Popular narratives versus Chinese history: Implications for understanding an emergent China

Abstract

Closely associated with China’s growing prominence in international politics are discussions about how to understand Chinese history, and how such perspectives inform the way a stronger China may relate to the rest of the world. This article examines two narratives as cases, and considers how they fit against more careful historical scholarship. The first is the nationalist narrative dealing with Qing and Republican history, and the second is the narrative on the Chinese world order. Analyses of Chinese nationalism tend to see a more powerful China as being more assertive internationally, based in part on a belief in the need to address and overcome past wrongs. Studies of historical regional systems in Asia point to the role that a peaceful ‘Confucian’ ethos played in sustaining a stable Chinese-led order, and highlight the promise it holds for checking regional and international tensions. The two perspectives create an obvious tension when trying to understand China’s rise, which can suggest that using historical viewpoints to understand contemporary developments may be doomed to incoherence. This article argues that difficulties in applying knowledge of the past to analyses of China’s role in contemporary world politics indicate a relative inattentiveness to Chinese and Asian history. It illustrates how the nature of China’s rise may be more contingent on the external environment that it faces than popular received wisdom may indicate. The article suggests that a more extensive engagement with historical research and historiography can augment and enrich attempts to appreciate the context surrounding China’s rise.

Keywords

Epistemology historical sociology international order nationalism security transition

Introduction

China’s growing global prominence — what historian Wang Gungwu (2004) terms its ‘fourth rise’ — is encouraging greater interest in its past. Observers indicate that history can provide insights into current and future developments in China (Carlson, 2012; Hui, 2008; Johnston, 2012; Wang, 2011: 1–33). However, history is rarely clear-cut. Accounts of an event often provide competing and contradictory views, like the unfolding of multiple perspectives in the Kurosawa classic, Rashomon. This reflects the different ways individuals, communities and organizations understand a phenomenon. Making sense of these perspectives requires wading through differing accounts, varying sources and multiple types of evidence — often before attempts to theorize and quantify.

A closer examination of historical claims highlights key contingencies affecting China’s role in world politics. More detailed consideration of different historical narratives surrounding nationalism highlights ongoing tensions in how China currently relates to its external environment. This approach builds on and applies insights developed by Lawson (2012), Lustick (1996), O’Brien (2006) and Schroeder (1994) to current conversations about applying Chinese history to the study of world politics. This can pave the way for a more precise framing of questions and explanations surrounding phenomena pertaining to China’s external relations. Unpacking different facets of past developments provides a means to understand the varying degrees to which path dependencies inform contemporary Chinese politics.

Conversations about how to make sense of Chinese history often include two sets of observations. Studies considering historical regional systems identify a China-centred order that shaped what we know as Asia today (Kang, 2005a; Paltiel, 2010; Qin, 2010; Yan, 2011; Zhang, 2009). These include a shared ‘Confucian’ ethos across East Asia that values Chinese leadership as legitimate and stability-enhancing. Proponents argue that these beliefs continue to inform regional politics. Analyses privileging Chinese nationalism frequently highlight dissatisfaction in China towards the experience of foreign pressure from the mid-19th century. These suggest a deep-seated desire within China to resist external affronts (real or perceived), rectify previous wrongs and restore pre-eminence (Gries, 2005: 43–53; Nathan and Ross, 1997: 19–34). Such a dynamic implies a potential for forceful assertions of interest that can put China at odds with other actors. Given these strains in historically informed outlooks, can understandings of the past provide coherent insights for China’s contemporary international relations?

Fine-tuning the popular historical narratives that scholars and others use to understand China’s current external relations is especially useful. Nationalist sentiments are prone to division, manipulation, even suppression — much like other ideologies. Popular recollections about historical patterns of interaction between China and its neighbours are subject to reinterpretation and selective remembering, intentional or otherwise. China’s capacity for playing a stable, leading international role may depend on how its government is able to articulate nationalist and order-shaping aspirations. These conditions suggest that appreciating the effects of nationalism and historical external interactions on China’s external interactions requires more attention to how these dynamics fit their contemporaneous contexts.

I compare common Chinese nationalist narratives by focusing on the late Qing, Republican and early Communist periods — the era of China’s ‘Century of National Humiliation’ and its immediate aftermath. By examining historiography on the period, I consider the range of variation associated with nationalism during this time and how it differs from popular accounts. I likewise survey the historiography surrounding China’s past management of relationships with neighbours to highlight key variations, especially conditions surrounding convergence and divergence from common accounts of Chinese leadership. Such efforts can underscore elements that shaped China’s outward interactions in the longue durée. This informs efforts to locate China in world politics.

Historical contingencies and China’s international politics

Unpacking dynamics linked to a historical episode can provide opportunities to study these forces. This means recognizing how multiple developments culminate in a particular event. Efforts in this direction enable researchers to introduce more rigour when developing general theories and establishing micro-foundations for explanatory frameworks. Basing theory and micro-foundations more on empirical observations and less on assumptions enhances parsimony (Audi, 1999: 197–198). Disaggregating history enables more accurate causal inferences by reducing the possibility of over determination, clarifying likely spurious relationships and uncovering omitted variables.

More fine-grained analyses of historical events can uncover spatial and social variation in the distribution of effects. Particular ideologies, policies and even wars at a given moment might not affect different classes, geographical regions and political actors similarly. Exploring how these distributions change over time provides insight into how specific episodes affect disparate spaces and populations temporally (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Pierson, 2004). This endeavour is consistent with comparative historical analyses, and even survival analysis and the examination of lagged effects. Ascertaining different aspects of a historical event and tracking how they work themselves out can provide higher-resolution empirical data.

Weighing multiple, competing historical accounts of particular events is useful for avoiding selection biases (Lustick, 1996; O’Brien, 2006). Taking for granted popular, even dominant, historical narratives can lead researchers to overlook incongruent or disconfirming evidence that has yet to become mainstream. This can undercut analytical accuracy by truncating variation. Discounting newer or less prominent historiography may result in unintentional inclusion of selection biases or teleological reasoning into otherwise rigorous research. Passing over contentious issues in historical accounts too quickly increases the likelihood of accepting false positives (Type I Error) and false negatives (Type II Error).

Looking at interpretations of Chinese nationalism and the traditional world order is especially appropriate for highlighting the analytical value of examining multiple perspectives surrounding particular historical phenomena. Students of modern and contemporary Chinese politics often invoke the enduring influence of a nationalism based on pervasive understandings of resistance to unwanted external influences during the ‘Century of National Humiliation’ (Bainian Guochi) (Gries, 2005: 43–53; Karmel, 2000; Nathan and Ross, 1997: 19–34; Yahuda, 2000). Similarly, there is a popular perspective that sees wide acceptance of China’s leadership based on its political philosophy and statecraft traditions as central to peace in Asia during periods of Chinese prominence. The popularity of such viewpoints makes nationalism and traditional order good vehicles for exploring what serious considerations of contending accounts can add when thinking about China.

