The addicted self and modernity

Abstract

In this paper addiction is regarded as a possible pathway to achieve an understanding of modernity. What they both share are ambivalence and ambiguity as basic characteristics. These aspects are also expressed in psychological terms like perception and feelings, which are pursued historically by referring to Leibniz and Kant, by whom they became closely related to change and unpredictability. Thus, feelings understood in terms of inhibition stand out as a core aspect of modernity. Feelings, however, stand in opposition to language. On this basis music may replace texts as an expression for the modern, ambiguous self.

Keywords

addiction ambiguity feelings modernity music self semiology text

Drawing attention to the self is a salient trait of modernity (Giddens, 1991). Yet there are several consequences that might be inferred from this historical change. One is the gradual replacement of science with knowledge, which among other things opens up for different readings and doubts around the question of what is the truth. Aristotle emphasized a clear distinction between science and knowledge, and this distinction was preserved throughout the Middle Ages, yet it was threatened in the early enlightenment and stands for fall in the late modernity. In this respect it is natural to question if professional knowledge is of higher value than lay knowledge (Nissen, 2012). To doubt the professional knowledge is the same as switching the legs under the slogan of evidence-based practice, which primarily is highlighting the expert’s superiority. However, the ambivalence to the layman’s perspective is due to the fact that a defence of it is only reliable if an expert is defending it in an acknowledged journal.

The objects’ ambiguity may easily well cause ambivalence in the subject. In this respect addiction can be regarded as a core issue when it comes to the role of the self in modernity. It is said, “ambivalence is the hallmark of addiction in humans” (Elster, 2000, p. 10). Yet ambivalence in the subject is also highly related to the ambiguity of the self. Thus the reflective self is not just a salient trait of the modernity, but the self and modernity share the same characteristic of ambiguity. One of the classics in Nordic contributions to the problem of drug politics is entitled: “The good enemy” (“Den gode fiende”) (Christie & Bruun, 1985), which demonstrates very well that substance abuse is something we love to hate. In this respect, an analysis of the treatment of the addicted self can almost be regarded as the royal route to an understanding of the self in modernity. This is exactly what is demonstrated so nicely in Morten Nissen’s article “Writing drug cultures” (Nissen, 2012), in which the reflexivity of the addicted self is mirrored in the process of producing texts and not at least in different ways of reading them.

In this respect Nissen’s article proves very well how psychology and psychological interventions have to be understood in terms of modernity. Yet it is not psychology, but rather sociology (Bauman 2000; Giddens, 1990, 1991; Habermas, 1962, 1992) and philosophy (Habermas, 1988, 1992; Taylor 1979, 2007) that have been promoted as owners of the discussion of modernity when Western intellectual history gets stretched back in time 400 years. The common understanding of modernity in psychology is rather restricted to a certain institution established in Leipzig in 1879 (Boring, 1929, Mandler, 2007), which implies that modernity in psychology is primarily understood in terms of devices and some methodological considerations instead of the very certain shift in thinking the general discussion about modernity actually is about. This mismatch of psychological self-understanding compared to a common understanding of the appearance of modernity in Western culture represents a problem. If it is true, as Giddens (1991) states, that one of the most important hallmarks of modernity is not only related to institutions, but the reflexive self, one has to admit that the core term in modernity is primarily a psychological term. Thus the problem appears when the psychological self-understanding excludes the intellectual history before 1879, in which the entrance of psychology actually was the subject that formulated the premises for the most radical turn in Western intellectual history.

In this paper, therefore, I will focus on the rise of modern psychology, in which the understanding of the self represents a core aspect. This history is however normally related to the Anglo-Saxon enlightenment, however, there are reasons to focus even more on the German enlightenment, in which Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz represents a starting point. His understanding of perception demonstrates very well how ambiguity with necessity is associated with the understanding of the self, but also how the modern turn in Western intellectual history is primarily related to the appearance of modern psychology. In this respect the understanding of emotions is not only related to the understanding of addiction, but may tell us something about the ambiguous self as well. Emotions may very well be regarded as signs, which are begging for criteria for a proper understanding. Thus, I will argue that both semiotic and critical approaches are primarily motivated by challenges related to the understanding of the ambiguous self. If cultural psychology is based on the semiotic approach, then the ambiguous self constitutes the core issue and an investigation of addiction may represent one of the main roads to understand it.

