Factors influencing intra-party democracy and membership rights

Abstract

Political parties are considered to be vital elements of political life in modern democracies, and whether in democratic regimes they maintain democratic mechanisms within their own organizations and structures has been an intriguing topic. The most important issue is which factors influence the internal democracy in parties. This article examines the relationship between functioning of democracy in parties and party leadership, candidate selection mechanisms, membership systems, policy formulation systems and communication channels. In addition to the commonly used indicators of intra-party democracy in three areas – the leader’s power and control, nomination process and determining policy preferences – this article deals with the process of membership recruitment and membership rights. It analyses the factors that influence intra-party democracy in Turkey focusing on the multiparty period after 1946 by giving examples from the political parties and previous research results.

Keywords

Country (Turkey)organization party system political environment relations with society

Introduction

Political parties are considered to be vital elements of political life in modern democracies. They have instrumental and representative functions, play several key roles, including: integrating diverse interests; serving as a bridge between the public and the government; creating public awareness and training people about the political process and public issues; serving as a milieu for the emergence and election of political candidates; monitoring the government when they are in opposition; and forming governments and issuing policies and laws as the ruling party. While they are the building-blocks of modern democracies, whether political parties maintain democratic mechanisms within their own organization has been an intriguing issue and involves the question: What are the main factors that influence intra-party democracy?

Previous research has focused on the factors that affect intra-party democracy mainly in the Western democracies that have a long democratic tradition and a developed culture of democratic system (Biezen, 2004; Caramani and Hug, 1998; Duverger, 1954; Inglehart, 1990; Kirchheimer, 1990; Michels, 1968; Mimpen, 2007; Pizzorno, 1990; Sartori, 1977; Scarrow, 1999; Webb, 2007; Weber, 1965; Wolinetz, 2002). However, the analysis of intra-party democracy in non-Western or relatively new democracies is under-explored. This study analyses intra-party democracy in Turkey, which is a relatively young non-Western democracy. However, having been engaged in party politics and democratic structures since 1946, Turkey has a democratic history that is long enough to assess the impact of changes in explanatory variables. The case of Turkey allows testing the generalizability of hypotheses and findings based on the Western experience, but also findings important for other new democracies, especially since the number of countries going through democratic transition has been increasing since the 1980s.

A review of the literature on party politics points to internal power structure being one of the key issues related to party structures and processes (see Dalton et al., 2011; Janda et al., 1995; Montero and Gunther, 2002; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Rahat et al., 2008). If the powers are balanced, mention can be made of the existence of internal democracy. Parties usually have oligarchic structures resulting in the concentration of power at the top and a decline in the influence of members at large. Party leaders end up with a disproportionately large number of resources compared to other party members, including access to information, control over formal communication channels and accumulation of know-how related to political activities.

Intra-party democracy requires the party leadership and top administration: to be accountable to the membership, to respect the rights of party members, to try to maintain a neutral platform during the intra-party elections and selections of candidates, to allow party conventions to be held freely, to promote active participation of members in candidate selection processes and other party activities, and not to interfere with the election and operation of local organs as long as they follow the party by-laws and laws of the country (Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 35). Thus, for a better functioning of democracy within parties, power should be decentralized, checks-and-balance mechanisms should be established and candidacy and party selectorates should be inclusive.¹

Janda and Colman examine the concentration of power within a party in eight areas: nationalization of structure; selecting the national leader; selecting parliamentary candidates; allocating funds; formulating policy; controlling communications; administrating discipline; and leadership concentration (1998: 197). Gibson and Harmel raise seven questions on intra-party democracy that cover similar items (1998: 216–217). Typically, three overlapping selection and decision-making processes are highlighted as markers of the level of intra-party democracy: (1) the selection and power of party leaders, (2) the selection of the party’s candidates for elected offices, and (3) the formulation of the party’s policy proposals.

After a brief review of these three processes, I examine whether the factors generally used to explain intra-party democracy within Western democracies can also be applicable in the case of new democracies such as Turkey. I analyse the impact of each factor on intra-party democracy in Turkey, i.e. election systems, as defined by laws and party by-laws, selection mechanisms of party candidates to public office, the power of party leadership and policy development mechanisms. Moreover, in addition to the three factors emphasized in the literature, I examine the importance of processes dealing with party membership. I propose that, as illustrated by the Turkish case, openness of the membership recruitment process and membership rights serve as antecedents of other factors that influence intra-party democracy and, as such, should be incorporated in studies examining intra-party democracy.

