Bypassing the press gallery: from Howard to Hanson

Abstract

Traditionally politicians have been dependent on political news media to get their message across to the public. The rise of social media means that politicians can bypass the Press Gallery and publish directly to their target audiences via Facebook, Twitter and other social media platforms. This article argues that Prime Minister John Howard’s (1996–2007) use of talk back radio and early forays on YouTube were pivotal in the trend towards ‘disintermediation’ in Australian politics. It draws on two studies. One involving interviews with 87 key media actors from the Howard era including journalists, broadcasters, politicians and media advisers; and a second, which includes fresh interviews with contemporary press secretaries. This article examines the shift from a ‘mass media logic’ to a ‘hybrid logic’, considered from a mediatization theoretical position. We also ask important questions about the press gallery’s ongoing relevance in the digital era, when politicians preside over their own social media empires.

Keywords

disintermediation journalism media advising mediatization political communication social media

Introduction

In 2011, veteran political reporter Laurie Oakes (2011) predicted during his delivery of the Andrew Olle Media lecture that ‘political journalists will be bypassed more and more’:

I’m not talking about politicians using talkback radio as John Howard did … but what I am referring to here is politicians, parties, government, interest groups and so on contacting voters directly via the internet.

In the 6 years since Oakes made this prediction, Facebook and Twitter have emerged as central media platforms for politicians to self-publish directly to audiences. These platforms rival traditional news media in reach and influence. In this way, the relationship between the Press Gallery and politicians is being significantly disrupted.

In the traditional media environment – dominated by the mass media platforms of newspapers, television, and radio – politicians and journalists were dependent on each other to fulfil their roles (Coleman and Freelon, 2015). The relationship was often described as ‘symbiotic’ and interdependent. Politicians were heavily dependent on the news media to have their policies and perspectives relayed to the public and the reporters relied on the politicians for stories and information. Although mutually beneficial, this was a necessarily tense relationship involving a constant process of ‘mutual adaptation’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981) and a continual struggle for control over the release and presentation of information (Cook, 2005; Ericson et al., 1989; Louw, 2010). The tension arose from the ‘watchdog’ role of journalism based on the idealized 18th century conception of journalists as members of the ‘fourth estate’ (Hampton, 2010), scrutinizing politics and keeping a check on those in positions of power. Depending on the circumstances, the tension between politicians and reporters can shift ‘between complicity and open power struggle’ (Brants and Voltmer, 2011: 4).

However, in a ‘hybrid media system’ (Chadwick, 2013), where both mass media and digital media platforms are used concurrently, politicians are no longer reliant solely on journalists to spread their message to the public; they can publish messages directly themselves. Equally, citizens are able to ‘evade institutional structures and processes’ (Coleman and Freelon, 2015: 4) and access information directly from a range of sources in addition to, or instead of, the news media. After nearly 100 years of interdependence, the struggle for power between journalists and politicians over control of the message is now tipping (Broersma and Graham, 2016), enabling politicians to ‘dodge’ the scrutiny of the gatekeepers (Skovsgaard and Van Dalen, 2013) and arguably forge new relationships with their constituents (Kalsnes et al., 2017).

Politicians’ desire to circumvent the interference of journalists did not begin with the arrival of social media. In their ‘strategic dance’ with reporters (Cook, 2005), politicians have always sought ways to maintain control of the message while attempting to foster an authentic (Enli, 2015) relationship with the people they represent. In the mass media age, live radio, in particular talk back radio, was a favoured medium for communicating with the public via a limited journalistic filter. In Australia, the tradition of regular talk back radio spots, pioneered in the 1930s (Ward, 1999) and mastered by John Howard, continues today for Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and other high-profile politicians such as One Nation leader Pauline Hanson. However, talk back radio appearances are now supplemented by self-publishing on social media of video addresses, as well as live streaming and information sharing.

In this article, we draw on the theoretical lens of the mediatization of politics to compare two sets of media logics operating in vastly changed media and political eras. The article considers the implications of this turn to self-publishing and the impact of ‘disintermediation’ on the legitimacy of the press gallery. We draw on understandings and insights from those deep inside the political process, the advisors and strategists of political leaders, to understand these complex and evolving political communication practices.

