Abstract
A source of the strength of Green parties has been their willingness to realign their distinctive organizational characteristics to suit the external environment, with the effect of pushing such organizations closer to a more conventional party type. Major organizational adaptations by Green parties have been much studied but only scant attention has been paid to the cumulative effects that ‘minor’ change renders to such parties. This article examines the impact of minor organizational change through an analysis of one of the oldest statewide Green parties in Australia. It finds that minor organizational changes exert a subtle but equally powerful force in moving such parties away from their amateur status to a more professional party type, even in the absence of reform to historical party structures.
Introduction
Green parties demonstrate a talent for maintaining a continuous organizational presence in advanced democracies, including party systems where electoral success has proved elusive (Müller-Rommel, 1998; Rihoux and Frankland, 2008: 260–261; Rüdig and Lowe, 1986: 268). 1 While they are at different stages of institutionalization and development, most have set down durable organizational roots. Their persistence is reflected in their longevity. In Europe, a number of Green parties are now approaching three decades of existence, while in Australia the National Green Party celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2011.
The resilience of Green parties is remarkable, not least because of the inhospitable electoral and institutional conditions that they often confront, but also because of the idiosyncratic nature of their organizational temperament. The normative aspiration guiding Green party organization has been ‘a model of direct democracy within the framework of a representative parliamentary system’ (Poguntke, 1994: 5). This has manifested in an amateur-activist 2 model of party organization that is distinguished by a set of characteristics that typically include: rotation of offices within the party; separation of parliamentary and party functions; binding mandates on elected members; decentralization of decision-making processes that privilege the party rank and file; consensus as the basis for decision-making; open access to all meetings of the party; collective forms of leadership; affirmative action; and close links with new social movements (Burchell, 2002; Poguntke, 1993; Rihoux, 2006).
Scholars writing on the nascent organizational practices of Green parties have expressed reservations about the desirability of the amateur-activist model of party organization. This format was argued to be ill-suited to the exigencies of competitive politics (Poguntke, 1994: 6–12) and it was not considered conducive to attaining high levels of institutionalization and cohesion, as witnessed by internecine intra-party conflict over structure, especially in the early years of the emergence of Green parties (Carter, 2008; Frankland, 1995: 33; Koelble, 1989; Poguntke, 1993, 1994; Rohrschneider, 1994). The organizational dilemma was further compounded because attempts to alter these participatory structures risked alienating the loyalists on whom the party was heavily dependent (Kitschelt, 1988).
In spite of these concerns, Green parties have been modifying their organizational form to better conform to the logic of electoral competition. Many of the amateur-activist traits have been replaced by more efficient (i.e. conventional) structures designed to stabilize internal decision-making and to facilitate campaigning. Scholars tracking organizational change within Green parties in Western Europe conclude that they are ‘now quite distant from the organizational ideal-type of the “New Politics” party’ (Rihoux, 2006: 94), even if it has not resulted in the wholesale abandonment of grassroots organizational elements (Burchell, 2001: 132; Rihoux and Frankland, 2008: 267).
Much of this literature has been pre-occupied with mapping major organizational change and adaptation within Green parties, defined largely in terms of the departure from those structural arrangements characteristic of the amateur-activist model (Lucardie, 2008; Rihoux, 2006). This emphasis given to those reforms that explicitly challenge the organizational identity of Green parties is consistent with the dominant approach in party studies (Harmel, 2002: 132). Not only is it easier to track and to document alterations to a party’s primary historical structures, but also the consequences of such reforms are more exciting to observe because they often have immediate and dramatic implications for a party’s internal dynamics.
Such an approach is not without limitations, however. It may understate the significance of those reforms that do not perceptibly threaten a party’s core organizational principles. While small adjustments to party rules rarely produce abrupt and dramatic changes, they ‘constitute the precondition for later fundamental change’ (Panebianco, 1988: 243). In the case of Green parties, which have crafted a model of party organization designed to resist bureaucratization, centralization and professionalization, modest adjustments to party rules are likely to have important system level effects, even if core features of the amateur-activist model remain intact.
This article examines the impact (and not the drivers) of minor organizational changes (and not changes in party platform or ideology) on Green parties through an Australian case study. While there are shortcomings associated with a single party case study, such an approach does allow for a more detailed exploration of the organizational development of a Green party that might sometimes be sacrificed in a comparative study. The Australian Greens are a fitting focus for analysis because although they are one of the most successful Green parties in terms of their electoral achievements, they remain comparatively under-explored.
