Do Changes in TASER Use Policy Affect Police Officer Injury Rates?

Abstract

The addition of TASERs as a less lethal use-of-force option for police officers has facilitated much discussion in recent scholarship. Many police agencies have responded with force policy changes specific to appropriate applications for these weapons. While the goal of these changes is often to minimize concern about injury to citizens, debate rests on whether injury rates for officers are influenced by such transitions in policy. The present study used officer injury panel data from the City of Dallas (Texas) Human Resources Department to assess the impact of a 2005 modification to the Dallas Police Department’s TASER policy. The goal of the study was to assess change in the rate of officer injury after the implementation of a more restrictive policy. We observed a modest increase in the monthly rate of police officer injuries following the policy restricting use. These results were found net of other effects, with some noteworthy between-patrol-division variation. Implications for TASER use policy and future research are discussed within.

Keywords

police use-of-force TASER force officer injury

Studies centered on police TASER use have emerged in recent years,¹ adding new arguments to popular police use-of-force debates (Alpert & Dunham, 2010; Bishopp, Klinger, & Morris, 2015; Chermak, 2009; Crow & Adrion, 2011; DeLone & Thompson, 2009; Ferdik, Kaminski, Cooney, & Sevigny, 2014; Gau, Mosher, & Pratt, 2010; Lin & Jones, 2010; National Institute of Justice (U.S.) [NIJ], 2011; Paoline, Terrill, & Ingram, 2012; Police Executive Research Forum & U.S. Department of Justice [PERF & USDOJ], 2011; Thomas, Collins, & Lovrich, 2011; Williams, 2012). The resulting discussion has revealed a lack of consistency in TASER policy among U.S. police agencies and has raised questions about the TASER’s role in both citizen and officer injuries. Presented here is a brief history and overview of typical TASER policy, a look at empirical evidence concerning TASER policy success, and an empirical outcome evaluation of one large police agency’s transition to a more restrictive TASER use policy on change in rates of officer injury.

Background

Gau et al. (2010) outlined the issue that necessitates proper evaluation of TASER policy in an officer safety context. The authors highlight the fact that much research has been completed for medical and descriptive purposes to analyze officer TASER use and risks posed by these weapons to suspects. Little is known, however, about risks to those who use TASERs in light of their introduction to police force options and the policies that dictate their use. Put simply, there is need for research that “embed[s] CEDs within current theoretical and empirical knowledge about police use of force” (Gau et al., 2010, p. 28). How the public is affected by police methods is certainly one of the primary aims of policing research, but a better understanding of how those who carry out justice functions are impacted by these tasks is also important. We therefore assume that attention to effects of TASER use policy on police officers has the potential to in turn improve police service.

Less lethal weapons such as the TASER were introduced to aid in protecting officers and citizens from aggressive, noncompliant subjects (Angelosanto, 2003; DeLone & Thompson, 2009). Demand has been growing for alternatives to lethal force when possible (Gau et al., 2010), but so has controversy over medical concerns such as TASER-related deaths and risk of injury or physiological changes to citizens. The latter has dominated TASER discussion in recent years. This debate has led a number of police departments to restrict TASER use, but these increasingly popular, reactive changes to TASER policy have spawned their own concerns. Use-of-force literature has revealed that agency attempts to respond to emerging apprehensions about TASER use while maintaining fulfillment of the TASER’s purpose in a law enforcement context are largely inconsistent.

While the aforementioned controversy certainly fuels concerns regarding abundant TASER use, TASER use restriction may limit officers’ ability to use the weapon as an alternative to discharging their firearms, forcing officers to go “hands-on” more frequently when compliance is necessary. This puts both suspects and officers at risk. Contemporary evidence has suggested that extreme placement of the TASER on either end of use-of-force continua results in greater rates of injury for both officers and suspects (Alpert & Dunham, 2010; PERF & USDOJ, 2011; Williams, 2012). This finding implies that police agencies with particularly strict or relaxed TASER deployment rules could reduce injuries by restructuring their policy.

PERF Guidelines

Most TASER work focuses on effects to citizens, leaving a gap in the literature regarding effects toward the police officers deploying them. The PERF addressed some of these officer concerns when they published the 2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines—findings from a study that used survey methods to examine TASER application in the United States. A joint effort with the USDOJ Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, the report comprehensively covered policy, training, use, medical, reporting, accountability, public information, community relations, and legal considerations associated with TASERs. Beginning with PERF’s earlier 2005 version, this document has guided many police agencies’ TASER policies (PERF & USDOJ, 2011). We use PERF’s report in this study as a point of reference concerning specific use-of-force issues.

Force Continua

As in any policy debate, recommendations regarding TASER use are only as strong as they are empirically sound. This was underscored in William’s (2012) conclusion that police officials considering TASER use “should research the existing scientific, medical, and technological literature to ensure they are formulating appropriate evidence-based policy” (p. 375). The problem with application of this standard to the TASER debate, however, is variation in policy recommendations by scholars specific to TASER use.

In spite of PERF’s attempt to establish and disseminate best practice recommendations, TASER policy has been found to vary greatly among law enforcement agencies. In fact, Thomas et al. (2011) reported that most agencies have not adequately met PERF guidelines. This is especially so with respect to the TASER’s place on use-of-force continua—visual aids used by many police departments in the implementation and continued application of use-of-force policies.