Mediation and disintermediation in the era of digitization

The ability to bypass the news media is called ‘disintermediation’ (Coleman, 2005; Steiner, 2009), which can be simply described as not having your message ‘mediated’ or edited, interpreted and filtered by news media professionals. This phenomenon is also referred to as ‘direct representation’ (Coleman, 2005), or ‘self-representation’ (Lilleker and Koc-Michalska, 2013) by politicians, reflecting their ability to communicate directly with their publics via online and social media and cut out the intermediary of the news media. In their study of politicians’ use of Twitter in the 2013 Italian election campaign, Vaccari and Valeriani (2015) made a distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ communication. With ‘direct’ communication, the politician’s message goes straight to their followers. With ‘indirect’ communication, the message is shared via highly politically engaged social media users to a broader audience. Drawing on the Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955) hypothesis of the ‘two-step-flow’ of communication – which theorized the influential role of opinion makers in sharing media messages to the public – Bennett and Manheim (2006) described the ability of politicians to target audiences directly via direct mail or other means, as the ‘one-step-flow’ of communication. This ability to bypass the news media and publish directly to the audience has emerged as a consequence of digitization and is described by Engesser et al. (2017) as one of the ‘online opportunity structures’ (p. 4) of digital communication technologies.

The capacity for direct communication via social media has been heralded for its potential to increase citizen and politician participation in the political process (Coleman and Blumler, 2009; Effing et al., 2011; Marsh and McLean, 2012). Allowing politicians and citizens to talk directly to each other online about policy has been seen as a way to facilitate a more dialogic and deliberative democracy (Coleman, 2005). However, doubts about its effectiveness have also emerged. While there has been strong evidence of citizen use of social media through ‘connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012) such as the Arab Spring and Occupy movements, there is less evidence of politicians using social media to genuinely interact with the public. Hindman (2008) has argued digital democracy is largely a myth for those without access to the Internet, leaving the online space dominated by elites talking to each other. Others such as Lilleker (2013) pointed to ‘politics as usual’ and a reluctance on the part of politicians and political organizations to ‘lose control of the message’ and have genuine open and unscripted communication with the public. Bimber (1998: 151) correctly predicted that the removal of gatekeepers would lead to deterioration in the civility of discourse over the Internet and argued that an increase in quantity of communication did not necessarily lead to a rise in quality.

When it comes to political campaigning, politicians from across the political spectrum are embracing the benefits of social media. As Broersma and Graham (2012) summarized it, using social networks is ‘cheap, engaging and easy to control’ (p. 405) and offers possibilities for politicians to ‘set the news agenda and get their message included in the mass media virtually untouched by journalists’. Concerns about trust in news media generally (Fisher, 2016) and political journalism specifically have been effectively tapped by populist politicians who have used online media to harness people’s lack of trust as well as their grievances and negativity (Kriesi, 2014). While research shows that politicians continue to use both mainstream and social media platforms (Skovsgaard and Van Dalen, 2013), populist politicians are very likely to rely on social media to reach the public. In a comparative study of six Western democracies, Ernst et al. (2017: 1357) found certain characteristics of social media lend it to exploitation by populist politicians. Those characteristics are the following: ‘A direct access to the audience without journalistic interference, a close connection to the people, an infinite potential for personalization, and the possibility to target specific groups’. Populist politicians can circumvent the ‘upmarket press’ who are ‘presumed to act as “paladins” of the elites’ (Engesser et al., 2016: 1113). The use of Twitter by US Republican President Donald Trump, whose antagonism towards journalists is well known, adopted this tactic of bypassing the so-called ‘fake news’ media to counter critical coverage of his campaign and policies in the mainstream news outlets. In doing so, he was able to increase his popularity without spending a lot on advertising. Acknowledging the benefits of this tactic, Trump is reported to have said, ‘It’s great. It’s like owning a newspaper but without the losses’ (Parkinson, 2015).

Mediatization of politics and hybrid media logic

Mediatization has emerged as an influential paradigm for understanding ‘the interrelations between changes in media and communications on one hand, and changes in culture and society on the other’ (Couldry and Hepp, 2013: 197). The mediatization of politics is a major branch of mediatization studies (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck and Esser, 2014). Not only does it help in critically analysing how institutions such as politics change as media technologies, industries and practices change, but mediatization also emphasizes micro-processes such as ‘media logic’, whereby routines, priorities and practices of news media are internalized and embodied by political actors (Altheide and Snow, 1979). Numerous empirical studies have identified the features of mediatization in a predominantly mass media policymaking environment. Thorbjørnsrud et al. (2014) explained how government bureaucrats in Norway had adopted ‘news logics’ into their practices, while McCallum and Waller (2017) identified that media practices and routines permeated deep into the policymaking environment in Australia. In the United Kingdom, Davis (2007) identified an increasingly intimate relationship between legislators and Press Gallery journalists.