I analyse the changes in intra-party democracy in political parties since Turkey made the transition from one-party rule to multi-politics in 1946. I maintain that intra-party democracy has never been a strong feature of political parties in Turkey and has been deteriorating, especially since the 1980s. I contend that while political parties in a country may vary in terms of the level of intra-party democracy they maintain, their authoritarian or democratic tendencies can be reinforced by factors that are exogenous to the parties. As has been the case in Turkey, constitutional arrangements, electoral laws and political culture – as systemic conditions – can push political parties in authoritarian (or democratic) directions. I also scrutinize the control mechanisms within parties.

Assessment of intra-party democracy

Selection and power of the party leader

Although there is consensus about the importance of leadership in political parties (Barnes, 1971; Koole, 1994; McKenzie, 1970; Michels, 1968; Schumpeter, 1942; van Biezen, 2004), Duverger problematizes the authority of the leader in democratic governance: ‘Democratic principles demand that leadership at all levels be elective, that it be frequently renewed, collective in character, and weak in authority’ (1954: 134).

Mass political parties in modern democracies assign a special position to the party leader because parties rely on their mobilization power, which is enhanced by charismatic personalities. However, as noted by Weber, the reliance on charismatic leader tends to reduce the function of parliament to that of a rubber stamp and its members to well-disciplined ‘yes’ men (1986: 106–107).

Klaus von Beyme argues:

Democracy within parties cannot be created by declarations or legislation. Nor in many cases it can be said that the authoritarian ambitions of a charismatic leader prevented the achievement of a greater degree of internal democracy. (1985: 234)

Of course, social and other changes external to the parties, how they are financed and how institutional and technological developments all affect the operation of political parties. For example, ‘new technologies and changes in the mass media which have enabled party leaders to appeal directly to voters…undermined the need for organizational network’ (Mair, 1997: 39). Moreover, ‘the gradual replacement of general party bureaucrats by professional specialists may act to ‘depoliticize’ the party organization and will almost certainly help to create the conditions within which the leadership, in public office, can win more autonomy’ (Katz and Mair, 2002: 125). Trying to avoid challenges by the membership, leaders usually prefer appointments over elections or nomination procedures that would increase their ability to have their favourites selected. Furthermore, when a party leader becomes head of the government, his/her dominance over parliament may increase as well (Puhle, 2002: 71).

Mair points out the trends of increasing autonomy of the central office and marginalization of party members in Western democracies (1994: 13 f.). In fact, he argues that ‘the process of intra-party democratization is often meaningless and/or illusory. Thus, for example, while ordinary members may be given the right to vote in the leadership selection process, they are nevertheless often offered only a limited or constrained choice’ (Mair, 1994: 16 f.). On the other hand, an open and transparent process of membership recruitment, along with secured membership rights, should be considered a precondition for intra-party democracy (Mair, 1997: 113).

Selection of candidates

‘If we claim that the behavior of parties is affected by the nature of electoral system, then the behavior of individual politicians must be affected by the nature of the selection method’ (Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 297). As Farrell indicates, stages of candidate nomination are key aspects of the electoral law in representative democracies (1998). The nominating process has thus become the crucial process (Gibson and Harmel, 1998: 217; Katz, 1980: 7) reflecting the institutional mechanisms that play a role in shaping the parties and party politics. Schattschneider was one of the first scholars to write about the significance of this process: ‘The nature of nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nomination is the owner of the party’ (1967: 64). Similarly, Pennings and Hazan point out that the role and composition of the selectorate that controls the candidate selection process are the most vital criteria for democratization (2001: 273). Rahat and Hazan developed an analytical framework for candidate selection, first by classifying the selection methods as uniform, complex and mixed, then by offering a tool to analyse the candidate selection process according to its inclusiveness and exclusiveness (2001: 299–301). Hazan and Rahat later distinguish five archetypical kinds of electorate: voters, party members, party delegates, the party elite and a single leader (2010: 35–37). The candidate selection process becomes more democratic with the widening of participation (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 166–168).

Candidate nomination may be made by a congressional caucus, a delegate convention, a mass meeting, a cabal, an individual or a party election. ‘The selectorates in the party members’ zone can be distinguished according to the restriction on party membership, the additional requirements that are placed on members’ (Rahat and Hazan, 2001: 302). The choice between these options rests on whether the best candidates can be determined by the local party organization or the central office. By setting very strict rules for evaluating the candidates, however, they increase the power base of party leaders (Katz, 1980: 7, 94–99; Scarrow, 2005: 7–9).

