Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh

Introduction

Well-functioning political parties are essential for the consolidation of democracy. As Schattsneider put it: ‘political parties created democracy’ and ‘modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties’ (Schattsneider, 1942: 1). Teorell adds that ‘no modern democratic state has been able to do without political parties’, and it is intuitive to demand that political parties be ‘democratically ruled’ just as ‘the systems of which they form a part’ (Teorell, 1999: 363).

This article analyses intra-party democracy in one particular country, Bangladesh, in order to answer the question of whether (or to what extent) a dynastic party can still be democratic. According to Chhibber (2013: 277), dynastic parties are political parties in which ‘the top leadership comes from within a family’. In theory, family leadership can still be democratic so long as it is elected through sufficiently democratic intra-party procedures, but are the party-ruling families in Bangladesh democratically elected?

First, we explore the argument that internal party democracy is essential for a political system to be democratic. The scholarly literature is largely in agreement about what political parties should strive to accomplish, namely interest aggregation, popular participation, policy formulation, legislation and policy execution. These are, however, descriptive and normative proposals on what political parties should be, given a (Western) democratic ideal, and this has led to a debate on what internal party democracy entails in real-world (and developing world) politics. It requires openness, inclusiveness and shared decision-making power among leaders and members within the party, and some have forwarded the ‘school of democracy’ argument that democratic party procedures will strengthen the overall democratic culture by nurturing citizens’ democratic aptitude.

Second, we will identify and outline the components of internal party democracy as analytical tools for examining the level of internal party democracy in the ‘real world’. Three processes are crucial for intra-party democracy: a democratic process for the election of leaders, for the formulation of policies and for coalition making.

Third, based on the (normative) notion that democracy requires democratic elections of party leaders, and based on the (largely accepted) worldwide standards for democratic election of party leaders, we will analyse the democratic quality of leadership selection within the main political parties of Bangladesh.

The theoretic argument is developed by using existing academic literature on the topic of leadership selection in political parties. Our sources on Bangladesh are primarily internal party documents on constitutions and election procedures of the parties, seconded by existing literature (academic literature, reports, news, etc.). In addition, we have conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with around 15 politicians and party officials, along with a handful of academics, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives and government officials (including a former election commissioner). The party officials were MPs and standing committee/presidium members of the ruling party (Awami League), of the main opposition party (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) and of several of the smaller parties.

The overall finding is that the degree of internal democracy in Bangladesh’s political parties is very limited. Decision-making, including leadership selection, is largely informal and handled by a restricted number of party elites. This is unfortunate, especially for a country undergoing democratic consolidation, where the political parties should have been ‘schools of democracy’ aiming at enhancing citizens’ civic skills through voice and participation.

Internal party democracy

There is a long research tradition on the internal life of political organizations, and over the past 30 years scholars have increasingly focused on internal party democracy (Croissant and Chambers, 2010: 196). In addition, practitioners and donors have been promoting internal party democracy as one way of addressing the problem of ‘democratic deficits’ in emerging democracies. Support for political parties has been given by donor agencies directly as funding via party-based foundations and institutes and indirectly as an element of ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy support’ programmes (Amundsen, 2007: 10–14; Catón, 2007: 14–15).

Despite (or rather because of) the increased attention by scholars and donors, there is some debate on the question of what internal party democracy entails in real-world politics. Although there seems to be a broad agreement that it requires openness and inclusiveness as well as voice and participation, some scholars emphasize participation of the lower party structures and party members in party decision-making processes (Croissant and Chambers, 2010: 196–197; Lotshwao, 2009: 903–904). There is, however, also some disagreement about how wide the circle of decision-makers should be. Most scholars argue that participation of party members (the rank-and-file) and the various party-affiliated institutions (like women, youth and local party organizations) is required, but some would also include the party’s support base, broadly defined as party-independent social/economic/cultural organizations, civil society and professional organizations, interest groups, activists and voters (Scarrow, 2005: 6).

There is also some debate on the justification and benefits of internal party democracy. A pragmatic argument is that internally democratic parties will select more capable and appealing leaders, formulate more responsive policies, and thus gain a greater number of victories at elections. On a more theoretic and normative level it is argued that democratic internal party procedures will strengthen the overall democratic culture. Internal party democracy has an ‘apparent potential to promote a “virtuous circle” linking ordinary citizens to government, benefiting the parties that adopt it, and more generally contributing to the stability and legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties compete for power’ (Scarrow, 2005: 3).