Underscoring the analytical value of different accounts surrounding historical phenomena augments the literature on comparative historical methodology and path dependency in political science. I examine how explicit incorporation of historiographical insights can benefit political science research, which usually privileges a central, driving narrative. For political scientists, acquiring better means to handle incongruent data can improve analytic precision (Gaddis, 2002; MacMillan, 2009; Trouillot, 1995: ch. 1). Exploring differing perspectives on oft-cited features of Chinese history is especially informative given how the past weighs on thinking about China’s contemporary politics. More awareness about how such influences operate can help analysts obtain broader and more accurate understandings of Chinese politics.

Nationalism reconsidered

A pervasive narrative for the years between the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the mid-20th century is of a ‘Century of National Humiliation’ for China. Military defeat, foreign economic and political domination, and domestic upheaval supposedly characterized this period. What follows is that China only emerged from humiliation with victory over Japan in 1945 and the 1949 Communist Revolution. This position argues that the Chinese experience of success rests on struggling for political unity and national interest against great odds. An obvious implication is that the Chinese people and state should assert what is ‘right’ in their view.

Here, I highlight not just the fact that China emerged from a position of weakness relative to other powers, but also how this development unfolded. This approach aims to underline constraints facing nationalist-based mobilization and resistance. I draw attention to dynamics that helped to shape the nature of contemporary Chinese nationalism and its effects on today’s Chinese foreign policy. I recap the contours of popular nationalist understandings of China’s recent past before examining where these accounts diverge from recent historical work and discussing the implications of such difference.

Nationalism is a set of beliefs emphasizing the primacy and virtues of a shared ethnic, cultural and political identity for a discrete population (Anderson, 1991: 5–7; Gellner, 1983: 1–7; Gries, 2004: 9). Nationalists seek to realize the interests of this self-identified group, which often — but not always — culminates in the establishment of autonomous control over a territory that they deem synonymous with that population (Gellner, 1983: 1–7). Modern Chinese nationalism generally identifies with a modern, centralized territorial state, controlled by ethnic Han and defined in opposition to foreign domination (Gries, 2004: 8–9, 45–52; Johnston, 2003; 2012: 67–69; Wang, 2012: 11–12; Zheng, 1999: 9–19). There are sometimes references to China’s dynastic and ‘Confucian’ past, even if such ‘traditional’ notions sit uneasily with modernist visions of China (Johnston, 2012: 59–62; Yan, 2011). Notably, such understandings contain sufficient vagueness for different groups to contest meanings, interpretations and expressions of Chinese nationalism.

Nationalist narratives

A central component in narratives on the late Qing and Republican eras is an emphasis on foreign victimization of China. Outside pressure came through attempts to open China to trade — including the import of opium, creation of treaty ports, imposition of extra-territoriality, carving of spheres of influence and outright annexation of territory (Gries, 2004; 2005: 43–54; Nathan and Ross, 1997: 19–34; Yahuda, 2000). Such developments came with Chinese losses during the Opium Wars, Sino-French War, First Sino-Japanese War, as well as Japanese expansionism in the 1930s and 1940s. It was against this background that Chinese nationalism had to defend sovereignty defined by territorial integrity and international status (Chiang, 1943; Mao, 1952b; Sun, 1945).

Closely related to foreign intrusion is loss of ‘inseparably’ Chinese territory (Yahuda, 2000; Zheng, 1999). Most prominent is Taiwan, which Japan annexed in 1895 and subsequently passed to Kuomintang (KMT) control in 1945. Hong Kong and Macau, before their handovers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government, were parts of China that came under foreign domination during China’s period of weakness. Manchuria, Xinjiang, Tibet, areas along the Chinese coast and leaseholds in various treaty ports too were areas that fell to external control between the 19th and mid-20th centuries (Nathan and Ross, 1997: 193–211; Purdue, 2005: ch. 16). Asserting central government control over these areas is a core concern for standard Chinese nationalist accounts.

Notions of resistance inform responses to the sense of victimhood and loss surrounding China’s collective experience during the 19th to the mid-20th centuries. Popular resistance to foreign intrusion, according to this view, was palpable. It involved heroic efforts to stand up to foreign pressure, such as Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu’s efforts at stemming British opium imports in 1839 and Sun Yat-sen’s efforts to build a strong Chinese Republic (Gries, 2004: 49; Spence, 1999: 152–160). Broad-based opposition to external enemies from the Boxer episode to the May Fourth Movement and the Long March culminated in the difficult victories of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Communist Revolution (Chiang, 1943; Johnson, 1962; Mao, 1952a, 1952b). Built into this narrative is a sense that success against foreign threats only came with determination in face of material disadvantage and isolation.

Alongside the idea of resisting foreign pressure is a concept of weakness stemming from the ineptitude, corruption and betrayal of those previously in power. China’s 19th-century Self-Strengthening reforms failed because of Qing bureaucratic intransigence, the incompetence of its chief advocates and a corrupt Qing court controlled by the Empress Dowager, Cixi (Hsü, 1970: 282–294, 440–451). Recent work by Elman (2004), Hung (2008) and Miller (2009) uses new evidence to dispute this narrative of failure.

The apparent readiness of senior officials such as Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai and Wang Jingwei to sell out China to everyone from the Japanese and Russians to the Germans compounded matters (Hsü, 1970: 475–492, 585–586; Nathan and Ross, 1997: 19–34). Even Chiang Kai-shek seemed more willing to pursue fellow Chinese in the Communist Party rather than confront the Japanese until forced to do so in the Xi’an Incident (Hsü, 1970: 563–577). Ending foreign repression required the rise of patriotic leaders, such as Mao Zedong, his Chinese Communist Party (CCP) comrades and a post-Xi’an Chiang Kai-shek. These were supposedly individuals who could uncompromisingly defend the common people and resist external pressure (Chiang, 1943; Mao, 1952a, 1952b; Sun, 1927).

Chinese nationalism commonly understood suggests little room for compromise and opposing positions over issues of apparent national importance. For proponents of the above, experiences from the ‘Century of Humiliation’ suggest that responding vigorously to outside pressure is the proper expression of Chinese nationalism, and one that brings victory (Gries, 2004, 2005; Johnson, 1962; Zheng, 1999). Implicit in such forcefulness is a conviction that nationalist mobilization enables the defeat of the foreign threats and internal weaknesses. This sense of nationalism promotes domestic and outward forcefulness as responses to intrusions on Chinese interests. Despite their obvious importance, such interpretations of Chinese nationalism downplay key dynamics in Chinese politics and external relations.