The article focuses on one of the eight regional Green parties that comprise the Australian confederation of Green parties. While the Australian Greens are growing in capacity, the national structure is a weakly confederated body 3 with neither the authority nor the capacity to act independently of the regional branches of which it is composed. 4 The state divisions are the key sites of organizational activity in the Australian context (Miragliotta, 2012a). The Western Australian Greens (Greens (WA)) were selected because they are one 5 of the most politically and electorally successful divisions that make up the confederation of Australian Green parties, as measured by its longevity, its share of the primary vote at elections, the size and continuity of its representation in parliaments, and its relative financial strength. Since its inception in 1990, the Greens (WA) have enjoyed continuous representation in state and national parliaments, more often than not in both arenas simultaneously. As the oldest, continuous, statewide Green party in Australia, its durability renders it particularly suitable for this study. The task of mapping organizational change has been assisted by the Party’s generosity in providing access to its archives, along with the cooperation of its members and officials.
The article draws its primary source material from all six versions of the Greens’ (WA) constitution, beginning with its first charter. Party statutes are a useful source of information because they set out a party’s ‘internal conceptions of organizational power, authority and legitimacy’ (Katz and Mair, 1992: 7), conferring ‘legitimacy on the decisions of the party’ and to ‘manage internal conflict’ (Smith and Gauja, 2010: 3). The strengthening in the legal status of party constitutions in Australia further enhances their value as an object of scholarly analysis. Since the 1990s, the Australian courts have indicated that party constitutions are justiciable as a consequence of statutory laws applying to aspects of party activity, such as registration, public funding and disclosure regimes (Gauja, 2006).
There are, of course, limitations in relying solely on the formal rules as a means of evaluating the changes that may be occurring within a party. The informal rules also matter, especially under conditions when the ‘formal rules either do not apply or are inappropriate to the desired outcome’ (Appleton, 1994: 25). It is not necessarily possible to comprehend the full extent of change, or its consequences, by simply compiling a list of the various amendments made to a party’s official rules. Party rules are a known ‘zone of uncertainty’, which renders them vulnerable to being adhered to selectively, manipulated and even ignored by party elites (Panebianco, 1988: 35). In order to gain better insight into the actual application of the Greens’ (WA) formal rules, the case study is supplemented with semi-structured interviews with party members who hold or have held official positions within the organization. Interviews with party elites offer a reasonably reliable means of understanding the effects of formal rule changes, but also the possibility to track the more dynamic, informal changes taking place within the organization.
There is the additional matter of clarifying the distinction between a minor and a major organizational change. This task is not without challenges, particularly in the absence of any single accepted definition in the literature. Harmel (2002: 140), for example, defines major changes as those which are imbued with a ‘transformational’ quality, compared to minor changes, which are ‘discrete’ in nature. Panebianco (1988: 243) refers to ‘fundamental’ changes as being those that ‘change the organization’s authority structure’, whereas Appleton and Ward (1997: 342) distinguish between organizational change that supports existing structures and practices from organizational innovation, which entails new organizational forms and practices that are ‘without precedent’.
Each of these definitions reveals something of the practical and analytical challenges in conceptualizing organizational change. Organizational change is mostly described in terms of the size of its effect and not necessarily in relation to what it actually entails in a functional sense. Similarly, prevailing definitions of change are often cast in fairly binary terms (i.e. transformational versus discrete; big versus small) and not in ways that are capable of recognizing the broad spectrum of organizational change. This can obscure the dynamic, continuous and cumulative quality of organizational change.
The definition proffered in this article is not without similar shortcomings, and furthermore because it has been tailored to satisfy the article’s modest objective. A major change is conceived as any alteration, whether formal or informal, that modifies and or dismantles those structures and procedures that are central to the organizational identity of the party. Major change therefore concerns reforms that directly impact on the Greens’ (WA) amateur-activist organizational characteristics, such as abolishing consensus decision-making. In contrast, minor change is taken to mean changes, whether informal or formal, which are not explicitly concerned with those structures or arrangements that are intimately connected with the party’s organizational identity. Alterations (and inclusions) that have been introduced in response to omissions and/or ambiguities in the extant rules, such as the clarification and/or the formalization of procedures, and the creation of new units or party roles (deepening complexity) constitute a minor change. They also include reforms which occur in consequence of expansion (or even contraction) in the party organization (i.e. changes in size of the membership, elected members, party bureaucrats and officials).