This body of mediatization research largely assumes a ‘mass media logic’. However, since the late 2000s, the media environment has changed profoundly. Technologies and media consumption practices have changed and social media has now become a major platform for news, challenging the dominance of mainstream media (Watkins et al., 2017). In this changing media context, new mediatization research is examining whether politics is being reshaped by a new set of logics driven by the affordances of digital technology and the ascendancy of social media. Kalsnes et al. (2017) identify the new phenomenon of ‘social’ or ‘network’ media logic with Facebook, in particular, ‘allowing for new connections between citizens and politicians without the news media as mediators’ (p. 1). As Ernst et al. (2017: 1350) explain, ‘while traditional ‘mass media logic’ is based on professional gatekeepers and a relatively passive audience, ‘network media logic’ evolves from interest-bound and like-minded peer networks’. Network media logics are built on virality, which allows a single message potentially to reach an unlimited audience. According to Vaccari and Valeriani (2015), within these networks, politicians can communicate in two distinct ways. First, by directly communicating to their followers and friends, politicians reach their ‘primary audiences’. Second, if this direct communication is re-circulated by their followers, politicians extend their network’s reach to a ‘secondary audience’ (Vaccari and Valeriani, 2015: 1026). The wide adoption of social media has led to the overlapping of social media logic with mass media logic, whereby ‘social media logic and mass media logics are intertwined’ (Kalsnes et al., 2017: 2). Casero-Ripollés et al. (2016) identified this as ‘hybrid logic’ (p. 384), whereby ‘parties and candidates synergistically combine online and offline tools, merging their communications into a hybridized environment’ enriching their traditional media tactics ‘with the new logics and possibilities of digital media’ (p. 382).

The implications of combined social and mass media logics, or ‘hybrid media logic’, on political communication are profound. When considered through the lens of mediatization, we can see how digitalization and the rise of new commercial media organizations such as Facebook are transforming the practice of politics. Garland et al. (2017: 1) identified that it marks ‘a shift in the relationship between government, media and citizens whereby social media is enabling governments to become news providers, bypassing the “prism of the [news] media” and going direct to citizens’. But, what are the implications for the Press Gallery’s ongoing relevance of bypassing the gatekeeper in a digitized media environment when every politician is a media baron over their own social media empire?

Methods

To answer this question, we draw on two bodies of research, 10 years apart, that investigate the media-related practices of politicians and their advisors. Our first dataset draws on Marshall’s (2015) doctoral research into the media operations of John Howard’s prime ministership (1996–2007). Marshall conducted 87 interviews with key media actors including with the former Prime Minister. The elite interview method (Davis, 2007; Herbst, 1998) is an established method of conversational interviews designed to gather expert or professional understandings of a topic or phenomenon. Interviews were analysed to identify key features and changes in patterns of political media use through the theoretical lens of mediatization and ‘media logic’, with special attention paid to the contexts of each media era.

The second body of material is drawn from the results of a pilot study into the phenomenon of ‘disintermediation’ in Australian federal politics. This pilot project involved interviews with six contemporary press secretaries across minor and major parties, supported by a content analysis of the social media outputs and online newspaper coverage of the leaders of five parties with the largest number of federal Members of Parliament (MPs). Both elements are described more fully in turn below. The interviews were conducted between February and June 2017. Using an aide-memoire (Minichiello et al., 1995: 83) to guide the interviews, the media advisers were asked about their reasons for choosing one media platform over another for relaying particular types of information content. The interviewees were offered anonymity to encourage maximum candour about the tactical and strategic decision-making behind their media decisions. Each of the interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours depending on the person’s availability. Five were conducted face-to-face in locations chosen by the interviewees, and one was conducted over the phone. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and a copy of the transcript was sent to the interviewee for their records. A general inductive approach (Thomas, 2006) was adopted to analyse the interview data. This approach involved multiple close readings of the data, first- and second-cycle coding (Saldana, 2009) and identifying categories and themes. Drawing on Saldana’s (2009) coding classifications, this included basic ‘attribute coding’ of participant characteristics and ‘structural coding’ of the interview data based on specific questions. In order to keep the interviewees’ responses in context, ‘holistic’ coding was used rather than line-by-line or word-by-word coding.