Shades of nationalism

Chinese nationalism is historically more vague and faced greater constraints than today’s prevailing views admit. Local and provincial interests lay behind much support for the 1911 Revolution and resistance to Yuan Shikai’s rule in the mid-1910s. ‘Declaring for the Revolution’ in 1911 and 1915 was literally ‘proclaiming independence’ (xuanbu duli) (Hsü, 1970: 465–474; Spence, 1999: 258–263). The 1919 May Fourth protests stopped the Xu Shichang government from signing the Paris Peace Treaty, delaying debates on Chinese territorial claims until the Washington Conference, but Japan’s control of Shandong and Manchuria persisted (King, 1931; 1959: 172–182; Koo and Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan Jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1983: 1; AS, 03/37/012, 03/37/013, 03/37/012/03; KMTPA, Huanlong Lu 14006; SHAC, 1039/399).

Other events that mark nationalist mobilization in China likewise underscore its unclear effects, especially in the face of opposition. Both the 1925 May 30th Movement and 1900 Boxer Episode did little to end the foreign domination over China that they aspired to achieve. The wave of nationalism behind the 1926–1928 Northern Expedition put the KMT in charge of three or four provinces, with control over the rest of China remaining under contestation throughout the 1940s (Chamberlain, 1946: 3–4). Mobilization behind China’s Korean War ‘victory’ brought a stalemate along the 38th Parallel and confirmed the political separation of Taiwan rather than Beijing’s declared aims of ejecting America from Korea and achieving unification (Chen, 1994: 211–223; Christensen, 1996: 192–193). The Korean War prompted top Chinese commanders such as Peng Dehuai to rethink the reliance on nationalist fervour even as some 14,000 out of roughly 21,000 Chinese prisoners-of-war chose repatriation to Taiwan rather than the Mainland (Chang, 2011; Ma, 2008; Shen, 2008).

Limitations to Chinese resistance against Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s, too, are instructive on the constraints on the appeal of nationalism. Chinese forces did not significantly roll back Japanese advances during World War II, Chinese victories and guerrilla operations in Japanese-held areas notwithstanding (Huang and Yang, 2001). Japanese occupation ended with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands coupled with the American atomic bombing. Nationalist mobilization did not achieve its avowed goal of defeating a foreign enemy even at its wartime high.

That foreign powers could sustain influence over parts of China since the Qing implies further constraints on the appeal of nationalism. Russian oversight in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang from the late 19th century saw little popular opposition. Russia — and later the Soviet Union — was able to exert near exclusive influence throughout the 1940s and beyond by sponsoring local elites such as Khorloogiin Choibalsan in Outer Mongolia and Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang (Elleman, 1999; Jeans, 2001). Paralleling Russian/Soviet efforts was Japanese backing for the Inner Mongolian Mengjiang regime of Demchugdongrub in the 1930s and 1940s, and the militarist regime of Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria (Barrett and Shyu, 2001; Liu, 2002). Manchukuo was an explicit Japanese project to cultivate a new and subordinate Manchurian nationhood in a Han-majority area (Duara, 2003, 2009; Mitter, 2000).

Popular loyalties did not necessarily map neatly onto the physical contours of China under the Qing, Republic or People’s Republic either. Apart from Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, significantly Han-majority areas also demonstrated a range of allegiances. The fall of both Qing rule and Yuan Shikai’s imperial pretentions came as parts of ‘China proper’ declared independence from central authority (Hsü, 1970: 465–481; Spence, 1999: 258–263). Such efforts persisted through the 1930s with calls for a confederated China in the liansheng zizhi movement and even Mao Zedong’s calls for a Hunan Republic (Chen L, 1999; Hsü, 1970; Liu, 2008). Sun Yat-sen, too, repeatedly described the Chinese population as a ‘sheet of loose sand’ given the pervasiveness of different, non-national loyalties and the absence of national unity (sun 1925: 337; 1947: 2, 7). Even identification as ‘Han’ historically demonstrated much fluidity and contestation (Crossley et al., 2006).

Except for the consequences of coercion, areas and populations that constitute a Chinese nation may not be immediately self-evident (Hui, 2005). An early objective of Sun Yat-sen’s fundraising for the KMT’s Guangzhou Government was to crush his erstwhile allies such as supporters of confederation like Chen Jiongming (Chi, 1976: 215; Lary, 1974: 58–63). Despite having an overwhelming Han population, Manchukuo existed with the trappings of a Manchu-led national state from 1932 until the 1945 Soviet invasion (Duara, 2003; Mitter, 2000). Loyalties on Taiwan remain in debate, even as Mongolia currently commands popular support as a separate political entity. The initial response on Taiwan to the island’s cession to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki was to form a Taiwanese Republic rather than reintegration into Qing China, even as popular sentiment later accepted Japanese colonial rule (Ching, 2001; Lamley, 1999).

A substantial proportion of the global Chinese diaspora self-identified as ‘Chinese nationals’ rather than part of their host societies through the mid-20th century (Suryadinata, 1997; Wang, 2000). Many Overseas Chinese donated to causes for their putative homeland, even going to China to take part in revolutions, wars or reconstruction (Suryadinata, 2011). Large numbers of Chinese diaspora from Southeast Asia were eager to provide financial and material backing for the anti-Manchu Revolutionary Alliance and the KMT government’s war effort against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s (Suryadinata, 1997; Wang, 2000). This was the case even for second- or third-generation émigrés with little or no direct experience of China.

Nationalism alone did not always amount to successful mobilization against external threats. Most apparent is the local quiescence that made possible Japanese occupation of areas in North, Central, East and South China through the 1930s and 1940s (Barrett and Shyu, 2001; Brook, 2005). Post-war collaborator trials in Shanghai reveal that pervasive local complicity with Japanese rule stymied effective prosecution except for the most recognizable top leaders (Brook, 2005: ch. 9). Efforts by people to get by in occupied areas — even under fear and coercion — meant acquiescing to external oversight and an erosion of active resistance. Local complicity in perpetuating external dominance is apparent in many occupied and colonized areas elsewhere in the world, and parallels more than two centuries of Han submission to Manchu rule during the Qing (Spence, 1999: 44–64).

