Power in discursive practices: The case of the STOP EPAs campaign

Introduction

Transnational activism has increased in relation to development and trade-related international politics in recent decades (Rugendyke, 2007). Notorious examples are the mobilizations around multilateral trade negotiations in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the Doha Development Round of negotiations stalled since 2001, negotiations of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) have increased (UNCTAD, 2007). The European Union (EU) has negotiated several FTAs, and presently is engaged in 29 negotiations (European Commission, 2011) guided by the Global Europe strategy (European Commission, 2006). Simultaneously, the EU had to make their preferential treatment to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries compatible with WTO agreements, and in the frame of the Cotonou Agreement (2002), started to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In this context, activists started to challenge the EU approach to negotiations, raising development concerns of possible negative social impacts. ¹ Activists formed North–South coalitions to advocate before negotiating parties. One of the most notorious campaigns was the STOP EPAs campaign, which started in 2004 and gained momentum in 2007. But what is the significance of this type of campaign?

The vast literature on the growing role of non-state actors in international politics has dealt mostly with campaigns related to issues such as civil and political rights, the environment, and disarmament. These campaigns are described as contributing to shaping international norms (e.g. Kaldor, 2003; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Less is known about the power of transnational activism to shape trade and economic politics (e.g. Newell and Tussie, 2006), and especially in the context of predominant liberal economic paradigms (Nelson and Dorsey, 2007). Exceptions are the studies of the campaign for access to medicines. However, while it is widely perceived that campaigns contributed greatly to the 2003 WTO agreement, others indicate its limitations (Gold and Morin, 2010; Thomas, 2002). Are transnational activists powerful? What is the nature of their power?

A recent study on the role of European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in EPAs negotiations concludes that NGOs gained access to policy makers, yet, ‘they have largely failed to shift policy outcomes in their favour’ (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007: 89). Despite this conclusive statement, the campaign is worth re-examining for several reasons. The study only looked at European NGOs, and only at their actions before the negotiations had ended, that is before the highest level of mobilization which also involved organizations from ACP regions. My preliminary interviews and observations indicated that the campaign had been quite influential, in either a positive or negative manner depending on who was asked. Other indications were the amount of activities and organizations involved, as well as the response to the criticism by negotiating parties. There certainly was noise about the EPAs. Yet, what kind of effects did the campaign have on the negotiations? This empirical question led me to address a broader theoretical one, what kind of power do transnational activists have on North–South trade negotiations?

International Relations (IR) theoretical approaches struggle to deal with non-state actors’ power. Realists have disregarded the role of non-state actors by focusing on state behaviour explained by the attempt to maximize national interests and security. Those scholars who do focus on non-state actors often refer to one type, using the catch-all and ambiguous terms of ‘NGOs’ (Götz, 2008), or ‘civil society’ (Biekart and Fowler, 2009). They do not account for the diversity in organizational forms and tend to look only at ‘NGOs’ as a sector separated from the state and the market, failing to see their role in governmentality (Sending and Neumann, 2006). Transnational activists are conceptualized in a limited way as engaged individuals (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005) or as the sum of amorphous ‘NGOs’. Given these limitations, scholars have approached non-state actors’ power in different ways. Rational choice scholars within liberal/pluralist accounts propose that given a set of interests, we can expect certain rational outcomes, and, thus, the role of non-state actors is conceptualized as the influence of interest groups on state decisions. Constructivists, on the contrary, argue that rational state behaviour is constrained and enabled by values and norms of legitimate statehood and proper conduct (e.g. Schimmelfenning, 2000). The role of non-state actors is seen as contributing to shape norms. In the context of the 2003 WTO agreement on medicines, Gold and Morin’s conclusions suggest that states negotiating trade agreements find themselves trapped between the rationality of fair trade as defined by WTO principles, in which private property and competition are unquestionable principles, and social impact concerns:

Caught between strategic and communicative actions, state and non-state actors found themselves trapped in their own rhetoric of reconciling intellectual property with access to medicines. From a theoretical perspective, this case study sheds a new light on the gray zone between rational choice theory and constructivism, where both discourse and strategies matter. (2010: 563)

This puzzle is worth exploring through an analysis of the STOP EPAs campaign for several reasons. EPAs were not ‘typical’ trade negotiations: there was a high asymmetry among negotiating parties, a history of preferential treatment and a colonial past in most cases. The Cotonou Agreement aimed to lay the foundations of a new relationship between the EU and ACP countries. Defined as a ‘partnership’, it was ‘centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy (Art. 1)’. Furthermore, the EU committed to policy coherence among its external policies, with a strong legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 21), which means its trade policy has to be coherent with its development policy.

Given the particularities of the negotiations, a coalition brought together groups with expertise in development and trade policy in both regions. These groups ranged from rights-based activists to private sector associations who sought very concrete interests (e.g. market access, protection). In what ways does the transnational activism of these characteristics affect North–South trade negotiations? This is of significance when the interests of the stronger economic sectors appear to prevail, embedded in an apparently unchallengeable economic liberal paradigm of international trade, against developmental and human rights concerns. To address these empirical and theoretical questions, this article examines the STOP EPAs campaign in terms of its power to shape policymaking discursive practices and decisions. It does so with a focus on one of the ACP regions, West Africa, for various reasons: it was a diverse region in terms of positions towards the negotiations, and it was referred to by activists as one of the regions in which they had been most active and where there were different opinions regarding the ‘success’ of the campaign.

