Intelligence-Led Policing

Abstract

The capacity of police organizations to adopt innovative practices is poorly understood. This article compares and contrasts the uptake of one particular innovation: intelligence-led policing (ILP), in New Zealand, using a survey of 286 officers and 32 depth interviews to explore police attitudes and perceptions of the organizational factors influencing the adoption of ILP. We found that leadership and effective use of technology were critical to initiating and sustaining innovation. We conclude with a discussion of how police departments might best plan for and execute the adoption of new, innovative approaches to crime control.

Keywords

innovation strategic innovation continuous innovation intelligence-led policing

Introduction

Innovation is a broad and multifaceted concept, emerging in a variety of forms and affecting society in diverse and important ways. Innovation includes a range of changes in practice, from adopting new technology to rethinking social networking, and is generally defined as adopting something new with the intention of benefit or improvement (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Rogers, 2003). Some of the most crucial components of innovation are the factors that facilitate the manner in which innovation is taken up within a social or organizational context. Damanpour (1991) depicts organizational innovation as a new product, service, technology, process, structure, administrative system, plan, or program that an organization implements to improve performance. Organizational innovations are transmitted discreetly or through sweeping reforms, takeovers and mergers, planned improvement, or evolutionary development (Rogers, 2003).

The study of innovation reveals a broad range of factors that explain the success or failure of innovation (Rogers, 2003). Innovation research also shows how innovations diffuse across social systems and highlights the types of factors that influence the adoption of innovations (Damanpour, 1991; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Rogers, 2003; Young, Charns, & Shortell, 2001).

Diffusion studies converge on the characteristics of a new product or practice that determine the pace of adoption and the factors that influence individuals, social groups, or organizations to adopt innovations (Wolfe, 1994). Innovation studies also consider the factors and processes that influence innovation uptake in organizations (Damanpour, 1991; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Rogers, 2003; Slappendel, 1996; Wolfe, 1994). These studies focus on how a wide range of organizational and environmental factors shape the uptake and development of innovation within organizations, addressing questions such as the role of organizational size, administrative arrangements, and bureaucracy in supporting innovation (Damanpour, 1991; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Wolfe, 1994). Other approaches focus on the role of leaders and champions in promoting innovation (Howell & Higgins, 1990).

Organizational factors in police agencies shape effectiveness and the adoption of innovation (Bayley, 2002; Mastrofski, 1998; National Research Council, 2004; Wilson, 1968). Changes in policy, procedure, structure, practice, training, leadership, and management arrangements are the principal mechanisms used to take innovation from idea to actuality (National Research Council, 2004). However, like the broader public sector, police often struggle to innovate successfully. Braga and Weisburd (2007, p. 17) conclude that “police most easily adopt innovations that require the least radical departure from their hierarchical paramilitary organizational structures, continue incident-driven and reactive strategies, and maintain police sovereignty over crime issues.” Technical, programmatic, and administrative innovations that support, or do not threaten, these features fare better than strategic innovations. The National Research Council reports that there is “little research about the innovation processes or how it can be facilitated” (p. 9). Our literature review confirms this. Even broadly defined there have been less than 10 empirical studies evaluating the determinants of organizational innovation in police organizations in the past 15 years (see Darroch, 2009).

Our study responds to these research deficits and endeavors to fill some important gaps in police innovation research. The uptake of intelligence-led policing (ILP) in New Zealand presents an opportunity to review how different police areas within a national police agency react to a strategic innovation (see also National Research Council, 2004). This study examines the relative uptake of ILP within four police sites across New Zealand. We use a survey of 286 officers and depth interviews with 32 respondents to explore organizational factors that constrain or facilitate the capacity of police to adopt the key principles of ILP. We examine 13 organizational-level variables to assess their importance to the uptake of innovation. The factors include goals, boundaries, formalization, technology, transactional leadership, transformational leadership, management style, organizational culture, management of change, loose coupling, interconnectedness, management commitment to ILP, and overall innovativeness (see Darroch, 2009). We begin the article with a review of recent police innovations and the emergence of ILP. We then describe the New Zealand Police (NZP) and introduce our research approach and data. In the third section we present our results and we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for police innovation more broadly.

Literature

Public, private, large, and small organizations all face a myriad of challenges in creating opportunities for innovation, fostering and encouraging innovation, and managing change. Organizations need to nurture novel and embryonic ideas and carefully manage the uptake and development of innovation. Resistance to change is an ever-present concern (Coch & French, 1948; Dent & Galloway Goldberg, 1999; Waddell & Sohal, 1998). An extensive literature on innovation and change management sets out the variety of challenges that emerge throughout the innovation life cycle (see, for example, Damanpour, 1991; Dunphy, 1996; Ford, 2002; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Kotter, 1995; Rogers, 2003; Schneider, 2003; Senge, 1990; Senior, 1997; Slappendel, 1996; Thomas, 2001; Webb & Cleary, 1994; Young et al., 2001).

The innovation life cycle explores how innovations develop from first knowledge to institutionalization within organizations (Rogers, 2003). Innovation literature tackles how innovations diffuse (Rogers, 2003) and the processes and factors associated with the adoption and implementation of innovation (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981; Rogers, 2003; Waarts, van Everingen, & van Hillegersberg, 2002). Innovation research presents insights into the innovation life cycle, including the role managers play and the influence of organizational size on innovation uptake (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Rogers, 2003). However, the study of organizational innovation is complicated, with contradictory findings often confounding the research (Slappendel, 1996; Wolfe, 1994). It is important to carefully specify the conditions of particular innovation research rather than to generalize research findings too broadly (Light, 1998; Slappendel, 1996; Walker, 2007; Wolfe, 1994).

Implementing innovation in the public sector is particularly challenging (Altshuler, 1997; Borins, 2001; Lipsky, 1980). The complications of politics, a media that enthusiastically reports failure, and the absence of market-driven incentives can paralyze public sector innovation (Altshuler, 1997). Confusion about goals or loosely coupled goals and acceptable behaviors can undermine innovation efforts (Lipsky, 1980). The shortcuts and simplifications used to achieve routine frontline service delivery can create unanticipated problems (Lipsky, 1980). A particular challenge in the public sector is to move successful local or small-scale innovations to large-scale organization-wide innovations. Public sector innovation frequently fails to make this transition from small to large (Borins, 2001).