Perception explains changes

To focus on abnormality in psychology is a late upcoming interest. Thus addiction was not regarded as an important issue in the early modern psychology. However, Søren Kierkegaard is probably very close to bring the two together. He refers to psychology as a science, “which indeed more than any other is allowed to intoxicate itself in the foaming multifariousness of life” (Kierkegaard, 1980, p. 23). He says so because psychology is regarded as the science about sensation, which is a prerequisite for having contact with life at all. Yet as long as life is given through our senses, then it is by necessity dealing with multitude and diversity. In this sense psychology is a science caught in a trap. On the one hand it is about the particular, which is the only sort of knowledge our senses can provide, but on the other hand psychology pretends to be a science, which is about general knowledge. This is the modern dilemma of psychology, namely that it deals with subjectivity, but at the same time aspires to express subjectivity in objective terms. This paradox has been referred to as a crisis in psychology by several scholars, especially in the early 20th century (Bühler, 1929; Vygotskij, 1997), but has been repeated quite recently as well (Mikulak, 2011).

If, therefore, psychology is about the self, then the self is embedded with the same paradox. This is possibly more obvious when development and learning are taken into regard. They are both about changes, but the self, who actually goes through these changes, is still regarded as a permanent unit. It is within this paradox Leibniz place the term “perception,” which is first of all an explanatory term for the paradoxical situation of the self. “The transitory state which incorporates and represents a multitude within a unity or within a simple substance is nothing but what we call perception” (Leibniz, 1998, p. 269). This is a quotation from the so-called “Monadology”, in which his philosophy is presented as a condensed summary written quite late in his life. The point is that when Leibniz summarized his understanding of the aspect of changes in the world, he explained it in terms of perception. Yet this is the first step in the real Copernican revolution in the history of philosophy, because perception is about the subjective impression of the world, and by introducing perception as the explanatory term, changes in the world are explained by subjective impressions.

Feelings

Perception, therefore, is first of all about a situation in which the one is encountering the other. Yet another premise for talking about perception is that the one actually notices the other in one or another sense. As long as the one actually is one, the act by which one is noticing the other represents a kind of change. This is an act, which immediately destabilizes the one as a unity. This situation represents a kind of turmoil, which primarily makes the individual confused. Thus confusion is a necessary accompaniment to perception, and this is why Kierkegaard talks about intoxication when it comes to psychology. As long as psychology is defined in terms of perception, it is about the confusion that by necessity adjuncts the point in which the one meets the other. In this respect substance abuse is an interesting sideway to follow. To be intoxicated by some substances is primarily motivated by changing the sensational impressions. This is true also when it comes to medical treatment, in which the motivation is primarily to mitigate the strength of sense impressions. A normal use or abuse of substances may rather be motivated by the opposite, namely by strengthening or transforming the impressions from senses. It can be compared with the child spinning around with the purpose of getting dizzy. By stopping, the world appears to spin instead of the child, and the impression of the world is transformed. This experience of transformed sense impressions normally pleases the child.

To be intoxicated by some sort of substances is normally a positive experience, which is about being “more ‘in touch’ with one’s emotions and feelings.” (Pillay & Duckert, 2009 p. 7.) Feelings, in other words appear as a core issue in this respect. One may even talk about “strong feelings” when it comes to substance abuse and addiction (Elster, 2000). Despite the fact that feelings and emotions have received increased attention in psychological research the last decades, Immanuel Kant has probably presented the most clear and concise understanding by stating that feelings represent the subject’s reactions to the unpredictable aspects of an unidentified object: “we shall call that which must always remain merely subjective, and can constitute absolutely no representation of an object, by the ordinary term ‘feeling’” (Kant, 1790/1972, p. 40).