Primaries allow the party members to express their preferences. An important question about the primaries involves who will participate in the selection process: the delegates or the members? The common practice in Europe has been limiting participation in the primaries to the formal party members (von Beyme, 1985: 239–240).

Although the principle behind the primaries is to have candidates identified by party members, the party leader of central administration may limit the members’ choices at the primaries by screening the candidates. Even when primary elections are held, oligarchic tendencies cannot be totally eliminated in the selection process (von Beyme, 1985: 239). It can be said that the more open and participatory the candidate selection process is, the higher is the intra-party democracy. Where the primaries are based on member participation, the recruitment of members and their rights become particularly important, since the party leadership can control the nomination process by controlling the membership registration.

Public policy formulation

The level of intra-party democracy exercised during the policy formulation process depends on who determines policies – are they formulated by the leadership, central committees or through the participation of local organization and members? In cases where the membership is polled on issues, whether the vote is considered advisory or binding on the party leadership is also important.

As well put by Barnes: ‘A final factor that greatly facilitates the existence of democracy within a unit is that of structural bases for opposition’ (1971: 95). Similarly to the functioning of opposition parties in pluralist democracies, a viable opposition within parties may also strengthen the development of intra-party democracy. The extent to which the ordinary members of the party – those close to the party leadership, as well as those who may side with the rivals – participate in policy discussions and formulation would speak to the level of democracy maintained within the party. Furthermore, as indicated by Pizzorno, recruitment of new members may sometimes result in programme differentiation (1990: 63 f.). If the old and newly recruited members can find the mechanisms to make policy differentiation, this adds to intra-party democracy.

Recruitment of members and membership rights

Even though some analysts have argued that the role of members may be declining (Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010: 823–843), members still serve crucial functions in political parties in contemporary democracies. Despite the widespread use of state subsidies in some countries, membership fees and donations are still an important source of revenue for many parties. Parties also need members to fill positions both within the party and in public office. Members help defend and legitimize party policies and are useful for mobilizing voters. Scholars agree that either way, whether as legitimizers or as active campaigners, membership is an important resource (Katz and Mair, 2002: 129–133; Mair, 1994: 13–18, 1997: 146–152).

As mentioned above, the main indicators of intra-party democracy – leadership, candidate selection and policy formulation mechanisms – would be meaningful, only if membership recruitment was open and transparent and members’ rights secured. There is therefore a strong causal link between membership recruitment and these three indicators.

In established democracies of Western Europe, party members are usually recruited at the local level. Most parties try to regulate membership by setting certain rules. In order to secure members’ commitment, parties require annual dues and participation in party activities (Scarrow, 2005: 11 f.). Parties may also require new members to be recommended by current members of good standing, or they may apply a waiting period before admitting an applicant. A person joins a local branch and the local branch reports its membership data to the party’s headquarters. Traditionally, efforts to register members at the party headquarters have been opposed by local branches for reducing the local autonomy (Bille, 1994: 137).

While parties may try to maintain a good public image by selecting responsible people as members, the local or central administrative units of the parties may deny membership to some applicants in a deliberate effort to weaken intra-party opposition and avoid competition. Selective admission then helps the group in control of the party to reinforce its power.

Party politics and intra-party democracy in Turkey

Selection and power of party leaders in Turkey

Political parties in Turkey tend to display oligarchic tendencies (Esmer, 2002; Heper and Landau, 1991; Heper and Sayarı, 2002; Rubin and Heper, 2002), with the party leaders dominating the party apparatus. Voters tend to personalize the party administration by identifying the party by its leader. It has been customary for loyal partisan electorates to refer to their party affiliation by the name of the leader rather than by the name of the party. For example, in the 1970s, supporters of the four major parties tended to be referred to as Demirelci, Ecevitçi, Türkeşci and Erbakancı, rather than by the party acronym: AP’li, CHP’li, MHP’li and MHP’li, respectively.²

Such cultural practices accentuate the significance of the leader and enhance the party’s reliance on leadership, which in turn reinforces the leader’s grip on the party bureaucracy. Thus, in Turkey, it has been difficult to remove party leaders. With a few exceptions, all party leaders in Turkey have clung to power even after their party has lost successive elections under their leadership. Changes in the top leadership have been rare and usually occur due to some extraordinary event, e.g. a military intervention, the closing of the party by the Constitutional Court, the death of the leader or the selection of the party leader to serve as the President of the Republic. The continuities in both party organizations (sometimes under different names) and their top leadership for the major political parties have been represented in parliament (see Table 1).