School of democracy

It has been argued repeatedly that internal democracy is necessary for creating a viable democratic culture within the party as well as in society at large. For those who believe in the merits of participatory democracy, intra-party democracy is an end in itself. This is the ‘school of democracy’ argument: parties should be the incubators that nurture citizens’ political learning, socialization and competence. Opportunities for participation in decision-making within the political parties can help citizens expand their civic skills (Scarrow, 2005: 3; White and Ypi, 2010: 810).

The ‘school’ function of parties is to train, educate and coach people in democratic values, principles and procedures. It should encompass not only party members and cadres, but also sympathisers, voters and the general public. This function is regarded as additional to the four central roles or functions of political parties in modern representative democracies: interest articulation (develop consistent policies and government programmes), interest aggregation (pick up demands from society and bundle them into realistic policy alternatives and programmes), recruitment (engage, select and train people for elected positions and office), and accountability (oversee and control government) (Catón, 2007: 7).

Moreover, scholars holding the more outcome-oriented ‘responsible party’ position also defend the ‘school of democracy’ argument. They maintain that the parties’ essential contribution to democracy is in offering clear and distinct electoral choices, and argue that inclusive processes can boost the legitimacy of the alternatives they produce. Inclusive parties can offer more acceptable policy packages and programmes. Internally democratic parties have a greater likelihood of being open to new ideas and new personnel. For instance, democratic leadership selection can attract different and more capable people, and give a broader social representation and a better representation of ideas (Mimpen, 2007: 1; Scarrow, 2005: 4).

At the same time, some scholars and practitioners (and indeed party leaders) are critical to intra-party democracy, advocating for a more authoritarian or oligarchic style of party leadership. They point to the risk that internal party democracy can undermine party cohesion and decision-making efficiency. They argue that too much internal party democracy can ‘overly dilute the power of a party’s inner leadership’ (Scarrow, 2005: 4) and that ‘internal democratic procedures may raise possibilities for party splits and crises’ (Mimpen, 2007: 1).

This argument was advanced previously by Schattsneider, who said democracy is ‘not to be found in the parties but between parties’ (1942: 60). Duverger made a similar statement when arguing that ‘an internally democratic party is not well armed for the struggle of politics’ and that ‘a party that organizes itself along authoritarian and autocratic lines is superior to others’ (1954: 134). These arguments are in the same vein as Michels’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ (1915/1962), which holds that elite rule, or oligarchy, is (regrettably) inevitable in any democratic organization. The idea of rule by oligarchy is also in line with the Leninist ideology of the ‘vanguard party’, for that matter.

In more pragmatic terms, Scarrow (2005: 3) argues that some procedures are better suited to some circumstances than to others, and Mimpen (2007: 1) argues that intra-party democracy can have positive consequences as well as adverse effects, depending on the political context. However, as these scholars have not specified the circumstances, we will make one basic hypothesis: when democracy is not in place, some vanguard parties are needed, but when democracy is formally established, democratic parties are needed.

In other words, in line with Schattsneider, Duverger and others, we will make the hypothesis that non-democratic parties might be needed in the context of democratization. In a situation where an opposition fights for the establishment of democratic politics and procedures (like institutional checks and balances, rule of law, free and fair elections) against the vested interests and resistance of entrenched ruling elites, parties with an authoritarian or oligarchic style of party leadership might be needed.

By contrast, and in line with ‘participatory democracy’ theory and the ‘school of democracy’ argument, more inclusive and internally democratic political parties are needed in the context of democratic consolidation. When democracy is formally established, when elections are free and fair and their results generally respected, internal party democracy is needed for the development of a broader democratic culture.

This point is important. Authoritarian parties might well be needed to defeat the ancien régime, but it is hard to be convinced that a political party which is not internally democratic will be working to establish a true democratic system and a democratic political culture, and be open to the possibility of its own electoral defeat. Internal party democracy and open and democratic leadership elections, on the other hand, will make it less likely that the party leadership will be preoccupied with holding on to their recently acquired power positions (Scarrow, 2005: 4) and the personal benefits that come with it.

The elements of internal party democracy

Political parties have over the last two decades become subject to more legal regulation and state supervision. In many developed countries, funding regimes have become stricter and accounting regulations more rigorous. Ceilings are introduced on campaign donations and spending, and sometimes requirements are made as to how parties should be organized (Gauja, 2008: 244).