The innovation challenges faced by the public sector are exemplified in police organizations (Bayley, 1989; Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988; National Research Council, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2005; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990). Historically, police innovation is especially troubled by resistance to reform (Etter, 1995; Finnane, 1999; Ford, 2002; Goldstein, 2003; Mastrofski & Uchida, 1993; Scott, 2003; Skogan, 2008; Zhao, Thurman, & Lovrich, 1995), a tendency to adopt innovations superficially (Allen, 2002; Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003), tensions between frontline officers and managers (Reuss-Ianni, 1983), and a conservative police culture (Chan, 1997; Foster, 2003). Research also shows that police organizations are unwilling to adopt strategic reform (Allen, 2002; Altshuler, 1997; Lipsky, 1980; National Research Council, 2004).

Innovations in policing such as community-oriented policing (COP), problem-oriented policing (POP), intelligence-led policing (ILP), and performance management initiatives such as CompStat¹ are arguably the best examples of recent innovative reforms in policing. ILP emerged in the 1990s as a strategic innovation in response to the call for more business-like policing models (John & Maguire, 2003, 2004; Maguire & John, 2006). ILP seeks to use modern information management tools and management techniques to achieve the goals of policing (Tilley, 2003). Ratcliffe (2003, p. 3) defines ILP as

the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evidential base.

ILP is not intended to be a static programmatic, administrative, or technical innovation (National Research Council, 2004) but rather a dynamic strategic process that incorporates crime reduction goals and sets challenging evidence- and effectiveness-based standards for policing tactics and strategies (Ratcliffe, 2003). ILP presents strategic challenges to police organizations that are likely to stimulate questions about the role of the police as well as generate supporting programmatic and managerial changes necessary to properly implement ILP (Ratcliffe, 2003; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

ILP innovation has developed in many locations, but, as was the case with COP, the implementation of ILP has also experienced significant difficulties (Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008). Ratcliffe (2008, p. 213) observes that “it is easily possible for intelligence-led policing to fall by the wayside and become lost in the history of failed attempts of law enforcement to move away from the traditional focus on reactive, investigative policing.”

New Zealand Police (NZP)

The NZP is New Zealand’s national and only public police organization. The NZP employs 10,300 staff, of whom 8,000 are sworn officers working from 360 police stations and offices across the country (NZP, 2008). New Zealand has a population of just over 4 million people, distributed over a land mass of 266,200 square kilometers, about the size of Japan and slightly larger than the United Kingdom (Statistics New Zealand, 2008). The NZP is a national police agency, so all officers and police interview participants involved in this study are recruited to national standards, receive standardized training, and are subject to the same policy regime. More than 99% of the officers are members of the same union, the New Zealand Police Association (Berry, O’Connor, Punch, & Wilson, 2008). All research participants in our study were members of the NZP. Previous studies of policing in New Zealand have taken advantage of national standards in policy and practice, which provide a high level of consistency in background features while allowing for variability in specific locations (Ratcliffe, 2005; Winfree & Taylor, 2004).

The NZP operates a distributed governance model. This involves managing a decentralized organization divided into 12 districts (NZP, 2008). Districts typically operate with three police areas, although some of the larger districts with more dispersed populations operate with six police areas. Inspectors manage areas and typically employ 100 to 150 sworn officers (NZP, 2008). Within broad goal, policy, financial, and employment settings, district commanders are charged with delivering police services that meet the needs of their local communities and support organizational goals of achieving crime reduction and improving community safety. District commanders have license to promote and encourage innovation (NZP, 2006). Nationally, crime trends had been slowly going downwards over the 5 years prior to this research (Statistics New Zealand, 2008).

The NZP began experimenting with ILP from the late 1990s in a small number of areas. Most districts and areas adopted some form of intelligence practice as part of their organizational structure (Office of the Auditor General New Zealand, 2006). Since 2004, the uptake of ILP has accelerated with the development of the New Zealand crime and crash reduction model.² This has encouraged (but not mandated) police areas and districts to adopt ILP through using standardized intelligence products and managing intelligence processes as suggested by Ratcliffe’s (2003) 3I model. The development of ILP was not driven from the top but led by individual commanders at area and district levels, who implemented intelligence practice focused on enforcement and reducing and suppressing crime within their local commands (Office of the Auditor General New Zealand, 2006).

For our study, the site selection process sought to identify four NZP areas that represented two strong and two weak examples of ILP innovation uptake within the NZP.³ Drawing from the work of Ratcliffe (2002, 2003, 2005) and Cope (2004) an ideal-type ILP model was developed representing a well-deployed and high-functioning implementation of ILP. The ideal-type model included features such as clearly defined intelligence structures, sound intelligence processes (including collection and analysis of intelligence, the development of options, and communication of these to decision makers), a well-developed problem-solving process (persistent problems are identified and a systematic problem-solving approach such as Scanning Analysis Response and Assessment is followed), clearly defined evidence-based products (intelligence products that utilize crime sciences and evidence of effective police practice) with unambiguous recommendations for decision makers, and use of a broad variety of tactics, including prevention, disruption, and enforcement.

Decision makers also need to be fully involved in the intelligence process. This might be demonstrated by the presence of a weekly whole-of-area meeting and directed daily briefings. Sound basic processes and procedures necessary to support intelligence will be in place, such as good file management, and there should be evidence of training and supervision for key intelligence personnel. There may be evidence of the systematic tracking of performance relevant to intelligence and decision-maker recommendations. Finally, there should be evidence of frontline staff and investigators taking actions on the direction of decision makers and the recommendations of Intelligence units. The deployment of ILP at strong innovation sites closely matched the ideal-type model. ILP at weak innovation sites was remote from the ideal-type model. A comprehensive survey of NZP areas was undertaken to identify four suitable examples of strong and weak ILP innovation.

The four areas needed to be broadly similar in terms of sociodemographics; as such we carefully matched police areas to a number of environmental factors such as demographic, population, and economic characteristics and general officer characteristics. These sites could then be compared and contrasted on a range of factors using qualitative and quantitative research approaches to explore the uptake of ILP innovation. The selection process was based on the work of Moore, Spelman, and Young (1992). They describe a methodology for identifying police innovations, setting out an approach to understanding what constitutes innovation within a substantive field. We adapted this approach and used it to identify innovative police areas within a national police organization. We considered a wide range of factors when assessing police areas, utilizing a variety of information sources. Drawing from Ratcliffe (2003) we formulated a clear definition of ILP and developed an ideal-type model identifying the features of a best-practice ILP model.

We then conducted a substudy to identify four police areas. The substudy used a panel of five experts to identify likely sites. All experts were employed by the NZP and had specialist skills and experience as performance analysts and/or intelligence professionals (such as senior practitioners, managers, and trainers). The experts shortlisted potential sites, based on their judgment through continuing direct observation of NZP districts and areas, in particular current knowledge of intelligence practice within areas. An extensive content analysis of official performance documentation was undertaken. The documentation consisted of routinely gathering reviews of district and area performance. We considered the presence of innovative ILP practice and asked whether other innovations were evident within the area. The documentation was systematically analyzed for key terms (such as intelligence-led policing, tactical tasking meetings, analysis, intelligence units, and intelligence product) and content including evidence pointing to the implementation and functioning of ILP. From a shortlist of possible sites we then matched sites by key variables such as size, location, general environment, population, and policing issues. Using this approach to site selection, we chose two strong and two weak ILP innovation uptake sites within the NZP (for a full description of the process see Darroch, 2009).