I depart from the concept of power and focus on the interconnections between two of its multiple possible conceptual layers: ² decisional and discursive power. It appears as if the power of activism in negotiations is less visible at the level of outcomes given that stronger groups’ influence prevails. But no less important, the power is more subtle and pervasive in terms of contributions to the process of negotiations through affecting discursive practices. I argue that the EPAs campaign may have affected decisions through discursive and politicization processes. I attempt to show how these two layers are interconnected. Given that the campaign coalition included a diversity of organizations, various approaches coexisted. There were discursive challenges to the overall liberal paradigm. At the same time, the concrete interests of those possibly disadvantaged were promoted through encoding demands in a development discourse and re-signification of the idea of fair trade. They managed to highlight areas of concern and secure more attention for certain issues (e.g. list of sensitive products) and encourage as much flexibility as possible in the interpretation of WTO compatibility.

This article aims to contribute to IR theory mainly in two ways. First, it sheds lights on the ways in which transnational activist coalitions try to influence North–South trade politics. Various types of organization of both material and non-material capabilities join forces while guided by different aims, discourses and approaches to social change. While some groups aim to advance concrete interests, other groups challenge the norms and values implicit in negotiation frameworks. The effects of the combination of these different strategies are examined. Second, it demonstrates the inseparability of interests and norms, reinforcing constructivist postulates. The campaign contributed to shape the identity of the EU as a responsible donor and fair competitor, through engaging in the debate over what pro-development EPAs would entail. Immersed in a more politicized issue than expected, negotiating parties attempted to reconcile regional/national economic interests and compliance to policy coherence between trade and development.

This article is structured as follows. The first section discusses strengths and limitations in IR literature on the role of non-state actors. It proposes a preliminary framework to examine the power of transnational activism, followed by methodological considerations. The third section introduces the STOP EPAs campaign, its organizational composition and strategies. It analyses how transnational activists attempted to influence the negotiations. The fourth section looks at how states responded to the campaign and to changes in discursive practices, followed by a discussion of the contributions of the campaign to changes in practices and decisions. Finally, the concluding section looks at the implications of this study for IR theory.

Power and non-state actors in IR

IR scholars have focused on state behaviour in the realist and neo-realist traditions, yet non-state actors are not insignificant in IR literature (e.g. Arts et al., 2001). In the context of trade politics, the focus has been mostly on the role of business associations and trade unions as nationally and internationally organized interest groups, or as ‘social partners’ (Halpin, 2005). Studies look into the preferences of these groups (either for protection or for trade liberalization) as a factor to explain trade policy decisions (e.g. Beyers, 2004; Dür and De Bièvre, 2007; Milner, 2002). Power is related to the type of interests represented, the size of the constituency and the value of the information that these groups bring to a policy process in the eyes of policy makers. Those of businesses and trade unions are highly valued by policy makers as they are the ones actually trading and producing the goods, that is, the ones who could be directly affected or benefited by new market conditions. Those that do not have defined economic interests are ‘diffuse interests’ groups and are considered to be less influential (Beyers, 2004); these encompass organizations such as human rights NGOs and private aid agencies. This distinction is useful. However, it has four important limitations to explain the role of groups with no material capabilities.

First, considering the level of interests’ diffuseness or concentration to explain the power of non-state actors excludes (economic) constraints to mobilization and participation. Second, it assumes that every group that wants to participate does so. It does account for the politics of ‘non-engagement’ (Newell and Tussie, 2006) and the ability to keep issues off the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). It overlooks organizations opposing trade liberalization whose actions may have an indirect influence on the process. Third, it relies on human rationality in deliberation: better information leads to better decisions. Though this is in principle true, power struggles can be overlooked if information is easily considered ‘neutral’ or ‘objectively more scientific’. The links between knowledge, ideology and power deserve to be problematized (Epstein, 2005; Gaventa and Cornwall, 2007: 70). Basic normative consensus cannot be assumed. Fourth, the role of coalitions bringing together both concentrated and diffuse interests operating in multi-level governance arrangements are not examined. The combination of material and ideological dimensions of civil society remains elusive.

An important strand of literature refers to the role of non-state actors with no material capabilities. It refers mostly to citizens’ associations and human rights NGOs (e.g. Holzcheiter, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and it demonstrates that their role is important in shaping the normative contents of global politics. Activists as ‘discourse entrepreneurs’ (Holzcheiter, 2005) promoted the identity of states as promoters of liberal values and democracy. This reinforces the constructivist point regarding the inseparability of identity and interests, and interests, instead of being given and stable, are constructed in historically specific circumstances and change depending on the context (Fierke and Wiener, 1999). Rational state behaviour is not only influenced by material interests but is also constrained by value-based norms of legitimate statehood and proper conduct (Schimmelfenning, 2000), even in those realms where economic interests have a strong influence (Epstein, 2006). Risse’s three logics (2000) at play in international politics help synthesize what is observed simultaneously in trade politics: (1) the logic of consequentialism, in line with pluralist-rationalist accounts; (2) the logic of appropriateness, proper conduct being defined by principles of fair trade as those underlying WTO rulings and agreements; and (3) the logic of arguing, especially when the ‘right thing to do’ in terms of policy approach is defied by the social impact concerns of trade liberalization/protectionism. Given that policy making and participation spaces are mostly regulated and dominated by powerful actors, it becomes more relevant to look into the quality of deliberation spaces. It is within a transnational public sphere that global civil society actors can enter deliberation fora. But, often, there are no conditions for deliberation, and little dialogue and exchange of arguments takes place, as proposed by Weller (2008) who describes the negotiations as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, in which there seems to be an arena of discursive struggles. It is in this arena where global civil society plays a role in shaping the normative contents of global politics. Rather than a neat exchange of reasons, various groups advance their goals discursively in a ‘messier’ manner. Non-state actors engage in these discursive struggles, drawing from their resources (material and non-material ones such as links to state and market actors, information, and moral standing).

