the past were more likely to indicate that they would purchase tickets with the offer (0.096, t = 2.42, p = 0.015). Including these variables did not alter the significance levels of any of the hypothesized paths.

Discussion

The first three studies test the promotion framework for admission-based experiences to illustrate the processes by which the BN/GN frame should perform better than the GN/BN frame. The results suggest consumers encountering the BN/GN frame are more likely to think an offer is a fair, good deal as the offer feels like a bonus or a reward for buying, that it is under their control, and the deal is easy to choose and get what they want. The fluency of the if-then causal thinking increases the salience and valence of the offer (save 50%) in the BN/GN frame, producing an overall more positive evaluation of the deal and subsequent intentions to buy the tickets in advance.

We now replicate the second study in the field, followed by general discussion of theoretical and managerial implications. This study is important to establish external validity and the generalizability of our effects to the domain of actual purchase behavior, a construct of managerial relevance.

Study 4

In addition to ongoing promotions, admissions-based experiences frequently offer holiday deals to attract patrons when more time is available for social occasions and hedonic consumption. Six Flags offers up to half-off for the Coca-Cola July 4^th weekend (when you use promo code COKE at checkout). Disney offers a holiday package celebrating 50 years of Disney with up to $950 dining credit and a 14-day ticket for the price of a 7-day pass when guests book stays of at least five nights. NBA and NHL teams offer holiday packs like the Vegas Golden Knights with two tickets for mezzanine seats to three games for $399 with $50 food and beverage gift card at select games. We selected a similar type of promotion for a single holiday game promotion to test our theory in the field.

In cooperation with an NBA team, the Dallas Mavericks, this study examines the role of the GN/BN-BN/GN frame in an email marketing campaign. Identical to the second study, the discount was 30% off and the restriction was that it was only available for select seats for a limited time. The Black Friday promotion lasted until 3:00 PM (See Figure 5). Study participants were 329,647 basketball fans who received one of the two email offers: “30% OFF SELECT MAVS TICKETS” or “SELECT MAVS TICKETS 30% OFF.” The two conditions were matched on the team’s database in terms of contacts, accounts, and leads. The dependent measure was the click-through rate.¹

The BN/GN frame produced an 8% higher click-through rate (3.51%, N = 5,788) than the GN/BN frame (3.25%, N = 5,358, Z = 4.14, p < 0.01). The team’s web analytics reveal that typically 12.5% of those who click-through convert to purchases averaging $115/order. Thus, the additional 430 click-throughs lead to an estimated incremental revenue of $6,181. Given national averages for click-thru rates of 2.3% (see www.campaignmonitor.com for annual updates), moving the needle to 3.51% places the team on the high end of the spectrum ranging from 0.7% for retail to 4.4% for education and well above its own sector of travel, hospitality and leisure (1.4%).

General Discussion

We begin with the managerial implications to highlight the practical importance of using the BN/GN frame to improve competitive advantage for the service provider. We follow with theoretical and methodological contributions and close with calls for future research. These topics are of importance not only to service providers but also to other contexts where marketers are faced with presenting good and bad news to consumers.

Managerial Implications

The decision to present deals using the GN/BN or BN/GN frame is perpetual in the advance selling of admission-based experiences. The service provider faces limited space or inventory, for specific dates and times, and for different quantities or price tiers. As one senior executive at a National Hockey League team shared, “We need to cap the number of discounts or give-aways in order to limit financial exposure, but we worry that fans will be turned off by the restriction.” Our studies reveal service operators employing the BN/GN frame can avoid turning off customers. Instead, leading with the restriction can increase response rates and engender customer feelings of shared gain as they feel rewarded for being a customer, find it easy to get what they want, and feel like it’s a bonus for buying (see the buyer control items in Table 2).