The focus of our study was on understanding the factors associated with the uptake of ILP innovation and how these factors interact and influence the adoption of innovation. We selected four sites in New Zealand that exemplified strong and weak uptake of ILP innovation. Table 1 sets out the comparative site data for the four selected sites, including population data, number of sworn officers, and crime data.

Table 1.

Comparative Site Data—Population, Sworn Officers, Crime 2005

Total population	Population aged 10-25 years (% of total population)	Population diversity	Number of sworn staff (male, female)	Number of non-sworn staff (male, female)	Total Crime 2005 and % change 2001/02 to 2005/06
Strong innovation
Site A: Mātātā
54,162	11,100 (20.5%)	European^a 43,662 (77%)	90 (64, 12)	20 (3, 17)	5,089
		Māori 11,016 (20.3%)			0.82
Site B: Takahē
43,128	11,334 (26.3%)	European 39,111 (65.94%)	83 (72, 11)	14 (2, 12)	6,822
		Māori1 5,624 (26.3%)			0.83
Weak innovation
Site C: Hihi
59,211	10,926 (18.4%)	European 49,278 (79.4%)	95 (85, 10)	25 (4, 21)	8,723
		Māori 10,122 (16.3%)	1.10
Site D: Kea
83,817	16,917 (20.18%)	European 65,850 (75%)	133 (110, 23)	41 (10, 31)	9,752
		Māori 18,735 (21.36%)			0.90
Average
60,079.5	12,569	21%	100.2	25	7,596

Both European and Māori categorizations are determined through self-selection as part of the New Zealand census.

Source: New Zealand Police, December 20, 2005.

The research sites were all NZP areas based around provincial cities in the North Island of New Zealand. All selected areas were organized and structured in the same way. The areas were all led by an area commander. In New Zealand, senior sergeants are the next management level reporting to area commanders and are responsible for a diverse range of management tasks. Sergeants manage constables and are responsible for some administrative functions. The police areas provide police services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. For the purposes of this study, the police areas are referred to using pseudonyms, which enhance the confidentiality of research participants. The pseudonyms used for the strong innovation uptake sites are Mātātā (pronounced phonetically Ma-ta-ta) and Takahē (pronounced phonetically Ta-ka-hei), and for the weak innovation uptake sites the pseudonyms used are Kea (pronounced phonetically Key-a) and Hihi (pronounced phonetically He-he).⁴

The population of all officers at the ranks of constable and sergeant level were surveyed at the four research sites. Following introduction by letter we visited each major station at each research site. Predeployment roll-calls and meetings at each station were attended and surveys were administered and returned. Table 2 shows return rates for each site.

Table 2.

Return Rates for Intelligence-Led Policing Survey

Sites	Eligible officer population	Number of officer survey returns	Return rate (of adjusted n) and %)
Strong innovative sites
Mātātā	85	67	78.82
Takahē	91	75	82.42
Weak innovative sites
Hihi	80	59	73.75
Kea	121	85	70.25
Overall	377	286	75.86

Considerable effort was put into obtaining a good return rate from the office population. Follow-up was completed with key contacts at each site in an effort to ensure the highest possible return rate. Overall, a 75% return rate was achieved across our research sites.

In addition to the self-administered survey 32 depth interviews were completed with key informants across the 4 research sites. Interviews were conducted with officers in management roles, officers supervising intelligence units, and community partners and community representatives to provide context and understanding to the survey results. Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim and then content analyzed.

Results

Leadership

Research highlights the importance of police leadership in shaping both officer behavior and police organizational behavior (National Research Council, 2004). Leaders can, for example, significantly reduce the incidence of unlawful conduct by officers by providing unequivocal leadership on what behaviors will and will not be tolerated (National Research Council, 2004; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). Unfortunately, however, the research literature on police leadership is limited in explicating the role of leadership in fostering innovation (National Research Council, 2004). An important approach from this literature considers transactional and transformational leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1994). This leadership model demonstrates usefulness in many organizational environments and its utility in supporting innovation and change (Antonakis, Avolio, & Sivasubramaniam, 2003; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Hoyt & Blascovich, 2003). Transactional leaders rely on authority and manage by exception; this style of leadership emphasizes the transaction that takes place between leaders and followers (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Tichy & Ulrich, 1989). Transformational leaders stimulate, motivate, or inspire staff to perform desired behaviors (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Tichy & Ulrich, 1989). Transformational leaders can also act as mentors or coaches, paying attention to the individual within the organization (Bass & Avolio, 1994). The relationship between transactional and transformational leadership is an important one for paramilitary organizations like police agencies, which might be expected to rely more heavily on transactional leadership behaviors than some other organizations.

Table 3.1 presents the results of our officer survey questioning officers across our research sites about their experience of transformational leadership. Differences between the sites were modest, but a number of them were statistically significant. Officers at strong uptake sites Mātātā (M = 11.56, p = .000) and Takahē (M = 11.44, p = .001) viewed their local police areas as having higher levels of transformational leadership than did officers at the weak uptake site Hihi (M = 10.13). Officers at weak uptake site Kea (M = 11.15, p = .014) also viewed their local police area as having higher levels of transformational leadership than did officers at weak uptake site Hihi (M = 10.13). There were no statistically significant differences between the research sites for the factor transactional leadership (see Table 3.2).

Table 3.1.

Transformational Leadership

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
11.56	1	Mātātā	x	ns	.000*	ns
11.44	2	Takahē	ns	x	.001*	ns
10.13	4	Hihi	.000*	.001*	x	.014
11.15	3	Kea	ns	ns	.014	x

Note: F = 6.80, df = 3, p < .000; Partial Eta Squared = .067; ns = not significant.

*p < .05.

Table 3.2.

Transactional Leadership

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
11.94	2	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	ns
11.99	1	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
11.41	3	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
11.37	4	Kea	ns	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 3.21, df = 3, p < .02; Partial Eta Squared = .033, p < .05; ns = not significant.