The central claim of this article is that the transformation of Green parties from amateur-activist structures into more conventional formats can be induced by small and incidental changes to the party rules. This article highlights the effects of modest reforms in shifting the organizational culture and dynamics of Green parties.
Green parties and the challenge of organizational reform
Organizational change is a necessary response by parties to the problem of ‘environmental uncertainty’. Yet, organizational reform is typically a highly contested event in the organizational life of most parties. Rose and Mackie (1988: 540) observe that parties are often faced with an unenviable bind when contemplating reform. The reluctance to pursue organizational change may weaken a party’s future electoral prospects, whereas the implementation of new rules or practices has the potential to undermine its internal cohesion, especially when the proposed reform threatens established modes of activity and the power base of elites. It is not surprising, therefore, that parties are more likely to countenance organizational change when there are compelling and ‘exceptional’ reasons to do so (Eldersveld, 1998: 326).
Even then, the vast majority of organizational reforms undertaken by parties are not fundamental adaptations that radically alter the relationship between the various organizational components of the party. The default for most organizations is to give ‘preferred treatment to alternatives that are consistent with existing practices as against those which may produce fundamental or dramatic changes’, typically entailing small adjustment to a party’s rules (March and Simon, 1958: 173). As a result, most changes are likely to concern modifications designed to improve the operational efficiency of the party by doing ‘more of what is already done’ or to ‘improv[e] what is already done’, as opposed to an ‘innovation’, which introduces some new form and practice or supplements existing processes that are without precedent (Appleton and Ward, 1997: 342).
The scope and scale of organizational reforms, especially those changes that directly challenge a party’s long-established organizational principles, are further circumscribed by its genetic traits. A party’s founding goals typically act as a barrier to the introduction of changes that seek to bring about a significant departure from the manner in which it previously operated, particularly among those parties with a strong ideological orientation (Duverger, 1964). The ‘crucial political-administrative decisions’ made by a party’s creators resonate throughout its existence in one form or another, establishing acceptable limits or desirable parameters for reform not easily or readily transgressed by party elites (Panebianco, 1988: 50). Similarly, a party’s primary goals are not without effect. While it is assumed that most parties are motivated by electoral considerations, it is also recognized that other goals may enthuse party activists and influence their strategic choices.
In the case of Green parties, the symbolic, and not merely ideological or functional, importance that they attach to a grassroots party organization poses an additional obstacle to the project of internal reform. Party organization represents ‘a symbolic commitment’ by Green parties to ‘distinguish their attitudes and approaches to party political activism’ from the established players (Burchell, 2001: 106), and, more particularly, the ‘centralist, elitist and bureaucratic’ organizational formats favoured by the conventional parties (Kitschelt, 1988: 127). This is reflected in the amateur-activist model of party organization that is imbued with elements intended to resist centralization, bureaucratization and professionalization, which are argued to stifle spontaneity, inclusivity and participation. The strength of the attachment to grassroots organizational principles has militated against attempts to jettison organizational features that move the model too far from this ideal (Kitschelt, 1990). Thus, while Green parties have been prepared to make significant concessions to these principles, grassroots principles have not been abandoned completely (Rihoux and Frankland, 2008: 271).
Nonetheless, even those changes that do not directly challenge the key organizational properties of the amateur-activist model have the potential to diminish these organizational principles in significant ways. Small adjustments to the rules that are intended to enhance and supplement a Green party’s operations may stultify its natural participatory character. Increased specification of role responsibilities, the regularization and standardization of internal procedures and routines, enhanced structural articulation and the growth of internal differentiation can have important system level effects on the dynamics of the amateur-movement model – even if the core features of the model remain intact. A strengthening in intra-organizational coherence as well as increased complexity and improvements in operational efficiency might facilitate a tilt towards greater bureaucratization, centralization and professionalization. In doing so, minor adjustments to the rules can alter the organizational character of a Green party in subtle but nonetheless significant ways, especially in conjunction with other changes previously introduced (Michels, 1911).
