Abstract
Once upon a time there was a country with a stable Westminster parliamentary system that held a uniquely unusual general election. The incumbent prime minister announced, well in advance of the election, that he would not run for another term, but retained the position for a considerable time, eventually choosing the date of his leaving. None of the three major party leaders previously had contested an election in that position, with two of the parties experiencing an unprecedented rate of change for unsuccessful leaders in recent years. For the first time, there were debates among the three party leaders. More of the campaign was conducted via the Internet than ever before.
The sitting government had suffered a record number of backbench rebellions for the post-war period. Because of a far-reaching financial scandal in parliament, even before the election occurred there clearly was going to be a modern record for turnover of members, including the ouster of a sitting Speaker of the House. The economy, previously buoyant, had dropped precipitously in a fashion not experienced for over a half century, calling into doubt the neo-liberal model followed for 30 years. Government spending had expanded substantially for peacetime as a result of emergency rescue and fiscal counter-cyclical measures.
The outcome was similarly unusual. The two major contending parties between them achieved a post-war low for combined share of the vote. Instead of being known early in the morning of the day after the election in the form of a majority or minority government, negotiations went on for five days until a full two-party post-election coalition, the first since the nineteenth century, was formed between the first and third place finishers, despite no foreshadowing of such an alliance before the election.
Jettisoning parts of their election manifestos, the two parties produced a detailed agreement for government. These included significant institutional reforms, such as a fixed term of office for this government, a referendum on changing the electoral system, a reduction of the number of seats in the legislature, and re-drawing boundaries to make constituencies substantially equal rather than recognizing historical ‘community interests’. The remaining opposition party engaged in a prolonged leadership selection competition that chose a person without extensive leadership experience over the favoured candidate – his more seasoned brother.
But some things remained the same. Fears over market and media response led to a stable majority government being formed with an agreed programme in the Queen’s Speech. The leading members of the government were products of elite private schools and higher education institutions. The country returned to normal parliamentary practices, albeit with the added complications of two parties cohabiting office, leading to a record number of backbench revolts in the first year. Despite extraordinary challenges, democratic resilience and familiar practices re-asserted themselves.
The nine chapters of this book cover the record of the outgoing government, developments in the two major challenging parties, the public–parliament gap as revealed by the expenses scandal, the leadership debates, the effects of local campaigns and non-uniform swing, and the formation of the coalition. The two most original chapters are on the background and implications of the financial crisis and an application of the US-developed concept of ‘policy mood’ to the UK.
According to this book, three well-publicized events had little discernible impact on the outcome. These were: (1) the parliamentary expenses scandal; (2) ‘bigotgate’, Gordon Brown’s recorded outburst over being questioned on immigration by a Labour supporter; and, most surprisingly, (3) Liberal leader Nick Clegg’s high popular ratings for his performance in the first debate, although it may have helped maintain Liberal support in some critical marginal constituencies against the Conservatives.
While there is a considerable amount of policy analysis for the Labour government, there is relatively little on the coalition’s distinctive response to the fiscal crisis. The origins of the ‘economically neo-liberal turn’ in the Liberal party, especially within the new leadership group, are well delineated. But one wonders which conflicting tendency in Conservative leader David Cameron’s attempt at ‘Thatcherism with a human face’ will dominate, as encapsulated by the fact that his calls for a ‘Big Society’ were considered vague and confusing both before and after the election.
The campaign, results and implications of the election for the Celtic periphery are almost completely ignored. But if the analysis in the chapter on the decline of the British economic model is correct, then the coalition’s public expenditure cuts will fall disproportionately on the heavily state and para-state-dependent regions of Northern England and the Celtic fringe, with predictable political results. This may presage a return to 1980s patterns of party competition.
With a few notable exceptions, the authors are from the younger generation of scholars, often affiliated with the University of Essex. The book is compellingly written and generally well edited, with the exception of one repetitive chapter. Because of its clear presentation and occasional use of comparisons to other democratic governments, the book is highly suitable for use with undergraduates in other countries, especially in the USA.
But one comparison is not made: Single-member district electoral systems no longer reliably deliver one-party majority governments. Not in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, nor necessarily in sub-central jurisdictions. While the electoral system may be the linchpin of the Westminster system, its effects have been eroding, irrespective of attempts to change the process. The British election of 2015 will prove to be an important milestone, even if not a final verdict, on the impact of its extraordinary immediate predecessor.