At strong uptake sites transactional leadership was balanced with transformational leadership and focused on encouraging officers to perform ILP tasks such as directed patrols at hot spots, bail checks of active offenders, targeting of the routine activities of prolific offenders, and contributing to the intelligence process with their own knowledge and insights. When managers used authority they focused on ILP tasks and behaviors. Commanders at strong uptake sites emphasized motivating staff and encouraging officer participation, but balanced this with a transactional focus on performance of key ILP tasks. Managers at strong uptake sites engaged in transactional leadership in a narrow way to support officer uptake of ILP behaviors. This approach by managers was consistent at both strong uptake sites. Expected behaviors were specific, clear, and logically linked to ILP. Transactional leadership was used to support the uptake of ILP behaviors by officers in New Zealand.

Our results showed strong levels of transformational leadership at our high-innovation sites. Our results were somewhat confounded by the finding that officers at Kea also reported significantly higher levels of transformational leadership than did colleagues stationed at Hihi. We explored these results further, examining the difference in officer perceptions within Kea, by rank, in the transmission of transformational leadership at the middle manager level, between senior sergeant and inspector ranks. Transformational leadership was evident at the sergeant level but was stymied in the middle ranks (see Darroch, 2009). As such we suggest that the failure to transmit leadership down through the middle ranks was an important barrier to innovation uptake at Kea.

Overall transformational leadership was a prominent feature at strong uptake sites. Managers focused on inspiring officers and developing officer confidence about ILP and their role in contributing to it. The area commander at Mātātā, for example, describes how he engaged with his officers. The commander sought officer participation in the intelligence-gathering process by tapping into officer craft or street knowledge (Sklansky & Marks, 2008) and characterized his role as that of a “coach.” The commander was consistent in his efforts to build confidence and to encourage local officers to understand that they “have the biggest impact on crime.” The commander encouraged his officers by “celebrating” success when crime reduction results were achieved.

Area commander Mātātā:

Um, it’s about, it was about talking about the belief that we’re people made the that have the biggest impact on crime. So if we had good numbers we celebrated them, if we didn’t have good numbers we asked the questions, you know, just like the coach does at half time if you’ve lost the first half, you know. What are we doing wrong here, what are we missing? Someone in this room knows why theft ex’s⁵ have gone through the roof here, or wherever it is and someone in this, at you know, at the station meeting has the answers, someone has spoken to the kid that’s done it or has spoken to them in the past and self, again it came back to that self-belief thing.

Efforts to build bottom-up support for ILP, engender confidence in ILP, and celebrate the successes of ILP were pivotal to the uptake of ILP innovation. Celebration of crime reduction was important. It signaled the effectiveness of ILP to officers and reinforced its merits. Key managers at strong uptake sites built support for ILP one officer at a time through encouragement and coaching.

Managers at strong uptake sites worked hard to inspire officers and stimulate interest and enthusiasm about ILP. They focused on building confidence and winning officer “commitment over compliance” (area commander Mātātā). There were also efforts to encourage officer participation in the development of ILP. These kinds of behaviors are typical of transformational leaders (Bass & Avolio, 1994). Similarly, transformational leadership stood out as a key factor supporting the uptake of ILP innovation.

Goals and Loose Coupling

A critical factor in successful implementation of innovation within any organization is goal clarity. Organizations and their constituent members need to be clear about why the organization exists and what they are trying to achieve (Boyne, 2003; Simon, 1964). Goals function to unify organizational members and focus action (Boyne, 2003). Loose coupling describes a weak relationship between the formal goals of an organization and the day-to-day behavior of frontline personnel (Crank & Langworthy, 1996). Evidence from the police literature demonstrates that the extent of loose coupling is an important influence on officer behavior (Falcone, Wells, & Weisheit, 2002; Mastrofski, Ritti, & Hoffmaster, 1987).

Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present results of our officer survey assessing officer views of local area goals and loose coupling. Our survey found no statistically significant differences across any of our research sites for the factors goals and loose coupling.

Table 4.1.

Goals

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
6.13	3	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	ns
6.30	1	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
5.97	4	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
6.15	2	Kea	ns	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 1.55, df = 3, p < .203; Partial Eta Squared = .016, p < .05; ns = not significant.

Table 4.2.

Loose Coupling

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
5.26	2	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	ns
5.29	1	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
4.95	4	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
4.87	3	Kea	ns	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 3.29, df = 3, p < .021; Partial Eta Squared = .034, p < .05; ns = not significant.

Despite the null findings from our officer survey, depth interviews revealed important differences in how managers at strong and weak uptake sites used goals. Our survey tested for general commitment to local area goals; evidence from interviews with key respondents pointed to differences in specific ILP-related goals. Interviews with key respondents established that managers at strong uptake sites set specific, challenging crime reduction goals to stimulate innovation at strong uptake sites. One commander set crime reduction goals at 50% over 5 years.

Challenging crime reduction goals stimulated continual planning for improvements in crime reduction and stimulated managers to find new and innovative ways to achieve those goals. Our interviews at weak uptake sites failed to establish evidence of challenging crime reduction goals being set. While officers appeared committed to general local area goals, this did not translate into commitment to ILP-related goals.

The police literature describes the difficulties police have in aligning organizational goals and routine officer behavior. Often a disconnection is reported between publicly stated goals and the realities of day-to-day officer behavior (Coleman, 2008; Lipsky, 1980; Maguire & King, 2004; Mastrofski et al., 1987; Weisburd et al., 2003). Our research, however, showed that police use of challenging ILP-related crime reduction goals was important to the uptake of innovation. This illustrates both the commitment of managers to ILP and a willingness to take risks (such as a potential failure to meet crime reduction goals) in order to pursue ILP. Our research shows police using goals in a novel way to encourage innovative practice and intensify thinking about how strategies and day-to-day practice might support crime reduction, reductions in traffic accident rates, and increases in resolution rates.

Boundaries

Police organizations are characteristically defensive about organizational boundaries and this defensiveness has underpinned resistance to innovations such as community policing (Long, Wells, & De Leon-Granados, 2002; Scott, 2000). This defensiveness is also often linked to the police culture that is associated with qualities such as suspiciousness, social isolation, and group loyalty (Paoline, 2003; Reiner, 1997). Table 5 presents our officer survey results for the factor boundaries.

Table 5.

Boundaries

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
10.02	2	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	ns
10.24	1	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
9.81	3	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
10.02	2	Kea	ns	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 2.02, df = 3, p < .402; Partial Eta Squared = .010, p < .05; ns = not significant.

As Table 5 shows, no statistically significant differences were reported between our research sites for the factor boundaries. This finding shows that officers at sites with different experiences of ILP innovation did not perceive any difference in the permeability of organizational boundaries.