This also takes place in some countries throughout the developing world, due to transnational learning as well as donor assistance and pressure. More developing countries are introducing and strengthening laws on political parties, regulating party and candidate registration, party funding and campaign spending. However, state regulation on internal party organization, internal party democracy and leadership selection remains very weak in most developing countries.

In the real world, internal party democracy ranges from the most centralized political parties, where the party president has the final say, to the most decentralized political parties, where the national party organization only has a coordinating role. Within this continuum, three areas of decision-making are identified, on which it is possible to measure the degree of internal party democracy: leadership and candidate selection (or election), policy selection and formulation, and coalition formation (Croissant and Chambers, 2010: 195–197; see also Scarrow, 2005: 7–11). In all three areas, the question is on inclusiveness and on the extent of formalization and institutionalization.

Leadership selection is the process of selecting or electing candidates for party office and public office (nomination for general elections). This raises a number of questions, as outlined by Croissant and Chambers (2010: 197): who can nominate, who can be elected, and who can elect? Do internal rules, regulations and procedures exist, and are these rules obeyed? At what level of territorial and organizational structure are the nominations, candidates and electors chosen? Are there any functional criteria, group quotas or veto powers?

In addition, one can ask about policy selection and coalition formation. The question is again about inclusiveness and centralization. What role do party elites, party members and/or ‘militants’ and supporters play in setting party policies? At which levels do they participate in drafting party programmes and setting party positions? How and when can a party form coalitions and alliances with other parties? Are party leaders obliged by party regulations to seek the approval of the party members or party substructures before entering into coalitions?

Coalition selection is increasingly important in Bangladesh, where the parties are coalescing into two blocks. However, we have chosen to analyse leadership selection, as intra-party democratization is, first of all, about broadening the inclusiveness of leadership selection, in Bangladesh and beyond.

Dynasties in South Asia

Political dynasties are common in most of South Asia, with the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty of the Indian Congress Party the best known. Yet Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal have also had their share of dynastic politics, with the Bhutto clan, Bandernaike’s children and the Koirala family, respectively, running political parties over several decades. According to Tariq Ali, a leading figure of the international left since the 1960s, even reluctant ‘heirs’ like Rahul Gandhi are ‘dragged along and promoted’ because ‘this is the only way they feel they can stay in power because their policies are indistinguishable from all other parties in the country’ (Saxena, 2012).

In India, the Congress Party and a ‘whole slew of regional parties’ are dynastic, with the top leadership coming from within a family (Chhibber, 2013: 277). Despite, or rather due to, the growth of dynastic parties at the regional level, the Congress Party and its Nehru-Gandhi dynasty are in serious trouble. In the 2012 elections for the Uttar Pradesh legislative assembly, the state from which the party ‘rose as the beacon of freedom before independence from Britain in 1947’, the party ‘won only a miserable fourth place’ (Chalmers and Gopalakrishnan, 2012). The Gandhi dynasty may never rule India again with a clear Congress majority in the national parliament.

In Pakistan, family-based politics remain as one of the main features of the political system (Rais, 2009). Pakistan’s leading political parties are dynastic, each with national ambitions and a provincial stronghold. The Pakistan People’s Party is the party of the Bhutto family (the chairman of the party is now 24-year-old Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of President Asif Ali Zardari and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto); the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz is controlled by the Sharif clan; and the Awami National Party is the party of the Wali Khan family (Lieven, 2011: 57). One exception is the emerging Pakistan Movement for Justice party, which claims to be internally democratic and not corrupt, led by Imran Khan, a charismatic ex-captain of the national cricket team.

Observers and analysts generally refer to feudal culture and family- and caste-based politics to explain political instability, confrontation and the failure of democracy in Pakistan (Rais, 2009). The parties are like family businesses. Coalitions are based on political convenience rather than ideology or policy compatibility. Like in Bangladesh, the main weaknesses are the absence of a democratic culture within the political parties, along with military interventions that have disrupted civilian rule and caused the decay of institutions and the political process.

Dynasties in Bangladesh

Villagers in Bangladesh seem to value their dynasties: they value politicians who can ensure a continuous flow of patronage from above. They prefer leaders with personal qualities like education, wealth and generosity, and when asked they explain that ‘ordinary people do not make good political leaders’ (Ruud, 2011: 67–68). Dynasty is an efficient branding, mobilization and vote-winning method in a country where party programmes are vague and actual policies are moving into the populist middle.