Table 1.

Continuities and changes in party names and leaders in Turkey (1945–present).

1945–1960	Coup	1961–1980	Coup	1983–present
CHP-I. Inonu	→	CHP-I. Inonu→B. Ecevit Split GP+ CP→CGP-Feyzioglu	→ → →	HP-Calp→Gurkan SODEP-Kartay→E. Inonu Two parties merged: HP+SODEP=SHP-Gurkan→E. Inonu →Karayalcin SHP merged into CHP CHP-Baykal →Cetin→Baykal →Oymen→ Baykal →Kilicdaroglu DSP-R. Ecevit→B.Ecevit→Karababa →B.Ecevit→Sezer→Turker
DP-Bayar →Menderes	→ → →	AP-Gumuspala →Demirel YTP-Alican Demokratik P- Bozbeyli	→ →	ANAP-Ozal→Akbulut→Yilmaz→Ozdemir→Nas→Mumcu→Uzun DYP-Avci→Cindoruk→ Demirel→Ciller→Agar→DP→Cindoruk
		MNP→MSP-Erbakan	→	RP→Tekdal→Erbakan→FP-Kutan Split AKP-Erdogan SP-Kutan→Erbakan→Kurtulus→ Erbakan →Kamalak
MP+TKP-Bolukbasi = CKMP-Bolukbasi	→	CKMP-Bolukbasi Split CMKP-Turkes→MHP-Turkes MP- Bolukbasi	→	MuP→MCP-Dogru→Turkes→MHP-Turkes→Bahceli Split BBP-Yazicioglu→Topcu
		TIP-Erakalin→Turkler→Aybar →Aslan→Yildiz→Boran
				HEP →DEP→ HADEP→DEHAP →DTP→BDP (Kurdish nationalist parties re-emerged after Constitutional Court Closings)

Symbols: → marks the continuation of the party after the previous one was closed down; → marks the shift in leadership or change in party name; names in boldface are those who left the position due to death, being banned from politics or becoming President of the Republic (except for Karayalcin, who stepped down when the party merged with the CHP, and Baykal, who resigned due to a sex scandal); names in italics identify the caretaker leaders.

İsmet İnönü, who had become the leader of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) on the death of its founding chair Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938, maintained his leadership throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. In 1972, after internal party strife, he finally left the position to Bülent Ecevit. Transfer of the CHP leadership from İnönü to Ecevit at a party convention and in accordance with the party by-laws was a rare case of ‘normal’ change in leadership. Celal Bayar, the founding leader of the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti-DP), transferred power to Adnan Menderes when he became President of the Republic in 1950. Menderes maintained the leadership of the DP until May 1960, when his government was ousted by the military and he was executed in 1961.

When civilian rule was restored in 1961, the Justice Party (AP-Adalet Partisi) was established as a successor to the DP. In 1964, Süleyman Demirel was elected leader of the AP, a position that he held until the 1980 coup. Although the military barred him and other political leaders from active politics for 10 years, a public referendum ended the ban in 1987 and Demirel returned to politics as leader of the True Path Party (DYP-Doğru Yol Partisi) by the vote of party members. He resigned from the party to become President of the Republic in 1993.

Colonel Alparslan Türkeş was involved in the 1960 military coup, after which he joined the Republican Peasant Nation’s Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-CKMP) and became its leader in 1965. Türkeş transformed the party into an ultra-nationalist one and changed the party’s name to the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP). He was recognized as the ultimate leader, ‘Başbuğ’ (akin to Führer), and maintained a highly authoritarian rule. After the 1980 coup, his political ban was uplifted (in 1987) and he resumed leadership of the Nationalist Labour Party (Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi-MCP). He ruled the MCP (and then the MHP) until his death in 1997, when the party convention appointed Devlet Bahçeli to the leadership of the MHP. Bahçeli subsequently established his own autocracy in the MHP (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 25–39).