Our officer survey findings and interview findings diverge on the importance of organizational boundaries. Despite the null finding from our survey results, interviews with key respondents demonstrated that boundaries at strong uptake sites were more permeable than those at weak uptake sites. This was particularly true in important areas of boundary delineation for the NZP. The extent to which local government, nongovernment agencies, particularly Māori tribes, authorities, or groups, and local agencies of central government participate in decision making are important issues for local police managers. How much the local community is able to participate in policing is also important in determining boundary permeability. What was observed was a much higher level of openness at strong uptake sites.

At Mātātā, for example, there was evidence of widespread use of volunteers to support local policing and intelligence activities, comprehensive engagement with other central government agencies, and the innovative use of civilians in support roles traditionally undertaken by sworn officers. Managers at strong uptake sites were willing to experiment and innovate with changes to organizational boundaries in order to establish effective approaches to local crime reduction challenges. At weak uptake sites boundary defensiveness with key partners was demonstrated and there was much less willingness to experiment with traditional police boundaries. More characteristic boundary defensiveness was evident at weak uptake sites (Long et al., 2002; Paoline, 2003; Reiner, 1997; Scott, 2000).⁶ The difference between our sites suggests research into police boundaries needs to address subtle differences that our survey instrument was not attuned to.

Police Culture and Interconnectedness

Many police researchers have focused on the police culture as an important influence on police behavior (Bowling & Foster, 2002; Chan, 1997; Foster, 2003; Reuss-Ianni, 1983). Recently, research has pointed to the dynamic nature of police culture and the variety of interactions that shape and change the culture (Chan, 1997; Cochran & Bromley, 2003; Reiner, 2000; Rosenbaum, Yeh, & Wilkinson, 1994; Sklansky, 2007; Skolnick, 2008). The traditional police culture is characterized by social isolation and group loyalty driven by shared experiences and an unpredictable operational environment (Paoline, 2003). The police culture has been presumed to be a major barrier to police innovation, but no strong evidence supports the link between police culture and actual police behavior (National Research Council, 2004).

One component of culture is the strength of members’ social ties or interconnectedness. Interconnectedness describes the extent to which the units in a social system are linked by interpersonal networks (Rogers, 2003). Linton (2002) and Rogers suggest that new ideas may flow more easily within a social system if there is a high degree of interconnectedness and that this flow can support innovation uptake.

As Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show, our survey of officers showed no statistically significant differences between our research sites for the factors police culture and interconnectedness. This null finding suggests that police culture and the viscosity of social relationships were consistent across our research sites.

Table 6.1.

Organizational Culture

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
9.25	2	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	ns
9.42	1	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
8.93	3	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
8.71	4	Kea	ns	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 2.66, df = 3, p < .048; Partial Eta Squared = .028, p < .05; ns = not significant.

Table 6.2.

Interconnectedness

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
9.04	2	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	ns
8.82	4	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
8.88	3	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
9.21	1	Kea	ns	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 1.47, df = 3, p < .223; Partial Eta Squared = .015, p < .05; ns = not significant.

Our interviews with key respondents drew accounts of positive local cultures at strong uptake sites and descriptions of mixed features at weak uptake sites. There was no consistent theme regarding the state of the culture at weak uptake sites. Stronger and more consistent themes emerged from interviews at strong uptake sites. A repeated theme was the description of a “can do” subculture. A key senior sergeant respondent from Mātātā described the local culture, drawing comparisons between Mātātā and other police areas in which he had worked.

Key senior sergeant 2 Mātātā:

Ah, for me yeah. Some of the things that um, ah, ah, probably don’t stand out much to me now because I’ve been there three years but when I first came back here things that really stood out for me was the can do attitude um, the um, the sort of um, the involvement of the management group in day-to-day policing. Um, the um, joint decision making. Um, the um, um, just the um, the focus on crime reduction um, and identifying problems and um, finding solutions and, doing specific um, you know your DPR⁷ um, your um, ah, taskings and all that sort of thing, which we’ve developed over the last two or three years further with the tactical co-ordinators role um, has certainly dd . . ., you know um, is different from where I’ve ever worked before. Um, the ah, the involvement of the CIB in it is, is ah, is different um, the use of a tactical group is different um, and yeah, just the willingness of, of everyone to ah, to be involved to ah, get a result really.

Officers at strong uptake sites found the ILP environment attractive and valuable for a number of reasons: The successful implementation of ILP gave officers clear goals, along with unambiguous tools and mechanisms to achieve those goals. Successful crime reduction encouraged officer engagement and commitment, and ongoing success reinforced officer support. Consistent reinforcement from leadership in depth across the area supported the development of a positive subculture.

Recently, the utility of police culture as an explanation for police behavior was called into question. Researchers point out that the link between police culture and police behavior is unproven and that police culture may be more diverse and less influential than previously proposed (Chan, 1997; National Research Council, 2004; Sklansky, 2007; Skolnick, 2008). Police officers may share an occupational identity, but many factors, particularly situational factors, influence actual police behavior far more than culture (National Research Council, 2004). In addition, research suggests distinctive police subcultures can emerge that are shaped by factors such as demographic changes and changes in patterns of officer education (Sklansky, 2007; Skolnick, 2008).

Our research shows the emergence of a distinctive subculture associated with the strong uptake of ILP innovation. The ILP subculture had the following characteristics: a broadly accepted focus on crime reduction as the overarching goal for local police, support for partnerships and problem solving as legitimate policing strategies, tolerance for experimentation and trial of novel approaches, support for ILP, a willingness to follow ILP leadership, openness to learning, and a willingness to participate and contribute to improvement and general innovation. New Zealand police officers share a culture or occupational outlook, but this outlook is not a factor that influences the uptake of innovation. While the police culture may cause police officers to share a common outlook, many other factors are more important in shaping actual behavior, and any negative aspects of police culture appear to be readily attenuated.

Formalization and Management Style

Formalization describes the density of the administrative apparatus within an organization and includes the intensity of features such as rule making, procedures, and overall bureaucracy (Maguire, 1997). The formalization of police organizations has been seen as a barrier to police innovation, particularly reforms such as COP and POP (Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Moore & Stephens, 1991; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988), with reduced formalization allowing police greater freedom to develop innovative solutions to the challenges of day-to-day policing (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Maguire, 2003; Moore & Stephens, 1991). Management style describes the approach managers take in their day-to-day interactions with staff. Management style assesses the extent to which staff believe they can participate in the management process, and research suggests a more participative management style is associated with successful police innovation (Beck & Wilson, 1997; Dick & Metcalfe, 2001; Eck & Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994; Sklansky & Marks, 2008; Toch, 2008; Wood, Fleming, & Marks, 2008).