Political parties in Bangladesh are neither totally autocratic nor fully democratic, but incorporate elements of autocracy, oligarchy (dynasty) and democracy, like in most of South Asia (International IDEA, 2007: 89). Like Pakistan, Bangladesh has seen a seesawing political history, with democratic experiments being aborted by military coups several times since independence. The last military dictator handed over power to a non-party caretaker government (NCG) in 1990, which subsequently organized parliamentary elections (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012: 6).

Formal, multiparty democracy and the parliamentary system were thus restored in Bangladesh with the elections of 1991. These were deemed free and fair and coincided with democratization in large number of other countries, in what has been called the ‘third wave of democracy’. Since then, the two main parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), have dominated politics, won every other election and ruled one after the other. And both parties are unquestionably dynastic.

That is, Bangladesh had an interlude in 2007–2008 with a military-backed caretaker government that made several political reforms and attempted to ‘clean up politics’. It strengthened the election commission and tried to reduce election-related expenses and violence. But one core reform element failed, namely its attempt to remove the dynasties and introduce intra-party democracy by ousting the two party leaders (popularly nicknamed the ‘minus-two formula’). The leaders of the AL and BNP demonstrated control of their respective parties and remained in charge when elections were held again in 2008 (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012: 13).

Dynasties and alliances

The AL is a centre-left, secular party, the ‘heritage party’ and a former socialist party, advocating nationalism, democracy, secularism and socialism (described as social justice and a society free from exploitation) (Awami League, n.d.: 1).

Sheikh Hasina has led the AL since 1981. She was one of the surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the ‘father of the nation’ and Bangladesh’s first president, who was assassinated in 1975. Sheikh Hasina was the prime minister from 1996 to 2001 and again today. During her first premiership, in particular, the family established itself as a ruling dynasty, building up a political base in government and administration and expanding its economic power.

Sheikh Hasina’s uncle by marriage, Zillur Rahman, served as the AL’s general secretary for many years. He was also the president of Bangladesh from 2009 until he died early 2013. His son Nazmul Hasan Papon is an AL member of parliament. A couple of other cousins also play important roles in the party, like Abul Hasnat Abdullah, member of the working committee, and Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim, member of the presidium, MP and former minister.

Hasina’s younger sister, Sheikh Rehana Siddiq, is an informal ‘advisor’, confidant and companion on state visits and functions, but Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Ahmed Wazed (Joy), now seems to be the one groomed to take over, although he lives in the US. Joy joined the party in 2010 (as ‘primary member’) (Joy joins politics, 2010), and he is a ‘special advisor’ to the party president (his mother). He has recently also taken part in international visits and political rallies and mass meetings in Bangladesh, along with his mother (Joy to travel around the country, 2013; Tusher, 2013b).

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party is a nationalist, centre-right political party, opposing communism and socialism and promoting free market policies. It has grown distinctly more religious; it is actively voicing the Islamic consciousness of the Muslim majority of Bangladesh, and it is allied to distinctly Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islami Oikya Jote.

Khaleda Zia has led the BNP since 1983. She is the widow of military ruler Ziaur Rahman (‘Zia’, with no family relation to the Rahmans of the AL), who established the party in 1978 in an attempt to civilianize his rule. Zia was murdered in 1981, and Khaleda, ‘much like her rival Sheikh Hasina’, consolidated her control of the party ‘by banning all major decisions taken in her absence and making it impossible to remove her as its chief’ (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2012: 9).

Khaleda’s son Tarique Rahman was made senior vice chairperson in 2002 and effectively his mother’s successor (‘in response to rising demand from ranks and files of the party’, according to his web page). Tarique now figures on placards and posters with his mother and deceased father, and a personality cult is being nurtured in rallies, on placards and with his web pages (www.tariquerahman.net and http://tariquerahmanfanclub.webs.com) and blogs, where he is presented as ‘our next Prime Minister’.

Included in the political/business family were also Khaleda’s sister Khurshid Jahan Haque, former MP and minister (deceased 2006), and her brother Sayeed Eskandar, former vice chairman of BNP and MP (deceased 2012). Tarique’s younger brother Arafat Rahman is a businessman, sentenced in court in 2011 in absentia for corruption and money smuggling during his mother’s 2001–2006 premiership.

Dynastic succession is thus secured within the BNP. Likewise, the same trend seems to be developing within the AL, if Hasina’s son takes up the challenge. At the same time, the AL/Mujib dynasty is larger, extended with family members occupying a greater number of government, party and business positions.