The qualitative content analysis was conducted to provide comparative data about the cross media activity of five party leaders: Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who is the leader of the conservative Liberal Party; Bill Shorten, the leader of the Australian Labor Party; Richard Di Natale, a Senator and leader of the minority Australian Greens Party; Nick Xenophon, who is an independent Senator from South Australia and leader of the Nick Xenophon Team; and Pauline Hanson, the leader of the populist Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party. Social media output and online newspaper coverage of the leaders covered a 4-week period from 6 February to 6 March 2017. This non-election period was specifically chosen in order to examine a non-campaign period, since campaigns inflate media activities. Despite the growing volume of research into politicians’ use of social media, everyday use in non-election periods remains underexplored (Larsson and Svensson, 2014). Analysis of the Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts of the five leaders was conducted manually. The online newspaper coverage of the leaders was also examined using the Nexis data base. Each search was conducted using the leader’s name. Duplicates were removed. Coding for both social media outputs and newspaper coverage was adapted from Macnamara and Kenning (2011) and Parmelee and Bichard (2011) who examined trends in social media use during elections. For the purposes of this article, additional manual content analysis was conducted of Malcolm Turnbull’s Facebook page from 6 March to 6 June 2017 following his appointment of a new social media adviser, Tommy Tudehope. It became apparent from mainstream media coverage that Turnbull’s social media usage, particularly on Facebook, was increasing and changing to incorporate more video following Tudehope’s employment. Therefore, a decision was made to analyse Turnbull’s Facebook account for an additional period to evaluate the difference in activity.

Findings and discussion

Talk back radio as ‘direct communication’ in the mass media age

Our research into John Howard’s approach to media demonstrates that the desire of politicians to maintain control of the message and bypass the gatekeeper is not a new phenomenon. Prior to social media, radio was a primary medium that allowed a politician to speak directly to and with the public while maintaining some control of the message. Ward’s (1999) research into the early use of radio in Australian politics reaches back to 1920s when politicians tended to see radio as an enlarged town hall meeting and used it to broadcast their speeches. In the 1930s, the New South Wales leader of the Australia Labor Party, Jack Lang, began to address the public via radio, emulating US President Roosevelt’s use of the ‘fireside chat’. In the 1940s, the leader of the Liberal Party, Robert Menzies, ‘also came to see radio as a powerful weapon’ for political advertising in election campaigning (Ward, 1999: 311). And later, Prime Minister John Curtin ‘delivered more national broadcasts than did Roosevelt, who was credited as being a highly successful radio communicator’ (Coatney, 2013: 70).

However, it was not until 1967 that ‘talk back’ radio arrived in Australia. Up until that time, it had been illegal to broadcast a person’s phone call via radio (Ward, 2002: 22). Once it was allowed, the talk back format became very popular with audiences and was successfully adopted by politicians, including Gough Whitlam during the 1972 federal election. But it was Liberal Prime Minister John Howard who raised talk back radio to a new level by placing it at the heart of his political communication strategy. Ward (2002) recounted that when Howard became Prime Minister in 1996, he used talk back radio more than any other politician because it allowed him not only to ‘evade close interrogation by well-informed Gallery journalists, but also to play to his own strengths as a political communicator’ (p. 23). This interpretation is supported by John Howard’s (2008, personal communication) own reflections on his use of talk back radio:

Within a fairly short period of time I formed the view that one of the best ways of communicating with the public was to try to speak over the heads of the press gallery and the best method of doing that was to appear a lot on radio with a television camera or cameras in the studio and distributing transcripts after I’d done the interview.

This was corroborated by political journalist Karen Middleton, who recalled that Howard ‘developed this extraordinary schedule of radio interviews’ which meant ‘he was incredibly accessible to radio commentators but not to the rest of us’. Middleton said that Howard bypassed the Press Gallery because he ‘felt that we would edit and package up what he said’. Howard’s preference for live radio interviews left the press gallery ‘very dependent on radio transcripts’ (Karen Middleton, 2009, personal communication).