The right-wing politics of the 1960s and 1970s also involved the formation of religious parties. The most prominent among them was the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP), which was established in 1970 but was closed down just one year later. Its leader Necmettin Erbakan formed the National Salvation Party (MSP-Milli Selamet Partisi) in 1972. Erbakan ruled the party, but was subject to the political ban imposed by the military in the 1980s. His colleagues established the Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi) in 1983, and Ahmet Tekdal led the party as a caretaker leader until Erbakan could return to politics in 1987. Before the RP was closed down by the Constitutional Court, some of its leaders regrouped and established the Virtue Party (FP-Fazilet Partisi) in 1997, but without Erbakan who was again subject to a political ban (Yeşilada, 2002). Recai Kutan assumed the leadership. Finally, the closing down of the FP by the Constitutional Court in 2001 led to a split in the party: the conservative group established the Felicity Party (SP-Saadet Partisi) while the reformist group formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP-Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). In comfortably winning both the 2002 and 2007 elections, the AKP became the ruling party, with its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, managing to maintain a strong party discipline (Hale and Özbudun, 2010: 44–52; Kumbaracıbaşı, 2009: 126–134 and 144–148). As is frequently mentioned in the media, Erdoğan is known for his quick temper and lack of tolerance for criticism and opposition both in and outside the party circle.

The Motherland Party (ANAP-Anavatan Partisi), which was established in 1983 by Turgut Özal, won both the 1983 and 1987 elections and established majority governments. Özal left the party leadership in 1989 to become President of the Republic. Analysts note that ‘Özal as the founding leader of the ANAP symbolized the party during his leadership. It was Özal’s vision that was reflected in party program, orientation, ideology and, once in government, on government policy’ (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 45). Özal used his popularity to further enhance his power.

Another party leader who had large popular appeal was Bülent Ecevit, who, in the 1970s, turned the CHP into a social democratic party. After the military coup, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) was established (in 1985) by his wife while he was still barred from politics. He assumed the leadership immediately after the ban ended and remained in that post for a long period of time. He left after the 1987 general elections when the Party received 8.5 percent of the vote and returned to leadership 10 months later – remaining in power until serious health problems beset him in 2004. He died in 2006. His tight control over the DSP apparatus and affairs is often noted with criticism. Kınıklıoğlu writes that: ‘Ecevit also treats the party as his own creation, which can survive only under his personal guidance’ (2002: 5). ‘The party organs of the DSP exercise no influence. Power rests solely with Bülent Ecevit and his wife Rahşan Ecevit. All other persons and organs are nothing more than formalities and carry no political weight whatsoever’ (Kınıklıoğlu, 2002: 12).

After the military coup another group from the CHP, under the leadership of Erdal İnönü, formed the Social Democratic Party (Sosyal Demokrat Parti-SODEP) in 1983. Table 1 lists SODEP’s series of merges with other parties until uniting under the umbrella of CHP, and also the changes in the party leadership accompanying these merges.³

In recent years, both the governing and main opposition parties have changed their by-laws in a way that strengthens the leaders’ status. For example, some parties require a considerable number of signatures of delegates to the party’s general assembly in order to have someone nominated to the post of party chair. Such high thresholds make it practically impossible to change party leaders through an election process.

Commenting on the situation in the 1990s, Rubin wrote that political parties in Turkey typically have no significant internal democracy: ‘Leaders who make bad mistakes in government or elections survive’ (2002: 3). Similarly, pointing to the fact that changes in top leadership are rare and caused only by exceptional circumstances, Özbudun contends that all major parties in Turkey display strong oligarchic tendencies (2000: 83). They are, indeed, highly centralized, and the central executive committees have the power to dismiss recalcitrant local committees. Also writing on the power structure of parties in the 1990s, Heper reaches the following conclusion:

Intra-party democracy did not exist in any of the parties examined. Leaders dominated all of the parties, and were intolerant of not only dissent, but also of constructive criticism. (2002: 145)

Heper’s comments along with others on the lack of tolerance for dissent and criticism within the party prompt one question, i.e. whether party leaders’ hegemony and domination have been on the rise. There have been no systematic data on the inner workings of any political party for a long period of time, but some anecdotal references to the early years of the Turkish democracy reveal a certain level accommodation by the party leaders that would seem unthinkable today. I will highlight two examples.

The first is about the DP and its leader Celal Bayar, who had served as the Prime Minister between 1937 and 1939 and then became the founding leader of the DP in 1946. In 1947, he was asked by eight party executives ‘not to act without obtaining the permission of the Party Headquarters and the Board of the Parliamentary group’ (Kabasakal, 1991: 175 f.).

The second example involves İsmet İnönü, who had been a national war hero and a founding member of the CHP. He served as Prime Minister between 1923 and 1937 and became the second President of the Republic after Atatürk’s death. He was referred to as the ‘National Chief’ during the one-party era. Nevertheless, in 1953, when leader of the CHP, he proposed an amendment to the party by-laws at a National Convention of the party, but this was flatly rejected by the By-laws Commission (Kabasakal, 1991: 183 f.).