Force continua serve as guidelines for officers’ field decisions and help ensure that only the amount of force necessary for the resolution of a given type of resistance is applied. Many continua are structured incrementally (Terrill, 2005), and most offer a range of possibilities, within each type of resistance outlined, for gaining compliance from a combative or resistive subject. In this way, well-written use-of-force continua may maintain departmental regulation while at the same time accounting for the dynamic nature of force incidents, weapon availability, certification variation, and officer discretion.

As Thomas, Collins, and Lovrich (2010) pointed out, “no standard use of force continuum exists in the United States” (p. 293). The authors went on to highlight the fact that “it has been suggested that no other use of force tool has been as broadly used across the entire spectrum of the use of force continuum as CEDs” (p. 293)—a notion first presented by Adams and Jennison in 2007. PERF’s study reiterated this policy inconsistency, reporting that only half of the agencies included in their research incorporated TASER policy into their use-of-force rules. Other police departments, the report suggested, had a stand-alone policy for TASER use (PERF & USDOJ, 2011). Indeed, the intermediate weapons sections of many force continua function quite differently, as many police departments do not use TASERs at all (DeLone & Thompson, 2009). Agency variation in TASER policy with respect to force continuum application presents an important issue with respect to concern over both leniency and overrestriction.

Crow and Adrion (2011) observed that

… officers do not appear to respond to calls with a predetermined sense of blameworthiness that influences their decisions regarding use of force. Therefore, policies and training designed to influence TASER use should focus on types of resistance likely to be encountered. (p. 380)

These authors revealed that while consistency among force continuum placement is imperative, uniformity may matter little if the continua themselves are structured poorly. Force policy governing TASER use must therefore reflect the specific types of resistance that conducted energy devices (CEDs), such as the TASER, have been shown effective in resolving.

Controversy

The effects of TASER use are widely deliberated in TASER literature, as a number of concerns regarding proper application of this tool and optimal construction of policy governing such have been raised. As mentioned, chief among these are physiological considerations. The potential for injuries and even fatalities has therefore been examined repeatedly (Chermak, 2009; PERF & USDOJ, 2011; Taylor & Woods, 2010; Vilke & Chan, 2007; White & Ready, 2009; White et al., 2013). Media bias regarding reports of TASER use has also raised questions, as some studies have concluded that media sources tend to present TASER-related injuries and deaths disproportionately and inaccurately (DeLone & Thompson, 2009; Gaines, Kaune, & Miller, 2001; Hallett, 2007; Lovell, 2003; Ready, White, & Fisher, 2008). Finally, funding and liability issues are also commonly discussed with respect to TASER inventory, training, and use (Smith, Petrocelli, & Scheer, 2007; Wolf, Pressler, & Winton, 2009).

It may be argued that these concerns are not directly related to a question of TASER policy’s effect on rates of officer injury. It is important to note, however, that TASER policy may be affected by medical, media, and funding hesitations, which may in turn impact officer injuries. Indeed, Wolf et al. (2009) determined decisions by law enforcement agencies not to adopt TASER use was commonly due to public opinion. Lin and Jones’ 2010 work clearly stated the problem with external influences on policy construction: “If law enforcement agencies do not carefully consider and monitor their electronic control device use policies … negative public dialogue could potentially detract from the many benefits of the device” (p. 172).

Empirical Evidence

Efficacy

Recent research has deemed the TASER a useful tool for the police. White and Ready (2007) found that 85% of the suspects who received a TASER deployment in their sample were arrested without further incident following use of the TASER. In his 2009 piece, Chermak concluded that the TASER is a generally safe and effective device. During the same year, DeLone and Thompson (2009) revealed the TASER to be “overwhelmingly effective” (p. 414) in its application by a police department in the Midwestern United States.

Thomas et al. (2010) later expanded TASER literature by fulfilling the need for a sizeable sample of municipal agencies. Their study reported that 56% of the police departments they surveyed indicated a decrease in the need to practice lethal force due to TASER use. Furthermore, two thirds of the agencies in their sample that adopted the TASER specifically for the purpose of reducing lethal force indicated that the weapon satisfied the policy’s intention. Sousa, Ready, and Ault (2010) found that officers were not as likely to discharge their firearms in response to resistance when armed with TASERs. Similarly, Ferdik et al.’s (2014) large, stratified random sample of agencies at the municipal, county, and state levels revealed less restrictive TASER policies to be linked with greater TASER use as well as fewer lethal police shootings. These authors indicated “police departments should at least consider adopting more liberal policies regarding the application of this less lethal technology” (p. 328).

PERF released its own statement regarding efficacy, stating that TASERs can “reduce the need for other force options and can enable officers to subdue actively resisting or aggressive subjects” (PERF & USDOJ, 2011, p. 12). PERF went on to assert that “when used appropriately with a full understanding of their risks, ECWs (electronic control weapons) are useful weapons that can effectively help officers to resolve serious situations” (p. 16). To fill a research gap, this report also included the results of several real-world application studies that indicated findings consistent with such claims. Their report suggested that TASERs have significantly impacted policing in the United States, perhaps more than any weapon. The 2011 Guidelines were able to outline specific policy recommendations, as related to departmental regulations, based on a solid comprehension of the weapon’s usefulness.