Marshall’s (2015) doctoral research found there were two key reasons behind Howard’s preference for talk back radio. The first was a perception that his ‘new government came into a hostile media environment’ and that ‘as the press gallery was against them the media needed to be neutralised’. This was underlined by veteran political journalist, Michelle Grattan (2008, personal communication), who said Howard became embittered by his experience of being heavily criticized by the Press Gallery in the 1980s and would therefore ‘bypass the gallery where he could’. Second, Howard apparently did not enjoy television interviews and did not give many press conferences. Howard’s former Chief of Staff, Arthur Sinodinos (2008, personal communication), said that if Howard did do television interviews, he ‘normally insisted on doing it live if possible’. Political journalist Tony Wright (2008, personal communication) argued Howard did this so that he could not be edited by the reporter and therefore ‘he’d only appear live’. Instead, Howard was more comfortable talking to ordinary people via the radio which became ‘the hallmark of his prime ministership’. From 1996 to 2007, Howard conducted 1000 radio interviews (Marshall, 2015: 134) including a fortnightly interview with Neil Mitchell on 3AW. Mitchell (2009, personal communications) recalled that ‘He would call into us on the allocated day from just about anywhere in the world … he rarely missed’.

Towards the end of Howard’s term, social media was beginning to make its presence felt. Politicians were embracing emerging social media platforms such as Myspace, Facebook and YouTube to connect directly to the public (Flew, 2008). At the age of 68 years, the Prime Minister published his first video address via YouTube making a policy announcement about climate change (Tobin, 2007) in what came to be known as Australia’s ‘YouTube election’ (Howell and Da Silva, 2010). This was seen by some commentators as an attempt to counter perceptions that Howard was too old for the leadership, especially in comparison with the younger and social media savvy Labor opponent, Kevin Rudd. Howard’s foray into YouTube attracted substantial criticism and popular ridicule for his stilted performance, which some argued highlighted the Coalition’s ham-fisted response to dealing with the emerging world of online media (Flew, 2008).

Facebook in the age of ‘disintermediation’

After 10 years, politicians in Australia and around the world have more fully embraced the potential of social media to increase electoral success. Interviews with contemporary media advisers of six Australian politicians confirmed the politicians they worked for use social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, for a common set of purposes: to connect with the electorate and the wider public by posting material related to local and portfolio issues; to provide commentary on topical, national events; and to criticize their opponents and to provide snapshots of their everyday life.

The interviews also highlight that in a hybrid media environment, talk back radio as well as other mass media platforms, such as television, remain key tools for contemporary politicians, despite the radical transition in the media landscape. This was evident in author Fisher’s content analysis of the social media outputs and online newspaper coverage of five Australian party leaders, which showed that Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull maintained a weekly spot on Melbourne radio, 3AW. Each of his appearances during the 4-week monitoring period set the agenda for the bulk of mainstream online media coverage that followed.

Interestingly, in the following 3 months, until 6 June 2017, there was a marked shift in Turnbull’s use of social media. This lift in social media activity coincided with the re-employment of his former adviser, communications specialist Tommy Tudehope, plus the addition of several extra advisers to boost the Prime Minister’s social media activity, which had waned since he became leader. From March 2017 onwards, Turnbull continued to use his weekly radio spot on 3AW, but he also increased his use of Facebook live and pre-recorded video addresses. Online news site Buzzfeed.com reported,

When asked by BuzzFeed News about the new push into Facebook Live, a source in the PM’s office said Turnbull hoped ‘to make Facebook Live his version of talkback radio’. Unlike former PMs John Howard and Kevin Rudd, who used morning spots on talkback radio and TV to connect with so-called ‘real voters’, Turnbull is trying to spread the word via Facebook. (Di Stefano, 2017)

At the same time, the Prime Minister reportedly turned down further opportunities to speak to the public via talk back radio, a decision that angered commercial radio host Ben Fordham on 2GB. In a podcast, Fordham (2017) argued,

While social media needs to be part of the strategy it can’t be THE strategy … It doesn’t have to be one or the other, you can do it all. Malcolm Turnbull’s failure to master talkback radio makes it harder for him to connect with average Australians.

Although Turnbull might have shunned one amplitude modulation (AM) station, his appearances on frequency modulation (FM) talk back radio rose dramatically from August 2017 (Remeikis, 2017).