Dryzek (2006) sees non-state actors as less constrained for action. They propose new ideas, while state and market actors are constrained by the preferences of voters and market actors, respectively. Dryzek proposes that action for qualitative change in a context of discourse contestation requires a special type of intelligence of agents, reflexive intelligence:

Reflexivity requires sensitivity to the extent to which key entities and actors, their interests and goals, the shared norms that constrain them, are themselves continually constituted and reconstituted … reflexivity never forgets that structures and discourses are constraining as well as enabling, and cannot be transcended. (Dryzek, 2006: 85)

Intelligent reflexive action requires a developed awareness of the consequences of one’s actions. Based on Beck et al. (1994), he distinguishes between reflexive and instrumental action. Reflexive action is constitutive action, while instrumental action is applying means to immediate ends. While the first transcends and creates new situations, the latter tends to lead to short-term outcomes. He explains: ‘Seen through the prism of the capacity of civil society actors for constitutive reasoning and reflexive action, transnational resistance movements take on added significance’ (Dryzek, 2006: 124). He refers to the numerous actions questioning market liberalism and deconstructing the Washington Consensus as the ‘cumulative weight of small interventions in the discursive field’. Transnational activism’s power in this sense is then related to diffuse reflexive action, and its effects are seen in the shaping of discourses and practices. But how does this happen?

The way in which discourses, as structures of signification, construct and produce social reality has been examined by IR scholars. Discourses are productive in various ways: (1) making intelligible ways of being and acting; (2) defining subjects authorized to speak and to act; (3) defining knowledgeable practices; (4) disciplining and controlling social spaces; and (5) producing common sense (Milliken, 1999: 229). Doty emphasizes the linguistic construction of reality through her ‘discursive practices approach’. She argues that language has a force of its own and that power is inherent to those practices by which agents are constructed and become articulated within particular discourses (1993: 302). But she also allows room for the role of agency:

What becomes sayable, doable, imaginable within a society results from a process of discursive repetition and dissemination. However, because discourses are inherently unstable, open and often contradictory, as are the subject-positions that are made available within them, there exists the possibility for variation in this process of repetition and dissemination. Herein lies the possibility for agency. (Doty, 1997: 385, emphasis added).

I define discursive practices as texts in action and in context. Agents draw from abstract but socially shared systems of ideas (ideologies), craft and re-signify ideas according to their aims in specific socio-cultural-political contexts, and transmit them to others through written and oral language, or other visual symbols. In the process of text production, agents are constrained and enabled, in and by power relations, and, thus, position themselves in reference to others and to existing rules, anticipating and assuming others’ frames of reference and their possible and allowed reactions. Different elements are articulated in more or less logical ways to form ‘stories’ which are disseminated and become accepted and taken-for-granted and, thus, more powerful. ‘What is centrally contested is the power of these preconstructed semantic systems to generate particular visions of the world which may have the performative power to sustain or remake the world in their image’ (Fairclough, 2003: 130). In this ‘play of practice’, actions can thus reproduce and/or change these power relations. It is in the dynamics of practices of re-signification and reproduction that both stability and change can be observed.

It is necessary to pay attention to changes in decisions (or non-decisions) within changes in discursive practices taking place in longer time frames which enable or constrain those decisions. Decisional power and discursive power are two aspects of the same process. Decisional power appears as more visible and linked to expression of interests. Discursive power is subtler but more pervasive, and as in a constructivist perspective, shapes identities and interests; thus affecting the frameworks within which decisions are taken.

Research design

Building on Fairclough (2003) and Milliken (1999), three main aspects of discursive practices are analysed, ways of being or subjects’ identities, ways of representing reality or discourses, and ways of acting. First, ways of being are operationalized as identity formation and subject-positioning (opponents/partners), and was analysed through predicative analysis of subjects mentioned in texts and interviews. Second, discourses were analysed through an examination of assumptions, legitimation strategies and predicative analysis of the idea of fair trade and its relationship with development. These discourses draw from economic theories and move through policy paradigms which guide decisions. A schematic categorization is proposed and adapted from Said and Desai (2003: 66). They propose five main paradigms in relation to levels and kinds of desired global market integration: ‘Supporters’ of global market integration; ‘Regressives’ — global trade is ‘good if in our terms’; ‘Reformers’ — trade can and must be made more equitable, WTO could be reformed; ‘Alternatives’ — new institutions should be created; and ‘Isolationists’ — the state should be re-empowered and the WTO abolished. Third, ways of acting are operationalized as states’ and activists’ actions, with specific analysis of genres (types of text, e.g. policy paper, speech, poster) used in these activities as indicators for tracing changes in discursive practices. A distinction was made between genres commonly used within formal governmental structures, that is, used by governments, and those that are used outside of them. ‘Invited spaces’ are included as within formal spaces (Cornwall, 2002). Though the distinction may not always be clear, texts that are produced, used, controlled or steered by governmental agents are considered as formal spaces genres. Variation in terms of genres used is then observed between texts of formal spaces (technical reports, statistics, legal texts) and texts of non-formal spaces (posters, pamphlets, declarations).

Discursive practices are then analysed through texts in action (how they were used) and in context (in relation to specific historical, political and social situations). Data were gathered in an iterative way combining documentation, interviews and observations. First, documents available on official websites were collected (European Commission DG Trade, ECOWAS and member countries, campaign and other research NGOs) and were the source for making the graphs included in Annexes 1 and 2. Though this may be biased as more documents were available on EU DG-Trade’s website, it serves here only to indicate a movement towards diversification of genres used in time and the trends are confirmed in my observations of the documents used and referred to in interviews and events observed. To mitigate this limitation, that is, different availabilities of documents via the Internet per country and organization, documents were also collected asking interviewees and during observations. A special collaboration was established with Oxfam International which was evaluating internally its contribution to the campaign. They agreed to share their documentation and, if public, partners’ documentation as well. To avoid bias in the collection of data, special care was taken to contrast Oxfam-provided information with those views of other organizations as expressed in interviews and in my own observations. It is important to note that the list of interviewees was already composed before the collaboration with Oxfam was established based on preliminary interviews with researchers and key observers. Due to practical limitations, information on local organizations not based in capitals is minimal. However, the main views were represented by national and international coalitions.