Still, not all studies agree. Adams and Jennison (2007) proposed that TASER training, policy, and operations were too inconsistent across agencies for best practices to be established. Thomas et al. (2010) identified support for the TASER’s worth, but also found that higher force continuum placement played a role in reduced lethal force. White and Ready (2010) found the body weight of suspects, use of drugs or alcohol, violence, and close distances between suspects and officers may reduce the TASER’s effect. Other threats to efficacy, including the influence of citizen race (Crow & Adrion, 2011; Gau et al., 2010) and police misuse of TASERs (Stinson, Reyns, & Liederbach, 2012), have also been identified.

Injuries

The study by Smith, Kaminski, Rojek, Alpert, and Mathis (2007) found mixed results regarding TASER use and injuries. Their work found TASER use to be associated with a decreased probability of officer and suspect injury in one of the agencies they examined. They also found pepper spray to be a better weapon for reducing suspect injuries in another. Despite these ambiguous results, however, the authors did indicate that TASER use may be preferable to the absence of less lethal weapons. “Among other findings,” they added, “in both agencies the use of hands-on tactics by police was associated with increased odds of officer and suspect injury … ” (Smith et al., 2007, p. 423).

Smith and his coauthors were not the only researchers to examine injuries and TASER use. DeLone and Thompson (2009) found that injuries were not a concern in the midsized agency they examined, indicating that the few officer injuries they found were not TASER-related. Taylor and Woods (2010) found agencies that used CEDs had lower rates of officer injuries and fewer injuries requiring medical attention than did agencies not using CEDs. Lin and Jones (2010) suggested that “the ECD tended to replace several other types of force used to gain compliance, tended to resolve incidents involving the use of force with fewer forms of force being used, and decreased officer injury rates” (p. 152). These authors were hesitant to report the TASER as the ideal type of force, however, in regard to incidents where the threat of life was present—lending potential support to a call for separation of the TASER and deadly force options on force continua.

Lin and Jones further differentiated which aspects of TASER use appeared to reduce suspect versus officer injuries. Their observation that cases involving TASERs exhibited lower arrestee rates of injury than cases not involving TASERs seemed to be greatly impacted by TASER display. Reduction in officer injuries, however, appeared to be a function of mere agency adoption of the device.

Alpert and Dunham’s 2010 article on TASER policy and training recommendations positioned quite precisely the gap filled by the TASER’s introduction. These authors reported that both suspect and officer injuries were most likely to follow physical resistance and physical control maneuvers, respectively. Hands-on tactics comprised approximately 70% of the officer injuries they examined. They advocated the adoption of less lethal weapons, to include TASERs, by police departments in response to this problem.

PERF weighed in on the matter as well. Their 2011 Guidelines stated that “ECWs can reduce the need for more dangerous weapons and lower officer and suspect injury rates” (PERF & USDOJ, 2011, p. 16). The report reflected that police agencies documented fewer officer and suspect injuries after TASER adoption and referenced a study PERF conducted for the NIJ, which lent empirical support to this effect (NIJ, 2011; PERF & USDOJ, 2011). Their document cautioned readers against assuming TASERs to be innocuous or without limitations. Nonetheless, PERF’s statement fell in line with other researchers’ reports of the TASER’s usefulness in reducing injury.

More recently, Paoline et al. (2012) found a reduced likelihood of officer injuries when a TASER was the only weapon deployed during a police encounter. When the TASER was used in conjunction with other force options, however, the opposite effect was observed. Consideration of Paoline and his coauthors’ discovery could promote clearer force continua divisions, with the goal of reduction in instances where officers draw more than one weapon or attempt to combine force options. This type of policy guidance, however, must account for the impracticality of prohibiting movement “up” or “down” force continua during the same incident in the face of rapidly changing situations.

Williams’ 2012 comparison of the British Columbia’s Braidwood Commission reports on TASER use to findings in academic TASER literature brought Canada into the TASER policy discussion with a significant contribution. His work found that the Commission’s reports with regard to the TASER’s dangers were not empirically supported. Williams (2012) determined that police TASER restriction was “likely to result in increased injuries to officers and suspects” (p. 356). On the contrary, Terrill and Paoline (2012) found a positive relationship between police TASER use and citizen injury, lending support to TASER restriction.

Summary

Not all use-of-force studies addressing TASER use are in agreement. Several contend that TASERs are not appropriate law enforcement tools, and no study to date has argued that TASERs are a catch-all solution suited for any police incident. PERF’s Guidelines have perhaps done a better job of putting TASER use into context, stressing that

no weapon is a substitute for effective police work, and no weapon should be incorporated into the range of force options available to the police at the expense of diminishing the fundamental skills of communicating with subjects and de-escalating tense encounters. (PERF & USDOJ, 2011, p. 2)

The overall message of the TASER literature, however, is that these weapons are safe, effective, and necessary additions to the police arsenal—with the caveat that clear, evidence-based policy must be in place and be adhered to properly by officers. Furthermore—though not within the scope of this study—consistent and comprehensive TASER training appears to be the string that ties together virtually all TASER use policy considerations.