While the single-game incremental revenue may seem trivial for an NBA team, sports venues run email marketing campaigns for virtually every homestand, much like other leisure service operators do for seasonal promotions. Some Major League Baseball teams run over 100 sales promotions for an 81-game season at home (Brown 2018). Based on the results above, an NBA team with 41 home games and a conservative estimate of 20 email marketing campaigns with offers might produce incremental revenue of up to $123,620 with the BN/GN frame compared to the GN/BN frame. Sellers that continue with traditional practices year-after-year forego substantive opportunity costs.

Referring to Figure 1, the BN/GN frame (see inset) should produce better financial results than the GN/BN frames in these instances. Even if equivalent results, our studies suggest the BN/GN frame produces more positive evaluations of fairness and deals offered than does the GN/BN frame. Thus, over the long term, the service provider considering the recipient’s news order preferences should improve competitive advantage over those maintaining a self-serving seller’s orientation to sharing news.

Experience Restriction BN/GN frame

Texas Rangers Conditions For select games score 50% off Rangers tickets

Manilow on Broadway Conditions On select tickets save $20

Fandango Movies Conditions Buy $40 gift card: Get a free ticket to any movie

Arizona Snowbowl Conditions On select weekends enjoy 40% off

Disneyland Duration On a 3-Day Disneyland Resort child ticket save $86

Events Center Condition On select tickets save 20% or more

Royal Caribbean Quantity Second guest 60% off | 3^rd and 4^th guests 30% off

AXS (NBA tickets) Condition On select Clippers games no taxes no fees

Ski and summer resort Condition Buy full-price lift ticket get free lodging

A secondary managerial implication is that perceived fairness improves when offers are presented in the BN/GN frame with the restriction plainly in view. Marketers often suffer from an image and trust problem with consumers (Sheth and Sisodia 2005). Media frequently report on failures or negative aspects of marketing (Cluley 2016). Marketing tactics often discourage price search (Lindsey-Mullikin and Petty 2011). Consumers have long distrusted sales advertisements (Aditya 2001) and attitudes have worsened to the point that over two-thirds do not trust brand advertising in general (Tenzer and Chalmers 2017). In short, consumers believe marketers do not play fairly. Greater use of the BN/GN frame is one step in the right direction to marketing in a more transparent approach.

Theoretical Implications

We provide a sales promotion framework incorporating recipient’s news order preferences in the context of the advance selling of admission-based experiences that should apply in other settings. Sales promotions are explicit value propositions inviting consumers to participate. Presenting consumers with bad news of the restriction then the good news of the discount produces stronger feelings or perceptions that the buyer is in control rather than at the mercy of the seller. Individuals have a basic need for control (Pervin 1963) and are less willing to take a risk to buy something if anxious or feeling out of control (e.g., Benthin, Slovic, and Severson 1993). Thus, applying news order preferences of recipients to offers with a BN/GN frame prompts feelings of buyer control over seller control and is apt to produce the results demonstrated in Study 4 not only in admission-based experiences, but in a variety of consumption contexts.

To the extent our framework is applicable to tangible goods as much as intangible services, we contribute to the sales promotion and price information pricing literature beyond the scope of admission-based experiences. Our findings reinforce early work suggesting restrictions may represent a hurdle producing feelings of inconvenience and irritation (Inman, Raghubir, and Davis 1997). These studies add to the literature on price promotion framing and design specifically (e.g., Krishna et al. 2002; Garnefeld et al. 2018), and scarcity effects more generally (Cannon, Goldsmith, and Roux 2019; Hamilton et al. 2019). If restrictions in the GN/BN frame are meant to signal scarcity (actual or not), these findings suggest the BN/GN frame presents the offer in a way that does less to make consumers feel manipulated and more to feel like they are getting what they want to buy.

Methodological Contribution

The measures of seller control in study 2 and buyer-seller control in study 3 provide the basis for future research in buyer-seller relationships in promotion contexts. Promotions represent a change in the value proposition that prompt a reassessment of the fairness and benefits associated with the deal.