China’s experience during the 19th and 20th centuries also suggests common elite and public acceptance of foreign domination. Helping Japan manage North, East and Central China during the 1930s and 1940s were regimes such as the North China Political Affairs Commission, the Reformed Republic of China, the Reorganized Republic of China and the Dadao Government (Barrett and Shyu, 2001; Brook, 2005; Henriot and Yeh, 2004; Liu, 2002). Leading these regimes were prominent politicians such as Liang Hongzhi and Wang Kemin as well as KMT stalwarts Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai and former premier Wang Jingwei. Their rule rested on support from regional and local elites. These regimes claimed an ability to negotiate and limit loss of life and property, and, by doing so, preserved national interests despite overwhelming Japanese superiority and the absence of external assistance (Chen P, 1999; Wakeman, 2000; Wang, 2001; Xu, 1999; Zhou, 2003). The absence of broad, sustained revolts against these regimes implies that many ordinary Chinese lived with subordination to foreign authority.

Sun Yat-sen similarly accepted Soviet and Communist penetration of the KMT in exchange for military assistance leading up to the 1926 Northern Expedition (Elleman, 1997: 55–76, 196–207; Kindermann, 1959; Yang, 1997: 9–67). Like the militarists, they were lambasted for ‘selling out’ China; Sun and the KMT gave up mining, minting and resource extraction rights in exchange for Japanese financing and arms in the 1910s (Jansen, 1954; AS, 02/20/039/04/030-032, 03/20/041/01/023, 03/20/053/01/017; SHAC 18/3043). The CCP likewise accepted de facto Soviet spheres of influence in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang from the 1920s despite demanding the territorial integrity of a China that encompassed Qing frontiers (Boikova, 1999; Elleman, 1997). Both the KMT and CCP governments recognized Soviet domination of Outer Mongolia alongside exclusive access to Manchuria and Xinjiang for political and technical assistance in the 1945 and 1950 Sino-Soviet treaties, respectively (Elleman, 1999; Kindermann, 1959; Niu, 1998; Wang, 2003: 265–431; AH, 0641.10/5044.01-01, 0641.10/5044.01-01/247/1-19; PRCFMA, 109-000020-01(1).

Fissures and contestation over the representation and content of Chinese nationalism were likewise a historical reality. The KMT and CCP’s bitter and protracted struggle was, amongst other things, a fight over which political system could best represent the aspirations of Chinese nationalism (Chiang, 1943; Mao, 1952a, 1952b; Yang, 2005). In stoking popular resistance to Qing rule and Yuan Shikai’s government, the Revolutionary Alliance and its successor, the KMT, tried to make themselves arbiters of a modernist, developmental vision of nationalism. This stood in opposition to the Manchu court and Yuan’s successive efforts to channel popular loyalties towards their own causes (Hu and Dai, 1998; McCord, 1993; Tang, 2004). That such projects enjoyed substantial following at various times implies that Chinese nationalism was open to redefinition.

Associated with successful nationalist mobilization efforts was a capacity to coerce supporters and detractors. Ensuring internal discipline and overcoming rivals is key for political movements and organizations, nationalist-inspired ones included. There is much work on the KMT eradicating opponents through its security services and underworld ties during the 1927 White Terror and anti-communist Extermination Campaigns of the 1930s (Kirby, 1984; Spence, 1999). The Qing court, the Yuan Shikai government and various Republican-era militarist administrations similarly tried to threaten, incarcerate and execute rivals. Even before the Collectivization and Anti-Rightist Campaigns of the 1950s, the CCP ruthlessly and systematically suppressed internal dissent during purges in the 1930s as well as the 1942–1944 Yan’an Rectification Campaign, reportedly killing up to 10,000 people (Chen, 1995; Gao, 2000).

If successful political movements require the acquisition of financial, military and other capabilities by all available means, then groups claiming nationalist agendas in China were no different. The KMT traded economic rights for financial and military assistance from the Japanese in the 1910s and the Soviets in the 1920s as the Duan Qirui and Zhang Zuolin-led central governments cut similar deals with Japan in the 1920s (SHAC, 18/3043). Apart from redistributing land and coercing taxation in Northwest China during the 1930s and 1940s, the CCP sponsored opium production and sales to boost their finances (Chen, 1995). CCP drug activities occurred even as the party publicly opposed opium.

Nationalism and China’s rise

Given the importance of nationalism to contemporary Chinese politics and foreign policy, the events above are informative for examining China’s growing prominence. Many studies point to the increasing importance of nationalism for domestic political legitimacy in China given the declining appeal of Marxism–Leninism (He, 2009). Scholarship also implicates nationalism as a source of rigidity and potential antagonism in China’s foreign policy (Gries, 2004). Others note that the Chinese government can claim nationalist constraints to harden bargaining positions and push for concessions from interlocutors (Weiss, 2013). If so, appreciating the limitations of and fissures in nationalism in China is central.

That Chinese nationalism demonstrates constraints suggest variability in the directions nationalism may take as China grows in economic, military and political stature. Popular and elite aspirations may find expression through anything from foreign-sponsored regimes to a minority-dominated ruling empire and popularly supported indigenous governments. Leaving aside Qing rule, this was the case even during the Second Sino-Japanese War, when anti-foreign — specifically anti-Japanese — sentiment was at its peak (Barrett and Shyu, 2001; Brook, 2005; Liu, 2002). Actors can re-channel, temper and perhaps even suppress nationalist passions as much as they may follow and stoke such sentiments (Jiang, 2006: 1; Yu et al., 1985; Zhongyang dang’anguan et al., 1995: 1). Examining conditions that moderate, redirect and foster compromise on nationalism can be as key as looking at more strident nationalist influences on political and foreign policy options.

If popular impetus for nationalist causes requires active nurturing and enforcement, then the significance of nationalism in contemporary China may rest on official management of public sentiment. Just as support for various groups fighting Japanese forces during the Sino-Japanese War depended on efforts to impose and rally popular attitudes, government action may shape popular nationalist passions today. This is consistent with research indicating that the seemingly widespread Chinese disaffection for Japan rests partially with purposeful official attempts to shore up CCP legitimacy (He, 2009). Official framing and promotion of nationalist concepts may prove central to how nationalism features in the foreign policy of a rising China and its external relations. Interlocutors may need to be mindful of how the Chinese government handles popular images and impressions domestically.

If domestic political actors can restrain and soften nationalist impulses as much as mobilize and intensify such inclinations, working with a rising China may be similar to cooperating with other domestically powerful regimes. Asymmetries in capabilities and bargaining positions notwithstanding, Chinese leaders may be able to strike compromises that challenge popular domestic sentiment. Beijing’s acceptance of tough World Trade Organization accession conditions in 2001 may echo CCP and KMT compromises with the Soviet Union in the 1940s and 1950s as well as Sun Yat-sen’s trading of economic rights for Japanese assistance in the 1910s (Bao et al., 2006). Domestic ‘win-sets’ for Chinese leaders can remain larger than nationalism-based ‘hand-tying’ tactics suggest (Weiss, 2013).