The key is that agency policy should reflect empirical findings, rather than politics or popular discussion topics. The collective of scholarly recommendations appear to urge that reasonable force continuum placement of the TASER be a constant among law enforcement agencies. Based on evidence from recent studies, a policy improvement of this nature should aid in resolving officer–suspect physical confrontations while minimizing injuries.

The Present Study

Objective

This research asks whether increasing the level of suspect force required prior to police officers being authorized to deploy TASERs also increases rates of injury to officers. Evaluation of this policy may help determine whether one large police department’s TASER program is fulfilling its intended purpose—to enhance officer safety. Therefore, this study seeks to both augment and clarify force policy literature by assessing the effect of a police agency’s restriction to TASER use via measurement of the change in officer injury rates following adoption of a more restrictive policy. The impact observed for this agency, weighed together with the evidence presented in other TASER literature, may shed light on the influence TASER policy changes could have on injury outcomes for similar agencies. This may aid in determining the degree to which the TASER should remain accessible to police officers as an intermediate weapon in dynamic situations involving noncompliant subjects.

Relevance

This research question builds upon the findings of a prior study conducted by Bishopp et al. (2015), which found that this very policy change within the same agency was followed by a reduction in TASER use by officers. These authors delivered the first empirical examination of the link between TASER policy and TASER use, finding that force policy did indeed impact officers’ actions regarding this less lethal tool in Dallas. These authors cautioned, however, that this outcome was not a reflection of the policy in question, as restrictive TASER use policies may result in the application of other, potentially more injurious force options. The goal of the current study was to determine whether this policy has had implications regarding rates of officer injury.

The Research Site

The prominence of Dallas and its primary police agency make Dallas Police Department (DPD) data a necessary part of the TASER policy discussion with respect to officer injuries. Dallas is the 9th largest city by population and 18th largest by land area in the United States (United States Census Bureau, 2015). DPD is the 13th largest U.S. police department by number of full-time, sworn personnel, employing approximately 3,500 sworn officers (United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012). DPD officers cover more than 340 square miles to serve more than 1.2 million people by population—though the influx of people into this metropolitan area in a given day increases this number greatly (United States Census Bureau, 2015). DPD’s TASER policy and general officer safety are therefore considered influential among other police agencies and can be presumed to impact a large number of officers and citizens.

Six primary patrol divisions—Central (CE), Northeast (NE), Northwest (NW), North Central (NC), Southeast (SE), and Southwest (SW)—were examined for purposes of this study.² DPD divisions are further divided into five to six sectors, each of which contains five or more patrol beats. Figure 1 illustrates how different these divisions appear from each other.

Figure 1.

Dallas Police Department patrol division boundaries, 2009.

Each divisional name indicates its geographic location in the city, and much can be derived from the name. Historically, Dallas has been divided economically and racially with much of the underserved populations residing in the southern portion of the city. As with many U.S. urban neighborhoods, areas high in poverty and predominantly populated by minority citizens often experience higher crime rates (Boggess & Hipp, 2010; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Dallas is no different. The SE and SW patrol divisions have traditionally experienced higher rates of property and violent crime (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics [USDOJ, BJS], 2015).

Similarly, officers tend to vary demographically among divisions. DPD patrol officers across all divisions are primarily male (85%) and White (51%) (USDOJ, BJS, 2015). Note also that the southern divisions have the lowest percentage of White officers. NC, by contrast, is the most affluent section in Dallas, and more than 65% of its officers are White (USDOJ, BJS, 2015). Table 1 illustrates these divisional differences via a summary of each division’s demographics.^3,4

Table 1.

Divisional Differences.

Division	Total	White	Black	Hispanic	Other	Male
CE	254	142 (55.91)	54 (21.26)	43 (16.93)	15 (5.91)	220 (86.61)
NE	356	212 (59.55)	72 (20.22)	63 (17.70)	9 (2.53)	310 (87.08)
NW	280	166 (59.29)	37 (13.21)	50 (17.86)	27 (9.64)	240 (85.71)
NC	216	141 (65.28)	29 (13.43)	36 (16.67)	10 (4.63)	188 (87.04)
SE	366	185 (50.55)	87 (23.77)	78 (21.31)	16 (4.37)	305 (83.33)
SW	311	129 (41.48)	85 (27.33)	89 (28.62)	8 (2.57)	267 (85.85)

Note. Percentages were truncated to two decimal places. Values are denoted as n (%). CE = Central; NE = Northeast; NW = Northwest; NC = North Central; SE = Southeast; SW = Southwest.

The Policy Change

DPD’s force continuum includes the following categories of subject behavior to which officers may respond: psychological intimidation and resistive dialogue, passive resistance, defensive resistance, active aggression, and aggravated aggression. Acceptable officer responses, on each end of this spectrum, range from officer presence and verbal direction to deadly force. In July of 2005, DPD moved TASER use “up” the use-of-force continuum, changing TASER deployment from an acceptable response to defensive resistance to a response requiring display of active aggression (Bishopp et al., 2015). See Figures 2 and 3 for an illustration of the change.