Table 7.1 presents the results of our officer survey for the factor formalization. Although numerically small, statistically significant differences were detected between the sites. Our results show officers at strong uptake sites Mātātā (M = 9.73, p = .004) and Takahē (M = 9.49, p = .000) viewed their local police areas as less formal than did officers at weak uptake site Kea (M = 10.73). Officers at strong uptake site Takahē (M = 9.49) also viewed their police area as less formal than did officers at weak uptake site Hihi (M = 10.44, p = .014).

Table 7.1.

Formalization

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
9.73	3	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	.004*
9.49	4	Takahē	ns	x	.014	.000*
10.44	2	Hihi	ns	.014	x	ns
10.73	1	Kea	.004*	.000*	ns	x

Note: F = 8.23, df = 3, p < .000; Partial Eta Squared = .081; ns = not significant.

p < .05.

Table 7.2 presents the results of our office survey for the factor management style with again small but significant findings. Our results show officers at strong uptake site Mātātā (M = 13.74) viewed their local police area as having a significantly more open management style than did officers at weak uptake sites Hihi (M = 13.00, p = .045) and Kea (M = 13.07, p = .049). There were no other statistically significant differences.

Table 7.2.

Management Style

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
13.74	1	Mātātā	x	ns	.045	.049
13.53	2	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
13.00	4	Hihi	.045	ns	x	ns
13.07	3	Kea	.049	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 3.72, df = 3, p < .012; Partial Eta Squared = .038, p < .05; ns = not significant.

Our survey findings demonstrate that officers at strong uptake sites viewed their local police areas as less formal than officers at weak uptake sites viewed their areas. Managers engaged officers at strong uptake sites in a more participative way than managers at weak uptake sites. This enabled officers to feel closer to their managers and more comfortable taking independent action. Officers at strong uptake sites also believed they had more influence over their job, could contribute more to solving problems at work, and were part of a stronger team environment. These results support a growing body of research evidence highlighting the importance of both encouraging participation by officers in the innovation or reform process and reducing formalization to enable open comment and full participation by officers (Beck & Wilson, 1997; Dick & Metcalfe, 2001; Eck & Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990; Lurigio & Skogan, 1994; Sklansky & Marks, 2008; Toch, 2008; Wood et al., 2008).

Management of Change

Management of change is an umbrella term that describes managers’ deliberate efforts to facilitate the introduction of an innovation or change (Argyris, 1989; Leavitt, 1989; Young et al., 2001). Advice on managing change comes from the business literature and is prolific (Dunphy, 1996; Ford, 2002; Kotter, 1995; Lewin, 1989; Schneider, 2003; Senge, 1990; Senior, 1997; Thomas, 2001; Webb & Cleary, 1994). Approaches recommended by the voluminous change management literature have been criticized for being simplistic, formulaic, lacking an empirical evidence base, and having a high failure rate (Todnam, 2005).

Table 8 presents our officer survey findings for the factor management of change. Officers at strong uptake sites Mātātā (M = 10.49, p = .000) and Takahē (M = 9.99, p = .002) viewed their local police area as managing change significantly better than did officers stationed at weak uptake site Kea (M = 8.98). No other statistically significant differences were reported.

Table 8.

Management of Change

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
10.49	1	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	.000*
9.99	2	Takahē	ns	x	ns	.002*
9.66	3	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
8.98	4	Kea	.000*	.002*	ns	x

Note: F = 9.90, df = 3, p < .000; Partial Eta Squared = .095, ns = not significant.

p < .05.

Our interviews with key respondents bolstered our survey findings, linking effective change management with strong innovation uptake. Managers at strong uptake sites were highly motivated to implement change effectively. A superordinate commitment to crime reduction motivated managers to undertake ILP-related innovation as well as secondary innovations seen as necessary to achieve crime reduction. The crime reduction orientation of managers also motivated them to pursue effective change management strategies.

Management Commitment to Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)

Management commitment to ILP sends a strong message to officers about the importance of ILP and sets expectations about what officers are expected to do to support ILP. Police and innovation research has demonstrated the central role that management commitment can play in innovation uptake. Clear management support for community policing, particularly when coupled with supportive behaviors (in particular those identified in this article), facilitates innovation uptake (Ford, Weissbein, & Plamondon, 2003). Management support has also been shown to influence the uptake of problem solving by officers (Rosenbaum et al., 1994).

Table 9 presents our officer survey findings for the factor management commitment to ILP, with differences between the sites modest but significant. Officers at strong uptake site Mātātā (M = 9.24, p = .000) viewed their managers as more committed to ILP than did officers at weak uptake site Kea (M = 8.24). Officers at weak uptake site Hihi (M = 9.06, p = .006) also viewed their managers as more committed to ILP than did officers at weak uptake site Kea (M = 8.24). No other statistically significant differences were reported.

Table 9.

Management Commitment to Intelligence-Led Policing

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
9.24	1	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	.000*
8.65	3	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
9.06	2	Hihi	ns	ns	x	.006
8.24	4	Kea	.000*	ns	.006	x

Note: F = 7.14, df = 3, p < .000; Partial Eta Squared = .071, ns = not significant.

p < .05.

Managers at Mātātā were strongly committed to ILP and the finding that officers were cognizant of this is consistent with our broad findings. The finding that officers at Kea viewed management commitment to ILP as weak is supported by interviews with key informants. While the area commander at Kea was personally committed to ILP, other managers were less committed or not committed, and because of this, support for ILP was not communicated down through the chain of command. Managers at Kea were confused about ILP and leadership was inconsistent.

Our interviews with key respondents at Hihi explained why officers reported high levels of management commitment to ILP. Efforts to develop ILP at Hihi were strongly driven from the top within the local police district. Officers understood there was high-level management commitment to ILP and this is reflected in our survey results. However, the absence of other supportive factors meant this understanding did not translate into uptake of ILP. This is consistent with earlier research demonstrating the importance of coupling management support with supportive behaviors (Ford et al., 2003). Our findings suggest that management commitment alone is insufficient to support the development of ILP.

Innovativeness

Innovativeness is the degree to which a social unit adopts innovations before other social units in the same social system adopt them (Rogers, 2003). Studies of police innovativeness have focused on the adoption of technology and the influence of environmental factors on the diffusion of police innovations (Morabito, 2008; Skogan & Hartnett, 2005; Weisburd & Lum, 2005; Weiss, 1997; Zhao, 1996).

Table 10 presents our officer survey findings for the factor innovativeness, with numerically small but significant findings. Officers at strong uptake site Mātātā (M = 8.62, p = .001) viewed their area as more innovative than officers at weak uptake site Kea viewed their area (M = 7.74). There were no other statistically significant differences.

Table 10.

Innovativeness

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
8.62	1	Mātātā	x	ns	ns	.001*
8.01	3	Takahē	ns	x	ns	ns
7.98	2	Hihi	ns	ns	x	ns
7.74	4	Kea	.001*	ns	ns	x

Note: F = 5.08, df = 3, p < .002; Partial Eta Squared = .051, ns = not significant.

p < .05.