Promotional incentives in the service industry largely follow the GN/BN frame pattern of offer followed by restriction. The deal presentation to offer what we sell with a restriction we impose (viz., Figure 2, the sales promotion framework) is indicative of the financial industry, starting with toasters and wall clocks if customers opened a new account in the 1960s during highly regulated times, to today where common practice is to offer cash bonuses followed by stipulations (e.g., Get $450 Welcome Deposit at HSBC, with qualifying activities within a time frame and $5,000 monthly deposits for 3 months). Airlines follow the same GN/BN frame format of free miles, discounted tickets, or companion tickets when the buyer chooses select flights, at select times, within a time frame. Thus, these and other service industries, provide opportunities to test and refine our measures of buyer-seller control and to determine if the predictive validity approaches the robust results we found to relative to fairness and purchase probabilities for admission-based experiences.

Some work suggests other factors, such as the channel (digital/online vs tangible/in-store) may also influence perceptions of control influencing coupon redemption (Kang et al. 2006). Measuring perceived buyer-seller control and other situational factors regarding coupon redemption or other deals offering rebates, cents-off, or quantity discounts could use or adapt these measures to assess the appropriate format and subsequent effects on usage rates.

The first study demonstrates the preference for the BN/GN order in promotions targeting frequent ticket buyers. The next two studies demonstrate process. With the ease of online ad testing, sellers can readily assess perceived buyer-seller control of offers before market launch. The BN/GN frame garners attention and makes the offer more salient, thereby enhancing the perception buyers are in control of the exchange. These factors are notably important in the advance selling context. Tickets and reservations are sold via intermediaries (viz., Ticketmaster; Hotwire), primary sellers (viz., Dallas Mavericks; Hilton Hotels) and resellers (individual buyers or brokers) for many experiences. Information asymmetry is relatively high given supply and demand fluctuations such that buyers may miscalculate the value of changes in prices (Wakefield and Wakefield 2018). Thus, commercial enterprises must consider how value propositions are perceived given the fact sellers have more information on inventory supply and demand fluctuations than do consumers—and consumers are apt to be wary of the disadvantage.

Finally, since price promotions trigger reward seeking (Shaddy and Lee 2020), our studies show it is better to frame offers with a BN/GN that models if-then reward logic: “If I incur cost X, then I get reward Y.” Or, in the case of being a customer or a fan, the mechanism or frame should follow the same logic: “If I am a fan, then I get a reward.” Our measure of buyer-seller control strongly influences the purchase decision, both directly and indirectly by improving the perceptions of a fair, good deal. Thus, future sales promotion research should account for the predictive and explanatory power afforded by understanding if the offer is consistent with news order preferences and, in short, appeal to the intended targets of the promotion.

Future Research and Limitations

Future research might examine the promotion frame, buyer-seller control, and individual differences (viz., reward sensitivity, price sensitivity, etc.) in different situations on reward-seeking behavior (Shaddy and Lee 2020; Wadhwa, Shiv, and Nowlis 2008; Wakefield and Inman 2003). For example, our findings are consistent with recent research (Grewal and Stephanie 2020) indicating the use of handheld scanners increases perceived control among those with shopping budgets that increases sales for unplanned, healthier, and impulsive purchases. Unknown is whether the use of scanner devices, which focus attention on offers, would differentially influence shoppers encountering GN/BN versus BN/GN frames.

We focus on what qualifies or restricts the offer in terms of duration, quantity or other limitations, but we do not examine restrictions on who qualifies. Future research may find that limitations based on group memberships (veterans, seniors, students, etc.) may operate in much the same way or may differ based on what other restrictions accompany the offer and in what order.

Our first study indicates differences may exist in news order preferences in promotional contexts between infrequent and frequent buyers. The qualitative insights suggest frequent buyers prefer and favorably process the if/then logic of the BN/GN frame, but that infrequent buyers may opt for the traditional GN/BN frame. More work is needed to understand the information processing that differs across buying segments and news order preferences in promotions and other marketing contexts (viz., consumer reviews).