Figure 2.

Dallas Police Department’s use-of-force response continuum prior to policy change. ECW = electronic control weapon; OC = oleoresin capsicum; P-ball = pepperball weapon.

Figure 3.

Dallas Police Department’s use-of-force response continuum following policy change. ECW = electronic control weapon; OC = oleoresin capsicum; P-ball = pepperball weapon.

Data and Measures

Independent variable

The study’s focal predictor was DPD’s TASER use policy for any given time period. This variable was created as a binary indicator of policy in effect versus not in effect, for any given month of observation, as well as an additive effect (results shown present the findings with the additive effect of the policy, but results of the dummy variable approach were equivalent).

Dependent variable

Data for the outcome variable, officer injury, were obtained from the Workers’ Compensation Section of Dallas’ Human Resources Department. Injuries reported as being the direct result of a struggle between an officer and a subject displaying aggression or resistance were culled from a comprehensive list of reported duty injuries of any kind. It is important to note that all injuries of this sort were analyzed, rather than only injuries that occurred during actual use of a TASER. It was difficult to conclude from injury data alone whether a TASER was carried, displayed, or deployed. More importantly, however, the goal of this more comprehensive injury count was inclusion of injuries for which other forms of force were applied as well as incidents occurring in detention facilities where weapons could not be carried by officers. This was to ensure all incidents where a TASER could have impacted the injury outcome were considered.

This measure allowed us to eliminate injuries not affected by a departmental change in TASER policy, such as those resulting from motor vehicle accidents, physical fitness training, or provision of aid during hazardous circumstances. Subsequently, we calculated the rate of officer injuries per one hundred available officers within each of DPD’s patrol divisions for each time period, as dates of incidents were provided and monthly data for available call answerers was also collected from within-agency administrative records.^5,6

Control variables

The magnitude of criminal activity for a particular duration (i.e., month) and place (i.e., division) served as our primary control variable.⁷ Crime rate data for each of the six patrol divisions were acquired from Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) on Part I offenses (USDOJ, BJS, 2009, 2010).⁸ All data were specific to individual patrol divisions in Dallas and included the CE, NE, SE, SW, NW, and NC divisions. Crime rate was calculated via dividing the count of total offenses in a given division by the grand total of offenses for all divisions; this was done for each month of observation. A seventh division category was added to account for injuries that were caused to officers assigned to various other DPD field units, including but not limited to SWAT, K-9, Traffic Unit, Gang Unit, Mounted Unit, Narcotics Division, and Vice Section officers.⁹ Descriptive statistics for all variables modeled appear in Table 2. All values presented reflect totals for all patrol divisions per month in Dallas.

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Control Variables.

Variable	Before policy change	After policy change
Injuries	20 (5.154)	29 (3.909)
Crime rate	0.883 (0.006)	0.874 (0.004)
Call answerers	1,161 (10.605)	1,188 (11.559)

Note. All figures per month for all of Dallas. Values are denoted as X (SD).

Dataset

Data reflecting 14 months of activity were examined—7 months prior to the policy change and 7 months following implementation of the new policy. The resulting sample captured 348 resistance- and aggression-related injuries.¹⁰ The same months were included for each year of observation to ensure that other variations related to month or season were better controlled. The time between these periods, including all of the year 2006, was excluded to allow for all TASER-carrying officers to be trained with respect to the new policy. This aided us in avoiding attribution of any changes observed to the policy when the officers examined may or may not have been TASER-recertified with regard to the policy change.

Analytic Plan

To assess whether the transition to the new TASER policy had an effect on changes in police officer injury rates, we relied upon a fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE) panel regression models that accounted for within-division variation as the TASER policy was introduced. With this approach, dummy variables representing each time unit are typically added to the regression model as control variables. However, in our case, we excluded the time dummies for the reasons that (a) time was highly correlated with the policy variable as it went into effect at the same time for each division and (b) an F test of a time dummies-only model was not statistically significant, nor were time unit specific tests, indicating that time alone did not appear to be associated with changes in officer injury rates. In addition, FE regression inherently controls for all non-time-varying covariates.

The results from the Hausman test modestly favored the use of an RE approach, though findings between the RE and FE approaches were equivalent. Serial correlation was deemed nonproblematic via the Breusch–Godfrey or Wooldridge test for serial correlation, and the Breusch–Pagan test suggested no presence of homoscedasticity. Root units were deemed nonpresent via the Dickey–Fuller test statistic.¹¹ The mathematics behind FE and RE regression models are explained in detail elsewhere (see Allison, 2009).

Results

Model Results

Table 3 presents the results from both the FE and RE regression models examining whether DPD’s TASER policy change may have impacted officer injuries. The results are complementary in the fact that they suggest the effect of the TASER policy was statistically significant and positive in terms of impacting the rate of officer injuries (per 100 officers). In other words, changes in officer injury rates tended to modestly increase following the more restrictive TASER use policy, net of changing crime rates, time, and division. However, these findings call for a more nuanced interpretation.

Table 3.

Panel Regression Model Results Predicting Change in Officer Injury Rate.