A total of 988 texts were collected and classified by author, general genre (formal/non-formal) and type (technical, legal, brochure, poster, etc.). From analysing these materials, certain patterns emerged and progressively new documents found continued to confirm the same patterns. I considered data collection exhausted at that point. Key texts and extracts to analyse in more depth were selected on the basis of how relevant they appeared in the eyes of interviewees: for example, statement, declarations and materials used in the different phases of the campaign, especially mentioned by activists, and recalled by policy makers and observers. I also noted documents used and referred to in the different activities I observed.

Interviews took place during 2008 and 2009. The interview guide started with a name elicitor, that is, asking who the interviewee thought were important players in the negotiation in order of importance. These allowed a basic picture of subjects’ positioning. A total of 59 interviews were conducted with main players. These included the main negotiating parties, that is, regional organizations and member states, and most active organizations. ³ Five activities were observed with the aim of obtaining a balanced mix of activities organized by governments and intergovernmental and activist-related organizations in both the EU and West Africa: public hearing and debate at the European Parliament (Brussels, 9 April 2008); Civil Society activities at UNCTAD Conference (Accra, 16–22 April 2008); TNI Debating Europe Series ‘The global crisis, solutions, and implications for EU trade policy’ (Brussels, 25 February, 2009); Civil Society Dialogue at the European Commission, State of Play Bilateral Trade Negotiations (Brussels, 11 March 2009); and Oxfam EPAs Evaluation Campaign Meetings (The Hague/Brussels, 24–25 August 2009).

The STOP EPAs campaign

The EU and ACP countries have cooperated formally since 1975 (Lomé I Convention). Since then, subsequent agreements were signed (1981, 1985 and 1989). Signed in 2000, the ACP–EU Partnership Agreement defines the relations between the two groups in areas of trade, aid and political cooperation with the aims of promoting democracy, economic growth and sustainable development. It implied profound changes, mainly the shift from unilateral trade preferences to reciprocal trade relations compatible with WTO rules. The main elements in the new equation are: poverty eradication + reciprocity in trade + governance + aid based on performance. The idea underlying this shift is that trade preferences and aid do not suffice and it is necessary to support countries to ‘trade their way out of poverty’ with much emphasis on ownership, governance and targeted interventions in relation to performance. However, all these elements prove difficult to realize. There were various views on the degree of desired integration into the global economy. While ACP in general favoured preferences to take into account the asymmetries, the EU believed in openness supported by trade-related assistance. Given that preferential agreements violate the principle of non-discrimination of the multilateral trading system, the EU negotiated a waiver with WTO members to continue preferences until 2007. After this, a WTO-compatible trade arrangement was needed.

Though a few organizations such as Eurostep ⁴ in Europe and ENDA ⁵ in West Africa monitored the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement, the campaign was launched in December 2004 in Lusaka at the African Social Forum and gained momentum in 2007. Some organizations led the coordination such as Third World Network Africa/Africa Trade Network. At this initial stage, there were about 15 groups in 13 countries. In 2006, there were 30 groups, and in 2007, there were at least 217 groups in 49 countries comprising seven regional networks and four international organizations. ⁶ There was a diversity of organizations involved: private aid agencies and solidarity groups predominantly in Europe, farmers’ associations, trade unions, private sector associations such as traders, and manufacturers’ associations in West Africa. Other groups involved were environmentalists, women and students/youth groups. Though the coalition was loose in its organizational form, there was a ‘core’ coalition formed by key European and ACP groups, and a wider coalition including various networks and spontaneous movements. At the core, there were European private aid agencies which played key roles in articulating the multi-regional network given their international work and connections, providing expertise and funding.

The following section examines how activists attempted to change the negotiations from a discursive practices point of view. Activists aimed to shape subjects’ identities, discourses and policy making practices.

The EPAs campaign from a discursive practices point of view

Campaign texts refer to the voice of ‘civil society’ and mostly in general terms to the main negotiating groupings — EU and ACP countries — though regional and international organizations and individual states appear as well. The main identities that the texts produce are: (a) that of civil society, especially those groups possibly negatively affected; (b) the EU presented as a strong economic force/group of developed countries which has to respect its commitments to policy coherence, promotion of human rights and development cooperation; and (c) ACP countries who are weaker in terms of economic power and negotiating capacity. This is clear in the first text jointly signed by both European and ACP groups, Six Reasons to Oppose EPAs (EPAs Coalition, 2004). Its purpose was to explain their opposition to EPAs ‘in their current form’, that is, as proposed by the EU. The text contains 18 direct quotes and 42 references to non-campaign-issued documents in a six-page document. All of these quotes and references are related to official documents or persons with high academic credentials. No quote appears by either coalition members or related civil society groups that would be affected by the EPAs. Though it is a position paper, the voices of ‘we’ or ‘civil society’ seem to be hidden. The legitimation strategy of these arguments is not built only on ‘unreasonable’ claims from civil society, but mostly from references to ‘official’ voices. Legitimation is built by making reference to authorities (most notably ACP officials, parliamentarians) and on rationalization, appealing to existing agreed rules in the frame of the WTO and UN, and references to the Millennium Development Goals.