Further work is needed to determine limitations or other boundaries to the effectiveness of the BN/GN frame, including discount or savings levels and how they are presented (viz., Suri, Monroe, and Koc 2013). Traditional GN/BN frames typically present the offer in larger font size and follow with the restriction in small or even footnoted print. Further work could evaluate attentional control (Peschard and Philippot 2016) via eye-tracking or other means to determine the presentation effects. It may also be that reversing the order of some restrictions (e.g., those displayed in discussing managerial implications) might be perceived differently. We argue doing so will make the deals seem under the buyer’s control and fairer, but future research can examine the contexts and boundaries that may apply.

While we examined the effect of the BN/GN frame to prompt feelings of buyer control, it may also be true that the traditional GN/BN frame could prompt buyers to process the discount as a concession or consolation for choosing a limited time, space, or place. Other frames might nudge buyers accordingly, such as “Enjoy 40% off—as our thanks on select weekends,” or “40% Off: Your reward on select weekends.” Future research could examine the efficacy of each value proposition across different settings, categories, or clientele (viz., first-time versus repeat buyers).

Even though tickets are a critical category within the advance selling of admission-based services, these studies are limited to that domain. Future work in other domains oriented toward hospitality and tourism is needed. Further, the scope of our work in sales promotions is limited to service-dominant businesses, but we expect the BN/GN frame to produce similar results in the sales of packaged goods. Future research is needed to determine if differences exist.

Accordingly, subject to future research, we expect Lowe’s would do better to reframe plumbing supply offers to “When you buy 10 or more save 20%.” Walmart would benefit from reframing grocery delivery offers with, “Spend $50 or more and get $10 off.” Academy would find more takers for, “Buy the reel and get $50 off a Shimano SLX rod.” Such research might also explore consumer perceptions of retailers who more frequently use BN/GN frames than GN/BN frames. Such research would extend news order preference research further into the retail sales promotion and price information processing literature.

Seller control	% choosing buyer control	Buyer control
Feels like a restriction they put on me to get a ticket	62.6%	68.6%	Feels like a reward I earn for incurring a cost
Feels like strings are attached	59.3%	64.1%	Feels like a bonus for buying
Makes me feel everything is under their control	55.9%	54.6%	Makes me feel everything is under my control
Makes it difficult to get the deal I want	63.2%	72.2%	Makes it easy to get the deal I want*
Takes advantage of me for being a customer	54.7%	76.9%	Rewards me for being a customer
Lets them offer what they want to sell	52.1%	55.3%	Lets me choose what I want to buy
Mean scale score (0–6)	3.48	3.92

	Attention	B-SControl	DealEval	Fairness	Frame	PurchaseIntention	Salience
Frame	0.227	−0.019	0.197	0.166	1	0.041	0.212
Salience	0.296	0.233	0.284	0.234	0.212	0.223	1
Attention1	0.857	0.335	0.684	0.424	0.200	0.574	0.237
Attention2	0.903	0.404	0.651	0.439	0.235	0.595	0.330
Attention3	0.886	0.409	0.598	0.387	0.160	0.573	0.206
PI1	0.601	0.533	0.670	0.486	0.007	0.947	0.183
PI2	0.647	0.576	0.715	0.528	0.056	0.968	0.225
PI3	0.632	0.563	0.693	0.479	0.053	0.943	0.229
BS1	0.370	0.776	0.42	0.373	−0.023	0.481	0.145
BS2	0.337	0.800	0.419	0.411	−0.039	0.473	0.177
BS3	0.251	0.728	0.343	0.320	−0.058	0.388	0.142
BS4	0.382	0.763	0.397	0.341	0.021	0.466	0.191
BS5	0.352	0.703	0.388	0.290	0.050	0.439	0.241
BS6	0.198	0.674	0.270	0.262	−0.053	0.324	0.133
Deal1	0.690	0.471	0.939	0.589	0.270	0.686	0.300
Deal2	0.697	0.483	0.918	0.488	0.091	0.681	0.243
Deal3	0.661	0.475	0.945	0.574	0.185	0.670	0.251
Fair	0.473	0.454	0.590	1	0.166	0.523	0.234