Beyond the two major parties, there are two other relatively important parties, but these are not dynastic. The third largest party, the Jatiya Party, was established by former military dictator Hussain Mohammad Ershad in 1984 in an attempt to civilianize his rule, and it is still in business, allied to the AL, and is still led by Ershad, now an octogenarian MP. In the last elections it secured 27 MPs, but the party has split several times and is in terminal decline. Without a clear successor, the party is more personal authoritarian than dynastic.

The fourth largest party is the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JIB), a conservative but pragmatic Islamist party with links back to Muslim organizations of the colonial period. Jamaat is the BNP’s largest alliance partner, although the BNP seeks to distance itself from it as some Jamaat leaders have been convicted for ‘crimes against humanity’ in the belated Bangladeshi war trials, and because the party harbours radical ideas like the application of Sharia Law and (old) sympathies towards Pakistan. Driven by Islam, Jamaat (along with the communist party and some other small parties) is more based on ideology than dynasty.

Of the remaining parties with parliamentary representation, three are allied with the AL in the Grand Alliance and two are allied to the BNP in the 18-Party Alliance. In addition, four independents later joined the alliances. This means that although there are eight parties in Bangladesh with representation in parliament – and most of these are not dynastic – none of them operate outside the two blocks or are independent of the influence of the two dynasties. The two leading parties are favoured by the ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) electoral system – a system that makes other parties gravitate towards two distinct party coalitions (blocks) (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012: 12) – and by a constitutional provision (the famous Article 70) banning floor-crossing, thus making all MPs follow the party leadership in every vote, including the alliance partners that tend to vote along the same line.

So, from 1991 onwards, voters in Bangladesh have been presented with two choices: one alliance led by the AL and the Mujib dynasty and another by the BNP and the Zia dynasty.

Legal provisions

Bangladesh has no provision for public funding of political parties, maintains weak regulations for party funding and campaign spending, and has no legal provision or state regulation of internal party organization or leadership selection. Political parties are referred to only a few times in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (1972, with later amendments), in the Representation of the People Order (1972, that establishes the election system and the election commission) and in the Electoral Rolls Ordinance (1982, that deals with voter registration).

However, all political parties must register with the Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC), and the BEC-promoted Code of Conduct for political parties – along with a noticeable pressure from the BEC under the last military-backed and reformist NCG (2006–2008) – presents the parties with a number of requirements (Hussain, 2012: 83–84; International IDEA, 2007: 78). The more important provisions include the disclosure of candidate and campaign spending and transparency in finances and fundraising. Beyond these financial requirements, there are ‘recommendations’ for a 33 per cent quota for women in all party bodies and internal decision-making through regular party elections.

The latter recommendations are not compulsory, as they have never been promulgated into law (despite promises by political parties that they would be). Besides, the election commission’s sanctions on violations are toothless and negligible (a fact confirmed by various observers, including a former election commissioner). In practice, the political parties have been ignoring many of them; for a while some of the larger parties even ignored the legal requirement that parties had to be registered with the commission. There is not much talk about the 33 per cent representation of women and no more pressure for regular internal party elections. The entire reform agenda seems to have come to a halt.

Leadership selection

Internal party democracy requires an open and inclusive process of selecting candidates for party and public offices. In Bangladesh, party leaders are to be elected at regular party conventions or conferences, according to the procedure laid down in the party by-laws. In the case of both AL and BNP, however, leadership election, including the selection of the party leader, is conducted beforehand and only approved by the convention as a mere formality.

In formal terms, the AL party president and general secretary are elected by the tri-annual party convention, called the council, which is the party’s supreme body. The council is composed of 3000–4000 district representatives, including the president, general secretary and up to 25 party members from the party’s 74 district bodies. Then, for the selection of the other party bodies, the tri-annual council elects the majority of the members whereas the party president nominates a certain number.

However, opposition officials and independent observers, as well as two AL officials (a MP and an executive committee member) we spoke with, made the claim that in reality, the party leader is elected at the party convention only through a formal approval of a single candidate. Although possible alternatives are discussed behind closed doors prior to the convention, our sources indicated that elections for the party president (and general secretary) are always devoid of alternative candidates. The leadership issue has always been settled informally before being formally endorsed by the council (by acclamation).

Moreover, the members of the presidium, executive and advisory committees are for all practical purposes chosen by the party president (International IDEA, 2007: 93). The council authorizes the party president to nominate all members, in ‘consultation with’ other office holders. This applies to the 15-member presidium (the daily executive body), the 71-member executive committee (the central committee which meets monthly) and the 34-member advisory committee (an advisory body that also includes non-party members and meets about every three months).