While a minor incident, this debate about the merits of talk back radio versus social media marks a tipping point in the application of hybrid media logic by the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s media staff. The mass media audience is assumed to be already established, but the search is on to engage younger voters on social and online platforms. Recent consumer research (Watkins et al., 2017) shows that older Australians are more likely to use mainstream media platforms like radio and television to access information, whereas younger Australians are more likely to use social media and online sources. It also shows that television continues to have the largest news audience. However, Roy Morgan (2016) research found more than half of Australians are listening to radio, especially at breakfast time. A politician’s choice of platform will be determined by which segment of the community they wish to reach.

Since March 2017, the number of live broadcasts and video posts via Turnbull’s Facebook page has increased dramatically. During the monitoring period between 6 February and 6 March 2017, Turnbull posted just four video items on his Facebook page, including one live recording. In the 3 months that followed until 6 June 2017, Turnbull published 42 videos on Facebook, 5 of which were live-streamed. On 18 April 2017, Turnbull announced changes to government policy on 457 visas in a pre-recorded video statement to his followers, rather than at a media conference with the press gallery. In a shareable video, Turnbull said, ‘I want you to be the first to know about a major announcement we are making today’. Only later did he hold a press conference and undergo scrutiny from the Press Gallery once the announcement had been published directly to his followers. In just 3 weeks, this one short video had been watched 935,000 times. That equates to a viewing audience slightly smaller than Seven or Nine’s 6 p.m. news and significantly larger than the audience for the ABC’s 7 p.m. news bulletin.

Ewart and Dekker (2013) explained while there are similarities between talk back radio and social media platforms such as Facebook, there are also differences. Both provide direct communication with the audience but, they argue, it is ‘not identical … as talkback radio still provides a measure of access control and editing’. This perception was echoed by a contemporary media adviser to a federal politician: ‘It’s kind of a tired observation but [social media is] the new talkback radio except you don’t have to do the talking back bit’. Because there is no intermediary, it was seen as superior: ‘That level of being able to talk to people without a filter is excellent. So even when you’re in Talkback, there’s a huge filter going on’ (Interviewee 2, 2017).

Populism and the politics of mainstream versus social media

The practice of using live and pre-recorded video is regularly undertaken by the populist leader of One Nation, Pauline Hanson. The content analysis results of Hanson’s Facebook feed show that from 6 February 2017 to 6 March 2017, Hanson published 12 live-streamed video events, including question-and-answer sessions with her followers recorded from her lounge room. She also posted 16 video addresses about current events, such as the furore over the large salary received by the CEO of Australia Post. Hanson’s pre-recorded video outrage over this controversy was viewed more than 1 million times over a 6-week period.

Being able to circumvent the journalistic filter was seen by each of the contemporary media advisers interviewed as a real advantage, especially to avoid hostile media:

In politics it is a great benefit. And that was a great benefit to Donald Trump. What he did in the US is to be frank what any side of politics would like to do if they don’t think the media is on their side. You want to therefore bypass the media and get directly to people. (Interviewee 4, 2017)

This is the reason given by Pauline Hanson for refusing to speak to the ABC. Following a leak that she claimed jeopardized a planned trip to Afghanistan, plus a critical story by the ABC’s Four Corners programme, Hanson told her followers in a Facebook video statement (10 April 2017) that she had had ‘a gutful of the media’:

This is why I like having this ability to talk to you face to face so you understand the truth of what is going on. So ABC, don’t bother ringing me up for any interviews – it’s not happening.

Hanson’s remarks support Kriesi’s (2014) comment that online platforms enable populist politicians to tap into everyday grievances and cynicism.

Other minor parties in Australia also find it difficult to attract positive mainstream media coverage and have found social media to be best alternative to reach constituents. Party polling for one minor party showed,

The most reliable indicator of somebody changing their vote or increasing their level of support for us was visiting the web or getting to our website through social media or search. And the least reliable indicators were the mainstream media and in some cases, they were less likely to vote for us as a consequence probably of the editorial spin put on it. (Interviewee 5, 2017)

The interviewee explained that the Party assumed the target audience for One Nation consumed their news and information predominantly via social media. Therefore, bypassing the gatekeeper of the fourth estate was central to its media strategy, simply to reach its constituency. This is supported by other studies (Skovsgaard and Van Dalen, 2013) that show the orientation of the political party and whether it is in government, opposition or a minor party, will have an impact on their preference for using social or mainstream media to connect with the public.