		α	CR	AVE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	Attention	0.858	0.913	0.779	0.882
2	Buyer-seller control	0.837	0.880	0.550	0.434	0.742
3	Deal evaluation	0.927	0.953	0.872	0.730	0.510	0.934
4	Fairness	1	1	1	0.473	0.454	0.590	1
5	Frame	1	1	1	0.227	−0.019	0.197	0.166	1
6	Purchase	0.949	0.967	0.908	0.658	0.585	0.727	0.523	0.041	0.953
7	Salience	1	1	1	0.296	0.233	0.284	0.234	0.212	0.223	1

H	Path	B	t-value	P
H2	Buyer control	→	Fairness	0.306	5.15	0.001
H3	Fairness	→	Deal evaluation	0.590	13.55	0.001
H4	Frame	→	Attention	0.148	2.58	0.010
H5	Frame	→	Salience	0.212	3.78	0.001
H6	Salience	→	Attention	0.259	4.27	0.001
H7	Attention	→	Buyer control	0.422	7.11	0.001
H8	Salience	→	Buyer control	0.112	2.01	0.045
H9	Attention	→	Fairness	0.340	5.79	0.001
H10	Buyer control	→	Purchase likelihood	0.289	5.17	0.001
H11	Deal evaluation	→	Purchase likelihood	0.572	11.54	0.001

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Kirk L. Wakefield

Note

Author Biographies

Kirk L. Wakefield is the Edwin W. Streetman Professor of Retail Marketing, Baylor University, Hankamer School of Business, #98007 One Bear Place, Waco, TX 76798, Kirk_Wakefield@baylor.edu.

Priya Raghubir is the Dean Abraham L. Gitlow Professor of Business, Stern School of Business, New York University, 40 West 4th Street, Suite 816, New York, NY 10012, USA, +1 212 998 0727, raghubir@stern.nyu.edu.

J. Jeffrey Inman is the Associate Dean for Research and Faculty and the Albert Wesley Frey Professor of Marketing at the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, jinman@katz.pitt.edu.

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Seller control	% choosing buyer control		Buyer control
Item	Frame		Item
Coded as 0 if selected.	GN/BN	BN/GN	Coded as 1 if selected
Feels like a restriction they put on me to get a ticket	62.6%	68.6%	Feels like a reward I earn for incurring a cost
Feels like strings are attached	59.3%	64.1%	Feels like a bonus for buying
Makes me feel everything is under their control	55.9%	54.6%	Makes me feel everything is under my control
Makes it difficult to get the deal I want	63.2%	72.2%	Makes it easy to get the deal I want*
Takes advantage of me for being a customer	54.7%	76.9%	Rewards me for being a customer
Lets them offer what they want to sell	52.1%	55.3%	Lets me choose what I want to buy
Mean scale score (0–6)	3.48	3.92

Experience	Restriction	BN/GN frame
Texas Rangers	Conditions	For select games score 50% off Rangers tickets
Manilow on Broadway	Conditions	On select tickets save $20
Fandango Movies	Conditions	Buy $40 gift card: Get a free ticket to any movie
Arizona Snowbowl	Conditions	On select weekends enjoy 40% off
Disneyland	Duration	On a 3-Day Disneyland Resort child ticket save $86
Events Center	Condition	On select tickets save 20% or more
Royal Caribbean	Quantity	Second guest 60% off \| 3^rd and 4^th guests 30% off
AXS (NBA tickets)	Condition	On select Clippers games no taxes no fees
Ski and summer resort	Condition	Buy full-price lift ticket get free lodging