In fact, according to Duverger and Weiker, intra-party democracy can exist even in a one-party regime (Duverger, 1954: 276). Weiker notes that Atatürk, the leader of the party, together with his colleagues experimented with several organizational arrangements in the party structure, such as trying to convert the CHP ‘from rigidity to flexibility, from a monolithic into a pluralistic body, from centralized to decentralized structure’ during the one-party regime (Weiker, 1973: 184). An example is the Free Party Episode. The Republican Free Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) was established in August 1930 by Ali Fethi Okyar, former Prime Minister and close friend of Atatürk. Okyar was convinced he could form an opposition party by the initiation and strong support of President Atatürk (Kabasakal, 1991: 117–137).

Democratization of politics did not democratize parties, and a multiparty regime produced plenty of hegemonic party leaders. In fact, the authority of leaders might have been increasing, especially after 1986, due to changes in laws regulating elections and political parties and the new role of the mass media. As I discuss later in the article, while the old law on political parties forced parties to identify candidates through primaries, amendments and new laws left the selection mechanisms to the discretion of parties. Consequently, most of the parties stopped using primaries; instead, leaders and central executive offices of parties started to nominate the candidates for parliament seats and posts in local governments. This change inadvertently increased the power of the party leaders. Moreover, it is noted that ‘TV appeals that necessarily center on party leaders have also contributed to strengthening their authority and to the oligarchical tendencies within parties, in addition to their personalities’ (Özbudun, 2000: 84).

A survey study which we conducted in 1997 also supports the arguments about the strong control of leaders over the party apparatus. Based on 782 face-to-face interviews in 36 provinces with the current and former local leaders of the six largest parties, the survey included questions on the structure and operation of political parties in Turkey. In response to the question, ‘Do you believe that there is leader dominance in Turkey?’ more than half of the respondents (55 percent) indicated that there was leader dominance in most parties in Turkey; and almost a quarter of them (23 percent) expressed that there was leader dominance in some other parties. Only 11 percent thought that there was no dominance at all (see Table 2A).

Table 2A.

Perception of leader dominance in political parties.

Do you believe that there is leader dominance in Turkey?
Answers	Responses (%)
Yes, there is	55
There is in some parties	23
No, there is not	11
There should be	11
Total	100

Source: Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 86.

The survey data also show that local party leaders’ perceptions of leader dominance do not vary much from one party to the next. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, when asked to assess leader dominance in their own parties and in other parties, the participants tended to see leader dominance as more common in other parties (Table 2B).

Table 2B.

Leader dominance in Turkey.

	In your party?	In other political parties?
Parties	Yes (%)	Yes (%)
ANAP	68	74
DYP	63	88
DSP	57	76
CHP	55	77
MHP	43	76
RP	59	79
Average	58	78

Source: Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 88.

Candidate selection mechanisms in Turkey

In Turkey, the changes in laws that regulate party structures and nomination procedures have been in the direction of limiting members’ input and enhancing the power of the party leaders and central organs. During the first decades of multiparty era, i.e. between 1946 and 1960, parties nominated their candidates according to the party by-laws. These allowed party members in an electoral district to identify the party’s candidates from that district by holding primary elections within the party; the party leader and other top executives had a limited say. In the 1950s, the two largest parties, the CHP and the DP, identified their candidates through primaries (Kabasakal, 1991: 174 and 178; Tuncer, 2003: 159 f.). The 1961 Election Law required that all parties have at least 90 percent of their candidates for parliamentary elections and to be selected through primary elections held at the local level by party members (Article 15). The first Political Party Law, adopted in 1965, reduced the number of candidates that could be nominated by the central committees from 10 percent to 5 percent of all candidates (Article 31). The 1965 Political Party Law was amended in 1973 giving parties the right to decide on their candidates according to the party by-laws (Tuncer, 2003: 161 f.). Despite this freedom granted by law, during the 1961–1980 period the two major parties, the AP and the CHP, continued to rely on primaries and used the option of selection by central offices occasionally and only in a few provinces. Although the local party members’ say in the nomination process varied over time and across political parties, in the 1970s all major political parties, regardless of their ideologies and by-laws, held primaries before national elections. The practice empowered the local organizations and members of the party.