If there are factions in the party at the level below the leader, which is rather common, the party president will ensure that people from the various factions are drawn into the executive bodies (International IDEA, 2007: 92; interview sources). It is reported, however, that the latest changes in the AL executive committee did not include the known reformists, despite hectic lobbying (Tusher, 2013a).

Thus, there is no real democracy in party leadership selection within the AL. Although the outgoing presidium formally functions as a nomination committee (it presents the candidates), the wide-ranging nomination powers given to the party leader means that the real bargaining between factions and brokering over positions takes place mainly before and after the tri-annual party council.

When it comes to nominating the party’s candidates for parliamentary elections, the AL is, like some other parties (including the BNP), increasingly ‘selling’ nominations. ‘You can now buy yourself a MP nomination the same way as you buy an air ticket to Singapore: pay up and off you go!’ said a Bangladeshi MP when referring to this practice (Amundsen, 2014).

The fact that people can ‘buy’ parliamentary positions is also described in another study: ‘Money raised by an application fee from aspiring candidates for party tickets could also be substantial during an election year’ (International IDEA, 2007: 101–102). ‘The Bangladesh Awami League reported most of its income by this method. In the 2001 elections it could gather a substantial sum of 24 million BDT (c. 430,000 USD)’ (International IDEA, 2007: fn23). The applications are then scrutinized by a core group of leaders of various party organs but the final nominations are made by the party president, ‘in consultations with the executive committee and the parliamentary group’, according to our interview sources.

In the BNP, the president (here called chairperson), senior vice chairperson and the general secretary are formally elected by the party convention (council), in a process similar to that in the AL. But in reality the BNP system is even more centralized and informal, as confirmed by both BNP officials and others in our interviews. For one thing, the three annual council meetings have not been held regularly (between 1993 and 2009 there was a 16-year lapse, and the 2012 council has yet to be held), and there are no proper records of the meetings.

Furthermore, in the BNP, the 15 members of the standing committee and the 34 members of the advisory council are all appointed by the chairperson. The approximately 250 executive committee members are elected among the council representatives, in formal terms by the council but in reality by the party chairperson. Concerning the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections, BNP candidates are (like AL candidates) selected by the top party leaders, according to their applications, ‘fees’ and in ‘consultations’ with the party leadership, although the chairperson has the final say. These are facts confirmed by the independent observers as well as the BNP officials (standing committee members and MPs) we have interviewed.

The third largest party, the Jatiya Party (National Party) has a distinctly ‘dictatorial’ style: the JP founder Ershad declared himself party chairman for life in 2009, he appoints all posts, the central committee works under his direction and he dominates the decision-making process. According to Article 39 of JP’s constitution, the party chairman has the power to form, suspend or abolish committees at all levels, under the condition that he consults with the members of the presidium (according to our interview sources; see also the JP Constitution, n.d.).

In contrast to the formal and informal ‘single man’ dictatorship in the JP, the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami seems to be well organized, guided by principle rather than person and thus more internally democratic, according to our interview sources. The party was quick to register with the BEC, has held regular party meetings and congresses and recently adapted its constitution to adhere to BEC regulations and the country’s constitution (the party changed the section on ‘establishing the rule of Allah’ to ‘establishing a fair and just Islamic society’, and it now allows non-Muslims to be members) (ICG, 2012: 10; Jamaat drops ‘rule of Allah’ from charter, 2012).

Jamaat is headed by a leader who is elected by the central council (the Rokon) for three-year terms in a direct and secret ballot with alternative candidates. However, the party leader (Motiur Rahman Nizami) has been re-elected continuously since 2001, which may indicate rather strong leadership behind a democratic façade.

Programme formulation and coalition making

All over South Asia, including Bangladesh, policies, programmes and election manifestos of parties are generally worked out by the top party leadership. Party programmes are discussed in the highest decision-making bodies before they are made public or presented before the party conventions for approval (which means, usually, an unanimous approval without any substantial discussion or changes made) (International IDEA, 2007: 96). The daily policy decisions are mostly made by the party president in consultation with an informal group of party officials and advisors. According to our interview sources, there are few policy issues of any significance being discussed in formal terms in the various party organs.

Regarding coalition making, decisions are taken at an even higher and more informal decision-making level. According to our sources, the question of whether this or that party should join this or that party coalition is decided by the party leadership (party president and close advisors), although consultations are made in an informal way with party dignitaries and factions, and the formal decision is made by the presidium. There is no formal endorsement by the national convention or council, and there is no written agreement on terms and conditions. This is due to the heavy horse-trading involved, as party coalitions in Bangladesh entail in practical terms that the parties of a coalition are not presenting competing candidates in any constituency. It is the sheer weight of the candidates and parties in terms of popular following and vote-winning possibilities that counts.