Interviews with key respondents showed that innovativeness was a strong feature of the organizational environment at Mātātā. At Mātātā, features included developing simplified paperwork for officers and more permeable organizational boundaries. When interviewed about innovation within Mātātā, the area commander contrasted Mātātā with other police areas. In his view Mātātā was innovative and prepared to try new approaches and “have a crack.” He describes not only being open to new ideas but also wanting to develop new innovations to a higher standard and more quickly than anyone else.

The challenges of developing ILP fostered broader innovations at strong uptake sites but had the opposite effect at weak uptake sites, creating hostility to innovations. Overall, in the interviews there was little tolerance for risk taking or encouragement of innovative practices at weak uptake sites.

Technology

Technology describes the processes and systems an organization uses to accomplish its work (Maguire, 2003). In the past decade, information technology has become the bedrock of most police processes and systems. Rosenbaum suggests that since 2001, police have entered an information technology era. The emergence of data-driven policing, hot spots policing, CompStat geographically based crime fighting (Rosenbaum, 2007), and ILP (Ratcliffe, 2003, 2008) all emphasize the importance of information technology to contemporary policing. However, research shows that when police do adopt new technology, results are often disappointing. Rather than taking the opportunity to try fresh approaches, police integrate technology into traditional structures and approaches (Chan, Brereton, Legosz, & Doran, 2001; Maguire & King, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2003). The emergence of ILP has been accompanied by information technology–related challenges, including managing and maintaining data quality and data flow (Cope, 2004; Tilley, 2003; Townsley, Johnson, & Pease, 2003).

Table 11 presents our officer survey findings for the factor technology. Officers at strong uptake sites Mātātā (M = 15.18, p = .000) and Takahē (M = 13.91, p = .001) viewed their local police areas as making better use of technology than did officers at weak uptake site Kea (M = 12.45). Officers at strong uptake site Mātātā (M = 15.18, p = .000) also viewed their local police area as making better use of technology than did officers at weak uptake Hihi (M = 13.48). Officers at strong uptake site Mātātā (M = 15.18, p = .010) also viewed their local police area as making better use of technology than did officers at strong uptake Takahē (M = 13.91).

Table 11.

Technology

Mean	Rank		Mātātā	Takahē	Hihi	Kea
15.18	1	Mātātā	x	.010	.000*	.000*
13.91	2	Takahē	.010	x	ns	.001*
13.48	3	Hihi	.000*	ns	x	ns
12.45	4	Kea	.000*	.001*	ns	x

Note: F = 16.9, df = 3, p < .000; Partial Eta Squared = .152, ns = not significant.

p < .05.

Our findings clearly demonstrate the importance of technology to the uptake of innovation in New Zealand. Officers at strong uptake sites, particularly Mātātā, clearly viewed their local areas as making much better use of technology than did officers at weak uptake sites. Successfully adapting technology was strongly associated with the uptake of innovation.

Our interviews with key respondents bolstered the results presented in our officer survey. In particular, clear features distinguished the approach of managers at strong uptake sites to the challenges of technology. At Mātātā, managers recognized that officer judgments about technology (broadly defined as processes and systems supporting ILP) as well as about the effectiveness of information technology would be determined by the performance of the local intelligence unit. To guarantee the unit’s credibility, managers intentionally populated the unit with the highest quality staff who carried the respect of fellow officers. Managers also ensured no “lame ducks” (key senior sergeant 2 Mātātā) worked in the Intelligence Unit. There was an explicit recognition that the intelligence unit was at the heart of how the area organized its work as well as how the area adapted to new technology (Maguire, 2003; Ratcliffe, 2008).

Heavy emphasis was placed on the standing of the personnel who populated the unit. Managers recognized that officers would judge the credibility of local ILP as well as the area’s use of technology by the performance of the local intelligence unit. This approach was highly successful, with officers viewing their local area as making the best use of technology across all research sites. The effective use of technology was clearly linked to the strong uptake of innovation.

Discussion and Conclusion

Organizational innovation is difficult to achieve. It requires agility to innovate almost continuously and a capacity to experiment with everything from new products to fundamental reform of core business. Successful implementation of innovative practice also requires an organizational capacity to embrace and grow from a “healthy” level of resistance while at the same time overcoming deep-seated, pervasive, and counterproductive levels of defiance. By far the most challenging reform is embracing strategic change, with wide-ranging implications for organizational arrangements and external relationships. Global experiences with implementing community-oriented policing (COP), for example, demonstrates the struggles of police agencies to move beyond programmatic reform or administrative change toward more strategic innovation (King, 2000; National Research Council, 2004). Our case study analysis of the implementation of ILP in the New Zealand Police (NZP) allowed us to systematically explore the facilitators and barriers to a program of strategic reform. Our research findings compare and contrast how differing approaches to important organizational factors have produced divergent outcomes across our research sites. Within a national police agency different configurations and approaches to a broad range of important organizational factors have both encouraged and limited innovation uptake. Our findings help clarify the importance of some factors in supporting innovation and suggest others which are complex and require further investigation. Statistically significant differences were seen between officers’ responses at high- and low-innovation sites, but 6 of the 13 variables were not statistically distinguishable.

Leadership emerged as making the most important contribution to the uptake of ILP innovation. Transactional leadership behaviors at strong uptake sites focused on important ILP-related tasks. Managers limited the use of authority in ensuring these tasks were completed. The clearest and strongest evidence emerged for the importance of transformational leadership to the uptake of innovation. Managers at strong uptake sites focused on inspiring and motivating individual officers to support ILP. Failure to transmit leadership through the rank structure was associated with resistance to change and weak innovation uptake. Key leadership coalitions were necessary for innovation to flourish. Where leadership lacked a critical mass or was deficient in the command structure, ILP innovation struggled.

Managers at innovative NZP areas recognized the importance of inculcating both technically proficient and socially acceptable intelligence practice. For ILP to succeed, frontline officers needed to hold their local intelligence units in high regard. To ensure this, highly credible sworn officers were sought and trained for intelligence roles. Technical proficiency was demonstrated through skill in the use of information technology tools and consistency in developing quality intelligence products that focused on achieving crime reduction goals.

As well as expecting high technical standards, key leaders recognized and encouraged ILP performance by officers. Officers were encouraged to follow the suggestions of their intelligence units and the directions of the decision maker.⁸ Performance of ILP behaviors was benchmarked and improved over time. If encouragement failed and officer performance dropped below acceptable standards, more directive transactional leadership behavior came to the fore.