Cleavages within and among nationalist movements as well as other groups in China imply that nationalism is a contested concept that can undergo redefinition and re-appropriation even as the country grows in prominence. Aside from tensions within multi-ethnic definitions of the Chinese state — like the early Republican idea of the ‘Five Ethnicity Republic’ (Wuzu Gonghe) — what may be ‘provincial’ and ‘regional’ affinities today were once locations for nascent nationhood (Young, 1980). Desires for Taiwanese independence, substantial regional autonomy or even strict distinctions between Hong Kong and the Mainland may be persistent elements in Chinese politics rather than anomalies (Ge, 2011). After all, even within ethnically Han areas of China, many southern regional languages (fangyan) are intelligible to neither each other nor northern regional languages such as Mandarin (Chun, 1996; Li, 2010; Wang, 2010). Efforts to promote a common, popular standard for a spoken and written language are relatively new, originating in the early 20th-century Late Qing Reforms (Wan Qing xinzheng) and enjoy only partial success today (Hu and Dai, 1998; McCord, 1993; Xinhua, 2007).

Split and shifting popular allegiances between various contending political groups further imply that nationalist ideals are open to partition and renegotiation. The Qing court, various Republican governments and regional regimes, different foreign-backed administrations, the KMT, and the CCP all commanded the loyalties of large numbers of people in China at some point. Consistent efforts by these groups to tie their competing political and economic goals to some expression of nationalism indicate recognition of the divisible and malleable character of nationalist claims. That popular leanings swayed with the military, economic and political fortunes of different groups underlines the variability of loyalties in China.

Contestation over the nature and representation of nationalism means that Chinese nationalists can encounter the same types of collective action and coordination problems that other social movements face. Such fissures translated into infighting amongst political groups in spite of significant foreign pressure, seen in the rivalries between the various militarist cliques, the CCP and KMT, different KMT factions, as well as various CCP factions (Eastman, 1990; Fitzgerald, 1996; Pepper, 1991; Wilbur, 1969). Desires to overcome domestic adversaries historically opened groups claiming nationalist agendas to compromise with foreign actors in return for economic, military and political backing (Chen, 1973; Chong, 2012; Huang, 2005; Kirby, 1984; Yang, 1997; Zhang, 2004: 1; Zhou, 1997). Nationalist aspirations today may not automatically spell strong, unified responses to national challenges if nationalism remains subject to manipulation, partition and co-optation by different groups (Anderson, 1991: 159). Expressions of nationalism in China may rest on how actors attempt to overcome issues of collective action and coordination.

Externalities from efforts to address collective action and coordination problems make the trajectory and consequences of contemporary Chinese nationalism difficult to determine. These challenges do more than blunt articulations of nationalism and the appeal of nationalist movements. Chinese mobilization around the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis implies that nationalist-driven overactivity in foreign policy can run counter to national interests. Belligerence based on nationalist impulses stymied potential improvements in Sino-American relations, hardened divisions between the Mainland and Taiwan, and exacerbated friction with Moscow (Christensen, 1996: 240–241). Cartelization among Chinese political elites may encourage PRC foreign policies that are harder-line than necessary as different groups compete over their ability to appear as defenders of the national interest (Christensen, 2011). Moreover, different nationalist voices in China today — ranging from liberal to conservative to the New Left — can frustrate each other (Ling and Ma, 2008; Zheng, 1999).

Rethinking nationalism

Chinese nationalism conjures up images of singularly focused, potent popular passions. Yet, a wider investigation into the origins and development of nationalism in China suggests that it is historically open to interpretation and redirection. Such realities do not mean that history will repeat itself or provide any definitive indication of contemporary or future developments. They instead suggest that Chinese nationalism and politics — for all their nuances and particularities — are sufficiently similar to political and social dynamics elsewhere for analysts to apply standard social-scientific tools.

If Chinese nationalists — even at the height of their influence — are subject to division, co-optation, compromise, manipulation, suppression and inconsistency, they are likely to be open to such forces in other circumstances too. Familiar instruments like winning coalitions, veto players, institutional structures, time horizons, information and issue-linkage remain useful for studying the effects of nationalism in a rising China, especially the degree to which nationalism may drive or inhibit policy. Seeing popular narratives of nationalism in China as naturally implying unity, strength and exceptionalism makes attempts to investigate such possibilities more challenging.

Disaggregating common conceptions of nationalism and nationalist movements highlights the scope under which such phenomena can affect political possibilities in China. Analysing nationalism in China as ideology and nationalist groups as social movements sheds light on the limitations facing nationalist agitators. Rather than simply relying on widespread support, nationalists and their supporters have to address capability constraints, countervailing strategies by opponents and challenges within their own ranks. The ability of nationalists and nationalism to influence the contemporary PRC government and Chinese politics depends on these interactions. Historicizing the development and effects of nationalism as well as nationalist movements in China draws attention to the agency behind such phenomena, and augments analyses emphasizing structural influences.

Recentring the Middle Kingdom

Another common understanding of China’s outward relations is a long history of pre-eminence among its neighbours, backed by acceptance of Chinese moral legitimacy and leadership. This view takes a historical, China-centred tributary system as the basis of its claims. The supposed moral authority of imperial Chinese dynasties sustained order, stability and prosperity in Asia. Some take this apparent precedent as a foundation for Chinese leadership that departs from the European or ‘Western’ experience of balancing and domination (Yan, 2011). A growing body of writing seeks to examine the instructiveness of suzerain–vassal relations and cultural elements in China for contemporary world politics (Kang, 2004, 2005b).

The available historical material indicates much more variation in the development, nature and consistency of Chinese pre-eminence. Common perspectives under emphasize the significant areas of congruence between Chinese experiences and existing theories about hegemony and power transition. Chinese dynasties built their empires on conquest, coercion and strategic calculation too (Purdue, 2005). Domestic legitimacy and the efficiency gains of hegemonic restraint may be as much a part of effective leadership as inherent cultural attractiveness. That China’s dynasties were at times subservient to more powerful neighbours likewise implies limits to Chinese centrality as well as cultural and moral authority.

Popular perspectives

Two themes stand out in conversations about China’s past relations with its neighbours. One emphasizes the legitimacy of Chinese pre-eminence among actors in Asia and beyond. This claim rests on a cultural and even moral prominence observers ascribe to China and its ruling dynasties (Deng, 2008: 3–9, 280–281; Kelley, 2012; Ren, 2009; Yan, 2011; Zhang, 2001). Another suggests China’s natural position as the predominant power in Asia, given geographic size, economic prominence and military might (Kang, 2005b, 2009, 2010; Zheng, 1999: 15–17). Both perspectives view China as anchoring peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and beyond, informing an understanding that sees a powerful China as willing to work for the benefit of its neighbours.