Local party democracy

At the local level there is a certain degree of democratic procedure in electing committee chairmen and secretaries, as the constitutions of all four parties provide for the election of leaders at the sub-national level. This might indicate a certain ‘school of democracy’ at the local level. But are the political parties educating and coaching people in democratic values, principles and procedures?

The AL constitution provides for election of leaders at the district, ‘upazila’ (subdistrict), municipal and metropolitan level in local triennial meetings (called councils), although it does not specify the election process at the grassroots level, i.e. the union, ward and village levels. In practice, members of the local committees are usually not elected in local council meetings through secret voting, but selected from above by the national level leadership and ‘elected’ by acclamation in the meetings, according to independent observers as well as AL officials. Besides, council meetings are rarely held and many committees continue for years beyond the expiry of their terms.

In two district and two upazila committees that we randomly selected for scrutiny, we found that one AL district committee was formed partly through election by secret ballot and partly through selection. That is, eight senior positions, including the president and secretary, were elected through secret ballot, and this eight-member committee then selected the remaining positions. In the other district, the committee was formed in 2002 through acclamation in an open council endorsing the party leadership’s choices. Moreover, the two district committees were formed in 2003 and 2002, respectively, and were still operating. In the two upazilas, the committees, which are still operating, were elected in 2004 and 2009, respectively, by acclamation of the leadership’s nominees.

In contrast to the AL, the BNP constitution stipulates election of members of all committees from the district down to the union and ward levels through local, biennial meetings. However, as with the AL, local party committees are often not elected but selected by the party leadership and ‘elected’ by acclamation locally. In the BNP, local council meetings are even more sporadic than within the AL. In the two districts selected for scrutiny, we found that one committee was formed on an ad hoc basis in 2003 and another in 2010, and that the members of both were selected by national-level leaders. Similarly, the two upazila committees were nominated from above in 2009.

The constitutions of Jatiya and Jamaat also provide for election of committee members from the district level down to unions and wards. Nevertheless, in the two districts and upazilas we examined, the party president of JP had simply selected the local party committees, after consultations with local leaders. In Jamaat, however, the local leaders of the two district and upazila committees had been elected through secret ballot, in 2011, in line with the party constitution. In Jamaat, all party members can vote and can be candidates, and the candidates are elected by simple majority.

In sum, of the four parties we looked at, only Jamaat follows the practice of leadership selection by party members locally and through secret voting. The AL has a mixed practice of election through secret ballot and election by acclamation of candidates presented by the party leadership. The BNP and the JP were the worst performers; in the BNP all local committees examined were selected by the party leadership and in the JP by the party president. Consequently, the level of local, internal party democracy is underdeveloped in Bangladesh, and local party organs can hardly be said to fulfil the role of a ‘school of democracy’.

Instead of regularized politics, the parties in Bangladesh (in government and opposition alike) frequently call for ‘hartals’. Hartals are a form of mass protest, which includes public agitation, street manifestations, road blockages, stone throwing and varying degrees of civil disobedience. Hartals can muster millions of protesters throughout the country and shut it down for a day or two. Hartals illustrate the party leaders’ influence on the political agenda and their ability to mobilize the masses. This happens, however, in a way that is not nurturing a democratic culture but rather confrontation and violence.

Confrontational politics

There is a distinctly confrontational political climate in Bangladesh. Politics is perceived as a zero-sum game in a ‘winner-takes-all’ system, in which the ruling party dynasty (no matter which) has always used the incumbency advantage to the full and strived to establish hegemonic control over the political agenda and over the use of public resources. One writer argued that the confrontational politics is a manifestation of the undemocratic (feudal) political culture in which each party seeks to monopolize state power as if the other party does not have the right to exist (Hossain, 2000: 509).

Politics has to some extent become a battle of family vendettas, with the two leading ladies and their families, friends and supporters cultivating two opposite and incompatible narratives about the history of the liberation war, international relations, religion and society. Each is demonizing the other for being erratic, hegemonic, corrupt and dictatorial.

This explains the frequent ‘hartals’ and the prolonged boycotts of the parliament. In fact, the opposition lawmakers (no matter the party) have boycotted roughly half the parliamentary sittings over the last 20 years (Jahan and Amundsen, 2012: 63). The current opposition has boycotted the incumbent parliament since its formation.