Organizational change and the Greens (WA)
The Greens’ (WA) model of organization exemplifies the amateur-activist type of party organization. It has a highly decentralized organizational format that has been designed to empower the voluntary organization and its control over both the central office and parliamentary fractions of the party. Mandatory balloting of party policies, consensus decision-making, open access to all party meetings and quotas for affirmative action were all incorporated in order to promote membership control over critical aspects of party affairs. Members were further empowered through their affiliation to a local branch, known as Regional Groups (Groups). These groups were guaranteed significant formal autonomy to determine their own internal practices and activities, including equal representation on the party’s central coordinating body, the Representative Council (Council). Delegates from Groups maintained a privileged status on Council. While party functionaries were entitled to participate in meetings of Council, only delegates from Groups were accorded formal voting rights. Restrictions were also imposed on the number of MPs on Council, an initiative designed to negate the accumulation of informal power that comes with high levels of sustained involvement in party affairs. Furthermore, the party rejected unitary forms of leadership in favour of a collective leadership model.
The formal rules of the Greens (WA) have been amended on five separate occasions since inauguration of the instrument in 1990. The first attempt to modify the rules occurred seven years after the investiture of the constitution, prompted by an allegation of improper conduct in relation to the selection of a candidate for public office. This episode led to a review of the party’s constitution in order to ‘resolve inconsistencies’ and to ‘refine aspects of [their] functioning and decision-making that caused difficulties’, especially those concerning the rules for candidate selection ballots (Minutes Representative Council Meeting, 12 April 1997). A second wave of reform was instigated following the party’s decision to amalgamate with the national union of Australian Green parties in 2003. This resulted in a new seven-point clause that set down the terms of the Greens’ (WA) relationship with the national body. In 2007, a comprehensive review of the party’s rules was conducted in order to attend to omissions in the constitution but, more significantly, to ensure that the constitution properly reflected ‘structures and processes’ that had developed in the intervening 17 years since its ratification (interview with Beilby). The constitution subsequently grew from nine sections comprising 46 clauses to 11 sections consisting of 60 clauses. Two additional alterations have since followed, which in both instances consisted of an amendment to a single clause in 2010 and 2011.
The various formal amendments made to the Greens’ (WA) constitution are catalogued using the four dimensions of organizational change developed by Harmel (2002: 138) (see Table 1). Harmel’s indicators are useful for this purpose because they represent an attempt to measure the totality of change occurring within a party. The first dimension concerns complexity and is used here to denote the amount of internal differentiation that exists within a party’s structure. Harmel rents complexity into five components that consist of: number of levels, units, organizational boundaries, variety of tasks performed and specialization of tasks. The second measure is magnitude, indicated by the number of persons/staff regularly involved in performing tasks within the organization. It represents an effort to capture the variable of size in terms of its impact on the functioning of an organization. The third measure is efficiency/control, and this corresponds to the distribution of decision-making authority among components and the extent to which members are directly involved in decision-making. The final dimension is representation and it refers to the provision for groups or interests in an organization’s decision-making bodies. These measures, and their associated indicators, are useful because they correspond to a greater or lesser extent to bureaucratization (complexity), centralization (efficiency/control) and professionalization (magnitude and representation). Only the formal rule changes, and not informal adaptations, have been catalogued along the four dimensions that appear in the table. Informal change is an inherently dynamic and largely subterranean phenomenon which can make it difficult to record in any systematic fashion.
Formal amendments to Green Party Constitution, 1990–2011.
Organizational complexity and the challenge of bureaucracy
As Table 1 shows, many of the alterations to the Greens’ (WA) rules have bolstered the complexity of the party. Organizational complexity and specialization is an important development in so far as it can enable an organization to better cope with external and internal challenges. But complexity can also generate tendencies that are not always desirable, particularly for Green parties. One of the side effects of complexity is increased bureaucratization (Panebianco, 1988: 199). Bureaucracy is a recognized feature of most political parties, even if they never develop all of the characteristics associated with conventional bureaucratic systems (Eldersveld, 1964: 4). It is associated with an array of organizational tendencies that are antithetical to values that Green parties prize. Bureaucracy is typically allied to characteristics that include rational-technical competence, hierarchy and impersonal rule-bound modes (Hall, 1972: 68). Such dimensions are inconsistent with the norms of inclusivity and participation enshrined in Green party structures.