The legitimacy accorded to China by its neighbours allegedly enabled central Chinese regimes to shape stable political orders across East and Inner Asia. This tributary or suzerain–vassal framework sees actors and governments bordering China as naturally accepting the leadership and direction of ruling Chinese dynasties (Fairbank and Ch’en, 1968; Yan, 2011; Zhang, 2001). So long as a regime established itself as having the ‘mandate of heaven’ through control of China’s central government, neighbours paid tribute and homage. In return, the ruling Chinese dynasty conferred imperial patronage on to the tributary government, which brought regional and domestic recognition. Vassal regimes accepted terms and practices established by central governments in China to guide relations with the imperial court and other regional actors.

China’s apparent legitimacy appears to originate from its presumed cultural attractiveness, political longevity and moral authority. Conventional wisdom on this matter cites admiration for China’s ‘Confucian’ philosophical tradition — which originates in the 4th century BCE — across Asia as a key reason for the acceptance of leadership by its ruling houses (Kelley, 2012: 410–414). Central to this customary system is an emphasis on benevolent rule centred on wisdom and meritocratic governance. This set the tone for concordant relations between China and its neighbours, and even the adoption of Chinese writing, administrative frameworks and academic systems from Japan to Korea, Viet Nam and parts of Inner Asia (Fairbank and Ch’en, 1968; Yan, 2011). The allure of Chinese traditions is such that it even assimilated non-Han rulers of China such as the Gokturks, Khitans, Mongols, Jurchens and Manchus.

Alongside beliefs in the moral and cultural underpinnings of Chinese leadership lies a view that sees Chinese dynasties as enjoying undisputed political, military and economic preponderance. This position contrasts the geographical and population size of various Chinese dynasties to neighbouring polities, which could be several-fold. Chinese regimes had militaries that significantly outnumbered their neighbours and at times controlled sizeable naval fleets (Liu, 1956; Lorge, 2002). Economic historians estimate that China was the world’s largest economy for much of the period between the 1st and early 19th centuries (Maddison, 1998: 19–54; Maddison, 2001: 42; 2003: 246–263; Pomeranz, 2000; Wong, 1997). Materially, these figures suggest a naturally dominant role for China.

Chinese preponderance ostensibly stabilized a neighbourhood otherwise prone to conflict, insecurity and uncertainty. The Chinese leadership supposedly helped maintain security by reducing uncertainty and keeping regional rivalries in check. Purported pre-eminence permitted Chinese ruling dynasties to arbitrate differences among regional actors in ways that ameliorated tensions (Deng, 2008: 3–9, 280–281; Ren, 2009; Yan, 2011). A popular example is Ming China’s backing for the Malacca Sultanate against Siamese pressure, which apparently helped establish the stable basis for Malacca’s regional standing (Andaya and Andaya, 2001: 40–41; Wilson, 2009: 250–252; Wyatt, 1984: 86–88). Ming military assistance to Joseon Korea in the 16th century was pivotal in first staving off and then deterring invasion from Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s forces (Kang, 2009; Swope, 2005). Recognition of vassalage by the Qing purportedly allowed the Ryukyu kingdom to avert annexation by the Satsuma domain and Tokugawa shogunate between the 17th and 19th centuries (Kang, 2009).

The above implies to some observers that a resurgent China inherently possesses a benign, even beneficial, leadership role in world politics. Contemporary China may be on the inevitable path of regaining its past material and political centrality (Deng, 2008: 280–294; Kang, 2009; Yan, 2011). A China with renewed primacy will resume its presumptive role as a leading power as its historical and cultural legacies foster assent among its neighbours and others further afield (Deng, 2008: 3–9, 280–281; Gries, 2004: 30–42; Gries et al., 2008; Yan, 2011). Undergirding such Chinese approaches to leadership in world politics are concepts of benevolence and right drawn from its rich philosophical tradition. This forthcoming Chinese-led order will purportedly resemble previous Sino-centric systems in stability, legitimacy and prosperity.

Behind benignity

Underlining the benign nature of China’s past dominance can lead observers to underplay variation in Asia’s regional orders and China’s role. Intellectually aggregating China’s historical patterns of interaction with its neighbours to stress stability under legitimate and benevolent authority obscures non-trivial variations in the Chinese polity’s outward behaviour. Historical evidence suggests that Chinese dynasties adjusted external ties according to their needs and interests during periods of imperial expansion, consolidation, maintenance and retrenchment. China’s ruling regimes also demonstrated substantial variation in relations across actors and regions. Testing these hypotheses alongside claims of China’s unique and persistent benignity can highlight conditions that encourage more or less benevolent external behaviour by Chinese regimes, which is instructive for understanding China’s contemporary international role.

Focusing on benignity may underemphasize the force, coercion and deceit present in China’s historical inter-state relations, particularly during expansionary phases. China’s dynastic houses often prevailed over local adversaries through conquest and the use of ‘ruthless stratagems’ (Hui, 2005, 2008). Such approaches to inter-state relations did not end at some physical or cultural boundary. Han and Tang primacy, respectively, from the 2nd to 1st centuries BCE and 7th to 8th centuries CE were built on vanquishing the Xiongnu, Gokturks, Tibetans and Goguryeo or playing them off against each other (Di Cosmo, 2002a: 294–311; Graff, 2001: 149–156, 83–201; Lin, 2011: Pt VI, ch. 2; Lorge, 2005: 86–87; Pan, 1997; Twitchett, 2000; Wright, 2002: 66–70). Ming pre-eminence in the 15th and 16th centuries CE came through military expeditions against Mongol regimes, while its maritime prominence in South and Southeast Asia came by demonstrating overwhelming naval might — including armed interventions into local politics (Lorge, 2005: 100–108; Wade, 2004a, 2004b; Wade and Sun, 2010; Wang, 2011; Wilson, 2009: 250–252). Qing extension into Inner Asia, which forms the basis for China’s contemporary borders, came through expansionary wars and politicking against Dzungars, Mongols and others (Crossley, 1997; Di Cosmo et al., 2009; Purdue, 2000, 2005; Sturve, 2004).