Feelings, in other words, is the bodily reaction of the subject when one encounters an unidentified other. There are two important consequences of this understanding of feelings. One is the notion saying that perception is always accompanied by feelings. This follows from two basic suggestions, namely that the other is different from the one and that this difference always includes something unexpected. The other consequence is that feelings stand in opposition to rational precisions. Rationality and preciseness are supposed to be salient traits of language. Given this, feelings stand in opposition to words. Yet if “the other” is not just one definable entity, the encounter between the one and the other is at the same time an expression for diversity. This is why Kierkegaard talks about the “multifariousness of life” when it comes to psychology. Psychology is not just about perception, but also about how perception is experienced. Yet perception is about diversity and the experience of diversity in the world is even so impressive and overwhelming that it is depicted as a foaming experience. Thus just to live a modern autonomous life, in which perception is the only guidance, is best characterized by being “intoxicated.”

This understanding of emotions as generated from unexpected aspects of the one encountering the other is what forms the premise for George Mandler’s hypothesis of interruption (Mandler, 1985). His historical review about the understanding of feelings and emotions is interesting because he underlines how the aspect of unpredictability is something that unites the different understandings of the terms in modern psychology. Although the term “modern” is restricted to start with 1879 (Mandler, 2007), and therefore does not include Immanuel Kant, he is highlighting that feelings and emotions are primarily related to a sort of conflict. This characterizes the theories of feelings whether they are presented by Wilhelm Wundt, William James, John Dewey and not at least by George Mandler himself. He describes his own theory of interruption in terms of “conflicting actions, blocked tendencies and erroneous expectations” (Mandler, 1985, p. 46). Thus this theory is very much in accordance with Kant's understanding, although Kant is not included in Mandler’s scenario. Another aspect Mandler is pointing at in his review is what he regards as the two main tendencies in theories, in which the one is focusing on the organic and the other on mental aspects. Even more interesting in this respect are what Mandler regards as some more erroneous consequences of several of these theories, in the sense that they try to sort out and specify different emotions by labelling them. This attempt contradicts Mandler’s own interruption theory, in which the unexpected represents what is impossible to define. When he therefore refers to Wundt as the one that talked about feelings as unanalyzable, it is not because Wundt avoided the topic. It was rather the opposite. Wundt expanded the understanding of feelings and let feelings be about much more than just what is pleasant or unpleasant. The unanalyzable part of feelings is rather connected to the fact that feelings contradict words.

Mandler’s reference to Leonard B. Meyer is of interest in this respect. Meyer is presented as the one that continues the historical understanding “by saying that emotion is ‘aroused when a tendency to respond is arrested or inhibited’” (Mandler, 1985, p. 44). The other important factor is the statement, which says that “physiological reactions are essentially undifferentiated” (loc.cit.), which implies that “an undifferentiated organic reaction becomes differentiated into a specific emotional experience as a result of certain cognitions” (Mandler, 1985, p. 45). The undifferentiated stands in contrast to language, which is based on differentiation and distinctions between the words. However, Meyer was not focusing on language in his theory of emotion, but on music. Despite the fact that music also presupposes a certain level of differentiation, it is not on the same level as language. “For in the case of musical expression of emotion, the emotion you are moved by is not [. . .] about any definite state of affairs and it is not experienced by someone of definite characteristics” (Budd, 1995, p. 149). Both the experiences and the experienced are in a sense more undifferentiated. This is why music is so easily associated with feelings, but according to Mandler, this is also why psychologists have problems with grasping what feelings may be about. Leonard B. Meyer is not very much referred to by psychologists, and according to Mandler that might be “because he worked in area not usually explored by psychologists, [and therefore] his work had no influence on any psychological developments in the field of emotion” (Mandler, 1985, p. 44). He continues by saying that this is despite the fact that Meyer, “in contrast to many other such theorists, had read and understood the literature” (loc. cit.). Still, we find attention more directed towards texts than music in treatment.