The growth in complexity is apparent in the Greens (WA) on both the horizontal and vertical organizational plane. Beginning with horizontal complexity; this has occurred in consequence of increased differentiation in the performance of administrative responsibilities within the party. Furthermore, it is evident by the appearance of new ancillary units that have been tasked with defined responsibilities. While the original party rules provided for temporary and ad hoc working groups, the 2007 reforms established permanent bodies that were allocated specialized roles. One example can be found in the Administration Working Group (AWG), which was responsible for the day-to-day activities of the party. While the AWG’s formal decision-making powers did not rival that of similar executive bodies in more established parties, its presence was significant, transferring some areas of day-to-day decision-making away from Groups and Council. Similarly, the standing of extant party units became much more clearly defined and their activities routinized. The Election Campaign Committees, for example, have increasingly assumed a more permanent form. Where such bodies were previously dissolved following an election, these committees remain active between elections (interview with Watson).
The organizational hierarchy of the Greens (WA) was augmented quite significantly following its merger with the Australian Greens in 2003. Increased vertical differentiation has produced a replication of many of the structures found at the level of state organization but which correspond to a similar set of structures at national level. This has had various implications for the Greens’ (WA) operational dynamic. The requirement that affiliated state organizations transfer a proportion of their funds to the national body has constrained the Greens’ (WA) use of its financial resources. It has also produced a displacement in the work of Groups and Council, with an increasing amount of its time consumed by national party business, that is, consideration of new initiatives that originate not from within the state organization but from the national structure (interview with Nunan). More significantly, this has altered some of the spheres of activity that remain under the Greens’ (WA) exclusive jurisdiction, namely determinations around national policy frameworks and national campaign strategies for federal electoral contests. While improved internal differentiation does not automatically equate to a more hierarchical distribution of authority, this mostly tends to be the case (Michels, 1911). In joining the confederation, the principle of hierarchy has been expanded, with all of its implications for control and supervision of lower offices by higher offices within the organization, even if the ‘actual’ authority of the national organization remains comparatively weak at this time.
The growth in complexity is also evident in the formalization of role responsibilities. Formalization refers to rules and procedures designed to handle contingencies and the codification of roles (Hall, 1972: 175). It is generally regarded as a separate characteristic in the organizational literature, but formalization does partially reflect some aspect of complexity, even if the relationship between the two variables is complex. Formalization is revealed in two ways. First, there has been a consistent effort to introduce greater specificity in role responsibilities of party units and agents. This is particularly evident in relation to the role description and competencies assigned to party functionaries. There has been an ongoing process of clarifying and strengthening the tasks or roles performed by different office-holders within the party, namely those of the Convener, Secretary and Treasurer. Second, there has been a movement towards greater specificity of procedures and rules and efforts to standardize many internal practices. This is apparent in the expansion of rules regulating the selection of candidates for public office. The procedures governing candidate selection practices 6 have become more heavily prescribed and the obligations on prospective candidates increasingly onerous. This change has occurred in tandem with growing standardization of candidate selection practices across the party.
Formalization is, as Hall notes, a power development. While it can have various consequences, its chief impact is that it ‘reduces the range of variation that is allowed’ (1972: 175). In the case of the Greens (WA), the growing codification of tasks and roles serves to reduce the discretionary power that office-bearers and Groups have to define the scope of their activities, and the ways in which they are required to discharge their obligations. This has engendered greater rigidity within party affairs, which has tempered its more spontaneous (and amateur) quality. Moreover, the trend to increased formalization of processes and roles has had the effect of delimiting the membership role. While efforts to clarify processes and role responsibilities do not inevitably translate in a significant reduction in the rights of members to participate in party activities, they do alter critical aspects of the ways in which ordinary members engage in party matters. The decision, for example, to select the party’s office-bearers at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), as against a full postal ballot of members, has limited membership participation in such matters to only those members who physically attend the AGM. While this rule change does not formally prevent members from participating in such meetings, it does impose a new hurdle requirement for them in doing so.
Operational efficiency as a driver of centralization
The growth in organizational complexity and formalization has also been accompanied by changes in the distribution of decision-making authority among the party’s various components or units. One important manifestation of this alteration in power dynamics is increased centralization of power in Council and away from Groups, even though there has been no formal diminution of the rights of Groups enshrined in the rules.
One of the organizational imperatives that shaped the architecture of the Greens’ (WA) central decision-making organ (Council) was to limit its authority in the affairs of Groups (interview with Jermanlinski). While the fundamental principle of Group representation on Council is unchanged, Council’s powers of oversight have been amplified over the years. The powers include the authority to expel members without appeal and to withdraw accreditation to Groups.