The text aims to challenge the EU approach to the EPAs by presenting five myths. Arguments for depicting the EU’s approach as myths are built on several ‘voices’: those of ACP, the EU and a selection of ACP officials. It is not what ‘civil society’ thinks; it is what ‘they themselves’ as governments and their own institutions have agreed upon. The message is ‘stick to your commitments’. The signatories appear as neutral and present the situation as credible economists and international institutions versus lack of respect for these agreements. The task of civil society is, then, to point out these inconsistencies. This contrasts with texts of the consolidation phase of the campaign when more and different opinions appear, for example, including quotes of representatives of farmers (Oxfam International, 2008). In this way, the campaign defined subjects authorized to speak and act.

Activists aimed to influence ways of representing economic reality, in particular, the relationship between trade and development. Since groups worked in coalitions, there were mainly two approaches: a reformist and an isolationist approach, which coexisted in a dynamic way. While European groups tended to have a reformist approach, some groups in Africa opposed the negotiations altogether. Yet, there were common concerns. The scope and pace of trade liberalization had to be put into question if development dimensions were to remain central. While there is general agreement that trade can be a powerful tool for development, a growing body of literature argues that rapid trade liberalization does not on its own automatically lead to positive development outcomes. This was in line with ACP countries’ demands. EPAs were represented as equivalents of unrestricted trade liberalization, connotated in a negative manner and using words such as ‘devastating’ and ‘damaging’. The meanings of the words ‘development’, ‘WTO compatibility’ and ‘regional integration’ were challenged. Concurrently, texts do share basic assumptions with the EC: ‘trade can bring benefits’, ‘it can be a powerful tool’, ‘a healthy economy is a competitive one’. However, the campaign mostly challenged the asymmetries in power and that conditions are not such that the ACP, presented as poor and dependent, could compete with the EU, presented as rich and ambitious. In this line of thinking, there were attempts to redefine WTO-compatible alternatives, as evidenced in the ECDPM (2006) report, Alternative (to) EPAs, Possible Scenarios for the Future ACP Trade Relations with the EU, financed by Oxfam.

While reformists use the slogan ‘STOP EPAs in their current form’, meaning as proposed by the EU, other groups chose only ‘STOP EPAs’, in a more ‘isolationist’ approach (e.g. EPAs Coalition, 2007a, 2007b). Another example of this type of declaration is 9th ATN Meeting DeclarationForward with the Struggle to STOP EPAs (Africa Trade Network, (2009):

We therefore re-iterate our rejection of the Economic Partnership Agreements, and re-affirm our campaign objective to Stop the EPAs. We re-state our position that as free-trade agreements between two unequal parties, the EPAs are fundamentally anti-developmental. This is especially so in the particular context of Africa’s weak, fragmented economies, which have been ravaged and distorted by years of European and (other) external domination. This anti-developmental essence can not be reversed by means of the on-going attempts to inject some so-called development dimensions into these FTAs. We also assert that any alternative to the EPAs can only be defined as the right of, and support for, African and other countries of the ACP to determine their own polices and agenda for development. (Emphasis added)

EPAs are negatively signified as attempts at domination and, in essence, anti-development. Through these different understandings, activists aimed to redefine what was the ‘good’ relationship between trade and development. They produced and reproduced ‘common sense’. For example, the idea that trade is good for development or the idea that countries have the right to define their development agendas.

The diversity in approaches is reflected in the variety of activities organized and texts produced. They ranged from lobby meetings to organization of debates, rallies, protests before embassies and media work. These activities were accompanied accordingly by texts of different genres, from detailed policy analysis to brochures and posters. It is noteworthy that technical-legal texts were made accessible for the general public in different formats, for example, FTAs Manual by Oxfam International, Action Aid and Christian Aid (2007) and posters by Ghana Trade and Livelihood Coalition. These texts circulated widely reaching parliamentarians, policy makers and media, as observed in events. By allowing more to participate and breaking the barriers between legal-technical and popular texts, activists aimed to redefine knowledgeable practices and open policy making spaces.

Activists’ efforts attempted to shape discursive practices in mainly three ways. First, they helped produce subjects: the EU as the economic power which has to support developing countries; the ACP as in need of support; and ‘civil society’ as the expression of citizens. Second, EPAs’ taken-for-granted development credentials were put into question. Reformist and isolationist policy approaches coexisted and converged on a general challenge to the predominance of the neoliberal approach to trade, but did not deconstruct its underlying principles. Third, a diversification of genres helps to bridge formal and non-formal spaces genres which allowed a broader politicization of the negotiations. These bridges facilitated the involvement and participation of different groups. Activists showed that they were aware of the different discourses and aimed to encode their demands into larger societal concerns rather than short-term sectoral interests. This awareness and reflection could happen because of — and was favoured by — working in a coalition composed of a diversity of groups. Discussions over the main message led to efforts towards constitutive reasoning, though the search for new creative alternatives remained limited and within the horizons of reformist and isolationist approaches.

States’ responses and the ‘play of practice’

Most officials revealed that they did not expect the campaign and the amount of criticism. The negotiations of a WTO-compatible trade arrangement had been agreed by all parties in the Cotonou Agreement. In the next paragraphs, the views and responses of states are analysed.

Though officials recognized the importance of ‘civil society’ and ‘NGOs’ (terms interchangeably used in a broad sense), they perceived the main actors as being the negotiating parties. Commissioners Michel and Mandelson’s letter (European Commission, 2007) replying to the criticism illustrates how subjects and identities were being reproduced. The letter presents the EU/themselves as respectful and open. They do so by thanking campaigners for their interest aiming to show respect for citizens’ concerns. But, towards the end, they stress that there were no credible alternatives provided. They denied any pressure on ACP countries, and present themselves as respectful of partners and past agreements. In reference to WTO members they say that ‘They expect us to honour our promises’. They also present the EU as open to flexibility and willing to support ACP countries, which they describe as ‘partners’: ‘the EU is standing by the side of its ACP partners in their drive to adapt to the challenges of globalisation’ and ‘The EU is not steamrolling ACP regions into completing negotiations this year; on the contrary, we are doing everything in our power to be as flexible as we can.’ ACP countries are portrayed as ‘working hard’ and they explicitly highlight that they should not be perceived as weak and unable to negotiate, indicating that this is what campaigners imply: ‘ACP countries deserve better than attempts to caricature them as weak and helpless. ACP countries themselves have repeatedly said that they are committed to the goals that EPAs are designed to achieve. They know their interests and they have negotiated hard.’ ACP countries also use the language of partnership and of development to request flexibility from the EU.