Variable	Fixed-effects model	Random-effects model
Policy	0.013* (−0.006)	0.013* (−0.006)
Crime rate	2.522* (−1.117)	2.483* (−0.948)
Intercept	–	−0.139 (−0.143)
R ²	.096	.100

Note. Standard errors in parentheses.

p < .05.

Changes Over Time

Additional examination revealed further details about the effects suggested by the initial models. Figure 4 illustrates the overall unconditional change in officer injury rates over time, while Figure 5 highlights the differences among patrol divisions during this time. The raw data, for the department as a whole, suggested a modest positive increase in officer injury during the time period after the new policy went into effect. Figure 4, however, illuminates that this increase can arguably be inferred upon some, but not all divisions individually. For example, the SW division experienced a relatively low and steady rate of officer injury prior to the policy and an upswing postpolicy. The CE division experienced a sharp downward trend in injuries in the months prior to the policy, and a reversal thereafter. The NC division’s injury rate was fairly steady throughout, even showing signs of decrease after enactment of the new policy.

Figure 4.

Overall unconditional change in officer injury rate (per 100 officers) before and after TASER policy change. Dotted line marks the transition to the more restrictive TASER use policy.

Figure 5.

Change in the number of injuries (per 100 officers) by division.

Aggregated Changes

Figure 6 alternatively illustrates this change via a display of the aggregated changes in officer injuries pre- and postpolicy. These results make it clear that the median rate of officer injury increased in most divisions following the policy change. In any case, it is evident that division injury rates vary, but for some divisions, the trend seems to be upward postpolicy. This research asks whether any increase may be due to the policy itself.

Figure 6.

Predicted change in officer injury rate before and after TASER policy change.

Discussion

The current study sought to isolate an effect from a policy change restricting the police officer use of TASERs in use-of-force situations in one large, metropolitan police department (Dallas, TX). A series of panel regression models assessed changes in injury rates across two staggered 7-month time periods and suggested that the policy shift may have played a role in increased officer injury rates across the department’s divisions, in general. These findings contribute to use-of-force literature the first known empirical assessment of police officer injury rates measured directly against a TASER restriction policy in a police agency.

Arguably the most notable discovery of this research, an evaluation of division-specific trends pre- and postpolicy highlighted the reality that there were division-specific differences. Specifically, the SW and “other” divisions saw increases in injuries, while injuries in the NC division actually decreased for a number of months following the policy change. Several divisions saw increases in volatility, if not in magnitude, of injuries during the postpolicy period, with a few reflecting an initial spike in injuries but leveling out over time. Of note was the CE division, whose injuries appeared to be steadily decreasing from month to month prior to the new policy but no longer reflected a pattern postimplementation. This variation could be accounted for by any of the data limitations discussed later.

Limitations and Additional Considerations

Though the injury data obtained was screened for injuries not related to struggles with resisting or aggressive subjects, all injuries related to such struggles were used—meaning that not all of the injuries analyzed involved TASER display or deployment. Evidence of a policy impact, however, naturally gives rise to curiosity as to whether a larger impact might be seen with the exclusion of injuries, which may not have been directly related to TASER incidents. Analysis of a dataset that includes only TASER use injuries might show to be useful. This approach was not deemed to fit our research question, as we wanted to assess the impact of officers no longer being allowed to apply their TASERs during incidents that might have concluded differently had a TASER been used. In addition, data for TASER-related injuries only would be difficult to acquire. Nonetheless, analysis of better specified injury data could reveal whether a more substantial trend exists.

Another question raised by our results lies in the absence of 2006 injury data. A 7-month period of 2005, just prior to the policy change, and a reflexive 7-month period in 2007, following implementation of the new policy, were examined. The injury rate for the months in between this time was not measured. This was done to allow time for all TASER-carrying officers to receive training to reflect the new policy, as we did not want to assume any change in the rate of injury following the policy change was due to the change if there were a chance that some of the officers who were injured had not yet been TASER-recertified. Data containing all of the time in between the 2005 and 2007 dates we examined might, however, tell us more about potential patterning in injury rates following DPD’s policy change.

It is possible that a larger effect is being hidden by the type of data analyzed here. Data for Part II UCR offenses, for instance, may have provided more in-depth insight into officer injury rates. It is also possible, however, that the policy change had no effect and officer injuries increased apart from the policy change in certain divisions. One potential inference, if this be the case, is that the body of TASER literature suggesting the use of police TASERs decreases officer injuries has lacked precision due to the absence of the controls applied to these models. For example, an overall effect to officer injuries was observed when these authors ran a count model with the same predictors applied here, but the addition of call answers as a control variable negated the effect.

Other controls not mentioned here include changes in demographics and neighborhood characteristics. These may very well have been found significant, had such data been accessible. Changes in the crime rates at the division-level, however, should have accounted for some neighborhood-level changes. In addition, no abrupt changes in the demographics of Dallas officers were found during the short time period analyzed. Racial demographics were likely rather stable, therefore, among divisions—further validating the FE approach.

Levels of self-control among officers were also not addressed. As this was a macro-level analysis, individual-level characteristics were not the focus of this study. Still, self-control is an important consideration. It was presumed here that self-control was constant within the individual over the short time examined here. The data for such were simply not available, however, to verify whether this assumption was correct.