In the 1980s, before returning to civilian rule, the military government issued a new Political Party Law (in 1983) making primary elections compulsory (Article 37). However, an election law enacted in 1986 rendered local primaries completely optional. Moreover, by requiring judicial supervision for primaries that would allow broad-based participation by all registered party members in a given constituency or by their elected delegates, the law discouraged holding primaries. Consequently, primaries in Turkey became uncommon or nearly a thing of the past.

These laws enacted in the 1980s and the subsequent practices of the parties seemed to go against the wishes of party members. In the above-mentioned 1997 survey of local party leaders, when the participants were asked the question, ‘Who should nominate the parliamentary candidates’, over 40 percent chose ‘all party members’ (see Table 3).

Table 3.

Local party leaders’ preferences on candidate selection mechanisms.

Who should select the party’s candidates in parliamentary elections? (%)
Party leader	2
Party headquarters	1
Party headquarters, by consulting the local organizations	4
Party headquarters, from the nominees of local organizations	8
Local organization leaders	12
Delegates of local convensions	13
All party members	42
Voters	19
Total	100

Source: Çarkoğlu et al., 2000: 84.

However, party leaders choosing the candidates has become the norm during the past three parliamentary elections (in 2002, 2007 and 2011, respectively). Practically all party leaders decided to choose the candidates themselves; at best, they merely consulted the central executive committees. In the 2011 elections, only the CHP nominated 10 percent of the candidates by primaries. This trend of moving away from primaries inevitability has worked against intra-party democracy. In summary, the trend for Turkish political parties is away from inclusiveness to exclusiveness in terms of the selectorate and decentralization to centralization. Handpicked, or largely decided by the party leaders, members of the parliament have become less likely to challenge the party leader’s decisions; acting either out of loyalty and gratitude or with a concern over securing their nomination in the next elections, they tended to support the executive.

Policy formulation by political parties in Turkey

Since the beginning of the multiparty era, political parties in Turkey are typically described as cadre or catch-all parties with strong clientelistic features. In Turkey, party programmes and manifestos issued during election campaigns are generally prepared by committees appointed by the party leader or drafted by the party’s central executive body, which may then submit them for the approval of party delegates at national conventions.⁴ Rubin points out that ‘Ideas [were] not generated within parties where debate [was] discouraged’ in Turkey during the 1990s. ‘Obedience rather than competition govern[ed] the parties’ political culture’ and he reached the verdict of ‘no significant internal democracy’ (2002: 3).

Our survey findings, however, show that local party leaders are not inclined to admit to the lack of internal democracy in their parties. The survey results (Table 4) showed that while half of the local party leaders tended to consider the internal workings of other parties as undemocratic, only 12 percent thought that other parties’ internal affairs were democratic.

Table 4.

Local leaders’ perceptions of intra-party democracy.

Are internal activities of the other parties democratic? (%)
	All respondents
No, they are not	50
Only some of them	17
Yes, they are	12
No answer	21
Total	100

Source: Çarkoglu et al., 2000: 81.

The acceptance of authoritarian politics can be explained by the party culture, as well as by the shift in the country’s political culture. It can be argued that as a result of the military regime’s assault on ideological organizations and its depolitization campaign, since the 1980s party leaders have become more important than party ideology in mobilizing people and appealing to the electorate. This shift in favour of the party leader might have affected the party members’ expectations about intra-party democracy.

Party member recruitment in Turkey

If mass parties are defined as parties that maintain a registration system for card-carrying and dues-paying members whose commitment to party’s goals and ideology are ensured through educational and training programmes, none of the Turkish political parties can be classified as a mass party. Paid irregularly, membership fees do not constitute a significant proportion of parties’ income. In Turkey, parties tend to rely on public financing, which was first granted in 1971 by a constitutional amendment and maintained ever since (Özbudun, 2000: 80 f.). While public financing allows parties to be less dependent on private donors – the policy impact of which is always considered to be problematic and anti-democratic – it may also curtail the influence of members in the policy process.

Political parties in Turkey recruit members generally at the local level and keep membership rosters. Applicants are considered ‘candidates’ until both the local or central offices verify their ‘eligibility’ according to the party by-laws. Applicants can be accepted or rejected at either level. One can often find that membership records kept at local level do not match the records submitted by the central organization to the Prosecutor of the High Court of Appeals, which is responsible for keeping such records by law.

Without clearly defined criteria for membership, however, it is not uncommon to hear claims that applicants who supported the prevailing party administration were granted membership and those who were close to the former administration, or sympathetic to the opposition groups within the party, were rejected. In the past, the party officials could be criticized for allowing or leading massive improper registrations just before the primaries (Farrell, 1994).⁵ Thus, membership recruitment conducted properly would influence the selection of candidates and shape intra-party democracy.