For the EU, promoting free trade with ACP countries was fundamental to foster their integration into the global economy. More trade would mean more economic growth, and thus more development. In this way, the two aims of the Cotonou Agreement would be realized based on a signification of good trade as ‘open and fair’. It can be summarized as: more trade = more economic growth = development. EPAs were presented as ‘above all instruments for development’ (European Commission, 2011) and justified in various official texts and statements. Commissioner Mandelson (European Commission, 2005) explains:

The Economic Partnership Agreement currently being negotiated with West Africa pursues an ambitious objective. That objective is to make West Africa an economic magnet that attracts investment and stimulates private enterprise, a hive of economic activity that guarantees sustained growth and drives more sustainable economic, social and environmental development. (Emphasis added)

In EU documents, EPAs are always related positively to economic growth and development. This is indicated by the collocation of words like: investment, enterprise, economic magnet, sustained growth and development. ⁷ Texts present similar collocations of words and share the same basic assumptions: EPAs are the only and necessary path towards development and integration into the world economy. Reform and change is imperative to grasp the opportunities. There is an overall stability both in discourses and the underlying neoliberal policy paradigm observed in the period when Mandelson was in office as EU Trade Commissioner. However, these stable discourses get tinged with elements of other policy paradigms in later texts of Commissioner Ashton (2009):

Going forward, my vision for the negotiation of full EPAs is one where each negotiation reflects and respects the regional specificity of the parties to that Agreement — a flexible process. That means both looking at content — because the EPA has to work for its signatories but also the pace of negotiations. But it also means that EPAs should be dynamic not static — able to react to future events and to account for different regional interests and needs. In this process, the Commission will continue to inform and involve the European Parliament. And while we should be ambitious there must also be no imposed dialogue, which is why issues like government procurement have already been removed from some negotiations.… And I can guarantee that there will be no opening of public services, no pressure for privatisation. The explicit right of the ACP to regulate their own markets will be recognized and there will be no limitation of access to essential medicines or collecting seed — in fact we would rather seek to strengthen than limit ACP rights and capacity in these areas. (Emphasis added)

Ms Ashton replies to most concerns, and important discursive moves can be observed. Though stating ambition should not be compromised, there are several considerations which limit the underlying idea of trade opening as an inevitable choice. This is emphasized and repeated various times: the process has to account ‘for regional specificities’ and for ‘different regional interests and needs’, and respect the ‘right to regulate their own markets’. The idea of rights and capacities of ACP countries to determine their agenda first is central, in contrast with the imperative of reform and opening to catch up with opportunities. Arguing for the reinforcement of governmental capacities complements, at least discursively, arguments for market-centred strategies. Second, flexibility and dialogue are promised to improve the process. This somehow implies that this had not been the case, or at least, that some ACP partners perceived it like this. Third, there are references to contentious issues. Ashton informs government procurement was removed from some negotiations and there would be no opening of public services. This indicates that the EU realized that its original ambitious agenda had to be limited, showing acknowledgement of critics.

The EU rearticulated its discourse: trade will help development if the necessary sensitive issues are discussed with less pressure and as much flexibility as possible. The EU maintained their understanding of fair trade and attempted to improve the ways negotiations were conducted. The EU aimed to come closer to ‘proper’ conduct, that is, being respectful of other countries’ interests and a good negotiation process. But the most important observation is that the campaign managed to raise doubts and required new efforts by the EU to rearticulate its communication strategy.

West African representations of the desirable link between trade and development were — not surprisingly — less compact than the EU one. West Africa negotiated as one of six ACP regions, coordinated by ECOWAS which gathers 15 West African countries, plus Mauritania. ⁸ ECOWAS and its members, given their different situations (LDCs/non-LDCs/UEMOA members or not), did not share a common position, but some concerns. They believed in trade as a tool for development and aimed for differential treatment and a maximum flexibility from developed countries. While for the EU, EPAs were tools for development as they promoted openness, investment and reforms, for ECOWAS, this meant a flexible interpretation of WTO article XXIV (‘substantially all trade in a reasonable period of time’), and financial support to deal with adjustment costs and loss of governmental revenue (e.g. ECOWAS, 2003). The main argument was that more trade would not necessarily mean more development. Opening their economies without the necessary conditions could be, in their view, dangerous. This is illustrated in a joint declaration of African Union Heads of State (African Union, 2006):

[We] re-iterate that economic partnership agreements with the European Union should be tools for the economic development of Africa. We express our profound disappointment at the stance taken by negotiators of the European Commission in so far as it does not adequately address the development concerns that must be the basis of relations with Africa. We urge our negotiating partners to clearly demonstrate the development content of the proposed agreements, and adequately address supply side constraints, infrastructure bottlenecks, and adjustment costs, bearing in mind that trade liberalisation together with the accompanying liberal policies, may not by itself deliver economic development. In this regard, we emphasise that the development content should include, inter alia, adequate financial and technical resources; full market access to the European markets for African goods and service providers; and policy space and flexibility for implementation of development programmes in Africa. (Emphasis added)

Furthermore, they stressed the need for a model beyond export-oriented growth only, as expressed by Mr Daramy, Head of ECOWAS:

We believe we need to increase local processing to add value to our goods — we don’t want our factories to be closed and create unemployment and social instability. I must reiterate that confining West African countries to the production of primary commodities amount to condemning them to remain locked in the commodity trap. West Africa is not negotiating for time — we are concerned with reducing poverty and development of our people — we’ll negotiate for the next 20 years if that is how long it will take to get our concerns addressed.(Emphasis added)

Thus, the signification of development is amplified beyond trade and external dependency. These representations of the links between trade and development are mirrored in strong positions and the decision to continue negotiations as long as necessary and beyond the 2007 deadline.