Approaches to external relations that concentrate on benign system leadership and legitimacy may reflect the needs of establishing and sustaining pre-eminence or managing retrenchment but not other conditions of empire (Ikenberry, 2001; Spruyt, 2005). Periods of internal weakness and rebellion in the 2nd century BCE and 2nd century CE saw the Han regime variously pay tribute to the Xiongnu and other empires in Inner Asia (De Crespigny, 1984; Di Cosmo, 2002a: 294–311). The Tang similarly retreated and accommodated the Tibetan empire at the height of the latter’s power during the 8th century CE (Lin, 2011). The more economically focused Northern and Southern Song generally adopted less confrontational strategies towards the neighbouring Liao and Jin regimes from the 10th to the 13th centuries, even accepting subservience and effectively becoming a tributary at times (Lau, 2000; McGrath, 2008; Rossabi, 1983). The 14th century saw Ming efforts to mollify the Mongols that they recently pushed out from China, so that the ruling house could entrench authority in its realm (Lorge, 2005: 108, 120–123). These instances contrast the Han and Tang dynasties at their height during the 1st century BCE and 7th century CE when ruling regimes in China received tribute and arbitrated regional stability (De Crespigny, 1984: 60–75; Di Cosmo, 2002a; Graff, 2001: 183–204; Pan, 1997; Yü, 1967).

China’s ruling regimes tended to have more acrimonious relations with neighbouring polities in Inner Asia than with those along the coast. More conflicts involving Chinese and non-Chinese regimes occurred in Inner Asia than along China’s seaboard or Southeast Asia (Kelley, 2012: 408–414; Lin, 2011; Zhanzheng jianshi bianxiezu, 2005; Zhongguo junshishi bianxiezu, 2003; Zhongguo lidai zhanzhengshi biancuan weiyuanhui, 1978). Such data are consistent with the observation that polities along China’s eastern borders, such as Viet Nam, Korea, the Ryukyus and, to a degree, Japan, were more amenable to accepting a hierarchical international order with a Chinese regime at its apex (Kang, 2009; Wade, 2007; Wang, 2004). This contrasts with the rivalry, violence and war between Chinese regimes and various Inner Asian polities immortalized in traditional scholarship, literature and art. These range from Sima Qian’s Han dynasty Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji) to Tang poetry such as Wang Han’s Song of Liangzhou (Liangzhou ci) to Yuan, Ming and Qing-era operatic and quasi-fictional works on the martial exploits of the Generals of the Yang Clan and Yue Fei (Di Cosmo, 2002a: 294–311; Du, 1985; Graff, 2009; Hengtangjushi and Zhao, 2006: 290–291; Sima, 2007: chs 79, 108–120).

China’s regimes likewise demonstrated a propensity for substantial violence in war. Republican forces were responsible for the massacre of Manchus around China after the 1911 Revolution just as ethnically Han soldiers retaking Nanjing for the Qing at the end of the Taiping Rebellion in 1864 killed about 100,000 of that city’s inhabitants (Rhoads, 2000: 173–231; Shorrock and Stevens, 1911). Historians’ accounts state that military campaigns under the expansionist emperors Han Wudi (r. BCE 141–87) and Tang Taizong (r. 626–649 CE) were notable for their destructiveness (Elleman, 2001; Graff, 2001: 187–188, 197; Graff and Higham, 2002; Twitchett, 2000: 111–118; Zhanzheng jianshi bianxiezu, 2005: 102–118, 255–269; Zhongguo junshishi bianxiezu, 2003: 165–180, 462–468). Chinese records going back to the Zuo Zhuan, Spring and Autumn Annals, Records of the Grand Historian and earlier note that the mass killing of defeated enemies was common since the Warring States period (Hui, 2005: 62, 86–87, 135, 152; Lin, 1992: 324; Sima, 2007: chs 79, 108–120; Yang, 1986: 189, 444). Such evidence stands in tension with claims about China’s inherent pacifism.

How Chinese regimes handled inter-state relations evokes the strategic considerations common in world politics. Alliance patterns displayed by the Tang and Song ruling houses relative to various Inner Asian regimes resemble balancing dynamics as Chinese dynasties sought advantage over their rivals. The Tang shifted allegiances among Gokturk, Uighur and Tibetan empires from the 7th to the 9th centuries to isolate and counter these adversaries, just as the Song sided with the ascendant Mongols to defeat its erstwhile suzerain, the Jurchen Jin, in the 13th century (Lin, 2011: Pt. IV; Pan, 1997: 168–203, 231–346; Twitchett, 2000; Wang, 2011: 95–96). Southern Song subordination to the Jurchen Jin in the 11th and 12th centuries as well as 14th-century Ming efforts to appease the Mongols along its borders parallel accommodation by weaker states (Di Cosmo, 2002a; Lorge, 2005: 119–125; Wang, 2011: 83–93). The tribute paying, marriage alliances and exchanges of hostages associated with these pacts reflect demonstrations of commitment, a standard concern of alliance politics (Pan, 1997; Smith, 2006; Wang, 2011; Yü, 1967).

Clear Chinese preponderance, immediate local security concerns and the absence of alternative strategic partners, in comparison, seem consistent with the subordination by polities in East and Southeast Asia to Chinese regimes. The Joseon dynasty and Malacca Sultanate had few alliance options other than the Ming when faced with threats from larger neighbours in the respective forms of Hideyoshi Japan and Ayutthaya during the 15th and 16th centuries (Andaya and Andaya, 2001: 40–41; Lorge, 2005: 92–93; Wyatt, 1984: 86–88). The absence of strong, credible allies similarly contributed to acceptance of Chinese suzerainty by successive Vietnamese dynasties despite a record of resistance to direct Chinese rule (Anderson, 2008; Choi, 2009; Wilson, 2009: 264–268; Womack, 2006, 2010). Just as tribute from junior partners in these cases demonstrated commitment, the larger return of gifts from Chinese regimes as well as the lucrative trade that accompanied tribute missions signalled assurance and the benefits of subordination (Wang, 2011: 147–149, 164–165; Wright, 2002).

Celestial imperialism in context

That variations in the nature of China’s outward relations may historically be susceptible to shifts in power, strategic considerations, geography and domestic politics strongly suggests a need to look beyond Chinese and Asian exceptionalism. This means testing the conditions under which and the frequency with which Chinese regimes act in a similar manner to those located elsewhere in time and space. Empirically grounded comparisons of China’s historical external relations can uncover the extent to which China diverges from other actors in world politics, and underscore circumstances that prompt Chinese regimes to act differently. In explaining the impetus for both China’s bellicosity and its benevolence towards its neighbours, a historically rigorous approach supports attempts to establish key characteristics of China’s governance. This can underscore the extent to which more general theories apply to China.

Substantive variation in the nature and patterns of relations between Chinese regimes and other polities as well as among Chinese regimes is not surprising given the long histories of such interactions and wealth of evidence. Examination of data on such ties enable researchers to test core hypotheses in world politics against a large, new set of cases. These include relative power, the availability of allies, geography, regional differences, cultural affinity, as well as the relative influence of structures and agents across time and space. Given the particular historical and cultural characteristics of China and Asia, such an approach is useful in highlighting the applicability, limits and conditions surrounding the generalizability of theories originally based on European and American experiences. This process can improve the analytical precision of efforts to incorporate Chinese and Asian experiences into theoretical frameworks for world politics in ways that move beyond the mapping of long historical trends and assertions of intrinsic difference.