The areas that Council can create by-laws were also expanded following the inclusion of a clause that permits Council to formulate by-laws on any matter it deems necessary. While by-laws are subordinate to the constitution, they govern many important aspects of the Party’s operations and activities. They serve to regulate important areas of party affairs from candidate selection, to procedures governing the exchange and dissemination of information, to specifying the conduct of office-bearers. The delegation of these areas of responsibility to Council has had the effect of bolstering the scope of its decision-making competence.
However, it is not merely the subtle extension in Council authority that signifies a trend to centralization in decision-making. The Preference Working Group (PWG) 7 was created to facilitate pre-election negotiations with like-minded parties, even though the final decision in relation to such matters resides formally with Groups. Over time, the PWG has emerged as the key body responsible for not just negotiating preference agreements, but also for making final determinations that Groups will ultimately accept (interviews with Beilby and Jermalinski). This has effectively bolstered the authority and importance of the PWG. In the process, it has produced a real transfer of power over a sphere of activity that Groups regarded as their exclusive responsibility.
A further indication of tendencies toward increased centralization is evident in the attenuation of the principle of collective leadership. The amateur-activist model is predicated on the rejection of individualist, charismatic leadership, in preference to a leadership model that is collective and amateur in its orientation (Lucardie and Rihoux, 2008: 7–8). The disavowal of professionalized, elite leadership derives from its associations with oligarchy and functional hierarchies. In 2009, the party’s Council assented to a request from the state parliamentary wing to the creation of the office of the state parliamentary convener. The nomination of a leader would permit state MPs to collect certain legislative entitlements that were payable only to the parliamentary leader of the party. Council stipulated that the new office would have no official status outside of state parliamentary caucus and that disbursements derived from the scheme had to be administered jointly by the state party room (Greens WA Parliamentary Group Protocol, 2010). Council’s decision to relent, notwithstanding its conditions, signifies erosion of the principle of collective leadership.
Magnitude and its implications for professionalization
The third key area of change that has occurred within the party organization is reflected in the drift towards the professionalization of the party, defined here in terms of the decline of amateur (unpaid) management and the emergence of paid staff who are employed on the basis of possessing particular expertise.
At its most basic, professionalization of the organization is associated with increases in personnel who derive a salary from the organization, either directly or indirectly. Paid staff employed by the organization presently consist of an administrative officer (since 1996) and a party development officer (2011), with a combined FTE of 1.7 (correspondence with Skinner). It includes various short-term appointments, typically paid campaign personnel at election time (since late 1990s), 8 such as media officers and polling booth coordinators, and those who Webb and Kolodny (2006: 338) refer to as professional consultants. Such staff may be regarded as party bureaucrats to the extent that their chief function is concerned with organizational maintenance (Panebianco, 1988: 231).
The greatest rise in professional staff has occurred within the ranks of employees paid by the state, those who Panebianco refers to as ‘hidden professionals’ (1988: 235). This subset of the professional category of employees results from the Greens’ (WA) success at electing MPs to state and federal parliaments. Although such staff are paid out of the MPs parliamentary entitlements, and are legally prohibited from engaging in party business, the areas of natural overlap between the organizational and parliamentary spheres create opportunities for these actors to participate in policy and coordinating work that ordinarily would be left to voluntary members. 9 Because party organizations typically struggle to keep pace with the exigencies of legislative and electoral arenas, this increases the scope for party political staff to influence actual policies (as against stated party platforms and official policies) and communications strategy. The other consequence of the presence of the ‘hidden professionals’ within the party, especially in the offices of the party’s national legislators, has been the assault on the confederal organizational principle. The fairly generous staffing entitlements afforded to national legislators results in their being more employees working for a Senator (national upper house MP) than for the whole of the state organization. The superior financial resources and personnel allocated to Senators have enabled the national parliamentary fraction to gently extend the priorities of the national structure into the affairs of the Greens (WA) because of their capacity to undertake tasks that resource-strapped state organizations otherwise struggle to perform (interview with Beilby).
The Greens’ (WA) aversion to professionalization derives from the concern that it inevitably leads to the displacement of the grassroots base and the capture of the organization by party functionaries and elites. Certainly, it has been observed by some within the Greens (WA) that the rise in the number of paid staff has coincided with diminishing levels of volunteerism and member engagement within the party (interview with Nunan), even though membership has risen from 366 in 1990 to 1036 members in 2010 (Jackson, 2011: 228).