Discursive practices were affected throughout the EPAs process in a number of ways. First, more and more diverse texts were produced (see Annex 1), especially, non-technical texts such as speeches and briefings at the peak of the campaign between 2007 and 2008. A second indication of the importance of communicating the advantages of EPAs was the involvement of media experts. According to EC officials, the problem was that EPAs had not been given good communication. Thus, numerous presentations were made available on line and the number of public events increased. One EC official stated in 2008, ‘in discussions about EPAs with civil society, which is all the time now …’ (emphasis indicates the stress in the interviewee’s voice). In sum, a more dialogical approach in the way of understanding economic reality in the later stages of negotiations, and second, the EU felt the need to react to critics and make efforts to communicate its view of the EPAs. In West Africa, in terms of discursive strategies, only at a later stage did ECOWAS create a special EPAs section on their website. The most common genre is official Ministerial and Parliamentary Declarations using formal and strong language as ‘recalling’ and ‘condemning’. Declarations were broadcast in local media (TV, radio, newspapers) and it was recollected that common citizens knew that ‘EPAs were not the Environmental Protection Agency’ (interview with Action Aid Ghana). Genres became more diverse and came out of formal spaces (Annex 2). Various public events were organized and officials spoke at civil society events. Again, there is a movement from ‘economist’ technical spheres towards ‘politicization’.

Shaping discursive practices, shaping negotiations?

In previous sections, the way in which transnational activism attempted to affect negotiations and the responses of states to the campaign has been analysed. But can changes in negotiations be attributed to the campaign? In which ways can changes in discursive practices be linked to changes in decisions? The links between decisional power and discursive power are never neat or evident. It is difficult to speak of attribution when there are various factors at play. Yet, there are indications that the campaign contributed to affect decisions in a number of ways. In this section, I explore these indications which make plausible the links between changes in discursive practices and decisions.

The campaign’s combination of ‘reformist’ and ‘isolationist’ approaches overall questioned the development credentials of EPAs and made their negotiation a politically contentious issue instead of a technical-administrative affair. Doubts were raised about the predominant discourse (‘trade liberalization = growth = development’) and the EU commitment to be a respectful partner and supporter of development. There was debate about the necessary conditions for EPAs to work: investment, reforms and accommodation to national and regional priorities. Some ‘isolationists’ believed that even if they did not manage to stop the negotiations, at least they helped to delay the process, helping to ‘buy time’. This shows the effects of the involvement of groups opposed to trade liberalization that do contribute to the mounting pressure and overall ‘mood’ in negotiations. The process slowed down and policy makers had to make extra efforts to advance their goals discursively. In fact, negotiations set to end in 2007 continued four years later with important outstanding issues.

Though EC officials reported that the campaign had been biased and only emphasized negative aspects of the EPAs, most EC officials perceived the campaign as influential (seven out of eight officials interviewed). One official explained: ‘They kept us on our toes … it’s good to debate, because it might help to shape the whole thing further. You can’t negotiate in total isolation.’ No EC officials acknowledged that they had changed their views because of the campaign nor could they give proof about how their decisions would have been different if there had not been one. Nonetheless, one official explained:

If they hadn’t done a ‘no EPA campaign’, maybe we wouldn’t have made the same effort of putting all these things on the exclusion list. I mean I still believe we would have done it, because we believe in fair trade and we want the best agreements. And they are not competitiveness driven agreements. It’s a different kind of agreement, it’s a development agreement. But still they kept us on our toes. So you could only come back with a deal that you could put into the narrative of why this serves development. And I wouldn’t meet an NGO twice if already the second time they would not yet have looked at the exclusion list and would come back with the old arguments which are simply not valid. (Emphasis added)

Though it is difficult to pinpoint a specific change to be attributed to the campaign, importantly, it seems the campaign made officials even more conscious of a number of issues and how they communicated over them. This is evident in the change in number and kinds of texts produced. These ranged from highly technical trade law documents to texts whose format made information accessible to a wider public, as illustrated in Annexes 1 and 2. In the case of the EU, interviews revealed that the groups most targeted by campaigners, parliamentarians and EU member states, were made aware of possible negative implications and demanded more information from the EC. The EC responded by organizing seminars and information meetings and producing briefing papers. Examples are the Open Letter to Campaigners of September 2007 by Commissioners Michel and Mandelson (European Commission, 2007), Six Common Misconceptions about Economic Partnership Agreements (European Commission, 2008a) and Fishing for the Truth: Is Europe Really Destroying African Fisheries Industries? (European Commission, 2008b).

In West Africa, officials believed that the campaign contributed to highlight the asymmetries between the EU and ACP countries and indirectly it reinforced and strengthened their positions. Campaigners claimed to have had a significant influence on the position of Nigeria, quite critical of the EPAs, which decided to apply for the alternative trade arrangement of GSP+. It was further supported by a national advisory committee, in which NANTS (an association of enterprises very active in the campaign) played an important role. But international agencies also played a role. One Nigerian official explained (in relation to the role of European private aid agencies), ‘Their analysis and researches provided handy/ready insights to backstop the dearth of studies, needed to guide African negotiators.’ However, Nigeria’s position had been originally strong and it is difficult to prove that the position would have been different without the campaign. In Ghana, the perception was that if it had not been for the campaign, a full EPA would have been signed instead of an Interim one. ⁹ A trade union leader described it as ‘it seemed it was going to be one more agreement’, meaning that there was not a deep understanding of the risks involved. Senegal being an LDC could rely on the EBA initiative to maintain its market access on goods to the European market. Yet, Senegal played a leading role in the region and former President Wade was vocal against EPAs (e.g. EU–Africa Summit, Lisbon, 2007). A representative from the Senegalese government acknowledged that the campaign made important and well-prepared contributions and reinforced their position. Evidence suggests that the campaign contributed to the maintenance and deepening of the original cautious stances. It appears as if campaign positions were closer to ACP positions, and in some countries there was close collaboration between the government and advisory committees where campaign-related organizations played an important role.