Another instrument frequently used to control party membership is that of activating the dismissal mechanism for members perceived as opposing the existing party administration with the claim that they are not acting in accordance with party discipline. This has been applied frequently since the beginning of the multiparty regime. Three members of the CHP, namely Adnan Menderes (future prime minister), Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü, were dismissed from their parties in 1945. They then established the DP, together with Celal Bayar. Later, the leadership of the DP dismissed some Parliamentarians of the party in 1948.⁶ In 1962, Kasım Gülek (former general secretary of the CHP), Nihat Erim (future prime minister) and Avni Doğan were debarred from the CHP for a year.

The dismissal mechanism has been used as a tool routinely in Turkish political life. Even former Secretary General of the CHP (Ertuğrul Günay) was dismissed from his party in 1990s. During the past decade, some parliamentarians (Mahmut Koçak and Turhan Çömez, AKP; Ümit Kandoğan, DYP) and party members (İhsan Barutçu, Ramiz Ongun and Ümit Özdağ, MHP) who had active roles in their parties were dismissed from their parties. A recent search of the Turkish popular media over the one-year period January 2011 to January 2012 shows that all three parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) represented in the Parliament have dismissed several party members during this period.

As mentioned above, if membership recruitment is not open and transparent, and members’ rights are not secured, the main indicators of intra-party democracy – leadership, candidate selection and policy formulation mechanisms – would not be meaningful.

Conclusion

Intra-party democracy can be conceptualized by inclusiveness in terms of candidacy and selectorate, decentralizion of decision-making and establishment of checks-and-balance mechanisms within a political party. The three factors commonly used to explain intra-party democracy include: the leader’s power and control, the nomination process and determining policy preferences. The analysis in this study contributes to the comparative literature by showing that these factors, which are identified in the study of old Western democracies, play a significant role in determining the level of intra-party democracy in Turkey, a country that has had a different political culture and trajectory from those of Western countries. Moreover, the article draws attention to party membership and identifies the process of membership recruitment and members’ rights as another factor that influences intra-party democracy. The three factors commonly related to intra-party democracy would be meaningful only when the process of membership recruitment is open and transparent and when members’ rights are secured by the country’s laws and party by-laws. People’s ability to join a party as members and the proper functioning of the election rules within the party are important for both intra-party democracy and the political culture of the country. Thus, membership should be given adequate attention, by scholars and democrats alike, in both established and new democracies.

While some of the undemocratic practices may be caused by the personalities of leaders, their desire to have a disciplined and efficient party, as illustrated by the case of Turkey, they can also be affected by the laws of the country. The practices followed in Turkey in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s suggest that democratization of the candidate selection procedures, such as requiring primaries, would be an effective step toward democratizing party politics. Territorial decentralization increased the power of parliamenterians, but control over MPs was reduced until 1980. As a reaction, party leaders tried to apply discipline mechanisms to control the party group in Parliament. After 1980, parties turned back to an appointment system, which increased the leaders’ authority and reduced the democracy in parties. The overview of Turkish political history since 1945 shows that decentralization of policy-making and inclusiveness of candidate selection were basically realized by laws. The impact of electoral laws on intra-party democracy is well established for older democracies, but particularly for the new ones. Given countries’ lack of experience and weak democratic traditions, new democratic systems are vulnurable and need structural enforcement. As mechanisms of intra-party democracy cannot be expected from or left to the discretion of party leaders, political party laws and election laws appear as the target of change.

Moreover, at the entry level, membership recruitment and registration processes have to be revised and measures need to be taken to allow free participation of members in decision-making and elections at all levels. Party conventions need to be organized without any intervention by the top leadership. Elected party organs should be able to complete their terms without any interruption by the central offices.

Of course, these radical changes intended to reduce the power of party leaders and central administration are not easy to accomplish. Tilting the balance in favour of the local organization of parties would be difficult. All parties in parliament, ruling or in opposition, would resist enacting laws in favour of intra-party democracy.

If party leaders are not interested in following or reviving democratic procedures in their own party or changing the laws to mandate all parties to democratize their structures and procedures, how can intra-party democracy be realized? The self-perpetuating cycle of authoritarianism within political parties can be broken only as a result of strong and persistent pressure by party members, civil society organizations and mobilized citizens.

Footnotes

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

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