Abstract
The scholarly debate between political institutionalists and sceptics is on the whole a healthy one. Institutionalists believe that formal rules matter decisively, whereas sceptics tend to emphasize contexts and accommodations. Surely, if elites were not happy with the formal rules of a political process, they would seek to change them, and very likely succeed? If people willingly follow the rules of a process, that is because it suits them to do so. And, as for rule-based behaviour, surely one would expect to find less of it in Latin America than in almost any other part of the world? Institutionalists reply that some people follow some rules, much of the time at least, through force of habit or because not very much seems to be at stake. Levitt adopts a clear but sophisticated and self-questioning institutional approach that conveys some of the strengths and weaknesses of the type. However, there is the difficulty that, for much of Levitt’s chosen period, Peruvian politics was largely shaped by Fujimori’s autogolpe, which had little if anything to do with parties, legislatures or institutions. Of course Levitt is aware of this issue but he does not deal with it convincingly.
On the negative side, the work seems rather normative. This reviewer was initially struck by the first words of the work when the author quotes someone called Hariou as stating in 1916 that ‘politics is defined as both the science and the art of balancing power’. In one of the bloodiest years of the entire 20th century, any attempt to relate the armed combat of that day to a search for political balance would seem rather partial.
In fact, Levitt’s work is not particularly dogmatic. He well understands that the degree of institutionality in any situation is a variable, and that some rules matter more than others. In a later chapter he presents some interesting comparative hypotheses seeking to weigh up some of the institutional determinants of relative presidential power in Latin America. In this part of the book at least, purely institutionalist explanations are treated with a healthy scepticism. For example, Levitt states on page 227 that there is no evidence at all to support the claim that the constitutional rules governing presidential law-making power significantly determine the strength of the presidential institution. That challenges a considerable secondary literature on Latin American presidentialism that has concluded the reverse. No doubt there are issues of measurement that will be the subject of further analysis, but the relationship between formal presidential power, partisan power and power in its various other manifestations is complex and can be surprising.
The problem with this work is not analytical weakness as such, but a tendency to make unexamined value judgements. Levitt does clearly let show his preference for a checking and balancing pattern of democracy, which is not an uncontestable viewpoint or necessarily a criterion for the long-term viability of democracy. In the 1960s, Britain’s political system was heavily controlled by the executive, whereas Venezuela’s system was based much more on checks and balances. Which country’s system worked best in the long run? By the same time, the relatively powerful Peruvian legislature between 1963 and 1968 behaved in a way that was clearly negative for public confidence in democracy.
Whether a high degree of executive control is good for democracy is a matter of opinion, or possibly context, not fact. So when the author refers to the ‘devastating damage to institutionality’ caused by Fujimori and Chavez (p. 239), he takes a position rather than explicating an issue. Very many voters in both Peru and Venezuela proved to be more concerned about the quality of governance and policy than with the functioning of institutions in the narrow sense. Admittedly, stable democracy does require some degree of constitutionality, but it also requires the rulers to maintain the confidence of the broader public – something that did not happen in either Peru pre-Fujimori or Venezuela pre-Chavez.
On the positive side, though, Levitt clearly knows his subject. The general quality of the research is convincingly professional. His explanation, comparison and contrast of the Peruvian constitutions of 1979 and 1993 are of the fullest and best that I have read in respect of any Latin American constitution, let alone just Peru. He also provides a good and full account of party and electoral politics since the beginning of the 1980s. The book will be of value to students of Peruvian politics and recent Peruvian history. It will also provoke some welcome fresh thinking about the role of institutions in the broader political process, both in Peru and the rest of Latin America.