Variations related to training, TASER availability, and officer discretion are also worth considering. All officers assigned to uniformed patrol during the months examined here were mandated to receive TASER training. After training, officers were required to carry a TASER if one was available. The training statuses of all officers in this sample, however, could not be obtained. We, therefore, do not know whether any officers in the sample had opportunities to check out TASERs but were unable to do so. TASERs were available for issue at each patrol substation and were provided upon request to officers who had been trained in their use. Even so, there were limited quantities of TASERs in each division’s inventory for those who had been trained.

Because a primary goal of use-of-force policies is to reduce officer and suspect injuries (Taylor & Woods, 2010), this study was designed to measure officer injury rates during only those incidents that would have allowed officers to use TASERs. The reasons for officers’ decisions to carry TASERs and their decisions to (or not to) deploy them are beyond the scope of this study. What we do know is that a policy allowing officers to carry TASERs was in place, the policy regarding the level of resistance appropriate for deploying the device became more restrictive, and all patrol officers who had received training were required to carry TASERs when available.

Recognition of the boundaries to any study highlights the importance of identifying context. Without knowledge of the framework applicable to our methods and the particulars of our data, our models assume that the coefficients reported here apply equally in all circumstances, “thus propagating the notion that processes work out in the same way in different contexts” (Duncan, Jones, & Moon, 1998, p. 98). It should be noted that these authors’ application of the same variables used here to a hierarchical linear model for change corroborated a modest increase in postpolicy officer injuries for the city examined. Our results should not be assumed generalizable, however, to other agencies in other cities.

Policy Implications

The outcome observed here suggests that less restrictive TASER use policies may help to limit officer injuries during physical confrontations. These policies carry implications for both citizens and officers, as force options have been found to reduce the need for hands-on tactics (discussed earlier) that can injure both suspects and the officers who apply them. This study’s results may therefore facilitate dialogue about the impacts of injured officers, to include manpower and emergency response time concerns and the expenses associated with complaints, litigations, and workers’ compensation claims. This larger conversation reminds us that those both inside and outside of the criminal justice system stand to benefit from identification of injury-reducing policies.

Concluding Remarks

One thing is evident: Injuries to officers resulting from a struggle with a subject have increased over time in Dallas. The models developed here suggest that the change in policy may have played a role in this increase, net of changes in crime rates. Perhaps the most important revelation in these results is that if the change in DPD TASER policy did influence officer injuries, the effect appears to vary between patrol divisions. This finding differs from that of prior work, which reported that division did not have a significant impact on TASER use in Dallas following the policy change examined here (Bishopp et al., 2015) and may speak to geographical differences with respect to police decision making. Future estimations of this data via other types of analyses and assessments of similar data in other locations could provide a comparison that may tease out the true nature of this effect.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

Author Biographies

Valerie G. Womack is a Ph.D. student in the criminology program at the University of Texas at Dallas. She received her M.S. in criminology from the same in 2014. She is a police corporal and field training officer in Dallas, Texas, where she has served for seven years. Her research interests include policing, victimology, media and crime, and distracted driving.

Robert G. Morris is associate professor of Criminology and Director of the Center for Crime and Justice Studies at the University of Texas at Dallas. His research is focused on assessments of criminal justice policy, quantitative analysis, and criminological theory. He has received numerous teaching and research awards, having published in notable outlets such as Justice Quarterly, the Journal of Quantitative Criminology, PLoS One, and Crime and Delinquency. He also serves as a member of the Dallas County Criminal Justice Advisory Board.

Stephen A. Bishopp is associate director for Research at the Caruth Police Institute. He received his Ph.D. (2013) in criminology from the University of Texas at Dallas and is currently a 25-year veteran and sergeant with the Dallas Police Department. His research interests include police behavior, promotional processes, and criminological theory. His most recent publications appear in Criminal Justice Policy Review and the Journal of Criminal Justice.

References

Adams

Jennison

(2007) What we do not know about police use of Tasers. Policing 30(3): 447–465.

Allison

(2009) Fixed effects regression models, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications (A Sage University Paper Series: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences: 160).

Alpert

Dunham

(2010) Policy and training recommendations related to police use of CEDs: Overview of findings from a comprehensive national study. Police Quarterly 13(3): 235–259.

Angelosanto, G. (2003). Implementation of the TASER M26: Report to the department of interdisciplinary technology as part of the school of police staff and command program. Westland, MI: Westland Police Department. Retrieved from http://www.emich.edu.

Bishopp

Klinger

Morris

(2015) An examination of the effect of a policy change on police use of TASERs. Criminal Justice Policy Review 26(7): 727–746.

Boggess

Hipp

(2010) Violent crime, residential instability and mobility: Does the relationship differ in minority neighborhoods? Journal of Quantitative Criminology 26(3): 351–370.

Chermak

(2009) Conducted energy devices and criminal justice policy. Criminology & Public Policy 8(4): 861–864.

Crow

Adrion

(2011) Focal concerns and police use of force: Examining the factors associated with TASER use. Police Quarterly 14(4): 366–387.

DeLone

Thompson

(2009) The application and use of TASERs by a Midwestern police agency. International Journal of Police Science & Management 11(4): 414–428.