The comparison between assumptions implicit in most campaign and official texts shows that there is little disagreement on the assumption that trade is good for development and that ACP economies need to be integrated into the world economy. This continues to appear as commonsensical. However, the ‘how’ of this integration was a matter of debate. The campaign contributed to challenging the liberal discourse of trade and development in the sense that it questioned the scope and pace of liberalization, reinforcing ACP positions which demanded maximum flexibility and recognition of asymmetries, especially in market access reciprocity. Campaign discourses supported the demands and concerns of West Africa, especially around the fact that there should be necessary conditions and support measures that are needed to deal with adjustment costs. The campaign pushed for limiting the trade agreement to goods, excluding so-called ‘Singapore issues’, appealing to the identity of the EU as a responsible and coherent donor, rather than a fierce competitor avid to expand its global market access. Officially, ECOWAS negotiators did not have a mandate to negotiate services, and asked for an extension of the WTO waiver arguing the need for truly development agreements (ECOWAS, 2007). The assumption that liberalization of services and public procurement markets would be beneficial to ACP countries was put into question and ‘de-naturalized’ in the context of these negotiations. ¹⁰

Three main characteristics in discursive practices in the context of trade negotiations can be observed. First, campaigners engage in ‘invited spaces’ using, reproducing and reworking ways of communicating and ways of representing economic ideas. At the same time, activities outside formal spaces, some contesting liberal premises, contribute to the politicization of the issue in the international public sphere. It is the cumulative weight of many small interventions in the discursive field that Dryzek refers to. This is observable in the increase and diversification of texts and genres in a movement from technically prohibitive texts towards wider-audience accessible ones. Second, more voices participate in the debate. Early texts refer only to the EC and ACP governments, while later ones refer directly to various groups of critics. The campaign compelled governments, parliamentarians and all actors to better argue the benefits and understand the full range of possible negative consequences. Negotiating parties had to learn to engage with different non-state actors and react in the public sphere. The EU had to put effort into the rearticulation of their discourse and actively respond to criticisms. And third, the scope of difference in terms of discourses remains limited between neoliberal discourses on trade and development and those that question the scope and pace of liberalization, but not their underlying liberal assumptions.

These discursive changes were indications of the level of controversy and difficulties in the negotiations. As the deadline of 31 December 2007 was approaching and important issues remained unresolved, the EU decided to split the negotiations into two stages: interim agreements for goods only to prevent a loss of market access and continuation of negotiations towards comprehensive EPAs. At the end of 2007, only one region initialled a full EPA (Cariforum) and a number of interim agreements were concluded with certain countries or regions in Africa and the Pacific. ¹¹ ECOWAS did not sign as a region, evidencing the important pending issues and intra-regional disagreements. This led non-LDCs to search for paths which best suited their national interests. Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana decided to initial interim agreements while Nigeria decided to apply for GSP+. Nonetheless, the EC has rejected its request on the grounds that Nigeria does not satisfy the necessary conditions, in particular concerning the ratification of certain international agreements. Since 2008, the region committed to conclude a full and regional EPA by June 2009. However, negotiations continue to date (Trade Negotiations Insights, 2011).

Conclusions

Transnational activism contributed to shaping the negotiations’ discursive practices and, thus, helped to frame what was possible in terms of decisions. It contributed to shaping discursive practices in a number of ways: reproducing certain aspects of them, notably not destabilizing the underlying assumptions of trade liberalization (though some groups aimed at this); and, at the same time, introducing changes, such as diversification in genres, towards inclusion of more voices and issues in debates, such as the meanings of development given that it was a North–South negotiation. Activists appealed to the identity of the EU as a responsible donor and fair competitor, through engaging in the debate over what pro-development EPAs would entail. Immersed in a more politicized issue than expected, negotiating parties attempted to reconcile regional/national economic interests and compliance to policy coherence between trade and development. It was in the ‘play of practice’ that activism opened spaces for change, as observed in the discussion on EPAs and WTO compatibility.

The power of transnational activism is of a composite nature in which decisional and discursive power converge. Coalitions are composed of North–South and concentrated and diffuse interest groups, each deploying its material and non-material capabilities, coexisting in one loose campaign. Some activists aimed to influence specific decisions and advance concrete material interests (e.g. farmers, small industries). But they did so helped by and in relation to debates on what ‘proper conduct’ means in trade and development policies. In this sense, it is an example of how interests and norms are inextricably connected and how activists act in a diffuse reflexive manner. It is the accumulation of their small and often not-so-coordinated actions that contributed to slowing down the process. Negotiating parties were encouraged to search for alternatives and it was non-state actors that led the important search for WTO-compatible alternatives. The main implication of these findings for IR theory is that the effects of this type of transnational activism can be best seen through an analytical framework which captures both changes in decisions and in the small — and often imperceptible — changes in the discursive context making some decisions possible, against others. If the campaign is analysed only in terms of effects on outcomes, it is difficult to prove attribution of specific changes to activism. On the other hand, if only changes in discourses are examined over a long period of time, the interplay between discursive frames and concrete actions and decisions would be missed.