Effects of rule clarification on representation
The final category in the table pertains to the type, as well as nature, of the opportunities for representation for certain groups and interests in party decision-making structures and units. Official recognition of particular segments, groups and interests not only signals the particular constituencies that a party believes it serves and whose interests it promotes, but also the extent to which the organization values the actual participation, as against the merely symbolic involvement, of certain interests and groups in its internal affairs.
Having modelled their party organization on the principles of inclusivity and popular participation, the issue of representation assumes particular prominence for Green parties. While the Greens (WA) have incorporated these values within their structures, there have been alterations to the rules that have served to impose new boundaries on participation in aspects of party activities. This includes the cessation of quotas for affirmative action. While the principle remains enshrined in the official rules, the requirement for the satisfaction of specific quotas has been eliminated. While the absence of specified quotas does not inevitably have to result in the diminution of female representation in official party organs, it does remove any formal barriers to the maintenance of strict gender ratios.
One other important change in terms of representation has been the party’s decision to restrict membership to natural persons only, thereby closing off membership to affiliated organizations. The party’s formative connections to social movements render the decision to formally prohibit affiliations with like-minded ancillary organizations as something of a break with traditional ways of thinking about representation within party structures. Green parties have their origins in social movements but they also conceived the electoral vehicle to serve as the parliamentary voice of the extra-parliamentary movements (Poguntke, 1993: 388).
Conclusion
Compared to Green parties in Western Europe (Rihoux, 2006: 76), the Greens (WA) have made only a fairly modest number of formal amendments to its constitution, most of which do not constitute major organizational reform, to the extent that critical features of the amateur-activist model have not been formally dismantled. The majority of formal amendments undertaken to the Greens’ (WA) rules have been concerned with fine-tuning, strengthening and clarifying existing processes, while leaving the structural framework and devices of the amateur-activist model largely untouched.
It is also the case that some of the changes to the Greens’ (WA) rules have strengthened aspects of the party’s core participatory values. The clarification of rules regarding consensus decision-making processes, and the imposition of limits of tenure on office-bearers has served to reinforce critical elements of the amateur-activist model. Such developments are not entirely unexpected and they are consistent with the findings of other studies that divergent pressures constrain the extent to which Green parties can undertake strategic adaptations that significantly compromise grassroots participatory ideals. At the very least, the competitive logic of elections is likely to generate sufficient incentives for Green parties to remain minimally organizationally distinctive in order to distinguish themselves from their rivals (e.g. Kitschelt, 1988).
However, what is clear, is that the combined effects of many of these changes, even if modest adjustments at first glance, have altered the organizational dynamic of the party in powerful ways, while preserving the basic structures that sustain the original model of the organization. The increased formalization of party rules and the growing specification of procedures and roles have introduced additional bureaucratic elements. The increase in paid professional staff – an inevitable outcome of electoral success – has affected the nature of the contribution of party members, even though their formal status remains largely unchanged.
The various structural and procedural changes that the Greens (WA) have made to their organization do help to cushion the party from external pressures and threats. But these modifications have served to extinguish much of the amateurism that the amateur-activist model of party organization values. In the process, the Greens (WA) have acquired some of the characteristics of a more bureaucratic and professionalized type. This suggests that the movement towards a more conventional organizational format can also be facilitated by smaller organizational adjustments which are intended to streamline and enhance operational efficiency and capacity.
While the changes taking place within the Greens (WA) are by no means complete, and the party’s original movement structures remain fundamentally preserved more than 20 years since their inception, the strengthening and continuing codification of the party’s processes and operations, and the growth in internal differentiation of the organizational structure, has moved it further away from the open, spontaneous and heavily voluntary party organization that was initially envisaged. This suggests that the organizational dynamics of Green parties can be subverted just as easily by minor organizational reforms, as they can be by fundamental modifications that dismantle the amateur-activist features of their party model. Although minor changes are quantitatively different from those of major structural reforms, there may not always be as great a difference in terms of their qualitative effects.
While it is not the author’s intention to extrapolate the results of this study beyond Green parties, the findings do suggest that marginal organizational adjustments should be accorded greater attention in party studies. A focus on small-scale adjustments, both formal and informal, is likely to better capture the full extent and breadth of changes that a party will undergo over its lifetime, but it may also provide new insights into the causes of organizational change.
This research received no grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
I thank the anonymous referees and Campbell Sharman for their generous suggestions and advice.