10.

Duncan

Jones

Moon

(1998) Context, composition and heterogeneity: Using multilevel models in health research. Social Science and Medicine 46: 97–117.

11.

Ferdik

Kaminski

Cooney

Sevigny

(2014) The influence of agency policies on conducted energy device use and police use of lethal force. Police Quarterly 17(4): 328–358.

12.

Gaines

Kaune

Miller

(2001) Criminal justice in action: The core, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

13.

Gau

Mosher

Pratt

(2010) An inquiry into the impact of suspect race on police use of Tasers. Police Quarterly 13(1): 27–48.

14.

Hallett

(2007) COPS and CSI: Reality television? In: White

M. D.

(ed.) Current issues and controversies in policing, Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon, pp. 365–367.

15.

Lin

Jones

(2010) Electronic control devices and use of force outcomes: Incidence and severity of use of force, and frequency of injuries to arrestees and police officers. Policing 33(1): 152–178.

16.

Lovell

(2003) Good cop/bad cop: Mass media and the cycle of police reform, Monsey, NY: Willow Tree Press.

17.

National Institute of Justice (U.S.). (2011). Police use of force, tasers and other less-lethal weapons (DOJ Publication No. NCJ 232215). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.

18.

Paoline

Terrill

Ingram

(2012) Police use of force and officer injuries: Comparing conducted energy devices (CEDs) to hand- and weapon-based tactics. Police Quarterly 15(2): 115–136.

19.

Police Executive Research Forum & U.S. Department of Justice. (2011). 2011 Electronic control weapon guidelines (DOJ Publication No. e021111339). Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

20.

Ready

White

Fisher

(2008) Shock value: A comparative analysis of news reports and official police records on TASER deployments. Policing 31(1): 148–170.

21.

Sampson

Raudenbush

Earls

(1997) Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science 277(5328): 918–924.

22.

Smith

Kaminski

Rojek

Alpert

Mathis

(2007) The impact of conducted energy devices and other types of force and resistance on officer and suspect injuries. Policing 30(3): 423–446.

23.

Smith

Petrocelli

Scheer

(2007) Excessive force, civil liability, and the Taser in the nation’s courts: Implications for law enforcement policy and practice. Policing 30(3): 398–422.

24.

Sousa

Ready

Ault

(2010) The impact of TASERs on police use-of-force decisions: Findings from a randomized field-training experiment. Journal of Experimental Criminology 6(1): 35–55.

25.

Stinson

Reyns

Liederbach

(2012) Police crime and less-than-lethal coercive force: A description of the criminal misuse of TASERs. International Journal of Police Science & Management 14(1): 1–19.

26.

Taylor

Woods

(2010) Injuries to officers and suspects in police use-of-force cases: A quasi-experimental evaluation. Police Quarterly 13(3): 260–289.

27.

Terrill

(2005) Police use of force: A transactional approach. JQ: Justice Quarterly 22(1): 107–138.

28.

Terrill

Paoline

(2012) Conducted energy devices (CEDs) and citizen injuries: The shocking empirical reality. JQ: Justice Quarterly 29(2): 153–182.

29.

Thomas

Collins

Lovrich

(2010) Conducted energy device use in municipal policing: Results of a national survey on policy and effectiveness assessments. Police Quarterly 13(3): 290–315.

30.

Thomas

Collins

Lovrich

(2011) An analysis of written conductive energy device policies: Are municipal policing agencies meeting PERF recommendations? Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(4): 399–426.

31.

United States Census Bureau. (2015). State & county quickfacts: Dallas (city), Texas. Retrieved from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/4819000.html.

32.

United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Crime in the United States, 2011. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/police-employee/city-agency.

33.

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2009). Federal bureau of investigation uniform crime reporting statistics: UCR offense definitions. Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata/offenses.cfm.

34.

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2010). Federal bureau of investigation uniform crime reporting statistics: Large local agency reported crime by locality. Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/ucrdata/Search/Crime/Local/LocalCrimeLarge.cfm.

35.

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2015). Local police departments, 2013: Personnel, policies, and practices (NCJ 248677) by B. A. Reaves. Retrieved from http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp.pdf.

36.

Vilke

Chan

(2007) Less lethal technology: Medical issues. Policing 30(3): 341–357.

37.

White

Ready

(2007) The TASER as a less lethal force alternative: Findings on use and effectiveness in a large metropolitan police agency. Police Quarterly 10(20): 170–191.

38.

White

Ready

(2009) Examining fatal and nonfatal incidents involving the TASER. Criminology & Public Policy 8(4): 865–891.

39.

White

Ready

(2010) The impact of the Taser on suspect resistance. Crime & Delinquency 56(1): 70–102.

40.

White

Ready

Riggs

Dawes

Hinz

(2013) An incident-level profile of TASER device deployments in arrest-related deaths. Police Quarterly 16(1): 85–112.

41.

Williams

(2012) The Braidwood commission reports on TASER use in Canada: An evidence-based policy review. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 35(2): 356–381.

42.

Wolf

Pressler

Winton

(2009) Campus law enforcement use-of-force and conducted energy devices: A national-level exploratory study of perceptions and practices. Criminal Justice Review 34(1): 29–43.