However, for the major parties, social media was seen as augmenting mass media options. As one federal opposition media adviser explained,

It’s like the difference between playing a guitar with four strings and a guitar with five strings. You don’t become less dependent on the other four, you just have an extra one to play with. (Interviewee 2, 2017)

While the media advisers to major parties expressed a desire to bypass the mainstream media and publish policy and commentary primarily via social media, they conceded it was not politically advantageous, given the small number of followers their politician had on social media. As one government media adviser said,

His Facebook audience isn’t big enough. To reach the biggest audience possible you use the mainstream media every time. (Interviewee 1, 2017)

The advisers for major parties consequently adopted a strong hybrid media approach to maximize electoral success and reach as wide an audience as possible.

Consequences

Whether talk back radio, Twitter or Facebook live, the consequences of bypassing the news media are significant. As Marshall (2015) explained in relation to John Howard’s use of radio,

The downside for public accountability of a deliberate policy of bypassing the press gallery was the lack of scrutiny and detailed questioning by experienced journalists that would normally accompany a fully blown media conference. (p. 131)

Combined with a shrinking traditional news media, increased surveillance of journalists and restricted access to information, some media advisers argued it was becoming increasingly difficult to hold politicians and governments to account:

There’s increasing hostility to providing information to media and then the public, but I think it’s a real ethical challenge that scrutiny is diminishing and politicians especially can circuit around them. (Interviewee 5, 2017)

I don’t really ever see the fourth estate vanishing. I mean, it’s always going to be challenged … It will be downscaled. It will be centralised. The proportion of news content in whatever format that’s given over to scrutiny and analysis will decrease. (Interviewee 4, 2017)

This reduction in scrutiny was most apparent in regional and rural areas. Four of the interviewees reflected that once a politician travels outside a capital city, there was often no journalist present at media events to ask questions or film the press conference. Instead, there was an increasing reliance on media advisers to provide footage and photographs to news rooms:

I mean from my side of the sphere, it’s incredible because it gives you more control over the messaging, but from a journalism side, it’s horrific. (Interviewee 6, 2017)

Although these reflections were provided by only a small number of contemporary media advisers, they offer a rare insight into the deliberations of these professional communicators at the centre of the political communication process. Their comments reflect both the benefits that social media provide to furthering the interests of individual politicians and a broader concern about the public interest and the future of journalism now that politicians are no longer dependent on the news media to disseminate their message to the voting public.

Conclusion

Whereas former Prime Minister John Howard was seen as brazen in his flouting of the norms of political communication in the mass media age, our research suggests that his successful early foray into disintermediation via talk back radio is now being increasingly adopted by contemporary politicians, facilitated by direct communication via social media. These conclusions lend support to the argument that not only do politicians adapt their media logics as the media landscape shifts, but that politics is fundamentally transformed.

While talk back radio still provides some limited journalistic filter, social media publishing enables the removal of external filters, leaving the initial release of information firmly in the control of the politician and his or her media advisers. For now, the major parties are continuing to employ a hybrid media logic to maximize their audience across traditional and digital platforms. However, as the audience continues to shift away from mainstream outlets such as television to social media, it appears obvious the politicians will follow, perhaps gradually abandoning a mass media logic for the networked logic required in a viral social media environment. In turn, the role of the federal parliamentary press gallery would also change. Once the chief gatekeepers of political news, this shift to disintermediation is placing reporters in the same seat as the audience, consuming the social media posts of elected representatives and playing catch-up to provide analysis and interpretation. We can only hope that those who follow the feeds of politicians also follow the independent analysis from the press gallery. As one media adviser said,

I think that direct communication has its place and it can be really useful but I think the shift in power and scrutiny is pretty dangerously poised at the moment. I don’t think it’s a good outcome democratically more broadly for anybody if that power continues to shift into the hands of the people with the hands on all the other levers as well. (Interviewee 5, 2017)

These concerns point to gaps in the research about the possible implications of politicians’ direct publishing to citizens. Future research should not only monitor and examine the increase and content of outputs from Australian politicians via these platforms but also investigate those who follow politicians, why they follow and what other sources of information they consume to be informed about national affairs. Only with a broader and deeper understanding of such trends can their impact be evaluated.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Caroline Fisher

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