Moreover, authorship of historical accounts may reflect particular political contingencies and proclivities. Many contemporary impressions of China’s centrality and benignity come from official imperial records or writings of literati whose interests are congruent with the imperial system (Elman, 2000: 66–172). Emphasizing the importance of Chinese regimes in political, economic, cultural and moral terms helps to legitimate the imperial system and particular dynasties (Di Cosmo, 2002a: 294–311; Graff, 2009; Wang, 2011: 157–166; Wilson, 2009: 240–241). Such views of China’s outward relations may differ significantly from those of its many interlocutors. Han and Ming relations with Viet Nam can be extensions of ‘civilization’ and ‘benevolence’ as well as impositions of foreign will, just as Zheng He’s military expeditions on Java and Ceylon can be both restorations of order and external interventions in local politics (Di Cosmo, 2002a; Wade, 2004a, 2004b; Wade and Sun, 2010; Wang, 2011; Womack, 2006). Analysts will do well to cross-reference and verify views from China against non-Chinese sources, especially since images of a powerful China that was historically benign towards its neighbours but victimized are highly popular today.

Claims of a Confucian long peace along China’s eastern borders tend to be more persuasive when assessed alongside more robust alternative explanations about the relative absence of regional conflict. Unlike China’s Inner Asian neighbours, those on its east and southeast tend to be weaker relative to Chinese dynasties and face more geographic — notably, nautical — challenges, which can make countervailing military alliances more difficult given period technology. Even then, war is a relatively rare event next to the multitude of day-to-day interactions between and across regimes (King and Zeng, 2001). Yet, conflict to China’s east and southeast during the pre-modern era seems to correspond with the presence of vigorous, outward-looking polities, whether Chinese or its ‘sinicized’ neighbours. Examples include the Japanese and Manchu invasions of Korea, during the 16th and 17th centuries respectively, periodic Chinese efforts to invade and occupy Viet Nam, as well as the 17th-century Manchu-Mongol wars (Di Cosmo, 2002b; Hawley, 2005). Along with historical data on Chinese military campaigns, these events induce interaction between Confucianism and considerations of material capacity, institutions, strategy and threat perception (Crossley et al., 2006; Zhanzheng jianshi bianxiezu, 2005; Zhongguo junshishi bianxiezu, 2003; Zhongguo lidai zhanzhengshi biancuan weiyuanhui, 1978).

Students of domestic politics, too, may find specific historical conditions surrounding policymaking in China useful subjects for further investigation. Chinese historical and court records provide detailed information on debates and discussions over policy options, especially from the Ming through the Qing. These include sources such as the Veritable Records of the Ming, archived court and other official documents, personal papers, local gazettes, as well as secondary records that historians and other scholars use (Wang, 2011; Zhang, 2009). Carefully exploring internal concerns, factional rivalries, regional variation and other dynamics may provide insights into the degree to which broader conceptual approaches to domestic politics travel across social, spatial and temporal contexts (Elman, 2000: 66–172, 521–627; Ouyang, 2010; Yü, 2003). Such exercises can help researchers develop more confidence in certain explanations about domestic politics and perhaps greater circumspection towards others — politics is, after all, not unique to the contemporary era.

Reflections

Common impressions can inform as much as they obscure. Conceptions of widespread nationalism in China and broad acceptance of China’s ‘Confucian’ suzerainty are two popular and influential views on Chinese history. This article attempts to qualify the use of such understandings in political science research by suggesting the range of empirical variation associated with Chinese nationalism and China’s role in the Asian regional order. This illustrates the pitfalls of not probing sufficiently commonly held ideas about history and historical events. The risks to analytic precision through inadvertent omission, truncation of variation, misapplications of chronological and geographic scale, as well as the introduction of bias are especially large. Addressing these issues allows more accurate analysis and robust theory development.

That discourses of China as victim and a normative power diverge from historical evidence highlights the contemporary concerns behind these narratives. The sense of victimhood that informs China’s territorial claims and anti-foreign — especially anti-Japanese — sentiment are consistent with an official narrative promoted through education and the media. He Yinan (2009) and Wang Zheng (2012) argue that such views correspond to CCP attempts to bolster legitimacy in a post-Mao, post-Deng era. The popularity of these perspectives appears to be contingent on the immediate interests of Chinese elites, as Maoism did at one time, rather than some intrinsically ‘Chinese’ quality. Perspectives of China as a normative power reflect academic efforts to conceptualize China’s re-emergence as a major force in world politics, and corresponding adjustments to the world and regional orders.

Engagement with China today depends on appreciating how familiar political dynamics operate in the Chinese context rather than deference to Chinese exceptionalism. Path dependence may run shallower than claims about national victimhood and China’s customary order-shaping role presume (Jin, 2012; Ming, 2012; Rozman, 2012). Fewer and fewer people have direct experience with resistance, internal division and collaboration in the face of external threat; no one alive has personal memory of a ‘Confucian’ world order.

Greater sensitivity to historical context widens possibilities for understanding today’s China and its potential trajectories. Contemporary nationalism in China may be as open to negotiation, manipulation, contestation, self-contradiction and even suppression as in the past. This implies that nationalist passions in China can be less constraining on policy and more open to compromise than mainstream views presume — especially over time. Recognizing the fundamental influence of domestic and external contexts on China’s normative commitments to world order historically should alert scholars and policymakers to look out for similar forces that may motivate and limit analogous claims from China today. Closer readings of history suggest that an ascendant China presents more a variation on major power behaviour than an exception. Such a starting point may prove more fruitful for scholarly analyses and policy than searching for Chinese uniqueness and exceptionalism.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful for comments from Thomas J. Christensen, Todd Hall, Yinan He, Victoria Hui, Pierre Landry, David Leheny, Erik Mobrand, Shelley Rigger, Lynn T. White III, Dali Yang, Min Ye, and two anonymous reviewers. The author is grateful to the Ministry of Education, Singapore for its support through the Academic Research Fund WBS R108-000-043-112. All errors are the author’s own.

Archival references

AH: Academia Historica, Taipei.

AS: Academia Sinica, Taipei.

KMTPA: Kuomintang Party Archives, Taipei.

PRCFMA: PRC Foreign Ministry Archives, Beijing.

SHAC: Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing.

Author biography

Ja Ian Chong is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore, Singapore. His research focuses on International Relations theory, security in the Asia-Pacific and Chinese foreign policy. He is author of External Intervention and the Politics of State Formation: China, Indonesia, Thailand – 1893–1952 (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

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