The critical approach

Conflict however is not just restricted to feelings; it is a salient trait of the modern self. One may say that feelings are the immediate expression of the self in context. In this sense feelings and emotions are signs because they signify the actual situation of an individual in the world. This process of signification is unfolded on at least two different levels. One is the general level, which can be summarized by the term conflict. This is the overall aspect of the self in the world, because the self stands in opposition to the other, but at the same time it has to be related to the other. The other level of signification is the actuality in which the individual self is located. The latter is not very easy to express in words because it is first of all characterized by feelings and emotions as the only adequate expression for the situation.

To achieve a kind of understandable discourse in this situation is not easy. On the other hand it is highly crucial to work it out, and the most natural pathway to follow is to introduce some criteria, by which the discourse can be defined as rational or at least understandable. This is exactly what is attempted by means of critical philosophy, whether we talk about Immanuel Kant or Theodor W. Adorno. No matter how different the two philosophers actually are; they share a common attempt at compensating for a fluid and chaotic contemporary. In this respect we can supply the list with Ferdinand de Saussure and Michel Foucault. Kant was facing the fundamental problem of subjectivity as a challenge to objective knowledge, de Saussure the changes in a stable language, Adorno the double communication of rationality in society and Foucault the concealed disposition of power in both language and society. What they are all sharing is to define criteria for handling the chaotic and ambiguous situation into which the modern human being is placed. In this respect, de Saussure is probably one of the most interesting to highlight. His theory about the arbitrary sign is influenced by Wilhelm Wundt’s folkpsychology, and especially Wundt’s lectures on language and the role of the gesture (Wundt, 1973). According to Blumenthal, Wundt’s “lectures on the psychology of language were the most heavily attended in the world, and those who heard him included de Saussure, Paul Delbrück, and Bloomfield” (Blumenthal, 1973, pp. 12ff). Wundt’s statement about general knowledge as something that is only given through language, myths and norms (Wundt, 1888) is similar to the dynamic nominalistic semiological system of de Saussure in the sense that they both combine stability with changes in an open system that regulates itself (Piaget, 1971). Thus if Wundt’s folkpsychology may count as a foundation for cultural psychology, it is hard to avoid the semiological approach as a systematic device in examining the relationship between culture and psychology. Yet this is not restricted to concern only language, but all dynamic communicational systems that are characterised by this mixture of stability and change.

Conclusions

After having made these connections between the addicted and the modern self, it is tempting to conclude that addiction is the self lost in sensual diversity—partly enjoying it, partly hating it, which could also summarize the modern self. The core issue in this respect is ambiguity generated by feelings. Feelings are understood as a result of conflicts, but these conflicts are located as inevitable parts of perception, in which the self is encountering the unpredictable other. Although addiction cannot be regarded as a modern phenomenon, the reflection on the unpredictability of the other is still what characterizes modernity. Unpredictability is exactly what generates ambiguity. Yet a reflection upon this ambiguity in both the outer world, and within oneself, is exactly what modern psychology is about. Furthermore, ambiguity blurs the distinction between knowledge and science. However, to overcome the ambiguity, and to form a basis for treatment of addiction, a sort of mitigation of the existential ambiguity is required. In this respect certain criteria for the reflexive self and understanding is introduced. To focus on text production and certain readings represent one approach, however to get a fully understanding of how feelings and ambiguity are embedded in modern life and society, one has to stick to music. This is exactly what Leonard B. Meyer and Theodor W. Adorno realized. Since music is also much closer to the undifferentiated bodily reaction one expose in the encounter with the other, it is free from all definable perspectives and therefore may fulfil a real deconstruction. In this respect music seems to form a kind of basis in all good texts, and could probably also provide the same in all good treatments.

Footnotes

Sven Hroar Klempe (b.1955) is associate professor in psychology at Department of Psychology, Norwegian University of Technology and Science (NTNU), Trondheim. As a former professor in musicology, but also associate professor in mass communication and media research, his research is highly cross disciplinary deeply rooted in the humanities. His specialty is in the history of psychology, and especially German and Nordic psychology in the 18th and 19th centuries.

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