Our research also shows that an additional factor was important in stimulating the ILP innovation life cycle in New Zealand: At both strong uptake sites police managers identified a strong commitment to crime reduction as an important factor stimulating ILP development. Managers were seriously committed to crime reduction as a superordinate goal and set ambitious crime reduction targets for themselves. ILP provided a model for achieving crime reduction goals.

Our research supports some of the main criticisms of police made in recent decades. At strong uptake sites many of the features called for as a necessary part of police reform, such as reduced formalization and more participative approaches, were evident (Eck & Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Maguire, 1997; Moore & Stephens, 1991; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988). At weak uptake sites more formalized and less participative approaches were apparent. Our research demonstrates that less formal and more participative police organizations support innovative police reform. This finding is consistent with recent research demonstrating the importance of participative approaches in supporting reform (Toch, 2008; Wood et al., 2008).

In contrast, other factors did not shape the innovation life cycle as expected. The evidence for police culture influencing police behavior is mixed, with little supportive empirical evidence (National Research Council, 2004). Despite this, the police culture is an often-cited explanation for negative police behavior and is often associated with police resistance to change (Maguire, 1997; Moore & Stephens, 1991; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Sarre, 1996; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988). Our research failed to find that the traditional police culture had any direct or necessary influence on innovation uptake. Traditional police culture appeared to be a consistent background feature of the NZP, with no variability between strong and weak uptake sites. Our finding is more aligned with recent studies questioning the impact and influence of police culture (Sklansky, 2007; Skolnick, 2008). Both our officer survey and depth interviews with key respondents showed that the traditional police culture was neutral with regard to innovation uptake. What emerged as important was how managers engaged with officers to neutralize any potentially negative expression of police culture and enhance positive aspects.

Manager commitment to ILP was not important to supporting the innovation life cycle. Public commitment to ILP by senior management, by itself, was insufficient to persuade officers to support change. At one weak uptake site conspicuous senior management support for ILP did not translate into officer support. Management support, although stated clearly to officers, appeared to be too removed from day-to-day reality to influence officer behavior. In the absence of other factors, senior management support for ILP was ineffective in facilitating officer support for ILP.

Our research posits the actions, motivations, and qualities of individual leaders as foundational to the emergence of a system of innovation, incorporating strategic and continuous innovation processes at strong uptake sites. Our research highlights the explanatory power of the individual paradigm (Slappendel, 1996) in explicating the development of these key processes. The intention of key leaders was to reshape local policing using ILP. Leadership stood out as important to the innovation process.

Individual leaders used Ratcliffe’s (2003) 3I model to support the innovation process, structure management thinking, and provide the vehicle for focusing crime reduction efforts. Managers were willing to pursue the logical consequences of management thinking as this turned from addressing the implementation of ILP to considering how wider obstacles to crime reduction could be overcome. Key outcomes of this thinking included reimagining external relationships, work methods, and goals and reconsidering how core activities could support crime reduction. This process exemplifies strategic innovation (King, 2000; Moore, Sparrow, & Spelman, 1996; National Research Council, 2004).

Our study selected the four police sites by purposively looking for extremes in ILP uptake. As such, our results are derived from areas that fall at the extreme low and high ends of the uptake continuum. While we carefully selected these extreme sites to compare and contrast the factors that either facilitated or constrained innovation uptake, our approach includes, by design, an inability to understand innovation uptake across a generalizable distribution of police jurisdictions. This limitation, while common in studies of police organizations or other aggregated units, means that our study results should be interpreted as exploratory and thus not generalizable to either the New Zealand Police or any other population of police jurisdictions. Whether these findings are specific to the New Zealand environment or are features of the wider policing milieu is an open question. Given the geographic isolation of New Zealand and its unique cultural influences, it would be surprising if some features of ILP innovation life cycle in New Zealand were not unique. What is clear is that the effectiveness of changes in police organizational arrangements determines the course of police innovation. As our research demonstrates, innovations such as ILP are brought to life through changes in leadership, goals, technology, boundaries, practice, and management arrangements.

Footnotes

Appendix

Organizational Variables—Item Scales and Clustering

Factors	Number of items	M (SE)	SD	Range	α (CI)
Organizational factors
Goals	2	6.1 (.05)	0.88	6	.70 (.62-.76)
Boundaries	3	10.03 (.08)	1.43	9	.74 (.68-.79)
Formalization	3	10.11 (.11)	1.84	9	.52 (.42-.60)
Technology	5	13.70 (.15)	2.56	15	.81 (.77-.84)
Transactional leadership	4	11.68 (.09)	1.60	12	.70 (.65-.76)
Transformational leadership	4	11.11 (.11)	2.02	12	.77 (.73-.81)
Management style	5	13.33 (.09)	1.57	11	.71 (.65-.76)
Organizational culture	4	9.07 (.10)	1.73	9	.56 (.47-.64)
Management of change	4	9.74 (.11)	1.84	9	.77 (.73-.81)
Loose coupling	2	5.09 (.06)	1.03	7	.77 (.73-.81)
Interconnected-ness	4	9.00 (.08)	1.23	7	.69 (.61-.74)
Management commitment to ILP	3	8.75 (.09)	1.49	9	.78 (.73-.82)
Innovativeness	3	8.07 (.09)	1.45	9	.81 (.77-.85)

Note: The survey utilized a 4-option Likert-type response (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree).

Officer Survey Items—Organizational

Qualitative Questions— Organizational—Community Partners

Qualitative Questions—Organizational—Police

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to acknowledge the support of the New Zealand Police in conducting this research, Dr Rebecca Wickes for her advice and assistance and Professor Richard Wortley for his support, advice, and wise council during the research process.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Funding and support for this research was received from the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), Brisbane, Australia.

Notes

Bios

Steve Darroch in an inspector in the New Zealand Police and completed his PhD in 2009 supervised by Professor Lorraine Mazerolle. He has professional and academic interests in crime sciences, police innovation, and the prevention of major social problems through the application of science to problem analysis. He is particularly interested in the role of policing in addressing crime and related social problems in neighborhoods and communities.

Lorraine Mazerolle is an Australian Research Council Laureate fellow and research professor in the Institute for Social Science Research (ISSR) at the University of Queensland. She is also the foundation director and a chief investigator in the ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), a chief investigator in the Drug Policy Modeling program, and the ISSR “Policing and Security” program director. She is the recipient of numerous U.S. and Australian national competitive research grants on topics such as community regulation, problem-oriented policing, police technologies, civil remedies, street-level drug enforcement, and policing public housing sites. She is a fellow of the Academy of Experimental Criminology, former president of the Academy, and author of scholarly books and articles on policing, drug law enforcement, regulatory crime control, displacement of crime, and crime prevention.

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