The confrontational climate may indicate a basic struggle for the establishment of democracy, which could, perhaps, legitimize the oligarchic leadership style within the parties. The two party leaders repeatedly claim that this is what is going on, and the deepest political disagreements are about the basic rules of democratic procedure, in particular the modalities of the next elections. A core question is whether elections are to be held under a caretaker government or an electoral commission. The current AL government in 2011 abolished the constitutional provision for caretaker governments, but the BNP wants to return to the caretaker system, fearing an election commission will not be independent. This is an important element of the current deadlock situation in which the BNP boycotts the parliament and threatens to boycott the next elections.

But the political parties of Bangladesh are not engaged in a struggle for the establishment of democracy. The military dictators of Bangladesh are gone (even when they could return relatively easily), and since 1991, two governments have stepped down following electoral defeat, and elections are deemed relatively free and fair. Thus, it seems that Bangladeshi politics is more of a struggle for hegemony through electoral means, in a strong ‘winner-takes-all’ political system, than it is a struggle for establishing democracy in the first place. This can also be seen from the fact that political reform is hardly on the agenda; the parties are not fighting for democratic reforms that can restrict executive power and reduce dynastic influence, neither in the polity nor within the parties.

Conclusions

Bangladesh’s two leading political parties are clearly dynastic, led by the daughter and the widow of former presidents. The BNP has appointed a successor from within the family, and the AL is about to do the same. The reason for this strong dynastic inclination is, first of all, that the families themselves are holding onto power within the party, and because the various party factions prefer an undisputed leadership. Furthermore, dynastic politics is an efficient branding and vote-winning method in a country where party programmes are vague and people seem to prefer the ‘influential families’ when voting.

One of the consequences of the prevalent practice of dynastic rule in Bangladesh is the continuation of a confrontational political climate, with two families in a dead-lock battle. Another consequence of dynastic politics is the low degree of internal party democracy. We have seen that the party leaders have been ruling their parties for more than 30 years, and how they have been re-elected without contestation. Internal party democracy in terms of top leadership election is not open for democratic procedure, and vital decision-making in terms of programme formulation and alliance building is the exclusive right of the party leader and the inner circle. In Bangladesh, not even electoral defeat challenges the position of the party leader.

From the Bangladeshi experience, then, it does not seem that dynastic parties can be democratic. Here, the inherent contradiction between dynasty and democracy is spelled out to the advantage of the former; dynasty is protected from democratic infringements.

Although the political dynasties are a hindrance to intra-party democracy in Bangladesh, dynastic parties in other countries can still, theoretically, be democratic. But that possibility is reduced when adding the experience of India and Pakistan to the present findings.

Now, are the political parties of Bangladesh engaged in a struggle for the establishment of democracy, which can legitimize the oligarchic party leadership styles? The two parties and the two party leaders repeatedly claim they are, and the deepest political disagreements are about the basic rules for democratic procedures, in particular the modalities of the next elections. But the parties in Bangladesh are not struggling to establish democracy: recent governments have stepped down and relatively fair elections have been held. This, paired with the fact that parties are not fighting for democratic reforms that can restrict executive power and reduce dynastic influences suggests that Bangladeshi politics is more of a struggle for hegemony through electoral means, in a strong ‘winner-takes-all’ political system.

In terms of intra-party democracy, it could be that party fragmentation would become worse with greater internal party democracy. However, the most devastating fragmentation has taken place within the Jatiya party, the most authoritarian political party in Bangladesh. It could also be that internal party democracy might weaken the parties’ policy-making power, but it seems that dynastic efficiency is invested more in protecting family interests and in scorning the other party than in promoting democratic values.

In sum, Bangladesh is not in the early stages of democratization; it is not in a situation of political parties fighting for democracy against an entrenched undemocratic regime. Consequently, the arguments for an authoritarian and oligarchic style of party leadership in Bangladesh are weak. Rather, the Bangladesh experience supports the rationale for internal party democracy and the normative ‘school of democracy’ argument. Bangladesh needs political parties that can engage, educate and coach people in democratic values, principles and procedures (rather than in endless political squabbles and confrontations), and Bangladesh needs inclusive politics and party-internal democratic procedures that can produce more legitimate and efficient policy programmes, give a broader social representation and restrict the vested interests of the party leaderships. Bangladesh needs political parties that can contribute to the establishment of a democratic culture by being themselves internally democratic.